Bismi ALLAH Arrahman Arraheem Class Notes of Principles of Macroeconomics Econ.102 BY Dr. Usamah Ahmed Uthman Associate Professor of Economics Department of Finance & Economics King Fahd University of Petroleum& Minerals Dhahran 31261 Saudi Arabia http://faculty.kfupm.edu.sa/finec/osama/ 1 Econ 102 Instructor Office Web Site KING FAHD UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & MINERALS College of Industrial Management Department of Finance & Economics : Principles of Economics II (Macroeconomics) : Dr. Usamah Ahmed Uthman : B24/296 : http://faculty.kfupm.edu.sa/finec/osama/ Office Hours Textbook :2:25 –3:15 PM,Sun. &Tues. (or by appointment) :Economics by Lipsey, et al, 12th Ed. Course Outline Chapter 21 Chapter 22 Chapter 23 Chapter 24 : : : : Chapter 25 Chapter 26 Chapter 27 Chapter 28 Chapter 29 Chapter 31 Chapter 32 Chapter 37 : : : : : : : : What Macroeconomics Is All About? The Measurement of National Income National Income Determination – Part 1 National Income Determination – Part 2 Applications to the Multiplier Theory Output and Prices in the Short Run Output and Prices in the Long Run The Nature of Money and Monetary Institutions Money, Output, and Prices Monetary Policy Unemployment Government Debt and Deficits Exchange Rates and the Balance of Payments First Exam Chapters 21,22,23,24 20% Second Exam Chapters 24,25,26,27,28, 20% Quizzes and participation 20% Final Exam (Chapters 22,24,26,28,29,31,32, and 37) 40% Total 100% NOTE: Professor reserves the right to change the contents and weights of course requirements. FIRST MAJOR EXAM, Wednesday, 8 Jumada I,1437 (17 February, 2016, 6:30- 8:15 PM SECOND MAJOR EXAM, Wednesday, 27Jumada II, 1437 (5 April, 2016),7:00- 8:45 PM Welcome to Economics 2 Dear Students of ECONOMICS Assalam Alikum WA Rahmat ALLAH wa Barakatuh It is my pleasure to teach economics to another patch of KFUPM students. Economic issues and events are with us all the time, at the personal, family, business, government, and international levels. There is almost no issue, problem or, event in the world that does not have an economic dimension either in terms of cause, consequences, or both. Economics Science tries to explain past and present events and tries to predict future ones. It tries to help us draw policies at every level of society. For these reasons the study of economics should be both necessary and enjoyable by everyone. How to Study Economics? You should try to understand the concepts much more than memorizing statements. This is how you can grasp and retain what you learn in your courses. Try to read ahead of class if you can, but definitely after class, and may be more than once, with a pencil in your hand. Some memorization is definitely required in the study of any science. To make sure you have retained in your mind what you read, it is strongly advisable that you re-write what you have read more than once. Our main material for the course of will be my Class Notes that you can find by clicking on the link below: http://faculty.kfupm.edu.sa/finec/osama/ After that, click on Teaching to find the Notes relevant to your course. Please download and print the Notes immediately and bring them with you to every class period. All information you need about the course policies are explained at the beginning of the Class Notes. For students of ECON.101 and ECON.102, upon reading a chapter at least twice, please try to solve some Study Guide, which you can find in any copying center on or around Campus. Try to solve and understand the answers, and not memorize them. Most of my quizzes come from the Study Guide. For students of ECON.410, I will provide you with end –of-chapter problems. Attendance, and coming to class on time are musts. Good luck and have an enjoyable semester. problems from the Dr. Usamah Ahmed Uthman Associate Prof. of Economics CHAPTER 21 INTRODUCTION TO MACROECONOMICS 3 Economics' two -major branches are: Microeconomics: discusses individual economic units: the firm, the consumer, particular markets, such as the oil market, the computers mkt, the tomatoes mkt. Macroeconomics: discusses the behavior of aggregate economic Variables, such as total investment, total consumption, govt. expenditures and taxation, unemployment, inflation, economic growth….. etc. The two branches are related, i.e. macro events affect micro areas & vice versa. Macro issues: What does macroeconomics discusses? I) Long term economic Growth: 1) What causes economic growth? 2) How do govt. policies affect economic growth? Through: a) Monetary policy, which regulates money supply and interest rates. b) Fiscal policy, which regulates government expenditures and taxation. II) Short term business cycles: are short term fluctuations in economic activity. To understand business cycles we must understand inflation and unemployment. * Economic indicators: are measures of the health of the economy, such as the rate of economic growth, unemployment, the budget deficit., the public ( govt.) debt, the inflation rate, investment , the balance of payments deficit….etc * National product and national income: as NP rises, NI rises too. * This means that the more goods and services are produced, there is more income generated for people. This is because in the process of generating output, factors of production must be employed and paid for. The value of NP = the sum of incomes to the owners of the factors of production. What are the factors of production? Who owns them? 4 Figure 21-1 The Circular Flow of Expenditure and Income Slide 21.2 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman You shall notice that: total leakeages = saving (S) + taxes (T) + imports ( M) total injections = investment (I) +govt expend.(G) + exports (X) for macroeconomic equilibrium: total leakages = total injection S+T+M = I+G+ X * Nominal National income: is measured in the prices of current year, NI=PQ. to change in P, Q, or both. It can change due * Real national income: is measured in the prices of some base year. This means we hold prices constant. When prices are held constant, changes in (real) national income reflect only changes in quantities. * The most commonly used measure of national income is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is the total value of all final goods & services produced at home. * The Business Cycle refers to the continual ups & downs in economic activity around a long term trend. This can be observed in many economic series. It is important to note that no two business cycles are exactly the same, neither in duration, nor in magnitude. * See FIG.21-3 below. Also, see EXTENSION 21-1 below for business cycle terminology. 5 Figure 21-2 National Income and Growth, 1929-1997 Slide 21.3 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Figure 21-3 A Stylized Business Cycle Slide 21.4 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman EXTENSION 21-1 THE TERMINOLOGY OF BUSINESS CYCLES RECESSION A recession, or contraction, is a downturn in economic activity. Common usage defines a recession as a fall in the real GDP for two successive quarters. Demand falls off, and, as a result, production and employment also fall. As employment falls, so do households' incomes. Profits drop, and some firms encounter financial difficulties. Investments that looked profitable with the expectation of continually rising demand now appear unprofitable. It may not even be worth replacing capital goods as they wear 6 out because unused capacity is increasing steadily. In historical discussions, a recession that is deep and long-lasting is often called a depression. The most famous depression in modern history was the one that took place during 1929-1933. The economic –financial crisis that started in 2008 has been called a great recession. TROUGH When the economy is at a trough, there are lots of unemployed resources, the level of output is low in relation to the economy's capacity to produce. There is thus a substantial amount of unused productive capacity. Business profits are low; for some individual companies, they are negative. Confidence about the economy in the immediate future is lacking and, as a result, many firms are unwilling to risk making new investments. RECOVERY The characteristics of a recovery, or expansion, are many: old equipment is replaced; employment, income, and consumer spending all begin to rise; and expectations become more favorable, as a result of increases in production, sales, and profits. Investments that once seemed risky may be undertaken as the climate of business starts to change from one of pessimism to one of optimism. Production can be increased with relative ease merely by reemploying the existing unused capacity and unemployed labor. PEAK A peak is the top of a cycle. At the peak, existing capacity is used to a high degree; labor shortages may develop, particularly in categories of key skills; and shortages of essential raw materials are likely. As shortages develop in more and more markets, a situation of general excess demand develops. Costs rise, but because prices rise also, business remains profitable. BOOMS AND SLUMPS These terms are nontechnical but descriptive. The entire falling half of the cycle is often called a slump, and the entire rising half is often called a boom. An economic boom is usually accompanied by inflation, and a slump is usually accompanied by deflation. However, it is possible that a recession is accompanied by inflation. In this case we say that the economy is in a state of stagflation. ___________________________________________________________________ *Potential GDP (Y*): is real GDP when resources are fully employed at normal rates of utilization Output Gaps: Positive GDP gap Y (actual real GDP) >Y* is called inflationary gap Negative GDP gap Y <Y * is called recessionary gap 7 Figure 21-4 Potential GDP and the Output Gap 1965-1997 Slide 21.5 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Long term growth in real national income is reflected in the upward trend in real GDP Short term movements around the potential reflect cyclical fluctuations. * Sources of long Term growth: 1) a rise in labor productivity. This could be the result of better education & technological advancements. 2) Increase in the amount of resources (Labor, land & capital) available to the economy. * Economic Growth makes people better off on the average. It does not necessarily mean that everyone will be better off. Employment & Unemployment * Employment: total # of people holding jobs * Unemployment: total # of adults actively seeking jobs but cannot find them. * Unemployment rate: No. unemployed/total labor force x100. Types of unemployment 1) Frictional unemployment: the result of labor turnover as workers move from one job to another. EX: If you are not happy with your job, you may quit and look for another job. 2) Structural unemployment: is the result of a mismatch between labor supply characteristics and labor demand. EX: There may be too many civil engineers, while the economy is demanding more accountants and computer programmers. 3) Cyclical unemployment: is the result of insufficient aggregate demand. If the economy is in recession, some workers may lose their jobs. Full employment is achieved when the economy is operating at potential GDP. This assumes that unemployment is limited to frictional and structural unemployment. Natural Unemployment: When unemployment is limited to frictional and structural types. Also called The NAIRU: The Non- accelerating – inflation rate of unemployment. In other words, it is the unemployment rate when inflation is not accelerating. Income & employment: national income could rise because output per worker (labor productivity) is rising, or because more people are working, or both. Also, unemployment increases because economy is not doing well or because population growth rate is faster than economic growth or both. 8 Figure 21-5 Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1925-1997 Slide 21.6 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman * Unemployment is important because: 1) It causes economic waste. The time of unemployed labor implies forgone production & income forever. 2) Unemployment is the cause of crimes & psychological problems. For details on unemployment, see chap.31 * Inflation and the price level: Economists develop price indexes to measure the general price level, and they use changes in the general price level to measure inflation. What is a price index? A price Index is a weighted average of the prices of a basket of goods and services. - Definition: Inflation is a general rise in prices. - The inflation rate is the percentage change in the general price level from one period to the next. i.e , the inflation rate is the % change in a price index from one period to the next. Look at Extension 21-3below to see how the consumer price index is constructed. This is very, very important. Why inflation matters? Inflation erodes the purchasing power of money (PPM) which is the amount of goods and services that can be bought with money. Thus, the PPM is negatively related to the price level. * Types of inflation:a) fully anticipated inflation: everyone in the economy has the same and correct forecast of the inflation rate in the next period(s). In this case, there won’t be real changes in the economy i.e. workers won’t increase supply of labor, producers won’t increase output & employment of resources. b) Unanticipated inflation: When forecasts are incorrect. It harms those whose receive fixed payments (e.g. wages, interest on saving, pension income…etc.) It benefits those whose payments are 9 fixed in monetary terms (borrowers, employees, retired people). Thus, inflation redistributes incomes form some groups to the others. c) Intermediate case: when forecasts are partially correct, but even if forecasts are correct, it may be difficult to adjust for inflation because of binding contracts. * Indexation: is linking payments to changes in the general price level. It is away to go around inflation. Once again: Inflation is bad because:1) It erodes the purchasing power of money. 2) It redistributes income in a haphazard way between people. 3) It increases uncertainty about future revenues, costs, and rates of return of investments. Figure 21-6 The Price Level and the Inflation Rate, 1950-1997 Slide 21.7 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman EXTENSION 21-3 HOW THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX IS CONSTRUCTED Suppose we wish to discover what was happening to the overall cost of living for typical college students. A survey of student behavior in 2012 shows that the average college student consumed only three goods pizza, coffee, and photocopying-and spent a total of SR200 a month on these items, as shown in Table 1. TABLE l Expenditures Behavior in 2012 Quantity Expenditure Product Price per Month per Month Photocopying SR0.10 per sheet 140 sheets SR 14.00 Pizza 8.00 per pizza 15 pizzas 120.00 Coffee 0.75 per cup 88 cups 66.00 __________ Total Expenditures SR200.00 By 2013, the price of photocopying has fallen to.0 5 halalh per copy, the price of pizza has increased to SR8.50, and the price of coffee has increased to 80 halalh. What has happened to the cost of living? In order to find out, we calculate the cost of purchasing the 2012 basket of goods at the prices that prevailed in 2013, as shown in Table 2. 10 TABLE 2 2012 Expenditures Behavior at 2013 Prices Product Photocopying Pizza Coffee Price SR0.05 per sheet 8.50 per pizza 0.80 per cup Quantity per Month 140 sheets 15 pizzas 88 cups Total Expenditures Expenditures per Month SR 7.00 127.00 70.40 __________ SR204.90 The cost of living has increased by SR 4.90, or 2.45 % The base year (2012) figure is assigned an index number of 100. So, for 2013 the cost of living is 102.45 For example, in May 1998 the CPI in the United States was 162.8 on a base of 1982-1984 (the period in which the original survey was done.) Thus, the price level had risen by 62.8 percent over the preceding 13 years, an average annual rate of increase of 3.82 percent. The CPI is not a perfect measure of the cost of living because it does not account for quality improvements or for the tendency of consumers to purchase more of things whose prices fall, and less of things whose prices rise (i.e. the substitution effect). Also, it may not include new products. Thus, from time to time the underlying survey of consumer expenditure must be updated in order to keep up with changes in consumption patterns. The Interest rate:Is the price for lending and borrowing money. In reality, there are many interest rates. However, interest rates commonly move together. The height of the interest rate is affected by many factors (eg risk of customer, govt. fiscal and monetary policies, foreign interest rates… etc.). The interest rate is a procyclical variable, i.e. it rises during the upside of the business cycle, and decreases in during the downside of the business cycle. A countercyclical variable behaves in an opposite fashion. * The prime interest rate: The rate banks charge to their best business customers. * Interest rate and inflation:Inflation reduces the real interest rate on loans. The nominal interest rate (stated in contracts) includes an inflation component. Thus i=r+ e The nominal interest rate = the real interest rate + the expected inflation rate. This is called the Fisher Equation. 11 Figure 21-7 Real and Nominal Interest Rates, 1950-1997 Slide 21.8 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman * Why interest rates matter? 1) Interest is an income to many people from saving accounts and bonds. 2) The interest rate is a cost of borrowing money→ affects investments→ economy's growth rate → standard of living in the long run. 3) It affects consumption & saving decisions. In the short run the interest rate affects output and employment, & the business cycle. Note: Interest is Riba, and Riba is a major sin. We have to discuss it because it is a reality of the world that we should work to eliminate. International Economy: 1) The exchange rate: is the price of one currency in terms of another. Or, the No. of units of a local currency required to purchase one unit of a foreign currency (eg. SR3.75 = $1). So, according to this definition if the exchange rate ↑→ local currency depreciates. If the exchange rate ↓→ local currency appreciates. Note: the definition can be reversed. However, the above definition is the standard one. See Fig. 21-8, for the external value of the dollar. Why is it important to Saudi Arabia? 12 Figure 21-8 The External Value of the U.S. Dollar, 1970-1997 Slide 21.9 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Foreign exchange is the amount of foreign currency or claims on foreign currencies, such as foreign deposits, bonds and stocks that a country has. 2) The balance of payments: is an accounting record of all transactions of the country with the rest of the world in terms of goods, services & financial assets. There are several sub accounts in the balance of payments accounts. For details see Chap.37. Figure 21-9 U.S. Imports, Exports, and Net Exports, 1970-1997 Slide 21.10 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 13 Chapter 22 – The Measurement of National Income Three Approaches: I) The Value- Added (output) Approach: the value of national output= the sum of values added by different firms at successive stages of production. This means that the Value added by the firm = value of the firm's sales – value of its purchases from other firms. This difference is equal to firm’s income payments to its factors of production. So the Value added= W+ R + Pr + i + T-Sub + Dep. In other words, this reflects a distribution of national income in the economy. If the total value of sales of all firms in the economy are added up, we would be committing the mistake of multiple counting, which overstates the value of national income. See Extension 22-1 for the value added approach. EXTENSION 22-1 VALUE ADDED THROUGH STAGES OF PRODUCTION Because the output of one firm often becomes the input of other firms, the total value of goods sold by all firms greatly exceeds the value of the output of final products. This general principle is illustrated by a simple example in which Firm R starts from scratch and produces goods (raw materials) valued at $100; the firm's value added is $100. Firm I purchases raw materials valued at $100 and produces semimanufactured goods that it sells for $130. Its value added is $30, because the value of the goods is increased by, $30 as a result of the firm's activities. Firm F purchases the semi-manufactured (intermediate) goods for $130, works them into a finished state, and sells the final products for $180. Firm F's value added is $50. We find the value of the final goods, $180, either by counting only the sales of Firm F or by taking the sum of the values added by each Firm. This value is much smaller than the $410 that we would obtain if we merely added up the market value of the commodities sold by each firm. Transactions at Three Different Stages of Production Firm R A. Purchases from other firms $0 B. Purchases of factors of production (wages, rent, interest, profits) 100 ___ ____ _____ ___ A + B = value of products (sales) $100 Total value of all sales Firm I $100 Firm F All firms $130 30 50 $130 $180 $230 Total inter-firm sales 180 Total value added $410 _________________________________________________________________________________ A topic for a term Paper: The value added by a firm represents its contribution to national income. Measure the value added by a firm you may be working for, and find the breakdown of its payments to its factors of production. Do the same for other firms in the same business sector and for several years. This should indicate to you the relative importance of the firm to the sector, and the relative importance of the sector to the national economy. Also, this should tell you something about the distribution of income between different owners of factors of production. II) The Expenditures Approach: GDP is the sum of aggregate expenditures on final domestic goods and services. There are four components of expenditures: 14 a) Consumption: expenditures on final goods & services intended for immediate use during the year. b) Investment: expenditures on goods that aren’t for immediate consumption: i) inventory of raw materials, semi finished goods, and finished good. Inventories are recorded at market value. Inventory is part of investment because it is not intended to meet immediate consumption and there is tied up capital in it. Thus, there is an opportunity cost to hold inventory. Inventory reduction is an act of disinvestment. ii) Plant and equipment: the economy’s stock of capital is a major source of economic growth. iii) Residential housing: its services extend over many years. - gross investment = replacement investment + net investment - Both investments are part of national income because in the process of producing each, factors of production are employed. c) Govt. purchases of goods and services: expenditures generated in the process of output produced by the govt. involves hiring factors of production (e.g. schools, hospitals, roads, police and court services…. etc.) Govt. output is recorded at cost, (compare to inventory). This may understate or overstate govt. output depending on govt. efficiency. d) Net exports: exports - imports Imports: income generated by us to foreign producers. Thus, it must be deducted from national income. All previous national income components include an import component. Exports: income generated to us by foreign buyers, so it must be added to our income. THUS: Aggregate Expenditures (AE) = GDP= Consumption +Investment +Govt. Purchases + (Exports – Imports) AE= GDP = (C+ I+ G+ (X-M) ) TABLE 22-1 Components of GDP from the Expenditure Side, 1997 Billions Percent Category of Dollars of GDP Consumption $5,485.8 67.9 Government purchases 1,452.7 18.0 Investment 1,242.5 15.4 Net exports -101.1 -1.3 Total $ 8,079.9 100.0 (Source: These data are available at the Web site for the Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.doc.gov.) III) GDP from the Income Side (The Income Approach): it sums up the incomes to owners of factors of production, plus some other claims on the value of output. a) Factor Payments (or Payments to the Owners of the Factors of Production): i) Wages (W): total employees compensation: salary, allowances, pension deduction, social insurance deductions, unemployment insurance deduction. Wages include any income that is due to labor. ii) Rent (R): income to land services or anything that is rented, including rent on own -occupied houses. iii) Interest (i): on bank deposits and corporate and government bonds. Interest is income from lent capital. iv) Profit (Pr): income to owned capital. Dividends (distributed profits) and retained earning are both included in national income. 15 b) Non-Factor Payments: i) Indirect taxes (IT): are imposed on the production and sale of goods & services eg. Sales tax. If the government does not collect indirect taxes it would have remained as firms’ profit. This has to be added to GDP figures. ii) Subsidies (Sub): make income exceeds the market value of output. So, they have to be subtracted from GDP figures. Eg. govt. subsidies to wheat and dates producers. Subsidies are not an earned income, so, they have to be deducted. NET NATIONAL PRODUCT (NNP) = (W+R+i+Pr+IT) – (Sub.) iii) Depreciation is the cost of used up physical capital; a deduction from profits to provide for replacement investment. Depreciation reduces net profits but it is part of gross profits, so it has to be added to GDP, thus GDP=NNP + depreciation Table 22.2 Components of GDP from the Income Side, 1997 Billions Percent Category of Dollars of GDP Compensation to employees $4,703.4 58.2 Rental income 148.1 1.8 Interest 448.7 5.6 Business income (including net income of farmers and unincorporated businesses) 1,349.5 16.7 Capital consumption allowance 871.6 10.8 Indirect taxes less subsidies 635.5 7.9 Statistical discrepancy -76,9 -1.0 Total $ 8,079.9 100.0 GDP measured from the income side of the national accounts gives the size of the major components of the income that is generated by producing the nation's output. The largest category, equal to about 58 percent of income, is compensation to employees, which includes wages, salaries and other benefits. The capital consumption allowance (depreciation) is the part of the earnings of businesses that is needed to replace capital used up during the year. This amounts to over 10 percent of GDP. (Source: Economic Report of the President, 1998.) SEE SAMA's ANNUAL REPORT http://www.sama.gov.sa FOR NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS OF SAUDI ARABIA, AND NOTE THE SIMILARITIES & DIFERECES WITH THE APPROACHES EXPLAINED IN THE TEXTBOOK. * GDP (gross domestic product) is income produced at home. GNP (gross national product) is income received at home+ net foreign income GNP=GDP+ (income to foreign investment locally – income from our international investments) Disposable national income (Y d ):- How much of national is left to persons (the owners of the factors of production) to consume and save. It is the most important variable that affects consumption expend. Y d = GDP - IT - Dep.- RE (retained earnings)- i (paid to financial institutions)+Sub.