IEEE C802.16m-09/2954 Project Title
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IEEE C802.16m-09/2954 Project IEEE 802.16 Broadband Wireless Access Working Group <http://ieee802.org/16> Title Proposal on 16m encryption test vectors (Annex Q) Date Submitted 2009-12-31 Source(s) Avishay Shraga Xiangying Yang Liran Harlev Elad Levy Intel Re: Call for LB #30b on “ P802.16m/D3”: Target topic: Annex associated with Security “16.2.5” Abstract This contribution proposes an Annex with test vectors for the 16m encryption algorithms. Purpose Adopt proposed text. Notice This document does not represent the agreed views of the IEEE 802.16 Working Group or any of its subgroups. It represents only the views of the participants listed in the “Source(s)” field above. It is offered as a basis for discussion. It is not binding on the contributor(s), who reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein. Release The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, and any modifications thereof, in the creation of an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE’s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the IEEE’s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that this contribution may be made public by IEEE 802.16. Patent Policy The contributor is familiar with the IEEE-SA Patent Policy and Procedures: <http://standards.ieee.org/guides/bylaws/sect6-7.html#6> and <http://standards.ieee.org/guides/opman/sect6.html#6.3>. Further information is located at <http://standards.ieee.org/board/pat/pat-material.html> and <http://standards.ieee.org/board/pat>. E-mail: avishay.shraga@intel.com Phone : +972-54-5551063 Proposal on 16m encryption test vectors (Annex Q) Avishay Shraga, Xiangying Yang, Liran Harlev, Elad Levy Intel Introduction PKMv3 introduce a new way to build the inputs for the AES-CCM and AES-CTR algorithms. In order to increase the vendors confidence on the encryption mechanism implementation (usually 1 IEEE C802.16m-09/2954 HW) – it is good to include some test vectors for the different methods References Proposed Text Add informative ANNEX Q with test vectors -------------------------------------- Start of first Proposed Text ------------------------------------------------ Annex Q (informative) Test vectors Q.1 Cryptographic method test vectors Q.1.1 AES-CCM: Q.1.1.1 Short payload and short ICV - Plaintext PDU Advanced Generic MAC header = D0 06 Payload = 9c 05 3f 24 STID=0x234, FID=0xD - Ciphertext PDU where TEK = 0xD50E18A844AC5BF38E4CD72D9B0942E5, EKS=0x1 (2bits), PN=0x17F6BC (22 bits) and ICV length is 4B: Advanced Generic MAC header = D0 0D Initial CCM block B0 (128bits): 19 D0 0D 23 4D 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 F6 BC 00 04 Encrypted payload of EKS+PN (3B), encrypted payload (4B), encrypted ICV (4B): 57 F6 BC 10 71 D1 B0 3C DF A2 28 After decryption Plaintext ICV= 99 C7 97 F7 Q.1.1.2 Long payload and long ICV - Plaintext PDU Advanced Generic MAC header = A0 CA Payload (200B): - 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 04 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 05 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 06 16 26 36 46 56 66 76 07 17 27 37 47 57 67 77 08 18 28 38 48 58 68 78 2 09 19 29 