A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
Running head: A MEASURE OF EPISTEMIC COGNITION IN HISTORY
Walking on the Borders: A Measure of Epistemic Cognition in History
Liliana Maggioni, Bruce VanSledright, and Patricia Alexander
University of Maryland
In press
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This exploratory study builds on literatures related to the development of epistemic
cognition, research on historical thinking, and studies of individuals’ epistemic beliefs. It
was designed to explore, develop, and test a measure of epistemic cognition in history.
The Beliefs about Learning and Teaching History Questionnaire (BLTHQ) was
administered to elementary teachers and college history professors and represents an
effort to construct a reliable and valid measure that could effectively monitor changes in
epistemic cognition across large samples. Results from confirmatory factor analysis
suggested a good fit of a 2-factor model underlying the questionnaire. Responses from
experts in the domain of history served as an initial attempt to validate the instrument.
Keywords: epistemic cognition, epistemic beliefs, historical thinking
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In one of his ficciones, Jorge Luis Borges reports a legend about an imaginary
world, the region of Tlön. According to the people living in this region, “the world is not
a concurrence of objects in space, but a heterogeneous series of independent acts”
(Borges, 1962, p. 23). Since the universe for Borges’s Tlöners is conceived as a series of
mental processes, psychology becomes the core of classical culture and language abounds
in nouns, since they do not necessarily refer to an actual reality, but can be created at will
by a writer. On Tlön, metaphysics is considered nothing more than “a branch of fantastic
literature,” seeking amazement and not truth, and not even an approximation of it (p. 25).
Centuries of living according to this way of thinking have influenced Tlön’s
reality. For example, it happens that forgotten things fade away and lost objects are
duplicated. “Two people are looking for a pencil; the first one finds it and says nothing;
the second finds a second pencil, no less real, but more in keeping with his expectations”
(p. 29). Named hrönir, these secondary objects are of particular interest to archeologists,
who finally succeeded in systematically producing them. By showing people employed in
the excavation photographs of what was expected to be found, archeologists were able to
have workers dig up the desired objects. Borges comments, “The methodical
development of hrönir ...has been of enormous service to archaeologists. It has allowed
them to question and even to modify the past, which nowadays is no less malleable or
obedient than the future” (p. 30).
Although the creation of hrönir by terrestrial archeologists would typically be
thought of as nothing but forgery, the epistemic problem foreshadowed in Borges’s story
is today at the core of much debate among historians and history educators. What is the
nature of historical knowledge? And what is the role of historians in the generation of
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such knowledge? Do historians simply act as couriers between the past and the present,
or do they actually create the past through the act of narration, much as Borges
archeologists do on Tlön, or are historians interpreters of the past and, if so, what does
such interpretation entail? What is the nature of historical evidence? Is it a complex of
traces from the past or a terrestrial hrönir generated by historians?
Philosophers, historiographers, and historians have struggled with these questions
and reached very different conclusions (e.g., Gadamer, 1975; Novick, 1988; Popper,
1968; White, 1973). Their works have challenged our thinking about epistemology and
have been relevant to the framing of this study. Yet, the perspective pursued by this
literature tends to be different from the one we adopt as educators and psychologists. In
particular, our interest in epistemology springs from the hypothesis that epistemic
cognition may affect the way in which teachers teach and students learn (Hofer &
Pintrich, 2002). Therefore, our principal concern is with this teaching and learning and its
outcome.
Epistemic cognition has been defined as the cognitive process enabling
individuals to consider the criteria, the limits, and the certainty of knowing (Kitchener,
1983). Thus, we wonder whether individual beliefs about the nature and justification of
historical knowledge influence history teachers’ pedagogical choices and shape students
learning experiences in their history classrooms.
A review of the literature on the role of epistemic cognition in teaching and
learning suggests a few venues to investigate these questions (Bain, 2000; Brickhouse,
1990; Hashweh, 1996; Kardash & Howell, 2000; Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Stanovich &
West, 1997). In particular, qualitative research has provided rich descriptions of teachers’
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and students’ reasoning about knowledge and knowing, thus increasing researchers’
awareness of how epistemic cognition can manifest itself during the learning process
(Elby, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 2002; VanSledright, 2002, Wineburg, 2001). The studies
on expertise have also furthered the understanding of epistemic reasoning within specific
domains, offering insights on the characteristics of experts’ thinking within particular
disciplines (Alexander, 2003; Stevens, Wineburg, Rupert Herrenkohl, & Bell, 2005;
Wineburg, 1991).
At the same time, we need to acknowledge that researchers are still struggling
with theoretical and methodological issues in the study of epistemology. Given their
complexity, the operationalization of epistemological constructs has proven difficult,
leaving many issues of validity and generalizability open to debate (Wood & Kardash,
2002). How can we further the study of epistemic cognition in the face of these
theoretical and methodological hurdles?
We believe that results from extant research provide an initial, articulated
description of the characteristics of epistemic cognition in history. Although such
descriptions mainly come from qualitative studies that may not be apt to generalize, the
corroboration of the findings seems to support the emergence of a few consistent traits.
For example, participants in such studies differed in the way they conceptualized the role
of the historian and thus the relation between history and the past (Levstik, 2000;
VanSledright, 1997). People also varied in their conception of the nature of a text. Hence,
participants differed in the way they treated and drew conclusion from historical evidence
(Lee & Ashby, 2000; Wineburg, 1991) and built understanding from conflicting sources
(VanSledright, 2002).
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A reflection on these findings also suggests the existence of important
connections between historical thinking and the development of epistemic cognition,
raising questions such as, what learning experiences foster them? In order to explore this
question on a level that goes beyond a reflection on anecdotes, developing valid and
reliable measures able to monitor individuals’ beliefs change becomes critical. We are
aware that, in trying to model individuals’ epistemic beliefs, we are attempting to
categorize commitments that people, for most part, may perceive as fuzzy and somewhat
vague. Yet, as researchers, we believe that the exercise is worthwhile for several reasons.
The first rationale is theoretical. By challenging ourselves to explicitly describe
features of epistemic cognition in history, we foster the development and testing of
hypotheses about the definition of this construct. In other words, we test whether our
hypotheses about the existence of different theoretical stances are not only reflective of
various philosophical perspectives but also compatible with data obtained by different
groups of individuals.