+ TR (transfer payments) 16 http://onforb.es/1KXas1N Tim Worstall Contributor Follow Following Unfollow I'm a Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, a writer here and there on this and that and strangely, one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths. An odd thing to be but someone does have to be such and in this flavour of our universe I am. I have written for The Times, Daily Telegraph, Express, Independent, City AM, Wall Street Journal, Philadelphia Inquirer and online for the ASI, IEA, Social Affairs Unit, Spectator, The Guardian, The Register and Techcentralstation. I've also ghosted pieces for several UK politicians in many of the UK papers, including the Daily Sport. Contact Tim Worstall Economics & Finance 2/14/2015 @ 11:42AM 798 views Korean Wages Are Now Higher Than Japanese Wages, Perhaps For The First Time In 3,000 Years Comment Now Follow Comments Following Comments Unfollow Comments This is something of a surprise actually, and it’s also an interesting indicator of just how fast economic growth can be. Average wages in South Korea are now higher than they are in Japan. Underneath this is the slightly surprising detail that GDP per capita is still significantly lower in Korea than it is in Japan. That means that, out of a smaller set of economic resources (that GDP, obviously), Korea is doing a better job of providing a level of consumption for the workers than Japan is. And that is, in the end, what having an economy is all about. Enabling consumption by the general population of the country. Here’s the actual news itself: The average wage of Korean workers has surpassed that of Japan in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) for the first time. In addition, Korea topped the list of OECD member countries in the pace of wage increases from 1990 to 2013. However, Korean ranked second among OECD counties in terms of wage inequality. Wages rose sharply but it happened around large companies so wage inequality was deepening among workers. Something that’s common to both countries is that there’s a distinct difference in wage levels between large companies and the smaller ones that surround them. This is true in all economies by the way, but it’s especially marked in these two Far Eastern countries. The thing is though, it’s not true that South Korea is a richer country than Japan. Here’s a listing of countries by nominal GDP per capita which is the normal thing people look at and that’s much higher for Japan than it is for Korea. In the normal course of things we would thus expect Japanese workers to have higher living standards than Korean ones. The gap closes a bit when we look at GDP adjusted for PPP (that is, taking account of the differences in prices between the two places). But that gap still doesn’t close (although note that those references are to slightly older figures, the quote is to near current ones). So what’s happening here is that there’s two different things going on. One is that more of the Korean economy is actually going in wages than it is in Japan. That makes sense as the Japanese economy has quite a lot of subsidies in it and wages, profits, subsidies to production and taxes on consumption make up, with self employed income, the four parts of our income definition of GDP. But also there’s something else. Which is that the general price level in Korea is lower making those wages go further. And it’s that that pushes Korean living standards (measured in this rather crude manner of course) past Japanese. And the really surprising thing is that this might well be the first time in about three millennia that this has been true. I wouldn’t say that the 3,000 years is definitely true but if does accord with my understanding of the history of the area. And Angus Maddison’s numbers show that this is almost certainly true too. As to the speed with which it has happened as late as 1980 South Korea’s GDP per capita was only one fourth that of Japan. This has all happened in only the one generation, just in one working lifetime. Quite astonishing. There really might be something to this freeish market capitalism stuff you know. 17 My latest book is “23 Things We Are Telling You About Capitalism” At Amazon or Amazon UK. A critical (highly critical) re-appraisal of Ha Joon Chang’s “23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism”. This article is available online at: http://onforb.es/1KXas1N 2015 Forbes.com LLC™ All Rights Reserved Real And Nominal Measures: Nominal vs. Real GDP:Nominal GDP = ∑P.Q is measured in current prices .It changes due to a change in P,Q, or both. This makes it difficult to compare real GDP over the years. Thus, we have to fix prices using some price index. Nominal GDP (at current Prices) Implicit GDP deflator = ______________________________ X 100 Real GDP (at base year prices) It is the most comprehensive price index as it includes all final goods & services in the economy. It shows the changes to the overall general price level in the economy. ___________________________________________________________________ Extension 22-3 CALCULATING NOMINAL AND REAL GDP TABLE 1 Data for a Hypothetical Economy Quantity Produced Wheat, Steel (bushels) (tons) Year 1 100 20 Year 2 110 16 Prices Wheat Steel (dollars/bushel) (dollars/ton) 10 50 12 55 Table 2 shows nominal GDP, calculated by adding the money values of wheat output and of steel output for each year. TABLE 2 Calculation of Nominal GDP Year 1: (100 X 10) + (20 X 50) = $2,000 Year 2: (110 X 12) + (16 X 55) = $2,200 Table 3 shows real GDP, calculated by valuing output in each year at year 2 prices; that is, year 2 is used as the base year for weighting purposes. TABLE 3 Calculation of Real GDP Using Year 2 Prices Year 1: (100 x 12) + (20 x 55) = $2,300 Year 2: (110X 12) + (16 X 55) = $2,200 18 In Table 4, the ratio of nominal to real GDP is calculated for each year and multiplied by 100. This ratio implicitly measures the change in prices over the period in question and is called the implicit GDP deflator. The implicit deflator shows that the price level increased by 15 percent between year 1 and year 2. TABLE 4 Calculation of the Implicit GDP Deflator Year 1: (2,000/2,300) X 100 = 86.96 Year 2: (2,200/2,200) X 100 = 100.00 In Table 4, we used year 2 as the base year for comparison purposes, but we could just as easily have used year 1. The measured change in the price level would have been very similar-but not identical in the two cases. If we use year 1 as the base period, the implicit GDP deflator in year 2 is equal to (2,200/1,900) X 100 = 115.8, indicating an increase in prices of 15.8 percent from year 1 to year 2. The GDP deflator measures the level of prices in a particular year relative to the level of prices in the base year. Why does the measured change in prices depend on which year we use as the base year? If you look back at Table 1, you will notice that the price of wheat relative to steel is higher in year 2 than in year 1. Thus, if we use year 2 as the base period, the changes in the quantity of wheat will be weighted more heavily {and the changes in the quantity of steel weighted less heavily) than if we use year 1 as the base period. This difference in weighting explains the variation {15 percent as compared with 15.8 percent) in the measured change in the implicit GDP deflator. The GDP deflator can be used to calculate inflation from one period to the next: Inflation rate in year 2 = GDP deflator in year 2- GDP deflator in year 1 X100 GDP deflator in year 1 For example suppose we calculated the GDP deflator in one year as 125 and in the next year as 135, Inflation in year 2 would be: 135-125 X100 = 8% 125 The GDP deflator gets its name because it can be used to take inflation out of nominal GDP- that is, to “deflate” nominal GDP for the rise that is due to increases in prices. How do we choose the “right” base year? As with many other elements of national income accounting, the choice involves some arbitrariness. The important thing is to be clear about which year you are using as the base year and, for a given set of comparisons, to be consistent in your choice. ___________________________________________________________________ A Comparison of GDP Deflator and the CPI: Both indexes are used to measure inflation. The Inflation rate is the % change in some price index from the one year to the subsequent year. However, there are some differences. The GDP deflator reflects the current level of prices relative to the level of prices in the base year. Because nominal GDP is current output valued at current prices and real GDP is current GDP valued at base – year prices, the GDP deflator reflects the current level of prices relative to the level of prices in the base year. The GDP deflator measures the change in nominal GDP from the base year that cannot be attributable to change in real GDP. What does this mean? It means that since nominal GDP can change due to a change in prices alone, change in quantities alone(real 19 change), or a combination of both, the GDP deflator tries to measure the change in GDP that is due to change in prices alone. The CPI measures prices of consumer goods that an average household faces. So a higher CPI results in a higher cost of living. There are problems in measuring cost of living via CPI: 1) it ignores changes in quantities as prices change. 2) It ignores the introduction of new goods 3) it does not reflect quality improvements in goods and services. That’s why measuring the cost of living can be inaccurate. Differences between CPI and GDP deflator: 1) CPI covers only a basket of consumer goods, while the deflator covers all output in the economy. 2) CPI compares what happened to the prices of a fixed basket of goods over the years. The GDP deflator compares the price of currently produced goods and services to the prices of the same goods and services in the base year. Thus the group of goods and services used to compute the GDP deflator changes automatically over time. In other words, while the CPI compares what happened to the prices of a fixed basket of goods over the years, the GDP deflator compares what happened to the prices of a changing basket of goods over the years. ____________________________________________________________________________________ Output and Productivity: GDP may rise because of an increase in the amount of resources available to the economy. Also due to a rise in output produced per unit of input. * Labor productivity:Productivity per worker = GDP # of employed workers Productivity per worker-hour = GDP total # of labor hours * Omissions from GDP:- GDP statistics may not include all activities actually taking place in the economy, such as: 1) Illegal activities such as the production of drugs, liquor, gambling, etc. use resources and generate income to criminals. This is why they should be included in national income statistics. However, this shouldn’t imply that their inclusion imply a rise in social welfare. Illegal activities harm society in 2 ways: a) waste of resources in bad things b) waste of resources in fighting crimes. Illegal activities may be reported in national income when legal activities are used as a cover for illegal ones. 2) Unreported activities: could be perfectly legal in themselves however people don’t report them to avoid taxes. 3) Non-market activities: includes “do –it- yourself” works, voluntary works, housewives' works, value of leisure. 4) Economic “bads” such as traffic congestions, pollution etc. (also when students park their cars in the professors' parking lots). 20 The article below explains why GDP and per –capita income measures may not be good enough to explain people’s well- being. PRINT Culture & Society Joseph E. Stiglitz Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics and University Professor at Columbia University, was Chairman of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and served as Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. His most recent book, co-authored with Bruce Greenwald, is Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, and Social Progress. OCT 13, 2014 The Age of Vulnerability NEW YORK – Two new studies show, once again, the magnitude of the inequality problem plaguing the United States. The first, the US Census Bureau’s annual income and poverty report, shows that, despite the economy’s supposed recovery from the Great Recession, ordinary Americans’ incomes continue to stagnate. Median household income, adjusted for inflation, remains below its level a quarter-century ago. It used to be thought that America’s greatest strength was not its military power, but an economic system that was the envy of the world. But why would others seek to emulate an economic model by which a large proportion – even a majority – of the population has seen their income stagnate while incomes at the top have soared? A second study, the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report 2014, corroborates these findings. Every year, the UNDP publishes a ranking of countries by their Human Development Index (HDI), which incorporates other dimensions of wellbeing besides income, including health and education. 21 America ranks fifth according to HDI, below Norway, Australia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. But when its score is adjusted for inequality, it drops 23 spots – among the largest such declines for any highly developed country. Indeed, the US falls below Greece and Slovakia, countries that people do not typically regard as role models or as competitors with the US at the top of the league tables. The UNDP report emphasizes another aspect of societal performance: vulnerability. It points out that while many countries succeeded in moving people out of poverty, the lives of many are still precarious. A small event – say, an illness in the family – can push them back into destitution. Downward mobility is a real threat, while upward mobility is limited. In the US, upward mobility is more myth than reality, whereas downward mobility and vulnerability is a widely shared experience. This is partly because of America’s health-care system, which still leaves poor Americans in a precarious position, despite President Barack Obama’s reforms. Those at the bottom are only a short step away from bankruptcy with all that that entails. Illness, divorce, or the loss of a job often is enough to push them over the brink. The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (or “Obamacare”) was intended to ameliorate these threats – and there are strong indications that it is on its way to significantly reducing the number of uninsured Americans. But, partly owing to a Supreme Court decision and the obduracy of Republican governors and legislators, who in two dozen US states have refused to expand Medicaid (insurance for the poor) – even though the federal government pays almost the entire tab – 41 million Americans remain uninsured. When economic inequality translates into political inequality – as it has in large parts of the US – governments pay little attention to the needs of those at the bottom. Neither GDP nor HDI reflects changes over time or differences across countries in vulnerability. But in America and elsewhere, there has been a marked decrease in security. Those with jobs worry whether they will be able to keep them; those without jobs worry whether they will get one. The recent economic downturn eviscerated the wealth of many. In the US, even after the stock-market recovery, median wealth fell more than 40% from 2007 to 2013. That means that many of the elderly and those approaching retirement worry about their standards of living. Millions of Americans have lost their homes; millions more face the insecurity of knowing that they may lose theirs in the future. 22 These insecurities are in addition to those that have long confronted Americans. In the country’s inner cities, millions of young Hispanics and African-Americans face the insecurity of a dysfunctional and unfair police and judicial system; crossing the path of a policeman who has had a bad night may lead to an unwarranted prison sentence – or worse. Europe has traditionally understood the importance of addressing vulnerability by providing a system of social protection. Europeans have recognized that good systems of social protection can even lead to improved overall economic performance, as individuals are more willing to take the risks that lead to higher economic growth. But in many parts of Europe today, high unemployment (12% on average, 25% in the worstaffected countries), combined with austerity-induced cutbacks in social protection, has resulted in unprecedented increases in vulnerability. The implication is that the decrease in societal wellbeing may be far larger than that indicated by conventional GDP measures – numbers that already are bleak enough, with most countries showing that real (inflationadjusted) per capita income is lower today than before the crisis – a lost half-decade. The report by the International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (which I chaired) emphasized that GDP is not a good measure of how well an economy is performing. The US Census and UNDP reports remind us of the importance of this insight. Too much has already been sacrificed on the altar of GDP fetishism. Regardless of how fast GDP grows, an economic system that fails to deliver gains for most of its citizens, and in which a rising share of the population faces increasing insecurity, is, in a fundamental sense, a failed economic system. And policies, like austerity, that increase insecurity and lead to lower incomes and standards of living for large proportions of the population are, in a fundamental sense, flawed policies. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-failure-individual-insecurity-byjoseph-e--stiglitz-2014-10 © 1995-2014 Project Syndicate Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-failure-individualinsecurity-by-joseph-e--stiglitz-2014-10#wXCKMlbuX8qe7Gsw.99 23 Bismi ALLAH Arrahman Arraheem Projects in Macroeconomics Project # 1 Estimating the Value Added and Factor Income Payments for the Highest –Valued Saudi Corporate Firms Get from the web the highest ten market -valued Saudi public firms by the end of 2015 and arrange them in a descending order in terms of market value. (Start with the highest- valued firm). Mention against each firm the nature of its activities (Ex: manufacturing, banking, agriculture, etc.) You are required to do the following: a) From the financial statements of each firm, estimate the value added by each. The value added by a firm = value of the firm's sales – value of its purchases from other firms. This difference is equal to the sum of its income payments to its factors of production plus non- factor payments. So the Value added= Wages+ Rent + Profits + Interest + Taxes- Subsidies + Depreciation. Both are measures of GDP at the macroeconomic level. The latter can be thought as a proxy for the other. b) Arrange firms in a descending order in terms of value added. Mention against each the nature of its activities.(Ex: Manufacturing, banking, agriculture, retail, …etc). c) Does a higher market capitalization value necessarily mean a higher added value? Why, or why not? d) Show the distribution of value added (factor incomes) for each firm. i.e the breakdown of Value added= W+ R + Pr + i + T- Sub +Dep. e) Arrange firms in terms of each component of the factor incomes. This means you have to make a table for each component. f) For each component of factor Incomes, find the total for all firms. EX.: Total wages paid by all firms, total profits, total interest, etc. g) Find the average wage per worker for each firm. h) If the Saudi government were to apply a 5% value-added tax, how much each firm would be paying. Assuming the list of top ten firms is representative of the whole private sector in the Saudi economy, which sector do you expect to pay a higher value-added tax? i) Alternatively, assume the government was to impose a 10% income tax on purely Saudi Firms or the Saudi partner in each joint venture firm, calculate income tax to be paid by each firm ( including Zakat) and arrange firms accordingly. Which sector would you expect to pay more income taxes? j) Compare the government proceeds from the two taxes and explain the result. k) Support your work by the suitable tables, graphs, charts, histograms, …etc. Sources: Use the English page of each website. (Tadawul) http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_AewIE8TIwP3gDBTA08Tn2Cj4AAvY_dQA_3gxCL9gmxHRQB0Zc_U/ (Capital Market Authority) http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Pages/home.aspx 24 Project’s Groups ( 2nd Semester, 2015-2016) Group # 1 Taha + Mashaal (Leader) Assignment: Almaraii + NCB Bank Group # 2 Hussien (leader) + Abdurrahman Alzahrani Assignment: STC + Alrajhi Bank Group # 3 Amer (Leader) + Hatim Assignment: Saudi Electric + Jabal Omar Group # 4 Waleed + Abdullah Aloqaili (Leader) Assignment: Samba Bank + Maaden Group # 5 Abdulaziz +Saleh +Mohannad (Leader) Assignment: Riyad Bank +Safco END OF CHAPTER 22 25 Chapter 23: National Income Determination: Part I * National Income accounting deals with measuring actual expenditures while the theory of national income deals with how NI is determined. * Distinguish between actual & desired aggregate expenditure. EX: inventory is part of investment expenditures. The actual level of inventories maybe >,<,= intended ( desired) inventory, Actual Expenditures =Ca + Ia +Ga + (Xa-Ma) Desired Expenditures= C+I+G+ (X-M) * 1) 2) 3) Simplifying assumptions for this Chapter: constant price level → no inflation no government → G=0,T=0 closed economy → X=0 , M=0 * Autonomous (Exogenous) variable: is a variable that cannot be explained by the model. In the theory of NI it is a variable not affected by national income. Autonomous expend. can and do change , but such changes do not occur systematically in response to changes in NI. * Induced (Endogenous) variable is one that can be explained by the model. i.e. is affected by NI. * The consumption function relates desired consumption to the variables that affects it. In many countries, consumption is the largest single component of aggregate expenditures. 1) the most important factor that affects C is personal disposable income. See previous chapter for definition. if T=0 → disposable income (Yd) = National income(Y) Consumption Theories: 1) John Maynard Keynes: current income is the most important factor in affecting consumption. 2) Milton Freidman: the permanent income hypothesis states that consumption is mainly affected by the expected long term income level. This implies that transitory changes in income don’t have much influence on consumption. 3) Franco Modigliani: the life cycle hypothesis states the following: a) at early stages of life C>Yd → people borrow b) at middle stages of life C<Yd→ people save c) at later stages of life (retirement) C>Yd→ people dissave (or consume from previous savings.) Friedman & Modigliani are both Noble Prize Laureates in economics. See http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ 26 TABLE 23-1 The Calculation of the Average Propensity to Consume (APC) And the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) (Billions of riyals) C= a + b Yd = 500 + 0.8 Yd Disposable Desired. Income Consumption APC = MPC = (Yd) (C) C/Yd Δ Yd ΔC Δ C / Δ Yd 0 500 500 900 1.800 500 400 0.8 2,000 2100 1.050 1,500 1,200 0.8 2.500 = 2,500 1.000 500 400 0.8 5,000 4,500 0.900 2,500 2,000 0.8 7,500 6,500 0.867 2,500 2,000 0.8 8,750 7,500 0.857 1,250 1,000 0.8 10,000 8,500 0.850 1,250 1,000 0.8 APC measures the proportion of disposable income that households desire to spend on consumption; MPC measures the proportion of any increment to disposable income that households desire to spend on consumption. The data are hypothetical. Economists call the level of income at which desired consumption equals disposable income the break-even level; in this example it is $2,500 billion. APC, calculated in the third column, exceeds 1-that is, consumption exceeds income below the breakeven level. Above the break-even level, APC is less than 1. It is negatively related to income at all levels of income. MPC, equals 0.80 at all levels of Yd. Thus in this example 80 halalah of every additional riyal of disposable income is spent on consumption, and 20 halalah is saved. ___________________________________________________________________ * The average propensity to consume ( APC) = total consumption = C/ Y total income The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) = change in Consumption = Δ C change in income ΔY In other words, MPC is the slop of the linear consumption function. 27 Figure 23-1 The Consumption and Saving Functions Slide 23.2 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman The Saving Function: The Average Propensity to Save (APS) = S/Yd The Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS) = S/ Yd TABLE 23-2 Consumption and Saving Schedules (billions of dollars) Disposable Desired Desired Income Consumption Saving 0 500 -500 500 900 -400 2,000 2,100 -100 2,500 2,500 0 5,000 4,500 500 7,500 6,500 1,000 8,750 7,500 1,250 10,000 8,500 1,500 Saving and consumption account for all household disposable income. The first two columns repeat the data from Table 23-1. The third column, desired saving, is disposable income minus desired consumption. Consumption and saving both increase steadily as disposable income rises. In this example, the breakeven level of disposable income is $2,500 billion; thus desired saving is zero at this point. APC+ APS =1 MPC+ MPS = 1 C=a + b Y d ; S = -a + (1-b) Yd Where a: is autonomous consumption. bY d is induced consumption, b is the slop of a linear consumption Function The 45- degree Line: points on that line imply C= Y d (spending equals income) no saving 28 * Consumption & wealth: a rise in wealth (a stock concept, a concept that has no time dimension) increases the flow of consumption out of a given level of income. Moreover, it reduces the flow of saving out of that income. A rise in wealth shifts the consumption function upwards while it shifts the S- function downward. SEE Fig 23-2. Figure 23-2 Wealth and the Consumption Function Slide 23.3 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Figure 23-3 Consumption and Disposable Income, 1970-1997 Slide 23.4 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 29 * Desired Investment Expenditures (I): Investment is the most volatile component of AE. The factors that affect investment are: the real rate of interest, the level of sales, business confidence, and taxes. 1) The interest rate: affects investment as follows: a) Inventory: represents tied- up capital in them. Thus the higher the interest rate, the higher is the cost of capital, the lower is the desired inventory level. Also, there is a storage cost to carry inventory. b) Residential housing: the interest component of the cost of housing could represent a very large percentage of the total cost of a house. c) Plant and equipment: firms finance some or all capital expansion by retained earnings. The higher the interest, the less will be the desire to go for debt, and the more attractive is financial investment (the less attractive is real investment.) A rise in Interest rates increases the cost of any investment and reduces profits. 2) The level of sales: a) Inventory levels change with the level of sales and the level of production. b) If there is a surge in sales (demand) that firms believe is sustainable enough, they will invest in plant & equipment. However, once that is completed, investment decreases. What if the increase in demand is only transitory, how do firms meet the increase in demand? 3) Business confidence: is a psychological factor that could change in either direction for many different reasons. It is a major source of investment volatility. Sometimes, it is the most important one. 4) Taxes: reduce profits and thus a cost that affects investments in plant & equipment. Governments give special tax reductions to encourage both domestic and foreign investment. * The role of profits in the economy. 1) They are signals that direct resources (and investment) into their best use (assuming perfect markets). 2) Profits help to payback for the cost of existing investments. 3) Profits help to finance future investments. 4) Taxes and interest are deductions from profits. So Profits pay for taxes and interest. In the Islamic system, interst is not allowed, and Zakat is not related to profits * For simplicity: investments will be assumed to be autonomous. Thus I = I * This chapter assumes G=T=X=M=0 , thus * THE AGGREGATE EXPENDITURE FUNCTION IS AE=C+ I AE= a + by + I In this simple economy, the marginal propensity to spend out of national income ( Z) is the same as mpc (b ) ; (1-z) is the marginal propensity not to spend) is the same as the MPS. 30 TABLE 23-3 Desired Aggregate Expenditure (Billions of riyals) Desired Consumption National Income (Y) 0 500 2,000 2,500 5,000 7,500 8,750 10,000 15,000 Expenditure (C = 500 +0.8Y) 500 900 2,100 2,500 4,500 6,500 7,500 8,500 12,500 Desired Investment Expenditure (I = 1,250) 1250 1250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 Desired Aggregate Expenditure (AE= C + I) 1750 2,150 3,350 3,750 5,750 7,750 8,750 9,750 13,750 In a simple economy with no government and no international trade, desired aggregate expenditure is the sum of desired consumption and desired investment. In this table government and net exports are assumed to be zero, desired investment is assumed to be constant at $1,250 billion, and desired consumption is based on the hypothetical data given in Table 23-1. The autonomous components of desired aggregate expenditure are desired investment and the constant term in desired consumption expenditure. The induced component is the second term in desired consumption expenditure (0.8 Y). 31 Figure 23-4 The Aggregate Expenditure Function Slide 23.5 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman TABLE 23-5 The Saving-Investment Balance Desired Aggregate Expenditure Desired Consumption Desired Saving Desired Investment National Income (Y) (AE = C +1) (C = 500 + 0.8 Y) (S=Y-C) 500 2,150 900 -400 1,250 2,000 3,350 2,100 -100 1250 5,000 5,750 4,500 500 1250 8,750 8,750 7,500 1250 1,250 10,000 9,750 8,500 1,500 1,250 15,000 13,750 12,500 2,500 1,250 National income is in equilibrium when desired saving is equal to desired investment. The data for Y, AE, and I are from Table 23-3. The data for desired saving is from Table 23-2. * Determination of equilibrium NI: 1) 2) 3) if AE>Y → pressure an income to rise. WHY? If AE<y → pressure an income to decrease. WHY? Equilibrium will be achieved where AE=Y * At equilibrium: AE = Y & S= I * To show this; C + I = C + S. If C is deleted from both sides, I=S If the economy is out of equilibrium, then Y-AE = S-I (The income-expenditure gap) = (The saving – investment gap) .See the figure below. 32 Figure 23-5 Equilibrium National Income Slide 23.6 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Changes in NI equilibrium: Equilibrium national income can change because of: 1) income changes 2) a shift in AE function because of a) a permanent rise in one of the components of AE due to a parallel shift in AE, which is due to an increase in one , or more of the autonomous expenditures. b) A rise in the propensity to spend a change in slop of AE. Figure 23-6 Movements Along and Shifts of the AE Function Slide 23.7 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 33 Figure 23-7 Shifts in the Aggregate Expenditure Function Slide 23.8 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Shifts in The saving & investment functions:- See Fig. 23-8 A decrease in saving, or a rise in investment both would increase AE and GDP, but would they have the same effect on the economy? Figure 23-8 Shifts in Desired Saving and Investment Slide 23.9 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 1) If the saving function shifts ↓→ C ↑ production of consumer goods ↑ AE →Y → S again until S= S 0 = I In the final equilib. Y, C both rise, but S is the same. The Production of consumer goods increases. 2) If the investments function shifts ↑ → AE ↑ → Y↑ → C↑& S↑→ in the final equilibrium Y , C, I,S all rise and the production of both investment and consumer goods↑ 34 The Multiplier Process A Numerical Example- See Extension 23-1 below. Consider an economy that has a marginal propensity to spend out of national income of 0.80. Suppose that autonomous expenditure increases by SR1 billion per year, because a large corporation spends an extra SR1 billion per year on new factories. National income initially rises by SR1 billion, but that is not the end of it. Increase in Expenditures (millions of Riyals} Cumulative Total Round of spending 1 (initial increase} 2 3 4 5 6 1,000 800 640 512 409.6 327.7 1,000 1,800. 2,440 2,952 3361.6 3689.3 7 262.1 3951.4 8 209.7 4161.1 167.8 134.2 479.3 57.6 4328.9 4,463.1 4942.4 5000.0 9 10 11 to 20 combined All others Def. : The Multiplier is the magnitude by which national income changes, in response to an initial change in aggregate expenditures. Figure 23-9 The Simple Multiplier Slide 23.10 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 35 Deriving the Simple Multiplier: At equilib.: AE = Y A + ZY = Y, where A is autonomous expenditures (a+I), and Z is the marginal propensity to spend out of national income. Y – ZY = A Y ( 1- Z) = A , thus Y = A/ (1- Z), where 1/ (1-Z) = K is the multiplier. We note that the magnitude of the multiplier is inversely related to the MP- not-to- Spend (proportionally to the MP to spend). i.e if a higher percentage of income is spent ( or less is saved), more income will be generated. EX; Let Z= 0.7 , K = 1/ ( 1- Z) = 1/ ( 1- 0.7) = 10/3= 3.3 Let Z = 0.8 K= 1/ ( 1- 0.8) = 10/2 = 5 What does a value of K=3 mean? It means that for every additional riyal of autonomous expenditures, equilibrium national income increases by 3 riyals. Figure 23-10 The Size of the Simple Multiplier ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman END OF CHAPTER 23 36 Slide 23.11 REVIEW: End of Chapter Questions Ch. 21 1) a) micro, particular market b) macro, inflation, unemployment c) macro, industrial production d) macro, subsidies affect national income, but micro prices e) macro, recession f) labor force expanding from population growth > a rise of employment =unemployment will rise Ch. 22 5) a) yes, consumption b) yes, consumption c) no, it in the contrary , spending an investment d) no , transfer of title e) yes, inventories part of investments f) no, ready counted when first sold 2) GDP not affected directly, but GNP is because income will go to foreigners not to “nationals” GNP= GDP +Net Foreign income (not affected but transfers income to foreign ownership) Ch. 23 1) c) upward shifts of C, and AE while saving shifts down d) AE, and I shifts downwards e) Investments decrease (reducing production, selling inventories until it waves out) f) If the government expending imports, export, (=consumption, I-gives investment C=1400+0.8y, I=400, equilib. Y=?, what will happen if interest rate ↑ ? A) AE=C+I → 1400+0.8y + 400 = 1800+0.8y at equilibrium: AE=Y Y= 1800+0.8y → Y(1-0.8) = 1800 → Y=9000 C=1400 +0.8 (9000) = 8600 S=Y-C= 9000-8600 = 400 37 Chapter 24: National Income Determination: Part II: Introducing Govt. & the Foreign Sector * Definition: Fiscal policy is the govt. policy regarding govt. expenditures and taxation. * When govt. is introduced into the model, Yd ≠ Y Yd = Y-T, also C ≠ f(Y), but C = f (Yd (Y)) → relationship between consumption & national income becomes indirect. * Net taxes = Taxes - Transfer Payments = T –TR * Govt. spending includes govt. purchases (G) and Gov't transfer payments = G+TR. Notice TR is part of the Gov't budget, but not a gov't purchase of goods & services. This is because TR is income from government to individuals that is not in exchange for any factor of production. So, TR is not part of G, but it affects AE & Y indirectly through Yd and C. The budget balance = T-G > 0 a surplus < 0 a deficit = 0 a balanced budget * The public(government) saving function: T- G = tY - G , where G an is autonomous variable, t (the average tax rate) is also autonomous. The budget balance is positively related to national income (Y). t is the slope, and a change in G shifts the function parallel to itself. A change in t, changes the slop of the function, i.e rotates the function. Figure 24-1 The Public Saving (Budget Surplus) Function Slide 24.2 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 38 Net exports = exports-imports = (X - M) = X-mY, where m is the marginal propensity to import. Exports are assumed exogenous. See Fig. 24-2 If X changes → a shift in (X-M) function. If M → (X-M) ↓. M could change either because m, y, or both change. Figure 24-2 The Net Export Function Slide 24.3 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman * Causes of shifts in (X-M): (X-M) = f (Y h , Y f , (P h / P f ), ER) 1) Foreign income (Y f ) → X ↑ → (X-M) ↑ 2) Relative domestic to foreign prices:(P h / P f ) ↑→ X↓ ,M↑→ (X-M) ↓ 3) Different inflation rates: If home inflation > foreign inflation, home goods are relatively more expensive, X decreases, M increases (X- M) 4) Exchange rate: # of domestic currency units to be paid for one foreign currency unit. If ER ↑ home currency imports becomes more expensive to us, exports cheaper to the foreigners , ( ) Note: For an economy to have positive net exports, the value of its output (GDP) must be greater than what it uses domestically (or absorbs) of that output. Absorption of domestic output is (C+I + G). So Net Exports= GDP- Absorption. However, if net Exports are negative, it must be that the economy is absorbing more than what it produces. For simplicity, in this chapter we assume both the price level and the exchange rate to be constant. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 37. 39 Figure 24-3 Shifts in the Net Export Function Slide 24.4 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Calculating the Marginal Propensity to Spend: If Y= 1, t=0.1, mpc =0.8Yd, m=0.1, What is the marginal propensity to spend out of domestic output (Z)? Notice that Consumption is a function of disposable income, Yd. So, Y d = Y – T = Y-0.1Y= 0.9 Y C = (mpc) ( Y d ) = (0.8)( 0.9) Y= 0.72Y ( What is S ? ) Since all domestic expenditure components contain some imports of an average of 10% (m=0.1), then that component must be deducted from the propensity to spend on Domestic output. Thus Z = 0.72- 0.1= 0.62 (What does it mean?) Thus the multiplier (K) = 1/ (1- 0.62) Conclusion: We notice that a rise in savings, taxes, and imports (all are leakages) reduces Z, and thus reduces the value of the multiplier and hence reduces equilib. national income. * Equilibrium National Income: Two Approaches: - I) The income- Expend. Approach. See Table 24-4 1) Desired consumption function: C = a + b Yd. Consumption depends on disposable income, which in turn depends on national income. To find the relationship between C and Y, we have thus Yd = ( 1- t) Y d = Y- tY = Y (1-t), We have C = a + b (1-t) Y : C / Y = (mpc) (1-t ) = ( C / Yd ) ( Yd / Y ) assume a=500, mpc = C / Yd =0.8. Also assume t= 0.1. Thus d 0.9Y C a (0.8)( d ) a (0.8)(0.9 ) a 0.72Y = 500+ 0.72Y 40 Figure 24-4 The Aggregate Expenditure Funnction Slide 24.5 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Figure 24-5 Equilibrium National Income Slide 24.6 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Thus: Equilib. is established where Y = AE = C + I +G+ ( X- M) II) The Saving –Investment Approach: Another app. is to show that equilib. is attained where national saving = national investment. To show this we have to discuss the national saving & national investment functions first. The National Saving Function is the sum of private and public (govt.) savings functions: = S + (T- G) (Fig.24-6) The slop of this function is the sum of the slops of private and public functions. 41 Figure 24-6 The National Saving Function Slide 24.7 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Derivation of the slop: Keeping in mind that C=a+ bY d S= -a + ( 1- b) Y d S = -a+ (1 –b)( 1-t) Y And T- G = tY – G Thus the slop of the national saving function: (S + (T-G))/ Y = (1-b) (1-t) + t So, if mpc= 0.8 & t = 0.1 , then mps=(1-mpc)= ( 1- b)= 0.2 of disposable income The slop of the national saving function is = (0.2)(0.9)+ 0.1=0.28. What does it mean? National Asset Formation (National Investment): This is equal to investment at home plus net claims on assets the country owns abroad. The latter comes from net exports and our net foreign investments. Thus: National Asset Formation= I + (X –M) Investment and exports have in common that both are not intended to meet current domestic consumption. A country that has positive net exports adds to its foreign assets, and thus is a net creditor. Negative net exports imply that the country is a net debtor. When desired national saving = desired national asset formation, the economy reaches equilibrium. S+ (T-G) = I + (X – M) 42 Figure 24-7 National Saving and National Asset Formation ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 24.8 To show that one equilibrium condition follows from the other: That's to show that AE=Y implies S+(T-G) = I+ (X-M), we have : AE = C+ I+ G+ (X – M) & C = Y-T- S. Thus AE = Y- T- S + I + G + ( X- M) At equilib. AE=Y, substitute for AE Y= Y- T-S +I +G + ( X- M) Cancel Y from both sides and re-arrange the terms, we get: S+ (T –G) = I + (X- M) From table 24-5, we can show that if the economy is out of equilib., then The national saving – national asset formation gap = the income – expend. Gap S+ (T –G) - I + (X- M) = Y- AE Also, if we re- arrange terms further, we get S+T+M = I+ G+ X The Sum of Leakages = The Sum of Injections Conclusion: There are three equivalent ways to express macroeconomic equilibrium. Can you re-state them? Fiscal Policy & National Income:- We know how the DIRECTION of fiscal policy affects the economy. If the economy is in recession, fiscal policy has to be countercyclical, i.e it should be expansionary, by raising government expenditures and/ or lowering taxes. If the economy is booming ( overheating), fiscal policy is again countercyclical, i.e it should be contractionary, lowering government 43 expenditures and/ or raising taxes. However, there are three more elements of policy; MAGNITUDE, TIMING & MIXTURE. We are less certain about the last three. For example, how much should G or T change? Which should change more? What expenditures should be increased or decreased? What taxes should be increased or decreased? When is the best time to start implementing the policy, and at what pace? What are the short run and long run effects? See Fig. 24-8 Figure 24-8 The Effect of Changing the Tax Rate Slide 24.9 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Does The Budget Deficit “Crowd Out” Private Investment? Some economists argue that if the government budget is in deficit, (T- G < 0), the government will be borrowing to finance the deficit. This implies that the government shall be competing with the private sector for loanable funds, which may cause the interest rate to rise, and thus may have a negative impact on private investment, in addition to increasing the public debt. If that happens, government budget deficit is said to “crowd out” private investment. However, this is a controversial issue; for other economists argue that the deficit may actually “crowd in”, instead of “crowding out” private investment, i.e it may cause it to increase, rather than decrease! This is because there is a lot of private spending, they argue, that is dependent on government spending. This issue is discussed in much more detail in Chapter 32. Limitations of the Income - Expenditure Model: The model is based on two basic concepts: a) Equilibrium Y is where desired AE = actual Y b) The multiplier measures the change in equilib. Y, that results from a change in the autonomous part of desired AE. However, 1) The model, so far assumes the price level is exogenous to the model, and thus we have been assuming the p-Level to be constant. 44 2) It assumes that equilib. Y depends only on aggregate demand (desired AE), and not on ( for example) on the firms’ technical capabilities, the supply of resources. In other words, it assumes that GDP is demand- determined. 3)It assumes the economy has some excess capacity (unemployed resources), which means that a rise in AE , will generate a rise in real Y These assumptions imply that equilib. income is determined by the demand side of the economy alone. Income is said to be demand- determined. Nevertheless, no matter what the p-Level is, the model continues to be useful to study the relationship between AE and Y. The equilibrium conditions stated before still hold. Deriving the Full Multiplier Model: Appendix Material; V.V. Imp. C G ( ) C= a + b d d t d t X X m G G0 0 At Equilibrium, we have: AE= Y. Substitute for AE in the above AE function, Y=C+I+G+ (X-M) Substitute for C,I, G,X, & M from the above, a b( t ) G ( X m ) (1 b bt m) ao bo Go o Y= 1/( 1-b+bt+m) ao bo Go o Y= the multiplier Autonomous expenditures Y= 1/(1-Z) A From the above, it is obvious that adding more leakages in the economy a lower value of the multiplier a lower equilibrium national income. Example from the text: Let C=500+0.8 Yd I=1250 G=850 X-M =1200-0.1Y T=0.1Y a)Find equilibrium national income. What is the value of the multiplier? What is the value of autonomous expenditures? 45 b) Is the government budget balanced? c) Is foreign trade balanced? ___________________________________________________ C= 500+ 0.8(Y-T) = 500-+ 0.8 ( Y-0.1 Y) = 500 + 0.72 Y At Equilib. AE=Y, substitute for the above values of C,I,G,,X,& M Y = 500 + 0.72Y + 1250 + 850 + 1200 – 0.1 Y Y=3800+0.62Y Y( 1-0.62)= 500+1250 + 850 + 1200 Y= (1/(1-0.62)) ( 3800) = (2.36) ( 3800) = 10000 Thus, the Marginal propensity to spend (Z) is 0.62, & the marginal propensity not to spend is 0.38. Let G=150, ? (1/(1-Z)) ( G ) =(2.63)(150 ) = 394.5 Deriving the Tax Multiplier: A change in taxes d C The change in disposable income = the change in taxes. Thus d Since C= a bd in a closed economy, let Y=C+I G C (b)( T ) Y= a+ bYd +I+G Y= a+ b(Y-T) +I+G Y= a+bY- bT +I+G Y(1-b) = a- bT +I + G 1 Thus Y= ( ) ( a-bT +I+G) 1 b Y 1 1 b (b)( ) (mpc) (Expenditure multiplier, K) 1 b 1 b b . Since b is less than one, it follows that the tax multiplier is 1 b 1 smaller than the expenditure multiplier,( ). What does it mean? 1 b Example: If T 300 Yd 300 C bd , Thus the tax multiplier is: C (0.8)( 300) 240 Y (C )( ) (240) 1 1 (240)( ) (240)(5) 1200 . Where K is the expenditure (1 mpc) 1 .8 multiplier. Alternatively, the change in Y can be calculated using the formula for the tax multiplier above. 46 The Balanced Budget Multiplier: If taxes increase by the same magnitude of the increase in govt. expenditures, what would be the effect on national income? Would equal leakages and injections cancel out each other in this case? The change in national income will be the combined effect of the expenditures and tax multipliers: 1 b 1 b 1 G 1 b 1 b 1 b This implies that the balanced budget multiplier, in a closed economy is equal to1. Thus a balanced budget policy increases national income by the same amount of G = T. WHY? Can you explain? Problem from Study Guide P. 338 (review session) Given the following Info: C=100+0.7 Yd Yd = 0.8Y I=56 X-M=10-0.1y G= 50 Find equilib. GDP, Z, (1- Z) _________________________________________________________ Solution: Yd = 0.8Y → Yd=Y-ty=Y(1-t) C=100+(0.7)(0.8)y C=100+0.56y AE=C+1+G+(x-m) at equilibrium: AE=Y Y=216+0.56y-0.1y Y(1-(0.56-0.1)=216 Y=(1/ 1- 0.46) (216) Thus Equilib. GDP: Y= 400 (b) Z ( MP to Spend) = 0.56 -0.1=0.46 1-Z=0.54←MP not to Spend Hence K (the Multiplier) = 1/ (1-Z) = 1.851 (c) Sum of autonomous exp= 216 (d) If G 20, y ? 1 y (G ) 1 Z (1.851)( 20) Y 37.037 (e) If G increases by 20 & suppose expenditures create a demand for imports , solve for y. In this case we have to include X-M=10-0.1Y. The final increase in Y will be reduced by 0.1 of the change in income that resulted from G. That is Y is reduced by 3.7 relative to part (d) above. 47 The Keynesian Revolution In the 1930s a major depression affected most of the industrial world. Unemployment in the United Kingdom reached levels around 20 per cent overall. In the USA it reached around 25%. World trade collapsed and factories lay idle. The economic orthodoxy at the time suggested that the best course for governments was first to let market forces solve the problem and secondly to get their own houses in order by increasing taxes and cutting spending to reduce the budget deficits that usually accompany recessions. Prices would adjust to clear markets and eventually excess supplies would be eliminated and confidence would be restored by seeing the government being financial prudent. Even if it was understood that this would take time, there was thought to be nothing much that government could do to help the process of recovery other than by setting a good example of financial prudence. John Maynard Keynes challenged this conventional view in his pathbreaking book. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan, 1936). This work, and its subsequent interpretations and extensions, marks the beginning of macroeconomics. One insight that Keynes expressed that is still considered valid today is that labor markets are not like conventional commodity markets, in that prices do not rapidly adjust to clear the market.. This ‘wage stickiness’ implies that unemployment can persist for a long time without the market mechanism doing much to eliminate it. In the context where there is a general excess supply of productive resources, the question then arises: why is demand is not high enough to utilize these resources? The answer was ‘effective demand failure’. What this means in terms of the analysis of this chapter is that the AE function is too low. It is leading to an equilibrium level of GDP that is well below its full employment or potential level. Thus the cause of the ‘great depression’ was that one or all of C+ I + G + NX were too low, perhaps as a result of a collapse of consumer confidence (and the reinforcing effect of unemployment on GDP), a collapse of investor confidence (in the context of low demand for output), and decline of world demand (as other countries were suffering too). The analysis suggested not just the cause of the problem but also a potential solution. By increasing G, governments would create a positive multiplier effect, shift aggregate spending upwards, and cause GDP to move towards its full employment or potential level. Thus, the Keynesian Revolution suggested an active role for fiscal policy in helping to stabilize the economy and a promise that mass unemployment could be a thing of the past. The idea did have a huge policy impact. It underpinned the new deal policies of US President Roosevelt in the 1930s and was influential in many other countries, especially the United Kingdom, which in the post-world war II period used fiscal policy actively to manage aggregate demand in an attempt to stabilize activity. In December 1965, Time Magazine famously ran a cover story with the headline: ‘We are all Kenesians now’. Paradoxically, when President Nixon even more famously quoted the same statement in 1971, it was almost certainly no longer true. In the 1970s and 1980s the problem most pressingly facing the world was moving on from that of unemployment to inflation and high energy prices. In the inflation story, governments came closer to being villain rather than savior, and active countercyclical fiscal policies went out of fashion. However, in the recession of 2008-09 there was a collapse of private demand on a global scale and governments initially saw fit to let their deficits expand in order to prop up aggregate demand in their home economies. These deficits were partially endogenous, as tax revenues fell and welfare spending rose, and partly policy included as governments undertook new spending in order to inject new demand into the economy and so reduce unemployment. In Many places Keynes was back in fashion, and fiscal deficits were once again regarded by many as an important policy tool for demand management. Although this change of view was dramatic, it was not held by everyone, and major controversies did occur, particularly in the United States, over the wisdom of using fiscal tools to fight the recession. Also those who thought that the large budget deficits in many EU countries, particularly those in the Mediterranean area, were a more serious problem that unemployment urged governments to rein in their spending and raise taxes in order to reduce their deficits, despite this being a contractionary fiscal policy. 48 Why We need Equilibrium Analysis; Cartoon by Paul Krugman, The new York Times, October 1,2010. 49 Chap.25: Output and Prices in the Short Run Virtually all AS & AD shocks affect both national income and the price level; that is they have both nominal and real effects. To understand these effects we have to drop the assumption of a constant price level that we maintained in the previous chapters. The Demand Side of the Economy: Shifts in the AE function: One Key Result: A rise in the P- level shifts the AE function down, and a fall in P- level shifts AE function up. WHY? I) P-level & Changes in Consumption: Two links: a) P → Wealth → C. Much of persons' private wealth is the form of assets with fixed nominal value: money and bonds. A rise in P-level reduces the purchasing power of money (M/P) → money wealth ↓ → real AE↓. Also, govt. and corporate bonds are fixed in nominal terms. A rise in P – level reduces real repayment to the bondholders (B/P) → wealth of bondholders ↓. However, for the bond issuer, since real repayment is lower → his real wealth ↑ → No net change in aggregate wealth of, assuming that both sides have the same mpc. b) P → Wealth → S → C. When wealth is decreased due to a rise in P – level, people need to increase their savings to restore their wealth to their desired level → Consumption ↓ → AE ↓. The above is the direct effect of wealth on consumption. There is an indirect effect that operates through the interest rate. It will be discussed in Chap.28. II) P –Level & Changes in Net Exports: A rise in domestic P-level → prices of domestic goods become more expensive relative to foreign goods. → (X-M) function ↓→ AE function ↓. CHANGES IN EQUILIB. INCOME: When P- Level ↑ → (C & NX) ↓ as explained above → AE function ↓ → equilb. GDP↓. A fall in the P- Level does the opposite. See Fig.25-1 below. 50 Figure 25-1 Aggregate Expenditure and the Price Level Slide 25.2 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Note: In chap.23 & 24 the horizontal axis was labeled "Actual National Income". In this chapter it is labeled "real GDP". It is still actual as opposed to desired, but it is real. THE AGGREGATE DEMAND CURVE: RECALL: The AE curve relates actual GDP to desired AGG.EXPEND. for a given P-Level, plotting GDP on the horizontal axis. The Aggregate Demand Curve (AD) relates equilibrium GDP to the price level, again plotting GDP on the horizontal axis. SEE FIG25-2 below. Changes in the P- Level that cause shifts of the AE curve, cause movements along the AD curve. A movement along the AD curve thus traces out the response of quilib. GDP to changes in the price level. Figure 25-2 Derivation of the AD Curve Slide 25.3 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 51 The Slop of the AD Curve: Remember from microeconomics that the D- curve for an individual good relates the price of the good to the quantity demanded of that good, holding all other prices and the consumer's money income constant. It slops downward because of the availability of substitutes, and because a rise in the price of the good reduces his purchasing power in terms of that good. However, for the AD curve: the first reason does not apply, for the AD curve relates the total demand (for all goods) to the general P- level (not just one good and not just price). All prices and total output are changing as we move along the AD curve. Because the value of output determines income, consumers' money income changes along this curve. The second reason applies only to a limited sense; As the domestic P- Level changes there could a substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The above discussion explains why AD curve is different from the individual D- curve. However, it does not explain why the AD- curve slops downward. Explanation: Actually, as the P- level ↑ →real money supply (M/P) ↓. If nominal money supply, M is constant, Ms= Mso → i ↑ → (C & I) ↓ → AD ↓ → movement along the AD curve. This is called the interest rate effect. In short, the AD curve slops downward because of the wealth effect (which is due to changes in the price level discussed above) and the interest rate effect. Points off the AD Curve: (V.V. Imp.) The GDP given by any point on the AD curve is such that if that level of output is produced, its value will be exactly equal to aggregate desired expenditures at that P- level. This is the meaning of equilib. Points along the AD curve mentioned above. Points off the AD curve show either pressures on output to rise (to the left) or pressures o decrease ( to the right). SEE FIG. 25-3 below. Figure 25-3 The Relationship Between the AE and AD Curves Slide 25.4 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Shifts in the AD Curve: WE have already seen that any change in the price level causes a shift in the AE function, and a movement long the AD curve. Any other change that causes a shift in the AE function (such as a change in one or more of the components of AE) will cause a shift in the AD curve. Such a shift is called an aggregate demand shock. 52 EX 1: in the early 1980's, changes in the US tax laws led to an increase in consumption at every level of national income → an expansionary demand shock → the US. AE shifted up & the AD curve shifted to the right. EX 2: The Asian crisis of 1997 -1998 led to recession in these countries that reduced their demand for US exports, and shifted US AE function down and thus the US AD curve Shifted to the left. → A contractionary demand shock. The Asian crisis has actually led to a sharp decrease in oil prices that also generated a prolonged recession in oil exporting countries. The Simple Multiplier & The AD Curve: The simple multiplier is the one that measures the change in equilibrium GDP in response to a change in autonomous expenditures when the p- level was assumed constant. Under this assumption, the multiplier gives the horizontal sift in the AD curve in response to a change in autonomous expend. SEE FIG 25-4 below. Figure 25-4 The Simple Multiplier and Shifts in the AD Curve Slide 25.5 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE ECONOMY THE AGGREGATE SPPLY: Aggregate Supply refers to the total output of goods & service that firms wish to produce, assuming they can sell all they wish to sell. Aggregate Supply (AS) thus depends on the firms decisions to employ workers & other inputs to produce goods & services. The aggregate supply curve relates AS to the P- level. Two types of AS curves: The short run AS curve ( SRAS) relates the P-level & GDP on the assumption on that technology & all factor prices are constant. The long run AS curve (LRAS) relates the P-Level to desired sales after the economy has adjusted to that P- level. We discuss this issue in detail in the next chapter. The Slop of the SRAS Curve: Costs & Output: Even though the SRAS assumes constant factor prices, this does not mean that unit costs (cost per unit of output) will be constant. As output rises less efficient standby plants & less efficient workers may have to be hired (i.e marginal productivity will eventually decline.) Thus, the law of diminishing marginal returns is one reason why costs rise in the SR as firms try to squeeze more output out of fixed capital. 53 Prices & Output: Firms are either price-takers (competitive industries), or price-setters (monopolistic or oligopolistic industries). As their unit costs rise with output, price -taking firms will produce more only if output price increases, and will produce less if output price falls. Price –setting firms will increase their prices when they expand output in the range in which unit costs are rising. Thus, the actions of both price-taking & price-setting firms cause the p-level & AS of output to be positively related. Thus, the SRAS is upward sloping. SEE FIG.25-5 below. Figure 25-5 The Short-Run Aggregate Supply Curve Slide 25.6 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Shifts in the SRAS are called aggregate supply shocks. 1) Changes in Input Prices: if factor prices increase → firms' profitability of current production↓ → So either higher prices will be required at each output level, or output will be reduced at every price level. SEE Fig. above. An upward shift in the SRAS reflects a reduction in AS due to change in input prices. 2) Changes in Productivity: if labor productivity ↑ → the unit costs of production (for given wages) ↓ → prices of output ↓. Competing firms cut prices in an attempt to raise their market shares. MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIM The equilib. values of real GDP and the P- level are determined simultaneously at the intersection of the AD & SRAS curves. SEE FIG 25-6 below. Any point above or below that point will generate either excess supply or excess demand. For macroeconomic equilibrium two conditions must be satisfied: 1) At the prevailing P- Level, desired AE must be equal to actual GDP- that is households are welling to buy all that is produced. This condition holds everywhere on the AD curve. 2) At the prevailing P- level, firms must wish to produce the prevailing level of GDP, no more & no less. This condition is fulfilled everywhere on the SRAS curve. 54 Figure 25-6 Macroeconomic Equilibrium Slide 25.7 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman *CHANGES IN THE MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM. 1) A shift of (AD) changes Y & P in the same direction. See Fig.25-7 2) if AD shifts rightward an expansionary demand shock, i.e. more output is demanded at all plevels. 3) if AD shifts leftward a contractionary demand shock, i.e. less output is demanded at all plevels. Figure 25-7 Aggregate Demand Shocks Slide 25.8 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman * The multiplier when P-level is changing: Look at Fig.25-8. Because the short run Aggregate supply (SRAS) curve is upward slopping, an upward shift of AD causes the P-level ↑ real AE is somewhat 55 reduced the magnitude of the multiplier is reduced. When the SRAS is positively sloped, the change in real GDP is no longer equal to size of the horizontal shift of AD. Figure 25-8 Multiplier When the Price Level Varies Slide 25.9 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman * The importance of the shape of SRAS curve: Fig.25-9 Figure 25-9 The Effects of Increases in Aggregate Demand Slide 25.11 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman , but doesn’t 1) At the early flat range of SRAS (called the Keynesian stage) shifts in AD rise. The flat stage of the SRAS implies that the economy is in a state of deep recession (or 56 depression.) A significant portion of resources are unemployed. AD and GDP can be increased without any pressure on prices. 2) The rising stage of SRAS : as AD shifts , both Y& P 3) The vertical stage, the economy is near full capacity utilization, very little more of output can be added. The shift of AD causes more of P-level rise than output increase. When the SRAS is completely vertical, the economy is at full employment further shifts of AD only causes higher and higher price level, but no more output. See Fig 25-10 below. Figure 25-10 Demand Shocks When the SRAS Curve is Vertical Slide 25.12 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman However, note that SRAS is used to analyze only short- term effects, for the SRAS assumes constant input prices and technology. Aggregate supply shocks: Fig. 25-11 Figure 25-11 Aggregate Supply Shocks Slide 25.13 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 57 if inputs prices , profits to firms , for firms to maintain profits, they must charge higher prices at every level of output the short run AS curve shifts up ( to the left) P & this is called a case of stagflation “(stagnation +inflation). Can you remember domestic and international examples of inputs prices increases and how they affected SRAS curves in the respective countries? END OF CHAPTER 25 58 Chap.26: Output & Prices in The Long Run * The assumptions from Chapter 25: 1) Inputs prices are constant 2) Productivity is constant. In this chapter we relax the first assumption. We want to see what happens when input prices are variable. Induced Changes in Factor Prices: Figure 26-1 The Output Gap Slide 26.2 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Since input prices can vary, changes in GDP can induce changes in input prices i) in booms firms are optimistic output(GDP) demand for factors of production . Booms inflationary gaps where Y>Y* & P-level ii) When firms are pessimistic Profits investment GDP … (opposite to booms) Recession recessionary gap where Y<Y* & P-level Closing the GDP gap: In recessions when demand for factor of production , input prices, especially wages unit cost SRAS shifts rightward until the economy at Y*. In booms: when demand for factors of production input prices, especially wages, unit cost the Short Run Aggregate supply shifts left ward until econ. is at Y*, & P-level . * Asymmetry in adjustment (V.V. Imp.) As a real -world observation nominal wages are much slower to adjust downward in recession than adjusting upward in booms. Wages are said to be sticky in a downward direction. However, it is not just wages; the international financial and economic crisis that has been going on since 2007 has shown that if business expectations are pessimistic, they may prolong recession that much longer. In addition, the availability of credit (financing) has proven to be very crucial and operates on both the supply side & the demand side of the economy. Thus, recession gaps are more difficult to close than inflationary gaps. The economy may take much longer time to get out of recession. 