November 19, 2001
Dear Judge:
You have the following questions:
1. Where court costs are set out and fixed by ordinance, does the city judge have
discretion to determine the amount of court costs a defendant convicted of a municipal
ordinance shall pay?
2. Where court costs are set out and fixed by ordinance, does the city judge have the
discretion to waiver court costs in municipal ordinance violation cases?
Similar questions also came up around June, 2001, from your City, but during that period
MTAS was extremely short-handed in the legal department. I was not able to devote much time
to those questions beyond supplying some previous research I had done on the question of
whether a municipality could levy court costs authorized by private act rather than general law.
In my opinion, under the City Charter, the city judge probably does not have the authority
to adjust the amount of court costs in individual cases; those costs are set in the City Code
under the authority of the city charter. However, in my opinion, under the City Charter the city
judge probably has the authority to waive court costs, subject to regulation by the city council.
The City Code does not appear to me to limit the city judge’s discretion in that area, but only
requires that it be done in open court.
Good arguments can also be made that procedurally municipal ordinance violation cases
are civil cases, and that for that reason the city judge has the authority under Tennessee Code
Annotated, ' 20-12-119, and under Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, to both
adjust and waive court costs in individual cases. If it is momentarily assumed that those are
winning arguments, does that statute and that rule supercede the city charter provisions
governing the discretion of the city judge to adjust and waive court costs?
Although I spend considerable time below looking at the possible connection between
the civil nature of municipal ordinance violation cases, and Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 2012-119 and Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, it does not appear to me that
the connection is convincing enough to pursue, unless you find that necessary. I understand
from discussing your questions with you that you are principally concerned about Question 2.
Because I have concluded that the city judge has that right under the city charter to waive court
costs, I did not finally determine whether that statute and rule are connected to the Knoxville
Municipal Court. For the same reason, I did not finally determine which of the City Charter
provisions governing the discretion of the city judge to adjust and waive court costs and of
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-12-119 and Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure, would prevail in a contest between them.
November 19, 2001
Page 2
I will attempt to analyze both your questions together.
Authority for Court Costs Generally
It is the law that court costs must be authorized by statute. [See in particular, Mooneys v.
State, 10 Tenn. 578 (1831); Railroad v. Boswell, 58 S.W. 117 (1900); McHenderson v. Anderson
County, 58 S.W. 1016 (1900); State ex rel. Vance v. Dixie Portland Cement Co., 267 S.W. 595
(1924); Person v. Fletcher, 582 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).] It is also said in Wilson v.
Wilson, 134 Tenn. 697, 706, 185 S.W. 718 (1916), that:
The matter of costs is essentially statutory. 1 Cyc. 24; 7 R.C.L. P.
789. Mooneys v. State. 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 578. There is no
constitutional restriction on the power of the legislature, and that
body may provide for the taxation of costs of litigation in such
manner as it may deem proper. [Emphasis is mine.]
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 8-21-401, “authorizes” all of the court clerks, including
“clerks of city courts...” to collect the costs provided by that statute. However, that statute is not
the exclusive statute under which “corporation courts” can set court costs. Until 1969, Section 6202(16) of the general law mayor-aldermanic charter authorized municipalities established
under that charter to “impose and collect fines and forfeitures for breaches and violations of its
ordinances.” Although the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County was not
chartered under the general law mayor-aldermanic charter, that statute was amended by Public
Acts 1969, Chapter 200, to add the following sentence: “Any city having a metropolitan form of
government shall be authorized to impose and collect fines and forfeitures for breaches and
violations of its ordinances and to impose reasonable court costs necessary to support the
maintenance and operation of the various municipal courts.” The Metropolitan government
passed an ordinance imposing court costs on defendants who pleaded guilty or were convicted
in the Metropolitan Court.
In Doyle v. Metro Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 471 S.W.2d 371
(Tenn. 1971), the question was whether the addition of the above sentence by Public Acts 1969,
Chapter 200, was local legislation requiring approval of 2/3 vote of the city’s governing body, or
by a referendum, under Article XI, ' 9, of the Tennessee Constitution. Holding that the
legislation in question was general legislation to which Article XI, ' 9 did not apply, the
Tennessee Supreme Court declared that:
The Legislature, by this provision, was delegating to corporate
courts the authority to impose costs on defendants found guilty of
‘breaches and violations of its ordinances’ after the appropriate
legislative body has approved the legislative act by proper
resolution. This court has held that it is well within the power of the
legislature to specify the reach of the jurisdiction of the corporate
courts in the exercising of their functions. [Citing Hill v. State ex rel.