A second reason is methodological. Such an approach has the benefit of extending
the investigation of epistemic cognition in history beyond individual cases and permits
hypothesis testing. Thus, it allows us to learn from our errors and refine our views of how
individuals reason epistemically. Far from being an instrument cut in stone, we conceive
the measure presented in this study as a first, tentative step down this path.
A third reason is pedagogical. Research suggests that the conception that people
have about the nature and justification of historical knowledge influences their learning
experience. In addition, while some epistemic stances favor the generation of historical
knowledge and a rich understanding of the past, others tend to cripple the learning
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process by fostering a climate of resignation in the face of learning history (Bain, 2000).
Challenging students’ current epistemic stances in history class is not an easy
undertaking, but the literature offers some pedagogical suggestions for how this work
may be accomplished (VanSledright, 2002). For example, asking students to build
narratives of past events on the basis of inconclusive evidence, may succeed in
challenging the idea that history is a mere mirror of the past, a conception typical among
novices.
Overcoming such a conception opens the possibility of acknowledging that
textbooks look at the past through particular lenses, lenses that sharpen some facets of the
past while blurring others. Without such awareness, any call for the development of a
critical attitude toward history rings hollow. In fact, if the history conveyed by the
textbook (or by any other text, for that matter) is a mere reproduction of a past state of
affairs, history becomes lifeless and dogmatic, and defies evaluation of it.
When encountered by learners initially holding a conception of history
isomorphic to the past, pedagogical strategies that openly challenge such view, such as
asking students to reconstruct past events on the basis of conflicting primary sources,
may spark a renewed interest in the study of the past, unveiling its investigative
dimensions and its appealing character of mystery solving. However, the same
pedagogical tools, when used with learners who are aware of the conflictual nature of
historical accounts but have not yet developed viable criteria to grapple with this issue,
may foster the unhealthy perception that any account is as good as another. Under these
conditions, history can be reduced to a mere issue of personal opinions or becomes
altogether impossible.
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Therefore, being aware of learners’ epistemic stances becomes crucial to making
pedagogical choices that facilitate students’ learning and the development of their ability
to think historically. If instruction takes place over a relatively long period of time,
teachers have many opportunities to understand the epistemic stances of their students
and of tuning their pedagogical approach accordingly. However, when an educational
intervention takes place during a short period of time and is directed at individuals not
previously known to the teachers, developing measures able to perceive and monitor
learners’ epistemic stances becomes very important. This situation is well exemplified by
most professional development programs aiming at improving teachers’ on-going
practice. However, even teachers approaching a new group of students may benefit from
the initial information about their students’ epistemic stances supplied by such
instruments, as a mean of providing them diagnostic feedback upon which make
pedagogical decisions.
Building a Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this study was the development and testing of a measure of
epistemic cognition in history, the Beliefs about Learning and Teaching in History
Questionnaire (BLTHQ). The initial rationale underlying this work was the search for an
instrument that could make it feasible to monitor changes in epistemic cognition across
large samples, and thus to extend the research on the role of epistemic thinking in
teaching and learning beyond case studies, as described in the foregoing. In this particular
case, we were interested in observing potential changes in epistemic beliefs about history
among a group of elementary teachers engaged in expanding their expertise in historical
thinking. Other methodologies, such as in-depth interviews and think aloud protocols,
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could have contributed to our understanding of these teachers’ epistemic reasoning, but
they were judged to be too costly and time consuming given the number of participants
(King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002; VanSledright, 2002; Wineburg,
1991; Yeager & Davis, 1996). Thus, the decision to build a paper-and-pencil measure
designed to help solve this methodological problem.
From a theoretical point of view, this project draws from three main frameworks
used in the study of epistemic cognition (King & Kitchener, 2002; Kuhn & Weinstock,
2002; Schommer, 1990) and on the literature on the development of historical thinking
(Lee, 2004; Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000; Wineburg, 2001). In particular, the
literature on epistemic cognition offers two models that afford rich descriptions of how
people think when faced with problems that do not offer unique solutions, that is, a
category of problems that resemble the kind of investigation that characterizes the work
of historians. They are the Reflective Judgment Model (RJM), developed by King and
Kitchener, and the Levels of Epistemological Understanding (LEU), developed by Kuhn
and Weinstock. These models have been developed mainly from analysis of extensive
interviews with individuals discussing problems whose solutions could not be reduced to
the application of an algorithm (sometimes also referred to as “ill-structured” problems);
the data have then been used to hypothesize and test trends of epistemic cognition
development.
Although similar in several respects, the RJM and the LEU look at epistemic
cognition from different perspectives. In particular, the RJM focuses on the development
of reflective thinking, building on Dewey’s (1933) definition of reflective thought as
“active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of
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knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusion to which
it tends” (p. 9). King and Kitchener found that individuals tend to move across three
majors periods, each one characterized by two or three different stages. They named the
periods pre-reflective, quasi-reflective, and reflective. On the other hand, Kuhn and
Weinstock focused on how individuals changed their characterization of the relation
between knowledge and the external reality. They found that individuals tended to move
along four different levels, on a continuum that roughly parallel the RJM periods. They
named those levels realist, absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist.
For the purposes of our study, it is important to highlight that both perspectives
can contribute to characterizing different epistemic stances in history, since reflective
thinking has a strong resemblance to the thinking process employed by historians in the
evaluation of evidence and construction of historical arguments. On the other hand, the
different relations between knowledge and the external reality described by the LEU offer
an interesting framework to investigate how people conceptualize the relation between
history and the past, and thus the role played by the historian in the generation of
historical knowledge.
Here we take a closer look at the descriptions of the stages identified by these
models. The pre-reflective period is characterized by a lack of awareness that solutions to
ill-structured problems are intrinsically uncertain. Individuals tend to express the belief
that what a person observes is necessarily true. A perfect coincidence between concrete
observation and knowledge follows. Analogously, at the realist level, individuals
manifest the belief that “assertions are ‘copies’ of an external reality” (Kuhn &
Weinstock, 2002, p. 124). Another aspect of pre-reflective thinking is the belief that it is
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always possible to discriminate between “right” and “wrong” knowledge. “Good”
authorities know the right answers. Similarly, at the absolutist level, individuals
contemplate the possibility of false beliefs. Assertions remain “facts,” but they may be
either correct or incorrect representations of reality. Whenever uncertainty cannot be
overcome, knowledge is deemed impossible; thus, beliefs are defended as a matter of
personal opinion. Such stance is still classified as pre-reflective by the RJM, but it would
probably be considered a sign of movement toward the third level in the LEU.
