COMMERCIALIZING UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: BEYOND ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES
E. Richard Gold
Introduction
The difficulty of ensuring the commercialization of university research is not one that can
be answered simply by setting up the right set of economic incentives. University
research and its transfer to the private sector respond not only to economics, but to
shifting cultural norms and other values that often override or reduce economic
incentives.
Culture obviously plays an important role in the economic growth of a society. This
belief can be traced back to the work of Max Weber (1930) who argued that cultural
changes play a critical role in the development of capitalism and its institutions.1 Lal
(1999) demonstrated the importance of Western individualism for the growth of markets
in the West.
Culture can be defined as “the enduring behaviours, ideas, attitudes, and traditions shared
by a large group of people and transmitted from one generation to the next.”2 As such,
culture will shape the behaviours and actions of individuals, and consequently the
institutions set up by a given society.
1
2
Stulz and Williamson
Social Psychology Book
This paper will show that economic incentives and institutional structures cannot alone
explain the difference observed in the effectiveness of technology transfer at American
universities.
The cultural atmosphere at these institutions plays a critical role in
achieving successful commercialization. Specifically, what is required is a culture of
entrepreneurship. In Part I, we will discuss the necessity for New Institutional Economics
to include culture as a fundamental element of economic theory. In Part II, we will
provide examples of how culture impacts economic systems, particularly those related to
patent law. In Part III, we will investigate the role of culture in the commercialization
process at American universities. Particularly, we will show that successful technology
transfer requires a specific cultural atmosphere at the university.
Part I
“The New Institutional Economics (NIE) is an interdisciplinary enterprise combining
economics, law, organizational theory, political science, sociology and anthropology to
understand the institutions of social, political and commercial life. Its goal is to explain
what institutions are, how they arise, what purpose they serve, how they change and how
– if at all – they should be reformed.”3
Although NIE claims to take culture into account, authors criticize the manner in which
culture is incorporated into the theory. Klein states that although NIE appreciates social
3
Peter G. Klein
phenomena such as corporate culture and organizational memory, it takes these as
explananda, not the explanans.4
Zweynert criticizes NIE for externalizing culture and viewing it as something static.5 He
states that by doing so, new institutional economics is at risk of repeating mistakes found
in most empirical and neoclassical-oriented studies on the influence of culture in
economic development. Specifically, culture appears as an ad hoc-variable that is used to
explain unusual developments, but a variable that cannot itself be explained. He argues
that there is an insufficient understanding of culture itself. Culture is not merely a factor
which can organize social life in a peaceful and productive – and hence cooperative –
manner; rather, culture’s structural importance for societal and political processes
themselves ought to be appreciated.
Part II
i. Bankruptcy and Insolvency
4
Peter G. Klein
The Two Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and the relation between Path
Dependent and Politically Implemented Institutional Change, Zweynert article
5
Global economics are rapidly changing the world and credit, particularly consumer credit
which is being offered in greater amounts and to greater number of people in more
countries than ever before.6 Commercial borrowing is also indicated to be on the rise.7
Many governments with developing economies have implemented new systems that do
not arise from existing cultural conditions, but rather are transplanted from elsewhere.
The hope is that cultural views will change with the laws. The United States is the source
for many new bankruptcy laws; however countries that incorporate US regimes have
significantly different cultural attitudes towards debt and insolvency.
The American system rewards entrepreneurialism and is based on extensive consumer
spending. Consequently, personal bankruptcy systems are designed to keep the consumer
spending and the economy running. The United States also has a forgiving business
reorganization system to avoid insolvency and to encourage risk taking and economic
growth. The American bankruptcy system is essentially a social program that addresses
many of society’s ills.8
Bankruptcy systems are essentially social tools, and as such they are value laden and
must be drafted with care to reflect the particular values of a culture. Martin claims that it
is not possible to simply transplant an American bankruptcy system into another
6
7
8
country.9 In fact, Martin indicates that even countries that share a common legal tradition,
such as the Unites States, England, Canada and Australia, have marked differences in
how they approach both business and personal bankruptcies. As well, many countries
around the world tend to have cultures that are less forgiving about debt compared with
the United States. In fact, in certain countries defaulting on debt is considered the
ultimate disgrace.10 Despite these cultural differences, countries around the world are
replicating the US bankruptcy regime.
