MEMORANDUM
FROM:
Sid Hemsley, Senior Law Consultant
DATE:
September 28, 2001
RE:
Venue for Municipal Ordinance Violations; Sheriff Enforcing Municipal
Ordinances
You have two questions:
1. Where a city’s police department provides police services for another city, including
the writing of city ordinance violations, can the city ordinance violations be tried in the city court
of the city that provides the police services?
In my opinion, the answer is no. The proper venue for municipal ordinance violation
cases is the municipal court in the municipality in which the offense occurred. Venue is probably
jurisdictional; that is, unless the case is heard in the proper venue, the court has no jurisdiction.
2. Can the sheriff enforce city ordinance violations, and those violations be tried in the
city court rather than in the county sessions court.
In my opinion, the answer is no.
Venue for Municipal Ordinance Violations
There is a civil venue statute at Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-4-101 et seq. But
even the recent consolidated Tennessee Supreme Court cases of City of Chattanooga v. Davis
and Barrett v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, decided June 13,
2001, failed to put municipal ordinance violations in the civil or criminal columns. Said the Court:
Since our decision in City of Chattanooga v. Myers, 787 S.W.2d
921 (Tenn. 1990), the law now appears settled that proceedings
for a municipal ordinance violation are civil in nature, at least in
terms of technical application of procedure and for pursuing
avenues of appeal. Outside technical procedure and appeal,
however, substantial conflict may still be found as to the
characterization of the substantive nature of the proceedings.
Indeed, depending upon the precise issue before the particular
court, proceedings for municipal ordinance violations have been
described as “civil in character,” City of Memphis v. Smythe, 104
Tenn. 702, 703, 58 S.W. 215, 215 (1900); as “partak[ing] more or
less of a civil wrong,” Hill v. State ex rel Phillips, 215 Tenn. 503,
507, 392 S.W.2d 950, 952 (1965); as “partially criminal,” O’Haver
v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 460, 111 S.W. 449, 452 (1908);
and as “criminal rather than civil in substance,” Metropolitan Gov’t
v. Miles, 524 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tenn. 1975).
The Court went on to conclude that with respect to the application of Article VI, '14,
substance was more important than form and that the purpose and amount of the “civil penalty”
imposed by municipal courts could be criminally substantive. But the case (and none other that I
can find) did not answer the question of whether municipal ordinance violation venue is
substantively civil or substantively criminal.
But venue is probably procedurally civil because appeals of municipal ordinance cases
are to the circuit, rather than to the criminal, court. In addition, under Article I, ' 9, of the
Tennessee Constitution, criminal defendants are entitled to a trial by jury “of the County in which
the crime shall have been committed.” Jury trials are not to be had in municipal ordinance
violation cases heard in municipal courts. Finally, it has been held that a municipal ordinance
violation case is an action on a debt, the debt being the penalty for violation of the ordinance.
Actions on debt are civil in nature. Under that theory, the venue would be the same venue as an
action on debt.
Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 20-4-101 et seq., covers civil venue. That statute is
based on the system of county courts and probably never contemplated a municipal ordinance
violation. But an action on debt under that statute appears to be what is called a “transitory
action.” As ill-designed for municipal ordinance violations as that statute is, it does contain
language that probably answers the venue question: “In all civil actions of a transitory nature,
unless the venue is otherwise provided for, the action may be brought in the county where the
cause of action arose or in the county where the defendant resides or is found.” [Emphasis is
mine.]
In all the charters that I have checked for the purpose of answering this question, the
municipal court judge has jurisdiction over municipal ordinance violations occurring within the
city. Such provisions appear to me to limit the hearing of municipal ordinance violation cases in
the city in which they occurred.
Sheriff Enforcing Municipal Ordinances
I seem to recall that in the past one or two cities entered into a contract with the sheriff
for the latter to enforce the city’s municipal ordinances, and the ordinance violations were tried in
the city court rather than in the county sessions court. I have been unable to recall the names of
those cities. However, it does not appear to me that the sheriff has the authority to enter into
such an agreement.
When we orally discussed this question, I thought that the impediment to such an
agreement might be the limitation on the authority of the sheriff. It now appears to me that there
is a similar limitation on cities.
Tennessee Code Annotated, '' 8-8-201(34), 16-15-204, and 12-9-104, authorize the
interlocal agreements between the county sheriff, the county sessions court, and cities for the
sheriff to enforce municipal ordinances, and for the sessions court to try ordinance violation
cases. The Interlocal Government Cooperation Act at Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 12-9-104,
authorizes a broad range of interlocal agreements, but it also specifically addresses the
interlocal agreements between the sheriff, the sessions judge and the city:
Notwithstanding any prevision of the law to the contrary, any
municipality may enter into an agreement with the sheriff, court of
general sessions, and the governing body of any county in which it
is located to provide for the enforcement of municipality’s
ordinances according to the provisions of '' 8-8-201(34) and 1615-501...
That language appears to authorize such agreements, but also to limit them to the configuration
contemplated in those statutes. In addition, the Interlocal Government Cooperation Act permits
interlocal agreements to cooperatively do things that both parties are authorized under the law to
do. The same thing is true of contracts between local governments authorized by the Interlocal
Government Cooperation Act. Tennessee Code Annotated, ' 12-9-108, provides that:
Any one or more public agencies may contract with any one (1) or
more public agencies to perform any governmental service, activity
or undertaking which each public agency entering into the contract
is authorized by law to perform...
A city is obviously authorized by law to enforce municipal ordinances, but a sheriff is not
authorized by law to enforce municipal ordinances except in the manner prescribed by
Tennessee Code Annotated, '' 8-8-201(34), 16-15-501 and 12-9-104. Likewise, I find nothing
in any statute, express or implied, that indicates a city has the authority to enter into such a
contract with the sheriff. Most municipal charters give cities the general power to contract, but
where several statutes have expressly stated how two governments can enter into an
agreement, as do Tennessee Code Annotated, '' 8-8-201(34), 16-15-204, and 12-9-104, the
general power to contract is inadequate to support an agreement that does not conform to those
statutes.
Incidentally, attached is TAG U-91-146 (unpublished opinion) of the Tennessee Attorney
General which appears to reach the same conclusion.