THE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT MANDATE: ONE
COUNTY’S JOURNEY TOWARDS DISPARITIES REDUCTION
Tanya Renee Red
B.A., Clark Atlanta University, 2003
PROJECT
Submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
at
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO
FALL
2010
THE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT MANDATE: ONE
COUNTY’S JOURNEY TOWARDS DISPARITIES REDUCTION
A Project
by
Tanya Renee Red
Approved by:
, Committee Chair
Dan Okada, Ph.D.
Date
ii
Student: Tanya Renee Red
I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University
format manual, and that this Project is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to
be awarded for the Project.
, Graduate Coordinator
Yvette Farmer, Ph.D.
Date
Division of Criminal Justice
iii
Abstract
of
THE DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT MANDATE: ONE
COUNTY’S JOURNEY TOWARDS DISPARITIES REDUCTION
by
Tanya Renee Red
Statement of the Problem
Youth of color have been overrepresented throughout the juvenile justice system
for decades. Despite being the focus of Congressional legislation, juvenile justice
coalition and advocate reports, and state and local jurisdictional reform efforts this issue
persists and is increasing.
Sources of Data
This project utilizes various literature sources including: books, academic journals,
reports/articles. The main analysis is built from the results of an interview conducted by
Star County (a pseudonym) staff in 2008, to identify perceptions of past committee
members and begin revamping their reform efforts.
Conclusions Reached
The work of reducing Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) is an ongoing progression, which is never totally complete. Although it may be impossible to
iv
eliminate DMC altogether, it has been proven that certain interventions can help to
balance the disproportion. Solutions to this problem are localized and specific to the
population being examined.
, Committee Chair
Dan Okada, Ph.D.
Date
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Tables.……………………………………………………………………………vii
Chapter
1.
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
Problem ................................................................................................................... 1
Scope ....................................................................................................................... 1
2.
BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 3
History..................................................................................................................... 3
Review of the Literature ......................................................................................... 8
3.
FINDINGS ................................................................................................................ 19
4.
ANALYSIS OF STAR COUNTY ............................................................................ 21
Changes ................................................................................................................. 21
DMC Coordinator ................................................................................................. 24
Recommendations ................................................................................................. 30
Conference Epiphany ............................................................................................ 32
DMC Advisory Committee ................................................................................... 33
DMC Grant Round 2 ............................................................................................. 36
5.
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 41
Appendix A Position Description .................................................................................... 44
Appendix B Police Department Survey ........................................................................... 48
References ......................................................................................................................... 51
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Page
1.
Table 1: Star County Stakeholders ........................................................................... 19
2.
Table 2: Interview Questions .................................................................................... 26
3.
Table 3: DMC Advisory Committee Members ........................................................ 34
vii
1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Problem
Youth of color have been overrepresented throughout the juvenile justice system
for decades. Despite being the focus of Congressional legislation (1974 Juvenile Justice
Delinquency Prevention Act), juvenile justice coalition and advocate reports (Church,
1994; NCCD, 2007; Bell & Ridolfi, 2008; Bell et al., 2009; Hoytt et al., 2002; Hsia &
Hamparian, 1998; Nelson, 2008), and state and local jurisdictional reform efforts
(Devine, Coolbaugh & Jenkins, 1998; Feyerherm, 2000; Leiber, 2002; Mukoro, 2005;
Macallair & Males, 2004; Nellis & Richardson, 2010), this issue persists.
Scope
In 1974, the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act required states to
“address Disproportionate Minority Confinement” (later Contact) or DMC. This meant
that in order to maintain federal funding, states were directed to focus on reducing
overrepresentation of youth of color within their systems. However, due to the vagueness
of the mandate, which only required states to “address” DMC, jurisdictions were left to
figure out their own approach to implementing interventions individually and without any
specific direction.
Existing studies (Devine, Coolbaugh & Jenkins, 1998; Feyerherm, 2000; Leiber,
2002; Mukoro, 2005; Macallair & Males, 2004; Hartney & Vuong, 2009) of state and
local interventions have analyzed data at each juvenile justice decision point, however,
very few have successfully identified areas of adjusting policy or implemented practice at
2
those decision points to actually impact the DMC issue. This project discusses the
successes and struggles one county endured over an eight year period as it attempted to
reduce DMC. After implementing its own Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative
(JDAI) model, Star County (a pseudonym) successfully reduced its detention population
but has yet to realize an impact of the proportion of minority contact within its system.
This project is limited in that it does not provide recommendations for future reduction
efforts, it simply reports on efforts applied thus far.
3
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
History
The doctrine of parens patriae, the basis of most juvenile justice ideology,
originated from English Common Law and gives juvenile courts the “authority of the
state to act as a parent for the needs and welfare of youth” (Penn, 2001, p.1; Wood, 2001,
p.116). This doctrine proclaimed that the state should step in as the legal guardian and
protector of those juveniles whose parent/s fail in their child raising responsibility. Early
colonists carried this belief with them to the new world; however it was not put into
practice until the mid-1800s when society’s attitudes toward the health and well being of
children shifted. Children were then no longer viewed as property or miniature adults,
but as vulnerable beings in need of protection (Mody, 2008; Billitteri, 2000; Wood, 2001;
Krisberg, 2005). According to Eskin (1988), the court became a “substitute parent,”
ready to step in to save the child from negative influences toward criminal activity.
In the late 19th century, changing attitudes and shifting gender paradigms (Platt,
1974), saw a need to create a process that would separately handle juvenile offenders
from adult offenders at each decision point: arrest, detention, trial, and sentencing. The
Illinois State Juvenile Court Act of 1899, created the nation’s first juvenile court system
(Platt, 1977). This court was established with the goals of rehabilitation and delinquency
prevention. Detention facilities and reform/training schools were outgrowths created to
treat children rather than punish them. According to Platt (1974), “a child was not
accused of a crime but was offered assistance and guidance” (p.377). Juvenile cases were
4
handled in informal settings with professionals who used their discretion to act in “the
best interest of the child.” It was believed that with appropriate intervention strategies
and proper treatment, juveniles could be “saved” from a life of indulgence and aberration.
By the early 20th century, society’s perceptions had begun to evolve from a
classical school model of crime causation (free will) to a positivist school of thought
where it was believed that external variables influenced decisions to commit crime
(Tibbetts & Hemmens, 2010). During this time the state had a virtual monopoly on law
enforcement and methods of crime prevention. Citizens trusted the state and its hired
staff to keep them safe, and were largely uninvolved in the day-to-day processes of the
judicial system. It was the job of these professionals to analyze, care for, and correct
delinquent behavior.
Pre-delinquency intervention in a youth’s life was the focus of what Platt (1974)
referred to as the “child-saving movement” (p.378). This was the period in which a
youth’s behavior and energy could be re-directed towards some productive prosocial
activity. This movement sought to disentangle delinquents from all adult criminal
processes as well as to discipline them by structuring activities and preparing them to
assimilate into the workforce as productive adults. The juvenile court took on the
responsibility for correcting a youth’s behavior. In this early judicial attempt, judges and
police had complete control over the treatment of youths without input from attorneys or
other officials. Juveniles were not afforded nor were they believed to need Constitutional
due process rights and protections in an effort to disassociate them from adult offenders
and the adult criminal justice process.
5
Complete system responsibility for crime control continued into the mid-20th
century but was undermined by a shift in society’s values. The expansion of democracy
and public demand for transparency in government forced changes in all justice systems.
