Running head: PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
Understanding the Psychology of Combat in the Law of War
Jacob S. Burns
Weber State University
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PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
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Table of Contents
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………….3
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...……4
Section 1……………………………………………………………………………………...….4
Section 2…………………………………………………………………………………………9
Section 3………………………………………………………………………………………..14
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………..19
Appendix A…………………………………………………………………………………….20
Appendix B…………………………………………………………………………………….22
Appendix C…………………………………………………………………………………….23
References……………………………………………………………………………………...25
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
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Abstract
This paper presents information to facilitate the understanding of the psychology of engaging
an enemy in combat, in accordance with the rules of engagement (ROE) to uphold the laws and
regulations of war. I will specifically discuss the psychology of engaging an enemy in armed
conflict, to include: training and preparing for war, how a person can kill, and any
repercussions that occur from their conflict. I will incorporate this into what rules of
engagement are, how they play into the laws of war, and their specific importance. The history
of the law of war, its regulation, and punishments affixed will be included. It is also important
to discuss the roles of authority and obedience within the topic, and this too shall be
accomplished.
Keywords: rules of engagement
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Understanding the Psychology of Combat in the Law of War
Introduction
This paper will delve into understanding the psychology of engaging an enemy in
combat in accordance with the rules of engagement while upholding the laws and regulations
of war. The purpose for this project is to better inform and teach junior cadets in Weber State
University’s Army ROTC program about the psychology of combat in relation to the law of
war. Doing this will help them prepare for their roles as United States Army officers. In order
to fully cover this subject I plan to discuss it in three sections. The first section will be about
the psychology of combat. This section will include: the physiological response to the stress of
combat, and how our mind reacts; the effect of training in preparing soldiers for combat; the
role that proximity plays in engaging an enemy; how a person can end another’s life; and
finally, the residual effects that combat leaves on people. The second section of this paper will
go over the law of war: to include its history, how it is regulated and punishments associated
with it, and how rules of engagement help to uphold the law of war. The third and final section
of this paper will incorporate information from the first two sections and will focus on
authority and obedience in relation to this topic.
Section 1
“The starting point for the understanding of war is the understanding of human nature”
(Marshall, 1947). Combat has been deemed as something that is not for the faint hearted. It is
dangerous, stressful, and tough. There are atrocities that are committed more often than they
should be. How a person reacts to this harsh environment is subjective to each individual.
However, many studies reveal how individuals may react to these situations. Particularly I will
focus on how the mind reacts to combat.
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Combat is undoubtedly one of the more stressful environments that a person can face.
Stress results from a reaction to a stimulus, which most commonly results from the
environment that a person is in. A person’s body responds to stress through the sympathetic
nervous system and activation of the fight-or-flight response, which is part of the autonomic
nervous system or “ANS”. This is an automatic reaction that the body goes through to increase
survival. Although it was originally noticed in animals, humans have been found to react in
similar ways as they had to make a decision of what to do when encountering a perceived
threat or dangerous situation. The hypothalamus delivers this perception to the nervous system
and in turn, the secretion of hormones begins: specifically, epinephrine, norepinephrine, and
cortisol (Olpin). Once these hormones have been secreted the body is then enabled to have
more speed, strength, and power than it usually does. Having this physical boost prepares the
body to react to a stressor, such as combat, by enabling an individual to fight back or flee the
situation. The hyperarousal that takes place in the fight-or-flight response has also been known
to produce an alternate response. This third response is to “freeze”. This is could be described
as someone completely locking up and freezing.
To add on to the theory of the fight-or-flight-or-freeze response, Lt. Col. Dave
Grossman added other responses that are commonly seen. Specifically when people are forced
to react in a combative environment where there is possible physical harm from an enemy
combatant. He theorized that there are four possible responses: fight, flight, posture or submit
(Grossman, 2009). The fight-or-flight responses are the same as before but “posture” is the
response that is commonly displayed in combat where soldiers act or pretend that they are
fighting back but in reality are missing the enemy on purpose as to not kill another person
(Grossman, 2009). There are many examples throughout history of posturing from the Civil
War through both World Wars and up to the Vietnam War. Many accounts claim that there
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were a very low percentage of soldiers who actually fired their weapons at the enemy in World
War II (Marshall, 1947), and if they did, they were posturing. Upon further investigation, the
actual percentage of posturing soldiers has been disputed by many scholars, but it still remains
as an available and very possible response to conflict (Grossman, 2009).
