EAAS Conference Abstracts Why we needed an EEAS and what still needs to be done Christopher HILL – University of Cambridge In response to Robert Cooper …. I am looking forward to hearing how a diplomat of Robert Cooper’s great experience – at both national and EU levels - looks upon both the concept of the EEAS and its current reality. Given the scepticism of Foreign Secretary Hague (possibly not shared by all his officials) there are clearly potential obstacles to implementation posed by the attitudes of the major Member States. Indeed, are we able to differentiate the attitudes of the Member States on the basis of their size, say, or their foreign policy traditions? I have spent much of my career arguing that EU foreign policy can only succeed if it manages to harness the various strengths of national foreign policies while not threatening their cherished, and in some cases new-found, sense of independence. The EEAS represents a very practical test of this hypothesis, and we must hope that Mr Cooper will allow us a sufficient glimpse behind the arras of EU foreign policy-making to follow it through. Where does cooperation most usefully take place? Who drives change and who drags their feet? How do third states react to changes of representation? How is the HR herself using, or likely to use, the EEAS? And is there an identifiable sense in which she is blending EU external relations into EU foreign policy overall, a practice we would expect given her dualhatted roles as Commission Vice President and EU High Representative. Finally, I may be craftily asking whether Mr Cooper would adapt any of the theses in his book ‘The Breaking of Nations’ if he were writing it now, after several years’ experience at the top of the world’s first attempt at supra-state diplomacy…… EU diplomacy in a changing global diplomatic environment Jozef BATORA – Comenius University, Bratislava I suggest that the EEAS could be conceptualized as an interstitial organization, i.e. an organization emerging in the interstices between various organizational fields and recombining physical, informational, financial, legal and legitimacy resources stemming from organizations belonging to these different organizational fields. This interstitial status creates a situation in which there are different and sometimes conflicting organizational principles and practices introduced within the EEAS. There are also various and sometimes conflicting sets of expectations in relation to the Service from actors within the organization as well as from outside. The EEAS as a newly founded diplomatic service is subject to the same isomorphic pressures and standardization of the diplomatic field as other newly founded diplomatic services. But due to its interstitial nature, the EEAS is a carrier of ambiguity and infuses the diplomatic field with heterogeneity which may generate a process of innovation in the institutionalized order of diplomacy. Mike SMITH – Loughborough University The focus of this session is on the extent to which and the ways in which the EU has changed European diplomacy. I look forward to hearing the views of the speakers at this session, which I hope will raise the following issues: The fact that European diplomacy as a whole (not just EU diplomacy) is in a state of flux and that this is part of a far broader process of change in diplomacy engendered by globalisation and new forms of communication and representation. The related fact that the very fact of the existence of the EEAS can be viewed differently: as an institutional innovation in the EU, a reflection of a diplomatic process entailing negotiation and bargaining, and as a response to the broader changes in diplomatic practice. The expectation that in this context, the EEAS might be expected to challenge diplomatic processes within the EU, between the EU and Europe more generally, and between European diplomacy and the wider world – the challenge being a reflection of the EEAS’ existence but also a reflection of its developing practice. That this challenge will be felt in four key areas: deliberation, representation, communication and negotiation. We can already see some of the impact in these areas, but it is early days. It remains to be seen whether the EEAS will establish itself as the pearl in the oyster of changing diplomatic practices or as the cuckoo in the nest. The EEAS : practical problems and prospects Cesare ONESTINI - Head of the Corporate Board Secretariat, EEAS From the outset the EEAS faced the challenge of unreasonably high expectations generated by the much trumpeted but ultimately failed attempts to agree a Constitution for the EU. Setting it up was a race against the clock, marred by the lack of adequate preparations, institutional bickering, novel administrative challenges, and poor staff morale - all at a time of a very demanding international agenda in Europe's neighbourhood. Against this backdrop, it is remarkable that; (i) the EEAS decision was adopted in a relatively short time; (ii) the setting up of the service minimised disruptions, ensured business continuity and marked a number of significant successes; (iii) the integration of staff from the 'three sources' is moving close to cruising