Dan Quint
Fall 2011
Lecture 23

Logistics
 Remaining lectures
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Today: some interesting digressions
Wednesday: efficiency, recap
Next week: review, practice problems
 Homework 4 due Thursday, 11:59 p.m.
 Final: Thursday Dec 22
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12:25-2:25, 6210 Social Science
Cumulative, more weight on second half of semester
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Duress/necessity source: http://news.yahoo.com/man-sues-former-hostages-saysbroke-promise-190902970.html
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Models in
Economics
3

Imagine you’re a physicist

Economists (at least theorists) work the same way
 The world is too complicated to study “as is”
 So we make a simple model
 Try to leave in the “important parts” for studying a particular question
 Realize that our results follow from the assumptions that we made, and may or may not be relevant to the real world
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Many assumptions get made differently in different situations
 “Are people risk averse?”
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Ask a sociologist, you get an answer
Ask an economist, he’ll say, “It depends on what type of problem you’re studying”
 For some questions, risk aversion is important
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How people choose investment portfolios
How people save for retirement if they don’t know how long they’ll live
 For other questions, risk aversion plays no role
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Including risk aversion complicates model, without adding insight
So we assume agents are risk neutral – not because they are, but because we’re focusing on something else
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What does it take to do economic theory?
Reduce a situation to a tractable model
Solve the model
Interpret the model
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Judgment
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(Which assumptions to make)
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Technical ability
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Judgment
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(How much to
“trust” results, given the model/ assumptions behind them)
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Another way to think about this:
 “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
– George Box (Statistician)
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The idea of a “standard” model
 We said: some assumptions (risk neutrality) get made differently in different settings
 Other assumptions get made so consistently that they become a part of the “standard way” that economists look at the world…
 …almost become a part of conventional wisdom
 And then we start to forget that they were assumptions in the first place
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Basically all mainstream microeconomics is based on two premises
 People have preferences
 Allowed to like whatever they like…
 …but assumed to understand all their options, and how they rank them
 And people optimize
 People pick whichever option they like most…
 …subject to what they can afford
 To put it another way, people are rational
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We’ve been assuming this throughout the semester
 “People respond to incentives according to what they correctly perceive to be their own rational best interest”
 Property/nuisance law
 each knows own threat point, can bargain with each other to transfer ownership of entitlements to whoever values them most
 Contract law
 can negotiate efficient contracts, courts can enforce them correctly
 Tort law
 people know effects of their actions, react rationally to incentives
 courts can assign liability and assess damages correctly
 Criminal law
 even criminals react rationally to incentives, commit crimes when benefit outweighs expected cost
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But rationality is a strong assumption
 Very useful assumption
 Led to lots of predictions about how laws affect behavior…
 …and therefore what types of laws would lead to efficient outcomes
 But conclusions are only as valid as the assumptions
 Today:
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How these assumptions sometimes fail in real life…
…and therefore why we may be skeptical about some of the semester’s conclusions
But, you’re still being tested on those conclusions!
 Think of today as a digression
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Behavioral Law and Economics
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Behavioral economics
 How peoples’ actual behavior differs from predictions of
“standard model”
 Started out ad-hoc
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Take a prediction of the standard model, e.g., expected utility maximization
Do an experiment – put a bunch of undergrads in a room and make them play a game
Or look for instances in real world where prediction was violated
 Over time, generated some fairly robust conclusions
 Systematic ways behavior differs from perfect rationality in a number of different situations
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Behavioral economics
 What’s important is that deviations from standard predictions of economics are not random
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Not random errors
But consistent, systematic biases
 At its best, behavioral economics holds itself to a “higher standard” than traditional economics
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Traditional economics: makes assumptions (rationality and optimization), derives predictions
Asks whether predictions seem right, but doesn’t spend much time questioning the assumptions
Behavioral economics looks to justify the assumptions as well
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Behavioral economics – sources
 Two recent “pop economics” books that are supposed to be pretty good:
 Effect of behavioral economics on law and econ:
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Jolls/Sunstein/Thaler discuss three different
“uses” for economics
 Positive
 “Increase in expected punishment will lead to decrease in crime”
 Or, an explanation for the laws that do exist, as outcomes of some process (evolutionary, legislative, etc.)