Varying attitudes towards debt can be seen around the world. In Britain, for example, the
population is quite sensitive about financial failure and it is often looked upon as a failure
of character. In fact, executives in companies that are failing financially will likely have a
difficult time finding alternate work, and may even be black listed in the business
community. The British government is attempting to change these attitudes in order to
help fuel Britain’s flagging economy. However, as Martin points out, “the government is
likely to be unable to tell people how to think or whom to invite to parties, even through
drastic legal change.”11
In Continental Europe, as a rule, financial failure carries significantly more stigma than in
common law countries, and personal bankruptcy laws are less forgiving than those in
common law countries. As well, reorganization laws are more varied and reflect different
societal concerns. European governments are attempting to reduce the negative stigma
9
10
11
associated with business and financial failure in order to fuel entrepreneurial spirits. They
are specifically looking to the United States as a model.12 The German government, for
example, initiated a more flexible insolvency law for businesses by allowing the
appointment of a trustee, called an administrator, to operate the debtor’s business and
avoid liquidation. However, two years after the New German Insolvency Code (InsO)13
was enacted, research indicates that the new law is still widely objected to if not entirely
ignored.14 It appears that history and culture play a more important role in determining
how insolvency cases are handled than the actual law itself.15
A recent European Union (EU) study examined stigma and financial failure in the 15 EU
member states.16 The study concluded that even if domestic legislators adopt laws that
promote a fresh start, like in the Unites States, there is a need to introduce a European
culture campaign promoting the fresh start. Martin states that despite “the goals of the EU
in modernizing and liberalizing the insolvency laws … it is unclear whether this will
work. Long held and strong cultural values may stand in the way, despite the best
intentions of lawmakers.”17
ii. Financial Development and Investor Protection
12
13
….
Page 39 of text for footnote 302 – see those articles
15
Page 39 of text for footnote 301 – see those articles
16
Page 41 of text – GET THE STUDY
17
Page 41
14
There is substantial evidence that financial development benefits economic growth.18
Despite this finding, there are significant differences across countries in the importance
of capital markets, in firms’ ability to access external finance, and in the ownership of
publicly traded firms.19 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishy, show that this
variation can be explained by how well the laws in a given country protect outside
investors from expropriation by managers, controlling shareholders, and governments.20
Nevertheless, not many countries provide investor protection as extensively as the United
States. Stultz and Williamson show that differences in culture can explain the variation in
investor protection across countries.21 They suggest that culture can affect finance
through at least three channels: (i) culture defines the predominant values of a country;
(ii) culture affects the institutions of a country such as the legal system; and (iii) culture
affects how resources are allocate in an economy.
Stultz and Williamson used two proxies for culture – religion and language. First, they
found that the relationship between culture and investor rights is especially strong for
creditor rights, whereas language is largely unimportant for creditor rights. Specifically,
they found that creditor rights are better in non-Christian countries than in Christian
countries, and within Christian countries, better in Protestant countries than Catholic
countries. Second, they found that religion is correlated with enforcement of rights,
whereas language is irrelevant for enforcement of rights, except for accounting standards.
18
Stultz article pg. 1, fnt. 1
Stultz article and La Porta article
20
La Porta article
21
Stultz article pg. 1, fnt. 1
19
Specifically, Christian countries typically have better enforcement, and enforcement is
significantly stronger for Protestant than for Catholic countries.
