NIGER DELTA REGION AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RESORCE CONTROL:
IMPLICATION FOR NASCENT
DEMOCRACY
In Ojo E.O Edited. Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria.
Ibadan : John Archer 2006 Pg 300-314
Aghalino, S.O.
INTRODUCTION
The quest for resources control has been a recurring decimal in the history of the Niger
Delta region of Nigeria. This could be explained partly in the light of the historical significance
of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. The area has featured as the loci of social and economic exchange
between the coast and the hinterland during the pre – colonial period. It remains remarkable that,
its economic significance to Nigeria now, and in the past, has derived largely from local and
international trade premises on oil.1
Whereas in the past, it was palm oil and general merchandise, now it is crude oil and
natural gas that provides the main basis of the economics existence of Nigeria. Oils, it would
appear have coloured the history of this region. The importance of the Niger delta oil probably
explains why the British named the whole area up to Calabar, “the oil rivers protectorate”.2 A
dispassionate appraisal of the oil wealth of the region has shown that, prosperity from oil trade in
the region has brought sorrow, repression and intimidation from successive administrations in
Nigeria, be it colonial or post colonial.3 Understandably, the quest to control the resources of the
region has always brought the people of the Niger – Delta on a collision course with the Nigerian
state. In Nigeria, oil is thicker than blood. As rightly pointed out by Bolanle Eyinla. “The
patronage associated with, and control over, the revenue accruing from oil export is perhaps the
most powerful incentive for power aggrandizement in Nigeria”.4 Conversely, the Nigerian state
would hardly brook any iota of threat that could disrupt the flow of oil. This, as it is, could be
partly explained in that Nigeria dependent on oil earnings; with government deriving as much as
95% of her exchange earnings as well as 25% of her Gross Domestic product from the sale of
oil.5
Paradoxically, while the quantum of oil revenue is colossal and is not in doubt, the
consequent environmental degradation and other attendant negative externalities from the
exploitation of oil and gas are borne mainly by the people in the oil – producing communities.6
In addition, very little or next to nothing by way of derivation is returned to the oil – bearing
enclave. Therein lies the resource control imbroglio with its attendant implications for the
nation’s nascent democracy. It is within this context that, this chapter examines the politics of
resource control and future of democracy in Nigeria. For a concise discussion, a historical
antecedence of the quest for resource control is undertaken against the backdrop of the recent
clamour for resource control. In line with this, a perfunctory evaluation of the argument for and
against the struggle is carried out. What appears to be the federal government response to the
agitation is given some attention. The attendant implication of the resource control gambit is
examined within the praxis of the future of democracy in Nigeria. Finally, a conclusion is drawn
while proffering some policy options.
THE PRESENT IN THE PAST
The concept of resource control has traveled a very long and languid road to its present
coloration. In the era of aggressive British imperialism in the late 18th and early 19th century, it
was seen as agitation by indigenous peoples of the Niger Delta to per take in the vibrant oil trade
and in the politics of se lf determination in the area.7 In this period, the politics of oil produced
the first nationalists in the Niger Delta. These nationalists were merchants who, as it were,
insisted that trade with their European counterpart must be fair. However, overtime, European
greed and intolerance manifest as these rulers/merchants were marked down for elimination as
they were alleged to be threat to “legitimate commerce”. In this regard, King William Dappa
Pepple, of Bonny was an early casualty of the intrigues of British imperialism when in 1859;
consul Bee croft exiled him to Fernando Po and later to Clarence. The encounter of Jaja of
Opobo with the British could be said to be the precursor to the chain of events that materialized
in Post – colonial Nigeria as exemplified by the renter state’s attempt to consolidate and / or
improve upon the British aggression against the people of the Niger delta.8
By 1885 when the final Act of Berlin was drawn (4361), Jaja was still a relatively
unknown but rising young trade in Bonny.9 By 1861, he had risen to the rank of first line of
Chiefs. In 1863, he was elected to the headship of the powerful Anna Pepple House of Bonny.
Opobo emerge as the most powerful trading state in the oil rivers under the firm control of Jaja
by 1870. Dike, suggests that by 1870, Jaja’s influence stemmed living in the East of modern
Nigeria”.10 Jaja’s influence stemmed from his business acumen and him middleman’s role in
the oil rivers.11 The point must be made that in the 1880s, the cloud of imperialist began to
darken. There was trade depression in England and White traders thought mistakenly as it proved
– that they would increase their profit by dispensing with Jaja’s middleman’s role.12 In 1884, like
other Niger Delta rulers, Jaja signed a treaty accepting British “protection” unlike most African
rulers, Jaja obtained a written assurance that his sovereignty was not diminished. The pressure of
British mercantile community for access to the hinterland took the familiar form of crusade
against the iniquitous monopoly of the coastal middlemen, a crusade in other words, for “free
trade”. But the attempts by the Liverpool firms to gain direct access to the resources of the Niger
Delta hinterland and its markets were effectively checked by Jaja.13 The British had either to pay
money to Jaja and trades on his own terms in his domain or close down. Jaja’s gut was more
infuriating to the British as he engaged in the export of oil.14 Indeed, because Jaja denied the
European access to hinterland, he was blackmailed and labeled a dictator, a cassus belli for his
eventual deportation.15 The exploits of Nana Olomu of Itsekiri, which communicated in the
sacking of Ebrohimi, Nana’s commercial Headquarters and the tragedy of Oba Ovaranwen
Nogbaisi in his quest for the control of the resources in his domain are sufficiently familiar.
Nevertheless, the effrontery of Ovaranwen led the British to invade Benin, dethroned him and
was eventually deported to Calabar, where he died in 1913. The common thread in these
episodes is the quest of the various leaders to assert themselves by having total control of the
resources in their domain. In the latter part of the 20th century, the drive for self assertion and
control of resources culminated in the series of anti tax riots in Southern Nigeria.16
At Nigeria’s independence in 1960, they perceived injustices against the Niger delta
people prompted Isaac Adaka Boro, the young, but radical nationalist and campaigner for
resource control to champion a revolt against the oppression of the people of the Niger Delta.
The revolt was meant to draw attention to the plight of the people and necessarily effect a change
in the environmental practices of the oil firms so that men can be men. On February 23, 1906, he
landed at Toutoubau, a sacred forest in Kaiama town in present day Bayelsa State with over one
hundred and fifty comrades to launch a guerilla war against the federal military government.
Earlier, Boro had in January 1966, proclaimed the Niger Delta people Republic with himself as
Head of state. He engaged the Nigeria police force in a bloody battle and defeated in the 12 th
day. This rebellion has today become known as the Twelve – day revolution.17 In point of fact,
Boro’s irredentist Niger Delta volunteer force of 1966 had made resource control a central theme
of the 12th day uprising, against the Nigeria state. It is important to reiterate here that, the
struggle for the soul of the Niger delta resources had been constantly watered by the death of
major agitators for in the region. As would be shown presently, the crisis in the region followed
the same pattern when crude oil became the basis of the fiscal existence of Nigeria as from the
1870s,
OGONI AGONIES AND THE ESCALATION OF THE QUEST FOR RESOURCE
CONTROL.
It seems obvious to state that the present debate on resource control as it relates to oil and
natural gas derived its ideological impetus from the activities of the Ogonis under the aegis of the
movement for the survival of Ogoni people (MOSOP). Ken Saro – Wiwa was able to attract
international attention to the plight of the people of the Niger Delta, using his own people – the
Ogonis, as a point of departure. he was able to “put shell on the federal Government on the court
of international public opinion”.18 He did this successfully by defining the Ogoni struggle as an
environmental issue rather than political and/ or economic issue, thereby winning the sympathy
of international non–government organizations (NGOs) on environmental protection. It was in
this context of international of the endemic problems associated with oil exploration and
exploitation in the Niger Delta that Saro – Wiwa became the body and soul of the Ogoni struggle
against shell and the Nigeria government.19
It was not surprising that when the prominent indigenous groups of Ogoni land came
together in august 1990 to form MOSOP, both shell and the Nigeria government took more than
a passing interest in its activities. The turning point in the history of the movement was reached
in October 1990, when Ogoni bill of rights was endorsed by all the traditional rulers and elite of
Ogoni land and presented to the Nigerian government. The primary objective of the bill of right
included the following. (a) political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people; (b) the right to
control and use a fair proportion of Ogoni resources for Ogoni development; (c)adequate and
direct representative as of right in all Nigerian national institution; (d)the bright to protect the
Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.20
the details of the drive toward actualization of these demands are sufficiently familiar.21
Suffice it here to state, that ken Saro – Wiwa embarked on an intense publicity drive at both
national and international levels, including united nations commission on human rights, the
European human rights commission and the African commission on human and peoples’ right.22
This was apart from mobilizing the Ogoni youths to lunch mass, and often – violent protests
against the activities of shell in ogoniland.23 Fearful of the consequences that continued Ogoni
protests mighty have on oil production and its revenue base and power; the government of Sanni
Abacha foreclosed any possibility of negotiating a peaceful settlement with MOSOP.
Consequently the government decided to clamp down on MOSOP through the use of force to
pacify Ogoni a situation which was rather horrendous. Ogoni was laid waste and consequently,
Ken – Saro Wiwa and his compatriots were hanged in 1995 due to trumped charges.
The point must be stated that the situation in Ogoni land was carefully played out in
virtually every part of the Niger Delta. This probably explains the angst of the particularly in the
area of revenue allocation and quantity of derivation that was coming to the. Rotimi Suberu
opined that, “derivation means that a fixed proportion of the revenue collected in the local area
should be retained in the area”.24 For the people of the Niger Delta, their grouse with Nigerian
state is that, very little or next to nothing of the enormous revenue derived from their land is
returned by way of derivation.
In the decade following independence, derivation played an important role in Nigeria’s
fiscal federalism. In 1960, the revenue allocation formula provided that 50 percent of “the
proceeds from royalties and mineral rents derived from an area should go back to it”. 25 It would
appear however that, as federal budgets were becoming increasingly depended on oil revenue,
the oil – bearing regions and later, states were allocated a small proportion of locally collected
oil revenue. From 50 per cent in 1960, the percentage of derivation based on revenue allocation
shrunk to 20 percent in 1975 and 1.5 per cent in 1982, and was later raised to 3 per cent in 1992.
It must be stressed that the 3 per cent derivation fund was supervised by the oil mineral
producing areas development commission.26 The federal military government, led by Gen.
Ibrahim Babangida, to “promote the development of oil community” set up this body. Currently,
the derivation fund has been raised to 13 percent. However, controversy has ensued between the
oil producing states and the federal government on the calculation of the 13 percent derivation
fund due in part to the so called onshore offshore dichotomy.
The point to note is that, ordinarily it is expected that between 1960 – 1975 when the
principle of derivation favored the oil producing region, there should have been some remarkable
social and economic transformation of the region. This was not the case however. A clear point
to disaffection in this period was the aggressive clamour for compensation from the government
and the oil firms as epitomized by Isaac Adaka Boro’s insurrection. The lack of development of
this region could be explained further when viewed against the backdrop of power configuration
in Nigeria as well as the disruptive tendency of the Nigerian civil war. Again, in this period no
special fund was set aside for the sole development of the region as such, development
programmmes were haphazard. To be sure, the derivation principle has been prominent in the
debate on the national question because a significant opinion, especially but, “not only the oil
producing states supports the primacy of the derivation principle”.27 The significant support for
the derivation principle may not be unconnected with the drive for the exploitation of solid
minerals, which are found virtually in every part of Nigeria. In any case, there has been an
aggressive drive for the exploration of oil in the northern parts of Nigeria. The support therefore,
is nothing altruistic; rather it may be a pre – emptive response to a future windfall from oil.
Perhaps, it should be added that, the statutory distribution of revenue from the federation
account has been controversial as well as contentious. The report of the political Bureau of 1987
observes that the issue of revenue is so contentious that:
None of the formulas evolved at recent times by a commission or decree under different regimes
since 1964 has gained general acceptability among the component of the country.28
The report also observes that the issue of revenue allocation and to be specific derivation
had been essentially a political rather than economic too. Whosoever is in a change introduces a
formula that serves his interest. To be sure, when the British administered the country initially
from the proceeds of cocoa and groundnut derivation was given pride of place in revenue
allocation calculus. This of course, underscores the linkage between regional control of the
political process and the dominance of the criteria for revenue allocation at any given time. This
linkage was given impetus when, following the increasing importance of oil found in the Niger
Delta, derivation was de – emphasized. The question of derivation appears to be the core point in
the clamour for resource control in Nigeria. In some sense, the oil wealth of the Niger appears to
be a curse. But a close scrutiny of the dialectical interplay of the issues will reveal that, wealth is
not a curse in itself however. Rather, it is the duality of wealth and misery that brings into
perspective the causes of the quest for resource control in the Niger Delta.
More than anything else, one of the driving forces in the politics of resource control is the
land question. The issue of land in the Niger Delta is a festering sore in the tri – partite
relationship between the government, the oil producing communities and the oil firms.29 Rightly
observe that “the manner land is acquired, owned used and transferred is a complex issue in
Nigeria’. The land use Act of 1979 redefined the legal position of land ownership in Nigeria by
vesting the ownership of all land within a state in the state governor. Section 28 of Act stipulates
that the state governor could revoke a right of occupancy for everyday public interest, which
included requirement of land for mining purpose or oil pipeline, or for any purpose connected
therewith.30 The land use Act has impacted on the people of the Niger delta negatively. They
have lost their right to question the incursion of the government and oil firms on their land.
Again, they are no more entitle compensation for the acquisition of their land, safe, of course, for
the surface use of the land. An ancillary to this disaffection is the payment of compensation to
the state governors rather than to landowners, seems to have escalated the grievances of the
people against the Nigerian state, hence, the quest for resource control. The situation is more
explosive, partly because of land scarcity arising from the swampy terrain and high population
density in the area. The result has been that the people feel shortchanged while the avenues for
seeking redress remain virtually non – existent.’31
Another dimension to the land issue is the 1969 petroleum act, which vests the ownership
of all known oil deposits in the Nigerian state. It also vests the power to grant oil exploration
licenses. (OEL), in the office of the minister for petroleum resources. By claiming ownership of
“all oil”, under the ground, and having the power to expropriate all such land in the oil interest,
the state asserts its own power over the land in the oil producing communities and claim to the
oil wealth. This is what has induced multiple conflicts over rival claims to oil fields,
compensation money, and arable land.
32
In most cases, the state will engage in militarized
mediation. Indeed, a clear manifestation of the potency of the land question is seen in Kaiama
declaration of all the Ijaw youth conference of December 1998, which raised the land question to
the level of political manifesto. After reviewing the long history of the plunder of the Ijaw (Niger
Delta) oil wealth, the declaration assert that “all land and natural resources (including mineral
resources) within the Ijaw territory belongs to Ijaw communities and are the basis of their
survival”. It would appear that, the unambiguous phrasing of Kaiama declaration must have set
the tone and direction for the resurgence of the quest for resources control in the present
democratic dispensation. The vigour of the renewed drive for resource control is explainable in
history. History as pointed out by igho,
33
becomes an “intoxicant for social and political
activism, perhaps in the same way that Karl Marx referred to religion as the opium of the
masses”
DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION AND THE RESURGENCE OF THE POLITICS OF
RESOURCE CONTROL
It is a well – known fact that Nigeria experienced long period of military dictatorship
with its attendant slant and skewed practice of federalism. The de – federalization of the country
probably accounts for why the new elite that ascended power in 1999 failed to come to terms
with any visible ideology to pursue. In point of fact, for the southern governors, the quest for
resource control was therefore their catch. More specifically, ERA,
34
Has shown why the
governors of the south – south states fell in love with resource control gambit. First, the
dominant position and view in the Niger Delta when they arrived on 29 May 1999 was resource
control. To take a contrary position may probably have amounted to committing political suicide.
Most of the governors also came into power without any visible and conceived programmed,
and, it would appear that, resource control was a veritable pedestal to forge one. Faced with the
reality of delivering on campaign promises, and low level of revenue at their disposal, resource
control was therefore a tool to compel the federal government to devolve more revenue to them.
In point of fact, resource control would appear to be a political response of the southern
governors to fight political Sharia put in place by most northern governors.35
It took time before the concept of resource control was fined tuned to reflect the
aspirations of most governors in the south. Nevertheless, opinion is divided among the
governors. There is therefore a crack in the interpretation of the issue. At the third summit of
southern governors held in Benin City, 26 – 27 March 2001, dissention centered on resource
control and the participants were divided on the onshore/offshore dichotomy. Thus there was a
frayed nerve between the governors of the littoral states and others. To some (apparently littoral
states), all the resources within their territories (onshore) (offshore) should be controlled by
respective states, while to others, the matter is the primary source of conflict because it will put
them at disadvantage.36 The position of the governors of the littoral states seems to suggest that
the quest for resource control go beyond increased revenue allocation. It means the right of states
and communities most directly concerned to have a direct and decisive role in the exploration,
exploitation and disposal of, including sales of “harvested” resources of Niger Delta.37 In other
words; the term resource control in today’s lexicon is appropriation of the mineral deposits found
in some states by such states. By implication, where such minerals are located, they become the
property of that state by alienation.38These diverse interpretations of the concept invariably made
it controversial to the extent that the federal government paid more than passive interest to it.
While the debate rages, from the intellectual standpoint, attempt was made to justify and
also knock out the quest for resource control. For example, Dafinone 39 avers that, apart from the
negative externalities from oil exploitation and gross poverty in the Niger Delta, resource control
is a basic political theory grounded on the fact that land, capital and entrepreneur are factors of
production owned by individuals and should be controlled by them. In doing so, the reward
derived from such factors of production should be passed to those who own them. He further
asserted that whosoever own land for example, expect some form of compensation from those
hiring this very important factor of production.40 Resource control is further justified because a
reasonable measure of resource control offers the best hope of weaning the Nigerian state from
dependence on oil revenue and starting a ‘genuine process of rehabilitation of the people of the
Niger Delta’,41 In any case, economic theory has shown that property rights provides the
foundation for efficient use of resources, rapid economic growth and sustainable development,
since it provides sufficient incentives to minimize the environmental impact of resource
exploitation under proper cost accounting.42
A private property right encourages wider stewardship because private owners have
strong incentives to undertake cost effective property management. It will also make people to be
accountable for their activities and thereby promotes the general welfare. There is the likelihood
that private owners may have the incentive and need to conserve for the future. In a way,
resource control enhance and develop the capacity for self reliance for the three ties of
government and the nation because it will allow for economic diversification which had elude
the country for solong.43 It must be noted that fear is entertained that private ownership of
resource may breed warlords and probably exacerbate and widen the gulf between the rich and
the poor states in Nigeria. It would appear however that, this fear is unfounded because resource
control may bring out the best in each state of the federation. This reasoning is hinged on the fact
that necessity is the mother of invention.
