‘The problem of Trinity College Dublin’:
A historical perspective on
rationalisation in higher education
in Ireland
Irish Educational Studies
1
‘The problem of Trinity College Dublin’:
a historical perspective on rationalisation in higher education
in Ireland
Abstract
This paper offers a historical perspective on government policies for the
rationalisation of higher education (HE) in Ireland through a critical reappraisal of the initiative for ‘merger’ of Trinity College and University College
Dublin. The initiative launched by Donogh O’Malley in 1967 was the first
significant attempt by an Irish government to transform the institutional
architecture of higher education. This study sheds new light on the rationale
for merger. A key motivation for the merger was to overcome ‘the problem of
Trinity College Dublin’: policy-makers sought to integrate Trinity College, long
regarded as a Protestant ‘enclave’ in a predominantly Catholic society, within
the Irish HE system. O’Malley’s initiative sought to bring TCD firmly under the
control of the state and transcend traditional religious divisions, by
circumventing the ‘ban’ on the attendance of Catholics at TCD imposed by the
Catholic bishops. This paper also explores the emergence of pro-active,
interventionist approaches by Irish ministers and officials to policy formulation
and implementation in HE.
Keywords:
Higher education, rationalisation, merger, state intervention, policy
Dr. John Walsh
CAVE Research Centre
School of Education
2
‘The problem of Trinity College Dublin’:
A historical perspective on rationalisation
in higher education in Ireland
----------------------------------------------------------Introduction
The prospect of merger between higher education institutions is an
intermittent but persistent theme in Irish educational policy. Contemporary
debates around the rationalisation of the higher education landscape, framed
by a discourse asserting the primacy of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the
central place of higher education in national economic revival, offer the latest
testimony to the persistence of the idea of institutional merger as a convenient
solution for economic and societal problems. The famous initiative for the
merger of Trinity College Dublin and University College Dublin, brought
forward by Donogh O’Malley in April 1967, fell short of realisation but
continues to fascinate scholars and commentators – not least because it
signalled the beginning of far-reaching policy change in higher education. The
initiative also offers valuable insights regarding the practice of policy-making
during the 1960s. .While the rhetoric and official justification for the merger
differs significantly from contemporary discourse on higher education, the
initiative underlines the emergence of pro-active, interventionist approaches to
policy-making by the political centre, which would remain an enduring feature
of Irish HE over the following half a century.
This paper is a case study of the first significant official initiative
seeking the rationalisation of university education in Ireland. A critical
3
exploration of O’Malley’s initiative for a university merger offers valuable
insights into the evolution of higher education policies in the Irish state at a
time of far-reaching societal and cultural change. The policy changes of the
1960s triggered a profound transformation in the Irish higher education
system and inaugurated a gradual but far-reaching transition in the relations
between the state and traditionally autonomous universities. The study draws
mainly upon documentary analysis of archival collections, official documents
and newspapers. This documentary analysis is supplemented by a small
number of interviews with former officials and academics.
Trow’s theoretical model for the development of higher education
indicates a progression from ‘elite’ to ‘mass’ systems of higher education and
ultimately to ‘universal’ access (Trow 1974, 61-2). Perhaps the most valuable
insight of Trow’s model was not its concept of linear progression which was
questioned in the 1980s, not least by Trow himself (Clancy 1989, p.100), but
his focus on the transformative nature of expansion which exerted a farreaching influence at all levels of institutional life, work and culture. O’Sullivan
suggests that religious ideals associated with a dominant ’theocentric’
paradigm, which provided the ideological backdrop for educational policy in
the first generation of the Irish state, were gradually displaced from the 1950s
by a ‘mercantile’ paradigm with economic considerations at its core
(O’Sullivan 2005, 104). This transition was closely associated with the
increasing influence of human capital theory, a major strand of international
economic thinking since the early 1960s, which held that investment in people
produced a potentially greater return of investment than investment in
physical capital (Ibid., 143). International influences mediated through the
4
Organisation
for
Economic
Co-operation
and
Development
(OECD)
contributed significantly to policy change: the Investment in Education study,
completed by an OECD survey team in 1965, was particularly influential,
applying an economic lens to educational challenges and chronicling the
shortcomings of the existing educational systems at all levels (Government of
Ireland, 1965). Irish political and administrative elites were profoundly
influenced by theories of human capital formation, which emerged as the most
significant ideological rationale for the rapid expansion of the educational
sector since the 1960s (Gleeson and Ó Donnabháin 2009, 29-30). Clancy
highlights the firmly utilitarian orientation of higher education policy from the
1970s, driven by vocational priorities linked to national economic development
(Clancy, 1989 in Mulcahy and O’Sullivan, 123). This broad ideological
reorientation underpinned a gradual transformation of Irish higher education
from an ‘elite’ to a ‘mass’ system as identified by Trow (1974, 61-63). This did
not entail a complete break with inherited patterns of policy-making, not least
due to the persistent legacy of the dominant religious and cultural influences
of the previous generation. Newly important economic imperatives co-existed
uneasily with traditional denominational and cultural norms.