speed; (iv) relations with the Commission, the Council and the Parliament have been put on a firm footing. Important challenges lie ahead and can be summed up under three headings: (i) strengthening the coherence of EU external action and leveraging the external aspects of internal policies, developing a comprehensive approach to respond to changing political contexts in third countries, and acting in sync with Member States; (ii) truly speaking with one voice, bridging the views from the two 'executives' (Commission and Council) and (iii) in terms of its structures, building on what the three sources bring to the EEAS: the agenda and priority setting dynamic of the Council, Commission and Presidency system; the diplomatic skills, traditions and networks of Member States’ diplomacies; the incentive-based negotiating know-how of the Commission; the civilian and military tools for crisis response and crisis resolution. If the EEAS manages to meet these challenges it will prove to be the blueprint for the European civil service of the future. The EEAS and the member states : cooperation or rivalry? Hugo SHORTER, FCO The real value of the EEAS lies in its ability to help the EU Member States to make the best use of their collective weight, and that of the different EU institutions, in the areas where we agree to act together. The July 2010 Council Decision that established the EEAS stated that “the EEAS shall support, and work in co-operation with, the diplomatic services of the Member States, as well as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other policies”. This means mobilising the different external action tools available and using these in a coherent way in consultation with Member States to deliver objectives agreed by Member States; for example, ensuring that EU-wide levers of influence, such as aid instruments, trade access and sanctions, are deployed in a way which reflects the foreign policy agreements reached by consensus in the Foreign Affairs Council, and deliver real impact on the ground. The EEAS has been in existence for some 22 months now. It has had a number of key successes, including its widely commended roles on the Iran nuclear issue and the Middle East Peace Process. The LSE discussion on the EEAS presents an opportune moment for further discussion – not least given Baroness Ashton’s Review of the EEAS in mid-2013. EU diplomacy, competence and international law Ramses WESSEL – University of Twente, the Netherlands The European Union (EU) is not a state. Yet it is an active participant in the diplomatic network of states that is primarily regulated by international diplomatic and consular law. In the report of December 2011 evaluating the EEAS, the view was expressed that it was set to rise above “internal debates pertaining to institutional and constitutional reform”, and instead to focus on “delivering new substance to the EU’s external action”. There is certainly no lack of ambition in post-Lisbon EU external relations. The intensified global diplomatic actions of the EU trigger the question to what extent the EU’s external ambitions are compatible with the international legal framework. Traditionally, diplomatic relations are established between states, and the legal framework is firmly stateoriented. The EU is not a state but an international organization, albeit a very special one. It enjoys international legal personality, which allows it to enter into legal relations with states and other international organizations. At the same time, its external competences are limited by the principle of conferral (Art. 5 TEU), and in many cases the EU is far from exclusively competent and shares its powers with the Member States. The emerging question is to what extent international law allows the EU to participate in international diplomatic relations. And, perhaps more importantly, to what extent international law allows the EU to represent or replace its Member States? The sociology/anthropology of European diplomacy Karolina POMORSKA and Ana JUNCOS – Universities of Cambridge and Bristol The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) begs the question of whether EEAS officials might develop an esprit de corps (understood as the emergence of shared beliefs and values and a desire amongst those officials to achieve a common goal) and how this might be achieved. This is a relevant question to pose of the EU’s new diplomats. They come from differing professional backgrounds and may have different beliefs about what diplomacy is and whether the EEAS is to have ‘diplomats’ in the same way that nation states do. In addition, in organizational studies ‘esprit de corps’ has been associated with key variables such as organizational commitment, propensity to leave, cross-functional cooperation and productivity. Since the EEAS is composed of officials originating from different institutions (the European Commission, Council Secretariat General and the Foreign Ministries of the Member States), the paper discusses the challenges associated with aggregating different beliefs and values within the Service. More specifically, the paper examines five factors that have the potential to promote organizational esprit de