The response to “submit” to an enemy force or combative situation is more commonly
viewed as surrender. “Submission is a surprisingly common response, usually taking the form
of fawning and exposing some vulnerable portion of the anatomy to the victor, in the
instinctive knowledge that the opponent will not kill or further harm one of its own kind once it
has surrendered (Grossman, 2009).” Although the posturing and submitting of soldiers has
diminished more recently with modern training, which will be discussed in more detail later in
this paper, it is still an available response.
In sporting events coaches will have players on their teams “practice like they play”.
Similarly in the military commanders would have their soldiers “train like they fight, and fight
like they train.” Regardless of what you are trying to improve, the amount of success improves
with practice. And so it is natural for soldiers to continuously drill and train to improve and
learn their duties. Learning is defined as “a systematic, relatively permanent change in
behavior that occurs through experience” (King, 2013). Although the military uses many forms
of training to help individuals learn, much training is completed with the use of associative
learning which “occurs when we make a connection, or an association, between two events”
(King, 2013). To learn specific associations between events is where conditioning takes place.
“One of the most powerful examples of the military’s success in developing conditioned
reflexes through drill can be found in John Masters’s The Road Past Mandalay, where he
relates the actions of a machine-gun team in combat during World War II:
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The No. 1 [gunner] was 17 years old – I knew him. His No. 2 [assistant gunner] lay on
the left side, beside him, his head toward the enemy, a loaded magazine in his hand
ready to whip onto the gun the moment the No. 1 said “Change!” The No. 1 started
firing, and a Japanese machine gun engaged them at close range. The No. 1 got the first
burst through the face and neck, which killed him instantly. But he did not die where he
lay, behind the gun. He rolled over to tap his No. 2 on the shoulder in the signal that
means Take over. The No. 2 did not have to push the corpse away from the gun. It was
already clear.
The “take over” signal was drilled into the gunner to ensure that his vital weapon was never
left unmanned should he ever have to leave (Grossman, 2009).” The conditioning that took
place for this gunner team in World War II shaped both their conscious and unconscious
actions. In learning there are two types of conditioning; classical and operant, both of which
are used in training soldiers. Operant conditioning or instrumental conditioning is defined as “a
form of associative learning in which the consequences of a behavior change the probability of
the behaviors occurrence” (King, 2013). I believe that operant conditioning is used more
heavily as it relies on rewards and punishments and better explains voluntary behaviors.
Military training is packed full of rewards and punishments, whether they are real or imagined.
The power of consequence in determining behavior is an essential characteristic in operant
conditioning for military training, specifically for combat.
In every time period, soldiers have been trained and retrained. In the Civil War soldiers
were trained to load their weapons and shoot as fast as possible in order to cause more
causalities to their opponents (Grossman, 2009). However, shooting accuracy and target
practice was not implemented in training regimes until the end of the 1800s and start of the
1900s (Emerson, 2004). With the development of better weapon systems there had to be better
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training to have success. Marksmanship and target practice became a high priority. Initially
targets used in training had a bull’s-eye centered on them. Studies indicated that a low percent
of soldiers would actually fire their weapons at the enemy (Marshall, 1947). Initiatives were
made to change the standard of marksmanship and the customary targets were changed from
the bull’s-eye to a silhouette of another person (Williams, 1994). This change in training was
made to better prepare and condition soldiers to engage the enemy. The voluntary behavior of
shooting a person in real life has become much easier for soldiers with the changes in training.