The historical legacy
Higher education institutions (HEIs) in Ireland historically enjoyed a high
degree of institutional autonomy and were not the focus of significant state
intervention following the foundation of the Irish Free State in 1922. The four
established universities, Trinity College Dublin (TCD) and the three
constituent colleges of the National University of Ireland (NUI), were largely
5
left to their own devices by successive Irish governments. Yet autonomy
came at a high price: all four university colleges were severely underresourced, with net state expenditure on higher education in 1958-59
amounting only to 0.62% of overall appropriations (Public Accounts
Committee 1959, 88). The policy of successive governments towards higher
education between 1922 and the late 1950s appeared to reflect a traditional
idea of university autonomy, involving ‘a self-denying ordinance of nonintervention’ in higher education on the part of the state (Neave 1982, 233).
Yet in practice the state’s policy amounted to little more than benign neglect,
as universities hardly featured at all in a national discourse dominated by
conservative Catholicism, protectionism and nationalism.
The idea of amalgamation between Trinity College Dublin and UCD did
not emerge from a clear sky in the mid-1960s. The Fry commission appointed
by the British government in 1906 proposed the reconstitution of the
University of Dublin as a federal institution including both Trinity College and
the Catholic university associated with John Henry Newman, which had
evolved into University College Dublin. Instead University College was
accommodated within the federal structure of the NUI under the universities
legislation brought forward by the Liberal chief secretary Augustine Birrell in
1908, while TCD was left undisturbed as the sole constituent college of the
University of Dublin (Coolahan 2003, 757-8). Merger then disappeared from
public debate for a generation, in which higher education impinged hardly at
all on the preoccupations of the nationalist elite which guided the fortunes of
the new Irish state.
6
Trinity College, Dublin operated in an inhospitable cultural and political
context during the first generation of the independent Irish state, due largely to
its traditional association with the dominant Protestant elite in the nineteenth
century. TCD was strongly attacked by the Gaelic League and other
advocates for revival of the Irish language as ‘hopelessly out of touch with the
national life of the country’ during the debate on the universities question in
1906-07 (Lydon 1992, p.40). Moreover, Trinity College was confronted with
the unremitting hostility of the Catholic Church since the late nineteenth
century (Lydon 1992, 38-9). The bishops regarded the university colleges of
the NUI as acceptable institutions for the education of Catholics, but were
hostile to Trinity College partly on the basis of its Protestant tradition but even
more because it was considered to be a repository of secular and antiCatholic influences (Commission on Higher Education, MFS8223, L10.4, 26
May 1961, 141-61). The bishops, at the instigation of John Charles McQuaid,
the Archbishop of Dublin, re-affirmed their policy in 1956, prohibiting the
attendance of Catholics at Trinity College without the explicit permission of the
archbishop (Lydon 1992, 42-3). While the college authorities established more
constructive relations with political and official elites in the 1950s, Trinity
College occupied at best a semi-detached position in an Irish society heavily
influenced by ‘integralist’ Catholicism, which sought to transform Ireland into a
more completely Catholic state than it had yet become (Walsh 2012, 108-127;
Whyte 1980, 158-61). The Department of Education acknowledged the
difficulties of Trinity’s position in a memorandum to the government in
December 1966, commenting that:
7
The College is in a position which calls for some sympathy.
Circumstances have left it with a working machine which, as far as
most Irish students are concerned, is not attracting material for the
winnowing (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December
1966, 10).
The rigorous implementation of the ecclesiastical ‘ban’ had an undeniable
impact on TCD, with the proportion of Catholic entrants falling to only 17% of
student admissions in 1960 (J.V. Luce 1992, 196). The college was heavily
dependent on its ability to attract non-Irish students, with a majority of the
student population drawn from outside the Republic of Ireland in the early
1960s. Trinity College traditionally attracted a far higher proportion of entrants
drawn from Britain and the unionist community in Northern Ireland than the
NUI, due to its history, international prestige and association with the
Protestant tradition in Ireland. Moreover, TCD experienced a rapidly
expanding intake of British students after the second world war. While about a
third of the TCD student population of approximately 2,000 was drawn from
outside the island of Ireland in 1952-53, the proportion of non-Irish students
amounted to 46% of a student population of 3,000 by 1962-63 (Lyons 1972,
655; Luce 1992, 183). This increased dependence on British students soon
attracted hostile attention from official elites
The idea of a merger re-surfaced during the public debate on the
transfer of UCD to a new site at Belfield. The relocation of the college, which
was vigorously promoted by Dr. Michael Tierney, president of UCD (1947-64),
did not command universal support among the college’s academic staff and a
possible merger with TCD emerged as an alternative favoured by opponents
8
of the Belfield project. John J. O’Meara, Professor of Classical Languages at
UCD, proposed a close association between the two universities in Dublin on
27 March 1958 in a public lecture entitled ‘Reform in Education’, arguing that
‘Dublin would have one of the greatest universities in the English-speaking
world, if to the old and great tradition of Trinity College were joined the
traditions of Newman’s Catholic University’ (O’Meara 1958, 18-19). But a
merger never became a credible prospect in the late 1950s, not least because
the transfer of UCD to Belfield commanded influential political support,
including the decisive endorsement of Eamon de Valera in his final term as
Taoiseach. A commission to examine accommodation needs for the NUI,
established by de Valera, endorsed the transfer of UCD to the new site in
1959 despite a strong dissent by one of its members, Aodhogán O’Rahilly
(Government of Ireland 1959, 47-8). When the proposed transfer was
considered by the Dáil in March 1960, Dr. Patrick Hillery, the Minister for
Education, explicitly ruled out amalgamation between Trinity and UCD on the
basis that it would deny protection to the religious preferences of parents,
which were guaranteed by the constitution (Dáil Debates 180, 23 March 1960,
940-41). The minister’s statement was framed carefully to avoid conflict with
the Catholic bishops.