Phillips (1965), 216 Tenn. 503, 392 S.W.2d 950; Constitution,
Article 6, ' 1] [Emphasis is mine]
November 19, 2001
Page 3
The “jurisdiction” the General Assembly gave to the Metropolitan corporate courts in that
case apparently included the jurisdiction of such courts to set their own court costs. There
appears no reason in Doyle why the General Assembly could not either by general law authorize
all or a class of corporate courts, or by private act authorize a particular corporate court, to set
court costs. Corporation courts are the municipal courts. That is true even where the municipal
court has concurrent jurisdiction. [Gregory v. City of Memphis, 6 S.W.2d 332 (1927); Phillips,
cited above, State ex rel. Boone v. Torrence, 470 S.W.2d 356 (1971); State ex rel. Town of
South Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1992).]
But Doyle does not deal with the question of whether the judge has discretion to impose
such costs in a lower amount, or waiver such costs, in individual cases. However, its logical
corollary is that the authority of a judge in those areas is also subject to regulation by statute.
That conclusion is also supported by State v. Black, 897 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. 1995), in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court considered the express question of whether the general sessions
court had the authority to waiver costs in DUI cases arising from indigency of defendants.
Holding that the answer was yes, the Court reasoned that:
1. Tennessee Attorney General’s Opinion U93-01 had opined that:
A Court of record has authority to waive costs where it finds that
the defendant is indigent and the county would be assessed the
costs in a misdemeanor prosecution, T.C.A. '' 40-25-129(2) and
40-25-132. Although this authority to waive costs appears to be
limited to a court of record, the General Sessions courts share this
authority in the case of a DUI conviction for the purpose of
regaining a drivers license by virtue of the language of T.C.A. '
55-50-303(b)(1).
While Tennessee Attorney General’s opinions were not binding on the courts, “this opinion is
entitled to great deference.” [At 683]
2. As between Tennessee Code Annotated, '' 40-25-123 and 129, which required
persons convicted of crimes to pay court costs, and Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 55-30303(b)(1), which permitted the court to waiver court costs in DUI cases involving indigency, the
specific statute prevailed.
That case leads to the conclusion that in the absence of Tennessee Code Annotated, '
55-30-303(b)(1), the sessions court would not have had the authority to waiver court costs, and
seems to make it clear that judges do not have carte blanche to adjust or waiver costs, at least
where a statute provides for their payment by a particular party or parties.
The Questions under the Knoxville City Charter
The City has a home rule charter, adopted in 1954, and its present charter is reflected in
Ordinance No. 0-177-82, as amended. However, it is within the authority of the General
November 19, 2001
Page 4
Assembly to pass general legislation that applies to home rule municipalities. [City of Knoxville
ex rel. Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. 1984).] The General Assembly has done so
with respect to home rule municipal courts in Tennessee Code Annotated, title 16, chapter 17.
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 16-17-105, provides that:
Reasonable costs shall be set by ordinance of the governing body
of any home rule municipality regardless of any present limit, but in
no event shall such costs exceed the costs assessed in the
general sessions courts in the state of Tennessee.
Nothing in that provision speaks to the question of whether a home rule city judge can
adjust or waiver court costs set by ordinance of a home rule city’s governing body. But Article V
of the City Charter also creates a municipal court. The following charter provisions govern fines
and costs:
Article V, ' 503, provides that:
...The municipal judge shall have the exclusive power to impose
fines for the breach of any city ordinance; and shall have the
exclusive power to grant releases and suspensions of judgments
for sentences, and to remit fines of persons convicted by said
judge, but the manner in which this power can be exercised shall
be subject to regulation by the city council. The city council is
authorized by ordinance to regulate the terms and conditions
under which fines may be secured and all additional fees and
costs.... [Emphasis is mine.]
Article V, Section 504, deals with state law violations, but says with respect to fines and
costs, that “Authorized fees and costs in state cases shall be collected as in city cases and paid
over to the municipality.”
Article V, Section 507, provides that:
The council shall have the power by ordinance, subject to state
law, to fix the fees and costs for cases tried in the municipal court,
for violation of ordinances of the City or the violation of state laws.
Such fees and costs shall be collected from defendants in such
manner as if authorized by law and shall be paid over daily to the
City. [Emphasis is mine.]
