HOW MEMBER REELECTION BEHAVIOR VARIES BETWEEN
PROFESSIONAL, CITIZEN, AND HYBRID LEGISLATURES IN STATES THAT
HAVE TERM LIMITS: A COMPARISON OF OHIO, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND
ARIZONA
Cristina Frances Dayton
B.A., California State University, Sacramento, 2004
THESIS
Submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
GOVERNMENT
at
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO
SPRING
2010
HOW MEMBER REELECTION BEHAVIOR VARIES BETWEEN
PROFESSIONAL, CITIZEN, AND HYBRID LEGISLATURES IN STATES THAT
HAVE TERM LIMITS: A COMPARISON OF OHIO, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND
ARIZONA
A Thesis
by
Cristina Frances Dayton
Approved by:
__________________________________, Committee Chair
Brian DiSarro, PhD
__________________________________, Second Reader
Wesley Hussey, PhD
____________________________
Date
ii
Student: Cristina Frances Dayton
I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the
University format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library
and credit is to be awarded for the thesis.
__________________________, Graduate Coordinator
James Cox, PhD
Department of Government
iii
___________________
Date
Abstract
of
HOW MEMBER REELECTION BEHAVIOR VARIES BETWEEN
PROFESSIONAL, CITIZEN, AND HYBRID LEGISLATURES IN STATES THAT
HAVE TERM LIMITS: A COMPARISON OF OHIO, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND
ARIZONA
by
Cristina Frances Dayton
Statement of Problem
This study seeks to empirically investigate how member reelection behavior
varies between professional, citizen, and hybrid legislatures in states that have term
limits. By accounting for the level of professionalism, we will be able to test whether
or not the opportunity structure predicts the reelection behavior of members. The
central thesis is that careerist and springboard behavior will be most common in states
that have favorable opportunity structures, least common in states that have poor
opportunity structures, and moderately common in states that have mid-level
opportunity structures. However, the level of legislative professionalization will work
to either strengthen or weaken these relationships, with highly professionalized
legislatures producing more careerist behavior and citizen legislatures producing less
careerist behavior.
iv
Sources of Data
I selected a cohort from the Ohio, South Dakota, and Arizona State House
Representatives who began their service in 1993 and traced that cohort over time.
These states were chosen because each one represents a different level of
professionalism. They were also chosen because they all enacted term limits in 1992,
have four, two-year terms in the state House of Representatives, same year of impact
(2000), and had consecutive term limit bans. Background research was conducted for
each person to discover past political experience, how many terms served in the lower
house, political or professional experience after terms served, and current position in
the legislature or private sector.
Conclusions Reached
Careerist and springboard behavior was most common in Ohio because of the
state’s favorable opportunity structures, least common in South Dakota because of the
state’s poor opportunity structures, and moderately common in Arizona because of the
state’s mid-level opportunity structures. Although South Dakota did not have a
favorable opportunity structure, some members exhibited springboard and careerists
behavior.
_______________________, Committee Chair
Brian DiSarro, PhD
_______________________
Date
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Professor James Cox for mentoring me through my
undergraduate and graduate work at California State University Sacramento. I would
like to thank Professor Brian DiSarro for his encouragement, advice, time, and effort
as he guided me through the thesis writing process. I would also like to thank
Professor Wesley Hussey for his time and feedback
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................... vi
List of Figures ........................................................................................................... viii
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION
Purpose/Argument ........................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................... 3
Review of Literature ........................................................................................ 4
Methodology .................................................................................................. 13
2. ANALYSIS OF OHIO COHORT
Background ..................................................................................................... 16
Data
.......................................................................................................... 21
Analysis .......................................................................................................... 23
3. ANALYSIS OF SOUTH DAKOTA COHORT
Background ..................................................................................................... 27
Data
.......................................................................................................... 30
Analysis .......................................................................................................... 34
4. ANALYSIS OF ARIZONA COHORT
Background ..................................................................................................... 37
Data
.......................................................................................................... 41
Analysis .......................................................................................................... 44
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Analysis .......................................................................................................... 47
Appendix A. Ohio Cohort ....................................................................................... 57
Appendix B. South Dakota Cohort. ......................................................................... 62
Appendix C. Arizona Cohort.. ................................................................................. 67
Bibliography……………………...…………………………………………..……... 74
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
1.
Figure 2.1 Evaluation of Term Limits: Candidates, Legislators, and
Observers……………………………………….…………………………… 19
2.
Figure 2.2 Overall Opinion on Term limits, Ohio Citizens…………….…… 20
3.
Figure 3.1 2008 South Dakota Survey of 500 Likely Voters: Vote to Repeal or
Keep Term Limits.………….……………………………………………….. 29
4.
Figure 4.1 Arizona Surveys of Registered Voters to Repeal or Keep Term
Limits …………...………….……………………………………………….. 40
viii
1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Purpose/Argument
Term limits have imposed a series of unintended consequences. When initially
created, term limits were put in place by voters who felt member seniority was
creating a legislature that was more responsive to the needs of interests groups,
lobbyists, and donors and less responsive to the needs of the constituents. A constant
rotation of new members was supposed to bring in new ideas, force members to
respond to constituent demands, limit the power of the “good ol’ boy” attitude, and
eliminate cronyism.
However, term limits have had an adverse effect of a wide range of issues,
unknown at the time of inception. Term limits affects member reelection behavior,
electoral competition, policy knowledge, and third party influence. The impacts of
these issues vary from state to state and depend on the level of legislative
professionalism. Professionalism is a model used predominantly in the literature on
state legislatures and refers to the development of overall legislative capacity.1
Rosenthal (1996, 1998) refers to the five S’s: space, salary, session length, staff and
structure.2 Kurtz (1990) divides states into three categories based on several
dimensions usually associated with the concept of legislative professionalism. The
first category is “professional,” defined as full-time, large staff, relatively high pay,
and stable membership. The opposite of a professional legislature is called “citizen,”
1
2
Berry et al. (2000, pp. 859) provides reference to Hibbing (1999)
Berry et al. (2000, pp. 859)
2
which are part-time, low pay, small staffs, and high turnover. Those that fall in the
middle are categorized as “hybrid.”3
This study seeks to empirically investigate how member reelection behavior
varies between professional, citizen, and hybrid legislatures in states that have term
limits. Carey, Niemi, and Powell (1998) say that “professionalized legislatures attract
individuals with specific qualities and generate specific sorts of behaviors that
correspond directly to so many of the concerns underlying the term limit movement
that an analysis of term limits would be of little value without accounting for this
factor.”4 By accounting for the level of professionalism, we will be able to test
whether or not the opportunity structure predicts the reelection behavior of members.
In this study, member reelection behavior is defined as the election pattern of a state
representative as it relates to running for higher office and the opportunity structure is
the amount of elected positions available for people to occupy.
The central thesis is that members in professional legislatures will continue
their career in politics, members in citizens legislatures will stay in office until they
are termed out and then continue to work in the private sector, not running for higher
office, and members in a hybrid legislature will be split down the middle, with half
running for higher office and the other half resuming their careers in the private sector.
The private sector is defined as any job that is not an elected office and not associated
with politics directly.
3
4
Moncrief et al. (1992, pp. 43) provides reference to Kurtz (1990)
Carey et al. (1998, pp. 278)
3
Background
Numerous studies have examined whether or not term limits have had an effect
on state elected officials and the legislature. Both Moncrief et al. (1992) and Opheim
(1994) sought to find how long legislators stay in office without term limits to see if in
fact term limits are even a factor in turnover. Moncrief et al. began the data analysis
by using a 12-year term limit as the focus and “tracking a particular cohort of
freshman legislators through time and providing data on the retention of this cohort at
specific times.”5 They concluded that “a relatively small proportion of individuals
remain in their state legislative office for as long as 12 years.” However, contrary to
the majority of their data, they do note that members of the most professional
legislatures are far more likely to remain in office for an extended amount of time.6
Basically, their findings show that “term limits did not have the intended impact.”7
Two years after the Moncrief et al. study, Cynthia Opheim conducted a similar
study using the Moncrief et al. model but with modifications to the stipulations. The
modification was choosing an 8-year time frame versus 12 and choosing states that
already imposed term limits. Opheim concluded, “a substantial majority of state
legislators will find their legislative careers affected, if not ended, by term
limitations.”8 Her data substantiates the claim made by Moncrief et al. that in
professionalized legislatures retention rates are highest.
5
Moncrief et al. (1992, pp. 38)
Moncrief et al. (1992, pp. 45)
7
Opheim (1994, pp. 50)
8
Opheim (1994, pp. 55)
6
4
Moncrief et al. claim that term limits did not have the intended impacts
because relatively few legislators stay in office for as long as 12 years and both
Moncrief et al. and Opheim claim that retention rates are highest in professionalized
legislatures. So, does member behavior change depending on the level of legislative
professionalism? And, in states that have term limits, will legislators find their careers
effected or ended? To address these issues and answer the question, “how does
member reelection behavior vary between professional, citizen, and hybrid
legislatures, I will select three states and examine the impact of varying levels of
legislative professionalization and opportunity structures on member reelection
behavior, given the common condition of term limits. Ohio will represent the
professional legislature, South Dakota will represent the citizen legislature, and
Arizona will represent the hybrid legislature.
Before the individual data from each state is introduced and analyzed,
additional issues surrounding term limits and legislative professionalism will be
discussed. These issues include a brief historical summary of term limits, electoral
competition, career opportunity structures, policy responsiveness, and the anticipatory
effect.
Review of Literature
In 1990 three states passed measures that limited the amount of terms a state
legislator could serve. California, Colorado, and Oklahoma were the first states in the
Union to pass legislation limiting the number of years a representative could serve in
each house. Since 1990, 21 states have enacted term limits and of those, six states
5
have repealed their term limits either by legislation or court action. Of the 15 states
that currently have legislative term limits, some have full-time legislatures and some
have part-time legislatures. Full-time and part-time legislatures are measured by their
legislative professionalism. Professionalism is an index which usually measures the
extent to which a state legislative body emulates the modern U.S. Congress with
respect to member pay, provision of personal and committee staffs and reference
services for assistance in issue research and bill drafting.9
More recently the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) created
another way to categorize state legislatures based on legislative professionalism. “The
NCSL prefers to look more broadly at the capacity of legislatures to function as
independent branches of government, capable of balancing the power of the executive
branch and having information necessary to make independent, informed policy
decisions. To measure the capacity of legislatures, it’s important to consider the
amount of time legislators spend on the job, the amount they are compensated and the
size of the legislature’s staff.”10 The NCSL categorizes the states into five categories,
as they say legislatures are too complex to fit into a black and white mold. The
categories are: red, red light, white, blue light, and blue. The spectrum begins with red
as the most “full-time” and ends at blue, being the most “part-time.” This
categorization allows for additional clarity when discussing the professionalism of
state legislatures.
9
Squire (1988, pp. 68-69) provides reference to Polsby (1975)
National Conference of State Legislatures
10
6
In 1992 Ohio, South Dakota and Arizona all enacted term limits through
various ballot measures.11 The state of Ohio passed Issue No. 3, which limited the
State House of Representatives to four, two-year terms and the State Senate to two,
four-year terms. The measure passed with 68.4% of the vote. South Dakota passed
Amendment A, which limited the State House of Representatives and the State Senate
to four, two-year terms. Amendment A also restricted the terms served for Congress
and Statewide Officials, although later the Congressional term limits were repealed.
