Taiwan’s Constitutional Reform, Statehood Building and
Cross-strait Relations
Wen-cheng Lin
Institute of Mainland China Studies
National Sun Yat-sen University
I. Introduction
According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States, “the state as a person of international law should process the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government ;
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”1
Taiwan has a population of 23 million, a land area of 36,179 square kilometers,
and a democratic government which exercises power independently of other states in
the world.2 It is the 17th largest trading country with a foreign exchange reserve for
more than US$260 billion—the third largest in the world. No country in the world
challenges Taiwan’s capability to fulfill its international obligation.
Although Taiwan currently has only 24 diplomatic ties, most of the countries in
the world accept Taiwan as de factor independent sovereign state. Jacques deLisle
points out that Taiwan “scores high in terms of the enumerated criteria.”3 But he also
suggests that there is a fifth, unstated Montevideo criterion—the state must claim
itself a sovereign state and that Taiwan did not make the requisite assertion that it is a
state.4 Louis Henkin and his colleagues also point out that the issue of Taiwan’s
statehood did not emerge because the leaders ruling Taiwan did not claim a state. 5
1
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed at Montevideo, December 26,
1933.
2
Taiwan has transformed from authoritarianism to a full-fledged democracy in the past two decades.
According to the Freedom House, Taiwan was one of the most democratic countries in the world in
2006.
3
Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan’s Referenda, Constitutional Reform and the Question of Taiwan’s
International Status,” presented to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing
on Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Balance, February 6, 2004, at
http://www.fpri.org/transcripts/testimony.20040206.delisle.taiwan.html.
4
Ibid.
5
Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachten and Hans Smit, International Law: Cases and
1
Taiwan did not claim that it is a state until at least before 1999.
Taiwan was ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT) under the leadership of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo from 1949 to 1988, it
was regarded as a province of China, or precisely the Republic of China (ROC),
which competed with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for the legitimacy to
represent the whole China. The two Chiang’s stuck to the One China policy and
cracked down any attempts to build an independent Taiwan state. Social forces that
emerged in the late 1970s and gained great momentum in 1980s challenged the state
and pushed for democratization in Taiwan. The first real opposition party, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was established on September 28, 1986.
Martial law, which had been in place since 1949, was lifted on July 15, 1987. In
January 1989, the Law on Civic Organizations was passed to legitimize the formation
of new political parties.
Taiwanese nationalism which first emerged in the second half of 1940s resurged
in 1990s and voices for the establishment of an independent Taiwan state gained
momentum in 1990s. But Taiwan’s efforts in statehood building faced three major
challenges or obstacles:
(1) The divided national identity among Taiwan’s people;
(2) China’s opposition and military threat; and,
(3) The lack of support from the international community.
This article studies Taiwan’s constitutional reform and statehood building and
how they affect cross-strait relations.
II. Taiwan’s constitutional reform
The current constitution of the Republic of China was adopted by the National
Assembly in China on December 25, 1946 and promulgated by the government on
January 1, 1947, effective December 25, 1947. The structure of the government,
national title, sovereignty and territory in the constitution was designed to cover the
whole China.6 After the KMT lost the civil war against the Chinese Communist Party
Materials, 2nd edition (St. Paul Minnesota: West Publishing co., 1987), p. 236.
6
Article 4 of the ROC Constitution states that “the territory of the Republic of China according to its
existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by resolution of the National Assembly.” Indeed,
2
(CCP) and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the territory under the ROC’s jurisdiction was
greatly reduced. It now covers only Taiwan, Penghu Islands (Pescadores), and the
offshore islands controlled by the ROC. Most of the articles in the constitution no
longer suit the needs of Taiwan and the ROC government imposed martial law in
1949. Under martial law, the people in Taiwan were deprived of basic civil and
political rights. The constitution was not replaced by a new constitution and had not
been amended prior to 1991.
Due to economic successes in the 1970s, the socio-economic environment
became fertile for democracy to take root in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s diplomacy
encountered severe setbacks. The ROC lost the battle against the PRC in the United
Nations and was forced to leave the most important international organization in the
world on October 24, 1971. Another major blow is that the United States decided to
switch its diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC on January 1, 1979; the number
of the ROC’s diplomatic ties was reduced to 22 in that year alone.
The diplomatic setbacks endangered the ROC’s legitimacy to represent the whole
China and ruined the ruling KMT’s legitimacy to maintain martial law and one-party
rule in Taiwan. In addition, China under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, began its
economic reform policies in 1978. Many old policies of the ROC that were based on
the theme that the CCP is a rebellious group were no longer convincing. For example,
those national assemblymen and legislators, who were elected in China in 1940s and
continued to serve without reelection, lost their legitimacy and representation. The
expanding middle class and the frustrated Taiwanese people demanded political
reform. As mentioned above, the KMT government tolerated the founding of the DPP
and was forced to lift the 38-year-old martial law on July 15, 1987. In addition, the
ROC government lifted the ban and allowed its people to visit Mainland China on
December 2 in the same year.
On January 13, 1988, Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo to become the
first Taiwanese president on the island. He sped up Taiwan’s democratic reform and
made six constitutional amendments. On March 18, 2000, Mr. Chen Shui-bian, the
DPP’s presidential candidate won the elections. It was the first time in Taiwan’s
history that the pro-Taiwan independence DPP became the ruling party. DPP’s victory
has made cross-strait relations more volatile.
the Constitution does not clearly define what are the existing national boundaries. But in fact it refers to
the whole China including Outer Mongolia.