At the multiplist level (LEU), the role of the subject in the process of knowing
becomes more vivid and the objective dimension of knowing recedes; assertions are
conceived as “opinions, freely chosen by and accountable only to their owners” (Kuhn &
Weinstock, 2002, p. 124). In the RJM, a similar subjective and contextual view of
knowledge characterizes quasi-reflective reasoning, a period in which individuals realize
that knowledge claims have an element of uncertainty, attributed sometimes to lack of
evidence or methodological problems, and sometimes to the unavoidable filtering of
evidence by an inquirer. Although in the RJM a reference to evidence remains, its very
choice and the arguments produced are considered idiosyncratic.
Finally, reflective reasoning characterizes the third period in the RJM and is
typified by the search for the most reasonable and supportable judgment, given the
available evidence. Individuals tend to express the belief that it is possible to be
reasonably certain about one’s own knowledge claims, but at the same time open to
reevaluation if new evidence or new methods become available. Similarly, at the
evaluativist level of the LEU, the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing are
reconciled, and assertions are conceived as judgments “that can be evaluated and
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compared according to criteria of argument and evidence” (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002,
p.124).
At this point, a brief clarification on how these models have aided the
development of the BLTHQ may be useful. Both models hypothesize a developmental
trajectory of epistemic cognition, casting it along a succession of progressive stages. In
other words, most participants in these studies provided evidence of epistemic
development along the paths summarized by the models, showing very few instances of
“regression” or “skipping of stages.” Such movements along the developmental
progression were mainly related to age and schooling experiences.
Yet, when we nest the study of epistemic cognition within the specific domain of
history, we find that the developmental trajectory suggested by extant research on
historical thinking appears more complex. A few studies have shown that conceptions
about the nature and justification of historical knowledge generally differed between
historians and bright high-school students (Wineburg, 1991) or history teachers (Yeager
& Davis, 1996). Yet, teachers were also found to differ among themselves, and expertise
in the discipline taught was perceived as a variable affecting teachers’ conceptualization
of the subject matter (Gudmundsdottir & Shulman, 1987). In addition, characterizing
teachers’ expertise has not been easy, since many personal and contextual factors seem to
affect teachers’ epistemic stances (Wineburg & Wilson, 1993).
In Britain, research on students between 7 and 14 years of age, participating in a
project explicitly addressing the development of historical thinking, found some evidence
for a developmental path, even if far more complex than the stage-like progression
suggested by study in domain-general epistemic cognition (Lee & Ashby, 2000). Overall,
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older students tended to perceive the active role of historians in the generation of
historical knowledge, while their younger counterparts tended to view historians more as
strict reporters or simple compilers. Nevertheless, individual variability was relevant and
students seemed to progress at various speeds on different second-order procedural
understandings (i.e., on ideas about how history is written, including concepts such as
evidence and causation.)
Overall, these studies strongly suggested the important role of education in
fostering students’ historical thinking. Such conclusion was also supported by a study
with fifth graders in the United States (VanSledright, 2002). It seems reasonable to
hypothesize that both age and education play a role in the development of historical
thinking. Yet, the extant evidence suggests that while age may in some cases and for
some concepts act as a constraint, education remains a necessary condition for a
progression in historical thinking, supporting the insight that such reasoning is for the
most part an “unnatural act” (Wineburg, 2001).
In doing history, we are continuously challenged to navigate the space between
the familiar and the foreign. So, while we try to encounter the past on its own terms,
avoiding the framing by presentist categories, we cannot forget that the other terminus of
this encounter is what we are. In other words, there is no history without the patient,
interpretive, and contextualizing work of the historian, and there is no history if this work
does not disclose the otherness of the past. If these are some characteristics of historical
knowledge, the attitude that it requires does not blossom without effort and needs to be
educated.
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What are some of the characteristics of this kind of cognition and how does it
develop? One way to address this question is trying to map how students’ ideas about
second-order concepts (i.e., concepts related to the “doing” of history rather than to its
outcome) like evidence, accounts, and causation shift across time. For example, based on
empirical investigation, Lee and Shemilt (2003) identified six levels in a progression of
pupils’ ideas about evidence. A comparison of this progression with the paths traced by
domain-general models of epistemic cognition development reveals interesting
similarities. At the first level in the Lee and Shemilt’s progression, students viewed
evidence as granting direct access to the past; at the second level, students likened
evidence to information, still equating history to the past as known by some authority.
Failing to recognize any difference between history and the past, students seemed to
believe that history simply reflects the past, as the calm surface of a beautiful mountain
lake would reflect the surrounding peaks. We termed the epistemic stance underlying this
view the Copier stance, to emphasize that the historian was perceived as a transparent
(and thus faithful) conduit of the past. Such stance parallels the one characterizing prereflective thinking in the RJM and the realist or absolutist level in the LEU.
Students at the third and fourth level in Lee and Shemilt’s (2003) progression
became aware that most of the traces of the past were in the form of human witnesses. As
such, the coincidence between the past “as it was” and our access to it fails, as it would
happen to the mirror-like reflections on the lake’s surface once agitated by the wind. At
these levels, students tended to struggle with the truthfulness of the accounts and tried to
paint a vision of the past by putting together the best (most convincing) pieces of
testimonies from different witnesses. We named the epistemic stance underlying this idea
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of evidence the Borrower stance, to highlight that individuals tend to “borrow” their story
from accounts or pieces of accounts on the basis of instinctive preferences or casual
selections. It is important to note that students at these levels were not yet fully aware of
the disciplinary tools used by historians to “transform” primary sources into evidence. In
Wineburg’s (2001) terms, they were still engaging the accounts more as jurors than as
persecuting attorneys. The locus of authority still remained in the texts, and students
looked for the “best” story to borrow to make it their own. Thus, it is not surprising that
they found instances of conflicting evidence very troublesome, much as a sailor finds a
wind-whipped lake difficult to navigate. Whenever faced by biased witnesses and lack of
accurate reports, students tended to find attractive the idea that history was an impossible
undertaking or just a matter of opinion; a stance that resembles the one described as
quasi-reflective thinking in the RJM or multiplist in the LEU.