When the government established a new Commission on Higher
Education in 1960 with a remit to conduct a far-reaching review of third-level
education, encompassing all institutions of HE, the only issue specifically
excluded from its remit was the government’s decision on the transfer of UCD
to Belfield. The Commission rejected the option of a merger between Trinity
College and UCD, recommending instead close collaboration between the two
9
institutions and the establishment of UCD as an independent university
(Government of Ireland 1967, pp.47-51). The commission’s report was not
submitted until 1967 and its lengthy deliberations limited its influence in an era
when educational policy was being transformed. Government policies on HE
were about to undergo a radical shift with far-reaching implications for the
higher education sector.
‘O’Malley announces wedding plans’
The influence of key agents in policy-making - notably politicians and senior
officials - was a notable feature of policy change in HE. The government’s
decision to sponsor the transfer of UCD to Belfield was influenced by de
Valera within the government and by Dr. Tarlach Ó Raifeartaigh, the secretary
of the Department of Education, within the administrative elite. Hillery’s
statement in favour of the transfer of UCD was drafted by Ó Raifeartaigh, who
was a devout lay Catholic and confidant of McQuaid (Walsh 2009, 54). This
decision underlined the residual influence of ‘integralist’ Catholicism, forcefully
represented by McQuaid. .
Yet it was Donogh O’Malley who left the most distinctive personal
imprint on policy-making in HE. O’Malley, who was appointed by Lemass as
Minister for Education in July 1966, was among the most ambitious and
dynamic members of a new political generation within the governing Fianna
Fáil party. O’Malley’s impatience to make his mark in education and his
flamboyant political style led to a number of dramatic public initiatives
designed to accelerate policy change, notably the announcement of free
second-level education in September 1966 (Walsh 2009, 313). The minister
10
was disposed to seek a merger of Trinity College and UCD from the outset
and found a plausible rationale in the changing demographic profile of higher
education.
O’Malley’s preference for radical restructuring of the traditional
universities was facilitated by a favourable political and institutional
environment, due to concern among senior officials within the Department of
Education to curb the autonomy of TCD, frustration within government at the
lengthy deliberations of the commission and perhaps most significantly the
increasingly rapid expansion of student enrolments. TCD experienced an
upsurge in student numbers during the 1960s, in line with an international
trend for increasing enrolments in higher education since the second world
war: the student body increased by 75% within a decade from 2,443 in 1960
to 4,032 in 1970 (HEA 1974, p.46). The department was dissatisfied at the
decision by the Board of TCD in 1965 to expand the maximum student body
up to 4,000 students by 1970 ‘without consultation with the Minister for
Education’ (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966,
1). The expansion of the college demanded an extensive building programme,
including the construction of a new arts building, which involved a request for
capital funding from the state of just under £2.4 million. Meanwhile, a new arts
and administration block at Belfield, had already received official approval, in
line with the government’s commitment to accommodate UCD on its new site
(HEA 1985, 42). It was Trinity’s request for major capital investment, at the
same time as UCD forged ahead with the move to Belfield, which raised
duplication of academic activity and resources as a key issue and emerged as
a catalyst for the proposed university merger..
11
O’Malley first raised the prospect of a university merger with the
Cabinet on 15 December 1966, even before the commission had completed
its report (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966).
O’Malley’s confidential submission to the government, bluntly entitled ‘The
Problem of Trinity College Dublin’, was much more revealing about the official
motivations for a merger than his subsequent policy announcement. O’Malley
warned the government that ‘…the problem is now brought to a head by
Trinity’s present student numbers, policy and capital claim. Its present policy,
if accepted, would evidently not stop there and would indeed draw in its train
implicit further commitment on the part of the State’ (NAI D/T 98/6/195,
Department of Education, 15 December 1966, 21-2). He argued that ‘the
State should not have to shoulder the enormous expense of duplication that
will be involved’ in financing the expansion of two rival universities in Dublin,
especially as the additional funding for TCD represented a commitment to the
education of non-Irish students (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of Education,
15 December 1966, 2). The composition of Trinity’s student body drew
criticism on the basis that it guaranteed the export of a majority of its
graduates and reduced the university’s value to Irish society: indeed the
departmental memorandum commented that the majority of non-Irish and
Northern Ireland students ‘constitute a present to Britain and other countries
of technical assistance of the highest quality’ (December 1966, 9).
Yet O’Malley’s concerns were not simply about money or nationalist
angst at subsidising the children of the ancient imperial oppressor – although
both were present to varying degrees in his reflections on the university
question. The minister perceived TCD as a non-Catholic institution, dominated
12
by a narrow elite of mainly Protestant senior academics, dependent on British
students for its survival and isolated from contemporary Irish society.
O’Malley’s position was admirably summarised by his officials:
The Minister feels that we cannot allow a position to continue in which
one University in Dublin would be allowed to remain apart from the
main stream of the nation and continue to recruit its student body to a
large extent from foreigners (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of
Education, 9 March 1967, 1).
O’Malley expressed frustration at the autonomy enjoyed by the Board of
Trinity College in regulating student admissions and institutional expansion.