59 The Philips Curve ( a very Important relation) When real GDP exceeds its potential, an excess demand for labor pushes wages up the unemployment rate is less than U*( the NAIRU) . When real GDP is less than potential, an excess supply is of labor exerts a downward pressure on wages the unemployment rate exceeds U*. This relationship between the unemployment rate, and the rate of change in wages is one of the most famous relationships in macroeconomics & is called the Philips curve. Extension 26-1:The Philips Curve & the Shifting of the SRAS Curve. In the early 1950's professor A.W. Philips, of the London School of Economics pioneered a study on the relationship between the inflation rate and the difference between actual and potential GDP,Y*. Later he studied the relationship between the rate of increase of wages and the level of unemployment. In 1958, he reported that a stable relationship had existed between these two variables for 100 years in the United Kingdom. This relationship came to be known as the Philips Curve. It provided an explanation, rooted in empirical observation, of the speed with which wage changes shifted the SRAS curve by changing unit labor costs. Since unemployment & output gaps are negatively related, we can therefore create another Philips Curve that plots wage changes against output. See the Figure below. Only when Y=Y* is the SRAS not shifting. In this case, AD for labor equals AS; the only unemployment then is frictional and structural. There is then neither upward, downward pressure on wages. Hence the Philips Curve cuts the axis at potential output, Y* and the corresponding level of unemployment is U*. The Philips Curve provided a link between national income models and labor markets. It allowed economists to drop the uncomfortable assumption of sticky money wages. In the figure below, if Y=Y1, the wage cost will be rising to W1. The SRAS will be shifting upward by that amount. Thus, a movement along the Philips Curve, caused by a change in output (and unemployment), implies a change in money wages and thus a shift in the SRAS Curve. What happens if the Philips curve shifts? And what would cause such a shift? An important cause of shifts in the Philips curve is changes in firms' and households' expectations of future inflation. As wages go up, so does the cost of production. Consequently the SRAS shifts up further, until it closes the GDP gap. The Philips curve also shits up until it becomes vertical at Y* (or U*.) At that point there is no trade off any more between inflation and unemployment. Extension 26-1 The Phillips Curve and the Shifting SRAS Curve 60 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 26.4 THE EFECTS OF AGGREGATE DEMAND SHOCKS *Expansionary Demand Shocks: See Fig 26-2 below Figure 26-2 The Long-Run Effect of a Positive Aggregate Demand Shock ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 26.3 Suppose equilib. is disturbed by an increase of some autonomous expenditures such as investment. The AD curve shifts upward & GDP rises to y1 > y*, creating an inflationary gap. Closing the Inflationary Gap If Y>Y* excess demand for labor unit labor cost -level & profit SRAS output . Note that prices not to make more profit but to cope with rising costs. However, there is a limit as to how much firms can raise prices because as P-level real i.e. demand. ( a movement along the demand curve, AD1.) Contractionary AD Shocks: Figure 26-3 The Long-Run Effect of a Negative Aggregate Demand Shock ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 26.5 If AD shifts for one reason or another (Eg. I or X ) Y & becomes < Y* recessionary gap. Closing the gap 61 Case 1: If wages are flexible. unemployment drives wages SRAS shifts to the right until Y= Y*. This is called the automatic (market) adjustment mechanism. i.e the economy reverts back to full employment on its own without any intervention form govt. Case 2: If wages are not flexible: quite often wages are not flexible and sticky in a downward direction. Unemployment and the recessionary gap may persist for a long period of time if nothing is done about it. So the economy must be activated by some components of AD, usually through govt. stabilization policy. This is an important and very controversial issue of macroeconomics. Fig. 26-3 ii above. Two important lessons: The asymmetry in wages adjustment helps to explain two facts: 1) Unemployment may persist for a long period of time, without causing wages and unit costs to go down. 2) Booms, along with labor shortages and production beyond normal capacity cannot persist for a long period of time, without causing an increase in unit costs and the price level. Extension 26-2 Anticipated demand shocks: Demand shocks, say by change in Gov't. fiscal policy, if perfectly anticipated by both workers and producers may lead to an equal rise in wages and output prices, such that there will be a simultaneous shift in AD and SRAS curves that leaves real GDP unchanged. In terms of Fig.26-2, the economy may move directly from E0 to E2. Thus, wages and the price level may rise without the presence of an inflationary gap. The possibility that anticipated demand shocks may have no effect on real GDP, plays a key role in some important controversies concerning the effectiveness of Gov't. policy. See Chapters 30 & 31. The scenario explained above requires that everyone have full knowledge of both the exact size of the AD shock & the new equilirium values of both wages and prices. Generally, however, people do not have perfect knowledge & foresight, so there are some temporary real GDP effects until the final equilibrium of wages and prices is reached. Demand Shocks & Business Cycles: Each component of AD is subject to continual random shifts which are sometimes large enough to disturb the economy significantly. Adjustment lags convert such shifts into cyclical fluctuations in Y. The time needed for the economy to adjust depends on the source and magnitude of the shock. It should be noted that using AD to activate the economy may also take time to bring results. Activating existing plants, hiring and training workers takes time. The multiplier process that translates an initial increase in autonomous expenditures to income takes time. However, AD policies are usually faster to work than the automatic adjustment mechanism. 62 The Long Run Aggregate Supply Curve ( LRAS): is AS curve when the economy has fully adjusted to all shocks. There is no excess demand, nor excess supply in any market. It is vertical at potential GDP. This is sometimes called “The classical AS curve”, because classical economists were more inserted in the long run. SEE Fig 26-4 below Figure 26-4 Long-Run Equilibrium and Aggregate Supply Slide 26.6 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman If the economy is already at long run position i.e. Y=Y*, further shifts in AD only causes price level . The LRAS is consistent with any price level. In other words, in the long run the price level can take any value. However, output may be pushed beyond its LR position only if the economy’s capital stock, its technology rise, or the supply of inputs increases. This means that potential GDP (Y*) rises. This implies that LRAS shifts to the right. LR Equilibrium: The Composition of output in The LR: If the economy is already at LR Equilib., a shift in AD because of G and/or I (P & W) SRAS curve P - level (C & NX) (AE= AE 0 & Y=Y*) a rise in autonomous G & I crowds out C & NX => The composition of national output changes. There will be more of public & investment goods but less of consumption and exportable goods. The position of LRAS is determined by past economic growth. 63 Three ways for GDP to change: Figure 26-5 Three Ways that Real GDP Can Increase Slide 26.7 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 1) Increases in AD: if AD shifts, a recessionary gap can be closed. A further shift turns the recessionary gap into on inflationary one. unit cost SRAS closing the gap at a higher price level. 2) Temporary increase in AS: If there is a temporary increase in AS decrease in input prices SRAS shifts downward unit cost . This will have no effect on LRAS and Y*. However if input prices swing up again, the cycle is reversed. 3) Permanent Increase in AS: If the productive capacity of the economy increases, potential GDP increases LRAS shifts to the right. * Sources of LR Econ. Growth (Very Imp.) 1) Governance of the law and equal opportunities 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) Improvement in labor productivity through education and training. Changes in labor laws that reduce rigidities in the labor market. Capital accumulation. Population growth and natural discoveries. Technological breakthroughs. * Sources of cyclical changes in GDP (Very Imp.) Changes in interest rates, exchange rates, government policies ( fiscal, monetary, commercial…etc), input prices, changes in consumer and producers confidence. SEE FIGURE 26-6 below for three different economic series. 64 Figure 26-6 Fluctuations in Economic Activity, 1960-1997 Slide 26.8 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman * The Basic Theory of Fiscal Stabilization: FIG.26-7 & 8 The basic power of fiscal policy is our knowledge about which direction it should take. However, there are problems with knowing the right timing, magnitude and mixture. *Using fiscal policy to eliminate a recessionary gap: Fig.26-7 Figure 26-7 The Closing of a Recessionary Gap Slide 26.9 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman a) If we rely on market automatic adjustment mechanism, SRAS shifts to the right but it could take time. b) Using fiscal policy (G , or T , or both) AD shifts . This method shortens the period required to close the gap, but it could take place at the same time when private decision makers are 65 increasing their expenditures. The AD curve may shift too much to the right creating an inflationary gap. * Using Fiscal Policy to eliminate an Inflationary gap: Fig 26-8: An opposite reasoning to the one above. Figure 26-8 The Closing of an Inflationary Gap Slide 26.10 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman * A Key Proposition: when the automatic adjustment mechanism fails to operate quickly enough, there is room for stabilizing fiscal policy. This has been the way countries dealing with the recession resulting from the international financial crisis (2007- ); mainly through injecting government expenditures and money supply into the financial and real sectors of the economies, in addition to lowering the interest rates (Using monetary policy.) * The Paradox of Thrift: states that an increase in savings at the individual level can be good, but it may be bad if it is widespread in the whole economy, reducing real GDP in the short run. A rise in S AE . The policy implication of the paradox of thrift is that in case of a major and persistent recession the govt. should indulge in a budget deficit i.e. should have G>T. The government should borrow and spend, not the other way around. Limitation: It works as long as Y<Y* only. When Y=Y*, a rise in AE & AD only rises the P-level. In the LR, economic growth is determined by the position of LRAS. * Automatic stabilizers: Even in the absence of active fiscal policy, the existence of taxes and transfer payments act as automatic stabilizers to the economy. T –G = tY-G. In case of recession, as Y .This reduces leakages from the economy, puts a partial break to the downward shift of AD. Also, during recession, transfer payments (like unemployment insurance & social security) , slowing AD shift. In the case of a booming economy, the opposite is true. Tax revenues are said procyclical (They go up in booms & go down in recessions.) Limitations of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 1)Lags: 66 a) Decision lags: changes in fiscal policy may require the approval of different govt. organizations. Also, whose taxes and how much should they be changed? What expend. Should be increased or decreased? b) Execution lags: time between a decision taken and implementation. The economic consequences may take some time to be felt. It is possible that by the time a given policy decision has any impact on the economy, the behavior of the private sector may shift the AD curve too far, converting a recessionary gap into an inflationary one. SEE FIG. 26-9 below. Figure 26-9 Effects of Fiscal Policies That Are Not Reversed Slide 26.11 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 2) Temporary vs. Permanent Policy Changes: Temporary tax measures are generally less effective than measures that are expected to be permanent. If households feel that tax cuts are to last for short periods, they will adjust their consumption very little. This issue is discussed in ore detail in Chap. 32. The Role of Discretionary Fiscal Policy: Fine Tuning: Trying to use economic policy to remove or to offset all fluctuations in private -sector spending to hold GDP near its potential at all times. However, the above – mentioned difficulties must be remembered. Gross Tuning: Many economists still argue that when the recessionary gap is large and persistent, occasional (gross) tuning must be used. FISCAL POLICY AND GROWTH (V.V.Imp): The desirability of using fiscal policy to stabilize the economy depends upon: a) The speed of the economy's own adjustment mechanism. b) in an economy that is at or near its potential level, expansive FP may lower national saving and national asset formation and consequently lowers future economic growth. HOWEVER, THIS IS A VERY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE. It depends on how and where government is spending. SEE CHAPTER 32 on "GOVERNMENT DEBT & DEFICITS". Paul Krugman: Business vs. Economics - NYTimes.com The article explains the differences between managing a business and managing a whole economy http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/03/opinion/paul-krugman-business-vseconomics.html?emc=edit_th_20141103&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=40845485&_r=0 END OF CHAPTER 26 67 Chapter 27: The Nature of Money & Monetary Institutions What is Money? * Money is a generally accepted medium of exchange. * Functions of money:1) A medium for exchange 2) A store of value 3) A standard of measurement of value 4) A means for deferred payments (debts) What are the attributes necessary for an asset to serve as money? The attributes of money: homogeneous, recognizable, divisible, portable, and storable and stable in value. Humanity has known many different forms of money such as precious stones, leather, salt, copper, gold and silver. Under a bi- metallic monetary system ( where two metals, such as gold and silver, serve as money at some exchange rate ratio between the tow), a phenomenon called the Gresham’s Law could take place. Gresham’s Law says: Bad money drives out good money out of circulation. This could happen if something happens that generates an abnormal rise in demand for one of the two metals such that the official exchange rate is no longer acceptable in the market. The “good” money, whose exchange value has increased, will disappear from circulation. People will hold on to it, and the other, “bad” money, will be used in transactions. In today’s world, most of money is accounting, electronic money. Question: Can Gresham’s Law phenomenon take place in today’s world? * How do commercial banks affect money supply in the economy.? * Assumptions: 1) Money supply is currency plus demand deposits at banks. 2) There is only one type of assets: (loans), only one type of liabilities: (demand deposits). Liabilities generate costs, assets generate revenues. 3) Banks hold a fixed ratio of cash and reserves to deposits, required by the central bank. E.g. 20%. 4) No cash drain form banks households keep a fixed amount of cash with them. See Tables 27-3 -10 below. 68 * Accounting identity: Assets Cash and other reserves Loans Assets = Equity + Liabilities. TABLE 27-3 The Initial Balance Sheet of Incidental Bank and Trust (IB&T) = 200 900 1,100 Equities +Liabilities Deposits 1,000 Capital 100 1,100 IB&T has a reserve of 20 percent of its deposit liabilities. The commercial bank earns money by finding profitable investments for much of the money deposited with it. In this balance sheet, loans are its earning assets. In table 27-3 above * Amount of loans= (Equities + liabilities) - cash and reserves * Final change in deposits (for the whole banking system) = Change in Reserves Required Reserve Ratio (ν) Where 1/ν is the money multiplier. EX: If the change in reserves is 100, and the required reserve ratio (RRR) is 20%, the final change in deposits is: = 100 = 100 = (100)(5)= 500. In this case the money multiplier =5 0.2 2/10 * The assumption of no cash drain implies: in money supply = in deposits The change of money supply by commercial banks is not an automatic process. It depends on 1) Risk perceived by banks and 2) Expected change in future interest rates, and 3) The preferences of banks and households. All of these factors have an impact on money supply in the economy. TABLE 27-4 IB&T's Balance Sheet Immediately After a New Deposit of $100 Assets Cash and other reserves Loans ___________________ 300 900 Liabilities Deposits 1,100 Capital 100 1200 1200 The deposit raises deposit liabilities and cash assets by the same amount. Because both cash and deposits rise by $100, the bank's actual reserve ratio, formerly 0.20, increases to 0.27. The bank has more cash than it needs to provide a 20 percent reserve against its deposit liabilities. 69 TABLE 27-5 IB&T's Balance Sheet after a New Loan and Cash Drain of S80 Assets Liabilities _______________________________________________________ Cash and other reserves 220 Deposits 1,100 Loans 980 Capital 100 1200 1,200 * in loans = in deposits - in required reserves IB&T lends its surplus cash and suffers a cash drain. The bank keeps $20 as a reserve against the initial new deposit of $100. It lends $80 to a customer, who writes a check to someone who deals with another bank. When the check is cleared, IB&T suffers an $80 cash drain. Comparing Tables 27-3 and 27-5 shows that the bank has increased its deposit liabilities by the $100 initially deposited and has increased its assets by $20 of cash reserves and $80 of new loans. It has also restored its required reserve ratio of 0.20. TABLE 27-6 Changes in the Balance Sheets of Second-Generation Banks Assets Liabilities Cash and other reserves 16 Deposits +80 Loans + 64 _____________________________________________________ _ +80 +80 Second-generation banks receive cash deposits and expand loans. The second-generation banks gain new deposits of $80 as a result of the loan granted by IB&T, which is used to make payments to customers of the second-generation banks. These banks keep 20 percent of the cash that they acquire as their required reserve against the new deposit, and they can make new loans using the other 80 percent. When the customers who borrowed the money make payments to the customers of third-generation banks, a cash drain occurs. TABLE 27-7 The Sequence of Loans and Deposit After a Single New Deposit of $100 Addition to Bank, New Deposits New Loans Reserves IB&T 2nd-generation bank 3rd-generation bank 4th-generation bank Sth-generation bank 6th-generation bank $100.00 80.00 64.00 51.20 40.96 32.77 $80.00 64.00 51.20 40.96 32.77 26.22 $20.00 16.00 12.80 10.24 8.19 6.55 70 7th-generation bank 26.22 20.98 5.24 Sth-generation bank 20.98 16.78 4.20 9th-generation bank 16.78 13.42 3.36 lOth-generation bank 13.42 10.74 2.68 ________________________________________________________________ Total for first 10 generations 446.33 357.07 89.26 All remaining generations 53.67 42.93 10.74 Total for banking system 500.00 400.00 100.00 The banking system as a whole can create deposit money whenever it receives new deposits. The table shows the process of the creation of deposit money on the assumptions that all the loans made by one set of banks end up as deposits in another set of banks {the next-generation banks, that the required reserve ratio {v) is 0.20, and that banks always lend out any excess reserves. Although each bank suffers a cash drain whenever it grants a new loan, the system as a whole does not, and in a series of steps it increases deposit money by l/v, which, in this example, is five times the amount of any increase in reserves that it obtains. TABLE 27-8 Change in the Combined Balance Sheets of All the Banks in the System Following The Multiple Expansion of Deposits Assets Liabilities _________________________________________________________ Cash and other reserves +100 Deposits +500 Loans +400 _________________________________________________________ +500 +500 The reserve ratio is returned to 0.20. The entire initial deposit of $100 ends up as reserves of the banking system. Therefore, deposits rise by (1/0.2) times the initial deposit-that is, by $500. TABLE 27-9 Change in the Combined Balance Sheets of All the Banks in the System Following the Multiple Expansion of Deposits with a Cash Drain of $20 Assets Liabilities _______________________________________________________________ Cash and other reserves +80 Deposits +400 Loans +320 _______________________________________________________________ +400 +400 The reserve ratio is 0.20, and cash drain is 0.05. Only $80 of the initial deposit of $100 ends up as reserves of the banking system. Deposits therefore rise by (1/0.2) times the $80-that is, by $400. The cash drain ($20) is 5 percent of the increase in deposits ($400). Note: Change in Deposits= (1/(1/5) ) ( Change in Res.) = (5) (80)= 400 Change in Loans = Change in Dep. – Change in Res.= 400- 80= 320 71 THE MONEY SUPPLY : The total stock of money in the economy at any moment is called the money supply or the supply of money. Economists use alternative definitions of MS. Definitions of Money Supply: See table 27-10 below. M1 concentrates on the medium- ofexchange function of money. M2 & M3 contain assets that serve the temporary store- of – value function and are in practice quickly convertible into a medium of exchange. TABLE 27-10 Money Supply in the United States, November 1997 " I (billions of dollars) Currency Demand deposits Traveler's checks Other checkable deposits 421.9 391.0 8.2 243.0 M1 Money market mutual fund balances Money market deposit accounts and savings deposits Small-denomination time deposits M2 Large-denomination time deposits Term repurchase agreements Term Eurodollars Institutional money market mutual funds M3 1,064.1 590.4 1,380.2 963.2 3,997.9 573.4 2 33.5 133.9 346.4 5,285.1 The three widely used measures of the money supply are M1, M2, and M3. The narrow definition of the money supply concentrates on what can be used directly as a medium of exchange. The broader definitions add in deposits that serve the store-of-value function and can be readily converted to a medium of exchange. Note that M1 includes traveler's checks held by the public, which are clearly a medium of exchange. Within M3, repurchase agreements are funds lent out on the overnight money market, and Eurodollars are U.S. dollar-denominated deposits in U.S. banks located outside the United States. M2 and M3 include similar items, with the difference in most cases being that the term deposits are in MJ and the demand deposits in M2. (Source: Economic Report of the President, 1998.) Students should look at SAMA Annual Report for definition and measures of monetary aggregates in Saudi Arabia. http://www.sama.gov.sa NEAR MONEY & MONEY SUBSTITUTES: An important debate of monetary policy centers on what is the appropriate definition of money. The problem arises because some assets perform poorly as a store- of –value, while others perform poorly as a medium- of – exchange. For example during 72 times of inflation, currency (or M1 assets in general) may well serve as a medium- of exchange , but poorly as a store of value. In contrast, heavy gold bars (& M2 and M3 assets) may do the opposite. Assets that fulfill adequately the store- of – value function and are readily convertible into a medium of exchange, but are not themselves mediums of exchange (such as M2 & M3) are sometimes called near money. Usually M1 assets do not earn any income, while M2 & M3 do. Why would anyone hold M1 assets? It is because of the transaction costs (the cost of inconvenience in this case) involved in converting assets back and forth from one account into another. Things that serve as temporary media of exchange but are not a store of value are sometimes called money substitutes. Credit cards are a prime example. CHOOSING A MEASURE: The definition of money supply for the purpose of conducting monetary policy, has been debated among economists at least as early as the eighteenth century. The specifics of the definition will continue to change over time as new monetary assets are developed to serve some if not all the functions of money. For the purpose of this course, we will focus on the medium- of – exchange function of money and hence money will be currency plus deposits that can be withdrawn and converted on a very short notice. Question1: What is the difference between total stock of money and GDP? Question2: How do we classify ATM cards? Are they near monies or money substitutes? THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MONEY THE CLASSICAL VIEW: Economists of the eighteenth & nineteenth centuries claimed that potential GDP(Y*) is independent from monetary factors. They distinguished sharply between the "real sector" and the "monetary sector" of the economy. This is now referred o as the Classical dichotomy. According to this view: 1) The allocation of resources, and hence the determination of real GDP, is determined only by the real sector of the economy. 2) It is relative prices, including the level of wages relative to the price of commodities, that matter for this process. 3) The price level is determined in the monetary sector of the economy. i.e the p- Level is determined by the rate of growth of money supply (MS.) 4) If the quantity of money were doubled, other things being equal, the prices of all commodities and money (nominal) income would double. Relative prices would remain unchanged, & the real sector of the economy would be unaffected. 5) The doctrine that the quantity of money influences the level of money prices but has no effect on the real part of the economy is called the neutrality of money. Money is spoken of as a "veil" behind which occur the real events that affect material well-being. THE MODERN VIEW: 1) most modern economists accept the insights of the Classical economists that relative prices are the major determinant of the allocation of resources, and that the quantity of money has a lot to do with determining the absolute level of prices. 2) They accept the neutrality of money in the LR when all forces causing change have fully worked themselves out. 3) However, they do not accept the neutrality of money when the economy is adjusting to the forces that caused it to change- that is when the economy is not in a state of LR equilibrium. 4) Consequently, they reject the Classical dichotomy of the economy in the SR. 5) The LR neutrality of money makes modern economists stress the strong link between money & the P- Level, especially over long periods of time. 73 Figure27-1 below gives long run perspective on prices in the USA. Two things stand out from the figure. First, there have been periods of dramatic price reductions. Second, there has been more or less uninterrupted increase in the P- level – positive inflation rates- since the end of World War II. Figure 27-1 An Index of Producer Prices in the United States 1785-1997 (1967 = 100) ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman END OF CHAPTER 27 74 Slide 27.2 Chapter 28: MONEY, OUTPUT, & PRICES The relationship between the interest rate & the price of a bond: If i↑→ Pb ↓ & vise versa why? Suppose i = 5% per year & the price of a bond, Pb= SR100. At the end of the year, the investor has SR 105. if i↓ to 3% how much does the investor need to invest in order to get SR105? Answer: he needs to invest more than 100, Hence, as i ↓, Pb ↑ and visa versa. For simplicity, we assume that (wealth) is only Money balances + Bonds. In a capitalist economy, the interest rate represents the opportunity cost of holding money. What is the opportunity cost of holding money in an Islamic economy? Q: If there is an opportunity cost to holding money, why do people hold money? The motives for the demand for money (Why Do People Hold Money?):1) The Transaction Motive: payments & receipts are rarely synchronized. Thus, people & firms need to hold money to conduct their transactions. The size of the transaction demand for money is affected by the size and no. of transactions, which is affected by level of income (GDP). MTr = f (Y+). 2) The Precautionary Motive: To cover the holders of money against emergency situations when payments are suddenly > receipts. The amount held for those purposes is a function of the cost of borrowing & the level of income. MPr = f (i-, y+ ). 3) The Speculative Motive: This was first discussed by John Maynard Keynes & later explained further by James Tobin, the1981 Noble Laureate in Economics. This demand for money is driven by speculative expectations about future interest rates & the prices of stocks and bonds. MSP= f(i-). Because their prices fluctuate, stocks and bonds are risky assets. Many H.H & firms are risk averse. Investors must balance the expected interest or profit from bonds and stocks against the risk of price fluctuations. Thus, they try to diversify their holdings between money and financial assets. REAL & NOMINAL MONEY BALANCES: Real values are measured in purchasing power units; nominal values are measured in money units. The real demand for money is the nominal quantity divided by the price level: md = Md/ P. If increases in nominal money balances are matched by a rise in the P- Level, the increase in real balances is that much reduced. Demand for real money balances is determined by real GDP (Y) & i. However, the nominal demand for money, Md = f ( p+, y+, i-). So if y & i are held constant, a rise in P increases Md proportionately. Note: the three motives are not "visible" in reality, but each is partially responsible for the total demand for money. See FIG 28-1 below. The relationship between i & Md is called the liquidity preference function (LP). 75 Figure 28-1 The Demand for Money as a Function of Interest Rates, Income, and the Price Level ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 28.2 Monetary Equilib. & Aggregate Demand The liquidity Preference (Portfolio Balance) Theory of the Interest Rate (A Keynesian Theory of what determines the interest rate): Monetary equilib. occurs when the supply and demand for money are equal. In the money market, the interest rate is the "price" that adjusts to bring about equilib. The LP theory implies that the interest rate is determined in the monetarysector, rather than the real sector of the economy, (contrary to the neo-classical belief.) Figure 28-2 The Liquidity Preference Theory of Interest Slide 28.3 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman If, for some reason, the economy is at i1 → ED for money. How does the Mkt adjust? ED for money→ people sell some bonds ( or any other assets they have) → Pb↓ → i↑→ the opp. cost of holding money ↑→ demand for money ↓ (moving upward along LP-Function) until the economy rests at i0. Alternatively: if i=i2 , → ES: The scenario is reversed. 