39 49 59 69 79 0A 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 0B 1B 2B 3B 4B 5B 6B 7B 0C 1C 2C 3C 4C 5C 6C 7C 0D 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D 6D 7D 0E 1E 2E 3E 4E 5E 6E 7E 0F 1F 2F 3F 4F 5F 6F 7F IEEE C802.16m-09/2954 80 90 A0 B0 C0 - 81 91 A1 B1 C1 82 83 92 93 A2 A3 B2 B3 C2 C3 STID=0x234, 84 94 A4 B4 C4 85 86 95 96 A5 A6 B5 B6 C5 C6 FID=0xA 87 97 A7 B7 C7 19 A0 D5 23 4A 00 00 00 88 98 A8 B8 89 99 A9 B9 8A 9A AA BA 8B 9B AB BB 8C 9C AC BC 8D 9D AD BD 8E 9E AE BE 8F 9F AF BF Ciphertext PDU where TEK = 0xB74EB0E4F81AD63D121B7E9AECCD268F, EKS=0x3 (2bits), PN=0x3B5F11 (22 bits) and ICV length is 8B: Advanced Generic MAC header = A0 D5 IV (128bits): 00 00 00 FB 5F 11 00 C8 Encrypted payload of EKS+PN (3B), encrypted payload (200B), encrypted ICV (8B): FB EA B8 8C 4E 13 C0 63 2C 02 F2 7C 5A EE 2F - 5F 53 D2 76 A9 A8 74 63 AB 50 E5 7B 10 74 6B 11 E1 67 AC 0A BA F3 1A C2 32 80 DC 7C 67 08 74 35 C1 F4 16 C1 F3 C9 81 83 AC FA A7 CF 89 4F 0C B9 3B CC D9 8C 14 B2 E9 39 13 49 B2 F6 B5 AC 9F BF 39 BC B2 08 D1 D6 DC 2A 0B 95 A6 B5 88 D0 F2 87 32 24 1B 51 03 E1 F3 D1 BB AF 42 84 8F 41 8C 4E 6B 17 EF 04 F0 8B 6C 28 56 C2 6D 78 28 7A 8B 67 After decryption Plaintext ICV= C2 C4 36 8F 9B 60 54 21 3E 7F F5 B7 C7 C4 EF 16 0C 79 1B 20 B4 D1 64 85 11 18 E3 46 1B F6 61 95 0B AC 31 27 72 63 54 3B 84 67 FB 41 8C 48 06 C4 75 3F 16 26 9A DB 13 02 4C 44 4B DD CE CB AE EE A7 FF 45 7B EA E6 AA 33 FF 38 3D EF 78 3D DA 4B 68 7D DE D0 57 85 26 85 24 01 2F 1F Q.1.2 AES-CTR: Q.1.2.1 Short payload - Plaintext PDU Advanced Generic MAC header = 20 06 Payload = 9c 05 3f 24 STID=0x234, FID=0xD - Ciphertext PDU where TEK = 0xD50E18A844AC5BF38E4CD72D9B0942E5, EKS=0x1 (2bits) and PN=0x17F6BC (22 bits): Advanced Generic MAC header = D0 09 Encrypted payload of EKS+PN (3B), encrypted payload (4B): 57 F6 BC 86 FB 65 B7 Q.1.2.2 Long payload - Plaintext PDU Advanced Generic MAC header = A0 CA Payload (200B): 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 3 0C 0D 0E 0F IEEE C802.16m-09/2954 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 A0 B0 C0 - 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 A1 B1 C1 12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 A2 B2 C2 13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 A3 B3 C3 14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 A4 B4 C4 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95 A5 B5 C5 16 26 36 46 56 66 76 86 96 A6 B6 C6 17 27 37 47 57 67 77 87 97 A7 B7 C7 18 28 38 48 58 68 78 88 98 A8 B8 19 29 39 49 59 69 79 89 99 A9 B9 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 8A 9A AA BA 1B 2B 3B 4B 5B 6B 7B 8B 9B AB BB 1C 2C 3C 4C 5C 6C 7C 8C 9C AC BC 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D 6D 7D 8D 9D AD BD 1E 2E 3E 4E 5E 6E 7E 8E 9E AE BE 1F 2F 3F 4F 5F 6F 7F 8F 9F AF BF STID=0x234, FID=0xA Ciphertext PDU where TEK = 0xB74EB0E4F81AD63D121B7E9AECCD268F, EKS=0x3 (2bits) and PN=0x3B5F11 (22 bits): Advanced Generic MAC header = A0 CD Encrypted payload of EKS+PN (3B), encrypted payload (200B): FB EC CD 83 BF DA F9 51 6C E5 91 2E 43 A6 5F 86 0E 99 52 21 DA 43 7C 01 DA 0D F6 BF 11 6C AC 58 34 2B AD D4 A0 86 F2 D2 7A AB FF 0F DF 9C 87 86 C8 9F 12 98 58 31 C6 73 0B B8 85 04 5B D5 FB 22 C5 55 E2 77 C8 A6 BB 25 