He noted disapprovingly that ‘The Board of Trinity is an absolutely
independent body and there is no legal or other effective means of preventing
it from adopting a policy of expansion’ (NAI D/T 98/6/195, Department of
Education, 15 December 1966, 1). TCD’s autonomy was problematic because
it underpinned the college’s ability to accept a high proportion of non-Irish
students and remain apparently impervious to the priorities of the Irish
government. The memorandum was explicit in its criticism of Trinity College’s
autonomous governance and the power enjoyed by its traditional academic
elite:
The answer is not in anything that the Trinity authorities may be
expected to do, for a body with absolute power has never been known
willingly to abdicate it…If Trinity is really to fit into Irish life… then it
13
would appear to be necessary for its constitution and government
organisation to be democratised in the same way as are those of the
other University Colleges. As such a reform cannot be expected to
come from within, it can only be effected by the Government (NAI D/T
98/6/195, Department of Education, 15 December 1966, 11-12).
The official memorandum acknowledged that the Board wished the
college to be regarded as ‘a full participant in the country’s life’, but concluded
that such sentiments were unachievable within the existing institutional
framework: ‘They do not seem to realise, however, that with their present
constitution and system of government and with their traditions of graduate
export, they can be no more than an enclave here’ (NAI D/T 98/6/195,
Department of Education, 15 December 1966, 10). This official perspective
was not hostile to Trinity College on traditional sectarian grounds, but
regarded its continuing autonomous existence as economically unsustainable
and politically undesirable. The official proposals envisaged the establishment
of a single University of Dublin with Trinity College and University College as
its two constituent colleges ‘and with each complementary to the other’ (NAI
D/T 98/6/195, 15 December 1966, 23). O’Malley and his officials was seeking
to resolve several problems at once – Trinity’s semi-detached position within
Irish society, the denominational restrictions imposed by the Hierarchy’s ‘ban’
and the duplication of academic activity arising from the expansion of two
universities in Dublin. The department sought to integrate Trinity College
firmly within a restructured system of higher education, responsive to the
14
government’s policy priorities and characterised by greater official control of
higher education.
Although the government deferred any decision on university reorganisation until it received the report of the commission, O’Malley acted
decisively to sideline the report immediately after its submission to the
government in February 1967..O’Malley commented that the commission had
‘served the nation truly and well’, at the same press conference where he
explicitly rejected their recommendation for the retention of Trinity College and
UCD as independent institutions (Irish Times, 19 April 1967). The minister
sought the approval of the Cabinet for a formal merger between the two
colleges on 9 March 1967.. O’Malley argued that the state had to address the
anomalous position of Trinity College, claiming that ‘the Commission has to all
intents and purposes shied away from the problem’ (NAI D/T98/6/195,
Department of Education, 9 March 1967, 1). The Cabinet agreed on 31 March
that O’Malley should approach the university authorities with a proposal for
the creation of a single University of Dublin (NAI 99/5/1, G.C. 12/22, Cabinet
Minutes, 31 March 1967, 3-4). O’Malley’s personal imprint on policy formation
and his preference for dramatic, far-reaching reform in education proved
decisive in making a university merger the cornerstone of government policy
on university education in the late 1960s. The policy change also reflected the
adoption by the government of a pro-active and authoritative approach to
policy-making in higher education, which made HE the focus of significant
government intervention for the first time since the foundation of the state.
The minister quickly publicised the government’s decision, making his
policy announcement at a press conference on 18 April 1967. O’Malley
15
informed the Provost of TCD, Dr. Albert J. McConnell and the President of
UCD, Prof. Jeremiah Hogan, of the initiative only on the morning of his press
conference. (Irish Times, 19 April 1967). The policy announcement reflected
not only O’Malley’s favoured tactic of pre-empting potential opposition by
publicly announcing new policy initiatives in advance of any consultation with
stakeholders, but also the abrupt emergence of a more authoritative approach
to policy-making in higher education by political and official elites..
O’Malley’s policy statement identified the merger of Trinity College and
UCD as the government’s most urgent priority within a wider process of
reform and expansion in higher education: the government later endorsed the
dissolution of the NUI and the establishment of UCC and UCG as
independent universities. O’Malley proposed the creation of a single university
authority, established on a statutory basis, with a subsidiary authority for each
constituent college. The powers and composition of each governing body
were not yet decided and no specific details were given on a possible reallocation of faculties. He commented that the government had taken the
basic policy decision and expressed confidence that a viable solution would
be found provided that the necessary goodwill was forthcoming. The Irish
Times accurately commented that the Minister had assumed ‘a cheerful,
confident, shoot-first-and-ask-questions-afterwards mood’ (Irish Times, 19
April 1967).
Significantly, the minister gave considerable attention to the economic
case for a merger between the two institutions. He warned that the state could
not be expected to subsidise ‘avoidable duplication’ of university services due
to the competing claims of two universities in a single metropolitan area,
16
emphasising that ‘the whole thing cries out for some kind of complementary
allocation’ (O’Malley 1967, 113-21). The prospect of a substantial increase in
student numbers and the considerable commitment of the state to the
university building programmes meant that the government had to insist upon
‘a joining of forces with a view to obviating all unnecessary duplication.’