Section 8-8 of the City Code also establishes a schedule of court costs for municipal
ordinance violations, and provides that upon a conviction “the following costs or fees shall be
taxed, collected and paid to the clerk of the court.” [ There follows a schedule of those costs.]
Likewise, ' 8-5 of the City Code provides that the city judge shall “upon conviction, render his
judgment against any person violating any provision of this code or other ordinance of the city,
and shall impose the fines, penalties, and costs fixed for such violation...”
November 19, 2001
Page 5
Article 5, ' 507 of the city charter, and '' 8-5 and 8-8 of the Municipal Code appear to
require the city judge to impose court costs set by the city council. But none of those charter or
city code provisions expressly speak to the question of whether the city judge has the authority
to waive court costs. However, Article V, ' 503 of the city charter gives the city judge the
authority to impose fines for city ordinance violations, and to “grant releases and suspensions for
judgments, and to remit fines...subject to regulation by the city council.” It has been held that
costs are part of a judgment [Grant v. Davis, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 315 (1917)], although a judgment
may be final even if it makes no provision for costs. [Brown v. Wright, 1 Tenn. Ch. App. 153
(1901)]. In addition, while State v. Copeland, above, involved the question of whether a general
sessions judge could waiver costs in a DUI case, the court also noted that the judge had the
general authority to waive fines under Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 40-24-102. That statute
provides that “The several courts in which a cause is adjudged are authorized, either before or
after final judgment, for good cause, to release the defendants, or any one (1) or more of them,
from the whole or any part of fines or forfeitures accruing to the county or state.” [Emphasis is
mine.] The language of Article V, ' 503 of the City Charter is similar to Tennessee Code
Annotated, ' 40-24-102, but is even more broad; it applies to “judgments” (of which costs are a
part), while the statute applies only to “fines and forfeitures.”
An argument can be made that the judge’s authority in Article V, ' 503 to “grant releases
and suspensions of judgments” does not apply to costs, but applies only to jail sentences.
There is some support for that argument in state law, the city charter, and the city code. In
theory, under Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 6-54-306, a home rule municipality can provide for
jail terms of up to 30 days for ordinance violations. Under Article 2, ' 232 of the city charter, the
punishment for city ordinance violations cannot exceed $100, “nor shall any imprisonment
exceed that authorized by law.” Under Article V, ' 505 of the city charter, the judge can impose
a fine of up to $100 and a sentence of up to 10 days for contempt of court. Finally, under
Section 1-9 of the city code, the penalty for ordinance violations is a $50 fine, up to $500 for
administrative expenses, and “imprisonment not to exceed thirty (30) days,” or both. While it is
not likely that a municipal judge in Tennessee can jail a municipal ordinance violator in spite of
that statute and city charter and code provisions, we need not even address that issue. The
context in which those jail sentence provisions are pertinent here has to do with whether they are
the “judgments for sentences” within the meaning of the city judge’s authority to “grant releases
and suspensions of judgments for sentences” contemplated in Article V, ' 503 of the city
charter. If the judge’s authority under Article V, ' 503 includes the authority to adjust or waiver
costs, there would be no need for the limiting language “and to remit fines.” Likewise, had that
authority been intended to include costs, Article V, ' 503 could have easily said, “and to remit
fines and costs...”
But that seems a hyper-technical reading of Article V, ' 503, particularly given that a
“judgment” includes costs. I suspect that the courts would have no trouble concluding that the
power to “grant releases and suspensions of judgments for sentences” includes the power to
release or suspend all parts of the judgment, including costs, absent charter language more
clearly indicating that such power does not include costs than is found in Article V, ' 503. That
conclusion appears supported by the rules of statutory construction. In Gay v. City of Somerville,
November 19, 2001
Page 6
878 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. App. 1994), the city charter gave the city’s governing body “full power”
over personnel matters. In holding that charter provision prohibited the city administrator from
terminating the police chief, the Court said:
The primary rule of statutory construction is that the intention of the
legislative body must prevail. The legislative intent or purpose is to
be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of
the language used, when read in the context of the entire statute
and without any forced or subtle construction to limit or extend the
import of the language. [Citation omitted.] It is the Court’s duty to
reconcile inconsistent or repugnant provisions of a statute so that
no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant. Effect
must be given to every word phrase, clause and sentence of the
act in order to achieve the legislative intent and the statute should
be construed so that no section will destroy another. [Citation
omitted. [At 126-27]
It seems a “forced or subtle construction” of Article V, ' 503 to limit the city judge’s power
to “grant releases or suspensions of judgments of sentences” to jail sentences. Surely, that kind
of subtlety could not be attributed to the drafters of that charter provision. The plain and ordinary
meaning of such a phrase would seem to include all or components of a judgment, including
costs. Permitting the city administrator to terminate the police chief when the city’s governing
body had “full power” over personnel matters, would render that term “superfluous and
insignificant,” reasoned the Court in Somerville v. Gay. The same is true of the phrase “grant
releases or suspensions of judgments of sentences,” if it limits the city judge’s power in that area
to jail sentences.
