Papua Paper No 7
May 2014
Indonesian Elections 2014: Jokowi, Human Rights and West
Papua*
Usman Hamid
Megawati and Jokowi
Published by the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Sydney
Usman Hamid was formerly executive director of the Commission for the Disappeared
and Victims of Violence (KontraS), a human rights group seeking justice for enforced
disappearances during the Soeharto regime in Indonesia. He assumed this role following
the assassination of KontraS founder Munir Said Thalib in 2004. In 2012, Usman Hamid
founded the Public Virtue Institute, an organization which conducts research on social
media and democracy in Indonesia, and Change.org Indonesia. He is presently
undertaking a Masters degree at the Australian National University.
*This paper is based on a seminar presentation at Sydney University on 28 April 2014 organized by the
West Papua Project, the Sydney Peace Foundation and the Department of Indonesian Studies. It
incorporates tributes to Munir and his widow, Suciwati—and also to Muridan Widjojo, a leading proponent
of Papua-Indonesia dialogue, who died on 7 March 2014.
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Prologue
Last week, a friend asked me why Jokowi, why human rights--and how do they relate to
West Papua? I said, if you wish, maybe we could suggest the host change the topic to be
“Prabowo, Human Rights, and West Papua.” “Does it sound prospectful?” He smiled.
“Sounds fearful”, he said.
In this seminar, I will address one neutral question: will the 2014 elections improve
human rights protection in Indonesia and West Papua? But first of all, allow me to pay
tribute by telling a story of our fellow human rights activist Munir Said Thalib and our
fellow peace builder in West Papua, Muridan Widjojo.
Tribute to Munir, died September 7, 2004: the test of our history.
It was May 12th, 1998. I was at my university, Trisakti University, in Jakarta, and we
were in the middle of a movement to change the status quo. There was a big monetary
crisis in Indonesia and the rest of Asia. We went to the streets in the morning, and we
wrapped up just before night time. But some students decided to stay.
The next morning, there was something wrong. It was tense, we were surrounded by fear.
I later found out through a friend that four students were shot to death. All of them were
my fellow university students. I felt a mix of emotions. I was angry, sad, scared, and
much else at the same time. But at the end of the day I felt determined. Determined to not
let this happen again.
The only person on campus that was brave enough to question the regime deeply was this
person called Munir. So, several months later, I joined his organization, KontraS. When I
told my mom, she was very concerned for me. She didnt want me to take the job. She
thought it was a dangerous job. I thought that, after the fall of Soeharto, it would not be
so dangerous.
But, she was right. Six years later, Munir was poisoned with arsenic in a Garuda airplane
on his way to the Netherlands for study. After Munir died, I thought my mom would beg
me to stop, for my safety. But instead, she said to continue my fight for justice for Munir.
In 2007, I had to accompany Suciwati, the wife of Munir, to Australia to speak before the
parliament. My mother was not feeling good at the time, and I hesitated to go. But she
told me to go. When I arrived in Sydney (the first time for me), I called her to tell her one
thing: that the fruits in Australia are amazing, and much better than in Indonesia.
When I got back to Indonesia, I went directly to the hospital; my mom was very sick. The
next day, she passed away. I was sad. But the one thing I will always remember is when
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she said, "Whatever you need to do, where ever you need to go, you need to continue the
fight--the fight that we shared with Munir."
Munir died on September 7, 2004, during the last days of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s
administration and only days before the 2004 second round presidential election. When
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) came to power, he said the murder of Munir is the
test of our history. Of course SBY has failed this test—no effective action has been taken
against the masterminds of the murder. But there’s now a chance for Joko Widodo
(Jokowi) to address Megawati’s responsibility and SBY’s failure.
Will Jokowi be able to address it? It is going to be a very hard job for Jokowi.
Tribute to Muridan Widjojo: "Dialogue does not kill"
Just like Munir, Muridan had a dream. A dream about freedom for West Papuan people,
an island free from oppression. His tireless efforts for his dream to come true have made
him to be careless with his own life.
With his friends, Muridan produce an important document called “Papua Road Map.” He
called on the government to understand Papua and give peace a chance. He asked for a
dialogue. Dialogue is a must. Numerous times Muridan said: "Dialogue does not kill".
“Dialogue won’t kill you!”
He loved to smoke. Due to his worsening health condition with cancer, he did quit. But
he never quit loving West Papua. Everywhere he went, it was all about Papua. Muridan
is a perfect exemplar of a concerned scholar. He goes beyond being an engaged scholar.