The proximity in which an individual engages the enemy is an important factor in the
effect of combat on an individual. Not only does the physical distance of the enemy matter in
engagements but so does the emotional distance. As the distance from the enemy increases, the
resistance to kill them functions inversely by decreasing (Grossman, 2009). In looking at the
spectrum of distance killing on one end there is bombing (from aircraft, ships, artillery, etc.)
where there is no interaction with the enemy. On the other end of the spectrum there is killing
in hand to hand combat. Once you have direct interaction with a person you typically have
more aversions to doing harm to them. It becomes more possible to view them as humans;
perhaps your opponent is someone’s mother or father, son or daughter, or spouse. You could
begin to empathize and sympathize with them and their situation, and see the similar positions
that you are each in. Killing then becomes much more difficult.
Combat takes its toll on soldiers and civilians alike. However, experiencing combat first
hand would be considered a traumatic event and could result negatively. “A traumatic event is
one in which individuals are exposed to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual
violation” (Comer, 2014). There are two stress disorders that are most commonly associated
with combat; acute stress disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). During World
War I it was called “combat fatigue” and during World War II and the Korean War it
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was referred to as “shell shock” (Comer, 2014). It was not until after Vietnam that these stress
disorders were identified (Comer, 2014). Symptoms for both acute stress disorder and PTSD
include: re-experiencing the traumatic event through thoughts, memories, dreams, or
flashbacks; avoidance of activities that remind of the event, or related thoughts, feelings, or
conversations; reduced responsiveness or separation from their environment, people, or loss of
interest in activities that were once enjoyed; increased arousal, negative emotions, and guilt
resulting in trouble concentrating, sleep problems, anxiety, anger, or depression (Comer, 2014).
Because the symptoms of both disorders are the same the divisor of the two is time that the
symptoms last. If they “begin immediately or soon after the traumatic event and last for less
than a month, DSM-5 (the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders)
assigns a diagnosis of acute stress disorder. If the symptoms continue longer than a month, a
diagnosis of PTSD is given” (Comer, 2014).
Section 2
International laws are intricate and can be difficult to understand. Therefore, this
section will provide an overview to increase understanding of this topic. Specifically laws of
war are both as important and complex as the laws that regulate our own society. Similar to the
origin of our governing laws, the laws of war have developed from religion, culture, policy,
traditions, and events. Some of the earliest examples of the law of war that exist may come
from the bible and other scriptures. “For example, in the Bible, Goliath suggested that a contest
between two champions would be used instead of using two armies. Thus: ‘If he be able to
fight with me, and kill me, then we will be your servants, but if I prevail against him, and kill
him, then ye shall be our servants and serve us’” (Gillespie, 2011). Although there were
traditions of what was acceptable in war, nothing was formally published about the law of war
for centuries. As it is in society, laws are made usually as the result of something that has
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
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happened or was happening which was seen to be unacceptable. Many nations did come up
with actions which they saw both as acceptable and unacceptable. However, on an international
scale, laws and treaties of war were essentially devoid until the mid-1850s when privateering
was abolished. Even then if there were international laws established, it was hard to enforce
them. Once modernization began many more laws came in to existence, most notably were the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which largely discussed what was proper in warfare in
regards to the use of weapons (Crowe, 2009).
The League of Nations can be identified as the first international organization whose
principal goal was to maintain and enforce world peace (Crowe, 2009). Established at the end
of the First World War, the League of Nations resolved some territorial disputes and minor
conflicts. One of its primary tasks was to enforce the disarmament of countries whose
militaries were getting too large (Crowe, 2009). The League failed to accomplish its goal of
world peace when World War II erupted across the globe. There were apparent improvements
that needed to be made in an international organization and so the United Nations came into
existence at the close of the Second World War to help piece the world back together. Having a
coalition of more countries helps to increase awareness and share opinions of international
matters, which is one reason why the League of Nations was unsuccessful (Crowe, 2009).
With obvious atrocities having been committed during World War II, the United
Nations established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) which conducted the Nuremburg
Trials and identified its “right to try individuals for three crimes plus conspiracy to commit
such crimes: Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity” (Crowe,
2009). These trials were perhaps the most important trials in history that established
international law of war, set a precedent for the proceedings of hearings, as well as convictions
for crimes. In the opening statement to the court in the Nuremburg Trials, Judge Jackson said:
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“The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace of the world
imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs we seek to condemn and punish have been so
calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored
because it cannot survive their being repeated” (Crowe, 2009). Those that were involved in the
proceedings understood the consequence that would result from the trials. The seven principles
established as a result of the Nuremberg Trials were to be used as guidelines in determining
what constitutes a war crime1 (International Law Commission, 1950). In 1948, the UN
outlawed genocide and broadly defined it as “any act designed to destroy, in whole or part, a
national ethnical, racial, or religious group” (Crowe, 2009).
