Seminar on
“Fifty Years After the Cuban Missile Crisis:
Next Steps on Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation”
2 Presentations by Dr. Sameh AboulEnein
New York, 15 October 2012
Organized by Arms Control Association,
Washington DC
Presentation by
Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein
The Future of Multilateral Disarmament conventions in the Middle East
(1)
New York, 15 October 2012
Conference Room 1, United Nations Building
1:15 – 2:45 PM
Introduction
I would like to thank you for inviting me today to speak in my personal and academic
capacity to reflect some of my views on nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a
Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. I
believe that the topic of nuclear weapon free zones is of utmost importance given the
transformative changes underway in the political landscape of the region.
I. The Current Situation
1.
The “Arab Spring” has without a doubt changed existing fundamental dynamics and has
had significant implications on the political and security settings in the Middle East. Public
opinion is already playing a much more significant and prominent role in Arab societies and
in this respect, will have a fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and security
issues. Arab governments are becoming more accountable to their people and foreign
policy is becoming more in line with domestic aspirations and a reflection of popular
demands. Parliaments, with their foreign affairs, Arab affairs and National Security
committees, are expected to play an increasing role in foreign policy issues in several Arab
countries including Egypt, in which nuclear disarmament issues will receive, without a
doubt, considerable attention.
2.
It is in this context, that the establishment of a zone can positively contribute to regional
and international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts as well as improving the overall
security environment in the Middle East. The convening of the conference in 2012 on the
establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in
the Middle East is integral to the future stability of the region. The success of the 2012
Conference will be crucial to the success of the current NPT Review Cycle and its outcome
will certainly have a significant bearing on future developments in the Middle East.
3.
The Middle East remains a highly volatile region troubled with protracted conflicts. It is
imperative therefore, that the Middle East follows other regional examples and complete the
implementation of existing regional nuclear weapon free zones and work actively to
establish such a zone given the exceptional challenges this region brings to global stability.
4.
In our attempts to provide a framework for a NWFZ in the Middle East, it would be
beneficial then to reflect on the treaties of other regional nuclear weapon free zones such as
the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok Treaties. Despite the contextual
differences between these zones and the Middle East, these treaties nevertheless can
provide us with guidance when it comes to formulating the technical, institutional, and
scientific dimensions related to a weapon free zone.
5.
The ABACC is a regional organization that should be examined to derive lessons for the
Middle East. The Middle East needs a similarly bold vision to rid the region of nuclear
weapons and solidly put the region on a non-nuclear course.
6.
The IAEA Forum on "Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East" held in Vienna by the IAEA November of last year
was useful in this regard as well. Several constructive proposals, made at the Forum, could
be taken into consideration such as taking stock of the importance of declaratory policy, in
particular, declarations of good intentions, and identifying specific and practical confidence
building measures. Issues such as studying the lessons of other regions in terms of the
context that prevailed there before a NWFZ was considered, as well as reviewing existing,
multilaterally agreed principles for establishing such zones as well as reviewing the theory
and practice of establishing the five existing NWFZs and discussing the experience of
representatives from the five NWFZs in setting up and implementing such zones and
discussing the region of the Middle East in this context.
II. The Way Forward: The Nuclear Weapon Free zone in the Middle East
1. Good preparation of the substantive and procedural issues related to the convening of the
2012 Conference will contribute to its success and achieving its objectives, namely the
implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution through an ongoing process as
stipulated in the fourth action plan of the 2010 Final Document. This process should launch
a sustained and serious process leading to the establishment of the Zone, and involving
concrete steps and measures to be taken within specific time-frames, and linked to the
successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Process of the
Treaty.
2. Nuclear disarmament in the Middle East should also take place within the efforts made to
implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament as agreed in the 2000 and 2010 NPT
Review Conferences.
3. In this respect, the free zone in the Middle East could contain the following technical
provisions:

Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons capabilities,
facilities, and devices under international verification mechanisms.

Renouncing nuclear weapons through refraining from conducting indigenous
development and activities related to nuclear weapons.

Prohibiting stationing of any nuclear explosive devices on the zone.

Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone.

Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only.

Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

Establishing the necessary relevant institutions and mechanisms/entities to uphold
such a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and
address the issue of verification to identify the role of the IAEA and other relevant
organizations within such a zone.
4. The participation in the Middle East Conference should be inclusive. The conference should
include Israel, Iran, and the members of the League of Arab States, as well as the nuclear
weapon states and other relevant international organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW,
BTWC, CTBTO, as well as the NPT representative. The 2010 Action Plan also endorsed
additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including
that the relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background
documentation for the 2012 Conference.
5. I believe that the 2012 Conference and the follow on steps should be inclusive to allow a
more genuine, candid, and necessary interaction about nuclear disarmament,
dismantlement, nuclear roll-back, test-bans, transparency, accountability, and verification.
There has not been an interaction for many years and all opportunities that exist to make
this happen should be utilized. The fundamental role of the NPT must also be reinforced in
order to achieve nuclear disarmament in the Middle East. This is why the issue of NPT
universality is a pressing issue within the zone process.
III. Learning from Past Experiences
1. In all these efforts, the example of South Africa – the first country to voluntarily abandon a
fully developed nuclear-weapons programme – should serve as a model. It took five years
to build the country’s first nuclear device and a total of 16 years to construct its six-weapon
arsenal. Ending and fully dismantling the program and all its facilities, however, took less
than 24 months.
2. South Africa’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon state shows that it is possible in
principle to roll back a nuclear capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented
integrated IAEA safeguards and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is implementing its
guidelines. Past successes in reversing the nuclear tide include also decisions by Brazil and
Argentina to roll back their nuclear programmes and to create a bilateral verification agency
as already mentioned.
IV. Conclusions
1.
In conclusion, it is worth recalling that key successes in abolishing nuclear weapon
programs included South Africa's historic decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join
the nonproliferation treaty; but also decisions by Brazil and Argentina to roll back their
nuclear programs and create a bilateral verification agency; and the decisions by Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons back to Russia after they seceded
from the Soviet Union. The actions by these states to give up nuclear programs and
weapons deserve greater recognition and merit drawing lessons from.
2.
Representatives of civil society and academic institutes, who can inject valuable
information and perspectives as well as build bridges between our communities in the ME
should be invited to help foster trust and better understanding in the build up to the
upcoming zonal process in the region.
3.
It is crucial for all countries concerned to realize how dramatically the regional context has
changed. This in turn, requires modifications in the behavior and approach of many. What
was possible and acceptable before, may not necessarily be plausible or tolerable today.
The establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass
destruction can safeguard both regional and international peace and security at this critical
moment.
Thank You
Presentation by
Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein
The Future of Multilateral Disarmament conventions in the Middle East
(2)
New York, 15 October 2012
United Nations Plaza, Manhattan Room
6:30 – 8:30 PM
Introduction
I would like to thank you for inviting me to speak this evening in my personal and
academic capacity on the future of multilateral disarmament conventions and the process
to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass
destruction and the 2012 ME conference. I believe that the topic of nuclear weapon free
zones is of utmost importance given the transformative changes underway in the political
landscape of the region.
I. The Current Situation
7.
The “Arab Spring” has without a doubt changed existing fundamental dynamics and has
had significant implications on the political and security settings in the Middle East. Public
opinion is already playing a much more significant and prominent role in Arab societies
and in this respect, will have a fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and
security issues. Arab governments are becoming more accountable to their people and
foreign policy is becoming more in line with domestic aspirations and a reflection of
popular demands. Parliaments, with their foreign affairs, Arab affairs and National Security
committees, are expected to play an increasing role in foreign policy issues in Egypt, in
which nuclear issues will receive, without a doubt, considerable attention.
8.
The Middle East remains a highly volatile region troubled with protracted conflicts. The
acquisition by states of nuclear weapons, and WMD's at large, undoubtedly contributes to
greater instability, aggravate tensions, and leads to an accelerated arms race in the
region. It is imperative therefore, that the Middle East follows other regional examples and
complete the implementation of existing regional nuclear weapon free zones and work
actively to establish such a zone given the exceptional challenges this region brings to
global stability.
9.
In our attempts to provide a framework for a NWFZ in the Middle East, it would be
beneficial then to reflect on the treaties of other regional nuclear weapon free zones such