Chief Justice Earl Warren led the United States Supreme Court from 1953-1969.
Decisions made by the Warren Court (as this version of the Court was called), played a
significant role in reshaping criminal and juvenile justice laws: Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S., 335 (1963) mandated that defendants have access to court appointed lawyers;
in re Gault (387 U.S. 1 , 1967) provided due process rights for youth; in re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970) required proof beyond a reasonable doubt verdicts in juvenile cases;
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) granted appellate rights to youth charged
as adults; and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) found juries not to be
required in juvenile court.
The Warren Court made many landmark decisions extending the reach of 14th
amendment rights beyond criminal proceedings into the juvenile courts. In the 1966 case
of Kent v. United States (383 U.S. 541, 556 1966), the Court reversed a state juvenile
court’s ruling to have a young boy charged as an adult. In the Gault decision, the Court
held that juveniles charged with a crime should have the same rights given to adults,
including: notice of charges against them; the right to an attorney; the right to cross
examine witnesses; the right against self-incrimination; as well as the right to remain
silent. The court thus extended 14th amendment and Bill of Rights protections to minors,
rights that juveniles had previously not enjoyed. This ruling forced a major overhaul to
6
every state’s juvenile justice system and pushed the treatment of juveniles to the forefront
as a national priority.
Between the 1960s and the 1970s, state courts began increasing use of various
alternatives to detention, specifically group homes, foster homes, ranches, and
community based programs. Detention alternatives, allowed for the removal of youth
from jails and other locked facilities that were meant to provide more nurturing
environments that could foster greater rehabilitation opportunities.
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974 provided
for two significant changes to the juvenile justice system on a national level: 1) the
decriminalization of status offenses; and 2) “sight and sound” separation. The
decriminalization of status offenses, those offenses if committed by adults would not be
considered criminal (e.g., runaways or curfew violation), significantly reduced the
population of juveniles detained in facilities across the country. Sight and sound
separation refers to the conditions of juvenile confinement. Juveniles would now to be
housed away from adult criminals minimally by “sight and by sound.” Enactment of the
JJDPA was a major victory for various reform agencies and child advocates who had
spent years protesting and demonstrating against the abuses and exposures juveniles
faced to greater criminal behaviors through their confinement with adults.
In 1980, the JJDPA was amended to include a third clause, requiring participating
states to remove juveniles from jails. In order for states to receive federal funding for
their juvenile justice systems, they were required to comply with all JJDPA mandates.
The JJDPA also allowed for the reorganization and creation of the Office of Juvenile
7
Justice Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) under the Department of Justice (DOJ). OJJDP
was chartered to act as a distribution center for federal funding, conduct research, and
provide training for participating states in all matters of juvenile justice and delinquency
prevention. It has since gained an international reputation as a respected clearinghouse
and disseminator of juvenile justice analysis and best practice information.
The JJDPA was reauthorized again in 1988, adding a final requirement.
Disproportionate Minority Confinement/Contact (DMC) was identified as a critical
juvenile justice problem by the National Coalition of State Advisory Groups, who had
lobbied Congress for the inclusion of DMC in the original JJDPA (Church, 1994, p.70;
Bell & Ridolfi, 2008, p.12). Coalition studies had revealed that youth of color
(specifically African American, Native American, and Hispanic males) across the country
were being confined at a rate drastically disproportionate to their numbers in the general
population. By the 1992 reauthorization of JJDPA, mandating DMC became critical.
States were now required to “develop a plan and implement strategies to reduce” DMC or
lose federal funding for juvenile justice programming (Church, 1994, p. 70; Shepard,
1995, p. 114; Mukoro, 2005, p. 23).
The purpose of adding the DMC mandate to the JJDPA was to force the states
into action regarding racial/ethnic disparities in juvenile justice, using funding as the
motivation to influence compliance. The basic problem of this mandate resides within its
inherent vagueness. The legislation instructs states to develop a plan but does not
provide any guidance as to how to go about implementing it. There is no “cookbook
formula to address DMC” (Leiber, 2002, p.15). The federal government preferred that
8
states identify their own DMC levels and design their own strategies for reducing it.
Unfortunately, those intentions seem to have backfired in that many states, recognizing
the shortcomings of the federal guidelines, have done little more than the minimum
required. As long as a state could show that it was addressing the issue, no matter how
ineffective their efforts might be, continued to receive funding.
Review of the Literature
What problem is the JJDPA mandate intended to fix? What is DMC?
Disproportionate Minority Confinement occurs when “the proportion of juveniles
detained or confined in secure detention facilities…exceeds the proportion such groups
represent in the general population” (Mukoro, 2005, p.23; Devine, Coolbaugh & Jenkins,
1998, p.2). The intent of the federal legislation for the DMC mandate was for states to
focus on and address reasons why minorities were overrepresented at the various stages
within their juvenile justice systems. In essence, states were required to specifically
focus on race and the role it may play on those youth who entered their juvenile justice
systems. To resolve this issue, states were instructed to examine their policies and
practices with regard to juvenile detention to determine if they had unfairly targeted
minority offenders, and then based on their own critical assessment, make those
necessary changes that would reverse those disparities.
In order to provide clarity on the mandates targeting minority groups, the OJJDP
“defined minority populations as African American, American Indian, Asian, Pacific
Islander, and Hispanic” (Mukaro, 2005, p.23; Kakar, 2006, p.370). Highlighting this
issue as an objective, required that jurisdictions examine the demographics of their
9
current juvenile detention population, and then compare those figures to the broader
demographic ratios found throughout its systems and communities. The DMC mandate
then asked the states to reduce those figures to a comparable percentage found in their
jurisdiction’s general population. Reducing DMC is not about releasing youth who
should be detained; so much as it is focused on detaining the “right” youth for the “right”
reasons.
Fast forward two decades to 2010, in many states, strategies for reducing DMC
remain in their nascent stages. Efforts have resulted in little more than “restating the
problem” and achieving little in the way of reaching a solution to the confinement/contact
problem (Cahn & Robbins, 2009, p. 2; Nelson, 2008, p. 30, Bell & Ridolfi, 2008, p.15).
Unlike other JJDPA mandates, DMC requires that individual states brainstorm and
engineer a plan to achieve the ambiguous ends identified in their jurisdiction. There were
no step-by-step guidelines for achieving DMC reduction presented and no list of
specified programs to implement in order to achieve an identified end. Solutions had to
be born within specific jurisdictions and be based on the level of disproportionality found
in that area. Rather than being told what or how to amend their practices, they were
instructed to do it themselves.
The OJJDP, in its role of overseer, administers formula block grants with the
understanding that states will identify and assess their levels of DMC then implement
intervention plans to reduce them. In California, a state DMC committee passes federal
funding down to the county level via grants to juvenile justice practitioners, where the
federal work of reducing disparity actually takes place. These state grants support county
10
level work to “understand and identify disparities,” and equip county officials “with the
tools and resources needed to reduce disparities” (Bell et al., 2009, p.7).
Reducing DMC requires jurisdictions to first acknowledge the existence of racial
and ethnic disparities. Comparing data (broken down by ethnicity) of youth in the
general population to that of youth in juvenile confinement, can reveal a specific
disproportionate population ratio. According to Hsia and Hamparin (1998), African
American youth have “had the highest prevalence rates of all segments of the population
in 15 of the 16 states” studied (p.1). In addition to African Americans, “much of the
work to date” has identified Latino and Native American youth as the most
overrepresented populations (Bilchik, 2008, p.23).