3
In May 2005, Taiwan amended its constitution again. But President Chen pointed
out that he would like to push for a new constitution. The constitutional reform is the
most important step to build an independent Taiwan state but the seven constitutional
amendments had not touched the fundamental issue to complete Taiwan’s statehood
building. As mentioned above, the ROC Constitution which was adopted in 1946 is no
longer suitable to today’s Taiwan.
First of all, it designs a government which is too big for Taiwan. The constitution
creates a four-layer government: the central government, provincial government/
special municipalities (Taipei City and Kaohsiung City), county/city, and township.
The Taiwan Provincial Government overlaps with the central government in more
than 90% of the territory and 80% of the population.
Secondly, the central government has five branches: the Executive Yuan, the
Examination Yuan, the Control Yuan, the Legislative Yuan and the National
Assembly. The function and duty of those bodies overlap.
Third, the National Assembly officially has 3,045 members and the Legislative
Yuan 773 members. They are too big for the island country which has a land area of
only 36,179 square kilometers and 23 million people. In addition, those national
assemblymen and legislators hold these seats “indefinitely” because it is impossible to
hold elections to represent constituencies in China.
Fourth, as mentioned above, the ROC government no longer had the legitimacy
to represent the whole China after it lost the China seat to the PRC in the United
Nations in 1971.
Fifth, the Constitution had become the obstacle for the government to increase
the efficiency.
There was urgent need to reform the constitution to meet the need of Taiwan and
to reflect the political reality of the ROC, but as mentioned above when Taiwan was
ruled by the two Chiangs from 1949 to 1988, no amendment was initiated. The two
Chiang’s, who stuck to the One China policy and used the ROC Constitution to
legitimize their claim that the ROC government is the sole legitimate government
representing the whole China, refused to amend the constitution. Only when social
forces emerged in the 1970s to challenge the KMT’s authoritarian rule, constitutional
reform in Taiwan finally occurred. Therefore, constitutional reform and democratic
reform in Taiwan intertwine with and support each other.
1. President Lee’s constitution reform
4
During President Lee’s rule of twelve years from 1988 to 2000, Taiwan was
transformed from an authoritarian country to a full-fledged democracy. President Lee
accelerated political reforms in the belief that democracy is the most powerful weapon
both to win international support for Taiwan and to fend off pressure from Beijing for
unification. The first step toward democracy was to build a multiparty political system.
In January 1989, the Law on Civic Organizations was passed to legitimize the
formation of new political parties. The second step was to return to the rule of the
Constitution. The third step was to amend the Constitution in order to reflect
Taiwan’s political realities.
The six constitutional amendments were very important to complete such an
important democratic transformation (see Table 1). Ten constitutional articles were
either amended or added in 1991, providing the legal basis for the comprehensive
elections of the three central representative bodies. All the senior parliamentarians,
who were elected on the Chinese mainland in 1947 or 1948 and continued without
election challenges were retired in December 1991. All of the seats in the National
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were open for public competition in 1991 and
1992, respectively.
In addition, the amendment reduced Taiwan’s jurisdiction to
cover Taiwan, Pescadores and the offshore island controlled by the ROC only and
accepted the PRC’s legitimacy to rule China.
These amendment laid the foundation for President Lee to redefine the
relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as “state to state, at least a
special state to state relationship” in an interview with the German Radio Station in
1999. The constitutional amendments in 1992 and 1994, which stipulated that “the
president and the vice president should be directly elected by the entire populace of
the free area of the ROC,” and the amendment in 1997, which froze the operation of
the Taiwan Provincial Government, helped to affirm Taiwan’s status as an
independent sovereign state.
More importantly, a new article, which states that “the president and vice
president shall be directly elected by the entire populace of the free area of the
Republic of China,” was added to the Constitution in July 1994. The first phase of
constitutional reform was completed. The milestone in Taiwan’s democratization was
the presidential election held on March 23, 1996, which was the first time in the
history of Chinese civilization that the highest position in a government was directly
elected by the people. The Republic of China on Taiwan has become a new sovereign
state based on the idea of popular sovereignty.
5
Table 1. Taiwan’s constitutional reform during President Lee’s era
Time
Key Changes
April 22, 1991
1. Added ten new articles;
2. All of the legislators and National Assemblymen shall
be elected from the areas under the ROC’s jurisdiction
in addition to a small number of seats from overseas
Chinese communities.
May 27, 1992
1. Added eight new articles;
2. The president and vice president shall be elected
directly by the people in Taiwan after 1996.
July 28, 1994
Remove the premier’s power to countersignature the
president’s appointment of top officials.
July 18, 1997
1. The president appoints the premier with the consent of
the Legislative Yuan. But the Legislative Yuan can
pass a no-confidence vote against the premier. The
president may, within ten days following passage by
the Legislative Yuan of a no-confidence vote, declare
the dissolution of the Legislative Yuan after consulting
with the president of the Legislative Yuan.
2. Freeze the operation of the Taiwan Provincial
Government.
September 3, 1999 Extended the term of the national assemblymen and the
legislators from three to four years. But the Grand Justices
announced that the amendment is unconstitutional.
Therefore, this amendment is not effective.
April 24, 2000
The National Assembly was abolished and its power
transferred to the Legislative Yuan.