The Nuremberg Trials were a huge step in international law and the law of war but they
were not enough. There was still a need to address the rising concern of overall humanitarian
actions of governments and militaries. The Geneva Conventions at the conclusion of World
War II in 1949 did just this (Geneva Conventions). These conventions laid out the first laws
and regulations for humanitarian treatment during war. In four separate conventions the
treatment for following were discussed in detail: the wounded and sick in armed forces in the
field; the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of armed forces at sea; prisoners of war; and rights of
civilians (Geneva Conventions, 1949; 1977; 1993; 2005). There were also additional protocols
which were introduced with time to account for changes in technology and warfare2 (Geneva
Conventions, 1949; 1977; 1993; 2005). Currently, the International Criminal Court or ICC has
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (Crowe, 2009). Military
law in the United States is enforced and punished through The Uniform Code of Military
Justice or UCMJ.
1
2
See the attached principles in Appendix A
A full list of conventions and protocols can be seen in Appendix B
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Although these laws and regulations were made in response to more recent events and
conflicts, they were long overdue. Typically when a person mentions the topic of war crimes or
genocide we are quick to remember World War II and the crimes committed by Nazi Germany.
But war crimes and genocide had been happening for centuries before that time and all around
the world (Crowe, 2009). In almost any region or country of the world, it is likely that there
have been war crimes of one type or another that have been committed. In order to help
prevent war crimes and other improper actions many countries have implemented Rules of
Engagement or ROE. “ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. [naval, ground and air] forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered” (United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 2005). There are common international ROE which are issued by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization or NATO. These ROE are typically adhered to by host nations who work
in conjunction with NATO. Other ROE are dictated by commanders of certain conflicts which
come down from the President and Secretary of Defense. Standing rules of engagement or
SROE are a base which are always applicable regardless of a specific mission. Some SROE
would incorporate self-defense (to include: the inherent right of self-defense, national selfdefense, collective self-defense, and mission accomplishment v. self-defense), hostile acts, and
hostile intent (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005). There are also mission-specific ROE
that dictate how solders may act only on a specific mission. In order to more easily apply and
remember ROE soldiers are given ‘ROE Cards’ which clearly display what soldiers are and
are not allowed to do3 (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005). ROE typically change over
time and are influenced by national political policies. For example, stricter, or more restrictive,
ROE have been implemented more in recent years as the combat has been drawn down in the
Middle East for U.S. forces. The increase in strictness can hinder soldiers in their operations by
3
An example ROE card is attached in Appendix C (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005)
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not allowing them to use force when it would be beneficial and perhaps save lives and have
mission success (Scarborough, 2013). In more recent years, ROE have complicated the jobs of
soldiers. The modern battlefields that soldiers are currently on are much more complicated than
they were in years past. Frontlines are not as easily distinguished, nor are the actual soldiers
that we face. It was apparent in the Vietnam War as well as our current conflicts in the Middle
East with our fight on terrorism.
A modern example of the applicability of ROE in preventing war crimes can be taken
from the account of Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell in his book titled ‘Lone Survivor’. This book
details his recollection of service in Afghanistan with SEAL Team 10. In the book Luttrell
describes a dilemma he and his team face during a mission. They had a mission to kill a
specific Taliban leader in the area when they were found by some goat herders. They had no
way of knowing whether or not these goat herders were regular civilians or if they were in fact
the very enemy they were fighting. The book details what his team decided to do. If by some
means of their actions they killed these goat herders, either by their own hands or by exposure
to the elements from detaining them, they would be breaking the ROE and have committed a
war crime (Luttrell, 2007). However, if they let the goat herders go free, their mission would
very well become compromised and their lives placed in immediate danger. They chose to let
the herders go, and as a consequence, Taliban forces attacked their position and many
Americans lost their lives.
