Early Modern Philosophy 1: Background. Dates for our philosophers: Broadly, these figures cover the 17th & early 18th centuries. Descartes: 1596- 1650 Hobbes: 1588-1679 Pascal: 1623-1662 Spinoza: 1632-1677 Leibniz: 1646-1716 Locke: 1632-1704 Berkeley: 1685-1753 Context: The scientific revolution. Nicholas Copernicus: 1473-1543: Placed the sun at the centre of the solar system; Argued only that his system was as good, on the evidence, as the Ptolemaic (earth-centered) system. Galileo: 1564-1642 * Developed the first astronomically useful telescope. * Formulated a law for the motion of falling bodies: Constant acceleration & Parabolic paths. * Noticed the periodicity of the pendulum. * Observed the moons of Jupiter. * Defended an early version of the principle of inertia. * Argued that Copernicus’ system of astronomy was literally correct, not merely another way to ‘save the phenomena’ (& was imprisoned by the inquisition). * Thought that a fully mathematical account of the working of the world could, in principle, be perfected. Tycho Brahe: 1546-1601 * Built massive (naked eye) instruments * Using them, he made much more precise measurements of the paths of the planets across the sky. * Developed his own system of astronomy, earthcentered for the moon, Mercury & Venus, but with the other planets orbiting the sun. Johannes Kepler: 1571-1630 Worked for Brahe. Developed a model of the orbit of Mars that fit Brahe’s data: An ellipse with the sun at one focus. Three laws of planetary motion: 1. Planets move in ellipses with the sun at one focus. 2. The area of the ellipse ‘swept out’ by a line joining the planet to the sun is constant (so the planet moves quicker as it gets closer to the sun, and slower when it’s further away). 3. The square of the period of a planet’s orbit changes as the cube of the mean orbital radius (that is, the planet’s average distance from the sun): T2=k R3 where k is Kepler’s constant. Isaac Newton: 1642-1727. Invented the calculus (Leibniz invented it independently). Applied it to develop his laws of motion and theory of gravity, which explains Kepler’s laws. His great work of physics, Philosophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica (The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) appeared in 1687. Philosophical Challenges: 1. Turning away from Aristotle on perception & metaphysics: Since the 13th century, philosophy in Europe had focused on Aristotle (whose works came to Europe through Arab sources). Ideas about perception, and metaphysics in general, were shaped by Aristotelian positions, modified (in some cases) to reconcile them with Catholic doctrines. The scientific revolution tossed out many of Aristotle’s views on nature and human knowledge: a. Inertia: Aristotle thought that a force was required to keep things moving, and that if the force was withdrawn, the object would come to a stop. But this doesn’t really work well for ballistic motions (which were a serious practical concern in gunnery). b. Earth-centered astronomy: For Aristotle, heavy things fall because the centre of the Earth is the centre of the universe, and it’s where such things belong. This never worked terribly well—while it’s easy to treat the fixed stars as turning on a sphere with the earth at its centre, the sun and other ‘planets’ (= wanderers) were tricky to fit in and the devices uses (epicycles) didn’t fit well with Aristotle’s physics, which demanded ‘perfect’ circular motion centered on the Earth for everything above Earth’s atmosphere. c. Perception: For Aristotle, things really were as they appear to us to be, at least when our eyes were working properly. Objects have sensible characters (colours, scents, etc.), or ‘species’, which they send out. For instance, light activates the transparency of the air, which allows visible species to be transmitted to our eyes, where they produce an awareness in us of the property of the object. 1. Mathematicized physics: a. Focuses on measurable quantities: Time, space and Euclidean geometry (which had been an ideal model for human knowledge since the ancient Greeks: On the entrance of Plato’s Academy was the slogan, “Let no man enter here unless he knows geometry”. Regards such mathematicized properties as completely describing the causal workings of the world. b. Creates problems for properties that we experience through our senses: How can colour, smell, taste, etc. fit with this mathematical account? It seems they aren’t really out there at all: The causal processes that link the object to our senses operate by means of the mathematical/geometrical properties that physics deals with, not by transmitting anything like ‘colour’ from the object into our minds. c. Philosophers had to try to build a new account of perception and human knowledge, more generally, that would fit with the new science. It had to allow that the physical world works as the physicists say it does, and it had to show (more subtly) that we humans could figure this physics out and get it right using the methods of science. Lastly, it had to apply these ideas of physics to human beings as well—which leaves a real problem for us: If colours are all in our heads, but our heads (and brains) are just physical objects too, it seems there’s no place left for the colours to be. But we see them, we are conscious of them, and when we think in those terms (of how we describe our experiences) it seems talk of colours is indispensable. This is one of the roots of (bad old) DUALISM. d. The philosophical response to this challenge is still underway; a lot of progress has been made, but the problem of consciousness is just one example of a fashionable contemporary issue whose roots (as I see them) lie precisely in this problem.