The fifth and sixth level of the progression model developed by Lee and Shemilt
(2003) describe students’ increasing awareness of the presence of the historical
investigator who can ask questions that sources of evidence were not specifically
designed to answer. For example, by considering sources’ perspectives and corroborating
evidence across different sources, the investigator is able to overcome the problem of bias
in testimony. Now the investigation of the past becomes possible again. The addition of
reasoning about the past within its historical context makes such approach even more
powerful. We named this epistemic stance the Criterialist stance, to underline the ability
of historical thinkers to use the disciplinary tools and criteria for historical inquiry and to
focus on a multiplicity of particulars without losing the capacity to perceive a broader
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view. Parallels with the stances characterizing reflecting thinking and the evaluativist
level in Kuhn’s model are evident.
In summary, the results of research on domain-general epistemic cognition and
research on historical thinking have some interesting areas of overlap, schematically
represented in Figure 1. Yet, differences remain. In particular, given the research
available so far, a hypothesis of a stage-like progression in historical thinking remains
problematic. As a result, we chose to focus our research on the individuation of different
epistemic stances in history, leaving to future research the investigation of marked
developmental trends.
Using the Theoretical Framework to Build a Measure of Epistemic Cognition in History
The choice of building inventories of statements targeting various aspects of
epistemic cognition in history was grounded on a third framework used in the study of
epistemic beliefs: quantitative research carried out with the aid of questionnaires (Jenhg,
Johnson, & Anderson, 1993; Paulsen & Wells, 1998; Schommer, 1990; Windschitl &
Andre, 1998).
Research on the development of paper-and-pencil measures of epistemic beliefs
has encountered several problems of validity and reliability (Wood & Kardash, 2002).
However, the use of this methodology has allowed researchers to conceptualize epistemic
beliefs as a multidimensional construct. Given the multiple dimensions of historical
thinking identified by extant research, we found this feature particularly appropriate to
the purposes of this study.
The characterizations of the different periods (RJM) and levels (LEU) offered by
King and Kitchener’s and Kuhn and Weinstock’s models provide a useful framework to
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hypothesize what may be the salient features of different epistemic stances in history. We
used the descriptions offered by these models as hints of how different epistemic stances
may look. Then, we turned to the research on historical thinking and asked ourselves
what kind of beliefs about the learning and teaching of history might be compatible with
the beliefs characterizing each stance. In particular, we examined characteristics of
historical thinking across different levels of expertise, paying particular attention to the
progression in the second order knowledge concept of evidence (Lee & Shemilt, 2003),
because the concept of evidence is a pivotal idea in epistemic cognition in history.
For example, one of the characteristics of pre-reflective thinking, and of the realist
and absolutist levels in the LEU model, is a view of knowledge directly obtainable. In
history, such view is very similar to what we called the Copier stance. In the BLTHQ,
and because our sample was to involve history teachers, a corresponding item we created
was “In history there is really nothing to understand: the facts speak for themselves.” It
was our hypothesis that teachers agreeing with this statement identified history with the
past, failing to acknowledge that most remnants of the past are in the form of human
witnesses and that facts tend to speak through the mouth of historical investigators.
Simplistically conceived as “what it was,” history does not need to develop any particular
criteria to deal with evidence. It suffices that the investigator observes and faithfully
copies the past. Thus, the set of items we created to exemplify views of learning history
aligned with the Copier stance paints an authorless view of history. Other examples
include, “To learn history means mainly to study many facts about the past and commit
them to memory,” and “In learning history, summarizing is more important than
comparing.”
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Similarly, an item constructed to mirror quasi-reflective reasoning (multiplist
level, in the LEU model) with its uncertainty and idiosyncrasy is: “Since there is no way
to know what really happened in the past, students can believe whatever story they
choose.” Our hypothesis was that teachers in our sample agreeing with this statement
were aware that the past becomes visible to us mainly through the voices of witnesses.
Evidence was thus conceived as testimony. Yet, they still lacked those disciplinary tools
and criteria that allow investigators to deal with issues of bias and perspective. Faced by a
plurality of testimonies, teachers adopting what we called a Borrower stance try to
discriminate between “correct” and “incorrect” residuals of the past and use them to build
a description of it. In doing so, they may consider instances such as bias, position of the
witness in respect to the event under consideration, and distance in time, showing some
nascent development of criteria indicative of the expertise of the skilled investigator.
However, still unable to transform sources into evidence by asking questions that the
sources were not directly created to answer, whenever the attempt at discrimination
between “good” and “bad” witnesses fail, teachers, we hypothesized, tend to withdraw to
the belief that history is fundamentally subjective and the past is made by whomever
writes it. Further examples of items designed to describe a view of history in line with
this Borrower stance are “Good students know that history is basically a matter of
opinion,” and “History should be taught like a story: some things are true, but others are
just a matter of personal opinion.”
In the BLTHQ, reflective thinking (evaluativist level, in the LEU model) is tapped
by items such as: “It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning
with evidence and ask that history textbook authors do so also,” and “Comparing sources
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and looking for author subtext are essential components of the process of learning
history.” We hypothesized that teachers agreeing with these statements had adopted a
Criterialist stance, and were thus aware that history results from a process of inquiry, in
which the questions asked by investigators inform the analysis of the sources. It is from
this interaction between the investigator’s initial hypotheses and the archive of sources
that historical arguments are generated. It is interesting to note that viewing the
investigator as a questioner is necessary to consider issues of reliability of sources, since
the reliability of a source can be discussed only in relation to the question asked of it.
From the point of view of learning and teaching history, this view favors a focus on the
use of criteria for formulating arguments based on evidence.
Finally, we created inventories of statements that aimed at reflecting and
exemplifying how these stances may inform history learning and teaching, given that our
sample was teachers. We hypothesized that the beliefs that such teachers entertained
about the learning and teaching of history were an acceptable proxy for their epistemic
beliefs about history. We also hypothesized that such phrasing might be more familiar to
the participants in our study. We based this choice on the relation between epistemic
beliefs and pedagogical strategies frequently discussed in the literature (Brickhouse,
1990; Hashweh, 1996; Lipson, Mosenthal, Daniels, & Woodside-Jiron, 2000; Zohar,
Degani, & Vaaknin, 2001).