(2) President Chen’s constitutional reform
Although President Chen had promised to give the people in Taiwan a new
constitution that is “timely, relevant and viable,” the constitution has only been
amended once since Chen was swore in as president on May 20, 2000. The
constitutional amendment in 2005 made the following changes:
(1) Cut the number of the Legislative Yuan from 225 to 113;
(2) Adopted a “single-district, two-ballot” legislative electoral system;
(3) Extended the terms for legislators from 3 to 4 years;
(4) Phased out the National Assembly and holding popular referendums on
future constitutional amendments; and,
(5) Empowered the Council of Grand Justices to screen presidential and
vice presidential impeachment proposal.
6
The amendment has had tremendous political impact for it has encouraged the
emergence of two-party system in Taiwan but it did not touch the issues on
sovereignty. President Chen promised to carry out a second-stage constitutional
reform during the rest of his term, mainly to establish a presidential or parliamentary
system for Taiwan.
III. Taiwan’s statehood building
As Malcolm N. Shaw points out, when both the ROC and PRC governments
claimed to represent the whole China and did not claim Taiwan’s separate sovereign
status, there is difficult to maintain a sovereignty which has never been pursued.7
The ROC government’s policy to stick to the One China principle, especially before
1991, weakened Taiwan’s status as an independent sovereign state. To build an
independent Taiwan state, the government in Taiwan needs to amend its constitution
to confine its territory to the island of Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu, and the offshore
islands currently under its jurisdiction. In addition, it needs to change the national title
from ROC to Republic of Taiwan (ROT).
The issue of Taiwan’s statehood building faces three major obstacles. First, there
is no consensus among the people in Taiwan on building an independent Taiwan state.
When Taiwan was ruled by the two Chiangs, the island population was politically
socialized to accept the one China policy. In late 1980s, most of the people in Taiwan
still supported Taiwan’s final unification with China and opposed the cause of Taiwan
independence. Democratic changes in 1990s added momentum to Taiwanese
nationalism. Various surveys show that support for Taiwan independence has become
the mainstream within the consciousness of Taiwanese.
Figure 1 shows those who support unification have never gone beyond 17% of
Taiwan’s total population, less than those who support independence. If we add those
who support status quo forever to the category supporting independence, the
percentage of Taiwan’s people who support Taiwan independence has reached almost
50%. For instance, the survey conducted by the Election Study Center, National
Chengchi University, in August 2007 showed that 34.9% of the respondents chose
status quo now/decision later; 17.9% preferred status quo indefinitely; 16.5% status
quo now/independence later; 12.2% status quo now/unification later; 10.3%
independence as soon as possible; and 2.2% unification as soon as possible.8 Based
on this poll, only 14.4% of Taiwan’s people support Taiwan’s unification with China,
while 26.8% support Taiwan independence. If we were to add the 17.9% who support
7
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edition (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 211
8
http://www.mac.gov.tew/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9608/9808_1.gif, accessed 2007/10/1.
7
the status quo indefinitely to the category of Taiwan independence because status quo
infinitely means that Taiwan remains de factor independence forever, there are 44.7%
of people in Taiwan support the establishment of an independent Taiwan state.
Nevertheless, Taiwan is still a divided society in terms of national identity. There is
still no consensus among the Taiwanese people to build an independent Taiwan state.
Therefore, it is very difficult to amend the constitution to solve the issue of
sovereignty.
Figure 1, Taiwanese people’s attitudes on the issue of unification versus independence
*Those polls were conducted by different institutes.
Source: http://www.mac.gov.tw
Second, the threat from China is another obstacle and may be the most difficult
one for Taiwan to overcome. Beijing regards Taiwan as its inalienable part of China’s
territory and threatens to use force against the island if it declares de jure
independence. China issued the “One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” white
paper on February 21, 2000, setting up the following conditions for the use of force
against Taiwan:9
(1) If Taiwan declares independence;
(2) If foreign powers intervene in Taiwanese affairs;
(3) If Taiwan continues to refuse to negotiate for unification for a long
period of time.
9
Ministry of Defense, 1993-94 National Defense Report, Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural
Enterprise Co., 1994), p. 62.
8
On May 17, 2004, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council was
authorized to issue a statement that warned Taiwan’s leaders not to “keep following
their separatist agenda.” Otherwise, “the Chinese people will crush their schemes
firmly and thoroughly at any cost.”10 On March 14, 2005, China’s National People’s
Congress went on to pass the anti-secession law, legally authorizing the State Council
and the Central Military Commission to use non-peaceful means to cope with
secessionism in Taiwan should peaceful means be exhausted.11In addition, Beijing
draws a red line to check Taiwan’s efforts to pursue separation from China. The taboo
issues include Taiwan’s bid for membership in the United Nations, constitutional
reform to change national title and area of territory, and declaration of de jure
independence.
On many occasions, the Chinese leaders have warned Taiwan not to play with
fire. Otherwise, China would not hesitate to use force. China’s military threat
intimidates a substantial percentage of Taiwan’s people from supporting
constitutional reform and the establishment of an independent Taiwan sovereign state.
Third, most of the members in the international community do not recognize
Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. Taiwan has diplomatic relations with only
24 other nations. Those countries are mainly small and have limited global influence.