Even ' 8-141 of the City Code does not appear to read Article V, ' 503 so narrowly as to
exclude costs. It provides that, “The municipal judge may grant paroles, releases or
suspensions of judgment, or the remission of fines..” The “or” separates the judge’s discretion
into two parts: (1) the granting of paroles, and the release or suspensions of judgments, and (2)
the remission of fines. Read together or even separately, both Article V, ' 503 and ' 8-141
seem to indicate that the city judge can partially or wholly release or suspend fines and/or costs
in the exercise of his authority to release or suspend judgments, or simply remit fines.
Section 8-143 of the City Code does provide that:
At the time of granting any parole, release or suspension of
judgment, or the remission of a fine, or as soon thereafter as is
reasonably practical without interfering with the conduct of the city
court, the city judge shall issue a signed memorandum or order
specifying the action taken. The order shall be filed with the city
court clerk...
That regulation appears consistent with the authority of the city council under Article V, ' 503, to
regulate the manner in which the city’s judge’s authority to release or suspend judgments or
November 19, 2001
Page 7
remit fines is exercised.
The Questions under State General Law
State v. Black, above, involved statutes governing costs in criminal cases. Tennessee
Code Annotated, title 20, chapter 12, contains a collection of statutes regulating court costs in
civil cases, and those statutes appear to give judges considerable discretion as to the allocation
and waiver of costs. Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-12-101 provides that:
The successful party in all civil actions is entitled to full costs,
unless otherwise directed by law, or by a court of record, for which
judgment shall be rendered. [Emphasis is mine.]
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-12-119, provides that:
(a) In all civil cases, whether tried by a jury or before the court
without a jury, the presiding judge shall have a right to adjudge the
cost.
(b) In doing so, the presiding judge shall be authorized, in the
presiding judge’s discretion, to apportion the cost between the
litigants, as in the presiding judge’s opinion the equities of the case
demand. [Emphasis is mine.]
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-12-118, also provides that:
If any case shall occur not directly or by fair implication embraced
in the express provisions of the law, the court may make such
disposition of the costs as, in its sound discretion, may seem right.
The reason those statutes need consideration is that arguably they apply generally to
municipal courts. That argument is difficult to support only from the faces of those statutes. But
it is said in Woolfolk v. Woolfolk, 69 S.W.2d 1089 (1934), that:
By the Act of 1917 the presiding judge, in all civil cases, was
authorized to apportion the costs as in his discretion the equities of
the case demanded. This statute [presently Tennessee Code
Annotated, ' 20-12-119] made the rule formally prevailing in courts
of equity as to costs “applicable to all civil suits in courts of law as
well as equity.” State ex rel. Wilson v. Bush, 141 Tenn. 229, 208
S.W.607, 690.
This statute is given effect in Code, ' 9091 [presently Tennessee
Code Annotated, ' 20-12-101]. The provision of the present Code
is that the successful party is entitled to full costs,” unless
otherwise directed by law.” [At 1000] [Emphasis is mine.]
November 19, 2001
Page 8
Municipal courts exercising only ordinance jurisdiction do not appear to be courts of law
or equity, but as we shall immediately see below, municipal court cases have for 130 years been
procedurally civil cases, although as far as I can determine there has been no case in which the
question of whether those statutes apply to such civil cases. But it is a rule of statutory
construction that the General Assembly is presumed to have knowledge. [Hodges v. S.C. Toof
& Company, 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992)] If that is so, the General Assembly is presumed to
have known in 1917 when it adopted what is now Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-12-119, that
municipal ordinance violations cases were civil cases, which Woolfolk, above declares was
made active by Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-12-101. .