 Prescriptive
 “To achieve efficiency, the law should specify injunctive relief when transaction costs are low, and damages when TC are high”
 Normative
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What should be the goal of the legal system?
(For this class, we’ve assumed it’s efficiency)
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Behavioral economics has implications for all three of these
 Positive
 Goal of any positive model is to mirror actual behavior
 Prescriptive
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If people respond differently than standard model predicts…
…then the law should be designed differently to account for this
 Normative
 If people seem to make “incorrect” choices, should we force them to choose “correctly”?
 If people do not optimize based on stable preferences, even the definition of efficiency becomes unclear
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The goal of behavioral law and economics
 To give a more accurate model of how people actually behave…
 …and use that model to reconsider the positive, prescriptive, and normative conclusions of law and economics
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So, how does behavior typically differ from the standard model?
 Bounded rationality
 We make mistakes…
 …and use simple heuristics or “rules of thumb” to make choices
 Bounded willpower
 Even when we know what we “should” do, don’t always do it
 Means commitment devices can have value
 Bounded self-interest
 We aren’t totally selfish, even in anonymous situations with strangers
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Behavioral biases in how we evaluate alternatives
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Trading experiment from Cornell
 Similar to the first experiment we did in this class
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44 students in an advanced undergrad Law and Econ class
Half were given tokens
Each was given a number – how much they could exchange a token for at the end of the experiment
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Given an opportunity to trade
As you’d expect, people with high token values bought them from people with low token values
This was with tokens – which had objective, artificial value
 Reran experiment with coffee mugs
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Half the students were given Cornell mugs
Then they were given opportunity to trade
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Trading experiment from Cornell
 Since the mugs were given out randomly…
 If each person knew exactly what a mug was worth to them…
 …we’d expect half the mugs to change hands
 Since half the mug owners would have above-average values, and half would have below-average values
 Instead, only 15% of the mugs were traded
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On average, people who got a mug asked more than twice as much money for them as people who didn’t get a mug were willing to pay
And the effect remained if the experiment was repeated
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Endowment effect
 Conclusion from the Cornell experiment: having something makes you value it more
 If you have a mug, you value mugs more than if you don’t
 “Endowment effect”
 Existence of this bias seems robust
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One of the chapters in Sunstein book shows 12 studies where
Willingness To Pay for something is compared to Willingness To
Accept an offer for something people already have
Every time, people who have something value it more than people who don’t – typically by 3X or more!
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Endowment effect – so what?
 Contradicts Coase Theorem
 Coase: without transaction costs, initial allocation shouldn’t affect final allocation, since whoever starts with something, it will get traded to whoever values it most
 But endowment effects mean initial allocation does matter in predicting final allocation
 Plus, if preferences depend on who starts with the object, it’s not even clear how to define efficiency!
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Endowment effect – so what?
 Using injunctive relief for private nuisances
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When TC small, clarify threat points and let parties bargain
Endowment effect: initial allocation effects preferences, outcome
 Calculating damages
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Suppose someone with two arms thinks losing one would be a catastrophe, like a $10,000,000 loss
Someone with one arm realizes he’s OK that way, thinks damage done was $500,000
What should construction company owe a worker who lost an arm?
 Should they take precautions that cost $3MM per lost arm saved?
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Context dependence
Price
 “Second-cheapest wine” effect
Quality/features
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Behavioral biases in how we perceive probabilities
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Hindsight bias
 Once something happens, people overestimate what its likelihood was
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One year before last election, what was chance Obama would win?
In November 2007, Intrade had Obama at 7%
 Famous study (Baruch Fischhoff)
 Nixon’s historic 1972 visits to China and USSR
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Students asked to assign probabilities to various outcomes
After visit, asked to recall what probabilities they reported
For the things that happened, 78 of 103 students gave higher probability estimates after than they gave before
(For things that didn’t happen, 58 of 102 – much weaker effect)
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Hindsight bias – so what?