The United States, which is the most important country to Taiwan’s national security,
severed diplomatic tie with the island in 1979. Under pressure from Beijing,
Washington has stuck to one-China policy and does not support Taiwan independence,
or two Chinas or one China one Taiwan. It even does not support Taiwan to join
international organizations which require statehood.12
State department spokesman Richard Boucher pointed out that the United States
is “opposed to any referendum that would change Taiwan’s status or move toward
independence.”13 In an interview with Hong Kong’s Phoenix TV Station on October
25, 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that Taiwan “does not enjoy
sovereignty as a nation.”14 Other countries more or less take the same position. In
10
Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee and Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council,
“Statement on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” in
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zywg).asp?zywg_m_id=102, accessed 2005/12/15.
11
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/flfg/flf.htm, accessed 2005/12/15
12
On June 30, 1988 President Clinton illustrated his position on Taiwan’s sovereignty before his
audience in Shanghai with the following remarks: “I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which
is that we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we
don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a
requirement.”
13
Agence France Presse, “US Cautious Taiwan Leader over Moves to Frame New Constitution,”
November 30, 2004.
14
Edward Cody, “Powell’s Comments in China Rile Taiwan,” Washington Post, October 28, 2004, P.
A18.
9
order to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, which is regarded by some observers as
the most dangerous region to the United States,15 Washington opposes Taiwan’s
constitutional reforms that touch the issue of sovereignty. Washington also opposes
Taiwan holding referendum for membership in the United Nations.
In the face of China’s military threat, Taiwan has made a detour in building its
statehood in the past two decades. First, the seven constitutional reforms promoted the
idea of people sovereignty. The central government in Taiwan is decided by the
Taiwanese people. The National Assembly was abolished in 2005; all of the
legislators are elected from the areas under the ROC’s jurisdiction and the president is
directly elected by the people of Taiwan.
Second, Taiwan, especially after the DPP came to power on May 20, 2000, has
reformed the educational curriculums from elementary to high schools, increasing the
proportion of the textbooks about Taiwan’s history, geography and essays written by
Taiwanese authors. The Taiwanese government has revised its high-school history
textbooks to show that Taiwan is an independent country and not part of China.16 The
government is also currently considering dropping about 5,000 inappropriate
references in those textbooks to strengthen Taiwan’s separate identity from China.17.
The government in Taiwan has tried to promote the Taiwanese consciousness through
political socialization among its people, in particular the young generation.
Third, the government in Taiwan has adopted a stealth strategy to promote
Taiwan independence. President Lee Teng-hui ordered the formation of a research
group in 1998 to study strategy to strengthen Taiwan’s sovereign status. Based on the
report of this research group, President made the famous “special state-to-state
relationship” remarks in his interview with Deutsche Welle (Voice of German) radio
on July 9, 1999. The report also suggested that the government of Taiwan avoid
using those terms which imply that Taiwan is a part of China, such as unification, one
country two governments or one country two regions, Taiwan provincial sports game,
etc. In addition, Taipei has abandoned the idea to play a diplomatic zero-sum game
against Beijing. It has no longer required other countries to sever diplomatic ties as
a precondition to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
is willing to accept dual recognition.
In other words, Taipei
Fourth, Taiwan has tried to test Beijing’s red line. Taipei began to knock the
Kurt M. Campbell, and Dereck J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no.
4 (July/August 2001), pp.14-15.
16
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Taiwan Revises Textbooks to Show Independence from China,” January
29, 2007.
17
Annie Huang, “Taiwan Eyes Editing China from Textbooks,” Associated Press, July 23, 2007.
15
10
door of the United Nations in 1993 and called for participation in the World Health
Organization in 1997. On March 20, 2004, Taiwan conducted the first national
referendum and it decided to conduct a referendum again in 2008.
Taiwan’s efforts to promote Taiwanese consciousness and to strengthen its
sovereignty have yielded some progress. For example, those who identify themselves
as Taiwanese have outnumbered those who identify themselves as Chinese in Taiwan.
A poll conducted by the United Daily in November 1989 showed that 52% of the
people in Taiwan identified themselves as Chinese, 26% both Chinese and Taiwanese,
16% Taiwanese, and 7% no response.18 A survey conducted in April 2000, one
month before the DPP came to power, showed that Taiwan’s people’s self-identity
had been reversed. 42.5% of the people on the island identified themselves as
Taiwanese, 38.5% both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 13.6% Chinese (Figure 2).
A poll conducted by the Strait Exchange Foundation on December 13, 2006, showed
that those who identified themselves as Taiwanese increased to 58% of the total
population in Taiwan.19
Figure 2, Ethnic identity among people in Taiwan
*Those polls were conducted by different institute
Source: http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/8903/8903_3.gif
In addition, most of the people in Taiwan oppose Beijing’s “one country, two
systems” formula to solve the problems across the strait. For instance, a poll
conducted by the Election Study Center, National Cheng-chi University in April 2007
showed that 72.2% of the respondents opposed that formula and only 12.8%
supported it.20 If there were no military threat from China, a majority of the people in
18
http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9001/table12.htm, accessed 2007/10/1.
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/new/dec/14/today-p6.htm, accessed 2007/10/1.
20
http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9608/9808e_8.gif, accessed 2007/10/1.
19
11
Taiwan would have supported the building of an independent Taiwan state. A survey
conducted by the Election Study Center, National Cheng-chi University in November
2006 showed that if China gives Taiwan the freedom to make a choice, 62% of the
respondents would opt to choose Taiwan independence.21 In addition, most of the
people in Taiwan believe that Taiwan’s future can only be decided by Taiwan’s
people.