In further considering combat in general there are a few important principles in the Law
of Armed Conflict or LOAC which govern actions of soldiers in the United States: military
necessity, distinction, avoid unnecessary suffering, and proportionality (United States Army,
2007). “Military necessity requires combat forces to engage in only those acts necessary to
accomplish a legitimate military objective” (Powers, 2013). This helps to limit any collateral
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damage that may take place in combat. “In applying military necessity to targeting, the rule
generally means the United States Military may target those facilities, equipment, and forces
which, if destroyed, would lead as quickly as possible to the enemy’s partial or complete
submission” (Powers, 2013). Distinction is termed to help the discrimination of civilians from
soldiers. The idea behind distinction is to only engage combative enemy soldiers. The Geneva
Conventions help to clarify what actions are appropriate for each distinct individual whether
they are a civilian, combatant, noncombatant, prisoner of war (POW), or injured or wounded
personnel. “On some contemporary battlefields, enemies may try to exploit this principle by
fighting in civilian clothes and using civilian or protected structures” (United States Army,
2007). The third principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering in the LOAC is used to help
soldiers to make the distinction in what is necessary to win the fight or save another soldier’s
life and not killing or destroying what is unnecessary (United States Army, 2007). The final
principle of proportionality is very important for soldiers and leaders to gauge the correct
response of force in a situation. “The military necessity of the target must outweigh the
collateral damage caused by the commander’s act” (United States Army, 2007). Not only is it
unacceptable but it also could have legal consequences under the UCMJ if disproportionate
force is used on a combatant.
Section 3
Having already gone over some of the psychological aspects of combat and the
background of the law of war it may be easier to make connections in the two of them.
Specifically, in this section, I would like to concentrate on the use of authority in combat.
“Authority is the delegated power to judge, act, or command. It includes responsibility,
accountability, and delegation” (United States Army, 2007). Stanley Milgram, a psychologist,
conducted many experiments about obedience to authority. He found that people as a whole are
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very willing to comply with authority figures. In his famous experiment there would be three
individuals involved: the authority figure, the participant as a teacher, and a student who was
actually a confederate, or actor, and part of the experiment. The participant was instructed by
the authority to administer an electric shock to the student if he or she had an incorrect
response to a question (although the student never actually was shocked but would just act as if
he or she was shocked). Each question wrongly answered would elicit an increasingly strong
shock from 15 volts, labeled as “slight shock,” to 450 volts, labeled as “XXX” (Kassin, Fein, &
Markus, 2011). The student and teacher could not see each other but could communicate and
hear each other. The student continually gave incorrect answers and the teacher continually
administered shocks. The student would scream and cry for the teacher to stop shocking him or
her but the authority figure would urge the teacher to continue even until the student was quiet,
perhaps dead. Sixty-five percent of all the participants administered the lethal shock of 450
volts (Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2011). In his experiments Milgram found that several factors
were influential in participants’ compliance: the authority figure, the proximity of the victim,
and the experimental procedure (Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2011). Indeed many people will
follow orders given to them without even second guessing whether they are doing something
that is morally correct. To better understand this blind obedience that people engage in we
must better understand authority powers.
Social psychologists define power as having a certain attribute which gives a person
more influence over another (Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2011). In reality there are five separate
types of authority powers; each one of these five powers of authority influence people’s
obedience. Obedience is defined as “behavior change produced by the commands of authority”
(Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2011). The first type of authority power is corrosive power, which is
defined by someone having the ability to punish another. The second is reward power, the
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opposite of corrosive power, giving a positive reinforcement. Third, is expert power, which
results from experience or education such as a professor or doctor. Fourth would be legitimate
power which would be held by someone in a position above another where they legally have
the ability to enforce something. Finally, there is referent power, which is achieved through
admiration or respect (Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2011). It is easy to see how each one of these
powers of authority are applicable to military leadership and could influence positive or
negative actions from subordinates. A few separate accounts may help to make this more easily
identified.