Unlike most anthropologists who use the emic approach and go native, he decided not to.
He became his own self. And, for this reason, Muridan was often criticized by the
conflicting parties in Papua.
But he never gave up. Not only did he tell stories about Papua or about doing something
for Papua, but he built up awareness among us about how to see Indonesia from West
Papua, how to improve our country from this fabulous viewpoint. We can’t solve
challenges in the country as a whole unless we solve challenges like health care,
education, good jobs and dignified justice for every Papuan.
Fourteen years ago, President Abdurrahman Wahid supported the Second Papuan Peoples
Congress, held 29 May - 4 June 2000. But a week before the Congress, Vice President
Megawati, much less sympathetic to Papuan aspirations, visited Papua and triggered proindependence street protests in different districts. This intensifying peaceful movement
for change left a “deep impression” on the government. On 9 June, after the Congress, the
Director General of the National Unity and Society Protection section of the Home
Affairs Ministry, in document 578/ND/KESBANG/D IV/VI/2000, announced an
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“Operational Plan for Conditioning the Area and Development of a Communication
Network in confronting the political direction of Papua for independence and separating
itself from the State of the Republic of Indonesia.” This was to include “clandestine,
arrest of activists of independence and development activities.” The operation was
aiming at “Papuanization to prevent internationalization of Papua.”
In this secret document, Theys Eluay, who presided over the June Congress and
announced to an ecstatic audience that “West Papua is no longer a part of Indonesia”, was
one of the targets. In August 2000, the annual session of the Indonesian Peoples
Consultative Assembly led by Amien Rais issued a decree that Papua was an area that
needed serious attention. Just over a year after that, Theys was murdered right after
attending the ceremony of National Heroes Day, November 10, 2001, in Jayapura. In
2003, senior military officer were convicted of his murder by a military court. But army
chief Ryamizard Ryacudu, who has long been close to Megawati and is a strong
contender to be Jokowi’s Vice President, declared that those convicted for the Theys
assasination were national heroes. They’d done their duty to the NKRI (Negara kesatuan
Republik Indonesia --the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia).
Avoiding and resolving such deplorable incidents as this is precisely one of the major
challenges facing Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election.
Jokowi’s leadership
I will next focus on Jokowi’s leadership, his vision, his party coalition, his circle, and his
rivals that are all crucial in the coming weeks. Why Jokowi, why not Prabowo Subianto
for President?
Firstly, by and large “leadership” is the most important determinant of the vote for parties
in the legislative elections and for candidates in the presidential election. Second, many
observers and scholars, including my supervisor at the ANU, think that Jokowi is the next
Indonesian president. I share their opinion. Third, almost all opinion polls show that
Jokowi is the most popular and the most electable candidate.
Our attention to leaders like Jokowi is almost certainly driven by the rapid spread and
great popularity in recent years of television and of the current atmosphere in both
mainstream and social media. But the thing is why do so many people like him? And give
their hope to a local leader like him?
Jokowi is a new face, a new actor, a new hope.
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Prior to Jokowi’s nomination, candidates from all the political parties planning to contest
the presidential election originally came from Soeharto’s political party, Golkar: Aburizal
Bakrie, Wiranto, Prabowo and Surya Paloh. Most of them could be Trojan horses for the
new government.
And yet within that bleak political landscape I observed that the nomination of local
leader Joko Widodo as presidential candidate stirred excited feelings from the general
public about the 2014 elections. They think this will make the 2014 presidential election
a historic moment for elite contestation and circulation in post-Soeharto Indonesia. And
Jokowi’s victory should put an end to the oligarchy of the Soeharto regime.
Jokowi could be a new line of demarcation between the past and the future. Under the
leadership of the old elites, the entire political and legal system failed to deliver justice to
human rights victims and, especially, those in West Papua. Understanding this reality,
Indonesia needs a new leader, a generation leader for a new reform era.
Jokowi needs to enhance his vision
He was born politically after his two-term action accomplishment as mayor of Solo,
Central Java. One of his strategies is to develop the people's economy, prioritize people
rather than big capital. Jokowi considered that the strength of small capital could
promote economic independence for the people. As Mayor he even dared to say that
small-scale business activities in Solo town accounted for greater economic development
than the large-scale business entities.