These findings indicate that culture is an important factor that must be considered when
attempting to understand why investor protection differs across countries. The precise
channels through which culture impacts financial development and economic growth
must be investigated in more detail.
iii. Japan – still working on this
Currently, in Japan, there is a pro-patent culture that involves a general orientation
around patenting. This culture was triggered by the emergence of the pro-patent era in the
1980’s. This pro-patent culture is specifically apparent in Japanese large corporations. In
fact, studies indicate that the level of IP resources in Japanese large technology-based
corporations is considerably higher than in most comparable western corporations, as is
the output in terms of both absolute number of patent applications and number of patent
applications per R&D dollar.
Research identifies a number of common features distinguishing patent organizations in
Japanese large corporations from Western large corporations. These common features
include increased resources devoted to IP activities (i.e. ten or more times in Japanese
corporations than in their Western counterpart), elevated status for patent and IP
departments, good working relations between patent departments and R&D, and the
immersion of Japanese patent organizations in a patent culture.22
Japanese industry built strong corporate cultures to coincide with Japanese pro-patent
policy: (i) top management is generally involved in patenting and IP, patenting is made a
common concern for all engineers in a corporation; (ii) patent policies and strategies are
integrated in business plans; (iii) clear and quantified objectives for patenting are
developed; (iv) strong incentive schemes are employed for R&D personnel and
organizational units; (v) behavioural attitudes and standards conducive to technology
protection by patents and secrecy, and to technology intelligence are fostered; (v) visible
organizational means such as patent promotion centres, patent liason officers, corporate
wide patent campaigns; (vi) patenting prizes and patent strategy seminars are employed;
and (vii) a common language, methodology and philosophy for a patent culture is
developed.
While, the United States and Japan were both able to institute successful patent systems
that aim to promote innovation, the two patent systems conceptualize innovation in
different manners. The American patent system emphasizes the inventor’s exclusive
rights in the invention, whereas the Japanese patent system emphasizes the promotion of
industrial development by encouraging the protection and exploitation of inventions.23
22
23
Corporate Management of Intellectual Property in Japan
Daniel Lin Paper
Over the past 50 years, studies show that Japanese industry focuses more on developing
and improving external technologies, including American technology, rather than
developing new internal technologies.24 This preference combined with the narrow scope
of patent protection afforded to Japanese technology resulted in what is termed “patent
flooding”. This involves Japanese industry filing volumes of patent applications covering
minor variations and improvements on a core technology patent and essentially holding
the latter “hostage” by charging a fee for use of the improvements. Whereas patent
flooding generates considerable criticism by American industry, the culture of the
“keiretsu” system in Japan allows Japanese industry to overcome any hindrances
resulting from patent flooding. Keiretsu is a “unique organization of Japan’s economy
and literally means “affiliation”. A keiretsu is a group of companies linked together by
close and enduring bonds that transcend ties of legal contract or short-term market
considerations.” This system, which fosters cooperation and minimizes business conflict,
allows for patent pooling arrangements in Japanese industry.
iv. Thailand
Thailand is trying to enter into the global economy by adopting a Western style economy.
Thailand represents an attractive market for investment and trade because of its location,
market size and minimal interference from the government.25 The United States is
24
25
Daniel Lin Paper
pg. 1
Thailand’s single largest trading partner with a 1998 two-way trade of $18 Billion.26
Thailand also provides a cost-effective regional manufacturing and distribution base for
the Mekong region (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma), which has a combined
population of over 125 million people.27 Despite all of this, Thailand is struggling to
incorporate the modern forces of Western technology and capitalism into its traditional
Eastern based Buddhist culture.
Thai and Western cultures vary significantly and their norms therefore come into conflict.
Niffenegger and Krutngeon provide the following comparison of the conflicting cultures:
Table 1
A Comparison of Conflicting Cultural Imperatives
Thailand
Western Culture
A tradition of spiritualism as based on Buddhism; to
A need for achievement and material rewards as a
give more than one takes; to resist material
sign of success.
attachments.