Once a jurisdiction has identified its DMC problem, it must then assess the
reasons why the overrepresentation exists at each of its decision points. In the years since
the reauthorization of the JJDPA, various studies have shown that DMC occurs and can
increase at every decision point within the juvenile justice process, from arrest (initial
contact) onto court processing, ending with sentencing and placement (Hartney & Vuong,
2009, p. 5; NCCD, 2007, p.1). For this reason, the 2000-2002 reauthorization of the
JJDPA updated the DMC mandate to “address the disproportionally large number of
minority youth who come into contact with the juvenile justice system” (Cahn &
Robbins, 2009, p.10). From this point on, DMC was referred to as Disproportionate
Minority Contact (replacing the word and significance of confinement), expanding the
focus of reform to every decision point within the juvenile justice process.
11
The significance of the change in the wording of this clause is that it opened up
exploration of how decisions are made by justice professionals to initially arrest and to
subsequently detain and place youth. According to Kakar (2006), “national and
individual state data showed that racial disparities increased at every stage of the juvenile
justice process” (p.370). Thus, it was believed, that if states could reduce disparities at
the initial contact point, this would reduce the disparities that followed at subsequent
decision points.
The key phrase mentioned above is decision points. According to Hartney and
Vuong ( 2009), “disproportion accumulates as one moves deeper into the system” (p.5).
Decisions being made along each step in the juvenile justice process seem to be adding to
the disparities problem, implying that the possibility of structural/institutional racism
within government agencies exists (Cahn & Robbins, 2009, p. 3). Racism or bias can be
institutionalized via department policies and procedures regarding detained juveniles and
are expressed via the bias of individual staff employed at these agencies.
Devine, Coolbaugh, and Jenkins (1998) report that the phenomenon of “selection
bias in the juvenile justice system” is a growing problem (p.2). Selection bias is defined
as “a process in which justice systems scrutinize the actions or histories of minority
juveniles more carefully or more strictly than they do the actions or histories of
nonminority juveniles” (Devine, Coolbaugh & Jenkins, 1998, p.2). Policies or practices
created to process youth through detention are often not culturally specific or even
competent. As a result, minority juveniles are more likely to enter and be processed
deeper into the system than their white counterparts.
12
Could this be true, is the system racist? Are law enforcement officials
perpetuating structural bias, simply by following departmental policies? Some DMC
advocates would say yes, institutional bias is the root cause of DMC. To this end,
various county-based studies conducted by the Annie E. Casey Foundation established
the following criteria for an environment conducive to reducing DMC, all aimed at
addressing institutional biases (policies): 1) agencies must be willing (defined as political
will) to examine data at each decision point to identify those with increased disparity
(starting point); 2) examine agency policies that exist at identified decision points; and 3)
be willing to change those policies in a way that will reduce the identified disparities
(Nelson, 2008, pp 30-33). Tackling DMC in a particular jurisdiction requires the
willingness on the part of all juvenile justice professionals, so-called stakeholders, within
and throughout that system to make necessary changes.
In order to assess a problem, one must know what caused it in the first place. So,
what causes DMC? A combination of socioeconomic disadvantages, institutional racism,
and personal biases are likely conditions. According to Bilchik (2008), DMC is produced
by “non-race/ethnic specific” as well as “race/ethnic specific” causes (p. 22). Non
race/ethnic specific causes refer to societal realities such as poverty, poor housing, or
poor education. Race/ethnic specific causes refer to cultural bias and institutional racism.
These are potential criminogenic factors beyond the control of the criminal and juvenile
justice systems, and not specific to any particular racial, ethnic, or cultural group.
Societal stereotypes related to socioeconomic disadvantages, family structure and
gender also lend fuel to the DMC issue. According to Leiber and Mack (2003), “just as
13
racial stereotyping may influence decision-makers, traditional notions about gender and
the importance of the nuclear family may affect the decision-making process as well”
(p.35). The stigma attached to poverty, living in inner city ghettos, and single-parent
households, those specific environments universally assailed as the homes of a
disproportionate number of those identified as “minorities”, can affect the decisions being
made for youth in those situations. In the juvenile justice system “decision-making is
multifaceted and often tied to stereotypical perceptions and beliefs” of those making the
decisions (Leiber & Mack, 2003, p.61).
Similarly, other studies show that the prevalence of minorities in the justice
system may be caused by their association with behavior and lifestyles that have negative
consequences to their health and well being. Risk factors associated with urban lifestyles
“include higher rates of poverty, greater exposure to violence, severity of offenses, the
effects of mental disorders, and other complex sociocultural factors” (Chapman et al.,
2006, p.171). In essence, a tautology exists where minorities are at high risk due to the
environments that surround them.
A recent study has revealed other causes of DMC, specifically the use of
detention to provide certain “social services that would otherwise not be available” to
these youth and another being “policies that drive youth of color into the system because
of their disproportionate impact on this population” (Nellis & Richardson, 2010, p.26).
In essence, the juvenile justice system is identified as a dumping ground for youth with
mental/behavioral health problems simply because they are not provided with and have
no-to-limited access to any other form of social or mental health services. The problem
14
with this logic is that most juvenile justice systems are themselves not equipped to handle
the needs of these children. These juveniles either do not receive the help they need to
correct their behavior or their conditions worsen due to extended stays in detention
facilities.
Institutionalized policies at schools such as recent zero tolerance strategies have
become catch-all methods for school officials to eliminate problem children from their
institutions, rather than handling troublesome situations on school property. According
to Nellis and Richardson (2010), the “process of criminalizing school infractions through
zero tolerance policies has an especially negative impact on youth of color because of
their predisposition to suspension/expulsion” (p.268). Instead of being suspended or
having a parent teacher conference after misbehaving, minority youth are being sent to
juvenile detention centers and end up in front of a judge. The predisposition that Nellis
and Richardson identify originates from the prevalence of zero tolerance policies in
“urban low-income school districts” (p.268). School administrators at these facilities,
with student populations filled predominantly by minority youth, tend to use suspension
at higher rates than their suburban, less minority populated, institutions. Zero tolerance
polices widen the net, exposing a greater number of youth to unnecessary formalized
system involvement.
In discussions with colleagues who regularly read and process police reports, it
was remarked that another, more blatant personal bias of individual officers writing these
reports is in evidence. These personal biases directed toward minority youth cannot help
but negatively influence decisions made by these professionals at each subsequent
15
decision point. An example of this bias can be seen in one anecdote where a colleague
related that one youth was found to have “brandished a knife.” This incident appeared on
a police report that was read by one probation officer (PO). This statement immediately
gave the PO a vision of a child recklessly waving a machete-like knife back and forth in
the close proximity of other students. The PO decided to detain the youth for the safety
of others. Two days later, when the youth reached court, it was revealed that a pocket
knife had been placed on the youth’s desk by someone else in the middle of class. The
teacher who saw the knife became frightened so that the police were summoned by the
report of a child “brandishing a knife.” Because of the school’s zero tolerance policy,
coupled with the teacher’s misidentification of the word (guided by her possible personal
bias toward youth of color), and misinterpretation of the entire situation, landed this
African American male juvenile two days in custody.