In general, the antagonist of resources control has hauled bricks on the issue. Foremost in
this direction is Bala Usman. He sought to use history to discredit the struggle for resource
control. In his “ignorance, knowledge and democracy in politics in Nigeria”, he dismissed the
Niger Delta claim to the resources within its territory by deploying two arguments. First, he
claimed that by virtue of British conquest, the Niger Delta lost its right over its resources to the
British conquerors, a right, which was transferred to the Nigeria state at independence. Second,
that the oil located in the Niger Delta is the result of geographical process that took place in the
upper reaches of the Niger and Benue Rivers. As such, it is the people up country that actually
lay claim to the oil in the Niger Delta.44
On the first argument, Bala Usman seems to have reluctant accomplice. In a subtle echo
of Bala’s position, Omo Omoruyi opined that under the rule of international succession in
international law, Nigeria and not regions became the successor of Great Britain on October 1,
1960. Consequently, the federal government of Nigeria becomes the successor to the ownership
of what the British government or British crown had in Nigeria after October 1, 1960.45 The
implication of this line of argument is that, the Nigerian state inherited such obnoxious laws that
made the Niger Delta a victim of internal colonialism. For example, in the mineral proclamation
of 1916, section 3 of which states that the entire property and control of mineral and mineral oil
under or upon any land in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams and water courses throughout
Nigeria is and shall be vested on the crown. The mineral Act has since been replaced by the
petroleum act of 1969.the use of geological process to explain away the genuine desire of the
Niger Delta merely reflected the fact that when the chips are down, serious and rigorous
academic pursuit gives room for sentiments and selective amnesia. In point of fact, Bala Usman
and his ilk merely justify Nigeria’s government right to control on behalf of the core north, the
oil resources in the Niger Delta. Generally speaking, Bala Usman claim that geological process
led to the formation of the Niger Delta and crude oil and natural gas formed on some of its
sedimentary formation, actually goes back much further than ten thousand years. Bala Usman
went further to assert in a spurious sense that those sediments are made of soil containing
vegetable and other organic materials including human remains. He claimed that these were
washed away from farmland, pastures and forest all over Nigeria and outside and carried by the
river Niger to the Delta and all minerals in it.
It would appear, this is a simplistic analysis of a complex issue. This theory ignores the
value of a suitable geological environment for the compression of accumulated solid minerals
under the proper pressure and temperature to produce petroleum. The places that have petroleum
resources are the area that has proper hydrological structures to generate them. This is why all
rivers do not form delta, and why only a number of delta’s have petroleum reserves. 46 In any
case, these materials do not need to be deposited in a marine environment to manifest. Oil can be
found in various areas of different hydrological variation from the deep sea of the North Sea, to
the desert area of Saudi Arabia and in dry regions of Texas in the United States. This theory as
demonstrated by Edevbie was formulated to encourage the northerners to intensify the belief that
they are the primary owners of Nigeria oil. The ultimate goal of this pseudo – theory, it would
appear, is to help influence policy on the distribution of oil revenue.
In the extreme, 47 lampooned the governors of the south – south states in their struggle for
resource control. He claimed that resource control is the “face of a resurgent and decadent
tribalism”. He went further to assert that, “in a curious sense, there is already some form of
resource control in some of the states where the loudest noise about the matter is being made.
The vast resources of the states are under the control of the new governors, some of whom have
spent the last two years dazzling their hapless citizenry in garish ostentation’. In a way this
caustic remark would seem to be justified when viewed against the backdrop of the enormous
revenue at the disposal of the governors of the oil – bearing states. There this yawning question
of what the governors have done so far with derivation fund that has accrued to them since 1999.
Nevertheless, it is rather simplistic to hinge non – performance of the present crop of
governors as a viable reason why resource controls should not be pursued. In any case,
government is a continuous process. There is the possibility that subsequent rulers may manage
the resources of the nicer Delta well. In point of fact, there is no convincing reality on the ground
that central control of natural resources has translated into any visible growth and development
of the Niger Delta in particular and Nigeria in general. Be that as it may, the federal government
has never taken the issue of resource control with kid gloves. Like the colonial government, the
issue of the oil resources of the nicer Delta has been handled so far with sledgehammer. To be
modest, it has been more of the stick rather than carrot approach in federal government response
to the restiveness in the Niger Delta.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE QUEST FOR RESOURCE
CONTROL
The point was made earlier that the oil wealth of the Niger Delta would seem to be anti –
thetical to the aspiration of the people. For one, it is more or less a curse. Again, any attempt to
endanger the flow of it has always been met with brute force. Consequently, to the federal
government, the advocates of resource control are viewed with suspicious and hatred
unnecessary distraction that must be crushed. Indeed without any convincing evidence, the call
for the resource control is seen as a call for the break – up of Nigeria as it smacks of separatist
tendency. The evidence available suggests that the federal government does not favor dialogue in
this matter although government agents feign preference for dialogue and peaceful resolution of
the impasse.
It is worth reiterating that the stick approach of the government to the resolution of the
resource control question has merely escalated the issue. It is expected that the federal
government should follow due process in bringing truculent youths to book. Rather, the
government more often than not sends in troops to pacify the youths – a strategy that has never
paid off. Apart from the fact that this is a continuation of pax Britannica in the area, it is meant to
harass and intimidate the people to submission by possibly wiping out communities as
epitomized by the Odi massacre. True to fact, in December 1998, the federal government
massacre youths in Yenogoa for demanding a measure of control of oil resources. As if this few
display of state terror were nit enough a few months earlier, the government leveled Kaiama
where weeks before youths issue the Kaiama declaration demanding for resource control. While
it may be cynical, for oil, Nigerian government is prepared to submerge the Niger Delta in blood.
In a way, it may be fair to stress that the shedding of blood has been part of Nigerian
government’s oil policy.
Perhaps the point should be made that the response of Nigeria to resource control should
not surprise keen watchers of the Nigerian economy. The point was made earlier that there is a
convergence of interest in the politics of the control of oil resources and the survival of Nigeria,
because of the mono cultural nature of the economy. Thus, as rightly observe by Ikelegbe, ‘given
the very high stakes of oil, it constricts the state to be sluggish on dialogue, negotiation and
concession and expansive in terms of the repressive response’.48 What to add is that, repression
and intimidation within a system bears inherent seeds of self – destruction and possibly
enhancing the festering of the muttered seeds of discontent. If any thing at all, right from the pre
– colonial period, repression has never weakened the spirits of the people of the Niger – Delta for
the ultimate control of their resources.
While repression has been a conventional approach of the government, from time to time
it toyed with the idea of co – operation and payment of money to selected communities leaders.
The essence of this was to create a crack in the rank of the people. This situation played itself out
on the Ogoni issue when those termed vulture and local collaborators where subjects of ribald
songs and infamy – a situation, which culminated in the escalation of the Ogoni tragedy. The
whole essence of paying gratification to targeted ‘members of truculent communities was for
them to act in a ways that were clearly against the interest of their own people.49 Some other
crude response of the government includes tacit support of one ethnic group against others. This
is done by preferential treatment of some communities in the provision of social amenities as
well as location of local government head quarters. The case between the Ijaws and Itsekiris in
the location and relocation of local Governments’ area Headquarters is succinct enough.50 While
the details of this approach should not delay us here, suffice it to say that, the whole essence of
this is to divert the peoples’ attention from the exploitative tendency of government.51
The federal Government has also responded to the quest for resource control in a number
of ways. These include attempting to whittle down the quest for resource control through
constitutional arrangement. For example, to appear responsive to the yearning of the people in
the Niger Delta, the federal government played safe and stuck a compromise in the constitution.
This was done by virtue of section 162 (2) of the 1999 constitution, which gives back 13 per cent
of the monies generated from all resources to the various state governments in the oil producing
areas. The reason for this concession derives not out of sympathy for the people in the Niger
Delta, but because of the ferociousness with which the youths in the Niger Delta were advancing
their course.
The federal Government has also responded to the quest for resource control by way of
blackmail. Churning out misleading information to the public on the issues in contention does
this. For example, the authorities in Abuja portray the quest for resource control as a secessionist
movement and that it is a treat to the corporate existence of Nigeria. Furthermore, legislators of
the Niger Delta extraction are said to have been approached, and advised to drop issue of
resource control if they want to be renominated for political offices they hold currently. While
this claim is difficult to substantiate, suffice it to say that the volte – face of some legislators
from the Niger Delta on the issue would seem to support to this contention.
Remarkably, the onshore/ offshore dichotomy imbroglio – a fall out from the resource
control debate, remains to date an acrimonious subject. This possibly explains why the federal
government elected to use the legal approach as a response to the quest for resource control. As it
were, the Attorney general and minister for justice of the federation, Chief Bola Ige, filed a suit
against the states on 6th February, 2001 (case section 128/2001) for a determination of seaward
boundary of a littoral state within the federal republic of Nigeria for the purpose of calculating
the amount accruing to the federation accounts directly from the state pursuant to the provision
of section 162 (2) of the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigerian. As it should be
expected, the states at the forefront of the agitation for state control of resources responded
adequately by marshalling out their argument. In spite of the optimism of the state governor, the
federal government won the case. In their judgment, the judges opined that “the seaward
boundary of a littoral state within the federal Republic of Nigeria for the purpose of calculating
the amount of revenue accruing to the federation account directly from any natural resources
derived from that state pursuant to section 162 (2) is the low – water mark of the land surface
thereof (if in the case of areas as in the cross river state with an archipelago of islands) the
seaward limits of inland waters within the state.52
The implication of this judgment is that the littoral states are not more entitle to revenue
from offshore oil exploitation. The Supreme Court judgment was nit totally a zero sum one.
Before the judgment natural gas was excluded from the derivation principle – action which has
now been deemed unconstitutional. It is relevant to add that the judgment in favor of the federal
government control of offshore oil and gas revenue without any compromise and negotiation can
only heat up the polity and further complicate matters. Ordinarily, it is expected that the
devolution of power to the state inform of control of their resources could facilitate ultimate
deepening of democratic culture. This is particularly so because, state resource would be visible
and the pattern of exploitation to a large extent will be inclusive as there would be a sense of
belonging. More than anything else, the politics of resource control merely reinforced the need to
look critically at the constitution and recreate it. As of now, the federal government is too big,
too cumbersome and too rich and influential for the good of the commonwealth. Its awesome
powers are too dangerous for the health of the nation. As far as the federal government continues
to disburse largess to the states, the future of democracy is bleak. This is particularly so because
there is an inherent tendency and tilt towards dictatorship.
CONCLUSION
The quest for resource control in Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been recurring
demand. Right from the pre – colonial period of informal contact with the Europeans, through
the colonial and post – colonial periods, the politics of resource control has continued to undergo
transformation in its languid drive to its present coinage. The point must be made however, that
opinion is divided on the issue. What is certain is that, it is essentially targeted at some modicum
of control of state resources and possibly increases in the derivation principle in federal
allocation of revenue.
Ken – Saro – Wiwa gave the issue its present ideological impetus. The present
democratic dispensation upped the decibel of the resource control question. Much ink has been
split on the desirability or otherwise of the issue. What is certain is that from the persistence of
the demand of the people of the Niger Delta, it is obvious that the issue merit serious attention
from the government. Available evidence suggests that high – handedness and intimidations by
the state has nit helped matters. In this light, compromise and conciliation on the part of the
government and the agitators is therefore a desideratum. If the examples of other federal
countries are anything to go by, the demand for resource control is not out of the ordinary. As it
were, in classical federalism, no component part of the federation should be too porocipal
enough to lord it over the other.53 therein lies the for the federating state to control their
resources while paying appropriate further to the federal government.
While it is true that the Nigerian situation is peculiar because little economic – viability
of most of the federating states, it must be recognized that in the long run, it may serve the
interest of the federating states to be inward looking. The control of resources has further
implication for democracy and good governance. For one, it will strengthen our nascent
democracy by making the centre less attractive. In a way therefore, it will foster political stability
and continuity. consequently, it is suggested that the issue of resource control should be
examined dispassionately. While Nigeria may no go the whole hog in allowing for total control,
a reasonable and workable percentage could be agreed upon. Over time, this could be graduated
bearing in mind stages of consolidation of the democratic process. It is agreed that opportunists
can catch on this and hold the nation to ransome because of their wealth, yet, constitutional
arrangement must be put in place to allow for checks and balances. This nation cannot afford to
continue the way it is now. True federalism must be adhered to albeit with local flavour. The
present configuration of the government is whimsical and too large to command any serious
developmental initiative. In a way therefore, resource control in an important component of
democracy.
References
1.
See, G.G Darah, “Dying for the Niger Delta”, the Guardian, Lagos, NW 19, 1995 and
Aghalino S.O., “oil and gas exploration and production in the Isoko- Urhobo areas of
Delta state Nigeria – 1956 -1995” being an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, university of Ilorin,
Nigeria, 1999.
2.
3.
G.G. Darah, op. cit., p.l.
Oyerinde, O., “Oil Disempowerment and Resistance in the Niger Delta” in Ken Saro
Wiwa and the crises of the Nigerian state, a publication of the committee for the Defence
of Human Rights (CDHR), Lagos, 1998.
4.
Bolanle Eyinla, “Between Jaja and Saro Wiwa: Contestation over Resource control in the
Niger Delta Region of Nigeria”, in Jomo, S.S. and Kheo, K.J. (eds.),globalization and its
discontent revisited, Tulika books, India, 2003, p. 123.
5.
See, Khan, S., Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1994 with Forrest, T., Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria, Oxford university
press, London, 1993 and Frynas, G.J., “political instability and Business” forms on shell
in Nigeria”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 13, 1998, pp. 457 – 478.
6.
Ashton, J., The Human Ecosystem of the Niger Delta, ERA, Benin City, 1998.
7.
See, Dike, K.O., Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830 – 1885, London, Oxford
University Press, 1966.
8.
9.
Darah, G.G., op. cit.
Garvin, R.J., and Bertley, J.A., the scramble for Africa: documents on the Berlin West
African Conference, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 1973.
10.
11.
Dike, K.O., op. cit., p. 190.
Ofoagoro, W.I., “notes on the ancestry of Mhanaso OKWARAOZURUMBA otherwise
known as King Jaja of Opobo – 1821 -1891, Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria, vol.
ix, No. 3, pp. 154 – 156.
12.
Isichei, E., a history of the Igbo people, London, Macmillan, 1996, p.110.
13.
Anene, J.C., Southern Nigeria in Transition – 1885 – 1906, Cambridge University Press,
1960, p. 20.
14.
Cookey, S.J.S., King Jaja of the Niger Delta, Nok, New York, 1974, p. 101.
15.
Obaro Ikime, “Colonial conquest and African resistance in the Niger Delta”, Tarikh, vol.
4, No. 3, 1973, pp. 1 – 14.
16.
Afigbo, A.E., the warrant chiefs, London, Longman, 1972.
17.
See,akpobibioonline:lttp://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/essays/resources/onduku.html.
18.
See, Eyinla, 2003, op. cit., p. 131.
19.
Ibid.
20.
MOSOP, Ogoni bill of rights, 1992.
21.
See, Naanen, B., oil producing minorities and the structure of Nigerian federation: the
case of Ogoni people, journal of commonwealth and comparative politics, vol. 33 no. 1,
1995, pp. 46 – 78. Welch, E.W., “the Ogoni and self – determination: increasing violence
in Nigeria”, journal of modern African studies, vol. 33, no. 4, 1995, pp. 635 – 649. E.E.
Osaghae, “the Ogoni uprising, oil politics, minority agitation and the future of the
Nigerians states, journal of modern African studies, vol. 98, 1997 with Okonta, I and
Douglas Oronto, where vultures feasts: forty years of shell in the Niger Delta, ERA/FOE,
Benin City, Nigeria, 2001.
22.
Ihonvbere, J., “A recipe for perpetual crisis: the Nigerian state and the Niger Delta
question”, in CDHR, boiling point, Lagos, 2001, pp. 73 – 109.
23.
24.
Bolanle Eyinla, op. cit., 2003, p. 139.
Rotimi T. Suberu, Ethnic minority conflict and governance in Nigeria, spectrum books,
Ibadan, 1996, pp. 29 – 31.
25.
See, Cyril obi, the crisis of environmental governance in the Niger Delta – 1985 – 1996,
African political science association occasional paper series, vol. 3, no. 3, 1999, pp. 14.
26.
Aghalino, S.O., institutional approach to the development of the oil – bearing enclave of
Nigeria” the OMPADEC example, Kaiabara, 2001, vol. 8, no. 2.
27.
Fashina, O., “reflection on the national question “, in committee for the defence of human
rights (CDHR), Ken Saro Wiwa and the crises of the Nigerian state, Lagos, p. 93.
28.
See, the report of the political bureau, a publication of Mamser, Abuja, 1987.
29.
See, Nigerian environmental action study team (NEST), “Nigeria’s threatened
environment”, Ibadan, 1991, p. 5.
30.
See, federal Republic of Nigeria, land use Acts, government printers, Lagos, 1979.
31.
Cyril Obi, op. cit., 1999, p. 10.
32.
33.
Ibid.
Igho, N., “resistance politics” an essay on the future of Nigeria”, a paper presented at the
international conference on the challenges and opportunities of globalization at the dawn
of the millennium, organized by the African studies programmer, Howard University,
Washington DC. USA, April 11 – 14, 2001, p.3.
34.
ERA.
35.
See, http:/www.waado.org/niger delta/ essays/ resource control/ guide – Douglas. Html.
36.
Agiobenebo, T.J. and Azibaolanari, N. “rights, freedom, resource control and politico –
economic equilibrium of the market for national union”, in Nigeria economic society
(NES), 2001, p. 481.
37.
Istle Sagay, “federalism, the constitution and resource control” my response” the
Guardian, Lagos, 2001, August 13, p. 8.
38.
see,blessingonline, http:/www.ngrguardiannews.com
39.
See, Dafinone, D., “Supreme court verdict on resource control: the political implication
in http:/www.ngrguardiannews.com
40.
The Guardian on Sunday, April 8, 2001, Lagos, p. 30.
41.
Edevbie, O., “resource control: matters arising, the guardian, August 2, 2001.
42.
Agiobenabo, op. cit., p. 428.
43.
Ibid.
44.
See, Naanen, op. cit.
45.
Omo Omoruyi, “the politics of oil: who owns oil? Nigeria, state or communities”, the
guardian, January 24, 2001, Lagos, p. 8.
46.
Edevbie online: http:/www.waado.org/ resource control.
47.
Amuta, C., “resource control and appropriate federalism”, Vanguard, Lagos, July 5,
2001.
48.
Ikelegbe, a., “civil society oil and conflict in Niger region of Nigeria: ramifications of
civil society for regional resource struggle”,
49.
50.
Ibid.
Human rights watch, the price of oil, Washington DC., human rights watch, 1999.
51.
Okonta and Douglas, op. cit., pp. 153 – 159.
52.
Cited in Aghalino, op. cit., 1999.
53.
K.C. Wheare, federal government, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 1 – 14.
BRITISH COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE OIL PALM INDUSTRY IN THE NIGER
DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA, 1900 – 1960
African Study Monographs, 21,1:19-33, January 2000
S.O. AGHALINO
Department of history, University of Ilorin
ABSTRACT. This paper is on British policies and the oil palm industry in the Niger Delta region
of Nigeria. Until 1990, the region was in the forefront in the production of palm oil and palm
kernel for export. The export of palm produce from this region was threatened by the emergence
in the world market of produce from Malaya, Sumatra and the Belgian Congo. The British
colonial administration introduced the plantation scheme and pioneer oil mills to improve the
quality of oil in order to remain relevant in the world market. These policies and their impacts
are discussed focusing on the Niger Delta, people predominantly by the Isoko and Urhobo. The
conclusion drawn is that the various British policies toward the oil palm industry had no
revolutionary impact on the people.
Key words: British colonial policies; pioneer oil mils; demonstration plantation; Niger Delta.
INTRODUCTION
The oil palm is an indigenous plant not only to the people of the Niger Delta region of
Nigeria, but also to all the people of tropical Africa. Before the establishment of British rule in
the region, the people within the Niger Delta region had established an economic system which
revolved, to a large extent, around the oil palm. The people had an economic system which made
adequate provisions for their needs and their immediate neighbors.
When the British finally penetrated the hinterland of the Niger Delta, the exploitation of
oil palms was paramount in her imperial motives. Of all the principal export commodities during
the colonial period, palm oil and palm kernel have the longest histories being some of the earliest
commodities exported from the present day Nigeria. Palm produce became important in the
second half of the 19th century with the abolition of slave trade, the inauguration of the industrial
revolution, and the development of the railway which required palm oil as a lubricant. Moreover
so, palm oil was used for “the manufacturing of soap, candles, margarine, and as cooking fat”
(Dike, 1965). The use for palm oil in Europe increased with time. The residue of palm – kernel
was fed to livestock, while palm oil itself was used for the manufacturing of pharmaceutical
products (Helleiner, 1966).