A desire to have trust in business relationships,
Need
for
new
regulatory
procedures
and
through traditional, social business networks, built
enforcement agencies, with modern and public
over time.
(transparent) reporting of data.
Need to take care of employees, avoid layoffs and
Need to speed up restructuring of insolvent
protect investors from "taking a haircut" (loss), thus
institutions, cutting the high ratio of non-performing
suffering a loss of face.
loans through implementing modern (Chapter 11)
bankruptcy laws.
Desire to keep the unemployment rate down, by
26
27
pg. 1
pg. 1
Need to see rapid progress in the restructuring of
preserving low skilled jobs in labor-intensive export
insolvent companies, layoffs, elimination of non-
industries.
performing loans, greater reliance on high-tech
production methods.
Desire for face-to-face business contacts, based on
Need to utilize the increased productivity of e-
trust and confidentiality.
commerce via the internet, with public display of
data.
Encouragement by the King (Rama IX) to be a more
A desire by Thais to possess Western goods as
self-sufficient country, to produce what one needs,
symbols of success and and status; a new culture of
become less dependant on imports.
profligacy among young consumers, students and
business people.
Thai economists and Western critics argue that the ultimate economic model that will
succeed in Thailand will result from the constructive confrontation and compromise of
Buddhism and capitalism.28 Klausner, a respected author and retired Yale anthropologist
who spend many years in Thailand believes that a workable approach exists for
successfully combining the conflicting mandates of capitalization and Buddhism.29 This
approach involves the teachings of Buddhadasa, Thailand's controversial philosopher
monk who believes that lay men and women can have access to the same spiritual
attainment as formal Buddhist monks, even though they live very different lifestyles.
v. Russia
28
29
The current intellectual property problems in Russia have historical and cultural roots and
emerged during the administrative law system of the former Soviet Union.30 Under the
Soviet regime, nearly all inventions belonged to the State and were protected by the
Inventor’s Certificate. As such, the exclusive right to use, manufacture and
commercialize an invention also belonged to the State. This gave rise to a particular
cultural attitude towards intellectual property, namely that new technical solutions were
considered to be part of the public domain and available for use without the inventor’s
permission.
When the former Soviet Union disintegrated, numerous changes were made to the
political, economic, and legal landscapes of the country. A number of amendments were
made to the intellectual property regime, including allowing private parties to obtain an
exclusive right to use, manufacture, and sell an invention, and an increase in the
requirements for obtaining a patent. As a result of these changes, there was a substantive
cultural shift of attitude towards intellectual property rights. In fact, following the
implementations of these changes, a reduction in inventive activity (up to 1998) was
observed with respect to national applicants. Post 1998, Russian attitude began to change
towards intellectual property and the priorities of the country shifted. For example, the
number of national patent applications under A-category (necessity for life) rose and
attracted the greatest level of activity. As well, since legislative amendments to the
intellectual property regime made it possible for foreign companies to patent their
technologies in Russia, there was a rise in foreign patent applications.
30
Karpova, N. “legal protection and commercialization of intellectual property in Russia”
(2004), www.ZDNet.RU
Despite the above-mentioned advances, a number of cultural limitations continue to exist
in Russia. A number of scholars support the thesis that the current system of state
regulation of intellectual property in Russia has low efficiency because it is rooted in the
former Soviet intellectual property system.31 Moreover, scholars also attribute the
problems facing Russian industry to the cultural attitude that intellectual property rights
are not valuable or worthy of protection.32 Part of Russian society continues to believe
that intellectual property is in the public domain and can be used without the inventor’s
permission. This cultural attitude directly impacts commercialization of innovation as it
diminishes the inventor’s financial return discourages investment in future technological
advances.