The measure passed with 63.5% of the vote. Arizona passed Proposition 107, which
limited the State House of Representatives and the State Senate to four, two-year
terms. Proposition 107 also restricted the terms served for Congress, the State
Executive Department, the Corporation Commission, and the State Mine Inspector,
although later the Congressional term limits were repealed. The measure passed with
an overwhelmingly, with 74.2% of the vote. Although all three states have term
limits, they are only consecutive bans, not lifetime. Therefore, after a representative
has been termed out of one house, they can run again after one term has passed. 12
The theory of term limits has been an issue for centuries. Aristotle argues
explicitly for term limits that placed “All over each and each in turn over all.”13
Venice’s Ducal Councillors were term-limited, and America’s first Congress under the
Articles of Confederation included a provision requiring “rotation in office.”14
11
There were a total of eight states that adopted term limits in 2002. Three were chosen for this study.
National Conference of State Legislatures. “Statewide Votes on Term Limits.”
13
Kousser (2005, pp. 1) provides reference to Petracca (1992) and his discussion of Aristotle.
14
Kousser (2005, pp. 1)
12
7
Elections are the alpha and omega for legislators and candidates. Electoral
competition is viewed as a necessary element of the campaigning process to ensure the
most qualified candidates win. Historically, electoral competition has been easier for
incumbents regardless of term limits for many reasons including name recognition,
past political experience, policy knowledge, campaign contributions, etc. Strong
potential challengers will be less likely to run against an incumbent, preferring instead
to wait until an open seat election is created by term limits.15
Term limits reformers have argued that the imposition of term limits creates
more electoral competition through an increase of political engagement, open-seat
elections, and voter turnout. Multiple studies suggest that these overzealous ambitions
were not thoroughly achieved through the passage of term limits. Salka (2005) sought
to test the influence of term limits on electoral competition in California. He found
that term limits have made Senate general elections and Assembly primary elections
less competitive although, turnover increased as evidenced by the greater number of
open-seat elections in each chamber.16
Proponents of term limits argue that forced retirement creates more open seat
elections, which tend to be the most competitive.17 In a competitive election, it
provides an avenue for diverse backgrounds, minorities, and women to run for elected
office. It creates turnover, new ideas, and limits career politicians. However,
legislators who are forced out of office by term limits may not retire from politics
15
Salka (2005, pp. 117)
The difference in these findings may be explained by the large number of seats in the Assembly
relative to the number of seats in the Senate as well as the lower visibility of Assembly races.
17
Salka (2005, pp. 117)
16
8
altogether but will instead run for other elected offices as hypothesized by Salka
(2005).
Nalder (2007) sought to gage the effect of legislative term limits on voter
turnout, specifically hypothesizing that the creation of more open-seat races would
spur interest and excitement in the electorate, thus leading to higher turnout.
However, her results (based on a case study of California) demonstrated that the
increase in open-seat contests resulting from term limits actually caused voter turnout
to decrease. This decrease could be attributed to “top-of-the-ticket races taking up
more space in the information environment, further obscuring messages coming from
state legislative campaigns that otherwise might have attracted voters” and, because of
a decrease in name recognition, voters may be more likely to skip voting in the race or
vote by using party cues almost exclusively.18
Term limits do create more open-seat elections but as previous studies suggest,
termed out legislators continue a career in politics. Although electoral competition has
seen a decrease since term limits, name recognition of termed out legislators will still
provide them an upper hand advantage as they seek higher office.
A central assumption in most legislative theory is that politicians are ambitious
and that, as a consequence, legislative behavior and organization cannot be explained
without paying close attention to political career opportunities and trajectories. 19
Squire (1988) has argued that membership stability in state legislatures is a function of
18
Nalder (2007, pp. 203)
Carey et al. (1998, pp. 272) provides reference to Arnold (1990), Fenno (1978), and Schlesinger
(1966)
19
9
the career opportunity structures offered within the state’s political system. He argues
that there are three types of state legislatures: career, dead-end, and springboard, based
on the incentives of the state legislative office and the opportunity to advance to
higher office.20
Careerism or, as Squire (1988) terms it, “a career legislature,” offers sufficient
financial incentives so that most members can make service within that body a
career.21 This is determinant on unlimited term limits as seen in the U.S. House of
Representatives. The other types of legislatures outlined by Squire are “springboard”
and “dead end.” Springboard legislatures offer great opportunities for political
advancement. A springboard legislature can have a level of compensation similar to
that of a career legislature, but its utility to members as a stepping-stone to better
political positions makes it different.22 Most springboard legislatures are seen in states
with term limits because it forces legislators to leave office after a certain time,
therefore “springing” them into another office. Dead end legislatures do not give its
members prospects for advancement or incentives to stay within it.23 These
legislatures are more common in citizen legislatures, which are traditionally
legislatures that are part-time, low pay, small staff and high turnover.24
Although it may be more common for careerism and springboard legislatures
to be present in a professional or hybrid state, we cannot assume that dead end
20
Moncrief et al. (1992, pp. 44) provides a reference to Squire (1988)
Squire (1988, pp. 72)
22
Squire (1988, pp. 72)
23
Squire (1988, pp. 72) (Note: these three types of legislatures mirror Schlesinger’s 1966 individuallevel typology of static, progressive, and discrete political ambitions.)
24
Moncrief et al. (1992, pp. 43) provides reference to Kurtz (1990)
21
10
legislatures are more common in citizen legislatures because, opportunity structures
are not determined by professionalization. Opportunity structures exist when there is
opportunity to run for (higher) office as seen in states with many U.S. House districts
(California), independently-elected Executive Branches (Texas), and lots of cities with
powerful mayors (New York).
The relationship between Kurtz and Squire’s theories of professionalism and
career opportunity structures can be described as an interwoven ménage à trois.
Consider the opportunity structure within each state as the independent variable (x)
and the level of careerism as the dependent variable (y). As the opportunity structure
increases in a state, so will the amount of career politicians. However, the opportunity
structures are independent of the level of professionalism (z). For example, there can
be a state with very low levels of professionalization, like Texas, yet career politicians
exist and springboard because they have a large opportunity structure including 32
congressional seats. Hence, its designation by Maestas (2000) as a “low-salary
springboard.” By contrast, no matter how professionalized the Montana or Wyoming
legislature become, there will be fewer career politicians and less springboarding
because there is only one congressional seat in each state and few major cities thus
providing a low opportunity structure.
When members are termed out in citizen legislatures they can sometimes run
for higher office, especially if there is a large opportunity structure. When examining
the data from the South Dakota cohort, we will be able to see how many freshman
members ran for higher office, or waited one election cycle and ran for the same
11
position again. Due to a consecutive term ban and not a lifetime ban, members can
zig-zag through the legislature moving from one house to another in order to avoid
ending their political career. Therefore, we may see careerism present in a citizen
legislature as well.
Within these different opportunity structures are also varying degrees of
professionalism as it relates to policy responsiveness. Maestas argues that
professional legislatures that foster and support progressive ambition will be more
responsive to aggregate constituency concerns than will less professional legislatures.
Consistent with this argument, she also finds that states with more professional
legislatures and more opportunities for members to progress to higher office have
greater aggregate opinion-policy congruency, even after controlling for the effects of
electoral competition and alternative policy influences. 25 Proponents for term limit
reform argue that term limits will increase legislative responsiveness since they
increase seat turnover and reduce incumbent electoral advantage.26 Maestas found
that the imposition of term limits to enhance responsiveness may not be effective or
beneficial in all state legislatures because of the varying types of ambition as described
by Squire.
Term limits and electoral competition have also paved the way for a new type
of election model called the “anticipatory effect.” It is argued that the threat of
looming term limits may prompt legislators to run for another office when a seat is
25
26
Maestas (2000, pp. 663)
Maestas (2000, pp. 684) provides reference to Cain (1996)
12
vacated, even if they would not be forced out of their current seat for a number of
terms.27 This election model is termed the anticipatory effect because legislators seek
higher office, knowing they will be eventually termed out when the election is not
against an incumbent. In a study by William Salka (2005) he sought to find whether
electoral competition decreases as a result of term limits and whether politicians
forced out of office because of term limits run for another legislative office. He
concluded that the imposition of term limits did in fact reduce the number of
incumbents running in general elections.28
However, the data also indicated that the
reduction was not always when the incumbent was prohibited to run again. His data
suggested that a greater number of incumbents in the Assembly voluntarily chose not
to run for re-election before term limits actually forced them out of office.29 This data
supports the anticipatory effect hypothesis and shows that although term limits limit
the amount of terms one can serve it also infuses a sense of urgency to springboard
into a higher office if they do not have to run against an incumbent.
The primary theoretical focus is how member reelection behavior varies based
on the level of professionalism and the opportunity structures in states that have term
limits. While accounting for the theories presented by Carey et al., Moncrief et al.,
Opheim, Salka, Nalder, Squire, and Maestas and we will be able to test previous
findings to determine if there is a correlation between legislative professionalism and
opportunity structures, controlling for term limits.
27
Salka (2005, pp. 117)
Salka (2005, pp. 119)
29
Salka (2005, pp. 119)
28
13
Methodology
To collect the data to evaluate how member reelection behavior varies between
professional, citizen, and hybrid legislatures in states that have term limits, I have
selected a cohort of Ohio, South Dakota, and Arizona State House Representatives
who began their service in 1993 and traced that cohort over time. I only looked at the
lower house in each state because in order to effectively look at a member’s career I
needed to start at the lowest statewide office. The Ohio State House of
Representatives roster list from 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 was gathered from
information provided by the Ohio House Clerk’s office. These lists were compared to
each other to identify freshman legislators beginning their term in 1993; the year Issue
No. 3 was enacted. These legislators would have been termed out in 2000, had they
run for three more elections and won their reelection campaigns.
The South Dakota State House of Representatives roster list from 1991-1992
and 1993-1994 was gathered from information provided by the South Dakota
Secretary of State’s office. These lists were compared to each other to identify
freshman legislators beginning their term in 1993; the year Amendment A was
enacted. These legislators would have been termed out in 2000, had they run for three
more elections and won their reelection campaigns.
The Arizona State House of Representatives roster list from 1991-1992 and
1993-1994 was gathered from information provided by the Arizona History and
Archives Division. These lists were compared to each other to identify freshman
legislators beginning their term in 1993; the year Proposition 107 was enacted. These
14
legislators would have been termed out in 2000, had they run for three more elections
and won their reelection campaigns.
Out of the 15 states that have term limits in the United States, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Arizona were chosen for numerous reasons. First, all states enacted term
limits in 1992, they all have four, two-year terms in the assembly, and they all had the
same year of impact (2000). Second, all three states had consecutive term limit bans.
Consecutive term limits bans are not common among all states that have imposed term
limits. Six of the 15 states have lifetime term limits bans meaning that once a limit
has been reached in one house, that person can never run for that seat again.30
The important difference to be highlighted for this comparison was choosing
one state that was “professionalized,” one state that was “citizen,” and one state that
was “hybrid” in the past 20 years. The only other states that fit this model with the
variables listed above were Florida (Professional) and Montana (Citizen). Both of
these were excluded because both states had more representatives, 160 and 150
respectively, than the other states. When there was more than one state to choose from
within each level of professionalism, I picked the state with fewer members in the
State House of Representatives in order to keep the sample size of all three states as
close to the same size as possible.