(O’Malley 1967, 116). He offered examples of departments which faced
amalgamation, arguing that the veterinary science faculties of the two
colleges should be merged: it would make economic sense too for all Science
students to be taught under a single roof. Economic and financial
considerations certainly loomed large in the minister’s proposal for an
institutional merger.
O’Malley, however, was keen to emphasise that the initiative was not
driven solely by economic necessity. He argued that ‘what makes economic
sense makes educational sense too’ (O’Malley 1967, 120). This argument
was based on the contentious premise that a single institution would be able
to provide education of a higher quality than separate colleges under existing
conditions: the collaboration produced by a merger would help to alleviate
high staff/student ratios and to raise academic standards (Irish Times, 19 April
1967). It was apparent, however, that educational considerations were the
least
important
among
the
policy
imperatives
driving
the
merger.
Consideration of educational benefits figured only briefly in the memoranda
submitted by the department to the government and where the educational
implications were discussed it was assumed unquestioningly that bringing
together staff and facilities would automatically enhance educational
standards. Moreover, O’Malley’s commentary on the educational benefits of
17
merger was brief and defensive, acknowledging that he had ‘treated mostly of
the economic side of things and of training for the professions’ and consisting
mainly of a ritualistic reference to Newman – ‘we are all to some extent
followers of Newman in the belief that a university has something more to give
its students than mere training’ (O’Malley 1967, 121).
O’Malley was more eloquent in developing a wider political rationale for
his initiative. He mixed idealistic appeals to history and national tradition with
his pragmatic analysis of economic realities, arguing that the existing situation
was culturally and politically undesirable. He asserted that merger would end
‘a most insidious form of partition on our doorstep’, namely the traditional
division between Trinity College, once the bastion of the Protestant
ascendancy, and UCD, which had evolved from the original core of Newman’s
Catholic University. The minister waxed lyrical in evoking the cultural and
political benefits of a merger for the nation in general and Trinity College in
particular:
Trinity is not going to pass away. It will be merely taking the final step
across the threshold of that mansion to which it properly belongs, the
Irish nation (O’Malley 1967, 118).
O’Malley also rejected the position that UCD should have been reconstituted as an independent university, arguing that participation in a new
University of Dublin would ‘eventually add greater prestige to University
College than if it were to stand apart on its own’ (O’Malley 1967, 119).
O’Malley had not sought the agreement of the Catholic bishops for the
removal of the ‘ban’, but intended to make their policy redundant through the
merger: the new University of Dublin would be multi-denominational, giving
18
full respect and recognition to all denominations of students (O’Malley 1967,
121; Hyland and Milne 1992, 418-20). This wider political vision lent support
to O’Malley’s confident claim that ‘we are at the opening of a new era in
higher education’ (Irish Times, 19 April 1967). O’Malley’s statement marked
the first significant attempt by an Irish government to transform the traditional
institutional architecture of higher education since the foundation of the state.
. Yet O’Malley’s strategy of announcing a policy decision in advance of
consultation with the institutional stakeholders proved much less effective
than it had in securing the introduction of free second-level education. On this
occasion O’Malley’s confident rhetoric did not reflect the reality of the
situation. The minister had easily brushed aside the views of the Commission
on Higher Education, but he faced far greater obstacles in securing the
agreement of the two universities to a radical reshaping of higher education.
Leading figures in Trinity College, including McConnell, were willing to
contemplate a merger, albeit within a federal structure which would have
diluted the influence of the larger partner. The UCD officers, however, sought
the assimilation of TCD into a larger university as a condition for their
acceptance of the project. The governing body of UCD immediately endorsed
a ‘complete unification of the two institutions’, urging that the new university
should combine all the material and intellectual resources of the two colleges
under a single unitary authority (MacHale 1967, 122-9). The ‘unification’ of the
two institutions was the model favoured by Prof. Hogan and the majority of the
governing body. But the authorities and academic staff of TCD had no
intention of accepting a merger based on unification of schools and
departments, which was correctly regarded as a thinly veiled attempt to
19
absorb Trinity into a larger institution with a very different cultural inheritance.
McConnell issued a personal statement expressing confidence that Trinity
College would ‘look at the Minister’s plans with the utmost sympathy’, which
was followed by a statement from the Board endorsing a single university
based on a two-college model. (Irish Times, 19 April 1967). The college
administration’s willingness to accept merger on a conditional basis reflected
McConnell’s determination to integrate TCD fully within Irish society and
awareness among college officers of the weakness of Trinity’s position
compared to UCD due to its difficulties in attracting Irish students (Luce 1992,
187).
The stark divergence between the two institutions was illustrated by a
symposium on the university merger, which was published in Studies in the
summer of 1967. J.P. MacHale, secretary of UCD, argued strongly for a full
unification of the two institutions, on the basis that a unitary structure would
minimise avoidable duplication of resources (MacHale 1967, 122-9).. He
claimed that the governing body of UCD was willing to make an extraordinary
sacrifice, surrendering the traditional identity of the college to create a new
university: ‘That a university institution should agree to liquidate itself as a
separate entity in order that a new and better university structure should rise,
phoenix-like, from the ashes, is a very unusual occurrence’ (MacHale 1967,
122-9). MacHale represented the institutional leadership of UCD, who were
opposed to a merger recreating a federal structure comparable to the existing
NUI.