Having so many levels of leadership within the military there are always plenty of
chances that power and authority can be misused or misinterpreted, resulting in negative
consequences. One such case will make this clear, United States v. Calley, also known as the
“My Lai Massacre.”
As a part of the declared Tet Offensive in 1968, the United States was combating the
Viet Cong in Vietnam. First Lieutenant William L. Calley was in command of 1st platoon, C
Company of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. He was an integral part of a company
mission to eliminate hostile Viet Cong in the village of My Lai. It was expected that there
would be a strong amount of resistance in this village. Captain Medina had ordered Calley to
kill all the Viet Cong within the village, and was somewhat vague in the orders he gave. It
turned out that the village was entirely comprised of civilians, mostly elderly men, women, and
children, with no sign of the Viet Cong. Lt. Calley made the decision and ordered his platoon
to “waste them” and about 500 dead villagers were the result of this operation (Linder, 1999).
There were several of Lt. Calley’s soldiers that did not want to kill these civilians and others
that became sick from the bloodshed. Calley led by example and gave his soldiers orders to kill
the civilians. Many soldiers submitted to the orders of Calley and did as they were
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
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commanded. Others postured to act like they were following orders but they really would
intentionally miss their targets.
There is no doubt that Lt. Calley had committed war crimes in this operation and he was
accused as such. To tell the full account of these proceedings would be lengthy. In summary,
Lt. Calley gave a defense that he was merely following the orders of Captain Medina to kill
everyone in the village. Medina also faced charges but was never convicted as there was not
enough substantial evidence that he had intended the civilians to be killed (Linder, 1999). But,
Lt. Calley was eventually convicted of the atrocities that he conducted and oversaw. The court
ruled that even if he was obeying the orders of his superior commander, he was obligated to
disobey these as they were ‘illegal orders’ (Linder, 1999). Although there are many
contributing factors to the crimes of the My Lai Massacre there is no doubt that the
responsibility and influence of these crimes stem from the authority powers of the leadership.
In an attempt to prevent actions such as these the United States Army has included a section in
one of its field manuals about soldiers’ responsibilities:
“1-121. Clear, legal, unambiguous orders are a responsibility of good leadership.
Soldiers who receive illegal orders that clearly violate the Constitution, the Law of
War, or the UCMJ must understand how to react to such orders. Soldiers who receive
unclear or illegal orders must ask for clarification. Normally, the superior issuing the
unclear or illegal order will make it clear, when queried. He should state that it was not
his intent to issue an ambiguous or illegal order. If, however, the superior insists that
his illegal order be obeyed, the Soldier should request the rescinding of that order. If the
superior does not rescind, the Soldier has an affirmative legal obligation to disobey the
order and report the incident to the next superior commander” (United States Army,
2007).
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
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During the Nuremburg Trials there were Nazi war criminals who had attempted to use the same
defense of obedience. They were unsuccessful just like Lt. Calley (Crowe, 2009). The findings
in Milgram’s experiments provide support that the soldiers who were following orders did so
without questioning the authority of Calley.
“When we look at photographs of the piles of dead women and children at My Lai it
seems impossible to understand how any American could participate in such an atrocity, but it
also seems impossible to believe that sixty-five percent of Milgram’s subjects would shock
someone to death in a laboratory experiment, despite the screams and pleas of the “victim,”
merely because an unknown obedience-demanding authority told them to” (Grossman, 2009).
Looking closer to this there are several explanations to how Lt. Calley was able to have his
soldiers follow these orders. Having previously seen the horrors of combat they were already
desensitized to their own actions and the bloodshed which occurred. These soldiers had already
had a good amount of training and had seen combat. They were prepared to encounter a large
hostile force in the village. Their conditioning had already taken place and they were prepared
to kill. In addition to the desensitization and conditioning, soldiers commonly diffuse the
responsibility of their actions. The diffusion of responsibility in this sense goes into two
separate parties: the authority figure or to the group. Calley’s platoon placed the responsibility
of their actions on their leadership, whether directly above them to Lt. Calley, or all the way up
to Washington. Similarly Calley diffused his own responsibility to Captain Medina. Diffusion
of responsibility to a group is called “group absolution” (Grossman, 2009). There was a large
amount of group absolution that took place during the My Lai Massacre. For example, if there
is a group of people doing the shooting at an enemy then it is easier to participate with them
and you would be more uncertain if you are the person that actually killed someone. Therefore,
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
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the guilt that you would normally feel for your own actions is diffused to the group (maybe
your squad, platoon, company, or army in general) as a whole.