corps, communication, leadership, public image, trust and training. The paper concludes that, as far as these factors are concerned, the first two years of operation of the Service do not bode well for the emergence of an esprit de corps and that, consequently, this might undermine the coherence and effectiveness of the EEAS itself. Simon Duke – EIPA, Maastricht As important as the institutional issues are, they should be seen in the context of an existential identity crisis that the EU is undergoing in its external relations, a crisis related to the euro crisis but not the cause of it. The presentation concentrates on the composition of the EEAS, specifically the gender and geographical balance aspects. The key argument will be not so much any legacy imbalances, but what can be done to correct perceived imbalances and the impact upon the Service of either letting existing trends continue or of applying efforts aimed at rebalancing them. A second series of comments will dwell upon the training dimensions. While progress has been made, training initiatives are confounded by a lack of overall strategy, a lack of focus and open questions about whether any anticipated ‘socialisation’ effect is realistic. Finally, as a catalyst for discussion, the presentation will review the important question of whether a unified diplomatic culture or common mindset is likely to surface in the EEAS. I will suggest that the psychological challenges of creating common mindsets may have been underestimated, and that the adaptation to the Service and the emergence of a ‘diplomatic culture’ will remain longer-term challenges. The EU as a diplomatic actor: bilateral diplomacy pre- and post-Lisbon Bruno HANSES – Political Counsellor, EU delegation Kinshasa This session will cover what the Lisbon Treaty changed and did not change in bilateral EU Delegations, taking the EU Delegation in the DR Congo as an example. The context is a fast-moving political environment in the DRC encompassing enormous challenges for regional stability, economic recovery, the reconstruction of the state and the establishment of rule of law, democracy and human rights. The session will examine whether and how EU foreign and security policy makes a difference and whether through the EEAS it is now better equipped than in the past to pull together various EU policy instruments – diplomacy, development cooperation, humanitarian relief and external relations in general. Daniel SCHAER – Political Counsellor, EU Delegation, Kigali The creation of the EEAS required a mix of "diplomats" from very different institutions (Council, Commission and member states) combined to create one team. This session analyses the interplay between the different cultures of the institutions, the diplomatic mindsets involved and their influence on the work of bilateral delegations, with Rwanda and the Congo as prime examples. The session also reviews the new responsibilities of EU delegations: representing the Union in the host country and EU coordination. A sub-text is a view of the EEAS from a "new member state" and a "small state" perspective, where the EEAS widens the reach and horizons of a member state in terms of global affairs. On the assumption that participants will have read the papers on the conference website, the session will provide a discussion of the EU’s response to the war situation in Rwanda and Congo, asking whether the EU has been noticeably more effective post-Lisbon than it would have been under the regime of the ‘rotating presidency’. It will also provide a practical example of coordination between the Commission and the EEAS, and focus on the potential for the EEAS to use the specific diplomatic skills of member states with historical connections in the area. Is EU policy hampered by the continuation of national interests? Whatever the answer, there is the very pertinent issue of whether the member states represented in the area (a third of the EU membership) work alongside the EU Delegation or together with it, and whether there are separate agendas which the EU delegation has to face. Further issues include the coordination of Commission policies and CFSP by the EEAS in the field, the potential for continuing and new turf battles, practical implications of varying interpretations of the Treaty and line-management issues - relations between Brussels and the field. Brian HOCKING Diplomacy is commonly defined in terms of processes and structures concerned with communication and representation. But despite the enhanced complexity of diplomatic agendas and the increasingly diverse yet interconnected sites where these structures and processes are located, we adhere to traditional terminologies – such as bilateralism, multilateralism and summit diplomacy. This indicates disaggregated arenas and processes for managing complex and interlinked agendas possessing quite different dynamics. Against this background this session – together with that on multilateralism – provides a valuable opportunity to focus on both the broader and the more specifically EU-related aspects of diplomatic processes and their attendant structures. The setting for this discussion is clearly the changing nature of diplomacy with its more diffuse communication