MacHale’s generous interpretation of the official UCD response was
not shared in Trinity College. Basil Chubb, professor of political science and
20
college bursar (1964-74), spoke for many academic staff when he commented
that a unitary university was unacceptable to the staff and graduates of TCD
(Chubb 1967, 130-7). Chubb supported the O’Malley proposal for a single
university with two colleges, as such a structure would allow the preservation
of Trinity College’s existing academic community; it would also protect TCD’s
contribution to Irish society, a quality that Chubb considered essential to ‘help
combat the dreary and stifling conformity that is perhaps the greatest danger
to this nation’ (Chubb 1967, 130-7). Chubb’s opposition to a unitary structure
was endorsed by all the other TCD contributors to Studies: this position was
reiterated with particular force by T.W. Moody, professor of modern history
and a former member of the Commission on Higher Education. Moody
warned that a unitary university would mean ‘the extinction of TCD’ and only a
two-college structure stood any chance of acceptance by the college’s staff:
‘There being no death-wish in TCD, it will resist a unitary university to the
utmost’ (Moody 1967, 173-5).
Divisions also arose among academics in each institution. The unitary
model favoured by the governing body in UCD did not command universal
support among its academic staff. Denis Donoghue, professor of modern
English, argued that the governing body did not accurately represent the
views of the college’s academic staff: ‘They favour one University, two
Colleges. So do I’ (O’Donoghue 1967, 160-64). The Academic Staff
Association (ASA) in UCD emerged as a vocal contributor to the debate within
the college, usually in disagreement with the rigid unitary model favoured by
the officers of UCD. A minority of the governing body itself, in which the future
Taoiseach Dr. Garret FitzGerald was prominently involved, dissented from the
21
position of the president and officers, arguing for a more flexible approach
which did not make unified departments the cornerstone of a merger: this
minority succeeded in causing considerable irritation to the officers of UCD,
although they were outvoted at meetings of the governing body (O’Flynn
2012, 110-11). Meanwhile, the Fellows, the traditional governing elite of
Trinity College and still a powerful force within the institution, voted
overwhelmingly to reject a merger despite the more nuanced position
favoured by college officers (O’Donoghue 2005)..Yet whatever the internal
differences within the colleges, the divergence over a unitary or federal model
marked a fundamental division between powerful professional elites in each
institution, which could not be readily overcome. The negotiations between
the two institutions, which took place between November 1967 and February
1968, facilitated by Ó Raifeartaigh, not surprisingly proved inconclusive
(O’Flynn 2012, 113). Professor James Meenan, a member of UCD’s
negotiating team, commented that the negotiations between the colleges
appeared increasingly to be ‘an attempt to square a circle’ (Meenan 1968,
314-20). The inability of the negotiators to reach agreement on a mutually
acceptable redistribution of faculties and departments highlighted the concern
of professional elites within each university to protect established subject
disciplines and internal power structures.
‘Many of us feared the battle could not be won…’
John Coolahan highlights the failure of the government to consult adequately
among stakeholders or offer a convincing conception of what constituted
university education as key weaknesses which undermined the minister’s
22
plans (Coolahan 2008, 267). Yet O’Malley’s decision not to consult the
institutions in advance was deliberate and had worked successfully in
presenting prominent stakeholders in second-level education with a fait
accompli when he announced his initiative for free post-primary education.
The profound institutional differences regarding a unitary or two-college model
were more significant than lack of prior consultation in undermining the
minister’s initiative. The lack of detailed preparation for the merger within the
department was, however, a serious failure, reflecting an abrupt change of
direction driven by O’Malley and his key collaborators. Seán O’Connor, an
influential assistant secretary who supported the minister’s plans, admitted
subsequently that the department lacked detailed information about the
staffing requirements and accommodation needs of various faculties in the
event of merger (O’Connor 1986, 203). This omission explained the absence
of any definitive plan for re-organisation at the outset of the debate and also
limited the minister’s ability to develop a plausible educational rationale for the
merger, which emerged as perhaps the most fundamental weakness of the
official initiative. The early death of Donogh O’Malley in March 1968 deprived
the initiative of its most eloquent and persistent advocate: Ferriter suggests
that the idea ‘lost steam’ after O’Malley’s death (Ferriter 2012, 635). But
O’Malley’s premature death was not a crucial factor: departmental officials
privately regarded the outlook for merger as problematic from an early stage
in the debate. O’Connor commented subsequently that even during
O’Malley’s term, ‘many of us feared that the battle could not be won’
(O’Connor 1986, 204).
23
The detailed proposals for the merger announced by O’Malley’s
successor, Brian Lenihan, on 6 July 1968 underlined the virtual impossibility
of reaching agreement in practice. The new minister set out to provide a
practical blueprint for the reconstituted university by setting out a redistribution
of faculties between the two colleges, arguing that the initiative provided for ‘a
fruitful intermingling’ of the best qualities of the two institutions (NAI D/T
2000/6/655, Minister for Education, 6 July 1968, 8). Lenihan proposed that the
professional disciplines of law, medicine, veterinary science, dentistry and
pharmacy would all go to Trinity (Minister for Education, 6 July 1968, 4-6).
Engineering, social science and commerce would be based in UCD, with each
college retaining its existing range of disciplines in Arts and Science. While
Lenihan’s statement provided much of the detail missing from O’Malley’s
earlier announcements, a convincing educational rationale which engaged
with the aims and mission of the university was still conspicuous by its
absence.