Discovering what works in the way of juvenile justice reform via trial and error
has been the goal of advocates and juvenile justice professionals alike. Studies reveal
areas for improvements, test new intervention strategies for effectiveness, and expanded
successful strategies “of what works into widespread use” (Nelson, 2008, p.3). The
success of DMC work over the past 20 years has been in testing strategies for system
reform and putting successful strategies into widespread use. Two of the leading
advocacy agencies at the forefront of some of the successful strategies have been the
Annie E. Casey Foundation (a non-governmental public advocacy organization) (AECF)
through the creation of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) and the W.
Haywood Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equality.
16
For more than a decade, JDAI has been a successful juvenile justice reform
measure that has been utilized in many state and local juvenile justice systems across the
country. According to Nellis and Richardson (2010), “the JDAI strategy rests on the
awareness that detention is an inherently negative experience and should be reserved for
those youth who truly need to be detained…” (p.270). JDAI seeks to eliminate the
unnecessary use of secure detention by utilizing data-driven decision making and
introducing interventions like improved court processing, creating risk based detention
criteria, increasing use of detention alternatives, and reducing DMC. JDAI has
implemented various reforms that cater to all four provisions within the JJDPA, but
importantly, has made impressive advances in the area of DMC.
Since its inception, JDAI’s work in Multnomah, Oregon, Santa Cruz, California, and
Cook County, Illinois have led to significant “reductions in disparities” within their
respective jurisdictions (Nelson, 2008, p.30). Using a combination of data driven reforms
like implementing risk assessments during the intake process, reviewing case processing
data and methods, and utilizing community based programming as detention alternatives,
these three sites quickly became national models of DMC reform. According to Nelson
(2008):

In the mid-1990s Multnomah County youth of color were 30% likely to be
detained. Following the implementation of JDAI the odds were cut down to 22%

In Santa Cruz County the average daily population (in numbers) of Latino youth
in detention dropped from 34 in 1998 to 17 in 2007
17

In 2000, Cook County’s detention population was 74.1% African American,
15.9% Latino, and 7.8% White. While the proportion of racial and ethnic
minorities in detention has not changed much since the start of JDAI efforts, the
number of minority youth in detention (average daily population) dropped 31%
between 1996 and 2000 (Hoytt et al., 2002, p.33)
The W. Haywood Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equality (Burns
Institute) was founded in 2002 by James Bell, who is a longtime juvenile justice advocate
and civil rights attorney (Nelson, 2008). The Burns Institute works with sites across the
country, bringing together various juvenile justice stakeholders and community based
organizations, with parents and youth to follow a “data-driven, consensus-based approach
to change policies, procedures and practices that result in the detention of low-offending
youth of color and poor youth” (www.burnsinstitute.org). The approach of bringing all
stakeholders together to discuss and create plausible strategies on detention reform is one
that originates from the JDAI model, and has been proven to reduce DMC. The Burns
Institute has been a long time contractor with Star County and has been involved in Star
County juvenile probation departments’ DMC efforts since its inception.
DMC has always been a part of the JDAI core values and monitoring DMC was
incorporated into each detention alternative; however, Bell was a major proponent in
pushing AECF to separate DMC out as its own detention alternative. In early 2000, Bell
was employed with the Youth Law Center in Star County, and played a major role in
convincing the AECF to replicate JDAI. His early partnership with AECF is believed to
have prompted his development of the Burns Institute as an organization to deal
18
exclusively with DMC issues. Bell’s influence in Star County and his partnership with
AECF brought juvenile justice reform to the area and to this day the juvenile probation
department continues its relationship with the Burns Institute.
19
Chapter 3
FINDINGS
This project focuses on a review of Star County’s efforts to comply with the DMC
mandate over the past eight years. This project discusses all DMC related activity of Star
County JPD from 2002-2010 and includes recommendations from the various work
groups.
In 2008, a questionnaire was developed (see Chapter 4), which was used to
interview 26 former members of the initial Star County DMC work groups/committees.
The majority of these individuals were female (approximately 18 out of the 26) and
represent the ethnic and cultural diversity found throughout the county, including African
Americans, Latinos, Asians, and whites. Included in this analysis is a summary of the
responses received from this questionnaire. Those interviewed included representatives
from each of the below organizations (See Table 1).
Table 1: Star County Stakeholders
District Attorney’s Office
Public Defender’s Office
Juvenile Probation Department
Police Department- Juvenile Division
Youth Assessment Center (pseudonym)
Youth Advocate Center (pseudonym)
Department of Public Health
Kids Justice Institute (pseudonym)
W. Haywood Burns Institute
Annie E. Casey Foundation
Juvenile Justice Commission
Pike High School (pseudonym)
Youth Magic (pseudonym)
Family Resource Center (pseudonym)
20
GED Study Academy (pseudonym)
Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice
YMCA
All of those interviewed, at one time or another had a vested interest in DMC reduction in
Star County. They had all been members of the original workgroup, which was a
voluntary rather than formal or official commitment.
21
Chapter 4
ANALYSIS OF STAR COUNTY
Changes
In the spring of 2007, the juvenile detention center population spiked to 156 youth
(capacity being 150). The outcry from the community was so loud that the Mayor sent
out a directive to all juvenile justice stakeholders, insisting on immediate action to reduce
the detention center population. At the time, the Mayor appointed one of his staff
members to oversee all JDAI efforts. DMC was no longer a stand-alone committee as the
DMC principals were incorporated into two newly established committees: 1) case
processing committee, and 2) community committee. The case processing committee
was a small group consisting of juvenile justice stakeholders (i.e., representatives from
the JPD, district attorney, public defender, courts, and the police) who all had vested
interests in the way a youth was processed. The community committee was made up of
staff from several community based organizations. These individuals were able to
provide the juvenile justice stakeholders with a front line, in-the-trenches point-of-view
on decisions being made with youth living in the BV neighborhood. The sense of
urgency that was felt when the detention center surpassed capacity, quickly faded as the
population receded because of the action taken by the Mayor.
Around this time, the Chief of Probation and the JDAI Coordinator made the
decision that there should be a full-time DMC Coordinator. The JDAI Coordinator had
his time split among a myriad of other duties so that DMC issues were given his full
attention. This prompted the JPD to apply for the first DMC grant issued by the state.
22
Their proposal was given considerable scrutiny and in the end, JPD was not awarded the
grant. This setback caused the department to make a firmer commitment to develop a
DMC Coordinator job description and create a position from the department’s general
fund.
The JDAI Coordinator was given the responsibility of creating the DMC
Coordinator job description, since he had worked with all of the DMC sub-committees up
until this point. He consulted with job descriptions that had been created from other
JDAI sites that had a full-time DMC Coordinator in place, and incorporated these
descriptions into a narrative that was unique to Star County. The next step was to create
a new position within the department that fit into a city human resources category or
classification. In other words, the new DMC position had to fit the characteristics of an
existing County job classification in order to be incorporated into the department. This
involved much negotiation with the city’s Department of Human Resources (HR) and
JPD’s own HR department. Both parties finally agreed on an “1842 Management
Assistant,” with specialized DMC duties which were included in the original job
description (See Appendix A).
Once the position was added to JPD HR, applications were accepted. JPD
reviewed 200+ applications and identified 30 candidates. These 30 applications were
reviewed by the Chief, Assistant Chief, and Director of Administration and then further
reduced to a “short-list” of 5 applicants. At this point the JDAI Coordinator, appointed
an interview committee made up of six past and present DMC committee members, and
began interviewing. All-in-all, it ultimately took 2 years to fill the position. During this
23
process, the JDAI Coordinator continued to hold meetings with the DMC committee;
however it no longer met on a monthly basis. The group’s top priority became hiring a
DMC Coordinator.