It is said in the recent case of City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 249 (Tenn. 2001),
that:
Since our decision in City of Chattanooga v. Myers, 787 S.W.2d
921 (Tenn. 1990), the law now appears settled that proceedings
for municipal ordinance violations are civil in nature, at least in
terms of technical application of procedure and for pursuing
avenues of appeal. [At 259] [Emphasis is mine]
Footnote 14 in Davis declares that:
...In Allen [Metropolitan Government v. Allen, 529 S.W.2d 699
(Tenn. 1975)], we again held that A[a]n appeal for the violation of a
municipal ordinance is a civil action, triable [d]e novo in the circuit
court in precisely the same manner and under the same
procedural rules as those governing tort actions instituted in
General Sessions Courts, to include the right to a jury trial. 529
S.W.2d at 507. [At 261]
Meyers went even further with respect to the specific civil nature of municipal ordinance
violations. In holding that a person convicted of a municipal ordinance violation is entitled to a
jury trial upon appeal to circuit court, that case declares that:
In summary, for 130 years proceeding to recover fines for the
violation of municipal ordinances have been considered civil for
the purposes of procedure and appeal, although the principles of
double jeopardy have recently been determined to apply in such
cases...The basis of the cases accepted in Allen-Briggs, is that an
appeal to circuit court of a judgment of a municipal court (even
where the defendant is the appellant) is an appeal in a civil action
brought by a municipality to recover a “debt.” [At 928]
In its analysis of the Allen-Briggs line of cases, the Myers Court, pointing to Meaher v.
Mayor and Aldermen of Chattanooga, 38 Tenn. 75 (1858), for the proposition that:
There was no power [in the city] to indict--the city can only operate
by fines, forfeitures and penalties, and then to recover by warrant.
November 19, 2001
Page 9
If the fine, forfeiture or penalty--for the name is not so materialBis
fixed by the ordinance, for any particular thing, that may be
recovered by warrant, and the only proof required is, that the
offense, or act to which such fine or forfeiture is attached, has
been committed. Debt is the proper action for penalties prescribed
for certain offenses, by acts or ordinances. This is well settled law,
and has been recognized at the present term. [At 923] [Emphasis
supplied by the Meaher Court, and noted as such by the Meyer
Court.]
In Footnote 2, found at the end of the above quoted, the Meyer Court noted that:
Slightly over a half-century later, this Court stated in Deming v.
Nichols, 135 Tenn.925, 186 S.W. 113, 114 (1916), that there were
“two modes” in this country to enforce penal ordinances: an action
of debt to recover the penalty and “the ancient and familiar
summary proceeding on information and complaint.” At common
law the action was, in form, either debt or assumpsit and brought
merely to recover the penalty imposed for violation of the
ordinance. In assumpsit, the theory was that there had been a
breach of duty; and by legal fiction it was assumed the defendant
had promised the municipal corporation, which in most cases
became the plaintiff, to perform the duty. The action of debt was
allowable, as the penalty was for a sum certain in the nature of
liquidated damages. [At 923]
It is also said in Clark v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 827 S.W.2d 312 (Tenn.
App. 1991), that, “A prosecution for an act violating a city ordinance is civil and not a criminal
proceedings as is governed by rules in civil cases.” [At 315] [Citations omitted] the Court also
declared that, “Where a warrant charges only the violation of a city ordinance, it is considered
only as a civil process, and technical nicety of pleading is not required.” [At 315] [Citation
omitted.] That case also points to the procedure that applies in sessions courts as an apparent
model for the procedure in the municipal courts, and which is civil in nature:
Pleadings in a civil case before a General Sessions Court are “ore
tenus” (oral, in open court), except where the plea is required to be
under oath. Craig v. Collins, Tenn. App. 1974, 524 S.W.2d 947.
Civil actions are ordinarily brought in General Sessions Court by a
“civil warrant” which includes a designation of the type of action
and notice to appear for trial. With certain exceptions, civil
warrants are not required to be supported by affidavit. In lieu of a
civil warrant, metropolitan police officers apparently use a “citation”
or “ticket” which serves as a civil warrant. As such, it is not
required to be supported by affidavit, either at the time of service
or at trial. Therefore, in the present case, the original affidavit and
the amendatory affidavit were unnecessary... [At 315]
Consistent with the theory that municipal ordinance violations are civil in nature,
November 19, 2001
Page 10
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 6-54-303 provides for the execution on its judgments “in the
same manner and methods as prescribed in [Tennessee Code Annotated] title 26, chapters 13,” which manner and methods apply to the execution of civil judgements. Similarly, under
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 40-24-101, “any court of this state, including municipal courts for
the violation of municipal ordinances, is authorized to require fines to be paid at the time of
judgment, at a later date, or in installment payments.” Tennessee Code Annotated, 40-24-105,
contains a relatively detailed prescription as to how fines and costs are collected:
(a) Unless discharged by payment of service or imprisonment in
default of a fine, a fine may be collected in the same manner as a
judgment in a civil action. Costs and litigation taxes may be
collected in the same manner as a judgement in a civil action, but
shall not be deemed part of the penalty, and no person shall be
imprisoned under this section in default of payment of costs or
litigation taxes...