Once the state House of Representative cohorts were compiled for all states,
background research was conducted for each person to discover past political
30
States with consecutive bans: NE, AZ, CO, FL, ME, MT, OH, SD, LA. States with lifetime bans:
AR, CA, MI, MO, OK, NV
15
experience, how many terms served in the lower house, political or professional
experience after terms served, and current position in the legislature or private sector.
16
Chapter 2
ANALYSIS OF OHIO COHORT
Background
In 1992 voters passed Issue No. 3 with 68.4% of the vote. Issue No. 3 was a
constitutional amendment that read:
No person shall hold the office of state senator for a period longer than two
successive terms of four years. No person shall hold the office of state
representative for a period of longer than four successive terms of two years.
Terms shall be considered successive unless separated by a period of four or
more years. Only terms beginning on or after January 1, 1993 shall be
considered in determining an individual's eligibility to hold office.31
Since 1992, voters and legislators have continued to debate the issue of term limits. In
2007 Republican and Democratic leaders agreed to push for extending term limits for
state lawmakers to 12 years, up from eight years.32 In the 2009-2010 General
Assembly regular session, a joint resolution was introduced (HJR 8) which proposes
to amend the Ohio Constitution to eliminate term limits. HJR 8 was introduced by
Representative Tyrone Yates, a Democrat from Cincinnati representing the 33rd
District. Representative Yates served the maximum term in the House and served
from 2003-2010. In 2009 Representatives Yates was considering a run for State
Senate but decided to opt out of the race. He found that campaigning and raising
31
32
Ohio House of Representatives
American Policy Roundtable
17
funds was almost impossible while currently serving as a member of critical
committees in the State legislature.33 Prior to his term in the Ohio House of
Representatives Representative Yates was a member of the Cincinnati City Council
and served as Vice Mayor for two terms. In January of 2010 Representatives Yates
was appointed by Ohio Governor Ted Strickland as Municipal Court Judge in
Hamilton County. Not so coincidentally, Representatives Yates introduced HJR 8 in
his last term. If adopted by a majority of the electors voting on this proposal, it takes
effect January 1, 2011.34
Representative Yates has not always been the favorite in the media. In 2008
Representative Yates introduced a bill that would require pit bull owners to forfeit
their dogs to the dog warden for destruction. The bill would also authorize law
enforcement to confiscate and kill any dog that they suspect is a pit bull. This bill
created a swarm of opposition, leading to a Facebook campaign to gain support in
opposition of the bill. Numerous animal rights organizations rallied against
Representatives Yates and the bill eventually died. Representatives Yates also became
the center of a national debate when in 2009 he introduced HJR 7, which called on the
House and Senate to put the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act on the May 2010
ballot.35 It required a three-fifths vote in each chamber, which it did not receive.
Although it is not on the May 2010 ballot, Representative Yates made his mark in the
Ohio House of Representatives as a progressive reformer.
33
CBS Business Network
Ohio House of Representatives
35
ProgressOhio
34
18
Elected officials have had a history of not supporting term limits. All states
that enacted term limits did so through direct democracy, not through member
introduced legislation. Voters thought term limits would allow for increased diversity,
new ideas, and limit career politicians. However, terms limits have not necessarily
produced these results. In 2004, the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the
University of Akron complied data assessing legislative term limits in Ohio. They
found that:
“Ohio leaders are quite critical of term limits. Figure 2.136 reports the views of
three sets of leaders: legislative Candidates, Legislators, and Observers of the
state legislature (including former legislators, staff, public administrators,
lobbyists and journalists). Candidates are the least negative, with 42%
disapproving of term limits, followed by Legislators, with 60% holding
negative views, and Observers, with 81% negative assessments.”
36
Both surveys were completed in the spring of 2004. The Candidate and Legislator survey involved a
mail questionnaire sent to all 307 state legislative candidates who ran in the 2002 election. This survey
produced 121 usable responses (55 legislators and 66 non-legislators) for a return rate of 46%
(excluding undelivered mail). The Observer survey involved a mail questionnaire of 1,362 former
members, staff, former staff, lobbyists, and journalists. This survey produced 295 usable responses for a
return rate of 29.5% (excluding undeliverable mail). Both surveys had about the same number of
Democrats and Republicans.
19
Figure 2.1
Evaluation of Term Limits: Candidates, Legislators, and Observers
60
50
40
Candidates
Legislators
Observers
30
20
10
0
Very
Positive
Mixed
Very
Negative
The findings in the above data are not unexpected. If the public
overwhelmingly supports term limits, and legislators and candidates have to pander to
public opinion to win election (especially candidates who are not already in office,
because they don’t have incumbent advantages), then of course they should be more
favorable to term limits than observers who don’t have to face the voters.
However, according to a different survey executed by the Ray C. Bliss Institute
of Applied Politics and the Center for Policy Studies of The University of Akron in
March and April 2005, they found that:
20
“Ohioans express strong support for legislative term limits (Figure 2.2).37
Overall, 47% of Ohioans approve of term limits (27% “strongly approve” and
20% “somewhat approve”). In contrast, 27% disapprove of term limits (10%
“somewhat disapprove” and 17% “strongly disapprove”). One-quarter of the
respondents had no opinion on term limits.”
Figure 2.2
Overall Opinion on Term Limits, Ohio Citizens
30
25
20
15
10
5
Strongly Approve
Somewhat
Approve
No Opinion
Somewhat
Disapprove
Strongly
Disapprove
0
This data shows that the people most engrained in politics: the candidates,
legislators, lobbyists, journalists, and staff members, are more likely to disapprove of
37
These results are based on a state survey conducted by the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics
and the Center for Policy Studies of The University of Akron in March and April, 2005. The overall
sample size was 1517 respondents, comprised of a statewide sample and several regional over-samples.
For this report the data set was weighted to produce a representative sample of the entire state with an
error rate of less than +/- 3 % in 95 samples out of a hundred. (For more details, see
www.uakron.edu/bliss/research.php).
21
term limits than the general public. This disconnect is a sign that the voters do not
understand member election behavior. As the following data substantiates, most
termed out members continue to run for office regardless if they can only serve a
restricted number of terms in one position. Voters do not understand that term limits
will not stop career politicians. If they did, the support for legislative term limits
would not be so substantial.
Data
In 1992, 23 freshman members were elected to the Ohio State House of
Representatives. These 23 legislators began their term in 1993, which meant they
would be termed out in 2000 had they run for three more terms and won each election,
serving a total of eight years. The Ohio State House of Representatives has a total of
99 members and the freshman legislators in 1993 represented 23% of the entire House.
Of the 23 freshman members, 43% held an elected office before they ran for
the House and 52% of the cohort had prior political experience. Almost half of the
people that had prior political experience served as a member of a city council while
some held governor appointed positions and others were county employees. This prior
political experience in office, before moving up to the legislature, is evidence of
career-seeking behavior.
Although 43% of the cohort held an elected office before they ran for the
House, none of the cohort had ever been in the House prior to their term beginning in
1993. This data is interesting because as we will see when we analyze the South
Dakota cohort, this was not the case. Even before the term limits legislation in 1992
22
when members could run indefinitely, none of the Ohio cohort fell into that category.
In addition, after each member served their terms in the House between 1993 and
2000, none of the cohort went on to hold a position in the State House again. Due to
consecutive bans, not lifetime bans on terms served, it is possible for a member to
serve the maximum terms, sit one term out, and run for office again with the clock
beginning back at one.
Of the 23 freshman members, a staggering 74% successfully served four, twoyear terms and were termed out of the House. In addition, many of the members
served the majority of their limit within the House. Of the six members who were not
termed out, four of them served three terms and only two served two terms. None of
the Ohio cohort only served one term in the House. This data demonstrates the power
of incumbency within electoral competition. As previously mentioned, electoral
competition is easier for incumbents regardless of term limits for many reasons
including name recognition, past political experience, policy knowledge, campaign
contributions, etc.
Of the 23 original members of the freshman class of 1993, 74% successfully
served four, two-year terms, the maximum under Ohio law. Of the 74% of termed out
members, 17% ran for the Ohio State Senate and served two, four-years terms, also the
maximum per term limit laws and 17% served in Congress. Ohio is the only state in
this analysis that had a portion of the cohort successfully serve in Congress and the
only state that had no one leave his or her position in the House to run for higher
office before being termed out. The progression of running for higher office is more
23
common in legislatures with a greater opportunity structure and is reflected in this data
as it shows member reelection behavior is consistent with springboarding into higher
office. Of the six members who were not termed out, none of them were elected to
higher office nor did they run for higher office.
There was a portion of freshman members of the 1993 Ohio cohort that
decided not to run for a higher office after being termed out in the House or Senate.
Some went into local government or were appointed to various commissions and
boards, five members went back to practicing law, one member died while in office,
and some members ran for another office, sometimes more than once but continuously
lost.
As previously stated, 26% of the cohort did not serve the maximum number of
terms allowed in the House. However, of the entire cohort, 65% did run for another
office after successfully serving at least two terms in the House. Of the 17 members
termed out of the House, 88% of them ran for another office.
Analysis
The National Conference of State Legislatures classifies Ohio as a “Red Light”
state which means it is most closely associated with professionalized legislatures but
not as professionalized as say Congress. Red legislatures require the most time of
legislators, usually 80 percent or more of a full-time job. Most of the nation’s largest
population states fall into this category.38 According to Maestas (2000), professional
legislatures provide resources and opportunities for members to position themselves to
38
National Conference of State Legislatures
24
run for higher office and, consequently, attract a larger number of members who hold
progressive ambitions.39
In addition to being a professional legislature, Ohio also has a prodigious
opportunity structure. Ohio has a population of over 11 million people, the seventhlargest economy of all fifty states, 88 counties, 13 state universities, 46 private
colleges, 18 congressional seats, an independently elected executive branch, and 20
Electoral College votes. The state of Ohio is also nicknamed the “Mother of
Presidents” as they have sent seven of their native sons to the White House including
Ulysses S. Grant, Rutherford B. Hayes, James A. Garfield, Benjamin Harrison,
William McKinley, William Howard Taft, and Warren G. Harding.40 It is for these
reasons that Ohio has an opportunity structure that enables elected officials to
springboard into higher office and enhances careerism.
The data collected from the 23 freshman members of the Ohio House of
Representatives in 1993 demonstrates that the majority of the cohort continued their
career in politics after being termed out of the House. Although not all
professionalized legislatures provide opportunities for political advancement, Ohio has
proven to be a breeding ground for many politicians to springboard into higher office
including the Presidency.
However, not all professionalized legislatures encourage the same type of
ambition among members. Maestas explains the importance of distinguishing
39
40
Maestas (2000, pp. 669)
State Master
25
between institutional features that promote progressive ambition for higher political
office and features that promote intra-institutional ambition. The first type of
institution is similar to Ohio and provides resources of time, remuneration, and public
exposure that make them ideal springboards to higher office. In contrast, the latter
type of institution provides attractive internal career opportunities.41 However,
because of term limits, Ohio cannot provide an internal career opportunity as
compared to a professional non-term limited state such as New York.