Although the proposed redistribution of faculties received a qualified
endorsement from the Board of TCD, most academic staff and student
representatives were opposed to any form of merger (Luce 1992, 189).
Lenihan’s proposals proved particularly unacceptable to the authorities and
staff of UCD. Meenan commented in the autumn edition of Studies in 1968
that the minister’s proposals were being decisively rejected by various
faculties: ‘It could be said with great truth that University College has never
been so united about any issue throughout its existence as it is about this’
(Meenan 1968, 314-20). Lenihan succeeded only in uniting previously
antagonistic forces within UCD against the merger itself (O’Flynn 2012, 121-
24
22). The ASA in UCD approved two resolutions on 4 November 1968, which
endorsed co-operation between two independent universities in Dublin (NAI
D/T 2000/6/655, Ó Dálaigh to Ó Dubhda, 5 February 1969). The governing
body of UCD in turn produced a detailed critique of the minister’s plans,
entitled The Case for University College Dublin, which condemned Lenihan’s
proposal as a recipe for ‘the partial destruction and total discouragement’ of
UCD as a university institution (UCD Governing Body 1969, 14). The
authorities of UCD were particularly opposed to the proposals for the transfer
of the schools of Medicine (the cornerstone of the original Catholic university)
and Law to Trinity College. They made a strong case for the reconstitution of
UCD as an independent university, co-operating closely with TCD.
The
rejection of the official plans by academic staff in both Trinity and UCD
reflected the mobilisation of resistance by a professional class against
encroachment on its traditional power and autonomy by the political centre.
The initiative was undermined too by a rapidly changing political and
cultural context, as traditional religious influences became less powerful and
established institutions, such as the Catholic Church, were obliged to adapt to
wider societal change and the transformation of government policies in
education. The government’s reforming policies in second level education,
including vastly increased investment in second-level school building and
particularly O’Malley’s initiative for free second-level education, encouraged
an increasingly rapid expansion of undergraduate student numbers across the
university sector. Official assumptions that Trinity College was unattractive to
Irish students were outdated, as the ‘ban’ had a steadily declining impact
during the late 1960s. The college’s records indicated that Catholics
25
comprised 48% of the first year undergraduate cohort in 1969-70 (Luce 1992,
197), while departmental estimates suggested that Catholics already formed a
small majority of the new intake in 1968: either way the college had crossed a
significant watershed in its ability to attract Catholic students from the
Republic. Ó Raifeartaigh advised Taoiseach Jack Lynch on 5 February 1969
that TCD would have a large majority of Catholic students within a decade – a
prediction that proved accurate (NAI D/T 2000/6/655, Ó Raifeartaigh to Lynch ,
6 February 1969, 2-3). The upsurge in applications in the late 1960s reflected
an embrace of Trinity College by the Catholic middle class.
The impact of O’Malley’s dramatic announcement contributed to the
increased popularity of the college among Catholics, as it was assumed that
the ecclesiastical ‘ban’ was on the way out: Martin O’Donoghue, a lecturer in
the TCD economics department, adviser to the College officers on the merger
and future cabinet minister, commented that following the ministerial
announcement ‘there was a flood of applications from Catholics almost
immediately’ (O’Donoghue 2005). Ironically the initial impact of O’Malley’s
announcement undermined the prospects for its ultimate success. A merger
no longer offered any advantage to Trinity College by the end of the decade,
as it was already attracting a high proportion of Catholic students despite the
‘ban’. Certainly the increased flow of entrants from the Republic of Ireland
allowed TCD to reduce its previous dependence on British students.(Lyons
1972, 655). Traditional denominational divisions ceased to be a significant
dividing line in higher education, as Trinity broadened its appeal to
encompass a larger, more diverse and increasingly more liberal Catholic
middle class.
26
The removal of the ecclesiastical ban itself dealt a further blow to the
prospects for university re-organisation. The Catholic bishops agreed in June
1970 to repeal their regulation restricting the entry of Catholics to Trinity
College (DDA AB8/B/XV/b/07, Irish Hierarchy, 22-24 June 1970, 5). The
bishops announced publicly that they were acting to remove the ban in
response to constructive developments in the relations between the two
universities (DDA AB8/B/XV/b/07, Irish Hierarchy, 25/6/1970): but the
hierarchy was also responding to the reality that the ban was increasingly a
dead letter. This episcopal volte-face rendered redundant the key political
rationale for merger, promoted by successive ministers as a solution to
traditional political and religious divisions.
The establishment of the Higher Education Authority (HEA) in 1968,
initially on an ad hoc basis, provided a new institutional framework for the
regulation of the higher education sector (Hyland and Milne 1992, 424-5). The
HEA enjoyed significant executive powers for ‘designated’ institutions,
including the universities, recommending the allocation of state funding to
each institution and maintaining oversight of institutional budgets, but was
restricted to an advisory role for most non-university institutions, especially the
rapidly expanding higher technical sector. The first authority, which included
strong representation from the universities, emphasised its respect for
university autonomy (Dukes 2003) and succeeded in establishing a
constructive relationship with the institutions within its remit, which generally
recognised the value of a ‘buffer agency’ between universities and the state
(Ó Cathail, 1982, pp.44-55). Moreover, Ó Raifeartaigh, the first chairman of
the HEA, was never enthusiastic about an institutional merger: as
27
departmental secretary he had been instrumental in advising Hillery to reject it
in 1960. The HEA proved receptive to increasingly tenacious lobbying by both
universities to maintain their independent status.