For the position of DMC Coordinator, JPD looked for someone familiar with Star
County and the various neighborhoods included in the area. In addition to possession of
a bachelor’s degree, desired qualifications included: strong leadership skills, familiarity
with the area’s non-profit agencies, and proficiency in data collection and analysis.
Possessing the minimum qualifications for the position, and being born and raised in the
neighborhoods representing the most disparities was an added advantage. Unlike other
qualified candidates, I had first-hand knowledge of the conditions these overrepresented
youth faced having grown up and becoming one of the residents who had “made it out”
of BV. In this capacity, I could act as a role model to many of these youth. Aside from
the passion expected in this position, I had a personal stake in the results not only for the
department that hired me but for the youth and residents of the neighborhood that was
being targeted.
This position was created to be the lead staff person in charge of organizing the
DMC committee, whose “goal is to recommend specific strategies and resources to
reduce disproportionality in the juvenile justice system” (see Appendix A). Since hired, I
have engaged in a wide range of duties: collecting and analyzing data from various
decision points, working with management to identify priorities and create strategies for
program adjustments, applying for grants, collaborating with community agencies and
juvenile justice stakeholders on detention reform programming, and representing the
24
department in city- and county-wide juvenile reform efforts. There is no identified finish
point to this job where there will no longer be a need for a DMC position. With the
enactment of the JJDPA, states are now required to examine this issue that has existed for
more than a century and some believe was built into the very foundation of the system
(Platt, 1977).
DMC Coordinator
In June 2008, I was hired on as the DMC Coordinator for the Juvenile Probation
Department (JPD) in Star County. Filling this position was the victorious end to a multiyear quest by JPD staff and DMC committee members alike to fund a staff position
whose sole focus was DMC. African American youth had a long history of
overrepresentation in the Star County juvenile hall population. While African American
youth represented roughly 12% of the Star County youth population, they represented
52% of the juvenile detention population. The Chief felt it was time to take our work with
DMC, beyond forming a committee, to the next level by adding a full time staff person to
coordinate the department’s efforts to reduce disparities.
I began working as the Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) Coordinator
with the Star County Juvenile Probation Department on June 2, 2008. I came to this
position completely naïve as to the principles of DMC, the mandate, or any efforts to
reduce it. After an initial two-week orientation, I was instructed by the JDAI Coordinator
(who is my direct supervisor and overall program leader) to develop strategies to regroup
the defunct DMC committee.
25
A couple years had passed since the DMC Committee had held regular meetings
to review data and make program recommendations. I was allowed the freedom to
develop any necessary methods to reunite this group. After days of brainstorming, it was
decided that contact with past committee members, to get a better understanding of what
the various sub-committees were about, why they stopped meeting, whether or not
participants were still willing to be involved, and what the next steps should be. A short
questionnaire was developed that would serve as a guide for conversations with these
past DMC committee members.
In developing the survey, open-ended questions allowed the respondents to add
any insights s/he believed were applicable. The nature of these questions was to be
descriptive, to find out what had happened during the previous committee’s tenure and to
learn what practices or strategies should be avoided while trying to revitalize the
committee. Five questions framed the basis of this inquiry. Once the questionnaire was
created those former committee members who could be contacted by phone were, and an
informal face-to-face meeting at a location of their choice was scheduled. After about
five months, 26 members from the past committees representing various community
based organizations and justice agencies throughout the city had been interviewed.
These interviews yielded many insights as to how the committee and earlier DMC
efforts had evolved and progressed, what some of the strengths and weaknesses of the
committee were, and ultimately why the group discontinued meeting. Many of those
interviewed were still interested in participating in DMC at some level; however, many
others had changed jobs since the earlier committee last met but offered to rearrange their
26
current schedules to be included any DMC attempt. In going forward, the consensus of
the group was that we (JPD took the leadership role) should set goals and create timelines
for the work to be done. The following questions were asked to all stakeholders.
Table 2: Interview Questions
1. What was your involvement with the DMC/JDAI committees/working group in the
past? What were the strengths/weaknesses of the committees?
2. How do you think we should proceed this time around?
3. What do you feel are some of the barriers to addressing JDAI/DMC?
4. Do you have any suggestions of other individuals/agencies that should be involved
with the steering committee/working group?
5. Would you like to continue to be a part of the working group?
These interviews were informal, mostly conversations conducted over lunch or at
the agency of the interviewee. The common theme resonating from the participants was
that the committee meetings made for good discussions about the community as well as
the disparities facing the system, however all respondents reported that little action had
resulted from any of those discussions. The core strength of the past committee was its
inclusiveness. Wide ranges of service representatives were at the table and allowed to
speak their mind. However, the coinciding weakness of the past committee was that their
discussions and subsequent recommendations did not translate into action taken by
anyone at that table. A Star County Assistant Public Defender responded that “there
were not enough decision makers on the working committee to make something
27
happen…but there was a good mix of community folks.” While everyone who might
have an interest in the outcome of any recommendation made by the committee was
present, no one had any real authority to take a recommendation, no matter how valuable,
and institute practical change.
It was clear that the group wanted to know the who, what, and why before they
committed to another try with the JDAI and subsequently the DMC committee.
Participants wanted to understand JPD’s vision including who should be at the table and
why, what the goals or priorities were for 2008-2009, and what would be expected of
them as committee members. The former Director of the Mayor’s Office of Criminal
Justice responded that, “JDAI would work more efficiently if we keep it small...orient the
meetings to a ‘to do list.” This included establishing clear goals for each committee
member to accomplish, and assigning tasks to be completed on or before the following
meeting date. This also included having someone or even the group as a whole, hold
other members accountable for those assignments.
Many suggested that all sub-committees be combined (meaning the creation of
one all inclusive executive body and DMC working group). In the past, the perception
was that the separation of the committees contributed to the lack of progress. All of the
returning committee members wanted to be updated on the results from the last “goround.” A few reported that they were unaware of what if anything had been
accomplished the last time. The Star County Department of Public Health project
Director suggested we “hear a summary report of the results from the first go round, then
…set new goals” and vision for 2008-2009.
28
It became obvious that a significant obstacle to JDAI and specifically to DMC
was fear. This included fear of change and trying new things; fear of being corrected or
told “how to do one’s job”; fear of being blamed or labeled racist; fear of appearing “soft
on crime” or weak; fear of exposing flaws within departments (via data exploration); fear
of the unfamiliar or unknown, and fear of moving out of one’s comfort zone. Another
barrier or distraction seemed to be the divide between the various stakeholders and their
unique visions of reform. There was an underpinning lack of trust or divide between
probation and community-based organizations (CBO), between multiple juvenile justice
system agencies, between contracted CBOs and non-contracted CBOs, and between
community residents and law enforcement agencies. Long histories of misuse, disregard,
and countless confrontational incidents had fostered ill feelings between many of these
units and individuals.
While most of the interviewees felt there was a “pretty good mix” of stakeholders
involved, there were suggestions for representation from organizations such as: the
school district, juvenile court judges, county board of supervisors, and mayor’s office of
community development, and others. Many interviewees suggested that the steering
committee be kept small saying, “it would be more effective with less (sic) people.” For
the purpose of inclusiveness, an advisory council should be formed and organize
community meetings.