Contrary to the findings by Cynthia Opheim that concluded most legislators
will find their legislative careers affected, if not ended, by term limits, 88% of the
termed out members in the Ohio cohort ran for another office. Of the entire cohort,
65% ran for another office after successfully serving at least two terms. She did note
that retention rates were highest in professionalized legislatures and this claim is
consistent with the findings of this study. As predicted by Salka, the legislators who
were forced out of office by term limits (74% of the cohort) did not retire from politics
altogether but instead ran for other elected offices. However, these predictions were
made on the assumption that all states were equal. There was no discussion of the
legislative professionalism or the opportunity structure within the context of member
behavior. The lack of specification leaves room for alternate theories to be present
regarding member behavior in term-limited states. My theory that members in a
professional legislature will continue their career in politics, regardless of term limits,
is conclusive based on the data introduced because Ohio’s opportunity structure
41
Maestas (2000, pp. 666)
26
enabled the elected officials to continue a career in politics. So, contrary to the claims
of proponents, and the wishes of voters, term limits has done nothing to curtail
careerism by professional politicians.
Salka also found that a greater number of incumbents voluntarily chose not to
run for re-election before term limits actually forced them out of office. The data from
the Ohio cohort shows that only six members did not serve their maximum number of
terms in the House. Of these six members, none of them ran for higher office
immediately following their last term in the House. The sense of urgency as described
in the “anticipatory effect” is not present in this data set even though Ohio has career
politicians. Although the assumption would be that states with large opportunity
structures would have a larger portion of their members looking to run for higher
office, the Ohio cohort served the maximum amount of time in the House before
running for higher office. The variables within this data may be that the incumbents
did not have an open-seat race they wanted to compete in or there were no open-seat
races in their districts.
27
Chapter 3
ANALYSIS OF SOUTH DAKOTA COHORT
Background
In 1992 voters passed Amendment A with 63.5% of the vote. Amendment A
was a constitutional amendment that read:
No person may serve more than four consecutive terms or a total of eight
consecutive years in the senate and more than four consecutive terms or a total
of eight consecutive years in the House of Representatives. However, this
restriction does not apply to partial terms to which a legislator may be
appointed or to Legislative service before January 1, 1993.42
In November 2006, Amendment F appeared on the ballot in South Dakota as
an initiated constitutional amendment to eliminate term limits for United States Senate
and the United States House of Representatives. It was defeated with 67.7% of the
electorate voting against the amendment.43 In February 2008, South Dakota State
Senators Napoli, Apa, and Katus and Representatives Haverly and Moore introduced
SJR1, which would repeal term limits on state legislators. This bill was a bipartisan
effort between the House and the Senate, with its authors having an engrossing
presence in the legislature. Senator William “Bill” Napoli is known for his outspoken
antics regarding a 2006 abortion bill in which he claimed the only exception to for
abortion is if a women was a virgin, brutally raped, sodomized as bad as you can
42
43
South Dakota Secretary of State
South Dakota Secretary of State
28
possibly make it, and is impregnated. After his public statements he became the
center of media backlash and an attempt to popularize a neologism of his last name as
something undesirable.44 Representative Haverly is now running for Napoli’s senate
seat as Napoli is termed out. Representative Moore has also had a past in the South
Dakota legislature, although not nearly in the same capacity as Napoli. Moore served
in the state House of Representatives from 1990-1998, in the state Senate from 19982006, and is currently back in the state House since his term began in 2006. Although
Moore was not part of the South Dakota cohort chosen for this study, his reelection
behavior models careerism, which is more common in a state with a larger opportunity
structure. In November of 2008, this legislatively referred amendment (Amendment J)
appeared on the ballot and lost with a prodigious 75.7% of the vote.45
More recently, State Senator Tom Hansen sponsored SJR 3 that if passed,
would lengthen the number of years an elected official could serve in each chamber to
12 years. It passed in the Senate, stalled in the House State Affairs Committee, and
died with adjournment.46 U.S. Term Limits President Philip Blumel condemned
Senator Hansen for proposing such an amendment during these hard economic times.
He said it was an insult to hard-working South Dakotans and that lawmakers should be
concerned about the job security of their constituents, not their own.47 Senator Hansen
is a Republican from Huron, South Dakota and a former member of the State House of
44
The Huffington Post
South Dakota Secretary of State
46
U.S. Term Limits
47
U.S. Term Limits
45
29
Representatives. Prior to SJR 3, Senator Hansen has been a relatively quiet member
of the Senate. He has supported the South Dakota Farmers Union, the National Rifle
Association, and scores low when it comes to civil liberties and civil rights issues.48
He is in his last term and currently works as a nutritionist.
In a survey of 500 likely voters conducted on March 4, 2008 by Pulse Opinion
Research, they found that 64% of likely voters wanted to keep term limits.49 Figure
3.1 shows the results from their survey leading up to the November 2008 election.
Figure 3.1
2008 South Dakota Survey of 500 Likely Voters:Vote to Repeal or Keep Term Limits
60
50
40
Candidates
Legislators
Observers
30
20
10
0
Very
Positive
Mixed
Very
Negative
According to this survey, over 60% of men, women, Republicans, and
Democrats all wanted to keep term limits.50 This information shows that term limits is
48
49
Project Vote Smart
U.S. Term Limits
30
not a partisan or gender issue within the electorate, rather a policy preference issue
between elected officials and voters.
Data
In 1992, 29 freshman members were elected to the South Dakota State House
of Representatives. These 29 legislators began their term in 1993, which meant they
would be termed out in 2000 had they run for three more terms and won each election,
serving a total of eight years. The South Dakota State House of Representatives has a
total of 70 members. The freshman legislators in 1993 represented 41% of the entire
House, almost twice as many as Ohio.
Of the 29 freshman members, 28% held an elected office before they ran for
the House and 28% of the cohort had prior political experience. These eight people
who held an elected office and who had prior political experience are the same eight
people. This phenomenon is not common among professionalized or hybrid
legislatures because as the data supports, a portion of the members in Ohio and
Arizona did have prior political experience as political staffers, city managers, precinct
committee members, rotary presidents, and state party executive committee positions.
This data shows that the only people who had prior political experience before serving
in the House were elected officials. Seven of these eight people or, 24% of the cohort,
served as a member of the State House of Representatives prior to their term
beginning in 1993.
50
Other is categorized as the third option in party affiliation.
31
Member reelection behavior can also be observed prior to 1993 to understand
how members of a citizen legislature conduct their political careers. South Dakota is
the only state in this study whose cohort has prior House experience. On average the
number of terms served was three, in addition to one member also serving in the State
Senate prior to being elected to the House in 1992. One member actually served six
consecutive terms from 1971-1982 and then dropped off the political radar until the
1992 election. Another member served in the House from 1981-1986, the Senate from
1987-1992 and then ran for the House again in the 1992 election. This was the only
member who served consecutive terms in House and/or Senate up until the 1992
election. The one member who did not serve in the House prior to the 1992 election
but was an elected official served as a County Commissioner. It is interesting to note
that some members only served one term although there were no term limits at the
time. We will see a repeat of this behavior when we look at the number of terms
served post 1993.
Prior to term limits, as many studies have suggested, elected officials served a
multitude of terms because there was no limit. In a research paper I conducted in May
2009, I sought to find the effects of term limits on springboard and career legislatures.
I examined the freshman members of both the California and New York State
Assemblies from 1990 to 2009 to determine how many terms were served. In New
York, a state without term limits, over two-thirds of the 1990 cohort was currently in
the New York State Assembly, serving a total of nine terms and 18 years. The
32
remaining one-third, although not currently serving in the New York Assembly, spent
an average of 12 years in office. Of those, half were still serving in politics in 2009.
The data from the South Dakota cohort shows infrequent election behavior.
Compared to the data from Ohio and Arizona, we will see that this behavior is specific
to South Dakota.
Of the 29 freshman members, only 28% successfully served four, two-year
terms and were termed out of the House. 21% of the cohort served one term, 41%
served two terms and 14% served three terms. More than 75% of the freshman cohort
did not serve the maximum number of terms. This data does not include members
who served in the House after 2000. There were two members of the freshman cohort
who, after serving at least one term between 1993 and 2000, also served post 2000.
Of the 29 members, 17% ran for the South Dakota State Senate and served
four, two-years terms, the maximum under term limits laws. This data also shows that
four of the five members who termed out in the Senate were never termed out in the
House. There was only one member of the cohort who was termed out of both houses.
However, of the members termed out in the House, one member did serve in the State
Senate but only served one term. This data substantiates Moncrief et al.’s findings
that a relatively small portion of individuals remain in their state legislative office for
as long as 12 years. Term limits laws allowed members to stay in the House and
Senate for as long as four terms and as the data shows, only 28% were termed out in
the House and 17% were termed out of the Senate.
33
As seen in the Ohio data, it is common for members to run for higher office
and serve in the U.S. House of Representatives because of the state’s opportunity
structure. The member reelection behavior in South Dakota, post time served in the
House, is consistent with the preconceived notions of a dead-end legislature as 52% of
the cohort returned to a career outside of elected office after their time served in the
House. Most of these legislators had careers in farming or the law prior to their
service, and we would expect them to return to those professions upon leaving the
legislature. None of the South Dakota cohort served as a member of Congress because
its opportunity structure did not provide adequate room for advancement. The data
supports the central thesis that most members of citizen legislatures return to the
private sector. As stated previously, 75% of the cohort did not serve the maximum
number of terms allowed in the House. However, of the 29 freshman members, 41%
did run for another office after successfully serving at least one term in the House. Of
the eight members termed out of the House, only one ran for another office.
South Dakota is the only state in this analysis that had a portion of the cohort
serve multiple nonconsecutive terms in the House post their first term (1993-1994).
One member, Paul Dennert, served two terms in the House from 1993-1996 and then
three terms beginning in 2005. Between holding these positions, Dennert served in the
State Senate from 1997-2004 and was termed out. Dennert’s reelection behavior was
consistent with “the anticipatory effect” as he left his position in the House (1996) to
run for higher office before being termed out. Regardless of term limits, it is possible
for members to continue their careers in politics by moving from one house to another.
34
The other person in the cohort that also fell into this category was Darrel Schrempp.
Schrempp served one term in 1993, one term in 1997, and one term in 2009. Between
1998 and 2009 he unsuccessfully ran for State Senate twice.
According to Salka, strong potential challengers will be less likely to run
against an incumbent, preferring instead to wait until an open seat election is created
by term limits.51 This election behavior is consistent with all types of legislatures, not
specifically citizen. 24% of the South Dakota ran for another consecutive office
before being termed out of the House. As the forthcoming data will show, Arizona is
the only other state in this analysis that possesses the same member reelection
behavior, “the anticipatory effect,” as South Dakota.
Analysis
For the South Dakota cohort background research was conducted to find past
political experience, prior elected office, and post legislative employment. The South
Dakota cohort differs from Ohio in that the members who had prior political
experience before serving in the House actually held an elected position versus being a
staff member to an elected official or working for a city, county, or state. Of these
eight people who held a previous elected office, seven of them were members of the
South Dakota House. The member reelection behavior in South Dakota shows a
pattern of people continuously running for the same position after vacating the seat
years prior.