(b) The district attorney general or the county or municipal
attorney, as applicable, may, in such person’s discretion, and shall,
upon order of the court, institute proceedings to collect the fine,
costs and litigation taxes as a civil judgment.
In State v. Copeland, 647 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. Cr. App.1983), the “Lucky Lady,” a
business, was convicted of certain crimes, and filed notices of appeal. The state moved the trial
court to require the Lucky Lady to post a bond pursuant to Rule 62 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for a stay of execution pending appeal. The trial court denied the motion. In
reversing the trial court, the Court of Criminal Appeals declared that:
Since T.C.A. ' 40-24-105 places the judgment of a fine in the
status of a judgment in a civil action, we hold that Rule of Civil
Procedure 62 which governs stay proceedings to enforce a civil
judgment is applicable...[W]e think that the rule is applicable to this
court with respect to a fine since it is in the nature of a civil
judgment... [At 242-43]
If municipal ordinance violations cases have for 130 years been considered civil
proceedings for the purposes of procedure and appeal, it seems reasonable to conclude that
Tennessee Code Annotated, '' 20-12-101, 20-12-118 and 20-12-119, apply to municipal
courts. Article V, Section 507 of the city charter, expressly gives the city council the authority to
set costs for municipal ordinance violations, but it does so, “subject to state law.” It also
concludes in the next sentence with the curious language: “Such fees and costs shall be
collected from defendants in such manner as if authorized by law....” I am unable to determine
what, if any, is the significance of “if.” I presume that clause simply means “as authorized by
law.” Those references to state law may apply only to the amount of court costs, but it can be
argued that they also apply to state laws which govern the adjustment and waiver of court costs
in civil cases.
State v. Copeland and the above cases declaring that municipal ordinance violations are
civil raise another question: Do the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to such cases?
November 19, 2001
Page 11
Under Rule 54.04 of the TRCP, the judge also appears to have considerable discretion both as
to the amount of court costs and as to the waiver of such costs:
(1) Costs included in the bill of costs prepared by the clerk shall be
allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs...
(2) Costs not included in the bill of costs prepared by the clerk are
allowable only in the court’s discretion.
Rule 1 of the TRCP provides for the application of TRCP to specific courts:
Subject to such exceptions as are stated in them, these rules shall
govern the procedure in the circuit and chancery courts of
Tennessee and in other courts while exercising the jurisdiction of
the circuit or chancery courts, in all civil action, whether at law or
equity, including civil actions appealed or otherwise transferred to
those courts. These rules shall not be applicable to courts of
general sessions except in cases where such courts by special or
private act exercise jurisdiction similar to that of circuit or chancery
courts...
On its face then, Rule 1 does not expressly apply the TRCP to municipal courts, although
municipal courts are not expressly exempt from those rules as are courts of general sessions.
Clark, cited above, declares that municipal ordinance violations being a civil process, “technical
nicety of pleadings are not required.” [At 315]
For those and other reasons many, if not most, of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure are probably not appropriate for municipal courts. But under State v. Copeland,
above, at least some of those rules apply to municipal courts, apparently including those that
govern appeals to circuit court. It is not clear whether Rule 54 is among them. But it was held in
Mid-South Pavers v. Arnco Construction, Incorporated, 771 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tenn. App. 1989),
that where there are conflicts between the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and provisions of
the Tennessee Code, the former prevail. However, unless I am missing something, there is no
conflict between Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and Tennessee Code
Annotated, '' 20-12-101, 118 and 119. [See In re Webb, 675 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. App. 1984).]
The discretion of the judge under Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 12-20-119Band under
Rule 54 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure--is broad, and subject to review only upon
the grounds of manifest abuse. [State ex rel. Wilson v. Bush, 208 S.W. 607 (1918), Erin v.
Brooks, 230 S.W.2d 397 (1950); Roberts v. Brown, 310 S.W.2d 197 (1957); Webb, above.]
Sincerely,
Sidney D. Hemsley
Senior Law Consultant
November 19, 2001
Page 12