Although many “yes” answers were received when asked question 5, many of
them hedged on whether the respondent could adjust his/her current schedule to
accommodate the extra meetings. Also many of the former committee members had
29
transitioned into positions that no longer fit within DMC’s focus (juvenile justice
decision points). These individuals, although still personally interested in working on
DMC, did not see themselves having the time to participate.
After summarizing these results, the Chief and Assistant Chief assessed my
recommendations and developed a course of action. Since JPD had re-taken the lead role
in juvenile detention reform in Star County, a definition of reform was needed. When
referring to Star County, what is JDAI? What is the context of DMC? While the guiding
principles may have been the same, handed down from the AECF, they differed at the
local levels. How was success defined as it related to JDAI/DMC? All participants
needed to have reliable definitions and directions to improve chances of success.
A part of the communication breakdown of the past DMC committees was rooted
in the structure of JDAI. Having an executive “steering committee” full of policy makers
separate from the working groups full of community members negated the philosophy of
having all affected parties equally at the table to build solutions. The community
committee members were able to voice their concerns, however, lacked the “power” to
change policies and try new programming; and vice versa, the policy makers could
change policy but were not present to learn how the community was affected. To this
end, two recommendations for future DMC work were made.
30
Recommendations
Systems Approach
A recommendation to create an executive steering committee and add subcommittees (as needed) to work on each decision point was made –integrate, integrate,
integrate. It was believed that policy makers and community members with service
providers from the very beginning of any reform were needed. Committees from this
integrated pool of interested parties (on a volunteer basis) should be formed. The DMC
committee would remain, however a DMC committee member would be inserted into
each of the other committees to be a liaison, maintaining a thoughtful and intentional
focus on the impact of racial and ethnic disparities in that group’s activities. For this to
work, the Mayor needed to be included with JDAI and his help requested in enforcing the
directive put out by his office in 2007 (mentioned above in the Changes section). In the
least, his assistance in bringing all of the policy makers from the various city departments
back to the steering committee was needed.
Probation Centered Approach
JPD could begin work internally. After talking with past initiative participants, a
more realistic, albeit smaller, scale of change was introduced. JPD would work with the
AECF or the Burns Institute to educate JPD staff on the history, purpose, terminology,
and successes of JDAI/DMC. With a mantra of “change starts at home,” comprehensive
work and eradication of the “us versus them” mentality and actual “buy in” from JPD
staff in order to move forward and pursue change was recommended. True ownership of
31
this initiative would only come from staff participation in decision-making around the
JDAI structure.
JPD would be asked to include (on a voluntary basis) probation officers and
counselors on the various committees (including DMC) as well as on the steering
committee alongside JPD administrators and supervisors. As a counterpart to the internal
DMC committee, it was also deemed important to have some type of quarterly
community forum or advisory group to maintain a connection and encourage dialogue
with those who live and work in the communities and other areas affected most by DMC.
When JDAI was first brought in under the former Chief, it was perceived as
something that the administration mandated leaving staff with no voice in the matter.
Lack of education and information on the initiative left staff feeling blamed for the
disparities and increases in the detention population. These factors turned JDAI into a
pariah at JPD and fostered animosity that continued to plague the department for years.
Although JPD was only one of the stakeholders in the juvenile justice system, there are
decision points over which only JPD has control. Once JPD created a culture for reform
within its own walls, then JPD could reach out to other justice stakeholders.
Since this was not Star County’s first attempt with JDAI, many were aware of the
short and long term recommendations that had been made by the past JDAI and DMC
committees. Minus a small-scale reassessment (based on the time elapsed since the last
JDAI efforts), the visionary work had already been conducted. There could be no better
way to validate the hard work of the dedicated past JDAI participants than to actually put
into place some of the goals they had set. There were action steps and/or
32
recommendations outlined in the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice report of 2007, and
the DMC workgroup report of 2004. Some of these recommendations had been acted on
but most had received little attention or result. Reviewing these recommendations was a
reasonable starting point for the continuation of the DMC work.
Conference Epiphany
While the Chief and the Assistant Chief were pleased with the overall report and
recommendations and decided to take some time before making any final decision on the
direction of future JPD/DMC work, the annual Annie E. Casey Foundation-JDAI InterSite Conference was held. The purpose of this conference was to bring together staff
from all of the JDAI sites around the country for a weekend of information sharing,
reporting, and networking. Three DMC focused workshops: 1) Conducting Racial Equity
Impact Analysis, 2) Structural Racism in Juvenile Justice and 3) Deepening the Work of
Racial and Ethnic Disparities were presented. Each workshop provided tools to be
utilized in the planning and development of department programs, policies, and practices.
These tools provided assistance to more thoughtful and intentional issues of racial
disparities, the ultimate goal being to restore equality to the system.
Hearing counterparts from other jurisdictions describe their struggles and
successes was reassuring. A near consensus proclamation was to form a “DMC
Champion’s Support Network”, through which regular contact and the possibility of
working toward a DMC conference in collaboration with the Burns Institute, was taken.
Attending the JDAI Inter-Site conference, within the first six months on the job, helped in
understanding what my role at JPD was intended to be. DMC is one of the principles of
33
JDAI and can get lost in the process of those focusing solely on reducing the detention
population. While reducing the detention population is a goal of JDAI, populations can
be reduced without having any appreciable effect on DMC. The DMC Coordinator must
be the “squeaky wheel,” applying a racial/ethnic lens to every policy, practice and
program implemented to advance JDAI.
Identifying disparities, disaggregating population data (by race, ethnicity, gender,
geography, and offense), then using that data to start intentional racial equity impact
conversations with DMC committee members that would lead to trial adjustments and
monitoring of current polies/programs that were causing disparities were critical role
functions. DMC coordinators support the community via inclusive planning meetings
and or advisory group membership. Providing the community with eyes and ears from
the County administrators and staff, all working together to impact DMC in the system
was my role.
DMC Advisory Committee
In early 2009, plans to revamp the DMC work groups were made, after receiving
the approval from the Chief to follow a modified probation centered approach. A
recommendation to re-structure the group in a way that would acknowledge the wishes of
past members and still be feasible was made. In the past, the DMC work
group/committee met on a monthly basis. This time around meetings were scheduled
quarterly, one every three months. Increasing the period of time between meetings
allowed for suggestions to be acted upon via internal processing meetings with JPD staff.
34
When the subsequent quarterly meeting came, various progress reports could be made to
the whole advisory committee.
One of the flaws of the past DMC committee was the abundance of discussion
with little subsequent action. Now, the advisory committee provided the discussion and
follow-up potential. Membership on this new committee was voluntary. An invitation to
participate in the first meeting was sent to all past members (all who were interviewed).
The role of the new committee members was simply to provide input/perspective on
JPDs actions. DMC advisory committee members represented the following agencies:
Table 3: DMC Advisory Committee Members
District Attorney’s Office
Public Defender’s Office
GED Study Academy
Police Department- Juvenile Division
Youth Assessment Center
Department of Public Health
Community Baptist Church (pseudonym)
W. Haywood Burns Institute
Juvenile Probation Department
Juvenile Justice Commission
JPD’s internal focus is specifically on the “front door” of the detention center
otherwise known as the intake and booking process (this is an area controlled by
probation decisions). Strategies to improve this process turned into a focus on educating
parents about the juvenile justice system. The advisory committee weighed in on many
JPD initiated projects including: the Parents Group Initiative, and implementing
graduated sanctions at the court school. The Parents Group Initiative created a committee
of community workers, parents, mental health clinicians, and JPD staff who worked on
35
the creation and distribution of a parent guidebook to the juvenile justice system. The
guidebook gave parents step-by-step instructions on what was happening to their children
and what they could do while their child was detained.