51
Salka (2005, pp. 117)
35
Although term limits were in effect in 1993, more than 75% of the freshman
cohort did not serve the maximum number of terms. This minimal time served is
unique to South Dakota. More members of the cohort (41%) served only two terms,
half the allotted amount under South Dakota law. The assumption can be made that
the member reelection behavior is predicated on external variables not common in
professionalized and hybrid legislatures. These variables could be their other careers
or the lack of salary, staff, and resources. As with most citizen legislatures, these
members have other careers they need to work simultaneously with their elected
position. It could also be because of South Dakota’s opportunity structure. South
Dakota only has a population of approximately 800,000 and consequently one
Congressional seat. This does not provide an ample opportunity for termed out
legislators to run for higher office considering they only have one Congressional seat
and two Senate seats. The National Conference of State Legislatures categorizes
South Dakota as a Blue state which means on average lawmakers spend the equivalent
of half of a full time job doing legislative work. The compensation is quite low and
requires them to have other sources of income in order to make a living. The average
compensation for a Blue state is only $15,984 per year including per diems.52 Blue
states, which produce so-called "traditional legislatures", are generally rural and have
low populations. The lack of an opportunity structure is consistent with Squire’s
definition of “dead-end” legislatures, as South Dakota does not give its members
prospects for advancement or incentives to stay within it.
52
National Conference of State Legislatures
36
South Dakota’s term limits law prohibited members from serving more than
eight years in the House but some continued their careers in government. Although
75% of the cohort did not serve the maximum number of terms allowed in the House,
41% of the cohort did run for another office. This evidence suggests that South
Dakota elected officials continue their careers in government, however their
involvement is not consecutive or consistent. The cohort does not seem to be as
aggressive when it comes to maximizing the length of each position and
springboarding into higher office.
The data collected from the 29 freshman members of the South Dakota House
of Representatives in 1993 demonstrates that member reelection behavior in South
Dakota is more consistent with a citizen legislature as defined by Kurtz because there
was a significant amount of turnover. Although some of the cohort were elected
officials prior to 1993 and some of the cohort continued in politics after serving at
least one term, this behavior did create higher turnover in the legislature. The data
also demonstrates that although South Dakota has a low opportunity structure, it still
embodies similar characteristics of careerism and springboard legislatures as 41% of
the cohort ran for an elected position post their term in the state House. Therefore, the
opportunity structure did not predict the member reelection behavior of this cohort.
37
Chapter 4
ANALYSIS OF ARIZONA COHORT
Background
In 1992 voters passed Proposition 107 with 74.2% of the vote. Proposition
107 was a constitutional amendment that read:
The terms of office of the members of succeeding Legislatures shall be for two
years. No state Senator shall serve more than four consecutive terms in that
office, nor shall any state Representative serve more than four consecutive
terms in that office. This limitation on the number of terms of consecutive
service shall apply to terms of office beginning on or after January 1, 1993.
No Legislator, after serving the maximum number of terms, which shall
include any part of a term served, may serve in the same office until he has
been out of office for no less than one full term.53
In 1995 lawmakers in Arizona very cleverly tried to modify term limits by
introducing HCR 2011. HCR 2011, if passed, would change term limits to two-four
year terms instead of four-two year terms. It seemed like a bill of semantics, not real
policy change however, the proposal called for the new term limits to begin in 1997
with no mention of what happens to the years served by lawmakers who took office
prior to 1997.54 According to an editorial published on March 23, 1995 in The Daily
53
54
Arizona Secretary of State
The Daily Courier (1995)
38
Courier, “those in office regardless of years served would be handed a new clock, so
to speak, since the eight-year limitation would not start until that year.”
HCR 2011 was sponsored by Senator Carol Springer, Representative Don
Aldridge, and Representative Sue Lynch. Representative Lynch was one of the
freshman members of the 1993 cohort used in this study. Interestingly enough
Representative Lynch had no political experience prior to her first term in 1993, only
served three terms in the Arizona House, and did not continue a career in politics after
her position in the House. It is odd that someone who is against term limits, or at least
sponsored legislation that would increase her time allowed in the House, would not
serve the maximum terms nor continue a career in politics.
Representative Lynch also had a questionable history in the Arizona legislature
in terms of her partisanship. She ran for the Arizona House on a Republican ticket but
aligned more with the Democrats than her own party. In December 1996 Lynch voted
against her fellow colleague Don Aldridge when he was up for the position of Speaker
of the House.55 Both Representative Don Aldridge and Senator Carol Springer were
staunch Republicans and scored in the top 15 of the most conservative members in the
Arizona legislature whereas Representative Lynch aligned more with liberal
Democrats.56 Aldridge went on to serve as Speaker of the House later resigned after a
series of health problems and consequently died in 1999. Senator Springer went on to
serve as State Treasurer from 1999 to 2003. This example shows that either term
55
56
The Daily Courier (1996)
The Daily Courier (1994)
39
limits was not a partisan issue or Representative Lynch sponsored this bill for
exogenous reasons.
Currently there are two bills in the Arizona legislature, one in the Senate (SCR
1007) and its sister bill in the House (HCR 2029) that would result in a complete
repeal of term limits. SCR 1007 is sponsored by State Senator Carolyn Allen, a
termed-out Republican from Scottsdale. According to U.S. Term Limits President
Philip Blumel, “it’s the same old story: once legislators are term-limited, they decide
to repeal term limits provisions. The motive is always the same.”57 Contrary to
Blumel’s claim, Senator Allen says she is not doing this for personal reasons and has
no desire to remain a legislator.58 Senator Allen, unlike most legislators of her time,
was actually was a driving force behind the 1992 ballot initiative that enacted term
limits for state legislators. In a January 2010 Arizona Daily Sun article, Senator Allen
said “the idea, while it sounded good on paper, has proven to be a mistake.
Lawmakers with knowledge and expertise are forced out of office.”59 She continues
to argue that the problem is the ability of lobbyists to convince relatively
inexperienced legislators to go along with certain proposals because they don’t know
what has been tried before. Even Blumel agreed and said “there is some truth to
Allen’s contention that term limits have made the professional staffers more powerful
and more important but that doesn’t make it a bad thing.” There are also three bills in
the House: HCR 2012, HCR 2017, and HCR 2031 that would increase the amount of
57
U.S. Term Limits
Arizona Daily Sun (2010)
59
Arizona Daily Sun (2010)
58
40
time legislators are allowed to serve.60 If all these bills pass out of both houses, they
will be on the November 2010 ballot.
In a survey of 406 registered voters conducted between January 24-27, 2002 by
KAET-TV/Channel 8 and the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass
Communication at Arizona State University, they found that 58% of registered voters
wanted to keep term limits. Three years later they conducted another survey of 442
registered voters between January 20-23, 2005 and they found that 76% of registered
voters wanted to keep term limits. Figure 4.1 shows the increase in voters who favor
term limits over the period of three years.61
Figure 4.1
Arizona Surveys of Registered Voters to Repeal or Keep Term Limits
12
11.5
11
10.5
Ohio Freshman
1993
10
9.5
9
Prior Political
Experience
60
61
Prior Elected
Official
U.S. Term Limits
Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Arizona State University
41
According to these surveys, over 50% of registered voters approve of
legislative term limits. In 2005 there was an 18% increase in voters who wanted to
keep term limits. Although there are variables within every survey and a margin of
error, it is worth noting that there was a significant increase over time. As with Ohio
and South Dakota, Arizona voters favor term limits whereas elected officials would
like them repealed. According to an editorial in the Arizona Republic, “There's a
constant influx of newcomers, who barely learn the ropes before they're jockeying for
leadership positions. By their fourth and last term, lawmakers have one eye on the
next move in their political career. Yes, they can work around term limits by moving
to the other house - but that's still needlessly disruptive.”62 This opinion suggests that
Squire’s theory of a springboard legislature is present in Arizona.
Data
In 1992, 31 freshman members were elected to the Arizona State House of
Representatives. These 31 legislators began their term in 1993, which meant they
would be termed out in 2000 had they run for three more terms and won each election,
serving a total of eight years. The Arizona State House of Representatives has a total
of 60 members. The freshman legislators in 1993 represented 52% of the entire
House, more than Ohio and South Dakota.
Of the 31 freshman members, 13% held an elected office before they ran for
the House and 42% of the cohort had prior political experience. The gap between
62
Arizona Republic (2010)
42
prior elected officials and prior political experience (29%) is the highest gap among
the three states and the lowest percentage of the cohort having experience as an
elected official before their term began in 1993. In addition, as with Ohio, none of the
cohort served as a member of the House prior to 1993.
Of the 31 freshman members, 35% successfully served four, two-year terms
and were termed out of the House, 13% served one term, 29% served two terms and
23% served three terms. Although the most terms served was four, this data does not
have an overwhelming amount of skewed data in any particular direction. Kurtz’s
definition of a hybrid legislature as is relates to legislative professionalism is
consistent with this data from Arizona. Arizona seems to be in the middle of the data
set as compared to the professional and citizen legislatures. Ohio had an
overwhelming amount of their cohort serve the maximum terms allowed whereas
South Dakota had more than 75% of their cohort not serving the maximum terms
allowed. This data however does not predict the member reelection behavior as it
relates to the opportunity structure. Regardless of the opportunity structure, members
of the cohort could serve their full amount of term if reelected.
Of the 31 original members of the freshman class of 1993, 35% successfully
served four, two-year terms, the maximum under Arizona law. Of the 31 freshman
members, 6% ran for the Arizona State Senate and served four, two-years terms, also
the maximum per term limit laws. The 6% of the cohort that was termed out of the
Senate was not termed out of the House. There was a portion of the cohort that also
served in the Senate but was never termed out.
43
Like South Dakota, none of the Arizona cohort served in Congress. This data
is somewhat perplexing because Arizona has a larger opportunity structure than South
Dakota. Considering Arizona has eight congressional seats, it should fall someone inbetween Ohio and South Dakota but instead aligns with the behavior of the South
Dakota cohort. Although this member election behavior runs contrary to our
assumptions, it should be noted that 42% of the cohort did go back to work in the
private sector after their time served in the House. This data supports my prediction
that half of the cohort would return to the private sector after their term(s) in the
House.
Of the 31 freshman members, 42% did run for another office after successfully
serving at least one term in the House. Of the 11 members termed out of the House,
36% ran for another office. A small percentage of the cohort neither ran for another
office nor returned to the private sector, rather they went back into the public sector.
Some were non-elected members of commissions, boards, and departments within the
State. As predicted, hybrid legislatures, such as Arizona, were split down the middle
without too much influence in either direction.
As previously mentioned, Salka argued that strong potential challengers will be
less likely to run against an incumbent, preferring instead to wait until an open seat
election is created by term limits.63 This election behavior is only present in the data
from the citizen and hybrid legislatures. As with South Dakota, Arizona also had a
portion of their freshman cohort run for higher consecutive office before being termed
63
Salka (2005, pp. 117)
44
out of the House. This could reflect the fact that while they were in office, a seat
became vacant and the member thought they would have a better change of winning if
they were not challenging an incumbent.
Of the freshman class in 1993, 26% ran for higher consecutive office before
being termed out of the House. This number is very similar to the percentage in South
Dakota. As we will see in Chapter 5 when the data from all three states is compared,
Arizona has similarities to both professional and citizen legislatures as predicted and
substantiated by Kurtz’s professionalization typology.
Analysis
For the Arizona cohort background research was conducted to find past
political experience, prior elected office, and post legislative employment. Arizona
had the smallest percentage of their cohort having prior experience as an elected
official and the largest number of freshman legislators beginning their term in 1993.
This large amount of freshman in 1993 demonstrates high turnover and shows that
member reelection behavior in Arizona is more consistent with a citizen legislature.
According to Kurtz, Arizona should fall somewhere in the middle of the Ohio and
South Dakota data. As we will see in the forthcoming chapter, there were times that
Arizona fell in the middle of the data and other times they skewed towards either
extreme rather than a median position.