Although the My Lai Massacre was used to illustrate the point of obedience to authority
in combat, the unfortunate truth is that there are dozens of historical examples which could
make the same point.
Conclusion
Understanding the psychology of engaging an enemy in combat, in accordance with the
rules of engagement while upholding the laws and regulations of war is no easy task. Having
conducted much research to complete this project it is evident that there is a large amount of
information that could be tied into this topic. The information found in this paper serves as a
medium to support and facilitate the learning of junior cadets in Weber State University’s
Army ROTC program. Having a working knowledge of the psychology of combat, laws of
war, and rules of engagement is very important for members of the military. As this paper
provides a base, it would prove to be beneficial if more in-depth research and further
development of this topic were to be conducted. Being able to make connections in this subject
serve to produce more competent leaders of the military and members of society.
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Appendix A
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950.
Principle I
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is
responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
Principle II
The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime
under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility
under international law.
Principle III
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve
him from responsibility under international law.
Principle IV
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does
not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact
possible to him.
Principle V
Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on
the facts and law.
Principle VI
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:
(a) Crimes against peace:
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
21
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
acts mentioned under (i).
(b) War crimes:
Violations of the laws or customs of war include, but are not limited to, murder, illtreatment or deportation to slave-labour or for any other purpose of civilian population
of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against
any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when
such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connexion
with any crime against peace or any war crime.
Principle VII
Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.
@
<'I
<'I
State Parties to the Following InternationalHumanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 21-Jan-2014
ICRC
"i!
1
]
.....:l
Protection of Victims of Armed Confl cts
GC IV
Convention ()I for the Amefioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva.12 August 1949.
Convention (II) for the Amerioration of the Condition of Wounded, S
ick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Convention (Ill) re
lative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva.12 August 1949.
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Personsin Time of War.Geneva,12 August 1949.
AP 11977
Protocol Additionalto the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.and re
lating to the Protection of V.ctims of lntemationaJ Armed Conflicts. Geneva.8 June 19n.
AP I Declaration art. 90
Dec aration provided for under article 90 AP I. Acceptance of the Competence of the InternationalFact .mding Commission according to article 90 of AP I.
AP 111977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.and relating to the Protection of VICtims of Non- nternational Armed Conflicts. Geneva, 8 June
AP1112005
19n. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol Ill), 8 December
CRC 1989
2005. Convention on the Rights of the ChildNew York, 20 November 1989.
_ot PIQt. CRC 2000
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Chlid on the involvement of chidrenin armed conflicN
t ew York.25 May 2000.
ICC Statute 1998
Rome Statute of theInternationalCrim
inal Court, 17 Juty 1998.
Hague Conv.1954
Convention for the Protection of CuHural Propertyin the Event of Armed Conflict. The Hague, 14 May 1954.
-c.o
-o ....
5
C..rn
Hague Prot.1954
F rst Protocolto the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954.
Hague Prot.1999
Second Protocolto the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of CuHural Propertyin the Event of Armed Conflict. The Hague,26 March 1999.
<r:
ENMOD Conv.1976
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostlie use of environmental modification techniques, New Yod:, 10 December 1976.
Geneva Gas Prot. 1925
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiat ng,Poisonous or Other Gases.and Warfare,Geneva.17 June 1925.
BWC 1972
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpli ng of Bacteriological (Bio ogical) and Toxin Weapons and on the r
Destruction. Opened for Signature at London,Moscow and Wash ngton.10 April 1972.
CCW 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. Geneva. 10 October 1980.