Local revenue from traditional markets in Solo unde Jokowi increased from Rp. 7.8
billion to Rp. 19.2 billion from a daily levy of only Rp 2,600 (25cents). Meanwhile, the
mall or hypermart can only generate revenue from its building construction permit
(IMB). Therefore the number of “retail businesses” was restricted by Jokowi. Only a
dozen of around 80 applications were approved. 'It was my deliberate intention to prevent
the impression of anti-investment,' he said. His critical stance heated up his relations with
the Governor of Central Java, Bibit Waluyo, who wanted to dismantle a historic building
and turn it into a shopping mall.
This narrative of success shows Jokowi’s vision on the economy, his political courage
and technical competence. He did the same sort of thing when he became Jakarta
governor, especially with free healthcare. But, again, this merely reflected micro-scale
leadership at the local level.
However Jokowi has said that he is going to build zakken cabinet, a business cabinet, at
the national level. He has also promised that he will not allow “transactional” (money)
politics. This is good.
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However, he will need to choose the right person for key ministerial posts covering
politics, human rights, defense and the state intelligence sector. And he has to enhance
his vision at the macro state level in which the key barometer is human rights. He must
soon declare his vision on human rights, on West Papua, and his supposedly groundbreaking reforms for the military sector, the hardest legacy following the 1998 ouster of
Suharto, a former army general whose 32 years in power were marked by both repression
and corruption. It’s been 16 years of half-hearted reform since 1998 and the Indonesian
public need a leader with vision for the second half of the half-completed journey.
Recently Prabowo’s Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party) deputy, Fadli Zon,
attacked Jokowi in a poem. When journalists asked Jokowi if he had read it he answered
that he prefers poetry by Wiji Thukul, especially his famous poem ‘Peringatan’
(Warning). Wiji Thukul was a leftist poet who disappeared in the late 1990s. There has
been some indication that Jokowi was sympathetic to the family of Wiji Thukul. It would
be interesting if in the contest betweetn Jokowi and Prabowo, such issues about human
rights and crimes of the past become more prominent.
The hardest challenge facing Jokowi’s vision is the domination of the NKRI doctrine in
the outlookm of his patron Megawati and her PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle), which belatedly nominated him to run for President. This party in the past
was deeply involved in human rights abuses, especially in West Papua and Aceh. That is
why the former Free Aceh Movement commander who is now deputy governor of Aceh,
Muzakkir Manaf, has supported Prabowo and said publicly that it is religiously forbidden
for Acehnese to vote for the PDIP.
Again, Jokowi has to explain his vision in dealing with conflict regions: what will he do
with prisoners of conscience from Papua and also Maluku, where recently more people
have been arrested for their independence aspirations—supporting a South Moluccan
Republic (RMS)?
And what do the 2014 elections mean for West Papua? Will Papuans vote for Jokowi?
Will Jokowi have the capability to stop violence in Papua? Will he prosecute those
responsible for the most serious crimes that took place in Papua which include the
murder of Theys Hiyo Elluay? As I have noted above, this charismatic Papuan leader was
murdered by a special military operation.
It’s all not clear yet. But Jokowi has been to Papua, the province ruled in theory by
Papuans belonging to Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat Party and Prabowo’s Gerindra. He
was the only presidential candidate who managed to campaign in Papua during the
legislative elections of April.
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It has been 16 years since the fall of Suharto in 1998 brought about visions of political
reform in Indonesia. The international community has praised Indonesia for its successful
transition. Elections have taken place at all levels of provincial and central government.
The military is no longer controlling politics and active military can no longer have seats
in parliament or hold civilian posts. A constitutional court and a number of important
state auxiliary bodies have been set up to maintain an independent judiciary.
This accomplishment has put Indonesia forward as a model of democracy in Asia and a
leader of human rights in Southeast Asia. Indeed, in the field of human rights, the early
years of reform were hopeful given initiatives undertaken to adopt new laws on human
rights and to investigate past human rights violations. Indonesia’s diplomatic stance
before the United Nations has been widely appreciated as it did enhance human rights
promotion somewhat.
As of today, Indonesia has ratified eight of the total nine major human rights instruments,
namely, to begin with, two conventions ratified in the Suharto era--the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1984 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990. The other six major human rights
statutes ratified are the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1998, the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1999, the
International Covenant rights on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in
2005, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2006, the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2011 and the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families (ICRMW) in 2012.These have become an important
safeguard for improving the national democratic process of human rights protection.