Of the 31 members of the freshman class, 35% were termed out in the House
and 6% were termed out of the Senate. The percentage of the cohort termed out in the
House was in the middle of the entire data set, between South Dakota and Ohio,
45
however, Arizona had the lowest percentage of people termed out in the Senate. The
interactive relationship between Arizona’s opportunity structure and level of
professionalization would suggest that more members would springboard into a higher
office and serve as a member of the Senate.
Of the cohort 42% did run for another office after successfully serving at least
one term in the House and 26% ran for office before being termed out and
immediately following their term in the House. This data is more consistent with my
prediction that half of the cohort would run for higher office and the other half would
resume their careers prior to elected office however, the predictability of member
reelection behavior in a hybrid legislature is less consistent than the extreme ends of
the spectrum.
The majority of the data from Arizona does fall in the middle of the Ohio and
South Dakota data, but there are also characteristics of the Arizona cohort that is
consistent with the member reelection behavior patterns from states with weaker and
stronger opportunity structures. Although the legislative characteristics of Arizona
may fall somewhere in between either extreme, the actual behavior of members does
not always resemble its classification as “hybrid.”
According to the National Conference of State Legislature, states in the middle
of the population range tend to have White legislatures. Arizona, with a population of
a little over six and a half million, is a White “hybrid” state. The White category is the
largest category on their five-point scale with 23 states. White legislatures typically
spend more than two-thirds of a full time job being legislators and although their
46
income is greater than that in the Blue states, it is not enough to allow them to make a
living without having other sources of income. 64 Although Arizona only has eight
Congressional seats, which is relatively small considering some of the larger hybrid
states like Texas has 32, they have an opportunity structure that provides a favorable
prospect for political advancement. Arizona has produced four viable Presidential
candidates over the past five decades including John McCain, Bruce Babbitt, Mo
Udall, and Barry Goldwater. In addition, Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland
Security, was the Governor of Arizona before being appointed by President Obama,
William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, practiced law for 16
years in Arizona before being appointed in 1986, and former Supreme Court Associate
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor served as an Arizona state senator from 1969-1975 and
as a state judge before being nominated to the Supreme Court in 1981.65
The successes of the aforementioned Arizona politicians and the data from the
cohort, shows that this hybrid state has the ability to produce career politicians. The
central thesis predicts that Arizona will be split down the middle with half of the
cohort running for higher office and the other half resuming their careers prior to
elected office. Overall, the member reelection behavior in Arizona is consistent with
these predictions.
64
NCSL Scale: Red States (4), Red Light States (6), White States (23), Blue Light States (11), Blue
States (6).
65
About.com
47
Chapter 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Analysis
Term limits is known as the largest grassroots movement in American
history.66 National polls have consistently found that an overwhelming amount of
voters (75-80%) believe that elected officials should have their terms in office
limited.67 In the three states chosen for this study, voters supported the term limit
ballot measures with an average of 69%. Arizona voters passed their proposition with
74% in favor of term limits, the highest among the three states. Of all 15 states that
passed term limit propositions, only three states had a higher percentage of their
electorate vote in favor, Florida being the highest with 76.8%. Missouri and
Louisiana, both hybrid legislatures, also ranked higher than Arizona. The state that
passed with the lowest percentage was Nevada with 56% in favor and is also hybrid.
Based on this data, it cannot be assumed that the professionalization typology is an
indicator of overall support for term limits.
Of all three states, Arizona had the largest portion of freshman members in
their class of 1993. They had 31 freshman members out of 60 total members in the
Arizona House of Representatives. Although term limits were not in effect prior to
this election, this phenomenon is more indicative of post term limit legislative
behavior. Term limit reformers have argued that the imposition of term limits created
66
67
U.S. Term Limits
U.S. Term Limits and CATO
48
more electoral competition through an increase of open-seat elections. Salka found
that turnover increased because of the greater number of open-seat elections. The
large number of new members in the 1993 Arizona cohort challenges Salka’s findings
because the abundance of open-seats were before term limit legislation passed. In
Salka’s 2005 single-state case study he chose California because, the term limit
proposition created the most stringent system in the nation, it was one of the first
states to impose term limits, and is one of the most professionalized bodies in the
country.68 I believe his case study was flawed because his findings cannot be applied
to other types of legislatures. He notes at the end of his study that it is important for
future studies to compare a number of state legislatures, including other less
professionalized legislatures. By not including other states with varying levels of
professionalism, his study cannot be used to accurately measure the electoral
competition of the other 11 “non-professionalized” states with term limits.69
Ohio had the smallest percentage of freshman members. This information tells
us that there are less open-seat elections, therefore a low amount of turnover. This
behavior of course changed with the imposition of term limits but as the data
substantiates, Ohio elected officials continued their career in politics, more so than
South Dakota or Arizona. This could be because Ohio has a greater opportunity
structure that could attribute to its career and springboard characteristics.
68
69
Salka (2005, pp. 118)
Four of the 15 states are categorized as professional: CA, MI, FL and OH.
49
The prior political experience and prior elected official experience shows us
what type of membership each state embodies. The level of prior political experience
between states is as predicted, with Ohio having the highest percentage and South
Dakota being the lowest. This data is consistent with the Kurtz’s professionalization
typology. The only information not predicted is that Arizona had the lowest amount
of their cohort serve as an elected official before 1993. I would have assumed South
Dakota to have the least prior experience however; South Dakota is also the only state
to have a portion of their cohort have prior experience serving in the State House of
Representatives. This information tells us that unlike Ohio and Arizona, where
members are concerned with springboarding into higher office, South Dakota elected
officials have a pattern of running for the same office more than once (regardless of
term limits). South Dakota is also the only state where elected officials ran for
nonconsecutive seats in the State House after their initial term in 1993. The
conclusion can be drawn that members of professional and hybrid states want to run
for other elected positions whereas citizen legislatures do not mind running for the
same seat time and again nor do they optimize their consecutive allotted terms in the
House. This behavior is evidence of the variations in each state’s opportunity
structure. South Dakota, with its one congressional seat, does not provide its elected
officials with prospects for advancement, hence the election repetition within the same
position.
Ohio had more members serve their full amount of terms of any state. This is
consistent with Ohio’s opportunity structure as they are creating their career in politics
50
and laying the foundation and gaining the support to run for higher office after they
are termed out. The data from South Dakota and Arizona are fairly comparable to one
another. A reason for the decreased amount of full terms served, as compared to Ohio,
is that South Dakota and Arizona were the only states where members ran for higher
office before being termed out. This member reelection behavior is more consistent
with the “anticipatory effect.” As argued by Salka, the threat of looming term limits
may prompt legislators to run for another office when a seat is vacated, even if they
would not be forced out of their current seat for a number of terms. The data shows
that 24% of the South Dakota cohort and 26% of the Arizona cohort ran for a higher
consecutive office before being termed out of the House. On average, a member
served two terms in the House before vacating their seat to run for higher office.
For those members who were termed out in the House, some served in the
State Senate and were termed out as well. Surprisingly, South Dakota had a larger
portion of their cohort serve in the State Senate. This could be attributed to the large
number of people leaving their House term to run for a higher consecutive office.
Five of the seven members who left their position in the House early to run for higher
office, ran for the State Senate, won, and served the maximum allotted terms.
Ohio is the only state in the study that had members elected to Congress after
their time in the State House. This data is consistent with Ohio’s opportunity structure
as they have 18 congressional seats versus one in South Dakota and eight in Arizona.
South Dakota only had one member run for Congress and Arizona had five run for
Congress and one for Senate. None of the members won their races in either states.
51
As previously mentioned in chapter one, previous research does not always
include the discussion of legislative professionalism or the opportunity structure
within the context of member behavior. Most actually assume the legislatures are
professionalized when discussing the effects of term limits. Therefore, the level of
professionalism and the opportunity structures within legislatures must be identified in
order to interpret and compare previous literature.
Salka suggested that legislators who are forced out of office by term limits may
not retire from politics altogether but will instead run for other elected offices. The
data shows that Ohio had the largest percentage of their cohort run for an elected
position post their position in the State House. This is consistent with Carey et al’s.
findings that say “professionalized legislatures attract individuals with specific
qualities and generate specific sorts of behaviors that correspond directly to so many
of the concerns underlying the term limit movement that an analysis of term limits
would be of little value without accounting for this factor.”70 The behavior of the
elected officials in Ohio is expected considering its opportunity structure.
The percentage of the South Dakota and Arizona cohort that ran for an elected
position post their position in the State House is similar to one another. How does this
data compare against Salka’s claim that legislators will not retire but instead run for
other elected offices? More than 50% of the cohort in each state chose not to run for
another elected position. The opportunity structure within these states changed the
70
Carey et al. (1998, pp. 278)
52
assumed behavior of legislators. Therefore, Salka’s theories are only consistent with
Ohio.
Contrastively, Opheim conclusions were more correct for citizen and hybrid
legislatures, not professionalized. She found that “a substantial majority of state
legislators will find their legislative careers affected, if not ended, by term
limitations.” The data shows that 65% of the Ohio cohort continued their career in
politics, regardless of term limits and only 13% of the Ohio cohort went back to a
career outside of politics. The differences in percentage are members who still work
in politics but do not hold an elected position. However, her data substantiates the
claim made by Moncrief et al. that in professionalized legislatures retention rates are
highest. The members of the South Dakota and Arizona cohort saw a bigger impact
on their legislative careers because of term limits. Less than half of the cohort ran for
another elected position, confirming Opheim’s claim that state legislators will find
their legislative careers affected, if not ended, by term limits.
Unlike Salka’s single-state case study, Opheim used all 50 states in her
analysis. She distinguished between states with term limits and states without and
selected a cohort of state legislators who began their service in a specific session and
traced that cohort over time. Her methodology allows for her data to be interpreted in
any future analysis because of its inclusion of various opportunity structures and levels
of professionalism. The data found in my study most closely aligns with the findings
in Opheim’s study because of these reasons. However, the data set used in both
Moncrief et al. and Opheim’s studies were before the implementation of term limits.
53
They were looking to see if term limitations had been in place, how many legislators
would have seen their careers affected? By not being able to including data from
states, post term limits, it omits the inclusion of addition member reelection behavior
theories such as the anticipatory effect.
As theorized in chapter one, members in professional legislatures will continue
their career in politics, members in citizens legislatures will stay in office until they
are termed out and then continue to work in the private sector, not running for higher
office, and members in a hybrid legislature will be split down the middle, with half
running for higher office and the other half resuming their careers in the private sector.
The prediction was correct for Ohio as a majority of the cohort continued their careers
in politics. The prediction was also correct for Arizona as 42% of the cohort
continued their careers in politics and 42% resumed their careers outside of politics.
The differences in percentages were members who still work in politics but do not
hold an elected position.
However the data for South Dakota is not as predicted. South Dakota
personifies similar behavior to Arizona. South Dakota is within 10 percentage points
of Arizona with 41% of the cohort continuing their career in politics and 52%
resuming their careers outside of politics. South Dakota’s opportunity structure does
not provide a lot of room for political advancement but as evident from the data
introduced, members in South Dakota do not necessarily run for higher office, rather
they run for the same position time and again.
54
According to Kurtz and Squire, there are various terms that we can use to
identify the different types of legislatures. I used Kurtz’s legislative professionalism
to identify the three states used for this study. Squire argues that membership stability
is a function of the career opportunity structures offered within the state’s political
system. His terms are generally associated with Kurtz’s legislative professionalism as
follows: “career/springboard” and “professional; and “dead-end” and “citizen.”