Between 1865 and 1910, the export of palm produce doubled from West Africa as
Nigeria took the lead (Stillard, 1938). By 1900, palm produce constitute 89% of Nigeria’s total
export (Helleiner, 1966; 97). But this trend began to decline with the emergence and export of
other products including rubber and cocoa. Nigeria’s lead in the palm produce export trade was
further threatened with the growth of plantation in Sumatra, Malaya, and Belgian Congo. By the
1920’s, these countries have begun to export high quality palm oil (Stillard, 1938).
Understandably, this threat to British economic interest in the world market for palm
produce was readily checked through a number of colonial policies. Central to these policies was
the aim of maximally exploiting the natural and human resource of Nigeria for the purpose of
securing profitably trade to Britain (Hopkins,1973).this, the colonial administration hoped to
achieve not by radically destroying the existing indigenous production methods, but, through the
modification of such (Usoro, 1974). Furthermore, there was the need for government to
encourage the introduction of demonstration plantations, and the use of hand presses and
crushing mills for boosting the quality of extracted oil.
This study will focus on the palm oil industry in the western Niger Delta region of
Nigeria. This area, comprised mainly of Isoko – Urhobo people, was highly involved in the palm
produce trade. In the Niger Delta, experimental plantations began as early as 1932 while the first
oil mill was established in 1949. As should be expected, the mills and the plantation schemes had
both positive and negative impacts on the people. It is hoped that this study would more than
complement earlier studies on British colonial policies and African responses.
THE OIL PALM INDUSTRY IN THE WESTERN DELTA TO 1900
Before the establishment of British colonial administration among the Isoko – Urhobo
people of the Western Delta region of Nigeria (fig. 1), the people had established an economic
system which not only made fairly adequate provisions for their needs, but also for those of their
immediate neighbors such as the Itsekiri, Ijo and Kwale (Ikime, 1972; Aghalino, 1993). The
principal economic activity of the people was collecting palm nut from which oil and kernel
were extracted.
Palm nut collection was a seasonal activity. The periods of collecting extend from
January to June and it was controlled by a council of elders in each village community, whose
duty was to officially declare the palm bush open or closed for collection. Oil extraction from the
palm nut was a process that lasts approximately 21 days, and it involves the cooperation of the
man, his wife and children, and in some cases, members of the extended family. The first stage
in palm collection was the climbing of the palm trees using ropes woven from raffia palms. The
man uses a cutlass to cut down the nuts, usually bunches together in a big cob of about eighteen
inches long. The wife’s role was to haul to the trough the nuts collected in a single day, which
amount to “a little over one puncheon (13 cwt) or 180 gallons of oil and fifty – six bushels of
palm kernel” (Bradbury, 1957). In certain circumstances, such as when the taper is a bachelor,
the husband is very sympathetic, or the wife is very sick, the man could assist the woman in
gathering the scattered nuts to his own trough.
At the end of the collecting period, the palm nut collector (Oberokpa in Isoko – Urohbo)
then slices the bunches into four or more smaller pieces each, covers them with palm branches
and they are left for a period of two to three days to ferment a little.
Fig. 1: A map of Western Delta showing location of some palm oil mills.
This fermentation softens the nuts and facilitates further processing. That done, the palm nut
collector, shakes the nuts loose from the sliced cobs into a bamboo rack, designed to remove
husk or dirt from them. The clean nuts are then transferred into the oil canoe or trough of about
12 to 15ft long, 3 to 4ft wide and 4ft depth with a sloping bottom and plugged hole at the end
(Otite, 1973: 28; Bradbury, 1957: 135).
When the trough is half full with palm nuts, the nuts are trodden with bare feet for about
two days until they are reduced to pulp consisting of nuts, having integument and oil. Since this
part of the job is laborious, the man is often assisted by friends and members of the extended
family. The pulp that emerges as a result of the treading is piled on the higher end of the trough
so that the oil will flow to the lower end. The trough is then covered with plantain leaves as well
as palm fronds for a couple of days. Two to three days later, the man and his family complete the
process of oil extraction, which may take approximately two full days more.
The oil is usually of poor quality, and poured into tins for further boiling to remove
impurities. Water is then added to the pulp and shaken vigorously off from the top of the water
into drums and boiled for about one hour, after which it is poured into kerosene tins ready for
consumption and safe. Meanwhile, the clean nuts and fibrous residues are thrown out of the
trough to dry for about nine to ten days. These are share by the women who participated in palm
oil processing. The women crack the nuts for domestic use for sale (Mba, 1982).
The motivation for individual participation in the processing of palm oil in the pre –
colonial period stemmed from the individual, whether man or woman, who stood to gain from
the exercise. Because of it economic value, the oil palm is traditional source of revenue for the
people. For most men, palm oil was processed partly to meet domestic consumption needs and
partly for satisfying social obligation such as payment of dowries, purchasing essential articles
item such as salt or luxury items like gin and gun powder. It is important to add that the entire
processing of palm oil and kernel was carried out using locally manufactured goods. In addition
to the climbing ropes, locally made cutlasses bought from itinerant Akwa smiths were in
harvesting of fruits. The earthen pot was used for boiling palm fruits especially during the
production of soft oil (Benjo, 1983). Other items used were the calabash spoon locally called
Unuo. The mortar was used for pounding boiled fruits, while a wooden spade was to scoop
pounded pulp into the trough.
I stress that the oil palm made immense contribution towards meeting the socio –
economic needs of pre colonial Isoko – Urhobo people of the western delta. The palm frond was
used in burial ceremonies and in the propitiation of the gods. At the domestic level, the oil palm
had other functions. The trunk of the palm was used in building houses; its fiber was woven into
fist traps, while the fronds were used for construction of thatched fences around the compounds.
Palm frond was also fed as fodder to goats, while the veins were used in making brooms. The
palm kernel was chewed with maize, as snacks. Kernel was also fed to goats and chickens. The
palm nut, after the kernel had been removed was used to cement marshy areas in compounds and
foot paths (Usoro, 1974). The palm oil is ultimately used for cooking. The “Banga” and “Owo”
soups, special delicacies are made from the oil. Besides this, the oil palm was tapped to yield
palm wine. The pomade is a therapeutic all –purpose oil which readily served as Sloan liniment
to the people (Okumagba, 1980; Otite, 1973; Bradbury, 1957).
Since the oil palm industry was a principal source of revenue for the people, it had its
pantheon deity called Edjokpa. This goddess protected the people as they execute their duties
relating to oil extraction. In return, the deity was venerated before the palm bush could be
declared officially open for tapping. In some parts of Urhobo land, an animal such as the dog
was used as sacrifice to the deity. As the strategic importance of oil palm industry was self –
evident, any foreign innovation which tended to distort and /or modify the established system of
prospecting oil palm without the approval of the people would have naturally displeasure many
people.
BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE OIL PALM INDUSTRY: 1900 –
1923
The opening decade of this century marked a turning point in the determination of
Britain, along with other imperial European nations, to effectively occupy the African continent.
For Britain it meant a redefinition, and consolidation of her imperial strategies (Ikime, 1972;
Aghalino, 1993). The Isoko – Urhobo people of the western delta had been in contact with the
Europeans for a number of centuries, but it was not until 1900 that Britain decided to penetrate
into hinterland of the western delta. The intention of Britain was to establish pax Britannica, in
order for trade and commerce to thrive to her glory. Thus, between 1905 – 1911, the whole of the
Western Delta was brought under the British sovereignty after a spirited resistance by the people.
Having subdued the region, it was indeed necessary to exploit the local resources, particularly
the oil palm. The growth of oil palm industry in Nigeria during the colonial must grasped within
the framework of the primacy of the economic motivation of imperialism. At the initial years of
British colonial administration in the region, the European impact on the oil palm industry was
the juxtaposition of the use of European products such as cutlasses and basins, with products of
indigenous technology in the traditional processing of palm oil. However, the introduction of
these tools in the processing of oil had no revolutionary effect on palm oil production.
From 1910, the colonial administration began direct involvement in the oil palm industry
in the region as government policy started to unfold British economic policy towards the oil
palm industry in the western Niger Delta was influenced not only by the general agricultural
policy of Britain in Nigeria, but its overall goals and motivations for occupying Nigerian in
general. British colonial economic policy up to 1945 was characterized by a number of agenda.
Central to these was maximally exploiting the natural and human resources of Nigeria for the
express purpose of securing profitable trade in the world market (Hopkins, 1973). It was perhaps
this motive that influenced the British colonial administration to place the exploitation of cash
crops such as oil palm, cacao, cotton, groundnut and rubber, topmost priority in her economic
development programme in Nigeria (Crowder, 1968).
The colonial government believed in achieving the development of cash crops not by
radically destroying and/or altering the people’s existing indigenous production techniques, but
“through the gradual modification of such” (Usoro, 1974” 35). Modifications were to be effected
through various ways. First, the colonial government tried to make available to the local farmers
the kind of seedlings known to increase the yield. Secondly, the colonial government sought to
also improve the quality of the cash crops produced by the people.
The initiative for the modernization of the oil palm industry came from Sir William
Lever, of Lever Brothers Ltd., who suggested the grants or concession of land to commercial
firms for the establishment of palm plantations. But this proposal was rejected by the colonial
government as well as home government and the commercial firms of the united Africa
Company (UAC), and in particular, John Holt. Similarly, British public opinion led by E.D.
morel was vociferously opposed to the scheme (Buell, 1928). It was argued that the plantation
system would disrupt the traditional land tenure system, which could lead to violent outburst and
protests by Nigerians who would be deprived of their land (Hancock, 1942).
For the colonial government, such a prospect was anathema to efficient administration.
Besides, it was contended that a successful oil palm plantation would inevitably create a class of
landless labourers who would be left unemployed if the plantation failed. In addition, the
granting of freehold land to European firms would cause “endless legal and political problems
for the colonial authorities” (Meredith, 1984: 311). Moreover, in the larger West Africa where
Nigeria belonged, it was not certain that European – owned oil palm plantations could be
profitable without permanent government protection, assistance and subsidy – a prospect which
the colonial administration did not find appealing (Hopkins, 1973; Usoro, 1974; fieldhouse,
1978).
Opposition to the plantation initiative was also expressed by a number of Nigerian
nationalists. For example, Dr. C.C. Adeniyi Jones, member of the Nigeria legislative council,
referred to the nucleus plantations proposal as the “thin end of a wedge”, and asked, “Where, if
these plantations were to be in sparsely populated areas, their labour force would come from?”
(Adeniyi, 1928). It seemed to him that involuntary labour would likely be resorted to. Similar
reservation was expressed by Julius Ojo – Cole, and he urges the Nigerian government to turn to
the Nigerian farmers rather than the Liverpool chamber of commerce to develop the oil palm
industry (Julius, 1928). If this suggestion was acceded to by the colonial government, it would
have greatly redressed some of the problems that emerge when pioneer oil mills were finally
established in the region.
Aside from the opposition of Nigerian nationalists, and the local farmers as will be
demonstrated below, the failure of the plantation schemes elsewhere influenced the decision of
the colonial government not endorse the plan. In fact, the failure of plantation schemes in Sierra
– Leone and the Gold coast (Ghana) where government opposition was not as pronounced as in
Nigeria, must be regarded as a plausible explanation for the lukewarm attitude of government to
the scheme. These plantation failed because “there were difficulties with regards to labour
recruitment, and to diseases from neighboring native trees” (Perham, 1937: 309). Thus, it first
seemed that the administration was guided by antecedence.
But in the face of mounting competition and pressure from the joint West Africa
committees of the Liverpool, London and Manchester chamber of commerce, the secretary of
state for the colonies organized a committee in 1923 to study the Nigerian palm sector, and make
recommendations for its improvement (Forde, 1941). After an intensive survey of the industry,
the committee supported the introduction of the plantation scheme and improvement of the palm
groves. It also recommended the introduction of produce inspection to help regulate the quality
of palm produce exported from Nigeria.
THE IMPLEMNETATION OF ASPECTS OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE OIL
PALM COMMITTEE: PLANTATION SCHEME AND HAND PRESSES
The colonial government had earlier decided to embark upon a programme of assisting
the local farmers to cultivate improved seedlings. The response to this initiative to improve palm
groves took place at two levels in the western delta. These were the particular of UAC and the
individual farmers. The UAC systematically undertook experiments aimed at improving the
methods of planting oil palm for increased yield, and also the method of palm oil extraction.
Although the colonial
Table 1. Progress of planting of oil palm trees Urhobo/Isoko; 1932 – 1937.
Year
NNo. of planters
No. of extension of Average% increase in acres
groves
1932
4
*
19.2
1933
3
3
16.4
1934
*
1
0.2
1935
6
2
21.0
1936
2
4
9.0
1937
8
1
12.7
Total
28
11
78.5
*Not available
Source: Ughelli District, 1 file No. 391, 1937.
Government refused to grant concession to firms, the only exception was that made to
UAC for its plantation at Ajagbodudu (Cowan Estate) in the western delta; Ikotombo in Calabar
area of southern Nigeria, and Ndian in Cameroon (UAC, 1952). These concessions were
conceived by the colonial government as model estates for the cultivation of selected and
improved seedlings, to encourage African palm plots. In 1930, UAC alone owned 6,900 total
acreage of palm plantation (Udo, 1967).
For the individuals, the first attempt to cultivate a variety of palm fruits did not start until
1932, four years after it was officially introduced by the department of agriculture. In the western
delta, the ratio of wild plots to selected seedlings was 1:3, in contrast to Aboh division, also in
the delta province, which was 1:2 (National Archives Ibadan, henceforth NAI, and Ughelli
District 1 file 391). Table 1 shows the relative response of the people of the region to the
plantation scheme.
Between 1935 –1937, there was increase in planting. This may be attributed to the partial
recovery in prices of palm oil after the great depression. By 1946, there were over 101 acres of
plot in Urhobo Division. It would be unfair to the farmers to attribute the increase in the number
of local plantations entirely to the increase in prices for palm produce. Further explanation could
also be sought largely in the dynamism and enterprise of the people who required cash earned
from trade to meet their social and economic obligations. The point to add is that the changes in
society which involved the payment of taxes, school fees, and purchasing kerosen2e must have
influenced the people to increase their acreage of palm.
At the beginning, the Isoko – Urhobo people of the western delta reacted negatively to
the plantation scheme. At Ughelli, when District council requested a piece of land for plantation
and the clan trustee of the land, Osuivie, of the time, Omamohwo, and representatives of the ten
villages signed an agreement with the District Officer at Ughelli. Upon the agreement, the senior
District officer, W.K.D. Macray ordered his deputy, to organize the clearing and pegging prior
readiness for planting of palm trees, the people were alarmed at the extend of land acquired (NAI
1301/1, 1949). When the villagers saw how much land had been ceded to the British, they
resorted to violence. They tried to mob the government workers to stop them from further work.
In order to check the behavior of the people, policemen were recruited both from Ughelli and
Warri to safeguard the workers.
The question may be raised as to why the people were opposed to the plantation, when
in reality; their leaders had signed agreement which gave the land to the Department of
agriculture? The traditional modalities for measuring acreage of land was at variance with the
European tapes and acres, and the elders may not have anticipated that the land they were parting
with would be so large to incur the suspicious and antagonism of the people.
True to the apprehension raised earlier on by the colonial officials and Nigerian
nationalists with regards to the volatility of African land tenure, the Isoko – Urhobo people saw
that the adoption of the plantation scheme would interfere with their traditional economic and
cultural systems. The new scheme also affected the land tenure system based on collective
ownership held in trust by the elders who largely constituted the village council (Ogbobine,
1980). The introduction of individual plots was regarded as a radical departure from the existing
system as it meant individualization of land in place of communal ownership. Furthermore the
elders came to fear that their authority would be eroded with regards to control of land. It must
be noted that prior to the colonial period, scarcity of land had been partly responsible for
interclan dispute. It was easily imagined that individualization of land ownership could escalate
land litigations (Ikime, 1972).
The difficulties of the potential plot – owner were not to the limited to the opposition of
the elders and large majority of the Isoko – Urhobo people. When the prospective plantation
received approval from the elders, further
approval the District officer (D.O.) before the
department of agriculture could provide selected improved seedlings and give required advice for
laying out and maintaining young plants through the visiting agricultural assistants, finally an
approval must be gained from the Divisional officer (Apena, 1985). Apart from these
bureaucratic bottlenecks, planting of oil palms was also complicated and limited by shortages of
improved seedlings in stock at the Department of agriculture. Shortages caused delays, created
distortions, and in the process some potential planters resorted to planting wild palm, as was the
case in Ughelli in 1937 (NAI, Ughelli District file 391).
The plantation scheme in the western delta as was in other parts of Nigeria failed in spite
of the enthusiasm of the department of agriculture. As a possible means of stimulating the local
farmers to accept the plantation scheme the department of agriculture influenced and advised the
government to pass the cultivated oil palm ordinance in 1935. this ordinance provided that if a
farmer registered his cultivated palms with the government, and the oil produced by him from
the said farm met the required standard quality, i.e. 5% free fatty acid, he would receive a “full
rebate of duty which was in force” (Ekundare,1973). In spite of this incentive, the plantation
scheme failed as it was bedeviled by a number of factors mentioned above.
The colonial government was concerned for the improvement of oil quality in Nigeria
and was willing to regulate and ensure quality oil to be exported from Nigeria in order to
complete favorably with other major producers of palm oil (Usoro, 1974). The oil palm
committee recommended the mechanical extraction of oil palm when the government through
department of agriculture experimented with hand press. Thus, the Culley hand press was
adopted in 1929, and the Dutchscher hand press in 1932 (UAC, 1951). The former had a capacity
of five gallons and was sold to farmers for fifteen to thirty – five pounds, while the latter had a
capacity of nine gallons and was sold between nine pounds and thirteen pounds. The latter was
German – made, but preferred to the former which was English – made. It had the extraction
scale of 10%of the oil content of the fruits, which was higher than the traditional method.
Besides, it could extracts 65% of the oil in the fruits with a free fatty acid content of one and half
percent.
However, the adoption of the land press was unpopular among the people of the western
delta largely because most of the producers could not afford it. Not until it was introduced by the
government that the people became aware of this, “mechanized” system of oil extraction. The
hand presses did not help matters as they failed to meet expectations. With the threat of oil
export in Sumatra and Malaya, mechanical milling of oil palm was more than desirable. The oil
palm committee stressed that the introduction of mills would help to improve the extraction and
the quality of oil with free fatty acid content of less than 5%. The committee further suggested
that the government should, in the first instance purchase twelve mills.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PIONEER OIL MILLS
The recommendations by the special oil palm policy committee were submitted to the
government in 1945. In 1946, implantation began with slight modifications. This was influenced
by a number of factors. The first was the need for government to study the recommendations
thoroughly before accepting and implementing them. Secondly and importantly, 1946 created the
best kind of economic atmosphere within which the government could implement a new scheme.
It was in 1946 that the government’s new post – World War II policy of restructuring the
colonial economy of Nigeria came into effect. This was set in motion through the adoption of the
first ten – year plan of development and welfare for Nigeria.