patterns reflected in concerns with public diplomacy and soft power underpinned by developments in communications and information technologies (web 2.0/E-diplomacy); a more diverse cast of players or ‘stakeholders’ and an increasingly densely configured set of arenas in which network forms exist alongside – rather than replacing - more traditional, hierarchical forms. Against this background, we would expect to find a juxtaposition of changes deriving from three interlinked dynamics: change in the global diplomatic system, national diplomatic systems and the EU diplomatic system in the post-Lisbon Treaty environment. The result is likely to be uncertainty. Richard Haas reflects this well in an article entitled ‘Messy Multilateralism’ which appeared in the Financial Times in 2010. Here he argued for a more diverse range of multilateral structures/processes to meet the obvious failures of ‘classic’ multilateralism – as represented in the 2009 Copenhagen climate change summit. The same basic point can be applied to ‘bilateralism’. Here, what the EU appears to represent is ‘messiness’ to a high degree. Lest this be thought a pejorative term, we could speak of ‘hybridity’. Hybrid bilateralism differs from classic or pure bilateralism in a number of senses but most generally by testing the boundaries that we apply to diplomacy. It recognises that much diplomacy – and this is particularly true of the EU – embraces ambiguity, resting on rules, conventions, norms and processes deriving from several modalities of conducting relations. Trying to unpack this ambiguity requires us to think about the key features that underpin bilateralism as a set of structures, processes – and, in some contexts, values. One way of doing this is to apply a framework that Jozef Bàtora and I employed to examine intra-EU bilateral diplomacy. In brief, this involves three aspects: Access: the direction of representation in terms of the identification of key nodes in global policy networks. Function: what are the purposes of bilateral representation, both in terms of the ‘pure’ forms associated with developing relations between actors (both state and non-state) and as a component of complex/hybrid processes? How is the balance between symbolic functions and those related to various forms of service delivery and reporting, for example, registered in specific locations? Presence: what structures do the demands of access and function require in a given location? What considerations regarding EU external policies and the projection of the EU as an actor are relevant, and how do these vary between specific locations? How are the patterns of hybridized bilateral relations involving the EEAS and member state diplomatic posts reflective of different dynamics rooted in differing objectives? Against this background we might ask what we can expect from changing organisational structures as represented by the EEAS in terms of diplomatic outcomes. Multi-lateral diplomacy post Lisbon : the EU delegations in Geneva and Vienna Joëlle HIVONNET – EEAS China, formerly EU delegation Geneva (UN) The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon proved a major challenge for multilateral delegations and particularly for the EU Delegation to the UN and other international organisations in Geneva. Beyond the problems common to all EU multilateral Delegations (a lack of common understanding of what changes the Treaty would entail for the representation of the EU, unresolved questions regarding the status of the EU in International Fora, uncertainties about the respective roles of the European Commission in external affairs and the EEAS, as well as a crippling absence of instructions from EU Headquarters), the Geneva EU Delegation accumulated specific challenges. These were inter alia the diversity of international organisations in Geneva, the absence of a Head of Delegation for one year, the creation of a second EU Delegation to the WTO in parallel to a separate EU delegation to the UN and the merging of the Council Liaison Office with part of the previous Commission Delegation. To all these challenges was added a fundamental challenge for human resources. There was a need to meld mind-sets into a new team spirit, with the intake of national diplomats at the same time as the merger and the split. Given these challenges, Geneva embarked on a joint exercise with the Member States, which became known as "the matrix". It was based on 3 columns describing (1) the pre-Lisbon situation with regard to EU representation, organization by organization, (2) a full interpretation of the Treaty and how responsibilities would look in the end and (3) transitional arrangements. Ultimately, the matrix, which was meant to be approved by Brussels, was blocked in Geneva, and efforts became concentrated on agreeing transitional arrangements with rotating presidencies. Nevertheless, the matrix did contribute to identifying conflicting interpretations of the Treaty, and it was in that context that the new concept of "competence creep" arose. Left unresolved, in spite of repeated calls to COREPER to clarify issues, the conflicting interpretations of the Treaty of Lisbon led to a general crisis resulting in almost total