In December last year the Indonesian foreign minister speaking before the parliament
also asked approval for the ratification of the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. However, this was blocked by several
parties, especialy Wiranto’s People’s Conscience Party (Hanura), and Gerindra,
Prabowo’s party.
Overall, there has been no ground-breaking reform over the last decade under
Yudhoyono’s administration and the PDI-P’s soft opposition under Megawati. Not a
single past attrocity has been resolved. Some cases were investigated and prosecuted
under Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership. However, under Megawati and Yudhoyono, it’s
all ended with impunity.
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Meanwhile some cases of torture in West Papua have been brought to military court that
only brings a verdict with light punishment. The lack of an independent judiciary shows
how weak human rights protection and enforcement are in Indonesia. Positive
developments are limited to normative change. There are even political policies
promulgated after the Soeharto era that act as barriers against efforts at justice and
accountability. The situation has made it almost impossible that Indonesian democracy
will be able to deliver truth and justice, bringing perpetrators to justice as well as
reparation for victims and a guarantee of non repetition. This impossible situation is what
we often call impunity (impunidad). Furthermore, a recent report by Freedom House
shows the decline of civil liberties and political rights in Indonesia from those of a free to
those of a partly-free state.
Jokowi’s coalition
In most exit polls, the 2014 legislative election saw PDI-P defeat the ruling Democrat
Party by a big margin. PDI-P won 19% of the overall vote, followed by the Golkar Party
with 14.41% and Gerindra with 12.3%.
The President’s party has dropped dramatically to No. 4 with 9.71 %, immediately
followed by the moderate Islamic religious parties of PKB winning 9.09 % and PAN with
7.49%, followed by the conservative Islamic parties PKS 6.74 % and PPP 6.22 %.
Interestingly, everyone seems unhappy. The winner is unhappy. Although number one,
PDI-P’s expectations to get more than 25% were not met and the current 19 % -- they
could still get 20% of the seats-- means that PDI-P will not be able to pass legislation
without other party support. Now PDI-P cannot automatically nominate their own party
people to be a vice presidential candidate without a coalition that requires compromise.
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Source: William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining
Voting Behavior in Indonesia," Comparative Political Studies, July 2007
From the data above, and combined with the real count that will soon be announced by
the General Election Commission, we can explore how voters of each parties will decide
their vote for the presidential campaign.
Jokowi’s potential running mate.
Who would likely be the VP candidate for Jokowi? What criteria for a VP for PDI-P?
Choosing the right candidate--with certain popularity and electability--should boost
Jokowi to win in the first round of the presidential election. On the other hand, Prabowo
might find someone with the same political leverage as Jokowi and result in a second
round of the presidential election.
Initially, Governor Jokowi considered Sri Mulyani, former finance minister, to become
his running mate. Another strong civilian candidate is Agus Martowardoyo, also a former
finance minister; while a military figure such as Ryamizard Ryacudu, a former army
chief, and Luhut Pandjaitan, a former trade minister, would come up as “alternative
candidates”. The Prabowo camp has said: “If Jokowi picks Sri Mulyani as his VP, we all
can sleep until the next five years; unlike Bakrie (of Golkar Party), who will turn out to
be the target of Sri Mulyani’s economic policy.”
A bad past relationship between Bakrie and Sri Mulyani has raised issues around the
former’s alleged role in a scandalous bailout of Bank Century. It was reported that Bakrie
stepped up pressures against President Yudhoyono to remove Mulyani from her position
as finance minister – the maneuver pursued by Bakrie was “retaliation” against Mulyani
soon after the latter imposed a strict tax policy, and it succeeded.
A source from Jokowi’s success team confirmed the likely nomination of Mulyani and
Martowardoyo. “But Jokowi prefers to pick Mulyani, rather than Martowardoyo,”
according to the source. Recent media reports have indicated two other potential running
mates: Jusuf Kalla [the ultimate choice—ed] and Mahfud MD. Speaking to the Jakarta
Post, Megawati’s daughter Puan Maharani said that, ‘The State leadership duet
[president-vice president] must be able to feel and win the hearts and minds of the
people’.
Puan did not give any clue on who is the strongest VP candidate and how it is going to be
decided. But she did say that, ‘In the past two elections we have relied on mass-- or
institutional-- support bases in determining our vice presidential candidates. But, we
failed to win the [2004 and 2009] presidential elections.’ This means that the VP
candidate will be decided by a high level decision maker, her mother, Megawati, the
chairwoman of PDI-P.
