College of Aerospace
Doctrine, Research, and
Education
Public Affair
IW-220
AFDD 2-5.4
the way we think about and use public information
in a military operation...
“the public information battlespace”
contents

global information environment
 information as an instrument of national power
 informational flexible deterrent options
 virtual force projection
 case study - Haiti
 using themes & messages
 combating enemy PSYOP
 case study - Kosovo
 review
global
information
environment
…technology & competition has
changed the world !
global information environment
• media are virtually everywhere - and have the technology
to broadcast information in real-time
• media will find people to talk to them -- if they don’t get
info from us, they’ll get it from a less knowledgeable
source, or from the enemy
• can’t hide major troop movements
• appearance of withholding/manipulating information can
impair mission
• media attention and questions on an issue bring
enormous pressure on political decision makers to act
quickly ...
the “CNN effect”
a reality of the global information environment
The speed of communications & commercial
pressures to be first with a news story brings a
sense of immediacy to journalism today. In
essence, the CNN effect occurs when media
attention and questions on an issue bring
enormous pressure on political decision makers to
act quickly without full knowledge of the situation.
William J. Perry
Former SECDEF
given this, what advantages are there to
dealing with the media ?
• national support
- funding
- recruiting
- national will
- morale
• enemy decision making
- show of force
- resolve
- sending clear messages
how can this power of information and
communications be effectively used by the NCA ?
information as an
instrument of
national power
…every bit as powerful as diplomatic,
economic, military instruments…
combine them for an irresistible
synergy
information as an instrument of
national power

national will, or public support for the
operation = strategic center of gravity


information is crucial to the formulation of national
will -- PA ops tells the story
enemy will attempt to sway public opinion

PA ops counters these threats by:

1. gaining and analyzing information about the environment
 2. provide timely and accurate information
 3. defending against enemy propaganda, threats or attack
it’s important to create an effective synergy of
PA ops within IO
IO construct
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
INFORMATION IN WARFARE
gain
INFORMATION WARFARE
defend
exploit
attack
COUNTERINFORMATION
ISR
WEATHER PRECISION
NAV
COLLECTION/
DISSEMINATION ACTIVITIES
DEFENSIVE
COUNTERINFORMATION
Information CounterAssurance Intelligence
OPSEC
Electronic
Protection
CounterPSYOP
CounterDeception
OFFENSIVE
COUNTERINFORMATION
Electronic
Warfare
PSYOP
Deception
Physical
Attack
Information
Attack
include PA ops in your IO planning & IO cells
AFDD 2-5.4 considerations

AF performs strategic, operational, and tactical PA ops
utilizing deployable and reach-back capabilities in support of
the JFC

campaign plans contain PA ops -- commanders must build in
PA ops considerations in the campaign plan right from the
beginning

PA ops actions and capabilities must be integrated within
normal campaign planning and execution -- annex F and PA
guidance should contain the commanders intent for PA ops,
not just specific PA actions

PA ops must be coordinated and de-conflicted with other IO
activities -- this is done in the JFC IO cell
these capabilities give the commander some real options...
informational
flexible deterrent
options
…options other than “bombs on target”
informational FDOs
“attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles
is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the
enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of
excellence.”
-- Sun Tzu, 4th Century B.C.
how can we do this?
informational FDOs

PA ops can be key to “driving a crisis back to
peace” - Lt. Gen. Ron Keys, EUCOM J-3



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heightening public awareness and gaining and
maintaining their support
promoting national (and coalition) policies, aims and
objectives for the operation
combating enemy dis-information
keeping the operation in the news
PA ops must be carefully orchestrated
PDD - 68 helps
informational FDOs

presidential decision directive PDD - 68 helps the
U.S. government speak with:




one voice
one intent to the international audience
goal: “...more deliberate and well-developed
international public information strategy in promoting
our values and interests.”
integrates public affairs activities of government
departments into overall strategy through interagency
core group (ICG)
PDD - 68 can create a powerful strategic synergy for
the operational commander
informational FDOs

interagency core group -- ICG



assistant secretary-level reps from State, Defense, JCS,
US AID, NIC, NSC, and other offices or agencies as
situation requires
ICG will establish sub-groups on regional, functional,
and transnational issues as appropriate
ICG chaired by Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs
the ICG can coordinate powerful resources for the
commander’s FDOs and if needed, help create a
‘virtual force projection’
virtual force
projection
… combine military hardware with public
information to “project force”
virtual force projection