The goal of making these guidebooks available was to educate and inform those
parents/families having children in the system. These, predominantly minority families,
needed to be educated about their rights to show up for hearings, and visit their children
within the first 24 hours of detention. Having a parent present and available, would show
the court that the youth has a stable caretaker and can possibly lead to an early release to
the parent’s custody.
Another JPD project was the implementation of graduated sanctions and rewards
for youth attending the department affiliated court school. The school assigned probation
officer implemented graduated sanctions/rewards and maintained a database to track
successes/failures. The school is a court-mandated high school for students on probation
who have been expelled from other public high schools. Initially, these students were
getting into trouble (disrupting class, leaving campus, etc.), violating probation, and
being detained as a form of punishment. These violations resulted in an increasingly high
recidivism rate for these youth and most were of color. Data collected over a period of
six months were reviewed by the committee and possible solutions were discussed. A
weekend community service for minors to attend in lieu of going straight to the detention
facility was implemented. Overall, this program was successful, with 77% of the kids
completing community service and returning to class.
36
The DMC sub-committees of the past were working groups in that they reviewed
data and were assigned specific follow-up tasks (conducting focus groups and mapping
project). The new group served as an advisory body only, lending support and giving
their opinion on the steps JPD was taking to reduce disparities. Members of the newly
formulated DMC Advisory Committee included various justice, human service, and
community agency workers.
DMC Grant Round 2
Near the end of 2009, the request for proposals for the state DMC grant was
distributed, giving JPD a second chance to apply for funding. This time the Chief
believed that the pieces were in place to make a more competitive application. The grant
process was tedious and frustrating. Approximately two months’ worth of internal grant
planning meetings produced a document that would advance Star County beyond the
identification and assessment phases of their work and into the intervention and
monitoring phase. In essence a signature program had been created.
With a continued focus on the front door of detention and how youth find
themselves there, JPD formulated a specific plan to work closely with the police
department to provide early intervention services to middle school aged youth of color
from the BV which still reflected the highest disparity of contacts in Star County’s
detention population.
After reviewing the population data, it was discovered that an increasing number
of younger youth were being detained for first or second offenses. It was suggested by
37
the Advisory Committee that intervening in the lives of these juveniles sooner might
prevent them from continuing down the wrong path. It was agreed that a plan for these
types of services should be formulated.
This intervention program would include assigning a probation officer to the BV
police substation to informally counsel youth identified by police officers as troubled or
pre-delinquent. Informal counseling practices would be similar to mentoring in that these
identified youth had not yet committed a crime and were not formally on probation. A
probation officer would meet with the youth’s family and offer support while connecting
the family to community resources. For this program to work, JPD needed to call upon
past partnerships with community based organizations in BV, the police department, and
the Burns Institute. The process was coming full circle, in that some of the same
collaborators who helped convince AECF to initiate JDAI in Star County were reenlisting to help apply for state DMC funding and a chance to achieve DMC’s goals.
In October 2009, JPD applied for state DMC funding and was awarded a one year
$100,000 grant to implement its early intervention program. After assessing the city and
county’s lengthy process for accepting grants, the program began in March 2010. All
stakeholders attended this meeting including staff from JPD, the BV police station, BV
community based organizations, BV neighborhood churches, the District Attorney’s
office, and the Burns Institute. The Burns Institute was included to act as a technical
assistant, to facilitate all meetings and keep the group focused on disparity reduction.
By mid-2010, like many other jurisdictions, Star County faced a budget crisis that
changed the focus of the DMC program. A substantial budget reduction that would
38
potentially cost ten probation officer positions was introduced. In the face of these cuts,
JPD was forced to modify its commitment to the grant program by removing the assigned
probation officer. Facing similar cuts, the police department had to go renege on its offer
to supply two police officers. These staff changes were devastating to the original spirit
of the early intervention program, which relied on these staff members to form a team to
intervene and provide services to those high-risk African American youth from the BV
neighborhood. There was no choice but to modify plans and submit a program and
budget modification to the state.
The modification to the 2010 DMC grant includes: 1) revising the risk assessment
tool, 2) reassessing the relationship building through education and training of JPD and
police staff, and maintaining connections with community based organizations in the BV
neighborhood. Revision of the risk assessment tool was a three-step process. First,
internal meetings to discuss intake processes were convened. This was followed by a
revision to the risk assessment document, and finally a plan was devised to test the new
instrument on a sample over three-months worth of intakes. With the assistance of the
Director of Probation and the JDAI Coordinator, several meetings were convened with
the department staff. These meetings included probation supervisors, three on duty
probation officers who staffed the intake desk, as well as the midnight shift senior
counselors who worked swing shift hours.
The group made preliminary revisions to the risk assessment document, which is
currently being checked for reliability. Front door decision maker meetings provided
meaningful insight into the intake process that is currently in place and identified the gaps
39
that exist in that process. The probation supervisors were conscientious about following
up with staff concerns and continue to work toward closing these gaps.
The trainings, facilitated by the Burns Institute staff, focused on DMC
identification, issues, and reduction strategies. A major accomplishment thus far had
been the development and distribution of a DMC survey for police officers. Over
numerous planning meetings with police, JPD and the Burns Institute developed a tenquestion survey designed to assess patrol officer familiarity with DMC and its causes.
The purpose of this survey was to identify officer perceptions of DMC and the
neighborhoods they patrol. The survey results would be kept confidential and used only
by the Burns Institute staff to formulate a DMC training (date TBD) for the patrol
officers.
The survey questions were a combination of multiple choice and open-ended
statements that left room for the officers to be as detailed as possible with their responses
(See Appendix B). Since the objective was to gain information specifically about
individual officer’s knowledge of DMC, and their overall perceptions about crime in their
beats. The goal of this survey was simply to get candid individual officer perceptions.
The commanding officer distributed the surveys at a Wednesday roll call meeting and
collected the completed surveys over the course of two days. A total of 45 surveys were
returned, which the Burns Institute summarized and analyzed.
It was found that many officers had little or no knowledge of DMC and tended to
blame the increase of youth of color in detention on the “lack of good parenting” and the
criminogenic environment in which these youth are raised. DMC training for the patrol
40
officers tailored by their survey responses is currently being planned. Future plans
include surveying JPD staff and providing subsequent training.
41
Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
After thirty years of mandated reform efforts, most jurisdictions are no closer to
reducing disproportionate minority contact than they were in 1974. Star County has made
some progress in uniting juvenile justice stakeholders and community agencies under the
umbrella of system reform, collecting and analyzing data, empowering at-risk/underserviced families, and reducing the overall detention population by creating detention
alternatives. However, this has not led to a significant reduction of the rate to which
minority youth are detained.
There is a direct correlation between the vagueness of the DMC mandate and the
lack of success in jurisdictions nationwide. Although nationally recognized detention
reform models like JDAI, have had success in some states, their approaches have not
been universally embraced, and must be modified by the jurisdiction attempting to utilize
them. For example, JDAI’s success in Santa Cruz County was largely due to the
development of a bevy of detention alternatives (a number of community based agencies,
offering culturally competent, multi-lingual services), this was something that had not
been available earlier. Star County is rich with these types of services, yet DMC persists.