The universities found common ground in their scepticism about the
government’s policy. The authorities of Trinity College and the NUI agreed to
propose an alternative solution to the HEA in April 1970 (HEA 1972, 83-7).
The NUI/TCD agreement envisaged two independent universities in Dublin,
which would collaborate closely together and rationalise their academic
activity in a number of disciplines, including science, engineering and health
sciences. The successful negotiations between the NUI and TCD appeared to
offer the prospect of significant rationalisation between the two universities
without a merger. The agreement was a defensive innovation designed to
prevent a restructuring imposed by the state. It was a strategic defence of
institutional power by previously antagonistic elements of a professional elite,
who ultimately united to forestall a further assertion of power by the political
centre. It was perhaps the ultimate irony of O’Malley’s initiative that it
succeeded in uniting academic elites within the two institutions only against
the proposed merger itself and the undermining of institutional power and
autonomy which it represented.
The HEA sounded the final death-knell for the initiative in their report
on university re-organisation, which was presented to the minister on 9
December 1971. The authority accepted that there should be two separate
universities in Dublin, broadly endorsing the proposals for disciplinary
collaboration made by the university authorities: the HEA stipulated, however,
that a statutory conjoint board should be established to co-ordinate
28
rationalisation between the two institutions (HEA 1972, 59). The HEA
considered that the proposed merger was no longer a compelling necessity,
as circumstances had changed dramatically since the policy was adopted,
with the removal of the ecclesiastical ban, the reduction in the proportion of
non-Irish students in Trinity College and the NUI/TCD agreement. The
authority believed that the university accord signalled the end of an ‘insidious
partition’ in higher education, offering the prospect of overcoming duplication
by agreement between the universities (Ferriter 2012, 635-6). The HEA’s
recommendation for policy change enhanced its reputation with the
universities, which generally opposed a merger (Clancy 1989, 106-7). Yet
despite the authority’s hopes for reducing duplication by agreement,
institutional barriers to large-scale rationalisation proved enduring. The
NUI/TCD agreement was not implemented in its original form, although a
limited co-ordination of subject areas occurred during the 1970s, with
veterinary science being offered exclusively in UCD, while Trinity secured
dentistry and pharmacy (Coolahan 2003, 785; O’Flynn 2012, 153). The
government ultimately abandoned not only the merger, but also any attempt
to undertake a wider re-organisation of the university sector: ultimately
comprehensive universities legislation would be postponed until the 1990s.
Conclusion
The merger was intended to assert the power of the political centre over a
university sector that had previously been largely autonomous, particularly
TCD with its distinctive governance structure. In this context the initiative was
a failure, due to a successful defence of institutional power, which ultimately
29
brought together previously antagonistic professional elites to forestall a
radical reshaping of established disciplines and institutional structures. The
effective resistance of a professional university elite to the expansion of the
authority of the state in HE played a key role in the failure of the initiative.
Moreover wider policy and cultural changes in this period began a
transformation of the higher education system that decisively undermined
traditional denominational divisions in HE and made a merger appear
redundant. Ultimately maintaining the institutional status quo, with significantly
greater collaboration and some relatively minor discipline-based adjustments,
proved to be the alternative that divided politicians, officials and institutional
stakeholders least.
The significant personal dimension to policy-making in the late 1960s,
exemplified by the key role of O’Malley in triggering policy change in HE,
illuminates both the origins of the initiative for a university merger and the
reasons for its failure. In an era of transformation in higher education, different
ministers and officials brought distinctive and sometimes contradictory
perspectives to policy formation. It was an unusually creative period in
national
policy-making,
closely
linked
to
a
far-reaching
ideological
reorientation, which was itself influenced by ministers, senior officials and
international agencies. The state’s policies were undoubtedly shaped by a
compelling economic rationale informed by human capital theory, but more
traditional ideological influences were by no means extinct and newly minted
economic priorities were usually combined in official discourse with political
and cultural objectives. The diverse nature of central power and the extent to
30
which official policies were in a state of transition facilitated successful
professional and institutional resistance to the merger.
Yet while O’Malley’s initiative for merger proved abortive, this did not
signal any retraction of state intervention within HE, still less a long-term reassertion of institutional power. Indeed the initiative foreshadowed a long-term
expansion of the role and power of the state in HE, which was also
exemplified by the foundation of the HEA as a statutory intermediary agency
between the department and HEIs (Walsh, 2009). O’Malley’s intervention not
only sidelined the report of the Commission on Higher Education, but made
institutional reform and rationalisation at higher level a central theme of the
state’s policy for the first time. While O’Malley’s successors abandoned plans
to merge the two oldest university institutions in Dublin, they were determined
to influence not only the institutional shape of the HE system but increasingly
also the nature of future developments at institutional and programme level (Ó
Buachalla 1992, 69-78)..O’Malley’s initiative testified to the emergence of a
newly
pro-active,
authoritative
style
of
policy-making,
incorporating
interventionist approaches by politicians, officials and state agencies, which
sought a reshaping of HE in pursuit of wider economic and societal objectives.
.
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Interviews
Mr. James Dukes, 28 April 2003
Mr. Tony Ó Dálaigh, 3 May 2002
Prof. Martin O’Donoghue, 10 January 2005
34
35