76 The Quality of theory of money The quantity theory of money is a famous theory that relates the quantity of nominal money in an economy to its price level. The theory can be set out in the following equations. Equation (1) states that the demand for nominal money balances, Dm, depends on the value of transactions as measured by nominal GDP, which is real GDP, Y, multiplied by the price level. P: Dm = kPY (1) Equation (2) states that the supply of nominal money, M, is exogenously determined by the central bank (or under the gold standard by past gold flows from abroad) at some given level Ms: M = Ms, (2) Equation (3) states the equilibrium condition that the demand for money must equal the supply: Dm = Ms, (3) Substitution from eqns (2) and (3) into eqn (1) yields. Ms = kPY (4) Rearranging (4) gives P = Ms/kY (5) The original classical quantity theory assumes that K is a constant given by the transactions demand for money and that Y is constant because potential GDP is maintained. Letting (1/kY) = a we can write: P = aMs. (6) In words, the price level is determined by the quantity of money. By taking first differences (ΔP – aΔM), we derive the prediction that changes in the price level will be proportional to changes in the quantity of money, or equivalently that the rate of inflation will be equal to the rate of growth of the money supply if Y remains constant at its potential level. Alternatively, if Y is growing at a constant rate, a constant price level requires that the money supply grows at the same rate. Although we know that GDP does not stay constant at its potential level, but instead cycles around it, the theory can be interpreted as showing what will happen when GDP is at potential. The quantity theory is often presented using the equation of exchange: MsV = PY, (7) Where V is the velocity of circulation of money. From equation (5), V is just the reciprocal of K. Thus it makes no difference whether we choose to work with K or V. So if K is assumed to be constant, V must also be constant. Velocity can be interpreted as showing the average amount of ‘work’ done by a unit of money. If annual money GDP is £600 billion and the stock of money is £200 billion, on average each pund’s worth of money is used three times to create the values added that compose GDP. An example may help to illustrate the interpretation of each. Suppose that the stock of money that people wish to hold equals one-fifth of the value of total transactions. Thus K is 0.2, and V, the reciprocal of K, is 5. If the money supply is to be one-fifth of the value of annual transactions, each pound must be ‘used’ on average five times. The modern version of the quantity theory does not assume that k and V are exogenously fixed. However, it does argue that they will not change in response to a change in the quantity of money. Considering only potential GDP and dividing (7) by Y we obtain. P = MV/Y. (8) If we assume that V is constant and use a for the constant value of V/Y, we obtain, once again, that P=aM (9) Which only shows that it does not matter whether we state the theory in terms of k, the fraction of GDP that people wish to hold as money balances or V, the amount of times that the typical unite of money must change hands to create the existing level of GDP. The Transmission Mechanism: The mechanism by which disturbances in the monetary (financial) sector are transmitted to the real sector. It goes in 3 stages. 1) Disturbance of Md & Ms affects the interest rate. 2) From the interest rate to Investment, consumption & AE 3) From AE into AD & GDP See Fig28-3 ,-4 -5 & -6 77 Monetary equilib. can be disturbed either because of a change in money supply or money demand. Figure 28-3 Monetary Disturbances and Interest Rate Changes ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 28.4 Figure 28-4 The Effects of Changes in the Money Supply on Investment Expendi ture ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 28.5 Figure 28-5 The Effects of Changes in the Money Supply on Aggregate Demand ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 78 Slide 28.6 Figure 28-6 Transmission Mechanism for an Expansionary Monetary Shock ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 28.7 The transmission mechanism shows the very important role of the interest rate in “regulating” the capitalist economy. It affects both the monetary & real sectors of the economy. AGG . DEMAND & AGG .Supply: A rise in money supply causes AD to shift upward, but because the price level may rise (SRAS is upward sloping), the increase in real GDP is less than the horizontal shift of AD. SEE Fig 28-7 below. Figure 28-7 The Effects of Changes in the Money Supply ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 79 Slide 28.8 A Further look at the slope of the AD:In previous chapters, we explained the downward slope of AD on the basis of: a) The wealth effect: As P-level ↑→real wealth ↓→ AE↓→ AD↓ b) The substitution effect: as P-level ↑→ people substitute foreign goods for domestic goods → AE ↓ →AD ↓ c) Now the interest rate effect: if P-level ↑→Md ↑, if Ms=Ms0 (i.e. central bank does not increase MS) → i ↑ → (I &C )↓ →AD↓ This link is very important because it is known empirically that the interest rate is the most important link between the monetary sector & real expenditure flows. More on The Automatic Adjustment Mechanism: a) The rise in the demand for factors of production →their prices↑→ profits ↓ →firms reduce output & employment of factors of production →SRAS shifts upward. b) As AD ↑→ P ↑→ i↑ (provided MS is constant) →I↓→ AE↓, AD↓(a movement along the AD). Thus, the interest rate effect reinforces the automatic adjustment mechanism to close a GDP gap in the economy. . Note that (a) above, operates on the supply side of the market and (b) operates on the demand side of the market. An Important Proposition: A sufficiently large increase in the P-level will eventually eliminate any inflationary gap, provided there is no further increase in money supply. Frustration of The Adjustment Mechanism: Q: what happens if the central bank continues to increase MS? See fig. 28-8 below. Figure 28-8 Frustration of the Adjustment Mechanism ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 80 Slide 28.9 An Expansionary Monetary Policy → AD0 → AD1→ inflationary gap (y↑ &P↑). If this is a once and –for- all increase in Ms → the automatic adjustment mechanism will close the gap → SRAS shifts upward. However, if the central bank continues its expansionary monetary policy, the automatic adjustment mech. is frustrated, AD shifts to AD2, GDP stays at Y0. However, P↑↑. Inflation is said to be validated. The Strength (effectiveness) of the Monetary Policy(V.V.Imp.): Fig.28-9 below shows that the adjustment mechanism operates to insure that in the LR, regardless of the rate of growth of the money supply, real GDP converges to its potential level. This is often referred to as the long run neutrality of money. In other words, in the long run changes in the rate of growth of money supply cannot influence potential real GDP. This is a much- debated issue. Figure 28-9 The Long-Run Neutrality of Money ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 28.10 Short Run Effects Of Money Supply: Two views on The Strength of Monetary policy. 10 ( V.V. Imp.) See Fig 28- Figure 28-10 Two Views on the Strength of Monetary Changes Slide 28.11 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Effective Monetary Policy Requires Two Conditions: 1) a relatively inelastic function of the demand for money (LP has relatively sharp slope) 81 2) a relatively elastic demand for investment. (MEI slope is relatively small). What does each condition mean? The monetarists' view is that monetary policy is effective (the upper panel of the figure.)The lower panel represents the Keynesian view that monetary policy is ineffective. The Keynesian alternative to activate the economy would be fiscal policy. END of Chapter 28 82 Chapter 29: Monetary Policy Policy Instruments: OMO, RRR, DR, CREDIT CONTROLS Intermediate Targets Ms, i, ER Policy Variables (Ultimate Targets) GDP(y), P - level (P) & Unemp. (u) I) Policy Instruments: - are tools in the hands of the Central Bank to conduct Monetary Policy. These are: 1) Open Market Operations (OMO):The central bank buying & selling govt. securities (bonds). If the C.B. would like to increase money supply, the C. B. buys govt. securities from individuals, firms, or the gov't. and gives them money in return. It issues a check against itself. The check holder deposits it in his bank account → Deposits at banks ↑→ The Bank deposits the check in its acct. at the CB.→ Bank reserves (or the monetary base= C +R)↑→ the bank's ability to extend loans & accept deposits ↑. To reduce Money Supply, the C.B. sells govt. securities. See table 29.1 2) Required Reserves Ratio (RRR): assuming banks are loaned up (no excess reserves). If the CB increases the RRR, banks must reduce deposits. This is done by: a) not extending new loans b) calling back some old loans →deposits at Banks ↓ →MS ↓ The impact on MS of increasing RRR is definite i.e it reduces money supply. However, if the Central Bank decreases RRR→ Banks will have more reserves →Banks can, but do not have to extend more loans and accept more deposits. The impact on MS of reducing RRR is not definite. It depends upon Banks' decisions to lend, and decisions of H.H. and Firms to borrow. 3) The Discount Rate:- is the interest rate at which the Central Bank lends to commercial banks to meet short terms shortages of reserves. The CB is said to be a lender of last resort. The operation is conducted through the discount window. The discount rate as a cost of borrowing, affects directly interest rates charged by commercial banks. It is called the discount rate because for banks to borrow from the CB, they sell some of their holdings of government bonds to the CB at a discount of the face value. In Saudi Arabia, the discount rate (when banks borrow from SAMA) is called the "Repo". When banks have excess liquidity and deposit additional reserves with SAMA, they get an interest rate called "Reverse Repo." 83 4) Credit Controls: like maximum interest rates on consumer loans, mortgage rates, margin requirements…. Etc. Check SAMA and CBB (Central Bank of Bahrain) web cites for consumer credit controls. A Review of The Transmission Mechanism: Figure 29-1 Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Equilibrium Sli de 29.2 ©1999 Addison Wes ley Longman II) Policy Variables & Policy Instruments: The CB policy variables (The variables that it would like to influence) are real GDP, the P-Level, & unemployment. Monetary policy shifts the AD curve and changes P & Y simultaneously. Therefore, the CB cannot control both independently. If it targets one, it must accept the consequences for the other. For this reason, the CB often, but not always, concentrates on nominal GDP, (PY) as a target in the SR. Sometimes the CB may want to target inflation. However, in the wake of the current financial crisis, CB’s of industrial countries, like the USA, have been targeting unemployment, and later they shifted to targeting the inflation rate. See the article at the end of the chapter. Monetary policy and LRSA: It is argued by some economists (called monetarists) that in LR, monetary policy have no impact on LRAS, and thus in LR monetary policy can only influence the Plevel. This is called the principle of the neutrality of money. This is a highly controversial issue. The alleged LR neutrality of money (that money cannot affect LR GDP) led many CB's to concentrate on the inflation rate as the LR target of monetary policy. The European Central Bank (ECB) is an example. The first Chairman of the ECB, Wilhelm Duisenberg said in the inaugural speech of the ECB (January 1999) "Monetary policy is neither the cause, nor the cure of unemployment." This means that the prime policy target variable for the ECB has been price level stability (i.e. fighting inflation). Consequently, the charter of the ECB does not allow it to purchase government bonds, and thus is not supposed to participate in financing budget deficits of the member governments. Governments are supposed to float bonds in the market. This has changed a bit, however, with the current financial crisis, since 2008, as the ECB has been participating in stabilizing European economies, and purchased large amounts governments' bonds. The process has been called “ Quantitative Easing”. Send end of the chapter for an article on this issue. III) Intermediate Targets: i, MS, & ER Daily information about policy variables(Y, P, &U) is rarely available. Hence, policy makers typically use intermediate targets indicated above. To serve as a target, a variable must satisfy two criteria. First, information about it must be available on frequent basis- daily if possible. Second, its movements must be closely correlated with those of the policy variable. 84 Since the C.B. can not effect directly the policy variables (Y, P, U) it tries to influence what is called intermediate targets (the Ms or i). These are not independent from each other, targeting one automatically determines the other. See Fig,29-2 below. It may sound immaterial which variable to target. In reality, they are not the same. Figure 29-2 Alternative Intermediate Targets ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 29.3 Debate about Intermediate Targets Targeting the Interest Rate:Monetarists argue that the interest rate is pro-cyclical (i.e. it rises in booms, & decreases in recessions). Thus, it is hard to tell whether the interest rate is changing due to the phase of the business cycle or due to C.B Policy. Monetarist Prefer the C.B. concentration on monetary aggregates (the growth rate of money supply), in particular on M1. The Keynesian Counter Argument:1) Targeting money supply is a reasonable policy only if the function of the demand for money is stable. In many cases, it is not. In the figure 29-3 below, the C.B. fights inflationary pressures by reducing MS (so that i ↑). However, if L.P. function isn’t stable and for some reason LP↓, i ↓ instead of rising, 2) Also, which monetary aggregate to target? Suppose CB targets M1. If there is change in households preferences from demand deposits into saving deposits → M1↓ & M2↑. The CB may have to change its target accordingly. Most central banks today (Before the current financial crisis 2008- ) concentrate on the interest rate as their prime intermediate target. Figure 29-3 Intermediate Targets When the Demand for Money Shifts ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 85 Slide 29.4 The Role of Exchange Rate:Changes in the ER can affect X &M →affect AE & AD→(Y&P) Two sources of change in ER:a) If X↑→ demand for the country's currency ↑→ ER↓(currency appreciates)→ (AE=AD) ↑→P↑ in other words, the sources of change in ER is in this case is a rise in demand for exports. The CB may try to curb inflation by trying to restrain the economy close to its potential.( Does this sound a wise policy ?) b) The other case:- suppose there is a rise in the demand for the country’s financial assets (stocks & bonds )→demand for currency of the country ↑→ ER↓ (currency appreciates) → (X ↓ & M ↑ )→ AD ↓ →P↓. The C.B may try to stimulate the economy by trying to keep GDP close to its potential Conclusion: Movements in the ER can provide valuable information for the conduct of monetary policy. The two cases above show that although in both cases the ER appreciates, yet the source of change could have very different impact on the conduct of monetary policy and the economy. LAGS IN THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY A Historical Debate (See Application 29-1): Monetarists believe that monetary policy is very powerful in affecting the economy in the SR. Keynesians believe otherwise. The source of debate goes at least as early as the great depression, which was accompanied,( may have been started), by bank failures in the US →MS↓→AD↓ The counter argument was that the great depression in Canada & UK wasn’t accompanied by bank failures, so there wasn’t a reduction in MS. The debate involved more than just the size of the effect of change in MS. It focused on factors that are thought to render monetary policy ineffective. The debate centered on lags & uncertainty: Sources of execution lags in monetary policy: monetary policy may not be effective because of execution lags due to (1) lags in creation and destruction of demand deposits: it depends upon decisions by both commercial banks, households and businesses. (2) Investment plans take time to be decided upon & implemented (3) The full multiplier effect takes time to show its impact on the economy. The long & variable execution lags makes monetary fine tuning difficult & may be destabilizing to the economy. A MONETARY RULE: Monetarists believe that: Monetary policy is a potent (effective) force of expansionary & contractionary pressures; 1) Monetary policy works with long & variable lags; 2) The CB may indulge in sudden & sharp reversals in its policies. 86 Monetarists believe that the CB should stop stabilizing the economy. Instead, it should expand MS, year in and year out at a constant rate that is equal to the rate of growth of real GDP. When the rate of growth shows signs of long-term change, the CB adjusts the rate of money expansion. Many other economists disagree with the monetarists and believe that fine tuning of MS can in principle reduce cyclical GDP fluctuations. The possibility of an unstable function of the demand for money, explained earlier, is mentioned as a major counter argument. In this case, a constant –money rule may be destabilizing. LESSONS FOR MONETARY POLICY: Inflation & Monetary Growth: Does an increase in the rate of money growth rate necessarily cause a rise in the inflation rate? The relationship is not so tight to be viewed as automatic or mechanical, nor does it appear to resolve the issue of causality. In other words, is it as MS ↑ → P-level ↑ ? Or is it that as the P-level ↑ , MS has to rise ? Historical experience shows that unless the economy is under great recession or depression, there is an unmistakable connection between MS & the P- level. Monetarists believe in the first line of causality. Others believe money expansion was mainly a passive reaction to price increases caused by aggregate supply shocks. An important lesson : a sharp reduction in monetary growth led to high interest rates, a sever recession, and a dramatic reduction in inflation in the USA in the early 1980s. The experience of the 1990's ,shows that in the presence of AD shocks, GDP growth and inflation are positively related. In the presence of AS shocks, GDP growth and inflation are negatively related. The growth of the American (and other western) economies in the late 1990's can be explained by the following examples of AS shock events: a) The collapse of the Southeast Asian economies that began in 1997-1998 led to a reduction in those countries' demand for raw materials. The reduction in world input prices implied a positive AS shock to western economies. But it also meant a negative AD shock (reduction of exports) to oil exporting countries. b) Also, as the currencies of Asian countries depreciated, the cost of imports from these counties declined, thus reinforcing the Positive AS shock to western economies. c) The collapse of the USSR (the former Soviet Union) in the early 1990s enabled the USA to reduce military spending & relieved resources for civilian use. The Stock Market: How would a negative shock to the stock mkt. (such as the crash of October 19, 1978 in the USA) affect the economy & monetary policy? How was a crisis avoided? A fall in stock of money and decrease in prices coupled with rising interest rates was expected to slow economic expansion. The crash had a smaller effect on the American economy than expected. This was largely due to strong infusion of liquidity by the Fed into the American economy. A similar infusion of liquidity took place in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers Bank and the beginning of 87 the current financial crisis in September 2008.While it did not prevent a crisis, it reduced the severity of its impact on the Industrial economies. How would a positive shock to the stock mkt. (Such as that of 1994-1998) affect the economy & monetary policy? A rise in prices of bonds implies wealth of H.H rise, which in turn implies consumption rises. The American economy was already heating up. Because of the height of the stock market (Dow Jones reached 9000 points) a crash was expected. This would have decreased H.H wealth significantly & reduce AD. What was the impact of the crash of he Saudi Stock Market in May 2004 and the Big Stock market Crash of February, 2006? How different was it from the US case? CONCLUSIONS: 1) The economy is too complex for simple monetary rule to provide the best monetary policy. 2) Monetary policy can vary between being restrictive & expansive for reasons that are related to shifts in the private sector's demand for money, and not necessarily related to change in CB policy. 3) To judge the stance (position) of current monetary policy, the CB needs to monitor a number of variables. 4) Contrary to what was once believed, monetary policy is a very potent tool for influencing AD. It may be difficult, however to predict how fast & how strongly a given policy will operate, but if the CB is prepared enough, it can reduce inflation. 5) There is room for debate about whether the result is worth the cost (in terms of GDP). 88 More on the neutrality of money Are there real effects when the economy is hit by a temporary monetary shock? Given a fully anticipated, fully accommodated two percent inflation, this means temporary increases in the rates of monetary expansion and inflation above 2 per cent. However, when considering neutrality theories it is simpler to study an economy with a stable price level, in which case a monetary shock means a once-and-for-all injection of new money and a temporary inflation that causes a once-andfor-all increase in the price level. Short-run neutrality An extreme version of neutrality states that anticipated monetary shocks have no real short-run effects. Assume a monetary shock that would raise the price level by 10 per cent. If it is perfectly foreseen, everyone will alter their prices when the shock occurs. Hence, there will be no changes in relative prices and no real effects. In practice, because monetary impulses cannot be generated instantaneously, it takes real time for money to be injected into the economy, and for the effects to work out. Although these transition effects are not included in the equilibrium theories of micro economics, they are important in practice. An increment to the money supply is typically fed into the system by the central bank buying short-term securities to drive down the short-term interest rate and increase lending to their customers. This increases demand in the first instance on the part of those who sell to the recipients of the new loans. Profit maximization requires that those who first gain an increase in the demand for their products should raise output (and possibility prices) even if they know that eventually the prices of everything else will rise and they will be induced to go back to their original level of output at the higher price. So all that is needed for short-run non-neutrality is that the monetary impulse is injected over a period of time, that not all agents receive the injection initially, and that it takes time to work through the economy—no one has ever identified a real economy where this is not so. Indeed, if money was neutral in the short run, the sort of monetary policy that is practiced by the central banks of many countries, including the bank of England, would be ineffective. Long-run neutrality: A more controversial version of the doctrine of neutrality states that the monetary shocks have no real effects over the long run. Note that the effects of changes in the price level are typically only studied in macro models. Virtually all Micro theory texts deal with real quantities and relative prices, while saying nothing about 89 absolute prices or other monetary effects. Because they do not include the monetary side of the economy, they are not set up to consider the question of the possible interactions between the real and monetary sides over any run. In many major macro models money is neutral.. Thus the amount of money determines only the level of money prices and has no effect on real equilibrium GDP. Although there is a monetary sector in these models, it is only specified in terms of macro variables. The real micro relations that, when disturbed in the short run might have long run effects are not included in the model. Both of these equilibrium types of model, micro and macro, omit some key behaviors in the real economy that blurs the division between the real and the monetary sectors. The structure of the economy is continually being altered by endogenously generated changes in product, new production processes, and new firms are to a great extend financed by credit. Thus credit conditions can alter the flow of production based on new technologies. So a once-and-for-all bout of credit contraction designed to reduce the quantity of money (or reduce its rate of growth), not matched in other countries, can restrict the flow of funds to the local firms innovating some new technology. This can give a first entry advantage to firms in other countries and thus affect the future course of technological evolution, and hence the nature of employment, GDP, and economic growth over the foreseeable future. There are other possible long-lasting effects of a monetary disturbance. For example, since contracts set in monetary units have various lengths to run, from weeks to many years, monetary disturbances have real effects on the distribution of income and wealth. Such effects can be long-lasting and profound. Also a phenomenon called hysteresis shoes that the persistence of large negative GDP gaps, such as occur in a recession and can be induced by restrictive monetary policy, can have long-lasting effects on the labor force that can in turn affect the level of potential GDP. For these reasons some economists, while admitting that money is neutral in the long term in many economic models, hold that it is not neutral in the real economy. They argue that the short-run behavior that occurs over the business cycle or when the economy is hit by a monetary shock, can have long-term effects on such real macro values as potential GDP and the growth rate. Print Jeffrey Frankel Jeffrey Frankel, a professor at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, previously served as a member of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. He directs the Program in International Finance and Macroeconomics at the US National Bureau of Economic Research, where he is a member of the Business Cycle Dating Committee, the official US arbiter of recession and recovery. The Death of Inflation Targeting 16 May 2012 CAMBRIDGE – It is with regret that we announce the death of inflation targeting. The monetary-policy regime, known as IT to friends, evidently passed away in September 2008. The lack of an official announcement until now attests to the esteem in which it was held, its usefulness as an ornament of credibility for central banks, and fears that there might be no good candidates to succeed it as the preferred anchor for monetary policy. Inflation targeting was born in New Zealand in March 1990. Admired for its transparency, and thus for facilitating accountability, it achieved success there, and soon in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Israel. It subsequently became popular in Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru) and among other developing countries (including South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Turkey). One reason that IT gained such wide acceptance as the monetary-policy anchor of choice was the demise of its predecessor, exchange-rate targeting, in the currency crises of the 1990’s. Pegged exchange rates had come under fatal speculative attack in many of these countries, whose authorities thus needed something new to anchor the public’s expectations concerning monetary policy. Inflation targeting was in the right place at the right time. In the early 1980’s, prior to the reign of exchange-rate targeting, the fashion was money-supply targeting, the brainchild of the monetarist Milton Friedman. But that rule succumbed rather quickly to violent money-demand shocks, though Friedman’s general argument – that a credible commitment to low inflation requires favoring rules over discretion – remains very influential. Inflation targeting was best known as a rule that instructed central banks to set – and try their best to attain – a target range for the annual rate of change of the consumer price index (CPI). Close cousins included targeting the price level instead of the inflation rate, and targeting core inflation (the CPI minus volatile food and energy prices). There were also proponents of flexible inflation targeting, who held that it was fine to put some weight on real GDP growth in the short run, so long as there was a clear longer-term target for CPI inflation. But some felt that if the definition of IT were stretched too far, it would lose its meaning. 