The work of reducing DMC is an on-going effort that is not likely to be
completed in the near future. As long as poverty, unemployment, breakdown of families,
selection bias, and institutional racism persist, the potential for disparities in all justice
systems remain, not just in Star County. Although it may be impossible to eliminate
DMC altogether, it has been shown that certain interventions can help to balance the
42
disproportion. Solutions to this problem are localized and specific to the population
being examined.
Star County JPD is ending year one of their DMC grant and preparing to embark
on year two. Suggestions are circulating asking for community prevention programs,
continued data analysis, and site visits to other jurisdictions that have made progress in
reducing DMC. Whatever course of action is decided upon, will undoubtedly have
similar successes and struggles. However, in spite of the lack of progress that has been
made, the passion and commitment to change is present with all stakeholders and once
the right formula is produced, reducing disproportionate minority contact may become a
reality.
43
APPENDICES
44
APPENDIX A
Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative
Disproportionate Minority Confinement COORDINATOR
Position Description
The Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) initiative is a partnership
among juvenile justice stakeholders that utilizes a data driven, consensus based
process to identify and implement strategies to reduce the overrepresentation of
minorities in the juvenile justice system. The DMC Coordinator will serve as lead
staff to the DMC Planning Committee, whose goal is to recommend specific
strategies and resources to reduce disproportionality in the Juvenile Justice
system. Much of the work requires an ability to foster productive working
relationships with individuals and systems representatives while involving
constituents at the neighborhood and community level. An ability to interpret
data and develop corresponding interventions is essential.
Key Responsibilities:
1. Organize and oversee the delivery of services from the national expert.
2. Work with a national consultant to plan and coordinate planning team
meetings.
3. Collect and interpret qualitative and quantitative data in coordination with
the national consultant.
4. Present periodic reports to the planning team, vision council and project
funders.
5. Attend national consultant coordinator meetings when appropriate.
6. Facilitate the development of interventions that are based on
empirical/factual evidence.
45
7. Build upon an existing community profile and community mapping process
that includes a program matrix of social services specific to identified
neighborhoods.
8. Produce, in conjunction with other juvenile justice stakeholders, a juvenile
justice system flow-chart which specifically identifies data at various
decision points.
9. Conduct focus groups as needed.
10. Produce an action/work plan to reach the project’s overall goals and
objectives, as established by the planning team.
11. Evaluate planning team progress and recommend adjustments
accordingly.
12. Partner with a professional evaluator to assess overall effectiveness of the
Initiative.
13. Develop, as requested, in-depth data analyses of key juvenile justice
decision points.
Project duration: This project is funded through the Annie E. Casey Foundation
for one year, however JPD anticipates that the DMC Coordinator will be a
standing position of the Juvenile Probation Department.
Reports to: JDAI Coordinator for approvals and day-to-day operations. May
require some evenings and weekends.
Minimum Qualifications:
1. Possession of a Baccalaureate degree from an accredited college or
university with major coursework in public or business administration, accounting,
finance, economics, social sciences, education or related fields, or other subject
areas closely related to a specific departmental program or function; AND one
year of experience performing professional-level management and/or
administrative duties in functional areas such as: office/operations management,
budget development and/or administration, data entry and analysis, development
and administration of contractual agreements and/or grants, or other closely
46
related functional areas. Experience in Class 1840 Junior Management Assistant
will be considered qualifying.
Substitution: Five years experience performing professional-level management
and/or administrative duties in functional areas such as: office/operations
management, budget development and/or administration, data entry and
analysis, development and administration of contractual agreements and/or
grants, or other closely related functional areas.
Desired Qualifications










Demonstrated commitment to diversity, including race, ethnicity, class,
gender, sexual orientation, disability and religion, and the ability to work
with a diverse group of people to develop and accomplish strategic work
plans;
Strong working knowledge of the non-profit community serving youth and
the juvenile justice system;
Experience in working with committees, boards, or other working groups,
and the ability to carry out directions or respond to requests from such
groups;
Ability to effectively present information to top management, public
groups, and boards;
Ability to define problems, collect data, establish facts and draw valid
conclusions;
Excellent oral/written communication skills with an ability to work as part of
a team or individually;
Ability to self-motivate and provide project leadership;
Ability to self-monitor quality of own work;
Management experience as related to staff and contracted consultants to
fulfill project goals;
Proficient use of all office equipment, with computing skills including word
processing, spreadsheet, and database programs.
47
Other Key Qualities and Abilities
Interpersonal Relationship Development: quickly finds common ground and
solves problems for the good of all, easily gains support and trust of others,
creates a climate in which people want to do their best, can motivate many kinds
of people, uses diplomacy and tact, can diffuse even high-tension situations
comfortably, and relates well with all levels of people within and outside of the
project.








Understanding Diverse Groups: is comfortable working with people
from various cultural, ethnic and racial backgrounds. Demonstrates and
promotes cultural competence within and across organizations.
Organization: garner resources to reach established goals and
objectives, orchestrate multiple activities, and uses resources effectively
and efficiently.
Prioritization: set effective priorities that identifies the critical issues, can
sense what will help or hinder the accomplishment of a goal, has the
ability to identify barriers, institute appropriate correction steps and can
keep all involved parties focused.
Planning: accurately projects length and difficulty of tasks, breaks work
down into process steps, anticipates and adjusts for problems and
barriers, measures performance against goals and evaluates results.
Political Savvy: views politics as a necessary part of organizational life;
anticipates political challenges and creates plans to resolve challenges
effectively.
Process Management: understands how to separate and combine tasks
into efficient work flow, can simplify complex processes, and understands
how to organize people and resources.
Results Oriented: consistently is a top performer and exceeds goals,
pushes self and others for results, concentrates efforts on important
priorities, and gets more completed in less time than others.
Data Analytical Abilities: understand the importance of data driven
decisions, knowledge of basic computer data software (Excel, Access),
ability and willingness to learn new software as the needs arise.
48
APPENDIX B
Police Department Survey
1. How long have you been with the San Francisco Police Department?
 1 – 3 years
 3 – 5 years
 6 – 10 years
 11- 20 years
 20 + years
2. What best describes your role with the San Francisco Police Department?
 Patrol
 Investigative
 Special Assignment (i.e. Motors, SRO, etc.)
 Supervisory
3. Do you have any knowledge of Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC)?
4a. In your opinion, are youth of color over-represented in San Francisco’s
Juvenile Justice System? (The Juvenile Justice System includes law
enforcement, Courts, Social Service Agencies and community factors such as
families).
 Yes
 No
 No opinion.
4b. What influences your opinion? (i.e. personal background, media,
experience/tenure)
49
5. What factors, if any, do you think contribute to the overrepresentation of
youth of color within the Juvenile Justice System?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
6. What would you describe as the purpose of secure detention?



7. What would you describe as the purpose of SFPD community policing?
8. Describe your comfort level in participating in a departmental analysis
regarding over representation of minority youth within the Juvenile Justice
System in San Francisco.
 Very comfortable
 Somewhat comfortable
 Indifferent
 Somewhat uncomfortable
 Very uncomfortable
9a. What resources are available to you to handle detained/arrested juveniles?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
__________________
9b. What resources are missing?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
50
10. What are some contributing factors to delinquency that might be
decreased through pro active police outreach?



11. What are your ideas for how SFPD could help reduce over-representation
of
minority
youth
within
the
Juvenile
Justice
System?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
51
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