The highlight of development and welfare plan included the advocacy of the substitution
of the British doctrine of colonial self – sufficiency with substantial infusion of British capital in
Nigeria, and the need for government to expand substantially its economic roles in the colony,
especially in the field of manufacturing and agro – allies industries (Hopkins, 1973). It may be
added that the origins of these development in Nigeria post – World War II colonial economy
must be sought within the context of the economic impact of the pos- World War II radical
nationalism which was essentially geared towards attainment of independence for the country
(Coleman, 1965; Olusanya, 1946; Ezera, 1964)
In the western delta, the implementation of the pioneer oil mill scheme started 1949,
when one Imoniedafe was the clan head at Okan in the Agbarho area. He gave out a parcel of
land for the establishment of the first mill at Okan. As usual, the government was formalin its
approach. Hence Imoniedafe and the representatives from each of the ten villages that constituted
the Agbarho clan signed an agreement to cede land on the bank of river Okan to the government
for the establishment of the mill. The consultation with the village elders before land acquisition
was in line with the government decision to avoid possible upheavals in the process of payment
of compensations to land owners. The Okan mill came into operation in early 1950 with palm
fruits from the palm plantation scheme. Several other mills were established between 1952 and
1960 (NAI, file 1308).in the Isoko area, the Ivrogbo mill was established in1952, while in 1953,
that of Ekakpamre was established. Mills were established in other villages, including Omia in
the Udu clan and Asagba in Urhobo land.
REACTIONS TO THE PIONEER OIL MILLS SCHEME
At the initial stage, reaction to the mills was that of resentment, irregular patronage, and
boycott. In most cases, the capacity of the mills could not cope with the volume of production.
This problem was general but more prominent at the Asagba mill (NAI, file 1309).
Consequently, palm fruits were not crushed on time thereby leading to wastage. To the palm oil
producers, this was more than they could bear because of economic loss. As a result, some
producers resorted to the traditional method of palm oil extraction which the colonial
administration had earlier discredited. Adding to the resentment of the people was that fruits
could be rejected by the staff of the mills alleging that the fruits were damaged in the process of
harvesting and porterage. Wild oil palm normally grew to 30 35ft, and were scattered in groves
at long distance from the mill site. Hacking the fruits down to the ground in the harvest easily
spoiled them. Besides, the spoilage from head porterage increased fermentation. The mode of
transport was still “crude”, and very few people could afford the bicycle hen. The fruit often did
not arrive at the mills in the optimum condition of freshness.
Another area which incurred the wrath of the people was the loss of palm kernel to the
mills. This loss undermined the socio – economic arrangement of the family, generally deprived
the women of their income, as they ‘owned’ kernel after the oil extraction. The income the
women realized from the sale of palm kernel was integral to the economic wherewithal of the
family. Furthermore, soap and pomade manufactured from the palm kernel meant for domestic
use was no longer available. Thus, the household economy was destabilized, upsetting the
traditional family system. Indeed, the women’s role in the economy was degraded when they
lived at the mercy of their husbands. Even symbolically, the gift of palm kernel to women from
their husbands uses to be a manifestation of harmony in the convivial relationship between
husband and wife.
People generally feared that the mills encouraged the confiscation of farmland and
valuable oil palm trees. This in turn, it was argued, disrepute the perpetuation of a smooth and
cordial relationship among the society at large, the goddess of the oil palm trees, and ancestors
who were believed to be custodians of oil palm and the land. The people felt they were to stop
patronizing the mills to keep the gods from visiting anger on the communities by way of
pestilence and famine.
Producer buyers were in the forefront in the resistance against the oil mills. They were
mostly indigenous business men and were equally affected by the oil mill scheme because they
were middlemen of the region or for European firms such as UAC and John Holt, and felt feared
losing their commission for oil purchase. In Olomu for example, Chief Utie of Okpare, a
prominent oil merchant mobilized his people to boycott the oil mills (Ugbeyavwighren, 1982).
Compensation to land owners and crops destroyed in mill sites infuriated the people. The
Okan mil construction was delayed causing delays in the signing of land leases (NAI, file 1308).
Delay in the payment was probably caused identifying the land owners were difficult, as land
was communally owned. Furthermore, the people reacted against the mills because it was feared
that they could escalate interclan land disputes. Compensation paid for land acquired for the mils
was sufficient for villages and clans to vie for the location of oil mills. This was evident during
the dispute between Obodo and Omia of Udu clan over the sitting of the oil mill (NAI, Kwale
District file 1318). In some places, however, the communities did not ask for compensation. This
was the case in ekakpamre mill established in 1953.
However, from the mid – 1950,s, the response to the mills shifted from resentment to
acceptance. They became so popular that some people applied to the western Nigeria
development board, for mills to be established in their communities, without compensations from
the government) NAI, war prof. 1602).this sudden change of attitude could be explained by the
growing awareness of the need to produce high quality grade of oil and kernel. Moreso, mills
became associated with progress and modernity which help to enhance the status of the
communities were located in. furthermore, those who witnessed the British conquest of the
region at the beginning of the 20th century feared that any further attempt to overtly frustrate the
actualization of the pioneer oil mills scheme may once again, attract the wrath of British fire
power. As it were, as the economic and military consequences came into calculation in time,
cooperation with the colonial state became the norm.
It would be a historical to ascribe the response of the people to the colonial economic
initiatives entirely to missionary activities or improved transportation as Allan Mcphee (1926)
and Heeliner (1966), have claimed. The area was generally untouched especially by the railways
and major access roads. More significant, perhaps, were the feeder roads constructed by the
communities, which provided transportation for the produce. This however does not imply that
attempt was not made by the colonial administration to construct some roads in the western delta.
For example, Agharho was linked to Ughelli in the 1930,s (NAI, file 15, 1941/51).
THE IMPACTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ON THE
PEOPLE
From the onset, British agricultural initiatives did not have much appreciable
revolutionary impact on they economy of the region. With regard to the plantation scheme, its
impact on the society was minimal. Nonetheless, its negative impact was that the acquisition of
the few acres of land for the establishment of plantation reduced a portion of arable land for food
crops in parts of Urhobo and Isoko land. The people claimed that the local people for the
plantations were the most fertile areas.
Another area where these plantations had some positive impact on the society was the
provision of employment opportunities for the people. Each plantation recruited a number of
laborers for planting, weeding and harvesting of palm fruits. Apart from employing people from
the villages where the plantations were, they also attracted migrant laborers from the Calabar
area. The promotion of labour migration by the plantation scheme helped to promote all forms of
social interaction
Table 2. Percentage change in oil production by each grade/quality; 1949 – 1954.
Year
Special Grade
Grade I
Grade II
Grade III
Grade IV
Grade V
1949
-
66.4
14.5
12.7
6.0
0.4
1950
0.2
61.3
17.8
14.4
5.8
0.5
1951
6.3
70.8
11.4
7.5
4.0
-
1952
29.6
56.3
7.4
5.2
1.5
-
1953
50.4
38.0
7.2
4.4
-
-
1954
60.9
29.9
4.4
4.8
-
-
Source: Usoro (1974), the Nigerian oil palm industry, 85
Between the various Isoko/Urhobo communities and migrants from other places of the
Niger Delta (Aghalino, 1993).
The impact that the mills had over the people was largely limited, because the mills had
to content with operational and teething problems, such as the constant breakdown of machinery,
caused essentially by dearth of qualified technical personnel and spare parts. It must be pointed
out that the pioneer oil mill scheme brought about some relative changes in the oil palm industry.
By advocating the sale of all palm fruits harvested by the local farmers to the mills, and by
extension, fostering centralization of palm oil processing, and by encouraging the sale of fruits
largely
specified places i.e. mill sites and buying stations, the mill apparatus altered the
marketing of palm oil product. A spin – off effect of the mill scheme, especially after 1949, was
that it stimulated the government to establish more palm plantations in the region, although the
scheme failed (Udo, 1965).
Most importantly throughout the period in focus, the plantation scheme hardly made any
appreciable effect on the production of high quality oil in the region. The poor performance of
the mills was caused essentially by the “lack of fruits, inadequate laborers to work on the mills
and also irregular supply of fruits to mills” (Usoro, 1974). This in turn was partly responsible for
the inability of the mills to function at full capacity. This development, it must be stated, clearly
faults the claims of the government during the period that the oil mill scheme was capable of
making appreciable impact on the production of high quality oil in Nigeria. It is more plausible
to suggest that some innovations introduced by the marketing boards between 1949 and 1955
influenced the responses of the farmers to higher productivity. Central to this was the
introduction of “price/grade differentials” (Usoro, 1974). This innovation among others helped
to improve the quality of oil products in the region, as apparent in Table 2.
Whereas in 1949 there was no production of special grade oil, by 1954, special grade oil
has risen to 60.9 percent of the total oil produced in the region. On the other hand, the amount of
grade 1 oil produced declined from 66.4 percent of total production in 1949 to 29.9 percent in
1954. Other lower quality oil rapidly declined. The colonial government had introduced the
price/grade promotion method earlier to promote the production and sale of cocoa in the western
Nigeria. What is significant is that this promotion method which failed in western Nigeria was
successful in western Niger Delta and some parts of eastern Nigeria (Yamey and Baner, 1954).
The earlier promotion policies which preceded the innovation of price/grade differentials must
have been learn from Sumatra and the Belgian Congo where a fledging oil palm industry was. I
believe that what the colonial administrators could have done is to improve on the traditional
method of oil extraction rather than claiming that the traditional method of oil extraction was
inherently inferior. This contention must have emanated either from the arrogance of ignorance
or the usual colonial prejudice of dismissing all indigenous technological advancements as
inferior to western models.
It is important at this juncture to examine the impact of oil mills on other aspects of the
economy of the region. One contribution of the mill scheme to the economy of the people was
that it provided employment opportunities to able – bodies young men as the plantation scheme.
Each mill employed an average of about twenty – seven indigenous labour force. In some cases,
some of the people were recruited from communities where mills were sited. This was
particularly true for the Ivrogbo mill. Given the apparently low employment opportunities from
mills, there is no doubt that most of the labors force at this time was engaged in agriculture, trade
and manufacturing of crafts while others left the region to other parts of the country in search of
greener pastures (Otite, 1975, Essi, 1988). This is not to suggest that mill workers did not
contribute to the growth and development of their communities as some of them built block
houses, with corrugated irons sheets. In particular, mill workers at Ekakpamre helped their
personal friends who were not “wage” workers to raise monetary loans in times of need. Such
loans were used by the borrowers to pay taxes and school fees for their children.
Furthermore, as the plantation scheme, the established mills helped to boost the
construction and development of feeder roads linking fruit processing areas with fruit – buying
stations. A road was constructed link Agbarho with Ughelli (NAI, file 15, vol. vii, 1941/51). In
addition to the construction of roads, bridges were built across the Okan and ekrehawe Rivers.
Most of the roads and bridges are still functional in several parts of the Western Delta.
CONCLUSION
This paper stressed the importance of the oil palm industry to the people of the western
Niger delta in particular and Nigeria in general. Its importance is reflected in its multifaceted
function in the domestic economy as a source of major revenue to the people. Even before the
advent of the British, the oil palm was vital to the people (Buchanan Pugh, 1955). Indigenous
methods were employed to process palm kernel.
With British penetration of the western Niger Delta in the closing year’s of6 the 19 th
century which culminated in the effective occupation of the region in early 20th century, the
colonial administration was first content with the indigenous method of oil extraction. However,
with the glut in the world market for palm oil and stiff competition for high quality oil from
Sumatra and Malaya, there arose a need to improve the quality of oil. Between 1920 and 1960,
the colonial government introduced several initiatives to achieve the end.
Initially, the reaction of the Isoko – Urhobo people of the western delta was that of cold
indifference, resentment, irregular patronage and outright boycott. Gradually, the mechanized
mills became accepted as they were seen as indices of modernization.
I stress that whatever improvement that took place in the quality of oil and palm kernels
resulted from the need felt by the people to meet emerging social and economic obligations as
payment of taxes and school fees, rather than from the colonial government’s initiatives.
References
Adeniyi, 1928. Political and administrative problems of Nigeria. In West Africa. West publishing
Company Ltd. London.
Aghalino, S. 1993. Isoko under colonial rule, 1896 – 1946 (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University
Ilorin, Nigeria).
Apena, A.I. 1985. A socio – economic history of the western delta of Nigeria, 1914 – 1960
(unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Lagos, Nigeria p.118).
Allen, M. 1926. The economic revolution in British West Africa. Aberden.
Banjo, I. 1983. Traditional pottery in Nigeria. Magazine. 47.
Bradbury, R.E. 1957. The Benin kingdom and the Edo speaking of southern Nigeria. Oxford
University Press, London.
Buchanan, K.M. & J.C. Pugh 1955. Land and people in Nigeria. London.
Buell, R.L. 1928. The native problem in Africa volume II. Frankcan, London.
Coleman, J.S. 1965. Nigeria” background to nationalism. California Press, Los Angeles.
Crowder, M. 1968. West Africa under colonial rule. Hutchinson and co., London.
Dike, K.O. 1956. Trade and politics in Niger Delta. Oxford University Press, London.
Ekundare, R.D. 1973. An economic history of Nigeria. 1860 -1960. Methuen and co., London.
Essi, S.O. 1988. A short history of Aviara, 1468 – 1985. SSB organization, Oleh.
Ezera, K. 1964. Constitutional development in Nigeria. Cambridge University Press, London.
Fieldhouse, D.K. 1978. Unilevel overseas. London.
Forde, D. 1942. The native Economic of Nigeria. In (M Perman, ed.). The economic of a tropical
dependency. Faber and Feber, London.
Hancock, W.K. 1942. Survey of British common wealth Affairs. London.
Helleiner, G.K. 1966. Peasant agriculture, government and economic growth in Nigeria. IIIinois
97.
Opkins, A.G. 1973. An economic history of West Africa. Longman, London.
Ikime, O. 1972. The Isoko people. Ibadan University Press, Ibadan.
Julius, O.C. 1928. The oil palm; present conditions and prospects of the West African trade. In
West Africa. West Africa publishing company Ltd. London.
Mba, N.E. 1982. Nigerian women mobilized: women political activists in southern Nigeria. 1900
– 1968. University of California Institute of international studies, Berkeley.
Meredith, M. 1984. Government and decline of Nigerian oil palm industry. Journal of African
history. 23: 3.
NAI, Ughelli District, file 391, 1937.
NAI, file 51, 1941/51.
NAI, file, 1941
NAI, file 1301, 1949
NAI, file 1308, 1949
NAI, file 1309, 1950
NAI, Kwale District, file No. 1318, 1950
NAI, war prof file No. 1602, 1951
Ogbobine, R.A. 1980 The Urhobo and their land tenure. Judges Chamber, Sapele.
Okumagba, M.P. 1980. A short history of Urhobo. Kris and Pat, Warri.
Olusanya, G.O. 1964. The Second World War and politics in Nigeria. Evans, London.
Otite, O. 1973. Autonomy and dependents: the Urhobo kingdom of Okpe in modern Nigeria,
Ibadan University press, Ibadan.
Otite, O. 1975. Resources competition and inter – ethnic relations in Nigeria. In (L.A. Depress
ed.) Ethnicity and resource competition in plural societies. Monton publishers, The Hague.
Perham, M. 1937. Native administration in Nigeria. London.
Stillard, N.H. 1938. The rise and development of legitimate trade in palm oil with West Africa
(Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Birmingham).
UAC, 1951. Statistical and economic review. UAC, Lagos, No 7.
UAC, 1952. Statistical and economic review. UAC, Lagos, No 8.
Udo, R.K. 1965. Sixty years of plantation agriculture in southern Nigeria, 1902 – 1962.
Economic geography, 41.
Udo, R.K. 1967. British policy and the development of export crops in Nigeria. The Nigeria
journal of economic and social studies, 9 (2).
Ugbevwighren, M. 1982. Olomu states its evolution (B.A. long Essay University of Ilorin,
Nigeria).
Usoro, E.J. 1974. The Nigerian oil palm industry. Ibadan University Press, Ibadan.
Yamey, B.S. & Baner, 1954. The economics of marketing reforms. The journal of political
economy, 62 (3).
______ accepted November 4, 1999.
Author’s Name and Address: S.O. AGHALINO, department of history, university of Ilorin,
P.M.B. 1515, Ilorin Kwara State, NIGERIA.
Reflection on Arabic sources and the History of Nigeria
Dr. SO.Aghalino
Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XXIX July-Sept 2006
Department of History,
University of Ilorin,
P.M.B.1515, Ilorin,
Kwara State, Nigeria.
E-mall: aghalinosan@ yahoo. Com
Introduction
The contacts of Nigeria with outside word, particularly the Arab word, seem to have
enriched the historiography of the country, To be sure, part of Nigeria, which had contacts with
countries of Africa and the middle East, as epitomized by the introduction of Islam and the
attendant infiltration of Islamic learning, gained extensively from the documentation of their
history from a chronological perspectives.1 Contrary to Trevor Roper’s claim about Africa and
her history,2 the Arabic scholars appeared to have isolated change –purposive change and
continuity in the history of Nigeria. While written history was some what a bane of Africa
historiography, a
situation which promoted Hegel’s caustic and underserved comment
about the continent,3 it is obvious that Arabic sources would
oversimplification of the African reality. While it is
seem to have belied the
conceded that the importance of written
sources cannot be overemphasized, taking part for a whole is not consistent with historical
tradition.4
The point, however, must be made that in Nigeria there were few places for which
written sources date back much more than a century before the colonial period. But the presence
of the Arabic scholars in the Nigerian region as early as the 11th century seen to have added
glamour and consistency to t he history of the region as their literature helped to build a more
coherent picture of social and inter helped to the build amore coherent picture of social and
intellectual life in t he region. It is against t his
backdrop that attempt is made in this paper to
discuss the place of Arabic sources in the history of Nigeria. The possible contributions
and
limitation of these sources are isolated and evaluation d. Finally, a case is made for an
interdisciplinary approach in the written of Nigeria history.
The spread of Islam in Nigeria: A sketch
The details of the coming of Islam into Nigeria are sufficiently familiar.5 Suffice
it to say, that the contact between Nigeria and outside world to the north and the northeast
predated the introduction of Islam.6 It would appear that early interaction between Nigeria
and the north stemmed from the gradual desiccation of the Sahara as well as the reduction in
the amount of rainfall in the central Saharan region. But overtime, this contact increased
signification possibly because of the introduction of Islam into Borno and Hausa land, as well
as the intensification of t he trans- Saharan trade.7
The origin of Islam in the Nigeria region is controversial. It is possible that infiltration of Islam
into Nigeria may have started in the Chad basin fro North Africa possible by the 7th century A.
D.8 What is significant is that, it was precisely in the 11th century that there was evidence of
conversion of the king of Borno was revolutionary. Overtime, the king of Borno deliberately
facilitated the spread of Islam in his domain. Successive king in Borno laid emphasis on Islamic
learning and wooing of Arabic scholars to settle Borno. A
acceptance
Tacit demonstration of the
of Islam was the Muslim establishment of diplomatic relations with the Muslim
states of North Africa and the Middle East. This policy paid off in the form of presence of
colonies of Muslims in the various parts of Borno.9
The earliest evidence of the introduction of Islam into Hausa land was in the 14th century. It
is possible that Islam was
introduction into this part of Nigeria much earlier possible through
Borno. But evidence has it that Islam penetrated Hausa land from the west and Wangarwa
who arrived in Gobir, Katsina and Kano in the 14th century introduce it.10 The leaders of
Wangarawa
were granted a number of privileges, including
appointments in order to
encourage them in the propagation of Islam .in the years that followed, many more scholars,
traders, merchants arrived in Borno from North Africa, Egypt and the
This
western sudan.11
development coupled with the activities of the rulers (including annual pilgrimages
and establishment of diplomatic relations with Islamic countries), led to the spread of Islam in
Nigeria.
That point to note is that the introduction of Islam ushered into Nigeria both the Eastern
system of education and civilization. Most of the kings after their conversion made visits to the
holy offered
Prayers but also studied Arabic education and the peoples’ way of life. 12 On getting
back home, these kings began to introduce some of these innovations in their states. They
built mosques and schools where Quraniic education was taught. And Islam being a religion of
the Book, emphasis was placed on literacy. This probably explains why Arabic scholars
document much of the history of the region.