CCW Prot. I 1980
Protocol on non--detectabel fragments (J ).
tij
·c
.lS
-
International CriminalCourt
Pr-otection of Cultural Property in the Event of Anned Conflc
i t
3
C..rn
e
Environment
u
"0
Q)
Weapons
.;;
c.o
Q)
u
-
CCW Prot. II 19W
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines.,booby-traps and other devices
CCW Prot. 11119W
(II). Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incend ary weapons (Ill).
r;
u
CCW Prot. IV 1995
Protocol on 86nd ng Laser Weapons (ProtocolIV to the 1980 Convention), 13 October 1995.
CCW Prot. lla 1996
Protocol on ProhlDitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (ProtocolII to the 1980
"::l
CCW Arndt 2001
Convention). Amendment to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons which may be deemed
to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscrim
inate Effects (with Protocols IIII and Ill).Geneva 21December 2001.
5
::
CCW Prot. V 2003
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons vthich may be deemed
to be Excessivety Injurious or to have Indiscrim
inate Effects (with Protocols IIII and Ill).Geneva, 28 November 2003.
8
......
ewe
1993
Convention on the Prohibition of the Deve
lopment,Production,Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.Paris 13 January 1993.
AP Mine Ban Conv.1997
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use.Stockpi ing, Production and Transfer of AntiP
. ersonnelMines and on the r Destruction,Os o,18 September 1997.
Cluster Munitions 2008
Convention on Cluster Munitions,30 May 2008
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
Appendix C
Example ROE Card from Kosovo, June 1999
Peace Enforcement: KFOR Peace Enforcement: KFOR (Kosovo, June 1999)
KFOR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR USE IN KOSOVO
SOLDIER'S CARD
To be carried at all times.
MISSION. Your mission is to assist in the implementation of and to help ensure
compliance with a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) in Kosovo.
SELF-DEFENSE.
a. You have the right to use necessary and proportional force in self-defense.
b. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself.
GENERAL RULES.
a. Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission.
b. Hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender will not be harmed. Disarm them
and turn them over to your superiors.
c. Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile forces/belligerents, humanely.
d. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
e. Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take "war trophies".
f. Prevent and report all suspected violations of the Law of Armed Conflict to superiors.
CHALLENGING AND WARNING SHOTS.
a. If the situation permits, issue a challenge:
- In English: "NATO! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!"
- Or in Serbo-Croat: "NATO! STANI ILI PUCAM!"
- (Pronounced as: "NATO! STANI ILI PUTSAM!)
- Or in Albanian: "NATO! NDAL OSE UNE DO TE QELLOJ!
- (Pronounced as: "NATO! N'DAL OSE UNE DO TE CHILLOY!)
b. If the person fails to halt, you may be authorized by the on-scene commander or by
standing orders to fire a warning shot.
FRONT SIDE
23
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
Peace Enforcement: KFOR (Kosovo, June 1999)
OPENING FIRE.
a. You may open fire only if you, friendly forces or persons or property under your
protection are threatened with deadly force. This means:
(1) You may open fire against an individual who fires or aims his weapon at, or
otherwise demonstrates an intent to imminently attack, you, friendly forces, or
Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) or property with designated
special status under your protection.
(2) You may open fire against an individual who plants, throws, or prepares to throw,
an explosive or incendiary device at, or otherwise demonstrates an intent to
imminently attack you, friendly forces, PDSS or property with designated special
status under your protection.
(3) You may open fire against an individual deliberately driving a vehicle at you,
friendly forces, or PDSS or property with designated special status.
b. You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take possession of friendly
force weapons, ammunition, or property with designated special status, and there is no
way of avoiding this.
c. You may use minimum force, including opening fire, against an individual who
unlawfully commits or is about to commit an act which endangers life, in
circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act.
MINIMUM FORCE.
a. If you have to open fire, you must:
- Fire only aimed shots; and
- Fire no more rounds than necessary; and
- Take all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy property; and
- Stop firing as soon as the situation permits.
b. You may not intentionally attack civilians, or property that is exclusively civilian or
religious in character, except if the property is being used for military purposes or
engagement is authorized by the commander.
REVERSE SIDE
24
PSYCHOLOGY OF COMBAT AND THE LAW OF WAR
25
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