D6 20 CF 48 BD A2 0F 6F 2E CF EE 89 92 70 5F 0B 14 1C 49 DB 1B 6E A6 50 74 27 6C 8D FA EB 8A EC 7F EB 27 25 6C 10 79 CC 20 92 08 B5 FC 97 51 A6 CC 37 85 FD 37 8D 03 E3 92 A6 12 2D 13 3A D3 2E BA 49 DA 4E 39 3B D4 E5 81 C3 5C B6 36 0F 9E 17 ED 3B 1C 8E 67 37 62 AD 13 91 13 A5 6B 67 07 68 6C 0B F1 27 CD 2B A0 00 4C E3 F6 0E 85 7D A9 64 E8 70 1C FC F4 BF 48 35 6E C6 67 CD E0 9A A3 C7 6A 29 B0 Q.1.3 AES-CMAC: This section is assuming the CAMC calculation is performed according to the formula indicated in the approved contribution C80216m-09_2022r3. 2 flavors of test vectors are included- one with CMAC calculation that includes 16bit padding (as stated in the contribution above) and one with the suggested remedy of 24bit padding. Q.1.3.1 Short message (assuming 24 bit padding): - Plaintext PDU Payload = 9c 05 3f 24 STID=0x234, FID=0xD - Signature where CMAC_KEY= 0xD50E18A844AC5BF38E4CD72D9B0942E5, PMKID=0xA67B1FE254CD290A (64bits) and CMAC_PN=0x57F6BC (24 bits): Message header (PMK ID | CMAC_PN |STID|FID|24-bit zero padding | MAC_Management_Message)= A6 7B 1F E2 54 CD 29 0A 57 F6 BC 23 CMAC value (8B)= 52 DF 76 A9 Q.1.3.2 Long message (assuming 24 bit padding): - Plaintext PDU 4 4D 00 00 00 4B 00 0E 38 IEEE C802.16m-09/2954 Payload (100B): 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 - 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 04 14 24 34 44 54 05 15 25 35 45 55 06 16 26 36 46 56 07 17 27 37 47 57 08 18 28 38 48 58 09 19 29 39 49 59 0A 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 0B 1B 2B 3B 4B 5B 0C 1C 2C 3C 4C 5C 0D 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D 0E 1E 2E 3E 4E 5E 0F 1F 2F 3F 4F 5F STID=0xABC, FID=0xA Signature where CMAC_KEY= 0xB74EB0E4F81AD63D121B7E9AECCD268F, PMKID=0xD5F725AE30F45B3C (64bits) and CMAC_PN=0x3B5F11 (24 bits): Message header (PMK ID | CMAC_PN |STID|FID|24-bit zero padding | MAC_Management_Message)= D5 F7 25 AE 30 F4 5B 3C 3B 5F 11 AB CA 00 00 00 CMAC value (8B)= 7F F1 A7 68 60 CB CD 82 Q.1.3.1 Short message (assuming 16 bit padding): - Plaintext PDU Payload = 9c 05 3f 24 STID=0x234, FID=0xD - Signature where CMAC_KEY= 0xD50E18A844AC5BF38E4CD72D9B0942E5, PMKID=0xA67B1FE254CD290A (64bits) and CMAC_PN=0x57F6BC (24 bits): Message header (PMK ID | CMAC_PN |STID|FID|16-bit zero padding | MAC_Management_Message)= A6 7B 1F E2 54 CD 29 0A 57 F6 BC 23 CMAC value (8B)= 2B 21 D8 C2 Q.1.3.2 Long message (assuming 16 bit padding): - Plaintext PDU Payload (100B): 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 - 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 02 12 22 32 42 52 62 03 13 23 33 43 53 63 04 14 24 34 44 54 05 15 25 35 45 55 06 16 26 36 46 56 07 17 27 37 47 57 08 18 28 38 48 58 4D 00 00 70 E6 FC D3 09 19 29 39 49 59 0A 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 0B 1B 2B 3B 4B 5B 0C 1C 2C 3C 4C 5C 0D 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D 0E 1E 2E 3E 4E 5E 0F 1F 2F 3F 4F 5F STID=0xABC, FID=0xA Signature where CMAC_KEY= 0xB74EB0E4F81AD63D121B7E9AECCD268F, PMKID=0xD5F725AE30F45B3C (64bits) and CMAC_PN=0x3B5F11 (24 bits): Message header (PMK ID | CMAC_PN |STID|FID|16-bit zero padding | MAC_Management_Message)= D5 F7 25 AE 30 F4 5B 3C 3B 5F 11 AB CMAC value (8B)= 21 79 D3 11 5 CA 00 00 E1 B4 C7 16