Squire does not define the opportunity structure of a hybrid state but we can assume it
would take on the characteristics of both career and dead-end legislatures. Through
the compilation of the data for all three states, I was able to test whether or not the
opportunity structure predicts the reelection behavior of members. I’ve concluded that
the opportunity structure is a likely indicator of member behavior but must be
discussed in conjunction with the dependent variable (level of careerism) and the level
of professionalism in order to accurately assess reelection behavior. Yes, the behavior
of members in Ohio is consistent with professionalized legislatures and there are
career politicians interweaving through the gates of term limits but South Dakota also
assimilates a ping-pong effect where members bounce from one elected position to the
next. Therefore, there is an element of careerism within citizen legislatures such as
South Dakota. Although not a professional legislature, South Dakota actually
emulates similar behavior of Maestas’ explanation of the intra-institutional ambition.
Future research that could enhance the findings in this study may be a survey
to the 83 members used in the data set. The survey could include questions that
address why they either chose to fulfill or not fulfill their maximum terms, why they
55
chose to run for an elected position before being termed out, and what effects term
limits had on their political career. It would be interesting to compare individual
members’ point of view with this gathered statistical evidence to see if their opinion
corresponds to the behavioral evidence. To broaden the findings of this study future
research could also compare this data with the data from non-term limited states across
the same levels of professionalization.
56
APPENDICES
57
APPENDIX A
Ohio Cohort
Freshman Ohio House 1993
*Four two-years terms for House
*Two four-year terms for Senate
John R. Bender
- 1960-1987: Professor
- 1982: Ran for Senate (Lost)
- 1984-1992: Member-at-large of the Elyria City Council
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2006-Present: Ohio State Board of Education
- Reference: http://johnbender.homestead.com/,
http://www.centuryinter.net/tjs11/jean/bender6.htm
Barbara H. Boyd
- 1965: Volunteered on Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Campaign
- 1983: City Council Member, Cleveland Heights City Council
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2000: Executive Assistant to the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and
Family Services
- 2005: Regional Manager of the Children’s Defense Fund
- 2006 to Present: U.S. House of Representatives
- Reference:
http://www.house.state.oh.us/index.php?option=com_displaymembers&task=d
etail&district=9
Judy Carr
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 1999: Ran for Mayor of City of Alliance (Lost)
- 2002: Community Reinvestment Area Housing Council, City of Alliance
(Nomination)
- Reference: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/19901999OfficialElectionResults.aspx
Karen M. Doty
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 2001-2007: Law Director, Office of the Summit County Executive
- 2007-Present: General Counsel, Ohio Board of Regents (Appointed)
- Reference: http://regents.ohio.gov/news/press_releases/2007/Doty072607.pdf
58
Diane V. Grendell
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2000-Present: Judge, 11th District Court of Appeals (Elected)
- Reference:
http://www.11thcourt.co.trumbull.oh.us/judges_files/Diane%20V.%20Grendel
l.pdf
Richard A. Hodges
- 1987-1993: Treasurer, Fulton County
- 1994-1998: Director, Coordinated Care
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 2000-Present: Private Sector
- Reference: http://www.linkedin.com/pub/richard-hodges/10/352/B02
Jeff Jacobson
- Prior to Legislature: Medical
- 1993-2000, House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2001-2008, Senate, 2 terms (Termed Out)
- 2008: Ohio State Medical Board (Appointed by Gov)
- Present: Lobbyist
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Jacobson_(Ohio)
Gene Krebs
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2005-Present: Ohio Consumer’s Counsel Board Member
- Present: Legislative Appointments (Various)
- Reference: http://www.greaterohio.org/involved/staff.html
Jerry F. Luebbers
- Prior to Legislature: CPA, Attorney
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2006: President, Delhi Township Board of Trustees (Elected)
- 2009-Present: Trustee, Delhi Township Board of Trustees (Elected)
- Reference: http://www.smartvoter.org/2009/11/03/oh/hm/ballot.html,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Driehaus
James E. Mason
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1986-1988: Secretary, Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
59
-
1998: Tenth District Court of Appeals
Present: Judge, Domestic Court in Franklin County (Appointed by Gov)
Reference: http://noethics.net/Ohio_Reporter/taftimpeach.htm,
http://www.fccourts.org/DRJ/jmason.html
Priscilla D. Mead
- City Council Member, Upper Arlington
- Mayor, Upper Arlington
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2001-2004: Senate, 1 term
- 2008: Ohio Historical Society Board of Trustee
- Reference: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/19901999OfficialElectionResults/OhioReps110398.aspx,
http://cscc.edu/Board/index.htm
J. Donald Mottley
- Prior to the Legislature: Attorney
- Various positions for the Montgomery County Commissioners and County
Auditor’s Office
- West Carrollton Board of Education
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Present: Attorney
- Reference: http://www.taftlaw.com/attorneys/7-j-donald-mottley
Darrell W. Opfer
- Prior to Legislature: Teacher
- 1983-1993: Ottawa County Commissioner
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2000-2004: Economic Development Director of Ottawa County
- 2006: Ran for House, Lost
- Democratic Central Committee
- Reference: http://www.oagc.com/files/2006-election-results.pdf,
http://ohio2006elections.blogspot.com/2006_08_01_archive.html
Joy Padgett
- Prior to Legislature: Teacher
- Director of the Office of Appalachia (Appointed by Gov)
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2005-2008: Senate, 1 term
- 2006: Ran for Lieutenant Governor (Lost in Primary)
- 2006: Ran for Congress (Lost)
60
-
Reference: http://www.freedomspeaks.com/official/63268/ohio-(oh)-statesenator-joy-padgett-%5Boh-senate%5D,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joy_Padgett
Sally A. Perz
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2005: Member of the Transportation Review Advisory Board
- 2003- Present: Private Sector/Lobbyist
- Reference: http://www.capitol-link.com/Sally.htm
Marilyn J. Reid
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 2002-2009: Greene County Commissioner
- Reference:
http://www.ysnews.com/stories/2002/december/122602_yearinreview.html,
http://www.co.greene.oh.us/comm/BOCC_Reid.htm
Robert L. Schuler
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector/TV Host
- 1978-1985: Deer Park City Council Member
- 1988-1992: Sycamore Township Trustee
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2003-2009: Senate, 2 terms (Died in Office)
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Schuler,
http://www.freedomspeaks.com/official/63204/ohio-(oh)-state-senator-robertl-schuler-%5Boh-senate%5D
Kirk J. Schuring
- Prior to the Legislature: Insurance
- 1993-2002: House, 4 terms (appointed in his first term) (Termed Out)
- 2003 to Present: Senate, 2 terms (Termed Out in 2010)
- 2008- Ran for Congress (Lost)
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirk_Schuring
Betty S. Sutton
- Prior to Legisalture: Attorney
- 1990: Barberton City Council Member
- 1991: Summit County Council Member
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2006-Present: U.S. House of Representatives
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betty_Sutton
61
George Terwilleger
- Prior to the Legislature: Private Sector/Real Estate/USPS
- 1970-1980: Hamilton Township Government (Elected and Appointed
Positions)
- 1980-1991: Warren County Commissioner
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference:
http://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=77057
Patrick J. Tiberi
- Prior to Legislature: Real Estate
- 1996-1993: Assistant to Congressman
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2001-Present: U.S. House of Representatives
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrick_J._Tiberi,
http://tiberi.house.gov/Biography/
Rose Vesper
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2006: Campaign Co-Chair for State Auditor
- Reference: http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/19901999OfficialElectionResults/OhioReps110398.aspx,
http://www.beckergop.com/TheBeckerReport/TheBeckerReportVolumeII_Issu
e_III.htm
Mike Wise
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 1999-2000: Director of Governor Taft’s Regional Economic Development
- 2000-2005: Cuyahoga County Republican Party, Co-chair
- Present: Lobbyist and Attorney
- Reference:
http://www.mcdonaldhopkins.com/attorney/profile.aspx?id=CLp2rP89LEm0g
FYEJtqCAQ
23 Freshman Members
17 Termed out in House, 74%
3 Termed out in Senate, 13%
99 Total Members in the House
62
APPENDIX B
South Dakota Cohort
Freshman South Dakota House 1993
*Four two-years terms for both houses
Reference for all members:
http://legis.state.sd.us/historical/LegislatorsByType.aspx?Type=S
Maurice A. Olson
- 1971-1982: House of Representatives, 6 terms
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 2004: Died
H. Paul Dennert
- Prior to Legislature: Farmer
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 1997-2004: Senate, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2005-Present: House of Representatives, 3 terms
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Dennert
R. Lee VanSickle
- 1993-1994: House of Representatives, 1 term
Thomas G. Torchy Ries
- 1989-1990: House of Representatives, 1 term
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 2004: Died
Doug Bierschbach
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 2002: Department of Agriculture Weed and Pest Commission, “Statewide
One-Call Notification Center Board.