absence of effective EU representation in all Geneva multilateral fora in 2011. The presentation is based on hands-on experience over 3 years. It looks at some of the specific challenges faced in Geneva during that period as well as some general challenges arising from the sequencing and gaps in implementation resulting from the entry into force of the Treaty on 1st December 2009, the subsequent creation of the EEAS on 1st January 2011 and the adoption of the UN resolution on 3rd May 2011. Finally, the session will review the reasons why the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty so far may be falling short of expectations and may sadly be contributing to a loss of EU influence in international affairs. Lars-Erik LUNDIN – former head of EU delegation, Vienna This session will be based on some basic observations, in part arising from points made in my paper “Working together: the OSCE’s relationship with other relevant international organisations: Nine steps to effective OSCE engagement”, which I will assume participants have read, so that we can concentrate on discussion of pertinent themes arising. The international organisations in Vienna focus mainly on security, including significantly a wide range of transnational threats. The experience from efforts to get EU states to act together in three different multilateral security settings seems promising for future effective multilateralism. In the OSCE, ahead of the Astana OSCE Summit in 2010, diplomats, EU foreign Ministers and later Heads of State and Government were able to agree on firm positions, in particular on human rights. This agreement led to an overall reaffirmation of OSCE commitments across the board. In the IAEA the EU worked successfully to defeat resolutions in the General Conference threatening to derail further the NPT regime as regards the Middle East. On organized crime, terrorism and drugs, in UNODC the EU developed a viable strategic perspective. I shall be reflecting on whether the EU goes about achieving its objectives more effectively in the Vienna setting since implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. I shall describe differences in the management of EU business pre- and post-Lisbon and hopefully develop with other conference participants a view on whether the EU’s multilateralism is more effective since the important changes introduced by the creation of the EEAS. I shall argue that, above all, to achieve coherence and effectiveness it will be important to avoid damaging EU-internal legal battles and to avoid the negative impact of concentration on procedures as a substitute for inspired policy-making. The EU still has a long way to go before its claim to effective multilateralism can be substantiated. Achieving increased EU leverage is a key requirement for the EU in its relations with the US and other global partners; and increased leverage is only likely to be achieved with clear analysis of ‘the bigger picture’. There are benefits to be attained from enhanced overall relationships between the EU, its Member States and political dialogue partners across the world. One important lesson from this session will be that EU success in relations with one international organisation may catalyse success in others. Another will be that the efficiency introduced with the creation of the EEAS is key to understanding the EU’s increasing international presence and ‘actorness’. The EEAS: democratic control and the role of the European Parliament Charles TANNOCK – MEP As Conservative foreign affairs spokesman in the European Parliament I condemned proposals to create an EU foreign ministry, as recommended by a policy paper (included on this EEAS conference website) drawn up by nine European states excluding the UK but including France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland. It calls for wholesale reorganisation of external and security policies to create an all-powerful foreign ministry, run on majority voting and thus bypassing the British veto on key foreign-policy decisions. I believe this plays into the hands of the hardline eurosceptics who have been predicting this type of move for years. There is no evidence that this is something the people of Europe desire and it appears as a political elitist top down project which will end in tears. There is no support for such a move in the UK by the public or the Government, which would result in a veto and a referendum which would almost undoubtedly reject it. Those who want to suck all sovereign power to the centre of a federalist Europe dream equally of global status for their superstate. They fantasise a United States of Europe, bestriding the international stage and wielding diplomatic and military might. The truth is that under the Lisbon Treaty we already have an External Action Service led by Baroness Ashton which should be there to represent to EU's interests abroad. Its scope and its responsibilities - not to mention its cost to the taxpayer - are quite enough already." (adapted from Charles Tannock’s website, 19 September 2012) Normative Power Europe: the future of the EU’s diplomatic system SEE BLOG BY DAN SMITH IN CONFERENCE PAPERS AND OXFAM REPORT WRITTEN BY STEVEN BLOCKMANS.