Arabic sources and the History of Nigeria: A survey
The traditions of most part of Nigeria that had contact with the Arab world are overlaid
with Arabic influences. One result of this is that even to a great extent traditions emphasized the
tie to the East. There is limit to how we generalize on this
however. This is so because the
above observation is truer for Northern Nigeria and the Yoruba area where Islam is also
entrenched. Notwithstanding. Arabic sources provided the vehicle for recording traditions.
Hence the earliest written histories of Nigeria are those of Hausa and Borno. The point is, the
introduction of Islam into Nigeria made it part of the intellectual world of Africa culture. 13
Parts of Nigeria gradually began to reshape their myth to reflect their new appreciation of
Arabic
cultural origins. Their worldview
shifted so that the archetype contained in the
historical references came into line with Islam thought.14
The tie to the larger Arab world meant that sources of Nigerian history can be found
in the written of the well known Arab scholars of North Africa and the near east. The
kingdoms of Borno and several of the Hausa kingdoms are mentioned in the writings of
such Arabic scholars as lbn Battutah and lbn khaldun whose books refer to the Sudan . lbn
Battutah visited the Sudan in 1352-1353, spending time
in Timbuktu shortly after the
death of Mansa Musa.15 He traced the course of the Niger to Yufi(Nupe) and mentioned
Gobir and Borno. Lbn late 14th century and never visited the Sudan, wrote of Kanem-Borno and
the gifts sent by the king of Borno to the Sultan in 1257 A. D. More importantly, the Hausa state
and Borno have their own history s which were written in Arabic. it is not certain which scholar
within these state began to record the accounts of their kings, but writings of the 16th
century have bee preserved.16 Mai ldris Alooma of Borno had in his court a scholar by
name Ahmad lbn Fartua, who wrote an account of ldris reign and he was also his Chief
Imam. Fartua wrote an account of Idris’ reign describing his prowess and how he dealt with
Bulala insurrection.17 Above all, he narrated the dexterity of Alooma in diplomacy, which he
claimed was the gift of Allah.
Danmole
18
has show that Ahmad Baba wrote extensively about the western Sudan. in
particular, Ahmad’s work represents the beginning of writing in Arabic, which made reference
to Yoruba land.19 Besides the commentary on the nascent Ilorin Emirate and the events that led
to the final collapse of the Alafinate of Oyo, there was exchange of letters between the emirate
and the leaders between the emirate and the leaders of the Sokoto caliphate based at Gwandu.
20
One of these letters that is important for the events for the events in the news emirate of Ilorin
was the Risalla Amir Yoruba Abdul Salam (henceforth, the Risalla).21 The Risalla (Risalla)has
important and valuable significance as it suggests that there was struggle for leadership in Ilorin
and challenges that faced the new emirate. It gave a vivid description about the initial formative
stage of the emirates, which has facilitated modern historical re – interpretation of the events of
the period in question.22
Abdullahi Smith who stumbled upon the Talif Akbar al qurun min Umaru balad
(henceforth the Talif) Ilorin, written in 1912, by Ahmad B. Abubakri Kokoro, attempted to use it
to reconstruct the fall of the Alafinaye of Oyo.23 By providing information on the collapse of
Oyo, he has added a useful material towards reconstructing of the chronology and the sequence
of events in the last days of the empire. Abdullahi Smith’s appraisal of the valuable source
material conjures a picture of trying to exonerate the Fulani Jihadists’s complicity in the events
that led to the collapse of old Oyo Empire.24 Although the Talif was written to catalogue the
achievements of the emirs of Ilorin from the beginning of the conquest of Afonja and the events,
which led to the fall of Oyo, it also chronicles the series of wars involving the emirs of Ilorin
against the rest of Yoruba land, particularly, Ibadan in the 19th century.25 From the writing of
Arabic’s scholars, it would appear that a vibrant Muslim community existed in the old Oyo
Empire. It has been suggested that it was probably this Muslim community than sought the
guidance from Katsina on how to determine the precise time of sunset, may be in connection
with the Ramadan fast. Balogun has shown that it was probably in response that, Abu Abdullahi
B. Masina, wrote the Shifa al –ruba fi tahrif fuqaha’ Yoruba.26 This document as it were, could
attest not only to the age of Islam in Yoruba land but also to the amount of attention paid to the
practice of the religion as early as the 16th century.
It would appear that the most significant and the complete example of the assimilation of
Islamic culture would be works such as the Song of Bagauda, where the Arabic language was
used to compose Hausa kings’ list in verse.27 Al –Sa’id, author of the famous Taarikh al –Sudan,
recorded events in Kano, Kebbi and Katsina, in the 16th century. Much of the information
gleaned from the popular Tarikh added colour and the so much needed chronological perspective
to the history of the mentioned states in northern Nigeria.
Limitations of Arabic sources
For the professional historian, the use of Arabic sources must be handled with care. Just
like most historical sources, they are bedeviled with a number of shortcomings. One of the
limitations is ethno –centrism. To the Arabic scholars all Nigerian cultures were inferior to that
of the Arab world, as such should be discarded.28 this perhaps, influenced Al –Maghili’s treatise,
the obligation of princes, which he presented to the king of Kano. The implication of this is that,
certain aspect of the people’s cosmology would have been obliterated over time. This inevitably
must have left certain lacunae in our knowledge of the histories of the area that had contact with
the Arab world.
One other feature of the areas that had contact with North Africa and the Middle East
began to trace their history to Makkah. In this dimension, Sayt Ibn Ali Yazan, the legendary
ancestor of the Sefawa dynasty of Kanem- Borno, was said to have come from Yemen.
28
In the
same vein, the Yoruba were said to have migrated from the East, especially iraq.29 Consequently,
the traditions of origin of these areas must have been diverted from their probable original local
sources. The tendency for the Arabic scholars to give supernatural explanation to otherwise
purely human affair is a major weakness of Arabic sources.30 For example; the victory of Mai
Idris Alooma over his Bulala enemies had been explained not only in terms of his military
prowess, but also with the kind assistance of Allah. To be sure, ‘important institution had to be
sanctioned by association with the supernatural and the beginning of things, otherwise they fall
into the meaningless flux of the present impermanency’.31 While the divine hand of God cannot
be overemphasized in the affairs of man, the resource to God in purely human transactions is
antithetical to historical studies.
Again, most of the chronicles were written from the standpoint of the rulers of the various
Muslim states. Ahmad Ibn Fartua, the historian of borno, merely dealt with Idris Alooma’s
struggle to establish his authority over the whole of Kanem – Borno and how he dealt with his
adversaries.32 In this study, the author did not attempt to analyze the causes of political instability
occasioned by the incessant Bulala insurrection. This type of history, if not properly synthesized,
would only obscure, rather than illuminating the history of the region. Besides, writing history
from above without taking cognizance of the forces from below outside the court of rulers is
mere hagiography. Indeed, the role of other actors whether tribal groups or individuals, who did
the actual fighting for the born o state pale into insignificance before the great, all powerful
achievements of the Mai.33 Nevertheless, Fartua’s work is exceptional because there are a few
attempts before the 19th century to discuss in detail the contribution of individual to the history of
the region.
More often than not, the Arabic sources of this period were victims of offering mono –
causal explanation to complex and interrelated events.34 for example, the Uthmanm Dan Fodio’s
jihad of 1804 was chronicled in terms of restoring Islam to its proper context without considering
the seething social, economic and political condition prior to the commencement of the jihad.35
In the same vein, the Arabic document on the history of borno claimed that the achievements of
borno became noticeable when the legendary Sayf Ibn Yazan made his way to Borno. This
Arabic remnant of the Hamitic hypothesis that tend to take major achievements within the
framework of outside contact has severed to undermine these sources.36
Generally, the Arabic sources are almost entirely concerned with political affairs
although, religion took a place of pride. Religious themes were used to explain cause and effect,
as well as the rise and fall of kings.37 Economic and social matters are given residual explanation
and neglected as such, there is tainted and blurred appraisal of societal reality. To be sure, Arabic
sources are limited in their contribution because large areas of even northern Nigeria outside the
large emirates are neglected in their history. Except the limited areas of Yoruba land, the
southern sections of Nigeria are also excluded in the chronicles of Arabic scholars. The point
must be made that most of the identified shortcomings of Arabic sources are not really peculiar.
One problem or the other bedevils virtually every source of history. It behooves the professional
historian to sieve and search for alternative sources to complement each source. It is more
rewarding for historians to adopt an interdisciplinary approach while trying to reconstruct the
history of Nigeria or any other region. Notwithstanding the limitations of the Arabic sources,
they remain mines of information for scholars who are interested in the history of Nigeria before
the era of the British.
Notes and references
1.
There are a number of Arabic sources available for the Nigerian region. What we have
done here is to select some of the sources for our analysis. The paper does not pretend to
have exhausted all the available sources, as this would be impracticable and ambitious for
a paper of this nature.
2.
Trevor ropers cited by Fage, J.D., The Development of African Historiography’, J. Ki –
Zerbo ed. UNESCO general history of Africa, 1. Methodology and African pre –History,
Berkeley, Heinemann, 1981, p. 31.
3.
Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of History, New York, Praeger, 1956.
4.
Aghalino, S.O., ‘An assessment of the contributions of written sources to Historical
studies; review of arts and social sciences, volume 1, (1), 1999, pp. 43 – 50.
5.
For details, see amongst other, J.S., Trimingham, a History of Islam in West Africa,
oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962; P.B., Clarke, West Africa and Islam, Edward
Arnold, 1982; T.G.O., Gbadamosi, the growth of Islam among Yoruba, 1841 – 1908;
ph.D., Thesis University of Ibadan, 1968; John e. Lavers, ‘Islam in the Borno caliphate: a
survey’, Odu, a journal of West Africa studies, 5, 1971 and S.J., Hogben and A.H.M.,
Kirk Greene, the emirates of northern Nigeria, oxford university press, 1966.
6.
Toyin Falola et al., a history of Nigeria, 1, Ibadan, Longman, 1989.
7.
ibid.
8.
Michael Crowder, colonial West Africa, London, Frank Cass, 1978.
9.
Toyin Falola, a history of Nigeria …., p. 153.
10.
Ibid.
11.
Hodgkin, T. Nigerian perspective, London, Oxford University press, 1975, pp. 73 -90.
12.
Ibid.
13.
Aghalino, S.O., the contributions of written sources …, p. 44.
14.
Hess, R.A., perspectives on Nigerian Historiography, 1875 – 1971: the Historians of
modern Nigeria’, ph.D. Thesis, Howard University, 1972. See also Kapteijns, L.,
‘African Historiography written by Africans, 1955 – 1973 – the Nigeria case’, ph.D.
Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1977.
15.
Hodgkin’s, T., Nigerian perspective.
16.
Ibid.
17.
Hess, R.A., perspectives on Nigerian Historiography …., p. 35.
18.
Danmole, H.O., ‘Arabic Historiography on the Yoruba’, in Toyin Falola, ed. Yoruba
Historiography, Madison, University of Wisconsin, pp. 92 – 96.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Ibid.
21.
Ibid.
22.
Abdullahi, S., ‘A little new light on the collapse of the Alafinate of Yoruba’, Olusanya
C.O., ed., studies in Yoruba History, Ibadan, Heinemann, 1983, p.55.
23.
Atanda, J.A., ‘The Fulani and the collapse of old Oyo’, in Toyin Falola, ed., Yoruba
Historiography, Madison, University of Wisconsin, 1991, p. 109.
24.
Danmole, H.O., Arabic historiography …., p. 94.
25.
For details see Hooksett, m., a History of Hausa Islamic verse, London, University of
London press, 1975.
26.
Hiskett M. and A.D.H. Bivar, ‘The Arabic literature of Nigeria to 1804: A provisional
account’, bulletin, school of oriental and African studies, p. 116, cited in Balogun S.A.
‘history of Islam up to 1800’, in Obaro Ikime, groundwork …., p.219.
27.
For all intents and purposes, this was the Arabic equivalent of the so – called European
mission civilisatrice. The idea that influenced al –Maghili to present a treatise to the king
of Kano must have been geared at imparting Arabic/Islamic culture and cosmology,
which were presumed to superior to the indigenous culture. For details, see Sheikh
Mohammed Al –Maghili, the obligations of princes, trans., from the Arabic by T.H.
Baldwin, Beirut, 1932.
28.
Afigo, A.E., Facts and myths in Nigerian historiography’, in Nigerian Magazine, Nos.
122 – 123, 1977, p. 87.
29.
Akinjogbin, I.A. and E.A. Ayandele, Yoruba land up to 1800’, in Obaro Ikime, ed.,
Groundwork of Nigerian history, Ibadan, Heinemann, 1984, p. 122.
30.
Afigo, A.E., Facts and myths …., p. 86.
31.
Ibid, p. 87.
32.
Garvin, R.J., ‘Some perspectives on Nigerian history’, journal of the Historical society of
Nigeria, volume 9, No. 4, June 1979, pp. 19 – 20.
33.
Ibid, p. 19.
34.
Afigo, A.E., ‘Mono – causal explanation in African history: a prevalent distortion’,
Tarikh, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 33.
35.
It is obvious now the Sokoto jihad was motivated by myriads of reasons. For details, see
Adeyinka, O., ‘the 19th century Ilorin Wars and the growth of Islam in Yoruba land:
reassessment’, in Hamdard Islamicus, volume 18, No. 1, spring 1995, pp. 85 – 97.
36.
For details, see Sanders, R., ‘the Hamitic hypothesis in time perspective’, in journal of
African History, volume 10, No. 4, 1969, pp. 5321 – 5322.
37.
Garvin, R.J., Some perspectives …., p. 16.
Maiduguri journal of historical studies vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 111- 126 (2004)
COMBATING THE NIGER – DELTA CRISIS: AN APPRAISAL OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO ANTI – OIL PROTESTS IN THE NIGER – DELTA,
1958 – 2002
S.O. AGHALINO
ABSTRACT
This study attempts to discuss the palpable causes of anti – oil protests in the Niger –
delta region of Nigeria. The study is necessitated by the need to situate the crisis/protests in the
Niger – delta region in historical perspective, as earlier writers’ seem to have focused on the
issue within the framework of timeless ethnographic presence. In line with this, what appears to
be the federal government response to the crisis are isolated and discussed. It is found that one of
the issues causing disaffection in the region is branch of promises and dashed hopes. Our
conclusion emphasizes the need for consensus building as well as participatory approach to
conflict resolution in the region.
Introduction
Oil has been exploited in the Niger – Delta for well over forty years now. By the 1970’s, the
share of non – oil revenue had markedly decline. This, as it were, signified the increasing
importance of oil to the nation, as well as gross negligence of the agricultural sector of the
Nigerian economy.
1
increasingly, and overtime, the oil companies in Nigeria are playing
dominant role in Nigeria political economy as epitomized by their structural linkage to the
renters state of Nigeria. Understandably, this linkage which is, hinge on joint venture
arrangement, has made the oil majors to count more, in the scheme of things than the people in
the oil bearing enclaves of Niger Delta. While it is conceded that oil has generated massive
revenue for the country, it must be noted that, the negative effects from the exploration and
production of oil and gas from the
__________________________
1.
For concise discussion on this, see among others, Ohorhenuan, J.F.E. ‘the political
economy of military rule in Nigeria’, review of radical political economics, 16, and 2/3.
1984, Ikein, A.A., the impact of oil on a developing country. The case of Nigeria
(Praeger, New York, 1990.); Forrest, t. 1993. Politics and economic development in
Nigeria (oxford: oxford university press, 1993).
__________________________________________________________________
Department of history, university of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria
region, have continued to affect the people adversely. The deleterious impact has resulted in an
extensive pollution, ecological fragmentation and alteration, as well as socio – economic and
political marginalization. So much has been written on the environmental crisis in the region that
it should not delay us here. 2 Suffice it to say that, what the people of this region get by way of
compensation from the federal government do not seem to correlate with the stupendous revenue
that is garnered from it. Revenue from this region has fueled socio – economic and political
transformations of other geopolitical zones in Nigeria. Expectedly, in time perspective, the
people of this region realized that to, remain mute in the face of such huge ecological destruction
was unwise. It would appear that it is the realization of the need to protect themselves from
activities of oil firms and, a government so keen on extracting surplus from their region without
considering their interest that series of anti – oil protests have occurred in the region. Thus, this
study is necessitated by need to situate the protest in the region. In historical perspective. In
doing this, an analysis of the causes of the protests is undertaken. In line with this, what appears
to be federal government’s response to these protests are highlighted and discussed. Our
conclusion emphasizes the need for consensus building as well as participatory approach to
conflict resolution in the region.
Anti – oil protests in Nigeria: an appraisal
Opinion is divided on the causes and nature of anti – oil protest in the Niger – delta.
Various scholars have approached the issue based on their idiosyncrasies and perceptions as well
as ideological positions.Frynas has attempted to distill these conflicting perceptions of the causes
of the crises in the region.3 According to him, Ken Saro – Wiwa saw the struggle as a quest for
self determination.Naanem
4
and Osaghea
5
portrayed the crisis as a struggle against
colonialism and minority agitation for a fair deal in a negatively skewed federal. While it could
be taken for granted that these various positions have sharpened our grasp of the subject –
matter, nevertheless, the point must be made that a mono – causal explanation of reality is at
variance with historical events because, this could blur the intricacies, complexities as well a
dialectal inter – play of the various issues at satke.6 The issue of dashed hopes and unfulfilled
promises, which earlier scholars seem to have glossed over, are given adequate attention in this
study.
At the onset of the oil industry, the people of the Niger delta bubbled with expectation;
they were highly enthused as to be prospect of the transformation of their region.7 Their hope
was robust, as this was ignited by promises of gainful employment, provision of basic amenities,
better quality of life and assurance of establishment of cottage industries that would employ their
sons and daughters.8 To be sure , the oil industry made a dozen barrel of promises; raised the
expectation of the people to an unprecedented height. This optimism, probably explains the
initial warm and convial disposition of the people of the region to the oil firms.
Without a prospect for the transformation of their lives, the people of the oil – rich Niger
delta could not have given such unfettered reception to the oil industry, having earlier been
hoodwinked by colonial masters. 9 With time, the people discovered to their chagrin that, the
industry was not committed to fulfilling the promises made to the people. There is an explosion
in the number of youths who have obtained higher education who, as it were, feel they should be
absorbed as pledged by the oil firms and the federal government. The local elite seem not to have
access to plump jobs in the oil industry. Rather, the major ethnic groups appear to have hijacked
the oil industry.10 Besides, it is claimed that the revenue from the region has been used to
transform such cities like Lagos, Abuja, Kaduna, Port Harcourt and Enugu. The people of the
Niger delta have always referred to these cities as Inoko.11 It is not out of place to stress that, it is
the combination of the educated elite,; angry unemployed youths and their parents, frustrated by
diminishing opportunities in the oil industry, as well as the stagnant development in the region
that seems to be the plausible underlying factors in the anti – oil protests in the Niger delta.
A corollary to the above is the issue of gross poverty in the Niger delta. Despite the vast
oil wealth of region, the people are desperately poor and the region is generally underdeveloped.
It can be argued that poverty is a general phenomenon in Nigeria. Nevertheless, when viewed
from the perspective of the stupendous wealth in the region, it is paradoxical that poverty is
widespread – a situation that contrast sharply with developments in other oil – bearing nations in
the Middle East. Consequently, the people in the Niger delta have accused the federal
government of expropriating their
_____________________
2.
On the environmental series in the Niger Delta, see amongst other Ashton Jones, the
human ecosystem of the Niger Delta (Benin – City environmental rights action, 1998);
world bank, defining an environmental development strategy for the Niger Delta
(industry and operations division, west central Africa department, world bank,
Washington, dc), vol, 1, Annex m. 1995.
3.