 Determining negligence (Hand Rule) requires figuring out the probability something would happen, after it happens
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Example: risk of factory fire is 1 in 1,000, harm is $1,000,000, company chooses not to install $10,000 sprinkler system
Fire occurs, jury thinks risk was 1 in 50, finds company negligent
Publiclyowned companies must disclose “material risks” to investors
 Judges/juries will find negligence more often than “should”
 Jolls/Sunstein/Thaler suggestions for dealing with this
 Keep jury in the dark about what happened
 Raise standard of proof for finding negligence
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Similar bias – perception of probability skewed by availability and salience
 People overestimate probability of a certain type of accident if they’ve recently observed a similar accident
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“Availability” – memory of a recent accident is available in your mind, colors your judgment
“Salience” – how vivid the memory is
 Explains environmental/safety regulations covering “hot topic” without regard for cost-benefit
 Made worse because some people may deliberately keep the accident available for private gain
 “Availability entrepreneurs” – think of U.S. politicians after 9/11/01
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“Self-serving bias”
 Relative optimism when both sides have same information
 Example
 Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer and Babcock (1993), “Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining”, Journal of Legal Studies
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80 students asked to negotiate settlement for tort case
Some chosen at random to represent plaintiff, others defendant
Given facts of actual case from Texas – car hit motorcyclist, who was suing for $100,000
Actual (retired) judge examined case and gave ruling (secret)
Students would negotiate a settlement (or fail to reach an agreement and accept judge’s ruling minus costs)
Before negotiations started, students asked to predict how judge had ruled, and what they thought was “fair” settlement
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“Self-serving bias”
 What happened?
What do you think is a fair settlement?
How do you think judge ruled?
Actual judge’s ruling
Students representing plaintiff
$37,028
$38,953
$30,560
Students representing defendant
$19,318
$24,426
 So what?
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Pretrial settlements may be hard to reach…
…and sharing information may not be solve the problem
(all students had exactly same information)
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Bounded willpower
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How people discount the future
 People discount future events…
 …but not in the way standard model predicts
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Standard model: if discount factor is 11%,
$100 today = $90 in a year = $81 in two years = $73 in three = …
 Drop in value between “now” and “later” is more severe than between two future times
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Example: $100 today versus $150 in six months…
…or $100 in six months versus $150 in a year
 So what?
 Longer prison sentence may have weak deterrence effect
 (Also, people may not save enough for retirement)
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Bounded self-interest
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“Ultimatum game”
 Player 1 proposes a way to divide up $10
 Player 2 says yes or no
 Yes: they each get the proposed share
 No: they both get nothing
 Backward induction: only equilibrium is for 1 to keep almost everything, 2 to say yes
 Experiments: offers less than $3-4 are often rejected, many people offer fairly even split
 Shocking to economists, obvious to everyone else:
 People sacrifice their own well-being to help those who are being kind to them
 And sacrifice their own well-being to punish those who are unkind
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One interpretation of bounded self-interest
 People care not only about their own payoff, but also about
“fairness”
 But fairness is not objective – not all offers < $5 rejected
 Preference for fairness could explain lots of rules we see:
 Rules against scalping tickets
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Rules against predatory pricing during emergencies
Rules against usury (very high interest rates)
Any voluntary transaction should be a Paretoimprovement…
…but prices which are too “unfair” are sometimes illegal
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Jolls/Sunstein/Thaler prescriptive and normative
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Jolls/Sunstein/Thaler
 Lots of interesting stuff on positive aspects
 Less on prescriptive and normative
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One prescriptive suggestion
 How people respond to information depends on how it’s presented
 Example: choosing between safe and risky retirement investments
 So if government is putting out information, should think about how “framing” changes its effect
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Safe driving ads used to be, “Drive carefully, or you’ll kill someone”
But everyone believes they’re a good driver
When ads changed to, “Drive carefully, there are other BAD
DRIVERS out there you have to watch out for!”
 They started having more of an effect
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Jolls/Sunstein/Thaler’s conclusion: the case for “anti-antipaternalism”
 Antipaternalism
 Government shouldn’t tell people what to do
 J/S/T stop short of advocating paternalism
 If behavioral bias leads individuals to make mistakes, could also lead government bureaucrats to make mistakes in telling people what to do!