- Present: Private Sector
- Reference: http://legis.state.sd.us/rules/register/06102002.pdf
Arnold Brown
- Prior to Legislature: Health Care Administrator
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 1997-2004: Senate, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2006-Present: South Dakota Judicial Qualifications Commission
- http://judgepedia.org/index.php/Arnold_Brown
63
William C. Johnson
- 1993-1994: House of Representatives, 1 term
Dale Kringen
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 1999: Dakota State Foundation President
- Reference: http://www.departments.dsu.edu/alumni/alumninews/archive/spring2000/index.html
Roger Brooks
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
Kristie Fiegen
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Present: President of the Junior Achievement of South Dakota
- Present: South Dakota Commission on Health Care (Gov appointment)
- Present: Court Appointed Special Advocates Commission (Gov appointment)
- Reference:
http://www.sdsos.gov/adminservices/bluebookpdfs/2005bluebook/2005_blue_
book_chapter_6d.pdf
Jack Billion
- Prior to Legislature: Surgeon
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 2006: Ran for Governor (Lost)
- 2006: State Chair for SD Democratic Party (Elected position)
- 2008: South Dakota Super Delegate, Democratic Party's 2008 national
convention
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Billion
Linda K. Barker
- 1993-1998: House of Representatives, 3 terms
Barbara Everist
- Prior to the Legislature: Attorney
- 1993-1994: House of Representatives, 1 term
- 1995-2002: Senate, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2003-2006: Federal Housing Finance Board Member (Federal Home Loan
Banks)
- Reference: http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2468/PR03-03.pdf
64
Gilbert “Gil” Koetzle
- Prior to the Legislature: Firefighter
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2001-2008: Senate, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gil_Koetzle
Roland Chicoine
- Prior to Legislature: Farmer
- 1981-1986: House of Representatives, 3 terms
- 1987-1992: Senate, 3 terms
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference: http://agbio.sdstate.edu/eminent/single.cfm?id=16
Vincent Green
- Prior to Legislature: Author/Military
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- Present: Author/Lawyer
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vincent_S._Green
Donald Munson
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
Edward E. Van Gerpen
- Prior to Legislature: Farmer
- 1985-1988: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 2008-Present: Bon Homme County Commissioner (Elected Position)
- Reference:
http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/pastelections_electioninfo08_p
rimarycounty.shtm
- http://www.sdcc.govoffice2.com/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7BFF2E
0E97-81F1-4485-873E-ACB7CF7973BA%7D&DE=%7B4413330A-3EC14434-825C-7320FB350813%7D
Paul Widman
- 1993-1994: House of Representatives, 1 term
Ron J. Volesky
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1981-1986: House of Representatives, 3 terms
- 1986: Ran for Congress (Lost)
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2001-2002: Senate, 1 term
65
-
2002: Ran for Democratic nomination for Governor (Lost)
2002: Ran for Attorney General (Lost)
2003: Huron City Commissioner (Elected)
2004: Ran for Mayor of Huron (Lost)
2006: Intention to run for Governor, abandoned his bid
2010/Present: Running for Governor
Reference: http://sdstraighttalk.squarespace.com/straight-talk/2005/10/26/ronvolesky-loves-attention.html
V. Joanne Lockner
- Prior to Legislature: Farmer/Rancher
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
Nicholas E. Nemec
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 1996-Present: Elected member of the DNC
- http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/interactives/campaign08/primaries/2008_superdelegates.html
Darrel (Dean) Schrempp
- Prior to the Legislature: Private Sector
- 1980-1988: Commissioner of Dewey County
- 1993-1994: House of Representatives, 1 term
- 1997-1998: House of Representatives, 1 term
- 2000: Ran for Senate (Lost)
- 2004: Ran for Senate (Lost)
- 2009-2010: House of Representatives, 1 term
- Reference: http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Dean_Schrempp
Roy D. Letellier
- 1993-1996: House of Representatives, 2 terms
- 1996: Ran for the Public Utilities Commission (Lost)
- 1999-2000: Bowhay Institute for Legislative Leadership Development Alumni
- Reference: http://sdstraighttalk.squarespace.com/straight-talk/2008/7/13/pamflips-out.html
Kay S. Jorgensen
- 1979-1984: House of Representatives, 3 terms
- 1986-1989: SD Board of Regents
- 1987-1989: SD Centennial Commission
- 1990-1993: Board of Directors, Spearfish School District
- 1993-1998: House of Representatives, 3 terms
- 1998-Present: Private Sector
66
-
Reference:
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/officerProfile?symbol=BKH.N&officer
Id=904919,
http://www.wellmark.com/AboutWellmark/CompanyInformation/Board.aspx
Wenzel J. Kovarik
- 1989-1990: House of Representatives, 1 term
- 1993-1994: House of Representatives, 1 term
Carol E. Fitzgerald
- 1993-2000: House of Representatives, 4 terms (Termed Out)
Fred C. Whiting
- 1993-1994: House of Representatives, 1 term
- 1995-2002: Senate, 4 terms (Termed Out)
Cheryl B. Madden
- 1993-1998: House of Representatives, 3 terms
- 1999-2002: Senate, 2 terms
29 Freshman Members
8 Termed out in House, 28%
5 Termed out in Senate, 17%
70 Total Members in the House
67
APPENDIX C
Arizona Cohort
Freshman Arizona House 1993
*Four two-years terms for House
*Four two-years terms for Senate
Linda G. Aguirre
- Prior to Legislature: Educator
- Roosevelt School District Board of Directors
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 1999-2006: Senate, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference:
http://www.communicationsinstitute.com/site/cpage.asp?cpage_id=140007558
&sec_id=140000794
David Armstead
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 2000: Member, Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1996/General/Canvass1996GE.pdf,
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/iminute/house/cts12-16.htm
Ernie Baird
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- Present: Attorney
- Reference: http://www.bwglaw.net/attorneys/jeb/index.htm
Linda D. Beezley
- Prior to Legislature: Health Care
- 1993-1994: House, 1 term
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1994/General/Canvass1994GE.pdf
Russell “Rusty” W. Bowers
- Prior to Legislature: Sculptor/Painter
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 1997-2001: Senate, 3 terms (Resigned one year early)
- 2002-2010: Lobbyist
- 2010: Running for Congress
68
-
Reference: https://rustycountry.com/about/,
http://www.coppercountrynews.com/Arc/2009/Dep/Oth/112509Other%20New
s.html
Robert “Bob” Chastain
- Prior to Legislature: School District Superintendent
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 2006: Zoo President and CEO
- 2006: Retired
- Reference: http://www.chastaincentral.com/content/ccnews.html,
http://www.valleegirlproductions.com/therightvoicetherightchoice/id12.html,
http://www.azsos.gov/election/1996/General/Canvass1996GE.pdf
Harry R. Clark
- Prior to Legislature: Retired
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_A._Clark
Pat Conner
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1968-1972: National Guard
- 1984-1992: Yuma County Board of Supervisors
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 1997- 1998:Senate, 1 term
- Ex Officio member of the Arizona Water Banking
- Present: Owner of Car Wash Authority
- Reference: http://www.awba.state.az.us/personnel/bios/conner.html
George Cunningham
- Prior to Legislature: Administrator
- 1977-1988: UA Faculty
- Various public staffing positions: City Manager, Chief of Staff for a
Congressman
- 1990-1992: UA Faculty
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 1997-2000: Senate, 2 terms
- 2000: Ran for Congress (Lost)
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Finance and Budget (retired 2008)
- Reference: http://wc.arizona.edu/papers/94/44/01_3_m.html,
http://azgovernor.blogspot.com/2008/08/sinking-ship.html
Lori S. Daniels
- Prior to Legislature: Insurance
69
-
Board Member for United Way
1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
2001-2002: Senate, 1 Term
2008-Present: Commissioner, Citizens Clean Elections Commission
(Appointed)
Reference: http://www.azcleanelections.gov/aboutus/commissioners/current/lori-s-daniels.aspx
Catherine R. Eden
- Prior to Legislature: Professor
- 1983-1988: Coconino County Manager
- 1988-1991: Director, Department of Administration
- 1993-1994: House, 1 term
- 2000-2005: Director, Arizona Department of Health Services
- 2006 to Present: Director of ASU Education Center
- Reference: http://www.supreme.state.az.us/opin/pdf2003/bennettopinion9.pdf,
http://www.auditorgen.state.az.us/Reports/State_Agencies/Agencies/Health_Se
rvices_Department_of/Performance/05-L1/05-L1.pdf,
http://ramseyexecutive.asu.edu/meet-the-director
Bob Edens
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1985: Ran for Congress (Lost?) NO INFO
- 1993-1994: House, 1 term
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1994/General/Canvass1994GE.pdf,
http://www.city-data.com/elec2/elec-TEMPE-AZ.html
Jorge Luis Garcia
- Prior to Legislature: Social Services
- 1977-1981: Precinct Committee Person
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 2003-Present: Senate, 4 terms (Termed Out in 2010)
- Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jorge_Luis_Garcia,
http://www.votesmart.org/bio.php?can_id=3062
Jeff Groscost
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2001-2005: Political Consultant
- 2005: Private Sector
- 2006: Died
- Reference:
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/AFV+Solutions+Inc.+Announces+Appointmen
70
t+of+Jeffrey+Groscost+as...-a0133973006,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Groscost
Joe Hart
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector (Mining for 20 years)
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2006-Present: Arizona State Mine Inspector
- Reference: http://www.asmi.state.az.us/agency_info/joe_hart.asp,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Hart_(politician),
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/hrules.htm
Winifred “Freddy” Hershberger
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1973-1974: President, National Federation of Republican Women
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 1999: Retired
- Reference:
http://www.ourcampaigns.com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=109941,
http://www.nfrw.org/statefederations/arizona.htm
Becky Jordan
- Prior to Legislature: Air Force
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 2001: Secretary, Arizona Board of Medical Examiners
- Reference:
http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/publications/sites/default/files/157_en.pdf,
http://www.azsos.gov/election/1994/General/Canvass1994GE.pdf
John Kaites
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1989: Assistant Attorney General
- Deputy County Attorney
- 1993-1994: House, 1 term
- 1995-1998: Senate, 2 terms
- 2008: John McCain Leadership Team
- Present: Attorney
- Reference: http://www.lawyers.com/Arizona/Phoenix/John-P.-Kaites-50123a.html, http://joycom.tv/about/john-kaites/
John C. Keegan
- Prior to Legislature: Engineer
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 1996: Maricopa County Charter Government Commission (Elected)
71
-
1997-2007: Mayor of Peoria
2002: Ran for Congress (Lost)
2007-Present: Judge in Maricopa County
Reference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Keegan
Ned King
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- Reference: http://agic.az.gov/board/minutes/pre2006/jan95.pdf,
http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/Primary/Canvass1998PE.pdf
Richard Kyle
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/Primary/Canvass1998PE.pdf,
https://www.azasrs.gov/content/pdf/minutes/20000218.pdf
Sue Lynch
- Prior to Legislature: Homemaker
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1996/General/Canvass1996GE.pdf
W.A. McGibbon
- Prior to Legislature: Rancher
- 1984-1985: Rotary President
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2010: Wants appointment for vacant state Senate seat, but won’t run for
reelection.
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/General/Canvass1998GE.pdf,
http://www.rotaryclubofgreenvalley.org/desert_wheel/dw_090526.pdf,
http://gvnews.com/articles/2010/02/24/news/54mcgibbon0214.txt
Paul Newman
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1976-1986: Court Management Consultant
- Cochise County Supervisor, 2 terms
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 2008-Present: Commissioner, Arizona Corporation Commission
- Reference: http://www.cc.state.az.us/commissioners/pnewman/default.asp,
http://www.votesmart.org/bio.php?can_id=3101
Andy Nichols
- Prior to Legislature: Medicine
72
-
1970-2001: Director, University of Arizona Rural Health Office
1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
2000: Delegate to Democratic National Convention
2001: Senate, 1 term (Died in Office)
2001: Died
Reference: http://politicalgraveyard.com/bio/nichols.html,
http://www.unmc.edu/Community/ruralmeded/FM_GP/andy_nichols.htm
Jerry Overton
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference:
http://www.azsos.gov/Election/2000/Info/pubpamphlet/english/prop104.htm
Lou-Ann Preble
- Prior to Legislature: Nurse
- 1992: State Republican Party Executive Committee
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/General/Canvass1998GE.pdf
Elaine Richardson
- Prior to Legislature: Real Estate
- 1993-1996: House, 2 terms
- 1997-2002: Senate, 3 terms
- 2002: Ran for Congress (Lost)
- Gov. Cabinet Member
- Reference: http://danielpatterson.net/, http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tw/0801-96/cover4.htm, http://www.azag.gov/opinions/2000/I00-002.html
Dan Schottel
- Prior to Legislature: Private Sector
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2002: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education
- Reference: http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/General/Canvass1998GE.pdf
Tom Smith
- Prior to Legislature: Educator
- 1993-1998: House, 3 terms
- 1999-2002: Senate, 2 terms
- Present: Honorary Board Member, Jobs for Arizona’s Graduates and Retired
- Reference: http://www.azag.gov/CCC/appendixE.PDF,
http://jagaz.jobing.com/default.asp?PageID=10009246,
73
http://www.vets4az.org/content.aspx?page_id=22&club_id=513668&module_i
d=39711
John Verkamp
- Prior to Legislature: Attorney
- 1965-1970: Captain, US Army
- 1980-1988: Coconino County Attorney (Elected)
- 1993-2000: House, 4 terms (Termed Out)
- 2001-2002: Senate, 1 term
- 2006: Ran for U.S. Senate (Lost)
- Reference: http://www.smartvoter.org/1998nov/az/state/vote/verkamp_j/,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Verkamp,
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2002/General/Canvass2002GE.pdf
31 Freshman Members
11 Termed out in House, 35%
2 Termed out in Senate, 6%
60 Total Members in the House
74
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