Marina Portona proposes that in order to improve patent protection in Russia, and in turn
improve commercialization of innovation, the Russian government must take action to
overcome the particular cultural attitude of communal nature toward inventions held by
the Russian population. Portona states: “Russians have to realize that inventions are no
longer owned by all the people, and that using an invention without its owner’s
permission is theft. The recognition of patent owners’ rights by Russian officials and
public and private companies would help decrease patent infringement in the country.”33
vi. Indonesia – TO BE COM0PLETED
31
Karpova article and Russian article – GET FROM MEMO
Russian article – GET FROM MEMO
33
Portnova, M. “Ownership and Enforcement of Patent Rights in Russia: protecting an
Invention Existing Environment” (1998) 8 Ind. Int’l & Comp. rev. 505.
32
Part III
Technology transfer from a research university is a process that involves several steps.34
Rogers sets out those steps in the following diagram:
The first step in the process is invention disclosure. This step requires the faculty
member, graduate student, or staff member in a university to disclose the development of
a new technology to the university technology transfer office. The second step in the
process is applying for a patent. Once the patent is obtained, the research university owns
the intellectual property rights in the patented technology. The third step in the process
involves licensing the patented technology to an individual or organization, usually a
commercial company. After this licensing agreement is executed, and, given commercial
uses of the licensee, the research university may begin to earn income from the
transferred technology.
34
Rogers
The cooperation of faculty members, graduate students, or staff members is critical for
successful technology transfer and commercialization of new technologies. Their
willingness to disclose, help in the application for patents and the subsequent
commercialization of the new technology is necessary. These requirements for successful
technology transfer and commercialization require a particular cultural atmosphere of
entrepreneurship. This culture of entrepreneurship is viewed by some academics as
posing a threat to the traditional integrity of the university and its role as an independent
critic of society.35 More specifically, it is viewed as being in conflict with the university
culture that believes in the norms of pure science, academic freedom and openness.
Studies indicate that there is great variation among universities in the effectiveness of
commercialization and technology transfer offices.36 Rogers, Yin, and Hoffmann
assessed the effectiveness of technology transfer offices at 131 U.S. research
universities.37 They found a number of institutional factors that result in more effective
technology transfer. These factors are: (i) higher average faculty salaries, (ii) a larger
number of staff for technology licensing, (iii) a higher value of private gifts, grants, and
contracts, and (iv) larger R&D expenditures from industry and federal sources.
35
Etzkowitz et al. pg. 314
Nelson, Richard R. (2001). Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at
American Universities. Journal of Technology Transfer 26, no. 1-2:13-19.
37
Rogers, E.M., Yin, J. & Hoffmann J. (2000). Assessing the effectiveness of technology
transfer offices at US research universities...
36
Siegal and Phan reviewed the literature on institutions and agents engaged in the
commercialization of university-based intellectual property. Their review indicates that
both institutional incentives and organizational practices, particularly informational and
cultural factors, play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of technology
transfer. 38 This finding is contrary to conventional economic theory that attributes the
variation in performance of technology transfer offices solely to environmental and
institutional factors.39
Cultural barriers can limit technology transfer despite the presence of the appropriate
institutional factors for technology transfer. Johns Hopkins University (JHU) is one of the
world’s leading institutions of higher education and health. JHU receives more U.S.
government research and development support than any other American academic
institution,40 and JHU’s School of Medicine is the single largest recipient of research
grants from the US National Institutes of Health.41 As well, JHU boasts 26 Nobel Prize
winners among faculty and alumni.42 Despite all of this, however, studies show that JHU
is lagging far behind its peers in the field of technology transfer. In 1997, JHU held only
103 revenue generating licenses for intellectual property, compared with 232 licenses
38
Rensselaer article
See Rensselaer pg. 13-14
40
Feldman , Maryann and Desrochers, Pierre. “Research Universities and Local
Economic Development: Lessons from the History of the Johns Hopkins University”
Industry and Innovation, Volume 10, Number 1, 5–24, March 2003, p 1.