90 Regardless of the form it took, IT began to receive some heavy blows a few years ago (analogous to the crises that hit exchange-rate targets in the 1990’s). Perhaps the biggest setback hit in September 2008, when it became clear that central banks that had been relying on IT had not paid enough attention to asset-price bubbles. Central bankers had told themselves that they were giving asset markets all of the attention that they deserved, by specifying that housing prices and equity prices could be taken into account to the extent that they implied information regarding goods inflation. But this escape clause proved insufficient: when the global financial crisis hit (suggesting, at least in retrospect, that monetary policy had been too loose from 2003 to 2006), it was neither preceded nor followed by an upsurge in inflation. That the boom-bust cycle could occur without inflation should not have come as a surprise. After all, the same thing happened when asset-price bubbles ended in crashes in the United States in 1929, Japan in 1990, and Thailand and Korea in 1997. And the hope of long-time US Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan that monetary easing could clean up the mess in the aftermath of such a crash proved wrong. While the lack of response to asset bubbles was probably IT’s biggest failing, another major setback was inappropriate responses to supply shocks and terms-of-trade shocks. An economy is healthier if monetary policy responds to an increase in the world prices of its exported commodities by tightening enough to cause the currency to appreciate. But CPI targeting instead tells the central bank to tighten policy in response to an increase in the world price of imported commodities – exactly the opposite of accommodating the adverse shift in the terms of trade. It is widely suspected, for example, that the reason for the European Central Bank’s otherwise puzzling decision to raise interest rates in July 2008, as the world was sliding into the worst recession since the 1930’s, was that oil prices were just then reaching an all-time high. Oil prices are given substantial weight in the CPI, so stabilizing the CPI when dollar-denominated oil prices go up requires euro appreciation visà-vis the dollar. One candidate to succeed IT as the preferred nominal monetary-policy anchor has lately received some enthusiastic support in the economic blogosphere: nominal GDP targeting. The idea is not new. It had been a candidate to succeed money-supply targeting in the 1980’s, since it did not share the latter’s vulnerability to so-called velocity shocks. Nominal GDP targeting was not adopted then, but now it is back. Its fans point out that, unlike IT, it would not cause excessive tightening in response to adverse supply shocks. Nominal GDP targeting stabilizes demand – the most that can be asked of monetary policy. An adverse supply shock is automatically divided equally between inflation and real GDP, which is pretty much what a central bank with discretion would do anyway. A dark-horse candidate is product-price targeting, which would focus on stabilizing an index of producer prices rather than an index of consumer prices. Unlike IT, it would not dictate a perverse response to terms-of-trade shocks. Supporters of both nominal GDP targeting and product-price targeting claim that 91 IT sometimes gave the public the misleading impression that it would stabilize the cost of living, even in the face of supply shocks or terms-of trade-shocks, over which it had no control. Inflation targeting is survived by the gold standard, an elderly distant relative. Although some eccentrics favor a return to gold as the monetary anchor, most would prefer to leave this relic of another age to its peaceful retirement. This article is available online at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-death-of-inflation-targeting Copyright Project Syndicate - www.project-syndicate.org Explainer: How Does the fed Stimulate the Economy? Price easing vs. Quantitative Easing (QE) By Mark Thoma MONEYWATCH November 14, 2013, 5: 58 PM (MoneyWatch) In her testimony Thursday morning in front of the Senate Banking Committee, Federal Reserve Chair nominee Janet Yellen emphasized that one of the Federal Reserve's primary duties is to pursue its dual mandate for maximum employment and stable prices. The Fed attempts to pursue these two goals through changes in its target interest rate. For example, it decreases this rate when the economy is struggling, and it increases the target interest rate when inflation is too high. But how does the Fed do this? How does it change interest rates? And what happens at times like now when unemployment is too high, inflation is not a problem and interest rates are already as low as they can go? If the Fed cannot lower interest rates further, how does the it pursue its dual mandate? Open market operations and the federal funds rate The specific interest rate the Fed targets is the federal funds rate. This is the rate a bank pays to borrow reserves from another bank overnight, so it's a very short-term rate. For example, if one bank has reserves in excess of the amount it is required to hold by regulation, and another bank falls short of its required reserves, the bank with excess reserves can lend to the bank with a shortage. The interest rate on the loan is the federal funds rate, and it is determined by the supply and demand for reserves. In ordinary times, the main tool the Fed uses to control the supply of reserves and hence the federal funds rate is purchases and sales of T-bills (T-Bills are the "IOUs" the Treasury issues when the Federal Government borrows money from the public). For example, suppose the Fed purchases a $10,000 T-Bill from a bank. To pay for the T-Bills, the Fed creates new money (it's easiest to think of this as paper money, but it's mostly electronic), and credits the bank's reserve account for $10,000 in return for the T-Bill. This trade of newly created money for the T-Bill causes the bank's reserves increase by $10,000, and the increased supply of bank reserves lowers the price of reserves which is the federal funds rate. If the transaction is with an individual or financial firm rather than a bank, it works essentially the same. In this case the Fed pays for the T-Bills with a check. When that check is deposited into a bank the Fed honors the check by crediting the bank with newly created reserves. 92 When the Fed wants the target rate to go up, it does the opposite and sells T-Bills to banks or to the public. When the bank or the individual pays for the T-Bill, the result is that bank reserves fall by the amount of the sale, and the reduced supply of reserves puts upward pressure on the federal funds rate. How do changes in interest rates affect the economy? Since all interest rates tend to move together -- the supply of bank reserves relative to demand is a measure of the tightness of looseness of credit generally -- when the Fed increases or decreases its target federal funds rate, that increases or decreases interest rates more generally. The effects of these interest rate changes on the broader economy come mainly through changes in consumption, business, investment, and the construction of new housing. When interest rates -the cost of borrowing money -- fall, the purchase of consumer durables tends to rise. Then both business and housing investment tend to rise as well (though less so when the economy is in recession). This increase in spending by households and businesses stimulates the economy and increases output and employment. And, of course, when interest rates rise, perhaps to fight inflation in an overheated economy, the opposite happens. The consumption of durables, business investment, and housing construction fall and this slows the economy down. How does quantitative easing differ from traditional policy? Traditional policy works through what we might call "price easing." As the quantity of reserves is increased through open market operations, the price of reserves -- the federal funds rate -- falls and that stimulates the economy as described above. But once the target interest rate hits zero (interest rates cannot be negative) and it cannot be lowered further, how can the Fed pursue its dual mandate? The answer is that it can continue to purchase financial assets and increase the quantity of bank reserves, i.e. it can pursue "quantitative easing" once "price easing" has hit the lower bound (and the Fed has also broadened the types of financial assets it purchases beyond T-Bills as it has pursued quantitative easing. For example, it has also purchased mortgage backed securities). How does quantitative easing impact the economy? Traditional policy uses changes in interest rates to stimulate or slow down the economy, but since a fall in the target interest rate is not possible when it is at the lower bound, as now, how does increasing the quantity of reserves stimulate the economy? Quantitative easing works through several channels. First, as the Fed creates more and more reserves, some of those will be used to purchase financial assets, and that tends to cause their prices to rise. That's one reason why we generally see increases in stock values during quantitative easing. The resulting increase in wealth tends to stimulate more spending. Quantitative easing also puts downward pressure on exchange rates, and that should stimulate exports and decrease imports, which provides another means to stimulate the economy. 93 Finally, large increases in bank reserves tend to increase inflation expectations, and when people are worried that prices will rise in the future they tend to purchase more now and that provides another means to stimulate the economy. The increase in inflationary expectations also lowers real interest rates (interest rates adjusted for inflation), and that stimulates business investment, housing, and the consumption of durables. However, while quantitative easing can impact the economy, it is not as powerful as traditional "price easing," or interest rate lowering policy. Thus, quantitative easing may be able to ease a recession somewhat. But as we are seeing right now, it is not enough by itself to spur the economy to a speedy return to full employment. © 2013 CBS Interactive Inc.. All Rights Reserved. Mark Thoma is a macroeconomist and time-series econometrician at the University of Oregon. His research focuses on how monetary policy affects the economy, and he has also worked on political business cycle models. Mark is currently a fellow at The Century Foundation. A very important article below: QE ended in the USA by the end of October 2014. Below is an article that explains the history and impact of QE on the American economy. Quantitative Easing Is Ending. Here’s What It Did, in Charts. - NYTimes.com http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/upshot/quantitative-easing-is-about-to-end-hereswhat-it-did-in-seven-charts.html?mabReward=RI%3A14 How Does the Bank of England Do QE? http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/pages/inflation/qe/video.aspx image: https://www.project-syndicate.org/default/images/PS_Logo-Large-Black.png Economics image: https://www.projectsyndicate.org/default/library/1aafa197eccdcc127f6cc41924a3262b.square.png Martin Feldstein Martin Feldstein, Professor of Economics at Harvard University and President Emeritus of the National Bureau of Economic Research, chaired President Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1982 to 1984. In 2006, he was appointed to President Bush's 94 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and, in 2009, was appointed to President Obama's Economic Recovery Advisory Board. Currently, he is on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and the Group of 30, a non-profit, international body that seeks greater understanding of global economic issues. JAN 29, 2016 The Shortcomings of Quantitative Easing in Europe CAMBRIDGE – Why has the US Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing been so much more successful than the version of QE implemented by the European Central Bank? That intellectual question leads directly to a practical one: Will the ECB ever be able to translate quantitative easing into stronger economic growth and higher inflation? The Fed introduced quantitative easing – buying large quantities of long-term bonds and promising to keep short-term interest rates low for a prolonged period – after it concluded that the US economy was not responding adequately to traditional monetary policy and to the fiscal stimulus package enacted in 2009. The Fed’s chairman at the time, Ben Bernanke, reasoned that unconventional monetary policy would drive down long-term rates, inducing investors to shift from high-quality bonds to equities and other risky securities. This would drive up the value of those assets, increasing household wealth and therefore consumer spending. The strategy worked well. Share prices rose 30% in 2013 alone, and house prices increased 13% in the same twelve months. As a result, the net worth of households increased by $10 trillion that year. The rise in wealth induced consumers to increase spending, which restarted the usual expansionary multiplier process, with GDP up by 2.5% in 2013 and the unemployment rate falling from 8% to 6.7%. The expansion continued in subsequent years, bringing the current unemployment rate down to 5% – and the unemployment rate among college graduates to just 2.5%. The ECB has been following a similar strategy of large-scale asset purchases and extremely low (indeed negative) short-term interest rates. But, although the policy is the same as the Fed’s, its purpose is very different. Because Europe lacks the widespread share ownership that exists in the United States, quantitative easing cannot be used to stimulate consumer spending by raising household wealth. Instead, a major if unspoken purpose of the ECB’s low-interest-rate policy has been 95 to stimulate net exports by depressing the value of the euro. The ECB succeeded in this, with the euro’s value falling by some 25% – from $1.40 in the summer of 2014 to $1.06 by the fall of 2015. I have been an advocate of reducing the value of the euro for several years, so I think this strategy was a good one. But, although the fall in the value of the euro has stimulated the eurozone’s net exports, the impact on its members’ exports and GDP has been quite limited. One reason for this is that much of the eurozone countries’ trade is with other eurozone countries that use the same currency. Moreover, exports to the US don’t benefit much from the decline of the euro-dollar exchange rate. European exporters generally invoice their exports in dollars and adjust their dollar prices very slowly, a point made clear in an important paper that Gita Gopinath of Harvard presented at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole conference in August 2015. As a result, total net exports from the eurozone rose less than €3 billion ($3.2 billion) between September 2014 and September 2015 – a negligible amount in an €11 trillion economy. A further motive of the ECB’s bond purchases has been to increase the cash that eurozone banks have available to lend to businesses and households. But, as of now, there has been very little increase in such lending. Finally, the ECB is eager to raise the eurozone inflation rate to its target of just under 2%. In the US, the QE strategy has increased the “core” inflation rate – which excludes the direct effect of declining prices of energy and food – to 2.1% over the past 12 months. This has been a by-product of the increase in real demand, achieved by reducing unemployment to a level at which rising wages contribute to faster price growth. This strategy is unlikely to work in the eurozone, because the unemployment rate is still nearly 12%, about five percentage points higher than it was before the recession began. The ECB’s quantitative easing policy can probably achieve higher inflation only through the increase in import prices resulting from a decline in the value of the euro. This very limited process still leaves core inflation in the eurozone below 1%. 96 ECB President Mario Draghi recently responded to the new evidence of eurozone weakness and super-low inflation by indicating that the Bank is likely to ease monetary conditions further at its next policy-setting meeting in March. This could mean further reducing already-negative short-term interest rates and expanding and/or extending its bond-purchase program. Eurozone financial markets reacted in the expected way. Long-term interest rates fell, equity prices rose, and the euro declined relative to the dollar. But past experience and the reasons spelled out here suggest that these policies will do very little to increase real activity and price inflation in the eurozone. To make real progress toward reviving their economies, the individual countries need to depend less on quantitative easing by the ECB and focus squarely on structural reforms and fiscal stimulus. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/quatitative-easing-limited-effects-in-europeby-martin-feldstein-2016-01 © 1995-2016 Project Syndicate Interest rates Negative interest rates: what you need to know Following the Bank of Japan’s launch of negative interest rates, we answer the key questions A man walks past a board showing stocks in Tokyo. The markets went into reverse after the Bank of Japan announced its plan. Photograph: Shizuo Kambayashi/AP Jill Treanor and Larry Elliott Thursday 18 February 2016 13.02 GMT Last modified on Thursday 18 February 2016 13.38 GMT 97 What are negative interest rates? Normally savers earn interest when they deposit their money in banks. Similarly, commercial banks that lodge money with central banks receive interest for doing so. Negative interest rates turn this arrangement on its head. Savers have to pay banks for holding their money and central banks penalise banks for depositing cash with them. Why are we talking about them? Because central banks are increasingly using them to boost growth and raise the level of inflation. At present, it is really only commercial banks that are being charged negative interest rates but there is a possibility, if things get worse, that they will affect members of the public as well. Related: OECD calls for less austerity and more public investment What’s the rationale for negative rates? The idea is that negative interest rates provide banks with an incentive to lend money rather than to hoard it. The same would apply to members of the public, who would be encouraged to spend rather than save. Isn’t this unusual? It is, but it reflects the low level of inflation across the global economy despite seven years of economic recovery. In the past, interest rates would have been strongly positive by this point. Japan has had the longest experience with low inflation and deflation, and on Tuesday the Bank of Japan introduced negative interest rates. It is charging banks 0.1% for their excess deposits. Is Japan the first country to go negative? In recent history, the Swedes were first. Between July 2009 and September 2010 Sweden cut the deposit rate to -0.25% in an attempt to fend off the deep recession that followed the 2008 banking crash and global financial crisis. It reintroduced them in July 2014 and the deposit rate is currently -1.25%. Sweden’s central bank became the first country to lend at a negative rate when in February 2015 it announced a negative repo rate – its main lending rate to commercial banks. Economists point out that this is largely a technicality because of the way its banking system operates. 98 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Photograph: Morgan Stanley Switzerland introduced a negative rate in December 2014. However, it has experimented with them in the past; in 1972 it put a 2% penalty charge on deposits by non-residents. Denmark tried to reduce the pressure on its currency in July 2012 by having a negative deposit rate between July 2012 and April 2014. After a period of being back in positive territory, it imposed a -0.75% rate on certificates of deposit from September 2014. Eurozone: the 19 countries in the single currency area have had negative rates since June 2014. The deposit rate was set at -0.1% in June 2014 and then cut to -0.2% and to -0.3% in December 2015. Is anyone else thinking about it? The eurozone countries could yet get a deeper negative rate after the European Central Bank meets next month. Analysts at Morgan Stanley note that even the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, is “starting to sound more open to the idea”. There is even some chatter that the Bank of England could end up with negative rates, or at least cut them from the historic low of 0.5% – an idea raised by its chief economist Andy Haldane last year. Are negative rates helping growth? Analysts at Morgan Stanley think not, warning they are a “dangerous experiment”, particularly for the banking sector. “We are concerned it erodes bank profitability, creating other systemic risks,” they said. They acknowledge that when there was first a discussion of negative interest rates, it helped bolster sentiment “because it ended the debate on whether central banks are running out ammunition”. That has changed. Michael Pearce, a global economist at Capital Economics, said: “Policy loosening has fuelled, rather than soothed, market fears.” 99 What do negative rates mean for banks? If the share-price gyrations of Japanese banks are a gauge, there will be considerable turbulence. Analysts at UBS note that following the announcement of negative rates by the Bank of Japan on 29 January, Japanese bank share prices fell by around 30%. Bank shares globally have already been pummelled this year – eurozone banks are down 28% – and analysts at Morgan Stanley calculate that bank profits will be knocked by between 5% and 10%. How does it affect bank customers? Savings rates will remain low and banks will look to make profits in other ways. They could push fees for loans, such as mortgages, or impose charges on current accounts, which might otherwise be seen as “free”. How might customers react? There is a concern that customers might make withdrawals of cash, although, according to the Swedish central bank, there have been no signs of any substantial rise in the use of cash in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. This is because the banks did not pass on the negative rates to their customers - but that could change if negative rates were imposed for lengthier periods. Facebook Twitter Pinterest Photograph: Morgan Stanley Customers might also seek out higher returns elsewhere by looking at riskier investments. What would happen if negative rates became common? According to the Swedish central bank: “The most obvious problem associated with negative interest rates is that cash will sooner or later become a viable alternative to keeping money in the bank.” Phasing out cash and replacing it with electronic money or putting a tax on money – known as the “Gesell tax” after the economist Silvio Gesell – could also be an option. But whether policymakers would want to implement this and how it would work in practice is not clear. 100 View all comments > comments Sign in or create your Guardian account to join the discussion. © 2016 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved. END OF CHAPTER 29 101 CHAPTER 31: UNEMPLOYMENT Remember from Chap. 21: The unemployed are people who are without jobs and are actively searching for jobs. In macroeconomics, economists distinguish between the NAIRU, and the rate of cyclical unemployment, which is unemployment associated with fluctuations of real GDP around its potential (Y*). Issues of this chapter: 1) Cyclical unemployment, why it exists and why the adjustment mechanism often takes so long to make it disappear. 2) Unemployment rate follows a cyclical path, rising during periods of recession and falling in periods of business expansion. What are the sources of these cyclical fluctuations? What are the sources of the upward trend? 3) Are government policies partly (and perhaps unintentionally) responsible for increases in the NAIRU? Can government policy do anything to reduce the NAIRU? Changes in the Total Unemployment: On the supply side, the causes have included a rising population, increased labor force participation by various groups, especially women; and net immigration of working-age persons. On the demand side, economic growth causes some sectors of the economy to decline and others to expand. Recessions are a major cause of unemployment. SEE SAMA's ANNUAL REPORT FOR DATA ON SAUDI EMPLOYMENT & LABOR FORCE http://www.sama.gov.sa Flows in the Labor Market Usually the focus on the labor market tends to be on the overall level of employment and unemployment rather than on the amount of job creation and job destruction. This focus can often lead us to the conclusion that few changes are occurring in the labor market when in fact the truth is exactly the opposite. The disaggregation of data may reflect a very active labor market with very large amounts of both gross job creation and gross job destruction. The size of change in either or both areas reflects the degree of dynamism in the economy. Economists & policy makers must look at both gross & net flows in the labor market. SEE APPLICATION 31-1 Consequences of Unemployment : Two costs of unemployment. 1) Lost Output. According to an empirical relation sometimes called Okun’s Law-named after the economist Arthur Okun (1928-1980), for every percentage point of unemployment above the NAIRU, output falls by about 2.5 percentage points below potential outpu t. This loss represents a serious waste of resources. 2) Personal Costs. The loss of self-esteem and the dislocation of families that often result from situations of prolonged unemployment are genuine tragedies, in addition to rising crime. 102 Classification of Unemployment The unemployed can be classified by personal characteristics, such as age, gender, degree of skill or education, and ethnic group. They can also be classified by geographical location, occupation, duration of unemployment, or reasons for unemployment. The recorded figures, for unemployment may significantly understate or overstate the numbers of people who are actually willing to work at the existing wages. Overstatement arises because the measured figure for unemployment includes people who are genuinely not interested in work but say they are interested in order to collect unemployment benefits.( Some people registered in Hafiz Program in Saudi Arabia may be an example.) Understatement arises because of people who would like to work but have ceased to believe that suitable jobs are available for them, voluntarily withdraw form the labor force. Although these people are not measured in the survey of unemployment (which requires that people actively look for work), they are unemployed in the sense that they would accept a job if one were available at going wage rates. People in this category are referred to as discouraged workers. Three types of unemployment: Cyclical, frictional, and structural. Both frictional and structural unemployment exist even when real GDP is at its potential level, and hence there is neither a recessionary gap nor an inflationary gap. Cyclical Unemployment: a) The term cyclical unemployment refers to unemployment that occurs whenever real GDP is below potential GDP. b) People who are cyclically unemployed are normally presumed to be suffering involuntary unemployment in that they are willing to work at the going wage rate. c) It can be measured by estimating the difference between the No. of people currently employed & the No. of people who would be employed at potential output. This means that potential GDP has been estimated. d) The fluctuations in aggregate demand causes real output to fluctuate around its potential level. If f) all labor markets had fully flexible wage rates, wages would fluctuate to keep quantity demanded in each individual market equal to the quantity supplied in that market. Employment and the labor force would be pro-cyclical rising in booms and falling in slumps, but there would be no significant amounts of involuntary unemployment. Some people would withdraw from the labor force, being unwilling to work at the lower wage. The case of flexible (competitive) labor markets is shown in FIG. 31-1 – part(i) blow. 103 Figure 31-1 Employment and Wages in a Competitive Labor Market Slide 31.3 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman The realities of the world are however different. Although wages do tend to vary over the cycle, the fluctuations are not sufficient to remove all cyclical unemployment. Why is this so? Two types of explanation have been advanced in recent years. New Classical Theories The classical theory assumes that labor markets are always in equilibrium in the sense that the quantity demanded is continually equated with quantity supplied. If not, it gives two explanations for unemployment: a)Fluctuation in the willingness of people to supply their labor. The supply of labor increases in booms, and falls in recessions. This explanation of cyclical behavior in the labor market has two problems. First, wages will tend to rise in slumps and fall in booms, which is not what we observe. SEE FIG 31-1, part (ii) above. Second, there will still be no systematic cyclical unemployment because labor markets always clear, leaving everyone who wished to work actually working. Supply-induced fluctuations in employment form part of the basis of what is called real business cycle (RBC) theory, which is discussed in Extension 31-1. b) Second line of explanation lies in errors on the part of workers and employees in predicting the course of the price level over the business cycle. In chapter 28, we saw that the increase in the money supply leads to an increase in desired aggregate expenditure and a rise in prices of both inputs & outputs. Firms will produce more and workers will work more since both groups think they are getting an increased relative price for what they sell. Thus total output and employment rise. The extra output and employment occur only while people are being fooled. When both groups realize that their relative prices are in fact unchanged, output & employment will fall back to their initial levels. The only difference is that now the price level is higher, leaving relative prices unchanged. New Classical explanations assume that labor markets clear, and then they look for reasons why employment fluctuates. They imply, therefore, that people who are not working have voluntarily withdrawn from the labor market for one reason or another; there is no involuntary unemployment. 104 New Keynesian Theories Keynesian economists believe that: a) People correctly read mkt. signals, but react in ways that do not cause mkts. to clear at all times . b) Many people are involuntarily unemployed in the sense they would accept an offer for jobs they are trained for, at the going mkt. wage rate, if such an offer were made. c) These theories start with the everyday observation that wage rates do not change every time demand or supply shifts. SEE FIG. 31-2 below. Figure 31-2 Unemployment with Sticky Wages Slide 31.4 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman TWO KENESIAN EXPLANATIONS: I) Long Term Employment Relationships Both workers and employers look for relatively long-term and stable employment relationships. Workers want job security in the face of fluctuating demand. Employers want workers who understand the firm’s organization, production, and marketing plans. Wages are not the only determinant of employment decisions, & they become insensitive to fluctuations in current economic conditions. Given this situation, the tendency is that employers “smooth out” the income of employees by paying a steady money wage and letting profits and employment fluctuate to absorb the effects of temporary increases and decreases in demand for the firm’s product. Many long-term contracts provide for a schedule of money wages over a period of several years. Similarly, fringe benefits, such as pensions and health care, tend to bind workers to particular employers. Another example is payment that rises with years of service. This helps to bind the employee to the company, whereas seniority rules for layoffs bind the employer to the long-term worker. Thus, in labor markets in which long-term relationships are important (and this is the case in many labor markets), the wage rate does not fluctuate to continuously clear the market. Wages are written over what has been called the long term “economic climate” rather than the shortterm “economic weather”. Because wages are thus insulated from short-term fluctuations in demand, any market clearing that occurs does so through fluctuations in the volume of employment rather than in wages. Of course, wages must respond to permanent shifts in mkt. 105 conditions. ( Eamar company in Saudi Arabia kept and fired people on the basis of seniority. They could have cut wages across the board, and keep most employees, but they did not) II) Efficiency Wages Employers may find that workers may become more efficient if they are paid somewhat more than the minimum amount to induce workers to work for them. This increases the opportunity cost to workers if they shrink on the job & get fired. Several economists observed that, workers who feel that they are treated well work harder than those who believe that they are treated badly. This gives a reason for paying an efficiency wage provided that the increased output from treating workers well covers the increased cost of doing so. (AL-Zamel Group in Saudi Arabia has an end-of- year bonus system related to both overall profits and worker’s own performance) A variant of efficiency wage theory seeks to explain why firms do not cut wages during recessions. If workers feel unfairly treated when their wages are reduced, wage reductions (at least in response to moderate recessions) may cost firms more (in lost output from unhappy employees) than they save in reduced wages. If so, real wages may not fall rapidly enough to eliminate involuntary unemployment. (Mobily house ownership program for its employees is an example.) The basic message of New Keynesian theories of unemployment is that competitive labor markets cannot be relied upon to eliminate unemployment by equating current demand for labor with current supply. As a result, unemployment will rise and fall as the demand for labor falls and rises over the cycle. THE NAIRU is composed of frictional and structural unemployment. Our interest is in how the NAIRU changes over time and in the extent that economic policy can affect the NAIRU. FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT Frictional unemployment results from the normal turnover of labor. An important source of frictional unemployment is young people who enter the labor force and look for jobs. Another source is people who leave their jobs because they are dissatisfied or fired. Persons who are unemployed while searching for jobs are said to be frictionally unemployed or in search unemployment. How “voluntarily” is frictional unemployment? Some of it is clearly voluntary. An extreme New Classical view regards all frictional unemployment as voluntary. Critics of that view argue that many frictionally unemployed workers are involuntarily unemployed because they lost their jobs through no fault of their own (e.g. their factories may have closed down) and have not yet located specific jobs for which they believe they are qualified. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment is not always clear, as it might at first seem. STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT Structural adjustments in the economy can cause unemployment. When the pattern of demand for goods and services changes, the pattern of the demand for labor changes too. Such unemployment may be defined as unemployment caused by a mismatch between the structure of the labor force in terms of skills, occupations, industries, or geographical locations – and the structure of the demand for labor. 1) Natural Causes 106 a) Changes that accompany economic growth shift the structure of the demand for labor, especially if it generates a significant shift toward high-skilled jobs. The evolutionary shift toward service-sector employment and the restructuring within all industries in response to technological change has favored workers with more years of schooling. Some existing workers can retrain and some new entrants can acquire fresh skills, but the transition is often difficult, especially for already experienced workers whose skills become economically obsolete. b) Increases in international competition can also cause structural unemployment. This could happen either through the immigration of industries to other countries, or through increased imports of cheaper products. 2) Policy Causes a) Policies that discourage firms from replacing labor with machines may protect employment over the short term. However if the industry cannot compete effectively, an industry decline may cause more unemployment in the LR. b) Minimum wage laws can cause structural unemployment by pricing low-skilled labor out of the market. This is a very controversial issue. c) Unemployment Insurance. In some countries, unemployed workers are generally eligible for unemployment insurance only if they have worked for a given number of weeks in the previous year-this is known as the entrance requirement. In some cases these ER are very low & encourage seasonal workers to work for a few months & collect UI. See www.hafiz.gov.sa www.mol.gov.sa for conditions of unemployment benefits in Saudi Arabia. d) Immigration Policies: low- wage foreign workers could price out local workers & increase unemployment. Is Structural Unemployment Voluntary? According to the New Classical view all structural unemployment is voluntarily. However, a skilled computer programmer, if unemployed can work as dishwasher, but an unskilled dishwasher cannot work as a computer programmer. The Frictional-Structural Distinction Distinction becomes blurred at the margin. In a sense, structural unemployment is really long term frictional unemployment. If the reallocation were to occur quickly, economists would call the unemployment frictional; if the reallocation were to occur slowly, they would call the unemployment structural. The major characteristic of both frictional and structural unemployment is that there are as many unfilled vacancies as there are unemployed persons. In practice, structural and frictional unemployment cannot be separated. But the two of them, taken together, can be separated from cyclical unemployment. Specifically, when real GDP is at its potential level, the only unemployment (by definition) is the NAIRU, which comprises frictional and structural unemployment. Why Does The NAIRU Change? 1-a) An increase in the rate of growth, for example, usually speeds up the rate at which the structure of demand for labor is changing. 1-b) the adaptation of labor to the changing structure of demand may be slowed by such diverse factors as a decline in education and new regulations that make it harder for workers in a given occupation to take new jobs in other areas or occupations. 107 2) Demographic Changes: Young or inexperienced workers have higher unemployment rates than experienced ones. Also, the change in social values, such as the increase in the number of women going out for work contributes to a rising NAIRU. . Learning on-the-job experience is a critical part of developing marketable labor skills, and people who suffered prolonged unemployment during their teens and twenties have been denied that experience early in their working careers. Such people may have no choice but to accept temporary jobs at low wages. 3) Hysteresis Recent models of unemployment show that the size of the NAIRU can be influenced by the actual current rate of unemployment. Such models get their name from the Greek word hysteresis, meaning “lagged effect”. One mechanism that can lead to hysteresis in labor markets arises from the importance of experience and on-the-job training. Suppose that a recession causes a significant group of new entrants to the labor force to encounter unusual difficulty obtaining their first jobs. When demand increases again, this group of workers will be at a disadvantage relative to workers with normal histories of experience, and the unlucky group may have unemployment rates that will be higher than average. Another force that can cause such effect is heavily unionized labor force. This has been noticed in Western Europe. In times of high unemployment, people who are currently employed (insiders) may use their bargaining power to insure that new workers (outsiders) do not join in. If outsiders are denied access to the labor market, their unemployment will fail to exert downward pressure on wages, and the NAIRU will tend to rise. 4) Policy and Labor-Market Flexibility One important cause of unemployment in very general terms is inflexibility in the labor market. If workers are unable or unwilling to move between regions or between industries, then changes in the structure of the economy can cause unemployment. If it is costly for firms to hire workers then firms will find other ways of increasing output (such as switching to more capital -intensive methods of production). Any government policy that reduces labor-market flexibility is likely to increase the NAIRU. We discuss two examples. The first example is unemployment insurance. UI provides income support to eligible unemployed workers and thus reduces the costs to the workers of being unemployed. This income support will typically lead the worker to search longer for a new job and thus increases the unemployment rate. Longer search may be desirable since by reducing the cost of unemployment the worker is able to conduct a thorough search for a job that is an appropriate match for his specific skills. On the other hand, if the UI system is so generous the workers have little incentive to accept reasonable jobs. The second example concerns policies designed to increase job security for workers. In most Western European countries, firms that lay off workers are required either to give several months notice before doing so, or required to make severance payments equal to several months worth of pay. But this inflexibility on the part of the firms is passed on to workers. Firms are very hesitant about hiring workers in the first place. Given this reduction in labor –market flexibility, such policies are likely to increase the NAIRU. 108 Job security is very rare in the United States. Its rarity contributes to the general belief among economists that U.S. labor markets are much more flexible than those in Europe. Many economists see this as the most important explanation for why the unemployment rate in the United States is significantly below the unemployment rates in Europe, and has been for the past two decades. What is the situation in Saudi Arabia? REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT Cyclical Unemployment: Cyclical unemployment control is the subject of stabilization policy, which we have studied in several earlier chapters. A major recession that occurs because of natural causes can be encountered by monetary and fiscal policies to reduce cyclical unemployment. There is room for debate however, about how much the government can and should do in this respect. Whatever may be argued in principle, policy-makers have not yet agreed to abandon such stabilization measures in practice. Frictional Unemployment: Frictional unemployment is a natural part of the learning process for young workers. Increasing the knowledge of workers about market opportunities may help. Unemployment insurance is one method of helping people cope with unemployment. It has reduced significantly the human costs of the bouts with unemployment that are inevitable in a changing society. Nothing however is without cost. It also contributes to unemployment, as we have already observed. Supporters of UI emphasize its benefits. Critics emphasize its costs. Workers must be actively seeking employment in order to be eligible for UI. Finally, a system of experience ratings has helped to distribute the costs more in proportion to the benefits. Under experience rating, firms with histories of sizable layoffs, pay more than those with better layoff records. Structural Unemployment a) There are two basic approaches to reducing structural unemployment: try to prevent the changes that the economy experiences or accept the change and try to speed up the adjustments. Workers have often resisted the introduction of new techniques to replace the older techniques at which they were skilled. Older workers may not even get a chance to start over with the new technique. b)However, new techniques are a major source of economic growth. c) Over the long term, policies that subsidize employment in declining industries run into increasing difficulties. Agreements to hire unneeded workers raise costs and can hasten the decline of an industry that is declining because of economic change becomes an increasingly large burden on the public budget as economic forces become less and less favorable to its success. Sooner or later, public support is withdrawn, followed by a precipitous decline. There is often a genuine conflict of interest between the private interests of workers threatened by structural change & the social interest served by generating change for the benefit whole society. CONCLUSION: Harsh critics see unemployment as proof that the market system is badly flawed. Reformers regard it as a necessary evil of the market system and a suitable object for government policy to reduce its incidence and its harmful effects. Others see it as overblown in importance and believe that it does not reflect any real inability of workers to obtain jobs if they really want to work. Whatever the case may be, unemployment is always a problem of economic, social, political, and psychological dimensions that must be dealt with. END OF CHAPTER 31 109 The Rise of Invisible Unemployment The Rise of Invisible Unemployment3 theories about today's biggest economic mystery: If unemployment is shrinking, why aren't wages growing? DEREK THOMPSON NOV 9 2014, 8:00 AM ET By Derek Thompson In the last year, the most important question for US economists and economic journalists has changed from Where are the jobs? to Where are the wages? It's a problem best summed up by Matthew O'Brien in the Washington Post. As the labor market approaches full employment, there should be more pressure on wages to rise. In the graph below, that would look like a trend-line pointing up and to the left. Instead, as you can see in a half-a-second glance, the trend-line is a blob and it's certainly not pointing up. The unemployment rate has fallen below 6 percent, and earnings growth is flat. 110 Matthew O'Brien/Washington Post Here are three theories for why. 1. Wage growth and job growth are happening in different places. When economists and writers say "wages aren't growing," we're making a blanket statement that hides the fact that some wages are growing somewhere. Mining and energy jobs have had a fantastic few years, while retail and food service wage growth has been awful. The problem is that there are far more retail and food service workers than mining and manufacturing employees. We're adding lots of jobs in industries with stagnant wages, and a few jobs in industries with rising wages, according to new research out of the Cleveland Fed. "It may seem counterintuitive that wages and salaries are growing the slowest in industries where jobs are growing the fastest, but it actually is not," writes LaVaughn M. Henry, vice president of the bank's Cincinnati branch. We're adding few jobs in goodsproducing industries like manufacturing, which have the highest overall post-recession wage growth, and lots of jobs in service-producing industries (e.g. health care, leisure and hospitality, and education), which have the lowest real wage growth. Real Annual Wage Growth, by Industry 111 Cleveland Fed 2. The rise of invisible unemployment is too large to ignore. What is "invisible unemployment"? It's discouraged workers and part-timers who want more hours. The official unemployment rate doesn't consider them unemployed. So when we talk about the official unemployment rate—now at a lowish 5.8 percent—we're ignoring these workers. They're statistically invisible. Here's a picture of invisible unemployment (in blue) vs. official unemployment (in red). Since early 2010, the number of unemployed Americans has declined by twice as fast as the number of discouraged/parttimers (42 percent vs. 21 percent). 112 FRED In 2002, official unemployment swamped invisible unemployment. The official unemployment rate was an accurate description of the labor force. But the spread between invisible and official unemployment is shrinking. In the last 20 years, the six months with the smallest gaps between official and invisible unemployment were all in 2014. That means the official unemployment rate is getting worse and worse at describing the real conditions facing American workers. Invisible unemployment is hurting the participation rate even more than economists predicted with an aging work force. The entire developed world is getting older. But US participation fell faster in the years after the recession that just about any other country. 113 PIIE 3. The rise of invisible work is too large to ignore. By "invisible work," I mean work done by American companies that isn't done by Americans workers. Globalization and technology is allowing corporations to expand productivity, which shows up in earnings reports and stock prices and other metrics that analysts typically associate with a healthy economy. But globalization and technology don't always show up in US wage growth because they often represent alternatives to US-based jobs. Corporations have used the recession and the recovery to increase profits by expanding abroad, hiring abroad, and controlling labor costs at home. It's a brilliant strategy to please investors. But it's an awful way to contribute to domestic wage growth. This article available online at: http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/11/the-rise-of-invisible-unemployment/382519/ Copyright © 2014 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All Rights Reserved. 114 CHAPTER 32: GOVERNMENT DEBT & DEFICITS I) DEFICIT & DEBTS: FACTS & DEFINITIONS The Govt. Budget Constraint is: Govt. Expenditures = Tax Rev. + Borrowing In other words, part of govt. expenditures is financed by taxes, & part is financed by borrowing. Govt. Expenditures is composed of three broad components: G+TR+(i x D) = Tax Rev. + Borrowing, Where G is govt. purchases, TR: transfer payments( such as social security, unemployment insurance, or industrial subsidies), i: interest on Govt. debt, D: total outstanding public( govt.) debt , (i x D) is the debt-service payments, The Budget Deficit= Borrowing = D (change in Public Debt) = G+TR+ (i x D) - T Every budget deficit (BD) is financed by borrowing, which in turn adds to (and is equal to the change in) public debt. Two points about BD: a) a change in the size of the deficit requires a change in the level of expend. relative to the level of tax revenue. b) Govt. debt will rise whenever the BD is positive. Debt will fall only if the deficit becomes negative. i.e only if there is a budget surplus. The Primary Budget Deficit: The debt- service component of total expenditures is beyond the control of govt. policy because it is determined by past govt. borrowing. In contrast, the other components of the govt. budget are said discretionary because the govt. can choose the levels of G, TR, or T. The discretionary part of the BD is called the Primary Budget Deficit = Total Deficit – Debt Service Payment = {G+TR+ (i x D)-T} – (i x D) = (G+TR) – T Where (G+TR) is discretionary expenditures. It is called the Government's Program Spending. It is possible that the govt. has an overall BD but a primary budget surplus (BS). SEE FIG. 32-1 below. 115 Figure 32-1 The Government’s Budget Constraint Slide 32.2 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman In both cases above, there is an overall BD. However in case i there is also a Primary Budget Deficit (T< (G+ TR). In case ii, there is a Primary Budget Surplus (T> (G+ TR). Deficits & Debt in THE USA Compared to SAUDI ARABIA: SEE FIGURES 32-2-3-4: The size of govt. expenditures, revenues, BD, Primary BD, public debt, & debt- service payments may not be meaningful unless we relate them to the level of GDP. This is what the figures below are telling us about the US economy. 116 Figure 32-2 Federal Revenues, Expenditures, and Deficits, 1962-1997 (as a percentage of GDP) Slide 32.3 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Figure 32-3 Federal Government Net Debt (as a percentage of GDP) 1940-1997 Slide 32.4 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 117 Figure 32-4 Budget Deficit and Debt-Service Payments 1970-1997 Slide 32.5 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman SEE SAMA's ANNUAL REPORTS FOR DATA ON SAUDI PUBLIC DEBT & BUDGET DEFICITS http://www.sama.gov.sa II) DEFICITS & DEBT: SOME ANALYTICAL ISSUES II-1)The Stance of Fiscal Policy: Expansionary or Contractionary? a) The Budget Deficit Function: Budget Deficit= (G + i x D) – (T – TR) autonomous partially endogenous (due to policy) (a function of GDP). Thus with no changes in expend. Or the tax rate, the BD tends to rise in recession and fall in booms. In reality, however, the govt. does use its discretion to change many variables. Thus, the BD is actually two parts: Budget Deficit Discretionary (Structural) Cyclical Part of the budget deficit is due to the govt.'s own discretion (policy), but part of it is due the state of the economy (which phase of the business cycle the economy is in). To judge the stance of fiscal policy, we have to isolate one part from the other. To do this, economists speak of something called CAD. 118 b) CAD: The Cyclically Adjusted Deficit: Deficit measured assuming the economy is at potential GDP (Y*). This removes the effect of the business cycle. The change in CAD determines the stance of fiscal policy: If CAD increases, it implies that fiscal policy is expansionary. Otherwise, it is contractionary. SEE FIG. 32-5 below. Figure 32-5 The Budget Deficit Function and Cyclical Adjustment Slide 32.6 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman The govt.'s policy determines the position of the BD function. Moving from B0 to B1 in (iii ) above represents a restrictive fiscal policy. Figure 32-6 The Actual and Cyclically Adjusted Deficit, 1970-1997 Slide 32.7 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 119 II-2)THE DEBT-To-GDP RATIO: From Extension 32-1 we have: d= X+(r-g) x d Where d: is the debt-to-GDP ratio X= is the govt. primary deficit as a percentage of GDP r= is the real interest rate g= is the growth rate of real GDP. There are two distinct forces that tend to increase the debt-to- GDP ratio: 1) If r > g, then the debt- to – GDP ratio rises (that is d will be positive). It also means that government debt is rising faster the economy’s growth rate. 2) If the govt. has a primary BD (if X is positive), then the debt- to – GDP ratio rises. 1-a) The Importance of Real interest rates: It is the real interest rate not nominal interest rate that is important to determine d. Many commentators argue that high nominal interest rates are largely responsible for increasing the govt.'s debt-service requirements & thus pushing up the deficit & the debt .This is only partially correct. The real financial liability of the govt. is determined by real stock of debt. High nominal interest rates are usually associated with high inflation which reduces the real value of govt. debt. 2-a) The Role of The Primary Deficit: If the focus is to be on the debt-to- GDP ratio, rather than the absolute size of the debt, then tracking the behavior of the overall BD is misleading. The reason is that it is possible to reduce the debt- to- GDP ratio even though the overall BD may never be eliminated, & thus even though the absolute size of the debt continues to increase. Stabilizing The Debt-to-GDP ratio ( V. Imp): To do this the govt. must maintain certain relationship between the primary deficit, the debt-to- GDP ratio, & the values of r and g. For example, if r > g, then a govt. with a positive stock of outstanding debt must run a primary surplus in order to stabilize the debt- to- GDP ratio. See the equation above. II-3) GOVERNMENT DEFICITS & NATIONAL SAVING We have seen in Chapter 24 that: National saving= private saving + govt. saving (T- G) An increase in govt. BD is a reduction in govt. saving and national saving. Alternatively, we can write: National saving= private saving - govt. BD ( G- T) The effect of the BD on the level of national saving thus depends on the link between BD & private saving. For example, if BD rises by SR 10 billion and this reduction in govt. saving leads to an increase in private saving by exactly SR10 billion, there will be no change in national saving. If not, national saving will fall as a result of the BD. But what is the link between BD & private saving? Remember that govt. expenditures must be paid for either by current taxes or current borrowing (future taxes). This implies that Government Debt represents deferred liabilities for taxpayers. 120 The Ricardian Equivalence: The link between Government Debt & private saving is associated with idea of the Recardian Equivalence, named after the Classical economist David Ricardo (1772-1823). The central proposition is that consumers recognize that current govt. borrowing as a future tax liability & thus view govt. borrowing as equivalent to taxes in terms of its impact on their own wealth. In other words, taxes reduce households’ wealth, but current govt. borrowing reduces future wealth too. Therefore, a reduction in taxes and a rise in borrowing (or the reverse case) does not make people feel wealthier by holding govt. bonds and thus don’t increase their consumption. Thus “Ricardian” consumers faced with a change in taxes will change their private saving exactly to offset the change in govt. saving. If this is the case fiscal policy may not be effective to manage the economy. Why this might not be so? 1) Short-sightedness: many people don’t care much about the future and spend accordingly. 2) Uncertainty about future govt. fiscal policy: would reductions in taxes today be matched with more taxes tomorrow or reduced govt. expenditures? The issue of the Recardian Equivalence is an empirical one. Most evidence suggests that it does not hold completely and hence suggests a limited negative relationship between GD & national saving. In this case expansionary fiscal policy would stimulate private consumption and GDP. III)THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT DEBT & DEFICITS Does the govt. BD crowd out private economic activity? Does it harm future generations? Does it hamper the conduct of economic policy? III-1) DO DEFICITS CROWD OUT PRIVATE ACTIVITY? d) Investment in Closed Economies: in a closed economy the amount of national saving exactly equals the amount of domestic investment. Suppose govt. reduces taxes and increases borrowing. What is the effect on domestic investment? This depends on the degree that taxpayers are Ricardian—that is on the degree to which taxpayers recognize that today's deficit must be financed by higher future taxes. If taxpayers are not fully Ricardian, then private saving will rise by less than the fall in govt. saving. This implies a decrease in the supply of national saving. The resulting excess demand for funds will put upward pressures on domestic real interest rates. The components of AD that are sensitive to interest rates- investment in particular- will fall. This is called the crowding out of domestic investment. SEE FIG. 32-7. Figure 32-7 The Crowding Out of Investment ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 121 Slide 32.8 b) Net Exports in Open Economies: If the government reduces taxes, it thus increases its budget deficit. Furthermore, suppose that taxpayers are not purely Ricardian, so that private saving rises by less than the fall in government saving. What is the effect of such a fall in national saving in an open economy? As domestic real interest rates rise in the country, foreigners are attracted to the higher-yield domestic assets and thus foreign financial capital flows into the country, thereby dampening the initia1 increase in domestic interest rates. However, since U.S. dollars are required in order to buy U.S. interestearning assets, this capital inflow increases the demand for U.S. dollars and thus increases the external value of the dollar (the U.S. dollar appreciates). This appreciation makes U.S. goods more expensive relative to foreign goods, inducing an increase in imports and reduction in exports, thereby reducing U.S. net exports. In an open economy, therefore, a rise the government deficit leads to an appreciation in the currency and to a crowding out of net exports. In an open economy instead of driving up interest rates sufficiently to crowd out private investment, the government budget deficit tends to attract foreign financial capital, appreciate the currency, and crowd out net exports. A Closed Economy: The overall effect of the increase in the government deficit in a closed economy is a rise in the real interest rate and a fall in the level of domestic investment. However, less current investment means that there will be a lower stock of physical capital in the future, and-thus 'reduced ability to produce goods and services in the future. This reduction in future production possibilities, which implies lower consumption levels for future generations, is the long-term burden of the debt. An Open Economy: The overall effect of the increase in the government deficit in an open economy is an appreciation of the currency and a reduction in net exports. Recall from Chapter 24, however, that such a reduction in net exports implies a reduction in the country's national asset formation. This in turn increases the need for the domestic economy to make interest payments to foreigners in the future. Thus, in an open economy, an increase in the government budget deficit does not lead to a reduction in the domestic capital stock but less of it is owned by domestic residents. This reduced ownerships lowers the domestic residents' future stream of income because payments must be paid to the foreign owners of the domestic capital stock. This reduction in the future stream of income for domestic residents is the long term burden of the public debt in an open economy. In both cases, there is less output available for consumption by future generations of domestic residents. This reveals an important aspect of the costs associated with government debt and deficits. This last sentence suggests that current government deficits are always financing goods and services that are provided to the current generation. But is this really true? Some government spending is on good and services that will continue to be used well into the future. For example if the government increases- its current borrowing to finance the building of bridges or the expansion of highways, future generations will receive some of the benefits of this government spending. 122 Whether current government deficits impose a burden on future generations, depends upon the nature of the government goods and services being financed by the deficit. At one extreme, the govern borrowing may finance a project that generates a return only to future generations, and thus the future generations may not be made worse off by today's budget deficit. An example might be the government's financing medical research projects that generate a return only-in the distant future. The concern that deficits may be inappropriately placing a financial burden on future generations has led some economists to advocate the idea of budgeting by the government. Under this scheme, the government would essentially- classify all of its expenditures either consumption or investment; the former would be spending that mostly benefits the current generation while the latter would be spending that mostly benefits future generations. DOES GOVERNMENT DEBT HAMPER ECONOMIC POLICY? The costs imposed on future generations by government debt are very real. Unfortunately, the fact that these cost sometimes occur in the very distant future often leads us to ignore their importance. But other costs associated with the presence of government debt are more immediately apparent. In particular government debt may make the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy more difficult. Monetary Policy Recall that the long-term goal of monetary policy is influence ~rate-o[inflation,- and that the Federal Reserve's primary instrument is its control over the rate of growth of money supply. In Chapter 30 we saw that sustained inflation possible only when the Fed permitted a sustained growth in the money supply. These facts appear to suggest that government deficits cause inflation. Note, however, that when the government operates a budget deficit and is thus borrowing funds, it can borrow from households or firms in the private sector, it can borrow from the Federal Reserve. But not all of these are these are same in. term of effect on the money supply. As we saw in Chapter 29, changes in the Fed's balance sheet are central to changes in the money supply. And, when the government borrows from either the private sector or from foreigners~ there is no change in the Fed's balance sheet, and thus no change in the money supply. In contrast, if the government borrows from the Fed (an open-market purchase by the Fed), this increases the Fed's assets (government securities) and similarly increases the Fed's liabilities (currency). Thus it is no necessary link between budget increase the money supply. To summarize the foregoing argument, unless the central bank finances some of the budget deficit, there is no necessary link between budget deficits (fiscal policy) and inflation (monetary policy). Thus a budget deficit can cause a one time increase in the price level, but, unless the Fed increases the rate of growth of the money supply, it will not cause a sustained inflation. The last point suggests that the independence of the central bank from the government deficits and inflation. For example, if the government were able to force the central bank to finance some fraction of government deficits-referred to as monetizing the deficit-then government deficits would clearly-1ead to the creation of money and eventual inflation. Though budget deficits need not be inflationary, their accumulated value over many years-the stock of government debt: can still make monetary policy more difficult. To see how a large stock of government debt can hamper the 123 conduct of monetary policy, consider a country that has a high debt to GDP ratio and that has a real interest rate above the growth rate of GDB. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the debt-to- GDP ratio will continue to grow in this situation unless the government starts running significant primary budget surpluses. Such fears of future debt monetization will lead to expectations of future inflations of thus will put upward pressure on nominal interest rates and on some prices wages. How does the presence of government debt affect the government's ability to conduct such counter cyclical fiscal policy? ∆d = x + (r -g) X d Thus, there may well be room for the government to increase the primary deficit-either by increasing the programs spending or by reducing tax rates without generating a large increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In this case, the high value of d means that even in the absence of a primary budget deficit, d will be increasing quickly. Thus, any increase in the primary deficit brought about by the counter-cycled fiscal policy runs the danger of generating increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio that may be viewed by creditors as unsustainable. A tradeoff therefore appears to exist between the desirable short-run stabilizing role of deficits and the undesirable long-run costs of government debt. This tradeoff has been the source of constant debate. Here we examine some possible solutions. Before examining some proposals for dealing with deficits, however, note that not everyone agrees that government deficits and debt represent a problem. Some economist that take the view that Ricardian equivalence does hold and thus budget deficits do not lead to a crowding out of investment or net exports and thus there is no long-term burden associated with the public debt. Other economists accept the view that sufficiently high deficits and debt can indeed represent a problem, but argue that the current debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States, about 48 percent, is not high enough to cause concern. Though these debates might be reasonable, there are some unreasonable arguments for why government debt is a problem. For example, many people argue that the main problem with the government debt is that much of it is held by foreigners and that such foreign ownership is bad, because interest payments are remitted abroad, reducing the income available for Americans. Such claims have even inspired a proposal that the U.S. government issue new "U.S.-only" bonds to Americans and then use the newly raised funds to redeem foreign-held government debt. ANNUALY BALANCED BUDGETS Even with the success that the Clinton Administration has had in reducing the budget deficit-from $290 billion in 1992 to $22 billion in 1997, and a likely balanced budget by 1999-there is still considerable support among leading members of Congress for an amendment to the US Constitution that would require the federal government to balance, its budget on an annual basis. Balancing the budget on an annual basis would extremely difficult to achieve. The reason is that a significant portion of the government budget is beyond the short-term control of the government, and a further large amount is hard to change quickly. For example, the entire debt-service 124 component of government expenditures is determined by past borrowing and thus cannot be altered by the current government. In addition, as we saw in our discussion of the cyclically adjusted deficit, changes in national income (real GDP) that are-beyond the control government lead to significant changes in tax revenues (transfer payments) and thus generate significant changes in the budget deficit. Even if it were possible for the government to perfectly control its path of spending and revenues on a year-to-year basis, it would probably be undesirable to balance the budget every year. We saw above government-tax-revenues (net of transfers) tend to fall in recessions and raise inbooms. In contrast, the level of government purchases is more or less dependent of the level of national income. With a balanced budget, government expenditures would be forced to adjust to the changing level of tax revenues. In a recession, when tax revenues -naturally decline, a balanced budget would require either a reduction in government expenditures or an increase in tax rates, thus generating a major destabilizing force on national income. Similarly, as tax revenues naturally rise in an economic boom, the balanced budget would require either an increase in government expenditures or a reduction in taxes, thus risking an over-heating of the economy. An annually balanced budget would accentuate the swings in real GDP. CYCLICALLY BALANCED BUDGETS One alternative to the extreme policy of requiring an annually balanced budget is to require that the government budget be balanced over the course of a full economic deficits would6epermitted in recessions as long as they were matched by surpluses in booms. In principle, this is a desirable treatment of the trade off between the short-run benefits of deficits and the long-run costs, of debt. Although more attractive in principle than the annually balanced budget, a cyclically balanced budget would carry problems of its own. Congress might well spend in excess of revenue in one year,. leaving the next Congress with the obligation of spending less than current revenue ,in following years. Could Figure 32-8 Balanced and Unbalanced Budgets Slide 32.9 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman such an obligation to balance the budget over a period of several years bema-de-binding? It could be made a legal requirement through-ah-act of Congress. Indeed, both the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 has taken this direction (see Application 32-2). These laws do not require balance over the cycle, but they do limit overall 125 spending while still allowing automatic stabilizers to operate. However, what Congress does, Congress can also undo. Perhaps the most important problem with a cyclically balanced budget is an operational one. In order have a law that requires the budget to be balanced over the cycle. it is necessary to be able to define the unambiguously. But there will always be disagreement about what stage of the cycle the economy is currently in, and thus there will be disagreement about the current government should be increasing or reduction its deficit. Compounding this problem is the fact that politicians will have a stake in the identification of the cycle. ALLOWING FOR GROWTH A further problem with any policy that requires a balanced budget whether over one year or over the business cycle is that the emphasis is naturally on the overall budget deficit. But, as we saw earlier in this chapter, what determines the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio is the growth of the debt relative to the growth of the economy. With a growing economy, it is possible to have positive overall budget deficits and thus a growing debt and still have a falling debt to GDP ratio. Thus, to the extent that the debt-to-GDP ratio is the relevant gauge of a country’s debt problem, focus should be placed on the debt-to-GDP ratio rather than directly on the budget deficit. Some economies view a stable (or falling) debt-to-GDP ratio as the appropriate indicator of fiscal prudence. Their view permits a deficit such that the stock of debt grows no faster than GDP. END OF CHAPTER 32 126 CH.37 : Exchange Rates and the Balance of Payments The Exchange Rate: The price of one currency in terms of another. Usually, it is the price of a unit of foreign currency in terms of a local currency. Example: ($1=SR.3.75). Foreign Exchange: Holdings of a country o f foreign currencies and financial assets denominated in foreign currencies. Currency Appreciation: Arise in the external value of home currency >>>According to the above definition of the ER, the Exchange rate will decrease. The opposite will happen if the currency depreciates. Note: When one currency appreciates, the other depreciates. See Fig.37.1 Figure 37-1 The Dollar-Yen Exchange Rate, 1972 -1998 Slide 37.2 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman The Balance of Payments (BOP): It is an accounting record of all transactions between a country and the rest of the world. *Sales of any assets (real or financial) or services >>> Receipts >>> Credit to BOP. *Purchases of any assets (real or financial) or services >>> payments >>> debit to BOP. Table 37-1.U.S Balance of Payments,1997, (Billions of dollars) I- CURRENT ACCOUNT (a) Trade Account Merchandise exports +679.3 Service exports +258.3 Merchandise imports -877.3 Service imports -170.5 Trade balance -110.2 (b) Capital-Service Account Net investment income (including Unilateral transfers) -45.0 Current Account balance -155.2 II- CAPITAL ACCOUNT Net change in U.S. investments abroad [capital outflow (-)] -477.5 Net change in foreign investments In the U.S [capital inflow (+) 717.6 ===== 127 Capital Account balance III- OFFICIAL FINANCING ACCOUNT Change in official reserves [increases (-) Change in liabilities to official foreign agencies[(increases (+)] Statistical Discrepancy +240.1 -1.0 +15.8 -99.7 ===== Official Financing balance -84.9 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 0.0 The overall balance of payments always balance, but individual components do not have to Structure of BOP: (Table 37.1 above): 1- Current Account: a) Trade Account. b) Capital Service Account (net income from foreign investment. 2- Capital Account: _ Foreign investment in the country >>> Capital inflow >>> Receipts >>> credit to BOP Our investment abroad >>> Capital outflow >>> Payments >>> Debits to BOP. a) Short Term Capital Movements: Buying & selling short term financial assets such as bank accounts or treasury bills b) Long Term Capital Movements: Purchasing or selling long term financial assets and/or physical assets… *if the long term capital is for a voting, or controlling share, it is called Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) *if the long term capital is NOT for voting share >>>It is a Portfolio Investment. 3- Official Reserve (Settlement) Account: transactions of the central bank, buying and selling foreign currencies, foreign financial assets, gold and SDR. *Note: BOP must balance >>> sum of the sub-accounts must be zero. However, this does not mean that each account must be zero. *Balance >>> Total Receipts = Total Payments >>> (Cr+Kr+Fr) = (Cp+Kp+Fp) >>> (Cr-Cp) + (Kr-Kp) + (Fr-Fp) = 0 *Surplus in one or two accounts >>> Deficit in at least one account…WHY? a deficit in one or two accounts, must be financed by a surplus in the other account(s) *Ex., a favorable balance in the current account (a Surplus) must be either invested abroad (Capital Outflow) >>> Capital account is negative >>> and/or the official reserves balance must decrease. What does it mean that the official reserves balance decrease? It means that the central bank would be buying foreign exchange from the private sector. * If the other two accounts of the BOP are in surplus, the central bank is adding to its reserves, and it appears with a negative sign. *In day-to-day language of news, a BOP is: Current Account + Capital Account *Under flexible exchange regime, the official reserve account = 0, because central bank does not need to intervene in the foreign exchange market: BOP = (Cr-Cp) + (Kr-Kp) = 0 (Cr-Cp) = - (Kr-Kp) 128 * This implies that a deficit in one account must be balanced by a surplus in the other account. *National Assets Formation = I + (X-M). Since the surplus of the current account is invested abroad >>> an increase the size of national assets. Both domestic investment and surplus in current account contribute to national assets & thus generate incomes to the country. This is a very important concept of macroeconomics. Students may visit www.sama.gov.sa for information on Saudi balance of payments, and other info. on the Saudi economy in general. * The Sources of Foreign Exchange Market: 1- Exports: These are payments by foreigners. 2- Capital Inflow: When foreigners buy some of the country’s financial assets and/or physical assets. Example: Foreign companies invest in Saudi petrochemicals or telecommunication sector, 3- Reserve Currency: Changing the country's portfolio of foreign exchange. * Supply and Demand Curves of Foreign Exchange: Fig.37.2 Figure 37-2 The Market for Foreign Exchange ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman Slide 37.3 - On the Supply Curve: Suppose the Yen appreciates >>> $/Yen will increase >>> Japanese find it cheaper to buy $ and American products >>> Japanese supply more Yen (the quantity supplied of Yen will increase). - On the Demand Curve: American finds Yen more expensive >>> they demand less Yen and Japanese products >>> the quantity demanded of Yen will decrease. * Determination of Exchange Rate: Generally, there are three major ER regimes: 1) A Country could choose a fixed exchange rate against another currency (or gold). 2) Completely flexible (floating) exchange rate >>> exchange rate determined by the market. 3)Between these two extremes, there could be may intermediate arrangements such as adjustable peg( where the ER is essentially fixed, but adjusted once- and- a while), a managed float( where the ER is essentially floating but the central bank seeks to have some 129 stabilizing influence. However it does not try to fix it at some publicly announced value), and pegging against a basket of currencies. See Fig.37-3 below. Figure 37-3 Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates Slide 37.4 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman _ At e1: the value of the home currency is kept artificially low >>> X will increase and M will decrease >>> C\A tend to a surplus.The low value of home currency may encourage an inflow of foreign investment >>> the K/A tend to a surplus. >>> As a result of both sub-accounts, foreign reserves increase >>> central bank purchases the surplus of FR to maintain exchange rat at e1 >>> (Fp> Fr). _ At e2: Home currency is kept artificially high >>> an opposite scenario takes place. *Causes of Changes in Exchange Rates: 130 Figure 37-4 Changes in Exchange Rates Slide 37.6 ©1999 Addison Wesley Longman 1-A Rise in the Prices of Exports: Assume elasticity of exports ( X >1) >>> receipts (supply) of foreign currency will decrease ( TRX= PX.QX ) >>> at the same time, quantity demanded of home currency will decrease >>> supply curve for foreign currency will shift upward (Panel ii)>>> ER will increase >>> home currency will depreciate.) 2-A Rise in the Prices of Imports: Assume elasticity ( M >1) >>> Payments for F.C decrease ( TPM= PM.QM ) >>> demand curve for foreign currency will shift downward (Panel i, Note: the shift of the D- curve in the fig. is wrong. It should be downward))>>> at the same time demand for home currency increases and ER will decrease >>> home currency will appreciate. Note: the assumption about elasticity is very crucial about what should happen to the ER. If reversed, it would change the conclusion about the ER. 3-Changes in the Overall Price Levels: a) Equal inflation in both countries: if home & foreign prices change in the same direction and at the same magnitude >>> terms of trade (PX/PM) is not affected >>> NO effect on the exchange rate. b) Inflation in Only One Country: >>> terms of trade are disturbed >>> exchange rate will change. C) Inflation at Unequal Rates: Here also the terms of trade are disturbed >>> exchange rate will change. However in all cases, remember the assumption about the elasticity (E X > 1 & EM > 1). The direction of change depends on that assumption. 4-Capital movements: a) Short term capital movement: Most important factor is changes in interest rates. If the interest rate of a country increases >>> its financial assets are more attractive >>> demand 131 for the country’s currency will increase >>>its exchange rate will decrease >>> its currency will appreciate. b) Speculation about future value of a country's exchange rate: If a country's ER is expected to appreciate in the future, investors rush to buy assets denominated in that currency. The country's currency appreciates, & visa versa. c) Long term capital movements: are largely affected by long term expectations of about profit opportunities in a country and the long term value of its exchange rate. 5-Structural changes: Are large and Long- lasting changes that may affect the economy. They are not necessarily permanent. They may affect long term terms of trade & thus long term ER, such as: a) Changes in cost structure of production, such as a permanent rise in real wages and real interest rates, b) R&D that leads to growth in some sectors at expense of others, c) Discovery of natural resources. The development of natural gas in the Netherlands in 1960s, and the development of North Sea oil in the UK in 1970s brought about the socalled the Dutch Disease in both countries. It led to the appreciation of Dutch Guilder & the sterling Pound respectively and had a negative effect on other Dutch & British exports. d) Major changes in the terms of trade may generate structural changes and affect exchange rates, as happened in 1997-1998 when commodity prices in many countries declined and affected the currencies of major commodity exporters such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Also, in that period, oil prices severely declined and had a profound effect on the oil exporting countries. * Behavior of Exchange Rate: - The Law of one price: In the absence of all trade barriers, the price of identical baskets of goods should be the same in all countries. If not, arbitrage will take place until prices are equalized. -The Purchasing Power Parity Exchange Rate (the PPP exchange rate): is the exchange rate that guarantees the validity of the law of one price. This means If the market ER is equal to the PPP rate, the purchasing power of a currency should the same both at home & abroad. Or, the price of identical goods should be the same in the two countries when expressed in the same currency. This means: Ph= e X Pf -Example: Suppose that the price of a Shawrma Sandwich in Dhahran is SR10 and the price of the same Sandwich in Bahrain is 1 Dinar. If the exchange rate is: BD 1 = SR 10 >>> the exchange rate makes the cost of the Sandwich the same across the two countries. This exchange rate is called the PPP rate. If the exchange rate is different from PPP rate >>> currency is either overvalued or undervalued. -Definition (V.V. Imp.): An overvalued currency is one that has a stronger purchasing power abroad than it has at home. In this case, imports are encouraged and exports are discouraged. The BOT and the BOP will tend to be in deficit. An undervalued currency (abroad) implies the opposite. 132 -Note that: the PPP rate is an equilibrium exchange rate. So, PPP theory of exchange rate is an equilibrium theory of the ER. It says that in the long run, exchange rates should adjust to make the prices of identical goods the same across countries when expressed in the same currency. Why the absolute version of PPP theory may NOT hold??? 1) Differentiated products that may entre into the calculation of different price indexes. This makes basket of goods are not identical across countries. Consequently, it renders the comparison of price indexes difficult. 2) Costly information about prices. 3) The theory assumes the absence of trade barriers. In reality, there are many trade barriers. Thus, the law of one price cannot be validated. 4) Price indexes include prices of both tradable and non-tradable goods. Only tradable goods affect exchange rate. 5) Changes in relative prices of some goods affect supply and demand of foreign exchange rate & thus affect exchange rates. This may happen while the overall price levels are NOT affected. *The Relative (Weaker) Version of PPP Theory of Exchange Rate: Because of the reasons explained above, economists came up with concept of relative PPP theory; E^ = Π^h -Π^f This says that the percentage change in the ER is equal to the difference in inflation rates between the two countries. -PPP in the short run (Effect of speculation): Some economists argued that speculation in currencies may not be bad, for it will eventually bring exchange rates to their PPP values. However, this may be true only if speculators know that deviations from PPP are small and short-lived. -Experience shows that under flexible exchange rates, swings around PPP have been wide and long lasting. Changes in interest rates have been a major cause of swings in exchange rates. Whatever the causes of swings, speculation has been destabilizing to exchange rate. *Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and Monetary Policy: *If monetary policy is tight >>> interest rate will increase >>> exchange rate will decrease >>> the currency will appreciate >>> Expenditures on (I,C,X) will decrease and M will increase >>> AD (AE) will decrease >>> a recessionary gap may take place. *The appreciation of the currency will continue until it has appreciated enough so that investors expect a future depreciation that just offsets the interest premium for investing in the securities of that country. 133 *The implication of this theory is that a central bank that is seeking to use its monetary policy to achieve its domestic policy targets may have to put up with large fluctuations in the ER. * Other countries may be affected by the monetary a policy of another country. The interest rate differential among countries >>> capital outflows from other countries into the country with a higher interest rate. Also, the appreciation of one country's currency implies depreciation of currencies of other countries. This stimulates exports from other countries to the country that started a tight monetary policy. As a result wages & prices in other countries may rise. This leaves these countries with the uncomfortable choice of either following the example of the other country (raising interest rates), or maintaining a lower interest rate and suffer inflation. This scenario assumes that the capital markets of the concerned countries are integrated. *In 1980s when the US tightened it monetary policy, other central banks in major industrial countries were forced to follow the US example, which led to sever world recession. END of CHAPTER 37 Something Just Snapped In Saudi Money Markets Submitted by Tyler Durden on 04/08/2016 15:40 -0400 Away from the headlines about The Panama Papers, global financial markets turmoiled quietly this week with a surge in equity and FX volatility and banks suffering more death blows. However, something happened in Saudi Arabia's banking system that was largely uncovered by anyone in the mainstream... overnight deposit rates exploded to their highest since the financial crisis in 2009... 134 It is clear that that the stress in Saudi markets has spread from the forward derivatives markets to actual funding problems. This suggests one of the two main things: either Saudi banks are desperatly short of liquidity or Saudi banks do not trust one another and are charging considerably more to account for the suspected credit risk. Either way, not good. So what is going on behind the scenes in Saudi Arabia? www.zerogedge.com 135 Fiscal Austerity and the Euro Crisis: Where Will Demand Come From? http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB1301_EUAusterity.pdf image: https://www.project-syndicate.org/default/images/PS_Logo-Large-Black.png Economics image: https://www.projectsyndicate.org/default/library/ad1e19c70510f2bda3dc69b45eb3fc20.square.png 136 Adair Turner Adair Turner, a former chairman of the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority and former member of the UK's Financial Policy Committee, is Chairman of the Institute for New Economic Thinking. His latest book is Between Debt and the Devil. FEB 5, 2016 Japan’s Wrong Way Out LONDON – Financial markets were surprised by the Bank of Japan’s recent introduction of negative interest rates on some commercial bank reserves. They shouldn’t have been. The BOJ clearly needed to take some new policy action to achieve its target of 2% inflation. But neither negative interest rates nor further expansion of the BOJ’s already huge program of quantitative easing (QE) will be sufficient to offset the strong deflationary forces that Japan now faces. In 2013 the BOJ predicted that its QE operations would deliver 2% inflation within two years. But in 2015, core inflation (excluding volatile items such as food) was only 0.5%. With consumer spending and average earnings falling in December, the 2% target increasingly looks out of reach. The unanticipated severity of China’s downturn is the latest factor upsetting the BOJ’s forecasts. But that slowdown is the predictable (and predicted) consequence of debt dynamics with roots going back to 2008. Excessive private credit growth in the advanced economies before 2008 left many companies and households overleveraged, and their attempted deleveraging after the global financial crisis erupted that year threatened Chinese exports, employment, and growth. To offset that danger, China’s rulers unleashed an enormous credit-fueled investment boom, pushing the debt/GDP ratio from around 130% to more than 230%, and the investment rate from 41% of GDP to 47%. This in turn drove a global commodity boom, and strong demand for capital-goods imports from countries such as South Korea, Japan, and Germany. But the inevitable consequence within China was wasteful construction investment and enormous overcapacity in heavy industrial sectors such as steel, cement, and glass. So even though service-sector expansion supports strong employment growth (with 13.1 million new urban jobs created in 2015), the Chinese industrial sector is in the midst of a hard landing. 137 Indeed, official survey results suggest that manufacturing has contracted for six months in a row. This, in turn, has reduced demand for commodities, driving countries such as Russia and Brazil into recession, and posing a major threat to African growth. Lower industrial imports are having a major impact on many Asian economies as well. South Korea’s exports fell 18% year on year in January, and Japan’s fell 8% in December. In the eurozone, annual inflation is running at 0.2% – still far below the European Central Bank’s target, and German exports to China are down 4%. As a result, at its March meeting, the ECB’s Governing Council may also consider moving interest rates further into negative territory, or increasing the scale of its QE program. But it is increasingly clear that ultra-low short and long-term interest rates are not boosting nominal demand. Nor should that surprise us. Japan’s experience since 1990 teaches us that once companies feel overleveraged, pushing low interest rates still lower has little impact on their investment decisions. Cutting Japan’s ten-year yield from 0.2% to 0.1%, and Germany’s from 0.5% to 0.35% – the movements over the last week – just doesn’t make a significant difference to consumption and investment decisions in the real economy. The BOJ’s announcement of a negative interest rate certainly did produce a currency depreciation. But a lower yen would help Japanese exporters only if China, the eurozone, and South Korea – all themselves struggling with deflationary pressures – do not match Japan’s rate cuts. At the global level, currency depreciation is a zero-sum game – we cannot escape a global debt overhang by depreciating against other planets. And if multiple currencies all depreciate against the US dollar, the resulting impact on the US manufacturing industry could slow the American economy, undermining its import demand and thus hurting the word’s exporters. Forecasts for US economic growth have been revised downward significantly since the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate hike in December. Depressed equity markets and falling bond yields worldwide in January 2016 thus illustrate the global nature of the problem we face. Demand is still depressed by the overhang of debt accumulated before 2008. Indeed, this pre-2008 debt has not gone away; it has simply been shifted between sectors and countries. 138 Total global debt (public and private combined) has increased from around 180% to more than 210% of world GDP. Faced with this reality, markets are increasingly concerned that governments and central banks are running out of ammunition to offset global deflation, with the only tools available those that simply redistribute demand among countries. But the fact is that central banks and governments together never run out of policy ammunition to offset deflation, because they can always finance tax cuts or increase public expenditure with printed money. This is precisely what the Japanese authorities should do now, permanently writing off some of the BOJ’s huge holdings of Japanese government bonds and canceling the planned sales-tax increase which, if it goes ahead in April 2017, will further depress Japanese growth and inflation. Such a policy, as I set out in a paper at the IMF’s 16th Annual Research Conference in November, is undoubtedly technically possible. And it does not, contrary to some objections, involve commitment to perpetually low interest rates. Rather, it is the only way by which Japan can now escape from a debt trap so deep that only zero interest rates make it sustainable. There are no credible scenarios in which Japanese government debt can ever be repaid in the normal sense of the word “repay”: and none in which the bulk of the BOJ’s holdings of Japanese government bonds will ever be sold back to the private sector. The sooner that reality is admitted, the sooner Japan will have some chance of meeting its inflation targets and stimulating total demand, rather than seeking to shift it away from other countries. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bank-of-japan-negative-rates-mistake-byadair-turner-2016-02 © 1995-2016 Project Syndicate Economy is really bad...* 139 Can U help these guys?! 140