What follows is a description of how we tested the validity and reliability of the
BLTHQ. However, at this early stage of our research, we are equally interested in
exploring the compatibility of the theoretical framework with empirical data since it has
been our experience that the work at clarifying and articulating our conceptualization of
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epistemic cognition in history and the effort of developing a measure that targets it foster
each other. Thus, in considering the results, we discuss what we may learn in respect to
both these goals.
Method
Participants
There were two groups of participants in this study: elementary teachers and
history college professors. The first group, comprising 75 fourth- and fifth-grade
teachers, provided the possibility to explore and test a factor structure underlying the
BLTHQ. The second group, composed of five college history professors, allowed a
preliminary inspection of its validity, assessing whether the scores produced by our
measure were compatible with positions, arguments, and justifications offered by
established experts. The elementary teachers belonged to a large school district in the
mid-Atlantic region of the United States and participated in a year-long professional
development program, consisting in an intensive eight-day summer course followed by
several after-school meetings scheduled throughout the school year. Their teaching
experience varied from less than 1 year to 33 years. The history professors were teaching
at a large mid-Atlantic University and their areas of expertise varied from history of
science to ancient and medieval history to British history.
Measure
The measure tested was the BLTHQ. Respondents were asked to express their
position on 21 statements regarding the learning and teaching of history by means of a 6point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The items aim
at exemplifying the three epistemic positions we described in the introductory section as
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the Copier stance, the Borrower stance, and the Criterialist stance.
In addition, interpreted within the parameters of the LEU, the statements reflect
different conceptions about the relation between history and the past (e.g., historical
assertions can be viewed as direct copies of the past, as facts, as opinions, or as
judgments). Interpreted within the RJM framework, the items represent presumptions of
statements that would be scored as indicators of beliefs typical of a pre-reflective, quasireflective, or reflective thinking. Finally, each statement could also be seen as indicative
of different conceptualizations of historical evidence as described by the progression
model developed by Lee and Shemilt (2003). Tables 1 and 2 contain the complete list of
the items.
Procedure
The BLTHQ was administered to the fourth- and fifth-grade teachers as part of a
cluster of measures assessing substantive and strategic knowledge of history, called the
Historical Knowledge and Teaching Assessment Battery, or HKTAB (VanSledright, et
al., 2004). The first administration occurred during a preliminary meeting, two months
prior to a summer institute that served as a professional development experience.
Participants responded to it a second time 4 months later, which was 2 months after the
conclusion of the summer institute, and a third time at the end of the ensuing school year,
which was 9 months after the summer institute. In the case of the history professors, the
BLTHQ was administered only once.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Questionnaires collected from the fourth- and fifth-grade teachers prior to and 2
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
22
months after the summer institute were analyzed first. Preliminary analyses and
discussion of the shifts in epistemic thinking observed in teachers participating in the
professional development program were reported in detail previously (authors, 2004). We
briefly revisit some of these results here, to chart our approach at model building and
hypotheses testing.
In order to explore the pattern of correlations among teachers’ responses, we
performed exploratory factor analyses (principal components analyses with Varimax
rotation) separately, on both sets of data. Analysis of the scree-plot suggested the
extraction of two principal components, an occurrence that we initially found puzzling.
However, a closer inspection of the loadings revealed that items designed to reflect the
Copier and the Criterialist stance loaded together, but with opposite signs, on the first
factor, while items mirroring the Borrower stance loaded on the second factor.
The loadings in the Rotated Component Matrix are reported in Table 1 for the
pre-intervention and Table 2 for the post-intervention. Even when the value of specific
item loadings changed from pre- to post-intervention, their sign and overall structure did
not. We further explored the correlation between the two factors by performing a twofactor principal component analysis with Oblimin rotation. This analysis yielded the same
two-factor structure and a correlation of .04 between the factors, strongly supporting their
orthogonality.
The percentage of the total variance explained by the two factors remained low
(28.9 for the first set of questionnaires and 32.71 for the second set.) However, after
reverse coding items with negative loadings and dropping one item from both sets whose
loading was smaller than .30, for Factor 1, the reliability of the scale measured by
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
23
Cronbach alpha was .72 for both sets of data. The reliability of the scale for Factor 2 was
.63 for the first set and .70 for the second set.
We interpreted the overall stability of the loading structure together with the
orthogonality of the two principal components and the acceptable reliability of the scales
as indications that the epistemic stances we had hypothesized from the literature were
compatible with teachers’ ideas about learning and teaching history. The next step
consisted in the development of a structural equation model to be tested on data collected
at the very end of the professional development experience, when the BLTHQ was
administered for the third and final time for this group of teachers.
Testing the Model
Based on the results of the exploratory factor analyses, 12 items from the BLTHQ
were used to build a structural equation model describing the relations between the items
and the two factors that emerged in the exploratory analyses. The selection of the items
followed two main criteria. First, we looked for items that clearly loaded on only one of
the two factors; second, we retained those items with loadings that remained reasonably
high across both administrations. Table 3 reports the list of the items entering the model
as function of the two factors.
The model hypothesized that Factor 1 was directly related to items expressing a
Criterialist stance and inversely related to items reflecting a Copier stance. As
participants, on average, tended to agree with “criterialist” statements and to disagree
with “copier” statements, we interpreted Factor 1 as reflecting a Criterialist stance. It also
hypothesized that Factor 2 was directly related to items mirroring a Borrower stance.
Even if the theoretical framework derived from the literature differentiates among
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
24
three main epistemic stances, we chose to test the two-factor model emerging from the
exploratory analyses because we find it compatible with that literature. Viewing history
as a process of inquiry (Criterialist stance) is in fact theoretically incompatible with the
isomorphic conception of history as the past (Copier stance), an occurrence reflected in
the model by the opposite relation of statements mirroring these two stances and Factor 1.
In addition, given the low ratio between number of participants in the study and number
of items comprising the questionnaire, it is also possible that the loading with opposite
signs on the same factor of “criterialist” and “copier” items was a mere statistical artifact.
Only replication of the study can properly address this issue. We continue to explore this
concern.
Confirmatory factor analyses were first run on the same data previously used for
exploratory purposes in order to test the viability of the model. The results confirmed a
good fit of the model for both pre- and post-administration (CFI=.947, 1.00;
SRMR=.096, .071; RMSEA=0.039; 0.000, Χ2 > .05, based on 54 df.)