IV. The impact on cross-strait relations
Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen its sovereignty have frequently driven the Beijing
central government crazy. For instance, President Lee’s trip to the United States in
mid-1995, especially his speech to his alter mater Cornell University, in which he
mentioned the Republic of China of Taiwan seventeen times and unification only
three times, touched the nerve of China. President Lee’s “two states” remarks in 1999
again increased tension in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s decisions to conduct
referendums in 2004 and 2008 respectively also made Beijing very angry. Indeed,
Taipei’s efforts to build Taiwan’s statehood have caused problems in cross-strait
relations. But constitutional reform is a key element in Taiwan’s democratization and
Taiwan’s democratic changes helped relax Taiwan’s control over people-to-people
exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. A study of the evolution of cross-strait relations
will confirm such an argument.
(1) The evolution of cross-strait relations
Cross-strait relations after 1949 can be divided into five phases. Mutual
confrontation including bloodily military conflict was the main theme in the first
phase from 1949 to 1971. “Armed liberation” of Taiwan was Beijing’s main strategy.
Similarly, the ROC on Taiwan under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek swore to
recover the Chinese mainland by armed force. Armed conflict broke out twice when
Beijing shelled the offshore islands controlled by the ROC in 1954 and 1958,
respectively.
Cross-strait relations entered a second phase in the early 1970s when China
gradually recovered from the disaster of the “Great Cultural Revolution” and its
foreign relations policy was refocused. Beijing won the battle for representing China
in the United Nations in 1971 and began to normalize its relationship Washington in
the same year leading toward the establishment of formal diplomatic relationship in
1979.
Peaceful liberation replaced armed liberation to become the new basis of
21
http://www.singtaonet.com/hk_taiwan/t20061219_423457.html, accessed 2007/10/1.
12
Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan. Between 1971 and 1977, China wooed Taiwan with
more than 20 statements for unification, appealing to nationalism, offering a highly
autonomous status, and guaranteeing the maintenance of a high living standard in
Taiwan.22 On New Year’s Day 1979, Beijing issued a “Message to Compatriots in
Taiwan,” urging the Kuomintang (KMT) to open talks and to allow cross-strait “three
links” (trade, postal services, transportation) and “four exchanges” (exchanges
between relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups and sports
representatives).23
In the 1980s when China sped up its economic reforms, Beijing upgraded its
peaceful campaign against Taiwan. On September 30, 1981, Beijing proposed
CCP-KMT talks to carry out a third historic cooperation relationship between the two
parties “to achieve the great task of national unification.”
24
The foundation of
China’s peaceful unification strategy is the “one country, two systems” formula which
was first experimented in Hong Kong as it was coded in the 1984 PRC-UK
declaration on the Hong Kong issue and the Basic Law adopted by China’s National
People’s Congress in 1990. Under this formula, Beijing promises to treat Taiwan as a
special administrative region that would be allowed to maintain its socio-economic
system, way of life, and even armed forces. Taipei which lost external legitimacy
rejected to dance with Beijing by adopting a “three no’s policy,” namely no contact,
no negotiation, and no compromise with the PRC regime.
The cross-strait relations started the third phase after the ROC government lifted
the ban on mainland visits in November 1987. The increase in cross-strait
people-to-people exchanges and economic interactions forced Taipei to adjust its
“three no’s policy.” Taiwan’s Red Cross Society and its counterpart from China
conducted secret talks in Quemoy on September 11, 1990, reaching the Quemoy
Agreement. The agreement stipulates the principles, locations and procedures to
extradite criminal suspects and convicted offenders as well as to safely send back
Chinese illegal immigrants in Taiwan. The ROC government established the Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF) on February 19, 1991, to handle cross-strait matters on
behalf of the government.
Hungdah Chiu, “Prospects for Unification of China: An Analysis of the Views of the Republic of
China on Taiwan,” in Yungdeh Richard Ch (ed.), China in Perspectives: Prospects of China’s
Reunification (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1986), p. 107.
23
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), January 1, 1979, p. 1.
24
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), October 1, 1981, p. 1.
22
13
On April 30, 1991, President Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded President Chiang
Ching-kuo in January 1988, formally announced the termination of the “Period of
Communist Rebellion.” The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was redefined as a
“hostile political entity” that controlled the mainland.25 This policy change by Taipei
paved the way for a more friendly relationship with its nemesis and the opening of
regular cross-strait talks.
The SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu accepted the invitation from his counterpart Mr.
Wang Daohan of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) to
hold the first meeting in Singapore in late April 1993. Four agreements were signed in
the talks to establish regular communication channels between the two organizations
and to start talks that would be “non-governmental, administrative, economic, and
functional in nature” to deal with problems arising from cross-strait exchanges.26 The
two sides of the Taiwan Strait entered regular semi-official talks on functional issues.
After the Koo-Wang Talks in April 1993, the SEF and the ARATS conducted three
rounds of negotiations at the vice-chairman level and seven rounds of talks at the
deputy secretary general level. But no agreement was signed in the talks.
Cross-strait relations entered the fourth phase after Beijing unilaterally
suspended the SEF-ARATS talks in retaliation for President Lee’s trip to the United
States in June 1995. The fourth phase saw rapid fluctuation in cross-strait relations.