as the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok Treaties. Despite the contextual
differences between these zones and the Middle East, these treaties nevertheless can
provide us with guidance when it comes to formulating the technical, institutional, and
scientific dimensions related to a weapon free zone. The ABACC is also a regional
organization that should be examined to derive lessons for the Middle East. The Middle
East needs a similarly bold vision to rid the region of nuclear weapons and solidly put the
region on a non-nuclear course.
II. The Way Forward: The Nuclear Weapon Free zone in the Middle East
6. Nuclear disarmament in the Middle East should take place within the efforts made to
implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament as agreed in the 2000 and 2010 NPT
Review Conferences.
7. In this respect, the free zone in the Middle East could contain the following technical
provisions associated with several Conventions:
 Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons capabilities,
facilities, and devices under international verification mechanisms.
 Renouncing nuclear weapons through refraining from conducting indigenous
development and activities related to nuclear weapons.
 Prohibiting stationing of any nuclear explosive devices on the zone.
 Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone and the role of the CTBTO in this
regard.
 Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only.
 Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
 Establishing the necessary relevant institutions and mechanisms/entities to uphold
such a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and
address the issue of verification to identify the role of the IAEA and other relevant
organizations within such a zone as the CTBTO and test bans.
8. To address these issues and conventions, I believe that the 2012 Conference and the
follow on steps should be inclusive to allow a more genuine, candid, and necessary
interaction about nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll-back, test-bans,
transparency, accountability, and verification.
III. Learning from Past Experiences
1. In all these efforts, the example of South Africa – the first country to voluntarily abandon a
fully developed nuclear-weapons programme – should serve as a model.
2. South Africa’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon state shows that it is possible in
principle to roll back a nuclear capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented
integrated IAEA safeguards and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is implementing
its guidelines and became a non-nuclear member state of the NPT and joined the CTBT.
Past successes in reversing the nuclear tide include also decisions by Brazil and
Argentina to roll back their nuclear programmes and to create a bilateral verification
agency.
IV. Conclusions
4. As for the CTBT, it is important first to mention that over the years Egypt has played a key
role in support of the NPT aiming at the balanced implementation by all sides of their
commitments according to the treaty including its universality. In this context, Egypt played
a visible role in the negotiation of the CTBT and was among the first to sign the treaty in
1996. Its support for the treaty has been associated with the fact that, as stipulated in the
CTBT preamble itself, CTBT is a reinforcement of the NPT itself.
5. Also on the technical level, at the CTBTO, Egypt has participated recently in several
workshops aimed at capacity building and analyst training programs, as well as improving
the Egyptian National Data center to receive and process data.
6. The universality of the NPT and of the IAEA Comprehensive safeguards regime are
crucial steps and building blocs in the Zone, and will need to be complemented by the
universality of the CTBT. The priority should be to dismantle, roll-back and destroy any
nuclear programs and to ban testing and destroy testing devices.
7. Achieving the universality of the NPT, and other conventions banning weapons of mass
destruction, are essential in the process of building the Zone. The sequence and centrality
of this however is to be established as part of the legally binding treaty that the members
of the region will negotiate and sign.
8. The Arab Spring gives new impetus in the region to face these challenges. A serious
awareness program is needed from the CTBTO to place the treaty in its right context as
only a reinforcement to the NPT system. The outreach plan can be reviewed and revisited
to allow for a more technical constructive engagement. The Middle East region, public
opinion, the think tanks need to receive factual rather than political clarifications of the
articles of the Treaty –in local/national languages-, the implications and merits of adhering
to it by all States of the region, the security value of it to abolish nuclear weapons and any
possibility of their testing and use.
9. As the IAEA organized a forum on the Middle East Zone last November to build on
previous experiences from other free zones, the CTBTO perhaps needs to organize a
similar exercise, where expertise and experiences from the treaty’s application elsewhere
is underlined and technical dimensions are identified, and the process associated is
explained. A simulation of its role in any future Zonal arrangement is important.
10. NGO’s and think tanks can play a constructive role in repositioning the Treaty to become
more constructive to the M.E. Zone, and to add it to the building technical blocs in the
process to rid the region of nuclear weapons. The 2010 NPT action plan recognized that
role.
11. It is imperative for all concerned to realize how dramatically the regional context has
changed. This in turn requires modifications in the policies and approaches of many,
including those of relevant organizations.
Thank you