41
See footnote 6 in Feldman , Maryann and Desrochers, Pierre. “Research Universities
and Local Economic Development: Lessons from the History of the Johns Hopkins
University” Industry and Innovation, Volume 10, Number 1, 5–24, March 2003, p 1.
42
Feldman , Maryann and Desrochers, Pierre. “Research Universities and Local
Economic Development: Lessons from the History of the Johns Hopkins University”
Industry and Innovation, Volume 10, Number 1, 5–24, March 2003, p 1.
39
held by Harvard University and 201 held by Columbia University. As well, royalties
generated per active license were lower at JHU.43
One might suspect that the disparity in technology transfer between JHU and other more
entrepreneurial universities, such as M.I.T and Stanford, may be attributable to the nature
of the research – pure vs. applied. Thursby and Thursby,44 empirically assessed whether
the growth in licensing and patenting by universities (i.e. technology commercialization)
is attributed to an increase in the willingness of professors to patent, without a
concomitant, fundamental change in the type of research they conduct, or alternatively
whether the growth reflects a shift towards more applied research. They found support
for the former hypothesis that the rise in university technology transfer is the result of a
greater willingness on the part of the university researchers to patent their inventions, as
well as an increase in outsourcing of R&D by firms via licensing.
Feldman and Descrochers provide an historical perspective to explain how culture
impacts technology transfer at universities.45 These authors describe the culture fostered
by JHU’s founding faculty as one that is openly hostile to the practical application of
43
Feldman , Maryann and Desrochers, Pierre. “Research Universities and Local
Economic Development: Lessons from the History of the Johns Hopkins University”
Industry and Innovation, Volume 10, Number 1, 5–24, March 2003, p 1.
44
Who is selling the ivory tower? Sources of growth in university licensing, management
science, 48:90-104 
45
Feldman , Maryann and Desrochers, Pierre. “Research Universities and Local
Economic Development: Lessons from the History of the Johns Hopkins University”
Industry and Innovation, Volume 10, Number 1, 5–24, March 2003, p 1.
scientific research.46 The founders of JHU established an institution devoted to advanced
study and graduate training, based on the ‘German model’ of universities. This model
incorporates two features – the principle of academic freedom, and a commitment to
Wissenschaft – the idea of knowledge for its own sake.47
An early JHU commencement speaker, Basil L. Gildersleeve, suggested in 1877 “that the
word useful should be banished from the university vocabulary.”48 Henry Rowland,
chosen to help start JHU’s physics program, declared an intention to pursue a “substantial
reputation” rather than “filthy lucre.”49 Similarly, Ira Remsen, JHU’s first professor of
chemistry and second president of the institution, deliberately maintained a posture of
disdain for the practical applications of chemistry, disparaged what he described as
“practicalism”, and refused any offers to consult to private industry as long as he
occupied his university position.50 More recently, in the year 2001, Theodore Poehler, a
man who spent more than 50 years at JHU and who is currently vice-provost for research,
stated in an interview that commercializing research “just wasn’t something people did
46
Feldman , Maryann and Desrochers, Pierre. “Research Universities and Local
Economic Development: Lessons from the History of the Johns Hopkins University”
Industry and Innovation, Volume 10, Number 1, 5–24, March 2003, p 1.
47
Feldman, P. M. & Desrochers, P. (2004). Truth for its own sake: academic culture and
technology transfer at Johns Hopkins University.
48
Hawkins, Hugh 1960: Pioneer: A History of the Johns Hopkins University, 1874-1889.
Ithaca, NY Cornell University press. p 304
49
Rosenberg, Robert 1990: Academic physics and the origins of electrical engineering in
America. PhD dissertation (History of Science), Johns Hopkins University, p 52.
50
Rosenberg, Robert 1990: Academic physics and the origins of electrical engineering in
America. PhD dissertation (History of Science), Johns Hopkins University, p 19.