 “Anti-antipaternalism”
 We shouldn’t automatically reject paternalism, since it may have a role sometimes
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Unenforced laws
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We saw last week…
 Optimal criminal system will not detect/punish every crime, for two reasons
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Some crimes may be efficient (rare)
When cost of deterrence is positive, it’s not worth paying enough to deter every crime
 But we still assumed most crimes are inefficient, and main reason not to punish them all is cost
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However…
 There are a lot of old laws in many states that seem inefficient
 Massachusetts: can’t buy alcohol on Sundays
 Many states still have laws passed a long time ago
 In some cases, law is enforced
 Tim Wu, “American Lawbreaking” – many laws that we, as a society, have basically decided not to enforce at all
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(Example I found online last semester)
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Tim Wu, “American Lawbreaking” (Slate) http://www.slate.com/id/2175730/entry/2175733/
 Begins with New York prosecutors sitting around office, choosing celebrities (John Lennon, Mother Theresa) and coming up with obscure crimes they could be charged with
 “obstructing the mails,” “false pretenses on the high seas”
 “Full enforcement of every last law on the books would put all of us in prison for crimes such as “injuring a mail bag.” No enforcement of our laws, on the other hand, would mean anarchy. Somehow, officials must choose what laws really matter.”
 “Tolerated lawbreaking is almost always a response to a political failure
– the inability of our political institutions to adapt to social change or reach a rational compromise that reflects the interests of the nation and all concerned parties. That’s why the American statutes are full of laws that no one wants to see fully enforced – or even enforced at all.”
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First example doesn’t perfectly fit premise, but interesting
 “Over the last two decades, the pharmaceutical industry has developed a full set of substitutes for just about every illegal narcotic we have.”
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Rather than legalizing street drugs…
…society has developed Ritalin, vicodin, oxycontin, clonazepam, etc…
…which may serve legitimate medical purposes in some instances, but also mimic highs of cocaine and other drugs
 Marijuana: several cities where police chiefs or DAs have announced they won’t prosecute possession
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Philadelphia law will treat possession as a ticketable offense
Medical marijuana in California and elsewhere
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Wu’s second example: pornography
 Apparently, there’s porn online
 And it’s basically all illegal
 Federal law prohibits using a “computer service” to transport over state lines “any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter or indecent character.”
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Wu’s second example: pornography
 In 1968, Congress set up a commission to investigate
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Commission recommended we repeal all obscenity laws, replace them with laws to protect children and control public display
Nixon and other politicians condemned report as “morally bankrupt”, insisted they would continue war on pornography
 A few well-publicized prosecutions in 70s and 80s, halted in
90s
 2005: Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez tried to pressure local prosecutors to crack down, but nothing happened
 One Miami attorney: “compared to terrorism, public corruption, and narcotics, [pornography] is no worse than dropping gum on the sidewalk.”
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Wu’s second example: pornography
 So pornography is technically illegal, rarely prosecuted
 What’s developed is unofficial zoning system – rather than prohibiting behavior, it’s regulated
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Prosecuted when it crosses certain lines
Ignored otherwise
Super Bowl wardrobe malfunction – when something gets on primetime network TV, people freak out
Child pornography still prosecuted
But “mainstream” porn left alone, so functionally legal
 So as a society, we’ve functionally legalized porn…
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Not through legislation or courts…
…but through general concensus among prosecutors, FCC, FBI, local police, etc., to do nothing about it 51

Wu’s other examples: copyright law, illegal immigration, Amish and Mormons
 Amish refuse to pay Social Security taxes, do not accept benefits, do not educate children past eighth grade
 Mormons to some degree still practice polygamy
 Wu discusses history of legal treatment
 Again, what’s emerged is de facto zoning
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Mormon polygamist went on Sally Jessy and Springer to discuss his lifestyle, he was tried and convicted
But when it’s done quietly, in scattered communities outside of big cities, polygamy still goes on and is basically tolerated
Amish are open about how they live, but keep to themselves, and nobody worries about it
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This all doesn’t really fit into our framework of criminal law
 You’d think crimes are crimes because society wants them to be crimes
 But in some cases, society doesn’t care whether something is a crime, but doesn’t care enough to make it legal either
 Or, political system is “broken” enough that some things can’t be fixed, we adapt by ignoring certain laws
 More obvious example: speeding
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So what’s my point for today?
 Throughout the semester, we’ve been assuming rationality
 Of individuals, of businesses, etc.
 This has led to a number of conclusions
 Today: like with all economics, our conclusions are only as strong as our faith in our assumptions
 When we apply these conclusions to the real world, need to be aware of how they depend on assumptions, how robust they are when assumptions are violated
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