PA ops can effect a virtual force projection

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visible activity
visible resolve
visible enthusiasm
professional images
clear, unmistakable messages & images
send the enemy clear and unmistakable
messages and images -- goal can be to intimidate
the enemy through public information flowing
through the news media
resolving a crisis
case study
Haiti
case study: Haiti
 1994 UN authorized the use of force to remove the military
dictatorship in Haiti
 asked US to restore the lawfully elected government
 goal: generate public support for actions
 goal: show US resolve, intent to uphold UN resolution
 goal: show US willingness to resolve the conflict without
military force, although force was authorized
Haiti results
 Haiti dictators recognized international and US resolve -- saw
and heard leaders express support and determination to
restore elected government
 recognized willingness to use military force -- saw
preparations, heard from military leaders and service members
who believed in and supported the operation
 saw mobilization on TV -- watched forces load and depart
 quickly struck a deal to restore the elected government
“The objective is to ensure military
operations are put in the proper context
for the American public and audiences
around the world.”
Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton
commander, Haiti operation
using themes &
messages
never just “answer” a question !
respond to the question
ANSWER + MESSAGE = RESPONSE
using themes & messages

themes


messages

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message up front
you lead
bridging


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your main points - build them in advance
hooking

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overarching reasons for the campaign
don’t wait for “right” Q
move beyond the question
to the message
flagging


foot stompers - tell ‘em what’s important
voice inflection, hand gestures, body language
combating
enemy PSYOP
what PSYOPS techniques will the
enemy use against us in the
“public information battlespace ?”
propaganda
“propaganda for and against war, often
originating from senders halfway across the
world, sometimes masking the real source,
will be cleverly infiltrated into the news
exactly as entertainment is infiltrated into it
today.”
Alvin and Heidi Toffler
War and Anti-War, 1993
propaganda

enemy propaganda techniques
- atrocity
- hyperbolic inflation
- dehumanization & demonization
- polarization
- divine sanction
- metapropaganda
- transfer
- bandwagon
- unwarranted extrapolations
combating enemy propaganda

anticipate & identify propaganda
techniques being used
-- intel & PA = IO synergy

build PA Ops plan to counter the
techniques
 base plans on absolute credibility and
ground truth
 absolute credibility is the “gold standard”
to counter the enemy’s propaganda
-- credibility built up over years & decades
-- vanishes overnight
Kosovo case study:
combating enemy propaganda
“for leaders, winning the media campaign is just as
important as winning the military campaign - the two
are inseparable - can’t win one without the other.”
Dr. Jamie Shea
NATO Spokesman
why plan for and try to win the
“media campaign ?”
because . . .

keeps public opinion behind the operation

convinces your adversary that you are not going
to give up

sends a message to the enemy leadership

sends a message to the victims to hold on and
stay the course
how well did we do it in Kosovo ?
Admiral Ellis’ views . . .
“not a shining moment for the U.S. or NATO”
the enemy was better at this than we were… and far
more nimble
 the enemy deliberately and criminally killed innocents
by the thousands…but no one saw it
 we accidentally killed innocents sometimes by the
dozens…and the world watched on the evening news
 we were continuously reacting, investigating and
trying to answer “how could this happen?”
 Milosevic had informational “interior lines”

“a much underutilized instrument of national and
alliance power… ignore it at your peril”
why did we fail, if we failed ?
“It is quite simple -- no pictures, no news.”
Dr. Jamie Shea
a simplistic analysis or a profound insight ?
obstacles - press coverage in the
information age
international press:

primarily interested in the instantaneous image -becomes reality of the day

believes objectivity requires a “pro-con” debate

constructs the story from the picture, rather than
other way around
how do we deal with this new environment ?
Shea’s solutions

get out “ahead” of events - (recognize public
information as a “battlespace”) - gain, maintain the
initiative!

give ‘em pictures ! dedicate resources to do this

use government & military leaders rather than
“spokesmen” to take the case to the public

stress theme repeatedly that we are morally right

develop & use messages over and over again - across
entire spectrum
Shea’s solutions

saturate the airwaves with your themes, your
leaders, your messages, your images

don’t expect perfection

cold war paradigm is N/A to most of today’s
missions - so “weigh & challenge” classification

mobilize PA ops early

smooth, fast operational information flow
between Joint Task Force and PA critical
Shea’s solutions

intel needs to provide more unclassified info and provide it faster - will help us “get out front”

PA needs to better understand enemy’s
propaganda plan - and “get out front” of the
enemy’s efforts

plan to work the “public information battlespace,”
include PA ops in exercises and wargames and
expand media training for leaders
“…what information was released was managed, massaged,
and manipulated by NATO and the Pentagon -- with an eye to
filling up air time with the alliance’s message of the day, rather
than filling in the blanks for the thirsty media and the
uninformed public.”
James Kitfield
National Journal
press views of PA ops

managed, massaged, manipulated

ground vs. air war - media accessibility

possible backlash if not careful
implications for the future

images are stronger than words
 must better understand and get ahead of enemy
propaganda
 must be able to anticipate and get bad news out
first - before the enemy puts his “spin” on it
 must be able to better understand the “media”
increasing use of internet by friend and foe are
changing the dynamics of news reporting
 must be able to carefully coordinate and
orchestrate PA ops across oceans and time
zones
 be careful, open and up-front with all this -- the
press are not dummies and will not “be used !”
summary