China’s military conducted a series of exercises in 1995-96 in order to intimidate
Taiwan from moving further toward de juré independence. Cross-strait tensions
reached their peak in March 1996 when the PLA fired four M-9 missiles into waters
about 20 to 30 kilometers off the north and south coasts of Taiwan. Cross-strait
relations were finally put back on track when the SEF and the ARATS resumed
dialogue in 1998. Mr. Koo Chen-fu led a delegation to visit mainland China and held
meetings with Jiang Zemin, Wang Daohan, and Vice Premier Qian Qichen. However,
this rapprochement was pronounced dead when President Lee made the famous
two-state remarks on July 9, 1999.27 Beijing again suspended cross-strait dialogues
and increased the military threat to the island. China conducted a series of military
exercises aiming at Taiwan within the months after President Lee’s remarks.
See President Lee Teng-hui’s remarks at the press conference of April 30, 1991. China Times, May 1,
1991, p. 1.
26
According one of the agreements, SEF-ARATS talks would be held every three months at the deputy
secretary general level, every six months in general at the vice-chairman level and according the needs
and based on mutual agreement to hold meetings at the chairman level.
27
On July 9, 1999, President Lee redefined Taiwan-China relations as “a state-to-state relationship, or at
least a special state-to-state relationship” during an interview with a German radio station. Zhongguo
Shibao (China Times), July 10, 1999, p. 1.
25
14
President Lee’s two-state remarks brought cross-strait relations into the fifth
phase in which there have been no official or semi-official contacts between Taiwan
and China. Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
won the tripartite presidential race in March 2000. The DPP, whose goal is the
establishment of a de juré independent Taiwan state, became the ruling party. Beijing
which is highly suspicious of Chen and his party has rejected to enter dialogue with
the DPP government unless Chen can accept the one-China principle or the 1992
consensus. 28 Instead of accepting Beijing’s terms, President Chen made remarks
which suggested that there was “one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait” on
August 3, 2002. In addition, President Chen has emphasized that he would never
accept the so-called 1992 consensus which he equated to the one China principle.
Cross-strait relations have continued to be in deadlock.
(2) Taiwan’s constitutional reform and cross-strait relations
As mentioned above, Taiwan’s constitutional reform has had both a positive and
negative impact on the island’s relations with China. First, without constitutional
reforms the ROC government would have continued to regard the Chinese
Communist Party as a rebellious group and Taiwan would have continued its three
no’s policy. Only after the ROC lifted the martial law in 1987 and reformed the
constitution in early 1990s, redefining the CCP as an unfriendly entity which
legitimately ruled the Chinese mainland, it became possible for Taipei to relax the
restrictions on people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
and to allow the Taiwanese Businessmen to invest in China.
Cross-strait people-to-people exchanges have been increasing dramatically in the
past two decades. For instance, the Taiwanese made more than 4.41 million trips to
China in 2006.29 In other words, on average more than twelve thousand Taiwanese
traveled to China everyday. There were more than 222,800 cross-strait marriages
between 1993 to June 2004.30 According to the Ministry of Commerce of PRC,
two-way trade between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait totaled $91.2 billion in
2005. 31 Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council estimates cross-strait two-way trade
The so-called “1992 consensus” refers to an agreement in a meeting between the Strait Exchange
Foundation and its counterpart the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in November
1992 in Hong Kong. Both sides agreed that there is one China and that each side maintains its own
interpretation of the definition of one China. Ironically, it was Beijing which rejected to sign because it
believed that two different interpretations of the definition of one China would create two Chinas.
Therefore, there is no written agreement. President Chen argues that there is no “1992 consensus” only
“1992 spirit.” It means that although Taipei and Beijing disagree with each other, the disagreement
does not stop them from negotiations.
29
Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, No. 174 (April 2007), p. 39.
30
http://abroad.icxo.com/htmlnews/2004/09/14/340178.htm, accessed 2006/1/12.
31
http://news.xyfund.com/012006/25/41449.html, accessed 2006/1/20.
28
15
totaling $88.1 billion in 2006. Taiwan’s exports to China totaled $63.3billion and
imports $24.8 billion.32 Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus of $38.5 billion. Exports to
China accounted for 25.83% of Taiwan’s total exports in 2004. Taiwan’s investment
in China is even more impressive. According to official Chinese data, Taiwan’s total
investment had risen to about $87 billion by November 2005.33 The real figure is
even higher. This picture would have been impossible had Taiwan not reformed itself
to become a democratic country.
Taiwan’s constitutional reform has also created a negative impact on cross-strait
relations. While it is true that the constitutional reform is a necessary road for Taiwan
to move toward democracy, democratization also increases the Taiwanese
consciousness among the people on the island. The Taiwanese people, who are proud
of their democratic achievement, have no incentive to accept the rule of the
authoritarian Chinese communist regime. In fact, most of the people in Taiwan
oppose the “one country, two systems” model proposed by Beijing for unification.
When Beijing’s confidence on peaceful unification decreases, it has turned to the
approach of coercion. It has increased its military threat to the island.
(3) Beijing’s response to Taiwan’s constitutional reform and statehood building
Beijing regards Taiwan as a renegade province. It denies the existence of the
Republic of China on Taiwan and does not accept the ROC Constitution. Ironically
Beijing opposes Taiwan to amend the ROC Constitution to change the territory,
national flag, national title, or anything that ushers Taiwan toward de jure
independence.