[at Hopkins] … Hopkins was a place where you would come to be an academic person
and do research, and that’s that. Most people here today are still here for that reason.”51
In fact, most scientific breakthroughs at JHU traditionally did not bring direct economic
benefit to the academic staff or the University.52 JHU inventions became part of the
public domain even though the university would have reaped financial benefits given
their commercialization. Some of these scientific breakthroughs include the discovery of
Heparin, a drug used to prevent blood coagulation, and the discovery of vitamin D, which
set the stage for an effective polio vaccine. These examples are indicative of the culture at
JHU being one that gives priority to basic research and scientific publication.
Feldman and Descrochers explain that JHU’s anti-commercialization outlook can be
linked not only to the value of particular individuals that help found and establish the
university but also to the general climate that characterized the Progressive Era at the turn
of the century. Specifically, this era was characterized by promoting expert and
disinterested scientific planning and mitigating the ill effects of laissez-faire enterprise.53
Given the cultural atmosphere at JHU, invention disclosure to the technology transfer
office may not be looked upon favourably. Field studies and survey research indicates
that many faculty members are not disclosing to their technology transfer offices, despite
51
Rosenberg, Robert 1990: Academic physics and the origins of electrical engineering in
America. PhD dissertation (History of Science), Johns Hopkins University, p 52.
52
Feldman, P. Maryann & Desrochers, P. (2004). Truth for its own sake: academic
culture and technology transfer at Johns Hopkins University…..
53
Rosenberg, Robert 1990: Academic physics and the origins of electrical engineering in
America. PhD dissertation (History of Science), Johns Hopkins University, p 52.
the Bayh-Dole Act stipulation that faculty members working on federal research grants
must disclose their inventions.54 The difficulty in obtaining faculty disclosures is one of
the main challenges for technology transfer offices.
Bercovitz and Feldman investigated the mechanisms that result in disclosure. They used
JHU and Duke University as their study sample and collected data for over 2500 faculty
members across 15 departments in two medical schools for the years 1990-1999. Medical
schools were examined since most technology transfer activities originate within medical
schools. As well, they chose departments for which there was variation in disclosing
rates across the universities.
The findings indicate that the decision to disclose is influenced by social learning both
prior to joining an institution (in your training years) and afterwards by observing others
in the institution. In other words, researchers are influences by their surrounding culture.
Specifically, the decision to disclose is strongly influenced by three factors: training
effects, leadership effects and cohort effects.
With respect to training effects, faculty members that previously disclosed were more
likely to continue disclosing if the experience was reasonable, that is, if the culture
supported it. Moreover, the probability of disclosing decreased by about 1% for each year
from the completion of graduate study. In other words, older researchers were less likely
54
Siegal and Phan
to disclose due to the increased likelihood that they were educated in a cultural
environment that was anti-commercialization.
With respect to leadership effects, if the chair disclosed inventions to the technology
transfer office in the past five years, then the probability the faculty member disclosed
increased by 4%. This illustrates that the chair of the department sets the cultural attitude
towards technology transfer. In addition, faculty with appointments in more than one
academic department, were 7% more likely to disclose. The authors indicate that this
result may be due to training effects or may be due to an entrepreneurial orientation of
these individuals. It was also found that a graduate degree from a pro-technology transfer
institution increased the probability of disclosing.
With respect to cohort effects, a 1% increase in the percentage of faculty in the
department who engaged in technology transfer activities increased the probability that a
faculty member disclosed by 8%. Moreover, a 1% increase in the percentage of faculty,
in identical academic rankings, who engaged in technology transfer, increased the
probability of disclosing by 10%.
Similarly, Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck and Stoto,55 analyzed the propensity of life-science
faculty to engage in various aspects of technology transfer, including commercialization.
Their statistical sample consisted of life scientists at the 50 research universities that
received the most funding from the National Institutes of Health. They found that the
55
Rensselaer pg. 26
most important determinant of involvement in technology commercialization was local
group norms. In fact, university policies and structures had little effect on this activity.
Conclusion