Frynas, G.J., ‘corporate and state response to anti oil protest in the Niger Delta’, African
affairs, 100, 2001, pp. 27- 54.
4.
Naanen, B. ‘oil producing minorities and the structure of the Nigeria federalism: the case
of Ogoni people’, the journal of commonwealth and comparative politics, vol., 33. No. 1.
1995, pp. 46 – 78.
5.
Osaghae, E. ‘the Ogoni uprising, oil politics, minority agitation and the future of the
Nigerian state’, journal of modern African studies, 98, 1997.
6.
Afigbo, A.E., ‘facts and myths in Nigerian historiography’, Nigerian magazine, vol.,
122-123, 1997, pp. 81 -98.
7.
Oral interview, chief napoleon Egbedi, Illuelogbo, 22/12 /1998.
8.
Ibid.
9.
Aghalino, S.O., ‘oil and gas exploration and production in the Isoko – Urhobo area of
delta state, Nigeria, 1958 – 1995’ (unpublished Ph.D thesis, university of Ilorin, Nigeria,
1999,). See mostly chapter three.
10.
Oral interview, Chief Pender Okoro, warns. 26/12/1998.
11.
For details, see Nigeria’s oil and gas monthly, December 28, 1996.
resources without due competition. To them, oil is hemlock.12 Gross national product per capital
in the region is below the national average of US$ 280.13 Indeed, unemployment is high and the
rate of school enrolment is very low because teachers cannot be attracted to live in waterlogged
communities that lack social amenities such as Roads, electricity and potable water. The poverty
level of the people is compounded by the high cost of living caused partly by presence of highly
paid oil workers living in close proximity with poor folks in the oil – bearing enclaves.14 The
congruence of wealth and poverty living closely typified so pathetically the situation described
by Charles dickens in his fictionalized account of the immediate background to the French
revolution of 1789 in his tale of two cities.15
That the people of Niger Delta appeared to have been docile at the beginning of the
activities of the oil industry, was probably also informed by lack of awareness of the possible
negative impact of the oil industry. The early 1980’s were notorious for incessant oil spillages
that occurred in the Niger Delta. Environmental damages such as through oil spills or seismic
studies also aggravated existing disaffection or created new ones.16 As oil production intensified,
so also did oil spills and environmental deterioration. This as it were, impacted on the people
negatively as their sources of livelihood were seriously undermined. According to the
department of petroleum resources, between 1970 and 1996, a total of 4,835 incidents of oil
spillages occurred in Nigeria. Out of the 2.4 million of oil spilled only 0.55 million barrels of oil
were recovered, leaving a net loss to the environment of 1.8 million barrels. Available record for
the period also indicate that approximately, 6 per cent, 25 per cent and 69 per cent, respectively,
that oil spilled in the Niger Delta area were in land, swamp and offshore ecological beds.17
Undoubtedly, as a consequence of the cumulative adverse effects of oil operation on
people and because of the increased oil activities from the 1980s, the prospect of conflict
between the people of oil producing communities and the federal government was intensified.18
One issue, which appeared to have spurred anti – oil protests in the Niger – Delta, is the question
of derivation as a revenue allocation formula. Suberu opined that ‘derivation means that a fixed
proportion of revenue collected in a local area should be retained in that area’.19 For the people
of the Niger Delta, their grouse with the government is that a significance proportion of oil
revenue should be returned to their areas on the basis of derivation principle. In the decade
following independence, derivation played an important role in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. It
would appear that as federal budgets were becoming increasingly dependent on oil revenue, the
oil – bearing regions and later states were allocated a small proportion of locally collected
revenues ( see table 1 below). Apart from the 1968. Dina commission which gave derivation a
third place, others took derivation off the list of principle.20 The weight accorded the principle of
derivation appears to have been determined by the interest of the factions of the ruling class.
The table below is explicit on the alarming reduction of the derivation principle as a
revenue allocation principle. At independence in 1960, the oil producing communities were
receiving 50 percent as their share of petroleum proceeds, while the federal government and
distributable pool were 20 percent and 30 percent respectively. Between 1967 and 1969, it was
50 percent for the states and 50 percent for the federal government. As at 1975, the derivation
principle was seriously tinkered with, as reflected in the reduction of proceeds to states to 20
percent minus offshore proceeds. In contrast to this, a mouth – watering 80 percent accrued to
the federal government in addition to offshore proceeds. In the two years of 1979 – 81, oil –
producing states made do with no proceeds to them by way of derivation.
Indeed, in the 1999 constitution, it was conceded that 13 percent of the federal revenue
should be distributed to the oil – bearing states on the basis of derivation.21 The point to note is
that, ordinarily, it is expected that between 1960 and 1975 when the principle of derivation
favoured the oil – producing region, there should have been some remarkable social and
economic transformation of the oil – producing areas. This was not the case however. A clear
pointer to disaffection in this period was the aggressive clamour for compensation from the
government and the oil firms as epitomized by the Isaac Adaka Boro’s insurrection. The lack of
development of the region could be explained by the power configuration in the area at this point
in time as well as the civil war, which ravage
_____________________
12 See the Ogoni bill of rights presented to the government and people of Nigeria, (port
Harcourt, 1991).
13 See world bank findings, African region, no. 53, December 1995; Gbadegesin, a. ‘the
impact of oil exploration and production on the environment: implication for peasant
agriculture’, in Adewumi, F. (ed), oil exploration and exploitation: the state and crises in
Nigeria’s oil – bearing enclave, (Lagos; Friedrich Ebert foundation, 1998); Ashton Jones,
the human ecosystem…
14 Oil times, (Lagos), June, 2000. p. 23.
15 For an admirable discussion of this comparison, see the guardian on Sunday, (Lagos),
June 11, 2000.
16 Osaghe, E. ‘the Ogoni uprising, oil politics, minority agitation… pp.. 332 – 339.
17 Department of petroleum resources, cited in Nigerian tribune, (Ibadan), Tuesday 17 June,
2001.
18 Frynas, G.F. ‘corporate and state response to anti oil protests in the Niger Delta’…
19 Suberu, R.T., ethnic minority conflict and governance in Nigeria.Ibadan: spectrum,
1996), 29 – 31.
20 For details, see Mbanefo, G.F. 1993. Unsettled issues in Nigeria’s federalism and the
national question, in Nigerian economic society, the national question and economic
development in Nigeria. (Ibadan: Nigerian economic society, 1993) p. 73; Mbanefo, G.F.
and Egwaikhide, F.O. revenue allocation in Nigeria: derivation principle revisited, in
Kunle Amuwo, federalism and restructuring in Nigeria, (Ibadan: spectrum books, 1998).
21 See section 162 of the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria (Lagos: federal
government printer).
the region. Again, during this period no special fund was set aside for the sole development of
the oil – producing region as such, development programmes were haphazard.
Table 1. Federal – state % share in petroleum proceeds, 1960 – 1999
Year
Producing state
Federal
Distributable
government
pool
1
1960 – 67
50
20
30
2
1967 -69
50
50
-
3
1969 -71
45
55
4
1971-75
45 minus offshore 55 plus offshore proceeds
5
1975 -79
--
proceeds
20 minus offshore 80 plus offshore proceeds
proceeds
100
6
1979 -81
-
7
1982- 92
1 and half minus 98 and half plus offshore proceeds
8
1992 -99
3
minus
proceeds
9
1999 -
-
offshore proceeds
offshore 97 plus offshore proceeds
13 minus offshore 87 plus offshore proceeds
proceeds
Source: Itse of oil communities; oil times, June 2000, p. 23.
To be sure, the derivation principle has been prominent in the debate on the national
question because a significant opinion, especially, but ‘not only in the oil producing states,
supports, the priority of the derivation principle’.22 The significant support for the derivation
principle may not be unconnected with the drive for the exploitation of solid minerals, which are
found virtually in every part of Nigeria. In any case, there has been an aggressive drive for the
exploration of oil in the northern part of Nigeria. The support therefore, is nothing altruistic;
rather it is a proactive response to am future windfall from oil.
Perhaps, it should be added that, until the establishment of the national revenue
mobilization, allocation and fiscal commission in 1988, set up to review periodically the revenue
allocation principle for sharing the federation account revenue among the three tiers of
government, revenue allocation was based on ad-hoc arrangement through revenue allocation
commission and committee.23 In point of fact, the statutory distribution of revenue from the
federation account had been controversial as well as contentious. The political Bureau report of
1987 observed that the issue is commission or decree under different regimes since 1964 has
gained general acceptability among the component unit of the country.24 The report also
observed that the issue of revenue allocation and to 0be specific, derivation had been essentially
a political rather than economic tool. Whosoever is in charge introduces a formula that best
serves his interest.
To be sure, when the British administered the country initially form proceeds from oil
palm, derivation was not given prominence. But when groundnuts and tin from the north and
cocoa and rubber from the west became the major earner of revenue, derivation, ‘was catapulted
into a major criterion for the allocation’,
25
thus underscoring the linkage between regional
control of the political process and the dominant criteria for revenue allocation at any given time.
This linkage was further underscored when, following the increasing importance of petroleum
derived mainly from the Niger delta, as a revenue yielding source, derivation was deemphasized.
It is instructive to note that, the exclusive federal jurisdiction over natural resources applies only
to oil and gas, and not to cocoa, palm oil, hides, skin and solid mineral. Understandably, this
appears to be the main reason for the agitation of the people of the Niger Delta. 26 In some sense,
the oil wealth of the Niger delta appears to be a curse. But a scrutiny of the dialectical inters –
play of the issue will reveal wealth is not a curse in itself. Rather, it is duality of wealth and
misery that bring into perspective the causes of anti – oil protest in the Niger – delta region of
Nigeria.
More than anything else, the land question appears to be a sore – point in the tripartite
relationship between the oil – bearing communities, the oil companies and the federal
government. The land use Act of 1978 redefined the legal position on land ownership in Nigeria
by vesting the ownership of all land within a state in the state governor. Section 28 of the land
use act stipulates that the state governor could revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public
interest which includes ‘requirement of land for mining purposes or oil pipeline or for any
purpose connected therewith.27 The land use Act seems to have impacted negatively on the
people of the Niger delta. For one, oil – bearing communities lost their right to question the
incursion of oil firms into their land. Again, they were no more entitling to compensation for the
acquisition of their land, safe of course, for the surface use of the land. Understandably, the
payment of
____________
22.
Fashina,O., ‘reflections on the national question’, in campaign for the defense of human
rights (CDHR), Ken Saro – Wiwa and the crises of the Nigerian state, (Lagos: CDHR,
1999), p.93.
23.
See Ekuerhare B.; principles of justice, fairness and equity in relation to federalism and
revenue allocation in Nigeria; the Ruhono voice, (Lagos) July 2, 2001, p. 2.
24.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, the report of the political Bureau (Lagos government printer,
1987).
25.
Ibid.
26.
The guardian, (; Lagos), April 8, 200; the guardian, Lagos, April 9, 2001.
27.
See the land use act.
compensations to the state governors rather than to land owners escalated disaffection with the
government and hence, the spate of protests in the Niger Delta. Indeed, a clear manifestation of
the potency of the land question is seen in the Kaiama declaration of the all Ijaw youth
conference of December 1998, which raised the land question to the level of a political
manifesto. After reviewing the long history of the plunder of Ijaw (Niger Delta) oil wealth the
declaration asserted that ‘all land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the
Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of their survival’.28 The unambiguous
phrasing of the demands must have set the tone and direction of the agitation for resource
ownership and control.29
In line with the Kaiama declaration, the conference of the union of the Niger Delta, an
amalgam of different ethnic minority organizations in the Niger Delta, called early 2000, for ‘the
immediate abrogation of the land use Act’,30 from the stringent opposition to the land – use –
Act, it is clear that it is an unpopular enactment. This is so because, it is not only insensitive to
the demand of the various groups that are agitating for control over their land and resources, but,
a clear demonstration of continuing federal domination of the states, without doubt, this would
continue to generate pressure and conflict, unless of course, this unpopular enactment is
reversed.31 To be sure, there is ample evidence to suggest that the frosty relationship between the
government and oil producing communities could be blamed largely on the compulsory
acquisition of land and subsequent low compensation for surface rights over land.
It would appear that discontentment in the Niger Delta is driven by interlocking historical
factors. The people in this region have had a chequered history over time. It started with the
political and economic manipulation by the British, regional, federal and later states governments
in the allocation and distribution of revenue. This perception has spanned generations. Thus, the
feeling of betrayal is deep – seated. It is worth reiterating that the Niger Delta has been of
strategic importance to Nigeria yet, this has not been met with commensurate development of the
region.
The point must be made that the increasing wave of community unrest and protests,
which increased in the 1990’s at the behest of the movement for the survival of Ogoni people
(MOSOP), and later snowballed to other parts of the Niger Delta, are clear manifestations of
discontentment with the operations of the oil firms, as well as federal government negligence of
the oil – bearing enclaves. Perhaps, it should be added that the actions of the people are far from
new, although, the amount of publicity and international attention given them be speaks a new
sophistication,32 in all, the demand of the people illustrates the interplay of politics, economics,
and ethnicity within a context increasingly shaped both by access to international media and
rights concepts. The 1990’s recorded the worst cases of disturbances to oil operations. Shell for
example, claimed that the number of community disturbances increased five – fold from 39
incidents in 1989 to 160 in 1993.33 The recourse to protests and disruption of oil industry
operations would seem to explain the hopelessness of seeking redress through litigation.
Federal government concessions to the people of the Niger Delta
The rentier character of the Nigerian state is such that, it has been more concerned with
its predatory role as a passive recipient of petrol – dollar, than with any serious concern for the
welfare of the people of in the oil producing communities. This is not to say however, that the
federal government has not done anything to alleviate the problems of the oil producing
communities. To be sure, the government has so far adopted the strategy of the carrot and stick,
in combating the crises in the Niger Delta. Certainly the government has put in place some
policy measures after it had been prodded into action by increasing wave of protests. The point
must be made from the onset that it is difficult to fault the government at the level of intentions
as the issues are concerned. But intention is one thing, while actual performance is another.
The first major attempt at redressing the problems of the oil producing communities was
the establishment of Niger Delta development board (NDDB) in 1961.34 It was established
essentially to tackle the developmental problems of the depressed areas of the Niger Delta. The
board was also responsible for advising the government with respect to the physical development
of the Niger Delta. When the board became operational, its immediate pre – occupation was the
carrying out of a comprehensive survey of the development potential of region. Even before the
commencement of the board, the federal government had commission the Netherlands
engineering development company (NEDECO) to carry out a preliminary survey of the region.35
This was done probably to demonstrate the commitment of government to the development of
area. By way of achievement, the board was successful in initiating the clearing of creeks. For
example, during the 1965/66 periods, seven
28
This day, (Lagos), January 16, 1999, p. 14.s
29
See the guardian (Lagos), Monday April 9, 20001.
30
Frynas, G.F., corporate and state response to anti oil protest in the Niger Delta… see also
the vanguard, (Lagos), march 6, 2000.s
31
Ihonvbere, J. ‘a recipe for perpetual crises: the Nigerian state and the Niger Delta
question’, in CDHR, Boiling point, (CDHR; Lagos, 2001), pp. 73 – 109.
32
Welch, E.W. 1995 ‘the Ogoni and self determination: increase violence in Nigeria’ the
journal of modern African studies, 33, 4, 1995, pp. 635 – 649.
33
Shell, cited Frynas, G.F., ‘political instability and business focus on shell in Nigeria’,
third world quarterly, volume 19, no. 3, 1998, pp. 457 -478.
34
Niger Delta development board act, 1961.
35
For details, see Netherlands engineering development company, 1960; Niger Delta
development board annual reports, 1961 – 1962 and Ikporukpo, co. ‘planning and
transformation of petroleum regions: the experience of the Niger Delta’, the Nigerian
geographical journal, volume 24, nos. 1 – 2, 1981, pp. 119 – 129.
creeks a total of 171 kilometers in length were cleared. In the same period, about 2,406 trees
were trimmed from various riverbanks and snags were blasted. It would appear that the greatest
achievement of the board was its provision of wide ranging planning information. Such
information, in certain cases, formed the basis of the various projects initiated by the body.
In terms of direct impact on the development of the Niger Delta, the board performed
below the people’s expectation. Ikorukpo opined that ‘there was little or no d direct interaction
between the board and the people being planned for.36 While this may be an extreme comment, it
is possible that the commission must have assumed knowledge of the problems of the area based
on their extensive survey of the de velopment potentials of the Niger Delta. Nevertheless, a fall
out from this top – down approach was that, most projects were conceived and executed without
involvement of the inhabitants of the area. More importantly, the undue politicization of the
board denied it the degree of support it required to register its impact.37 expectedly, the board
was engulfed in federal and regional power intrigues and subsequently it was “killed”.
It was probably the failure of the NDDB that facilitated the establishment of the Niger
Delta basin development authority, along with other basin authorities through decree; No. 37 of
1976. While the terms of reference of the basin authority were unequivocal, yet it failed to
incorporate provision of infrastructures and restitution of derelict land in the Niger Delta.
38
Besides, the authority was starved of funds as budgetary allocations were either too meager or
were slow in coming. Indeed, the little funds in the coffers of the authority were grossly
mismanaged.39 It was because of the clear manifestation of potential threat to national security
by anti oil protesters that some serious attention was paid to the Niger Delta question. In 1986,
the 1.5 per cent find was put in place under the allocation of revenue (federation accounts). To
disburse this find, a committee was set up, (oil mineral producing areas development fund
committee). The committee could not do much because its activities were halted by a Supreme
Court judgment.40 More importantly; the money set aside for the committee was forwarded to the
state capitals and never got to the affected oil producing communities.41
What seems to be the boldest? Attempt at tackling the Niger crisis was the establishment
of the oil mineral producing areas development commission (OMPADEC). The OMPADEC was
established through decree no 23 of 19th July 1992.42 This decree raised the limit of the
derivation fund to 3 per cent of the federation account. Section 11 of the decree which set out its
objectives, empowered the commission among other things to: receive and administer the
monthly sums from the allocation of the federal government account in accordance with
confirmed ratio of oil production in each state for the rehabilitation and development of oil
mineral producing areas; for the tackling of ecological problems that have arisen from the
exploration of oil minerals. The administrative structure of the commission showed a radical
departure from earlier boards. This was possibly to stem the feeling of “alienation and to involve
the people in deciding what projects were necessary for them”, 43 this was perhaps also due to the
need to avoid the top – down approach of earlier boards, which resulted in poor performance. By
1993, barely a year after its inauguration, OMPADEC published a list of 78 projects embarked
upon as part of phase one of its activities. The list include: 63 projects in rivers state, 13 for delta
and one each for Akwa – Ibom and Abia states. By 1996, the list had risen to 1,182, covering a
wide range of activities such as provision of pipe borne water, roads, electrification and
hospitals.
It was reported that the commission received a total of N11.5 billion between 1992 and
1996 when its operations was suspended. This means that, the commission received a yearly
average of N3 billion or N250 million per month.44 On face value; it would appear that the
development on ground contrast with the amount of money released for the commission. Be that
as it may. We must quickly add that the performance of OMPADEC is a subject of heated
debate.45 It would appear that those who benefited from the commission lauded its activities,
while communities that failed to realize anything substantial from it poured a lot of vituperation
on it. One area that drew the ire of some critic was the way contract were indiscriminately
awarded46. It was alleged that contracts awarded by the commission failed to satisfy the
conditions laid down by government. The high level of corruption in the commission probably
explains why it was so insolvent that, at a time, it was indebted to the tune of N2.3 billion47.
In the face of copious corruption and mismanagement of funds, the federal government
instituted an investigation into its activities in 1996. The sordid finding culminated in the sacking
of the chairman of OPMADEC, A.K. Horsefall, in December1996. The appointment of Eric
Opia to replace Horsefall failed to assuage matters. Rather, Opia’s penchant for looting
______________________
36
Ikporukpo, co. ‘planning and transformation of problem regions…. P. 124.