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Since the beginning, PDI-P inclined to pair Jokowi with someone from PDI-P. An
internal source said Megawati had narrowed down her choice to Ryamizard Ryacudu,
former army chief under Megawati’s administration.
This would be a troublesome choice as Ryamizard has been widely known for his hardline stance towards Papua, as noted above
Jusuf Kalla: Will he have a chance to be partnered with Jokowi? What strength and
weakness factors define this pair?
Strengths:
Both Jokowi and Kalla have an informal character and style of leadership. This is good
not only to build effective and efficient government, but also when they need to face
political dynamics from the opposition in the parliament. Both of them are widely known
to be men of risk taking and quick decision makers. This pair will be seen to be very
conducive for the business community that can potentially give their support to the
campaign.
With Jusuf Kalla partnered with Jokowi, the eastern part of Indonesia Timur-- Sulawesi,
Moluccas and West Papua--will most likely be more solid to support them. This will also
mean that they can generate support and votes from the Golkar party mass support base.
Kalla will obviously generate voters from his old party, including even if they have to
face the chairman of Golkar, Aburizal Bakrie. At least, Golkar voters will split.
At the grass roots level, vote getting would be relatively much easier to consolidate
as Kalla has a strong network and is still quite popular among the common people. In
Sulawesi, some “Posko Jokowi-JK” groups have been started by some communities to
support their nomination.
Another important strength is Kalla’s role in the Aceh peace deal of 2005. With Kalla,
Jokowi could start to work on a Papua peace deal. Could Jokowi offer something like
SBY’s Otsus Plus, or enhanced special autonomy, which is unlikely to be an option
otherwise due to Megawati’s stance against SBY? What would Kalla do with Papua?
Maybe he really would do something, a big project. Kalla started with Aceh, and now it’s
time to move to Papua. And, with Kalla, Jokowi might get more Acehnese to vote for
him, while having a running mate with military style like Ryamizard might force Jokowi
to take strong action by choosing a policy of repression.
Weaknesses
Kalla represents the old generation of the national elite which might affect voters’
perceptions, seeing Jokowi as a real new generation of leader with new politics. In five
years under the SBY presidency, Kalla di not make any ground-breaking
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accomplishment except to secure SBY’s policies. In human rights discourse, Kalla has
denied the prosecution of past human rights offenders by mis-using the non-retroactivity
principle. He once said that democracy is just a political tool, and we can leave
democracy for the sake of welfare (seeming to refer to China’s political regime).
Furthermore, JK running is going to be perceived as ‘betrayal’ by die-hard Golkar
leaders, which will make it even harder for Jokowi to steal Golkar support. Both are
civilian candidates who will face a military political rival like Prabowo who can deploy
former personnel of Kopassus (the Indonesian army special forces) to monitor ballot
boxes. Both Jokowi and Kalla will need support from the military, at least some ex
military, to help them run their political campaigning on the ground.
With Kalla, getting support from eastern Indonesian voters may be easy, but it is not sure
with Sumatra or even Kalimantan.
Regardless of the weaknesses and strengths of all possibilities, the sooner the decision is
made and announced, the more opportunities will be available for consolidation of
Jokowi’s presidential election campaign.
Jokowi’s circle
Jokowi has to distance himself from some ex military generals connected to PDI-P such
as Lieutenant General (retired) AM Hendropriyono. I can’t be sure how influential these
former military generals under Megawati’s administration will be with Jokowi, but I am
pretty sure that they will make it difficult for Jokowi to decide anything new related to
human rights and West Papua.
In paying tribute to Munir, I feel that Indonesian authorities have not seriously taken
measures on the basis of the president-sanctioned fact finding team report that points
strongly to the role of AM Hendropriyono in the murder of Munir.
In his life, Munir fought for justice for victims of a mass killing on 7 February1989 in
Talangsari, Lampung province, Sumatra, which began with a brutal military attack led by
AM Hendropriyono. Munir challenged Megawati’s presidential decree appointing
Hendropriyono as the chief of the state intelligence body, BAKIN. Munir criticized
Megawati for her heavy security policy on terrorism that gave exessive power to BAKIN
which reported Munir as a “dangerous activist” to the Indonesian parliament
In pursuing the Talangsari case I accompanied Azwar, a victim of the massacre, to meet
with President Yudhoyono in the State Palace on March 26, 2008. He told the President
about the mass killing and how local authority stigmatized the victims as Gerakan
Pengacau Keamanan (GPK, Security Disturbance Movement). They had also been
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prevented from accessing public services, such as electricity, he said, and his village in
Talangsari district remains isolated. At the time, Yudhoyono promised Azwar that
(1) he would hold a special cabinet meeting to discuss and to find resolution in the
Talangsari case;
(2) he would immediately order the governor of Lampung to restore all basic social
facilities for the village.