The model was then tested on new data collected during the third administration
of the questionnaires. Since some of the teacher participants dropped out throughout the
school year, the number in the sample decreased to 58. Again, the results confirmed a
good fit of the model (CFI=.96; SRMR=.10; RMSEA=.045. Χ2 > .05).The reliability of
the 12-item BLTHQ at the three administrations measured by Cronbach alpha was,
respectively, .61, .76, and .71 for Factor 1 and .51, .60, and .62 for Factor 2.
We interpreted the results of the confirmatory factor analysis as supportive of the
compatibility of the BLTHQ with the theoretical framework and, thus, as an initial
indication of its validity. At the same time, the low number of items comprising the
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
25
questionnaire and the relatively low reliability of the scale derived for Factor 2 indicate
that the BLTHQ was still a rough measure of epistemic cognition in history and further
work needed to be done to increase its ability to reliably measure people’s epistemic
stances.
Working at Validation
A further attempt at the validation of the BLTHQ was carried out via examining
the responses given to the questionnaire by history college professors. On the basis of
previous research on expert thinking in history (Wineburg, 1991), we expected the
historians to take a Criterialist epistemic stance. Therefore, we hypothesized that, if the
BLTHQ was to validly detect this stance, historians would score high on Factor 1, and
low on Factor 2.
Table 4 and Table 5 show the scores of historians on the items comprising Factor
1 and Factor 2, respectively. With reference to Factor 1, it is important to note that items
reflecting a Copier stance (corresponding to variable 5, 6, and 7) were reverse coded in
order to be added together with items reflecting a Criterialist stance. The small number
of expert participants did not call for application of confirmatory factor analysis. The
pattern in the data was nevertheless clearly discernible by direct inspection of the raw
scores.
In general, historians consistently agreed with items positively correlated to
Factor 1, but disagreed with items negatively correlated to Factor 1 and positively
correlated to Factor 2. Even if the small sample does not allow for considering these data
as representative of the disciplinary community at large, the similarity of the responses
across the five participants in this group was, in our view, significant. In other words,
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
26
historians acknowledged the need for criteria in the interpretation of the past, but rejected
a view of history that equated interpretation with subjective opinion. Table 6 illustrates
this last point, contrasting the total scores for Factor 1 and Factor 2 for the five historians.
Even if there is some variability across the five participants, the total score for Factor 1
consistently falls in the area of agreement, while the total score for Factor 2 falls
consistently in the area of disagreement. At this point, we are interpreting these results as
supporting the validity of the BLTHQ.
Discussion and Conclusion
In wrapping together the results of the study, we revisit the questions that
prompted it in the first place. What did we learn in terms of theory, methodology, and
pedagogy?
Limitations
The first lesson we draw from this work regards the difficulties of detecting the
full range of people’s ideas about the nature and justification of historical knowledge.
Even if results of the confirmatory factor analysis generally supported the theoretical
framework, other occurrences were sobering. The variance captured by the BLTHQ that
we were able to interpret was quite low, reminding us that there is still much to be known
about people’s epistemologies and their interaction with other ideas and beliefs that
individuals entertain. In other words, our framework enabled us to interpret only partially
why individuals responded to the statements the way they did. Exploring relations
between epistemic cognition and other constructs will probably be necessary to further
our understanding of how people think at the epistemic level.
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
27
A particular feature of the BLTHQ may have conspired to lower the variance we
were able to interpret. In order to render epistemic thinking more familiar to the
participants, we chose to “translate” epistemic stances into “pedagogical” stances
theoretically consistent with such epistemologies. In other words, the statements in the
BLTHQ were worded in terms of learning and teaching history more than in terms of
nature and justification of historical knowledge. Since most teachers fully completed the
questionnaires, this occurrence probably facilitated their responses. On the other hand, it
is also possible that this wording solicited responses based on common pedagogical
practices which may be more susceptible to social desirability. Given the context of the
study, it was not possible to investigate participants’ thinking further.
Finally, the reliability of the scale, especially for Factor 2, needs to be improved.
Increasing the number of items and especially adding new statements directly targeting
beliefs about the nature and justification of historical knowledge may be ways of
improving reliability while exploring the relation between epistemic stances and their
pedagogical implications.
Question Marks
The first adjective that comes to mind to describe the questions suggested by the
study is “many.” In this section we focus on two issues that seem particularly pressing.
The results of the study show that the scale tends to work well with experts, but it
becomes less reliable when used with elementary teachers. Is this occurrence a
consequence of the poverty and “roughness” of the instrument or does it happen because
epistemic stances are much more “fuzzy” and inconsistent in novices than our theoretical
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
28
framework implies? Suggestions for future research depend on how we answer such
question.
If the problem is mainly located in the instrument, then research should focus on
developing and refining measures. However, if a certain degree of epistemic awareness is
necessary to enable people to verbalize their ideas about epistemic issues, then it may be
that epistemic stances can be assessed only indirectly, by studying how people perform
on purposefully designed tasks. Future research may try to triangulate findings,
comparing results obtained through direct surveys such as questionnaires and results of
indirect measures aiming at capturing epistemic thinking “in action.”
The second question regards the development of historical cognition. Do the
stances we identified describe different people’s attitudes, or can they be used as
descriptors of individual developmental paths? In particular, does the journey toward
expertise imply, at a certain point, the adoption of what we called a Borrower stance?
Researchers have noted, and not without some uneasiness, that a few students, once
challenged in their view of history as copy of the past, easily sympathized with a
generalized, helpless relativism (Bain, 2000; VanSledright, 2002). Is this a necessary
“rite of passage,” a pedagogical risk that we need to take in order to disclose for students
the opportunities of more mature and critical thinking, or is it an artifact of teaching
strategies that could be influenced by apt sequencing of learning experiences? How rigid
or flexible are epistemic stances? How pervasive in people’s way of learning and
teaching? What factors are more influential in fostering change? Venues for further
research abound.
Contributions
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
29
This study on the development and testing of a measure of epistemic cognition in
history encouraged us to work at the intersection of three different research lines,
respectively concerning the development of epistemic cognition, the development of
historical thinking, and the study of various components of epistemic beliefs. By
combining elements typical of the domain-general approach to the study of epistemic
cognition with understandings afforded by studies delving into the specificity of the
history domain, it allowed us to benefit of the knowledge generated by these various
perspectives. In this last section, we summarize a few insights that we believe were
favored by this approach.