37
See West Africa 23 August, 1958, and Aghalino, S.O. ‘institutional approach to the
development of the oil – bearing enclave in Nigeria: the OMPADEC example’,
forthcoming in Kiabara: journal of humanities, volume 8, and number 2, 2002.
38
For details, see Aghalino, So. ‘Petroleum exploitation and the agitation for compensation
by oil mineral producing communities in Nigeria’ in Geostudies forum, volume 1,
number 1 & 2, 2000, pp. 11 – 19.
39
Egborge, A.B.M. ‘environment and sustainable development’ paper presented at the
Urhobo economic summit, held at the petroleum training institute, Effurum, 1998, p.5.
40
OMPADEC Quarterly report, volume, 1, no., 1 October 1993.
41
The observer (Benin City) June 15, 1990.
42
OMPADEC Decree no. 23. 1992 (Lagos: federal government printer).
43
Akinleye, R.T. 1998 ‘institutional approach to the environmental problems of the Niger
Delta. In Osuntokun, a. (ed) current issues in Nigerian environment (ibadan: Davidson
press) p. 84.
44
The guardian, (Lagos) 22 January, 1997; the vanguard, (Lagos) 25 June 1996.
45
Aghalino, S.O. institutional approach to the development of the oil bearing enclave in
Nigeria…
46
Oral interview: Mr. Endow J. Zorro, 22/12/1998.
47
See daily times, (Lagos) 17 march, 1996.
Public fund surpassed that of Horse fall .48 Consequently, Opia was again sacked in 1998, when
he could not account for the sum of N6. 7 billion that accrued to the commission. In due course,
OMPADEC was restructured under the chairmanship of vice-Admiral Omatsola before its
activities were liquidated.49
On the political
front; it seems the Federal government has conceded much to the
people of the Niger Delta. As a plausible conciliatory to the ljaw ethnic nationality, Bayelsa
state was created out of the then Rivers state. This concession was also extended to the lsoko,
kwale and the ltsekiri when their yearning for aspirate state crystallized in 1991 with the creation
of Delta state from the then Bendel state. The point to note is that ideally, state were created to
facilitate grassroots development as well as to
eliminate majority domination.50
But
experience in the Niger Delta has shown that creation of state and Local Governments
has led to the distortion of the fragile peace in the region. This is blamed on the face that there
is always incessant agitation on location and re-location of state Local government Headquarters
as well as the ethnic configuration of such state and local governments. This situation more often
than not led to fratricidal crisis in the region as optimized by the ljaw ltsekiri crisis and the
Urhobo ltsekiri impasse.51
Earlier on, the point was stressed that the federal government conceded 13 percent of
Federal Allocation by way of derivation to oil mineral producing states. However, it must noted
that dispute resulted between the Federal government and southern state governors over
the method of calculating and distributing the derivation fund
52.
In the mean time, the
demand of the people in the Niger Delta increased. At a meeting in Benin city in July 2000,
the Governors of the six oil producing state, called for the 100 percent control of their state
natural
resources
and
in
return to pay a contribution
Government .53 This new position
there
from to the Federal
played with 13 percent derivation fund. It is
even
now clear that the Federal Government is still not complying with constitution al privation
that a minimum of 13 percent must be paid as derivation in any revenue formula.
54
That
Federal Government would appear to have sought to whittle down this provision by
applying a non –existent law
offshore and onshore
dichotomy in the
payment of the
derivation fund. A lot of criticisms have greeted the Federal Government’s stance on the
onshore /offshore
Dichotomy To a point, the federal government position and insistence on the onshore offshore
dichotomy stretched the polity to elastic limit as it threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria.
possibly as a face saving device , the Federal Government such the oil producing south
ere states Government at the supreme court over the right to revenue from offshore
oil
55
In the landmark April 5, 2002
the federal government, when it insisted
judgment the supreme court ruled in favor of
that the low water mark is the boundary of littoral
state.56
In what seemed to be a major frontal attack on the festering Niger-Delta problem,
the federal Government under chief Olusegun Obasanjo initiated a bill to the National
Assembly on the restoration of the Niger Delta. The National Assembly in accordance
with section 58 (a ) and 5 of the 1999 constitution subsequently passed the bill, the
Niger-Delta Development commission (NDDC), after the president refused to assent to the
bill. As it were, there was disagreement between the presidency and the National Assembly on
the finding of the commission. The National Assembly claimed to have acted in the national
interest by overriding the presidency in passing the bill. 57 possible to guard against the
weakness of
OMPADEC, the NDDC
Act provides
for
special bodes to supervise the
activities of the commission in order to avoid waste and corruption. These bodies
the management
advice and
committee, made up of
monitor
its activities .58
facilitating interaction among all
include
governor of member state of the commission to
The
development
commission is to be at the
forefront of
stakeholders and identifying priorities and
approaches for Niger-Delta development. Its responsibility for the sustainable development
of the area confers on it, the onerous task of mobilizing resources, effort and initiatives to ensure
effective coordination, and coherence. Implicitly, the NDDC also has embarked function to
ensure that regulation and policies are observed and, it is takes to ensure that the process involve
in its function are participatory and inclusive.
Since inception the NDDC has embarked on systematic effort to put in place enduring
institution and operational mechanisms which will consolidate its take-off, in order to prevent the
mistake of the past. It has commissioned consultancies to draw up administrative and financial
guidelines. Which are now completed? Preliminary work has been completed to initiate the
biding process for the proposed master plan of the Niger-Delta. In the mean time however. An
interim. Plan which incorporate the many on –going and other project that are of priority to the
Niger Delta, is being put together for immediate implementation. The plan also
______________________
48
.Aghalino, S.O.Institutional Approach to the Development of the oil –bearing Enclaves…
49
Post Express, 2 October, 1998.
50
Danmole. HO. And Aghalion. S. o. ‘ The military and creation of state in Nigeria,
1967-1991
51
‘.in Danmole, H.O.(ed.) contemporary issues in
Nigerian Affairs (Ibadan. Squad publishers, 1995), pp. 16-23
for details, see Human
Right watch, The price of oil (Washington D.C. Human Rights watch, 1999), p. 120.
52
The Guardian, (Lagos). 13 &14, June 2000.
53
The Guardian, Lagos, 16 July, 2000
54
See section 162 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
55
The Guardian Lagos, August 6,2001
56
A lot of eroticism greeted the Supreme Court judgment. Possible to avoid further heating
of the polity, the federal government set up a committee headed by the then minister for
works, Chief Anthony Anene to work out a political solution to the festering crisis. It
would appear a compromise was reached with the government to the oil rich solution
state on the issue.
57
The Guardian, Lagos, June 13,2000
58
For details, see the NDDC act especially section 2, 3, 4,9,11 and 19.
. Incorporate a number of projects abandoned by OMPADEC, the immediate past cursor of the
NDDC.59 While we cannot assess the NDDC post-haste, suffice it to say, that it is still essentially
an idea on paper as far as its immediate constituency is concerned. The commission is not yet a
reality until it begins the urgent work of turning the fortunes of the Niger-Delta around. Perhaps
the greatest challenge it face is how to exorcise the ubiquitous ghost of OMPADEC,
which lake the NDDC, started with a lot of promises but derailed and, it is today, an
acronym ‘ drenched in infamy’60
The point must be made that, if past experience
is anything to go by the federal
Government does not need to setup commissions to address the Niger-Delta crisis. Certainly no
commission is needed by the federal Government to direct the oil firms to give preference is
to the indigenes of the Niger-Delta in the recruitment drive of the Federal Government
and the oil firms. For example, the Federal Government massively developed Lagos, with out
recourse to a commission. The federal government has spent billions of naira checking the ocean
surge in Victoria Island, Lagos, without recourse to a commission. What, perhaps is needed, is
political good will devoid of intrigues and power – play between the federal government and the
oil – bearing states governments. Meanwhile, through a subtle process of social engineering and
re – orientation, the Obasanjo government seems to be making conscious efforts to promote
reconciliation and re – integration of excluded, estranged and aggrieved people of the oil –
bearing enclave into the mainstream of Nigeria’s national development.
From time to time, when the federal government is obfuscated, it had resorted to
intimidation, harassment and high handedness, in responding to the crisis in the Niger Delta.
This pattern of response, otherwise referred to as the ‘stick’ approach, is the subject of our
subsequent discussion. While it is arguable that the federal government has demonstrated a clear
attempt to positively attend to the problems emanating from oil exploration and production, it
has in most cases, responded to the crisis through the use of instruments of state violence to
harass agitators and environmental whistle – blowers in the region. Some example will suffice
here. In October 1992, the people of Umuechem in rivers state protested against shell petroleum
Development Company, on the grounds of discrimination in the employment of even unskilled
workers and due also, to the absence of basic amenities in their community. The protest, which
was initially peaceful, became violent when the SPDC brought in mobile police squad. The end
result was tragic for the people of Umuechem when on November 1, the whole community was
razed to the ground with their traditional ruler and others, gunned down while a hundred others
were either maimed, raped or assaulted.61 This pattern of response was replicated for the Ilaje
people. On May 25, 1998, a number of Ilaje people in Ondo state started a peaceful
demonstration when all efforts to have a meaningful dialogue with Chevron and the government
failed. On 28 may, three helicopters loaded with soldiers came to the barge where Ilaje
representatives were waiting for Chevron’s team. The soldiers started shooting before the
helicopter even landed to disperse the people. A number of causalities were recorded.62
More recent protests have also been met by state violence as exemplified by the Kaiama
and Odi episodes. The Kaiama protest was non – violent yet, dozens of anti – oil protesters were
killed and their houses burnt by the Nigeria security forces in December 1998.63 It must be noted
that the response of the Nigeria state has always been brutal. This was classically demonstrated
by the extra – judicial killing of a human right and environmental activist, Ken Saro – Wiwa, and
eight other Ogoni leaders, an act, which is linked to anti – oil protests in the Niger – Delta.64 On
balance, it would appear that the positive response of the federal government is prodded into
doing something to assuage the grave injustices perpetrated against the people of the Niger
Delta. This position is predicated on the fact that the federal government’s concession and
responses are fire – brigade approaches to taming an intractable problem.
Conclusion
In this paper, attempt has been made to discern the palpable causes of anti – oil protests in the
Niger – Delta. The point has been made that a number of interrelated factors account for this.
These include poverty, environmental degradation and lopsided government legislation as they
affect the oil industry. The fact that the people of the region have suffered gross neglect and
deprivation over time despite the region’s monumental contribution to the economic prosperity
of Nigeria is a pointer to their disaffection. This in turn, has bred a frustrated population, ethnic
polarization and anti – establishment hostility and violent agitation for compensations. The
federal government was prodded into action exemplified by the establishment of several agencies
and commissions. The OMPADEC which appeared to be a radical solution to the restiveness in
the Niger Delta could not do much due in part to institutionalized corruption, government
meddlesomeness and under – funding. The present civilian administration has also initiated the
NDDC. It is too early to assess the performance of the NDDC. But if signals from it are anything
ton go by, there is little prospect that it would achieve its objectives. This bleak prognosis is
hinged on the fact that, the menace of inertia and government’s is foot – dragging in releasing
funds would seem to be at play again. It is gratifying however; that the government has assured
the people of the Niger delta that the NDDC will not go the way of the OMPADEC.65
_________________
59
The post express, December 11, 2001.
60
The guardian, Lagos, august 29, 2001, p. 51.
61
Akaruese, l. ‘crisis in oil yielding communities: causes and dimension’, in campaigning
for the defense of human rights (CDRH), Ken Saro – Wiwa and the crises of the Nigerian
state, (Lagos: CDRH, 1998), p. 120.
62
Environmental right action, environmental testimonies, (Benin City: era, 1998), pp. 22 –
25
63
Frynas, G.J. ‘corporate and state response’ …. P. 49.
64
Environmental rights action, environmental testimonies, p. 25.
65
See the daily times, (Lagos) December 11, 2001; the comet, (Lagos) December 11, 2001.
It is observed that peace has eluded the Niger delta not necessarily because there has nit
been developmental initiative by the federal government, but most of these initiatives are
cosmetic – they are mere guilt assuaging projects, which does not satisfy the yearnings of the
people. In that the issues causing disaffection cannot be wished away. Rather, it must be
acknowledged that restiveness and protests can only be arrested if the identified irregularities and
perceived injustices are confronted headlong and redressed. Besides, important physical
infrastructure needs to be developed to tackle the enormous topographical difficulties of the
region. As observed by seize, ‘long term stability in the region will only be attained when oil
producing communities feel that they have adequate benefits for each barrel of oil produced from
their land’.66 with the wave of awareness, anything short of this, would spell further upheaval in
the Niger delta with a consequent disastrous impact on the petroleum industry. In every day
interaction between the oil firms and the host communities, conflict are inevitable as such, there
is therefore need for consensus building as well as participatory approach to conflict resolution in
the Niger Delta.
___________________
66.
Soeze, C.’Niger Delta and the way forward,’ the Urhobo voice. December 3, 2000,
p.11.
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA, 1914-1999
S.O. Aghalino
Abstract:
This article examines the intractable problem of constitutional engineering in
Nigeria. It is asserted that the drafting of constitutions is a recurring decimal in
Nigeria’s chequered political history. Right from the colonial period, Nigerians
were barely involved in the art of constitution making while the British colonial
overlords employed constitution making to consolidate their imperial strategies.
Post colonial Nigerian leaders have utilized constitution drafting to ensure regime
longevity. The current 1999 constitution is a product of haste because the receding
military junta was in a hurry to leave the political turf. Consequently, the 1999
constitution has all the trappings of military centralization of power resulting in
de-federalization of Nigeria and the consequent clamour and agitation for the
amendment of the constitution.
Introduction:
The drafting of constitutions has been a recurring decimal in the political
history of Nigeria. Right from the colonial period, Nigeria has witnessed incessant
clamour for one form of constitution or the other. The series of constitutions that
were put in place during the colonial period were geared towards consolidating
British imperial strategies.
____________________________
1 Senior Lecturer, department of History, University of Ilorin, Nigeria
Dynamics of Constitutional Development in Nigeria, 1914-1999
2
The point to note about colonial constitutions is that, the Nigerian people were
barely involved in the drafting process. When Nigeria was eventually de-colonised,
post-colonial constitutions reflected the idiosyncrasies and worldview prospective
leaders, with little consideration for the interests of the citizenry. This is
particularly so because post-colonial Nigerian politics has been dominated by one
ruling military junta or the other. Indeed, constitution drafting initiatives embarked
upon by successive military regimes were merely cosmetic and plastic. At best,
they were time saving devices to ensure the longevity of their regimes.
In this paper, an attempt has been made to review, albeit briefly,
constitutional development in Nigeria. While it could be taken for granted that
colonial and military constitutions have generated due attention, it appears that the
1999 Constitution which is presently in operation has not received due attention
from scholars. In this light, the bulk of our analysis will tilt towards the 1999
Constitution while assessing how earlier efforts have coloured it.
Attributes of a constitution:
The constitution of a State is that collection of rules and principles according
to which a state is governed. In other words, the Constitution refers to the
framework or the composition of a government, the structure with regards to its
organs, how power is allocated and the process by which power is exercised. 1 The
criterion which served as the basis for assigning political powers reflects the ethos
of a given society. Nevertheless, it is conventional for the present day constitutions
to reflect the composition of government and the relationships among these
institutions.
3
Second, a constitution should provide for the distribution of governmental power
over the nation’s territory. Third, and more importantly, a constitution should
provide a compendium of fundamental rights and duties of citizens including their
rights to participate in the institutions of government.2
Among the aforementioned attributes, the fundamental and inseparable
segment of the constitution is its origin from the organic will of the people who it
governs. This is referred to as in the autonomy of constitution, implying that the
people have been part of the deliberation, formulation and adoption of the
constitution, taking the heterogeneous nature of such a country as reflected in her
multi-ethnic, multi-linger and multi-religious nature.3 since the constitution must
be, logically, the original act of the people directed resulting from the exercise of
the inherent power, it becomes a binding instrument by which the sovereignty of
the people is measured. Thus, the phrase ‘we the people….hereby resolve to make
for ourselves the following constitution’, should not be dismissed as a mere
preliminary formalism because it suggests that the document is a replica of the
compendium of the people’s view and the objectives of their association. The
question that naturally arises is whether successive Nigerian constitutions contain
the above-identified salient pre-requisites for a good and durable constitution. A
close examination of the litany of constitutions in Nigeria should assist us to drive
home the point.
Constitutional development in Nigeria: A synopsis:
It is on record that until now, eight constitutions have been operated in
Nigeria. It began with the sir Frederick Lugard’s Amalgamation Report of the
1914.
4
Thereafter, there were the sir Clifford Constitution (1922); Sir Arthur Richards
Constitution (19465); Sir John Macpherson Constitution (1951), Oliver Littleton’s
Constitution (1954), the Independence Constitution (1960); the Republican
Constitution (1963) and the 1979 Constitution (1979).4 There was another draft
Constitution in 1989 prepared during the regime of former President Ibrahim
Babangida. This was never tried until general Sanni Abacha’s administration
brought about the 1994/95 constitutional Conference, which laid the foundations
for the 1999 Constitution.
The Clifford constitution, which was introduced by sir Hugh Clifford in
1922, replaced both the Legislative council of 1862 which was subsequently
enlarge in 1914, and the Nigerian council of 1914. Under the Constitution, a
Legislative Council was for the first time established for the whole of Nigeria,
which was styled as, ‘The Legislative Council of Nigeria.’5 In spite of the
embracive colouration of the Council, its jurisdiction was confined to the southern
Provinces, including the colony of Lagos, whose Legislative council was
subsequently abolished. The Legislative Council did not legislate for the Northern
Provinces but its sanction, signified by a Resolution was necessary for all its
expenditure out o 5the revenues of Nigeria in respect of those Provinces.6
The point to note is that the Nigerian Council was not created for any
altruistic motive, But rather to ‘enable the British officials obtain, in the central
exercise of their power, as much local advice and opinions as could be evoked.’
One feature of Clifford’s Constitution was that only Africans with minimum gross
income of $100 a year were eligible to vote and be voted for.7
5
This might have been a strategy to divide and rule – a fallout off the so-called
‘Indirect rule Principle’ that was in operation in colonial Nigeria. Though, this
charge cannot be easily denied, there is no written evidence that it was in
operation. The elective principle in the Constitution simulated political activities in
Lagos as in other parts of Nigeria and by extension created the leeway for the
formulation of political parties. Besides, the wide powers conferred on the
governor created a forum for unrestrained use of absolute power and this was
naturally unacceptable to Nigerian nationalists.
The disaffection caused by Clifford’s constitution invariably created the
need for another constitution. Thus, when Sir Richards became the governor of the
colony of Nigeria, he initiated moves to draft a new constitution. In March 1945,
through a Sessional Paper Number 4, the Chief Secretary to the government, sir
general whitely, initiated a motion in the Legislative Council which was passed
unanimously in the House. This motion for a new constitution gave birth to the
Richards Constitution. In this constitution there was one Legislature for the whole
of Nigeria. It also made provisions for three delineated provinces, viz – North,
West and East. There was an overwhelming African majority, but were not to be
elected in the provinces and the Central Legislative House.8 The constitution also
created three regional Assemblies. The monetary requirement noticeable in
Clifford’s Constitution was reduced in order not to disenfranchise eligible voters
and contestants for political offices. The salient feature of the Richards
Constitution is the emphasis on regionalism with its attendant negative
consequences.