Before President Lee’s visit of the United States in June 1995, Beijing’s was not
concerned with Taiwan’s constitutional reform for the following reasons:
(1) The ROC government still followed one China policy (but the one
China is Republic of China);
(2) There were regular semi-official talks between the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait;
(3) There were communications between envoys from Taiwan and China;
(4) Beijing believed that Lee Teng-hui reformed the constitution in order
to increase his power;34
32
Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, No. 174 (April 2007), p. 25.
Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, No. 155 (September 2005), p. 30.
34
http://www.voanews.com/chinese/Archive/a-2001-12-27-4-1.cfm.
33
16
(5) Although Beijing knew that constitutional reform could increase
maneuvering space for the Taiwan independence movement, it believed that the
Kuomintang (KMT) was still able to control the situation and that the KMT
would not abandon the national title of the Republic of China and the
constitution;
(6) Beijing believed that although the forces for establishing an independent
Taiwan state had gained its strength, it is unlikely for it to achieved its goal in the
near future; and
(7) Beijing still put its hope on the Taiwan authorities. Therefore, Beijing
did not comment much on Taiwan’s constitutional reform before 1995.
After President Lee’s visit of the United States in June 1995, cross-strait
relations have deteriorated. Beijing has increased its criticism of the Taiwan
authorities and Beijing has mentioned less about putting hope on the Taiwan
authorities. It defined Lee’s trip to the United States as a well-planned action to create
two Chinas or one China one Taiwan. It began to link Taiwan’s constitutional reform
with the secessionism.
In 1998, the Taiwan affairs Office of the CCP and State Council’s Taiwan
Affairs Office jointly issues the “China’s Taiwan Issue” report, criticizing that Taiwan
conducted constitutional reform since May 1990, defined Taiwan and China as two
political entities, used the name of Republic of China on Taiwan, conducted
pragmatic diplomacy, and bid to join the United Nations as to create two Chinas and
to pursue Taiwan independence. In fact, in his speech on January 30, 1996, China’s
premier Li Peng criticized the actions and efforts by “the Taiwan’s authorities” were
to divide Taiwan from China. He emphasized that no matter how Taiwan’s leader was
chosen, it can not change the fact that Taiwan is a part of China. After President Lee
made the state-to-state relationship remarks, Beijing’s anxiety increased and its
concern with Taiwan’s constitutional reform also increased. Officials in the Taiwan
Affairs Office pointed out that China firmly opposed the Taiwan independence forces
to reform the constitution based on Lee Teng-hui’s two-state theory.
Mutual trust before Taiwan and China decreased dramatically after President
Lee’s visit of the United States. Beijing regarded Taiwan’s direct election of the
president by the people, the DPP’s proposal to add the referendum mechanism in the
constitution and to freeze the operation of the Taiwan Provincial Government as
moves to separate Taiwan from China. One Chinese scholar argues that Lee’s
constitutional reform was to build the framework for Taiwan’s de jure independence
because Lee’s reform pursued the Taiwanization of the territory, government’s
17
structure, and the division of districts.
Beijing launched an intensive campaign to intimidate Taiwan. It conducted
military exercises in the Taiwan Strait; its fighter jets twice crossed the central line in
the strait; People’s Daily carried commentators’ articles attacking Lee Teng-hui; it
postponed indefinitely the talks between Taiwan and China; the People’s Liberation
Army’s leaders reiterated in different occasions that the Chinese military had the
capability to defend China’s territory. The tension in the Taiwan Strait increased.
That the DPP came to power in 2000 further complicated the situation in the
Taiwan Strait. It is well known that the DPP would like to establish an independent
Taiwan sovereign state. Constitutional reform or to draft a new constitution is the only
way to complete the task of establishing a de jure independent Taiwan state.
The DPP released a white paper in 1993, proposing to draft a new constitution
which reflects Taiwan’s sovereign reality and democratic constitutional principle. The
party suggested that the constitution should clearly define the country’s sovereignty
and territorial scope and state that Taiwan does not belong to the People’s Republic of
China. Some of the DPP’s ideas of constitutional reform, such as direct elections of
the president and the abolishment of the Taiwan Provincial Government, were
realized in President Lee’s era. But President Lee failed to draft a new constitution.
Therefore, many DPP’s supporters hope that President Chen can deliver a new
constitution to them.
President Chen’s victory on March 18, 2000, marked the first power turnover in
Taiwan’s history and ushered cross-strait relations into a brand new era. Beijing
distrusts President Chen and his party because they pursue the goal to establish an
independent Taiwan state. In fact, in order to prevent Chen from winning the
presidency, China’s premier Zhu Rongji spoke three days before the voting to warn
Taiwan’s voters not to vote for the wrong candidate. Otherwise, he warned the
Taiwanese people that it might mean war. Therefore, Chen’s victory was a surprise to
Beijing. Beijing has rejected to enter dialogue with the DPP government unless Chen
can accept the one-China principle or the 1992 consensus.35 Instead of accepting
Beijing’s terms, President Chen made remarks which suggested that there was “one
state on each side of the Taiwan Strait” on August 3, 2002. In addition, he
The so-called “1992 consensus” refers to an agreement in a meeting between the Strait Exchange
Foundation and its counterpart the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in November
1992 in Hong Kong. Both sides agreed that there is one China and that each side maintains its own
interpretation of the definition of one China. Ironically, it was Beijing which rejected to sign because it
believed that two different interpretations of the definition of one China would create two Chinas.