Soon after the meeting, Presidential spokesman Andi Mallarangeng informed Azwar that
he had already contacted the local authority and would soon take action to respond to his
requests. Up until now, however, the promises remain promises. Nothing has changed.
Jokowi’s main rival: Prabowo
Everything is possible in Indonesian politics. Learning from other countries’ experience,
it is not impossible for someone involved in the most serious crimes to run in a
presidential election and get elected. Take, for example, Kenya. Uhuru Kenyatta, one of
the richest men in the country, was already under an “arrest warrant” from the
International Criminal Court (ICC) when he started his recent campaign for the
presidential elections.
Kenyatta faces charges for his role in the deadly 2007-08 post-poll violence that rocked
the east African country. Kenyatta, 52, faces five counts of crimes against humanity
allegedly committed under his direction in the aftermath of the disputed elections, in
which prosecutors say more than 1,100 people died, 3,500 were injured and up to
600,000 forcibly displaced.
Opinion polls conducted in 2010 show 68 % public support for the ICC, but then, three
months after Kenyatta’s election, public support for the court dropped to 39 %. And a
couple of weeks ago, Uhuru Kenyatta was sworn in as Kenya's new President.
Dignitaries, including South African President, Jacob Zuma, Kenyatta’s Nigerian and
Ugandan counterparts, Goodluck Jonathan and Yoweri Museveni, and a large number of
other foreign visitors attended the swearing-in-ceremony.
In the meantime the Court seems to be failing now due to the prosecution's ineptitude,
and also because the accused has intimidated the Court and its witnesses since he became
President. Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, face trials before the ICC on charges
of committing or contributing to crimes against humanity during Kenya's election-related
violence in 2007 and 2008. Kenyatta and Ruto have voluntarily been attending ICC
proceedings. But now the ICC has postponed Kenyatta's trial after prosecutors said they
no longer had enough evidence to put him in the dock.
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Indonesia could be like Kenya. Having been involved in crimes against humanity or
being prosecuted internationally does not prevent people like Prabowo from joining in
politics and ruling the country. They can intimidate courts and witnesses without any
significant intervention from the international community.
In the case of Prabowo, there will be no prospect for human rights. He has talked about
human rights in a way that shows no respect at all. His party platform stipulates clearly
that the State shall purify religion and also undermine any role for a human rights tribunal
to prosecute serious crimes.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by reaffiming that Jokowi remains the most popular candidate
and will likely win. However, the power struggle will not be easy. To win, Jokowi needs
a large coalition, but to govern some of his potential coalition parties will be an obstacle.
Well, this is normal in power politics.
Will Jokowi make a change? Some challenges are:
1) All too many Indonesians uphold the doctrine that NKRI is not negotiatble;
territorial unity of the State is not negotiable. This sentiment is especially strong in the
PDI-P, so it might be a problem if Jokowi wants to initiate “dialogue”.
2) His presidential control over the military will very much depend on his vice
president.
3) His capability to seek a peaceful solution for conflict regions like Aceh and Papua
may be weak.
In the short term, Jokowi will have to deal with:
1) The composition of his government cabinet especially in the defense and security
sector;
2) Prospects for peace in Papua – for example, what will he do about the cases of
political prisoners and what will he do regarding the revision of Otsus(Plus),
which is unpopular in Papua;
3) Human rights based development.
I do have hopes, but with a full understanding of the hard reality we are facing in
working for a presidential candidate and campaign program in Indonesia explicitly made
to pay attention to human rights as a platform agenda, not for political manoeuvre against
rivals. Human rights must be an end in themselves. Not only the political elite but also
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society as a whole must be free from exploitation of communitarian, primordial, and
sectarian sentiment.
While we might all share new hope for Jokowi, I have explored some key problems he
will face:
Firstly, the new political constellation around him may result in a limited power to
nominate and to govern.
Secondly, lack of public vision in Jokowi may detract from his strength of being able to
“talk less, do more.”
Thirdly, his party relationships have thrown up some people with notorious records
positioned around him—can they undermine or paralyse his presidency?
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