At a theoretical level, casting the investigation of epistemic cognition within the
history domain helped us to overcome the dichotomy between “naive” and
“sophisticated” epistemic beliefs that tend to characterize most of the domain-general
research currently exploring the structure of these beliefs and their influence on learning
(Schommer, 2002; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002). In particular, the literature on
the development of historical thinking suggested tapping into beliefs about the
justification of historical knowledge claims, echoing a similar hint emerged from the
developmental work of Perry (1970), King and Kitchener (2002), and Kuhn and
Weinstock (2002). This approach allowed us to discriminate between beliefs reflecting an
overall relativistic stance, and beliefs reflecting the acquisition of criteria that enable
people to build knowledge even under conditions of uncertainty, a distinction that is
blurred when epistemic sophistication is measured mainly along the dimensions of
certainty and simplicity of knowledge.
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
30
We think that (re)defining the characteristics of epistemic sophistication
monitored by the measures we use has important pedagogical implications, since it
deeply influences what kind of educational outcomes are pursued and how such outcomes
are evaluated. For example, if belief in the uncertain nature of knowledge is considered as
an index of epistemic sophistication per se, then both a Borrower stance and a Criterialist
stance should be interpreted as “sophisticated” epistemic positions. Thus, pedagogical
interventions fostering either of these stances should be equally favored. However,
empirical evidence shows that students who are made aware of the uncertain nature of
knowledge without developing criteria to draw at least provisional conclusions from the
evidence available tend to develop an “everything goes” kind of attitude, a stance that
does not foster engagement with the reality investigated by the subject matter. On the
other hand, a position that acknowledges the limits of knowledge and teaches how to
cope effectively with uncertainty fosters a different attitude, since it empowers students
to engage in inquiry, to interact deeply with the material at hand, and overall to
participate more fully in the domain discourse (Bain, 2000; VanSledright, 2002).
Our study corroborates these insights, since the initial evidence generated by
historians shows that experts well discriminate between these two stances, tending to
agree with statements acknowledging the interpretive, albeit disciplined, character of
history, but rejecting statements that equate history to mere opinion. Charting the
development of epistemic cognition in history may provide teachers with a powerful key
for deepening their understanding of students’ perspectives and guide their planning of
pedagogical steps able to foster students’ further development and learning. The
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
31
compatibility of the theoretical framework used to develop and test the BLTHQ with the
data collected in this study lends support to the viability of such an approach.
We also found that the method we followed to develop and test the BLTHQ was
fruitful. It forced us to sharpen our theoretical framework which, in turn, allowed us to
interpret the results of the study and to identify limitations, new questions, and venues for
future research. In addition, favoring the development and systematic testing of a
measure of epistemic cognition in history, this method offers a path to refine assessments
that may aid teachers in monitoring student epistemic development in history. We believe
that availability of such measures may be particularly important in the context of
professional development programs of history teachers, where teachers are the learners
and instructors rarely have any previous knowledge of the participants. In this case, even
a rough understanding of teachers’ current epistemic stances may aid the choice among
different pedagogical options.
For example, it is possible that teachers currently adopting a Copier stance will
first need to face historical questions that cannot be answered based on the available
evidence in order to challenge a view of history as coinciding with the past. In other
words, it may be first necessary to realize that the past does not tell its own story to
understand the usefulness of gaining interpretive tools to investigate it and thus to
appreciate what professional development programs may try to offer. However, if the
instructional experience would stop at this first realization or if teachers were already
inclined toward adopting a Borrower stance, the result would probably be fostering or
reinforcing the idea that history is just a matter of opinion. In this case, pedagogical
strategies that expose teachers to ways in which historians evaluate sources, by
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
32
considering the accounts in relation to the question investigated and to the context in
which they were generated, may better foster epistemic development.
A similar argument can be made also with reference to pre-service teachers, since
we are convinced that one can teach only what one knows. If this is true when talking
about factual information and concepts that form the substantive knowledge of history
(Lee, 2005), it is even more so when at stake is the very way of reasoning and generating
knowledge within a discipline. In other words, if students have to profit from traversing
the thin ice of historical interpretation (VanSledright, 2002), then teachers need to be able
to negotiate the crossing first. Only in this way, will they in turn be sensitive to student
epistemic stances and be able to make pedagogical choices fostering their development.
Finally, as educators and citizens of the 21st century we cannot avoid thinking
with uneasiness to the Orwellian world described by Borges, a world in which history is
based on fabricated hrönir and not on traces of the past read as evidence; a world in
which the past, and thus the future, becomes “malleable” and “obedient.” For this reason,
we believe that being able to evaluate claims critically and formulate arguments based on
evidence is fundamental to understand the world in which we live and to participate to its
life. For the same reason, we think that developing epistemic cognition is a significant
educational goal.
In fact, fostering what we called a Criterialist stance goes hand in hand with
promoting that “unnatural act” that is historical thinking and with helping students to deal
with the uneasiness of navigating the space between the familiar and the foreign, between
our way of looking at the world and others’ ways of looking at the world (Lowenthal,
2000.) Thus, learning history can become a privileged place to encounter the “otherness”
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
33
of the past and perhaps also the “otherness” that sits at the desk next to us. At the same
time, it can provide the opportunity of discovering new facets of the human experience
and thus deepening the knowledge of ourselves. Borrowing the hrönir that best suits our
expectations may seem the most comfortable way to deal with the uncertainties of the
past (and of the present) since it still leaves it to us to determine the outcome of our
search, but learning to welcome the unexpected is much more attractive.
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
34
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Table 1
Two-Factor Solution for the BLTHQ at Pre-Intervention
_____________________________________________________________________________
Item
Factor
___________
1
2_
Students who are good at memorization learn history quickly.
.247 .0014
Corroborating evidence and identifying sources are important learning strategies
in history, but only after mastering the basic facts.
.472 .020
In history there is really nothing to understand; the facts speak for themselves.
.633 .223
Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for historians and students
alike.
-.291 -.259
Students who know their textbook well will be good at history.
-.013 .080
To learn history means mainly to study many facts about the past and commit
them to memory.