Therefore, there is no written agreement. President Chen argues that there is no “1992 consensus” only
“1992 spirit.” It means that although Taipei and Beijing disagree with each other, the disagreement
35
18
emphasized that he would never accept the so-called 1992 consensus which he
equalized to the one China principle. President Chen was the architect of a so-called
defensive referendum on March 20, 2004, and another national referendum in March
2008.36 These moves by President Chen increased Beijing’s mistrust of the DPP
government; cross-strait relations have continued to be in deadlock.
Beijing made great efforts to prevent President Chen from winning a second term
in office in 2004. After President Chen won reelection, Beijing, which was deeply
frustrated, decided to escalate its military threat to Taiwan. Indeed, the PLA has
increased the number of ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan, verbally threatened to use
force, frequently conducted military exercises to intimidate the island, and sometimes
its fighter jets flied across the central line in the Taiwan Strait to harass Taiwan.
Beijing has given up any idea to deal with the Chen government and cross-strait
relations have continued to be in deadlock. Only change of government in Taiwan
in 2008 might give Beijing some incentive to resume cross-strait dialogue in the
future.
IV. Concluding remarks
Taiwan fulfills all of the criteria set by the Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States to be a sovereign state, but it did claim itself a sovereign
state before 1999. Taiwan began to make efforts to strengthen its separate sovereign
status from China in the 1990s. Constitutional reform is one of the criteria measures
in these efforts.
Taiwan’s constitution has gone through seven amendments since 1991 but the
constitution is still far from desired because it still does reflect the reality of modern
Taiwan. The ROC’s territory still covers mainland China and Outer Mongolia
although it is totally impossible for the ROC to recover the Chinese mainland and
Outer Mongolia is already a member of United Nations. What Taiwan needs is a new
constitution.
does not stop them from negotiations.
36
The Legislative Yuan in Taiwan passed the Referendum Law on November 29, 2003. Article 17 of
the law authorizes the president to conduct defensive referenda when he deems that the country’s
sovereignty endangered. President Chen made use of the referendum mechanism on the same day of
the presidential elections on March 20, 2004. Two questionnaires used asked for voter’s approval on
two measures. The first one is whether Taiwan should increase its missile defense if China continues to
increase its missile threat against Taiwan; the other was about Taiwan should enter negotiations with
Beijing to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. These referendums did not pass because the boycott
from the opposition parties and the high threshold of the referendum required to pass. It required fifty
percent of the eligible voters to cast their ballots and more than one-half of the total number of electors
to vote in favor of it for the referendum to be valid. President Chen stated that it is his intent to
conduct another referendum on March 23, 2008, the same day of Taiwan’s presidential election, on the
issue of using the name of Taiwan to apply for membership in the United Nations.
19
Taiwan’s statehood building faces tremendous challenges ahead.
First of all,
Taiwan needs a new constitution which can clearly state that Taiwan is an
independent sovereign state in order to guide the governments decision-making and
functions, to nurture its people’s national identity, and to shape political life and
socio-economic life on the island. But to draft a new constitution in Taiwan is almost
a mission impossible because the threshold is extremely high.
According to the additional article 12 of the ROC Constitution, an amending of
the Constitution shall be initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of the total
members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by at least three-fourths of the members
present at the meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of the
Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by electors in the free area of the Republic of China
at a referendum held upon expiration of a six-month period of public announcement
and comment of the proposal, wherein the number of valid votes in favor exceeds
one-half of the total number of electors.
It requires cooperation between the two leading political parties— the KMT and
the DPP—to write a new constitution. The cooperation is unlikely to come between
the two parties who are currently in confrontational mood. Taiwan’s democracy is
still in a transitional stage. Political leaders from different political parties are still
learning how to compromise with each other and it takes time to deepen Taiwan’s
democracy. In addition, the KMT which is the biggest political party in Taiwan and
still favors the island’s final unification with China will not support any constitutional
amendment that would separate the island from China forever. Unless Taiwan can
consolidate further its democracy and an overwhelming majority of the people on the
island clearly support to pursue a de jure Taiwan sovereign state, the prospects for the
island to have a new constitution is not bright.
Secondly, Beijing strongly opposes Taiwan’s efforts to build a de jure sovereign
state. It has reiterated its threat to use force against the island if it declares
independence. Although Taiwan’s constitutional reform moved the obstacle in the
way toward exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, it did not win
blessings from China. Beijing was alerted by Taipei’s constitutional amendments
which it regarded as setting the tone for an independent Taiwan state.
China’s opposition will remain the main obstacle stymieing Taiwan’s efforts to
draft a new constitution. As China’s national strength increases it has more leverage
to isolate Taiwan internationally. More and more countries have succumbed to
Beijing’s pressure to more narrowly define their position on Taiwan’s sovereign
status. In addition, Beijing has been continuing to promote economic integration
20
between the two sides of the Taiwan. It recognizes that increasing people-to-people
exchanges might change the national identity of people in Taiwan.
Taiwan’s statehood building was started less than two decades ago and there is
still a long way to go. Although the external setting has become hostile at times, the
Taiwanese domestic climate has produced some positive changes because of the
support of Taiwan independence and a Taiwanese consciousness that have now
become mainstream in Taiwan society. More and more people on the island believe
that independence is a goal which they will fight for. Although it is not easy, the hope
remains alive that someday it may come true.
21