6
In spite of the fact that some concessions were granted to Nigerian nationalists in
the Richards constitution, it was regarded as a divisible document. In fact, Nigerian
nationalists opposed Richards Constitution on two major pedestals. The first was
the manner and procedure by which the constitution was introduced. Second, and
most importantly, were its inherent weaknesses. Just like Clifford’s Constitution,
Nigerians were hardly given the opportunity to shape their future. The constitution
did not make provisions for the training of Nigerians in their gradual march
towards self-rule.9
Richard’s constitution could not run its full course of nine years due to the
vociferous opposition to its configurations. In order, therefore, to “rectify” the
perceived deficiencies of Richard’s Constitution, when Sir Macpherson became the
Governor of Nigeria in 1948, he decided to fashion out a new Constitution. After
much deliberations and debates of the draft constitution Macpherson Constitution
(1951) sought to impose a colonial hybrid arrangement, which had the
characteristics of both Federal and unitary legal frameworks.10 Nevertheless, it
represented a major advance from the pre-existing constitutional provisions
because it introduced majorities in the Central Legislature and the Regional Houses
of Assembly. Among other provisions of the constitution were a Central
Legislative Council, Central executive Council, Regional Executive Councils,
Regional Legislature and the establishment of the Public Service Commission. One
shortcoming of the Constitution which was conspicuously highlighted was the
establishment of a Regional Legislature. This invariably led to the emergence of
ethnic-based parties such as the National Council of Nigerians and the Cameroons,
(NCNC) Action Group,(AG) and the Northern Peoples congress, (NPC). The
acrimonious way these parties contested the elections has been duly documented.
7
Despite the fact the Macpherson Constitution represented a major constitutional
advance, yet it was unsatisfactory to Nigerian nationalists who vigorously
campaigned for its sack. Consequently, the Macpherson Constitution was set aside
and replaced by the Littleton Constitution, which laid the foundations for a
classical Federation for Nigeria. The component units of Nigeria were “separate
yet united” in their sub-economies, civil service, legislature and public services.11
The constitutional evolution of Nigeria which started in concrete terms with
the Clifford’s constitution of 1922, climaxed with the enactment of the1960
Independence constitution. The Constitution, as expected, was fashioned after the
British West Minster model. Amongst its provisions was the presence of the office
of governor-General who was the non-political Head of State, while the Prime
Minister was the Head of government. Even when Nigeria became a republic in
1963, the Republican constitution did not change this position but merely removed
the constitutional umbilical cord binding Nigeria to Britain.12
Within six years of independence, the constitution had failed, basically due
to the cracks that had started appearing within its first two years. One of the factors
that led to the collapse of the first republic was the nature of political authority
within the State. The President, who was constitutionally, the chief executive
usually, exercised his powers on the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet
Members. The West Minster model could not fit into African society where “the
leader wants to assert his authorities without restraint.”13 Expectedly, there were
‘clashes between the President and the Prime Minister, the climax of which was
the federal elections crisis of 1964.14
8
The consequent collapse of the First Republic in January 1966 and the assumption
of position of governance by the Military dealt a fundamental blow on
constitutional development in Nigeria.
It would appear that the discovery of the apparent con traditions in the
parliamentary system of government made the drafters of the 1979 Constitution to
jettison the dual system of leadership for the executive presidential system. The
Constitution Drafting committee admirably rationalized the choice of the
presidential system when it claimed that the choice was based on the need for:Effective leadership that expresses on aspiration for
national unity without at the same time building a
leviathan whose powers may be difficult to curb.15
The process and ways of curbing the powers of the President were enshrined
in the Constitution and were also rooted in the principle of separation of powers.
One fundamental innovation in the 1979 Constitution was the primacy given to
federal character principle aimed at national integration and equitable
representation of all the ethnic groups.16 The inadequacy of the federal character
principle has received due attention from scholars. A related stabilizing device in
the 19790Constitution was the prescription that political parties should not be
ethnically based. Ethnic politics was an observable feature of the First Republic. It
is difficult to accept the 1979 Constitution as a document which emanated from the
people. This is particularly so because the Constitution was not adopted by the
people through a referendum, although there was a Constituent Assembly
established through a military decree in 1977 with 230 members.
9
It is relevant to add that of this number, 20 were appointed by the government.
Other members were elected not direly by the people rather they were elected by
the local councils acting as electoral colleges.17 Clearly, a Constituent Assembly
Elected this way cannot claim to have the mandate of the people to adopt a
Constitution on their behalf.
An attempt was also made by the General Ibrahim Babangida administration
to draft a constitution for the country. Indeed, a constitution was drafted for
Nigeria. The 19089 Constitution was promulgated through Decree Number 12 of
1989.18 As things were, a Constitution review process was embedded on the
transition programme of the administration. A close scrutiny, of the modalities for
drafting the 1989 Constitution would suggest that there was adequate consultation
and had some semblance of popular participation. In reality however, the outcome
of the process turned out to be highly influenced and manipulated. At the end, one
critic stressed, “the outcome was more of political engineering than of popular
consultation and participation.”19 What is important, however, is the fact that the
provisions of the 1989 Constitution did not depart markedly from the 1979
Constitution.20
The 1999 Constitution: An Appraisal:
The Constitutional conference, which produced the 1999 Constitution, was
inaugurated in 1994 in the wake of the turmoil that greeted the annulment of the
June 12, 1993 Presidential election. Some members of the conference were
“elected” ⅓of he members of the conference. Those appointed were pliant
individuals who openly canvassed the position of the regime ofn the floor of the
Conference.
10
As was expected, the Abacha regime used its effective grip on the technical and
executive committees of the Constitutional Conference to manipulate the decisions
arrived at on the floor of the Conference. Nevertheless, the Body identified and
somehow discussed Nigeria’s problems for well over a year before it wound up.
No doubt, the Conference had an image problem, as participants were highly
discredited. Suffices to say however that, in spite of the tensed-up political
atmosphere they worked, the body brought some ideas that could lead to solving
nation’s myriad problems.
Immediately after the conference submitted its reports, the Abacha regime
appointed another Constitution review Committee (CRC) consisting of about 40
persons to “rework” the report and evidently make if in tune with the
self-succession agenda of his regime. When the CRC finished its task in 1997, its
report was further subjected to scrutiny by a group of close advisers to Generals
Abacha. The point to note is that the recourse to the drafting of constitution by the
Abacha regime, apart from securing his self-succession agenda, was merely
diversionary in order, for the regime, to consolidate its hold on the nation.
Expectedly, the regime reasoned just like Babangida initiative that, once the people
were pre-occupied with the “why and how” of constitution making, their attention
would be diverted from the monstrous policies of the regime. But the Nigerian
people did not fall for this, as they were hell-bent on subverting the Abacha
regime. In any case, General Abacha did not live long enough to actualize his
self-succession agenda s he died mysteriously in June 1998.
11
With his death, General Abdulsalam Abubakar’s regime re-invigorated the hope of
Nigerians when it became clear at the beginning that the new regime was willing to
be difficult from the high handed regime of General Abacha. This ray of optimism
was again buoyed up with the dismantling of some of the transition structures of
Abacha’s administration. The people’s positive euphoria was dimmed when
Generals Abubakar announced that his administration was willing to review
Abacha’s 1995 draft constitution with a view to its possible adoption.21
To most Nigerians, this was rather an unpopular measure. Critics insisted
that everything associated with generals Abacha should be discountenanced
including the constitution. The Abubakar administration was not receptive to this
radical posture. Instead, it raised a committee to organize a debate on the draft. The
committee was named the Constitution Debate Co-coordinating Committee.
Shades of opinion were harvested by the committee, which later submitted its
report to the government in the end of December 1998.
An overriding opinion of the “debaters” was put together. The over-riding
feeling was a preference for the 1979 Constitution. Some amendments and reviews
were recommended. The 1999 Draft Constitution was signed into Law on May 5,
1999 after an agonizing wait. It is obvious that the 1999 constitution being
practiced today was hurriedly put together. Besides, it was exclusive and devoid of
consultation and popular participation. However, it may be said that Abdulsalam’s
regime would no really harvest different shades of opinion before the 1999
Constitution was drafted is understandable.
12
The regime was in a hurry to conduct elections and relinquish power to a
democratically elected civilian administration because popular opinion was against
continuous stay of the military in politics.
Since the 1999 constitution came into force on May 29, 1999, it has been
variously dismissed as a “false” document and a mere Tokunbo (fairly used). The
preamble, which states among other things “we the people of the federal Republic
of Nigeria do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following constitution”,
amounts to a false claim.22 It would appear that this criticism is predicated on the
fact that the people of Nigeria were barely consulted before the 1999 Constitution
was enacted. Nonetheless, some salient provisions in the constitution deserve a
close study. A cursory look at the second Schedule of the Constitution which deals
with the legislative powers of the National Assembly under the executive lists
reveals that all the important sectors of the society are listed here. The import of
this is that, the ability of the State assemblies to legislate on these matters is
restricted. And to this extent, the pseudo-sovereignty of the States in the Federation
is greatly checkmated in such a way that the federal arrangement appear in reality
to be a unitary one.23 The erosion of the powers of the States is more pronounced
when Part II of the Second Schedule of the Constitution, which deals with the
concurrent powers of the federal government and the federating states, is
examined.24 section 4 (5) in clear language, gives the National Assembly express
power where there is a conflict between the laws enacted by the States Assembly
and the National assembly. This gives the impression that the States are mere
appendages of the federal government when in reality they are part of a whole.25
13
With regard to public revenue allocation, as spelt out under Section 162 of
the Constitution, the revenue allocation formula titled heavily in favour of the
federal Government. Of particular interest is in the realm of derivation. The
Constitution is succinct when it states that “The principle of derivation shall not be
less than 13 per cent of the revenue accruing to the federal Account directly from
natural sources.”26 The handling down of the percentage to be paid on derivation
negates the principle of true federalism.27 It is not surprising therefore that oil
mineral producing states have opposed the 13 percent derivation and instead are
clamouring for total control of their resources while agreeing to pay taxes to the
Federal Government.28
A corollary to this is that Item 34 on the executive Legislative List
empowers the central government to legislate on national minimum wage There is
no doubt that this is in prejudice to the disparity in conditions of service, revenue,
derivation and resources of each State. Recent events in the country clearly
demonstrate the absurdity of this Section of the constitution. Currently, there are
spates of strikes and lock-outs in virtually all the States in the country in view of
the demand for a new minimum wage which the federal government pegged at
seven thousand and five hundred Naira (about $54) for Federal workers and five
thousand and five hundred Naira for State workers (about $39). Naturally, States
should determine how much they could pay to their workers based on their
available resources. The Federal Government has no business fixing of minimum
wages for States. This perhaps haves demonstrated in bold relief, some of the
contradictions in the 1999 Constitution.
14
One area in the Constitution, which has attracted so much controversy is
Section k275, which provides that “There shall be, for any State that requires it, a
Sharia Court of Appeal.” Section 277 provides that the ‘Sharia court of appeals of
a state shall in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by
the law of the state, exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil
proceedings involving the questions of Islamic Personal Law, which the court is
competent to decide’… The Constitution no doubt recognizes the Sharia to the
extent that Section 6(3), (5) recognizes a Sharia court of appeal as a court of
superior record in Nigeria, but the constitution did not elevate Islam to a State
religion. Indeed, Section 10 of the constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria
1999 prohibits State religion.29 Thus, the foregoing provisions makes the official
launching of the adoption of the Sharia in Zamfara and Kano States to be in direct
conflict with the spirit and letter of the constitution of the Federal republic of
Nigeria, 1999.
It would appear that the authorities off the concerned States might have
relied on Section 4 (7) of the 1999 Constitution, which states: ‘The House of
Assembly of a State shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good
government of the State or any part thereof…’ Whatever be the provision of
Section 4(7), it is clear that sub-section 4(7) (e) stipulates that the State Houses of
assembly may make laws but must not contravene the provisions of the 1999
constitution.
It is noteworthy that Sharia had been operational in some parts of Northern
Nigeria even during the colonial period.30
15
It was then known as Alkali courts, now area courts. Under this system the Islamic
law was employed only in civil and personal matters. With the adoption off the
Sharia, all Muslims in the said states have to abide by the Sharia provisions in both
civil and personal matters as well as criminal matters. The adoption of the Sharia
has all the trappings of infringing on individual rights as provided for under
Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution.
Under Section 130 of the 1999 Constitution, the President is described as the
“Head of State, the chief executive of the federation and commander-in-Chief of
the Armed forces.” In addition to the monstrous and alarming executive powers
bestowed on the President; the President is empowered with legislative’ judicial
powers to alter, amend, repeal, or modify any “existing” law so as to bring the law
into conformity with the provisions of the constitution. Granted that a level-headed
President would not deliberately abuse these enormous powers but there is no
guarantee that a power-drunk President who is conscious of his powers would not
abuse them and virtually declare a reign of terror on the citizenry by displaying
dictatorial tendencies. Falana has shown that “it can be argued that what the 1999
Constitution had done is to confer all the dictatorial powers that hitherto were
exercised by the former military Heads of state on the elected President of the
Federal republic of Nigeria.”31 In a way this could be excused based on the
background of the initiators of the constitution.
The point was made earlier that the 1999 Constitution is a product of a
highly exclusive, hurried and closed process. The present clamour for its disuse
and/or review is therefore not unexpected.
16
The Constitution is widely rejected because it was imposed and it is entirely
undemocratic as such it cannot serve as the foundation for a new Nigeria. There kis
a concern and demand for a more open, legitimate and popular process of
re3viewing the Constitution. This is particularly so when it is realized that the
people’s aspirations have not been met by the 1999 Constitution. Popular
participation in constitution making is essential because it confers legitimacy on it
and by extension, makes it popular, acceptable and sovereign.
The 1999 Constitution is merely an embellishment of a unitary constitution.
It is clear that all the trappings of federalism have been eroded particularly in the
realm of the control of resources and separation of powers within the various tiers
of government. The Obasanjo regime seems to have acknowledged the deficiencies
in the 1999 Constitution. The Obasanjo regime has responded positively to
demands of Nigerians for the need to review the Constitution, hence, he set up the
Yusuf Mamman – led Constitution Review Committee. The National Assembly
appears to be working towards this direction with the setting up of its own
Committee to review the constitution. Just like earlier attempts at constitution
making, the present review process has been elitist rather than popular and much
more exclusive rather than inclusive. The Yusuf Mamman Committee appears to
be too elitist and technical to the extent that the committees sits in Abuja, the
federal Capital and calls on Nigerian people to “submit memoranda in ten (10)
copies typed in double spacing and submitted personally or by speed post or
e-mail.”32 The point must be made that in this kind of elitist and exclusive
arrangement, the voice of the “ordinary” Nigerian would not be heard. At the end
of the exercise, the committee would submit a report that reflects the class and
aspirations of the elites rather than a popular and a people-driven report.
17
Consequently, such thorny issues like Niger Delta question, the issue of Sharia,
resource controls and the nationality debate would be treated as non-issues and the
vicious cycle of constitution making would continue.
Summary and Conclusion:
The point has been made that right from the colonial period, Nigeria has had
a plethora of constitutions. Starting from the 1914 initiative of Lord Lugard to the
Independence constitution, the people of Nigeria were hardly involved in the
drafting of their constitutions. We opined that the colonial state used constitution
drafting to consolidate imperial strategies. The post-colonial period does not look
promising. Post-colonial Nigeria until recently was dominated by the military who
in a bid to earn legitimacy had drafted one form of constitution or the other. The
current 1999 constitution is characterized by a number of deficiencies that have
inevitably led to a clamour for its disuse. For one, it has all the trappings of a
unitary constitution. The concept of federalism as embedded in the constitution is
only a paid lip service. Nevertheless, the document may not be perfect, but it
signals a starting point. In due course, it would be amended to reflect the views of
Nigerians. In this process, it would fulfill one of the attributes of a constitution,
which is that it should reflect the ethos of the people.
18
References:
1.
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1985, (Also see, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. “Consultation on
Participation in constitution Making recommendation to CHOGM”, Holiday
Inn, Burgerspark, Pretoria, 16-17 August, 1999.
2.
B.O. Nwabueze, Ideas and Facts in Constitution Making. Spectrum Books,
Ibadan, 1993, p.1.
3.
Enugu, Friends of the Environment and Minorities, 1999.
4.
The Guardian, Lagos, Nigeria, May 9, 1999.
5.
B.O. Nwabueze, The Presidential constitution of Nigeria, C. Hurst & Co.,
London, 1982.
6.
G.O. Olusanya, “Constitutional development in Nigeria, 1861-1960”, in O.
Ikime (ed.), Groundwork of Nigerian History, Heinemann, Ibadan, 1980, p.
518.
7.
N. Nwosu et.al., Introduction to Constitutional development in Nigeria,
Sunad, Ibadan, k1998.
8.
G.O. Olusanya, Op. Cit., p. 520.
9.
K. Eso, “Opening address”, in Frederick Ebert, Constitution and Federalism,
Frederick Ebert, Lagos, 1976.
19
10.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo asserted that the Constitution failed to satisfy the
three criteria by which federalism and Unitarianism should be judged and
concluded that the Constitution was therefore “a wretched compromise
between federalism and Unitarianism.” For details, see Awolowo, Awo: An
Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Oxford University Press, k1960,
p. 179.
11.
The Guardian, Lagos, June 16, 1997.
12.
M.O. Adeniran, “Separation of Powers in the 1999 Constitution: a Myth or
Reality?”, paper presented at the 2000 Biennial Law Week of the Ilorin
chapter of The Nigerian Bar association held on 18-20, April 2000.
13.
Constitution Drafting Committee report, Vol. I, Federal Ministry of
Information, Lagos, 1976.
14.
A.A. Madiebo, The Nigerian revolution and the Biafran War, Enugu, Fourth
Dimension, 19870, pp. 1-14.
15.
CDC. Vol. II XXXI, k1978.
16.
See Section 14 (3) of the 1979 Constitution.
17.
R.T. Suberu, “Background Principles of Nigeria’s Presidential System”, in
V.I. Ayeni and K. Soremeku (eds.),Nigeria’s Second Republic, Daily times,
Lagos, 1988.
18.
N. Nwosu, Op. Cit.
19.
The Post Express, Lagos, September 6, 2000.
20
20.
M. Abubakar, “The History of constitution Making in Nigeria (1922-1999)”,
in CDHR, Path to People’s constitution, CDHR, Lagos, 2000.
21.
The guardian, Lagos, May, 1999.
22.
Community Rights Initiative, “We Cannot Go on Like this,” a position paper
presented at the conference of the Peoples of the Niger delta and the 1999
constitution, port-Harcourt 2-04 November, 1999, p.1.
23.
This kind of subtle device was also noticeable in the Macpherson
constitution, which was desperately resisted by Nigerian nationalist.
24.
See Part II, Schedule II of the 1999 Constitution.
25.
Nigerian Institute of Human rights, “Federalism: The 1999 constitution and
the People of the Niger Delta”, position paper presented at the conference of
the people of the Niger Delta”, position paper presented at the conference of
the people of the Niger delta and the 1999 constitution held in Port Harcourt,
2-4 November 1999, p. 3.
26.
See Section 162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution.
27.
B. Onimode, ”Fiscals Federation and revenue Matters in Nigerian
Constitution”, Conference Paper. The centre for Democracy and
Development (CDD), Nicon Hilton, Abuja, 1999.
28.
The Guardian, Lagos, 16 July 2000; and The Comet, Lagos, 6 March 2000.
29.
See Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution.
21
30.
E.P.T. Crampton, Christianity in Northern Nigeria, Geoffrey Chapman,
London, 1976.
31.
F. Falana, “The Nigerian Federation, the 1999 Constitution and Sovereign
National Conference”, in CDHR, Path to People’s Constitution, CDHR
2000, p.133.
32.
J.O. Ihonybere, “Towards Participatory Mechanisms and Principles of
constitution Making in Africa”, in CDHR, Path in People’s Constitution
CDHR, Lagos, 2000.s