.576 .030
Teachers need to avoid giving students conflicting sources, since it makes
historical investigation impossible.
.718 -.043
In learning history, summarizing is more important than comparing.
.543 -.043
Teachers should not question students’ historical opinions, only check that
they know the facts.
.518 -.158
Good general reading and comprehension skills are enough to learn history well. .360 -.044
Comparing sources and looking for author subtext are essential components of
the process of learning history.
-.712 .060
Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence.
-.450 -.054
It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning with
evidence and ask that history textbook authors do so also.
-.553 -.099
Students who read many history books learn that the past is what the historian
makes it to be.
-.347 .545
Good students know that history is basically a matter of opinion.
.164 .657
Students need to be aware that history is essentially a matter of interpretation.
-.219 .576
History should be taught like a story: Some things are true, but some others are
just a matter of personal opinion.
-.054 .571
In reading a history book, it is more important to pay attention to the perspective
of the historian than to his/her reasoning on the evidence discussed.
-.180 .587
Since there is no way to know what really happened in the past, students can
believe whatever story they choose.
.276 .595
Teaching that one historical interpretation is better than another is usually
inappropriate.
.175 .305
Teachers need to make all historical interpretations available and let the students
construct their own understanding of them.
.080 .230
______________________________________________________________________________
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
40
Table 2
Two-Factor Solution for the BLTHQ at Post-Intervention
_____________________________________________________________________________
Item
Factor
___________
1
2 __
Students who are good at memorization learn history quickly.
.460 .098
Corroborating evidence and identifying sources are important learning strategies
in history, but only after mastering the basic facts.
.371 .308
In history there is really nothing to understand; the facts speak for themselves.
.329 .210
Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for historians and students
alike.
-.692 .183
Students who know their textbook well will be good at history.
.359 .193
To learn history means mainly to study many facts about the past and commit
them to memory.
.465 .230
Teachers need to avoid giving students conflicting sources, since it makes
historical investigation impossible.
.324 .247
In learning history, summarizing is more important than comparing.
.529 -.081
Teachers should not question students’ historical opinions, only check that
they know the facts.
.776 -.166
Good general reading and comprehension skills are enough to learn history well. .387 -.070
Comparing sources and looking for author subtext are essential components of
the process of learning history.
-.704 .147
Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence.
-.550 .036
It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning with
evidence and ask that history textbook authors do so also.
-.683 .067
Students who read many history books learn that the past is what the historian
makes it to be.
-.068 .630
Good students know that history is basically a matter of opinion.
.074 .638
Students need to be aware that history is essentially a matter of interpretation.
.039 .689
History should be taught like a story: Some things are true, but some others are
just a matter of personal opinion.
-.340 .692
In reading a history book, it is more important to pay attention to the perspective
of the historian than to his/her reasoning on the evidence discussed.
-.174 .575
Since there is no way to know what really happened in the past, students can
believe whatever story they choose.
.058 .616
Teaching that one historical interpretation is better than another is usually
inappropriate.
.043 .346
Teachers need to make all historical interpretations available and let the students
construct their own understanding of them.
-.286 .262
______________________________________________________________________________
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
41
Table 3
Items Entering the Structural equation model
_____________________________________________________________________________
Item
Loadings
________________
1st Adm. 2 nd Adm.
Factor 1
1) Knowledge of the historical method is fundamental for historians and
students alike.
2) Comparing sources and looking for author subtext are essential
components of the process of learning history.
3) Students need to be taught to deal with conflicting evidence.
4) It is fundamental that students are taught to support their reasoning
with evidence and ask that history textbook authors do so also.
5) In learning history, summarizing is more important than comparing
(reverse coded)
6) Teachers should not question students’ historical opinions, only check
that they know the facts. (reverse coded)
7) Good general reading and comprehension skills are enough to learn
history well. (reverse coded)
.291
.692
.712
.450
.704
.550
.553
.683
.543
.529
.518
.776
.360
.387
Factor 2
8) Students who read many history books learn that the past is what the
historian makes it to be.
.545 .630
9) Good students know that history is basically a matter of opinion.
.657 .638
10) Students need to be aware that history is essentially a matter of
interpretation.
.576 .689
11) Since there is no way to know what really happened in the past,
students can believe whatever story they choose.
.595 .616
12) Teaching that one historical interpretation is better than another
is usually inappropriate.
.305 .346
______________________________________________________________________________
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
Table 4
Experts’ scores on Factor 1
______________________________________________________________
Expert # Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Total
______________________________________________________________
#1
6
6
6
6
5
6
4
39
#2
5
5
6
6
5
5
3
35
#3
6
6
6
6
5
4
4
37
#4
5
6
6
6
6
6
5
40
#5
5
5
6
5
5
5
5
36
______________________________________________________________
42
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
Table 5
Experts’ scores on Factor 2
___________________________________________________
Expert # Item 8 Item 9 Item 10 Item 11 Item 12 Total
___________________________________________________
#1
2
3
1
4
2
12
#2
3
4
1
3
2
13
#3
2
2
1
3
2
10
#4
3
4
1
4
1
13
#5
2
2
1
2
2
9
___________________________________________________
43
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
Table 6
Comparison Experts’ Total Scores on Factor 1 and Factor 2
__________________________________________________
Expert #
Total F1
Total F2
Total F1
(raw score)
(raw score) (weighted score)*
___________________________________________________
#1
39
12
27.8
#2
35
13
25.0
#3
37
10
26.4
#4
40
13
28.5
#5
36
9
25.7
___________________________________________________
* Weighted scores = Total F1 (raw score) * 5/7
** Interval of Agreement (F2 and weighted F1) = (20 , 30)
*** Interval of Disagreement (F2 and weighted F1) = (5 , 15)
44
A Measure of Epistemic Cognition
Figure 1
Relations among Theoretical Models
King &
Kitchener (RJM)
Kuhn &
Weinstock (LEU)
Realist level
Pre-reflective
period
Absolutist level
Lee & Shemilt
Pictures of
the past
Reflective
period
Multiplist level
Evaluativist level
Copier stance
Information
Testimony
Quasi-reflective
period
Maggioni,
VanSledright &
Alexander
Borrower stance
Scissor and
Paste
Evidence in
isolation
Evidence in
context
Criterialist stance
45