Presentation by
Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein
The Arab Spring and the Changing Security Landscape in the
Middle East
Istanbul, 26-27 November 2012
EDAM (Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies)
Conference, W Hotel
9:15 – 11:00 AM
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1. I would like to thank EDAM for inviting me back to Istanbul, the bridge
between east and west, to speak in my professional and academic
capacity on the Arab Spring and the changing security landscape
including the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
2. The Arab Spring launched a new era of sweeping political changes in the
countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The people's rising
demands for a stronger voice in their own governance have brought new
opportunities for reform and democratic transition giving rise to new
fundamental changes in political rights and civil liberties.
3. Indeed, the “Arab Spring” has without a doubt changed existing
fundamental dynamics and has had significant implications on the political
and security settings in the Middle East. After the January 2011
Revolution, Egypt has witnessed new parliamentary and presidential
elections. This indicates that public opinion is already playing a more
significant and prominent role in Arab societies and will have a
fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and security issues.
Arab governments are becoming more accountable to their people and
foreign policy is becoming more in line with domestic aspirations and a
reflection of popular sentiments. The parliament with its foreign affairs,
Arab affairs and National Security committees will be at the forefront of
foreign policy issues in the Arab world, in which nuclear issues will receive
without a doubt considerable attention.
4. Public opinion follows closely now new developments in the Middle East
and the unfolding of political developments that are changing almost on a
daily basis and discern their impact on the Region. Disarmament is central
to the security and stability of the Middle East. This will not only be
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achieved through promoting nonproliferation, but more importantly through
disarming those who possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction. Practical steps and effective measures must be taken
towards the total elimination of such weapons in view of their potentially
catastrophic humanitarian consequences.
5. The Middle East remains a highly volatile region troubled with protracted
conflicts and the acquisition by states of such weapons can only
contribute to greater instability, aggravate tensions, and lead to an
accelerated arms race in the region. It is imperative therefore to complete
the implementation of existing regional nuclear weapon free zones and
work actively to establish zones free of nuclear weapons and Weapons of
Mass Destruction, particularly and most urgently in the Middle East.
6. The establishment of a free zone will contribute to regional and
international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts as well as
improving the overall security environment. The convening of a successful
ME Free Zone conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is integral to the
implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. Any
delay in convening the conference will jeopardize its overall
implementation and represent a major setback in this regard.
7. The ME Free Zone Conference is of course not an end in itself, but must
launch a sustained and serious process towards the full implementation of
the 1995 resolution, leading to the establishment of the Zone, and
involving concrete steps and measures to be taken in this regard within
specific time-frames, and linked to the successive sessions of the
Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review Process of the Treaty.
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8. The conference should cover the different properties of the Zone such as
geographical area, prohibitions, entry into force, coverage (nuclear
weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction), compliance and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The follow-on steps of establishing the
Zone should include the discussion of technical issues related to means of
applying the determinants of the Middle East free Zone: verification
process, implementation mechanisms, destruction of nuclear weapons
stockpiles, and building capacity in relevant fields.
9. The participation in the Middle East Conference should be inclusive. The
conference should include Israel, Iran, and the members of the League of
Arab States, as well as the nuclear weapon states and other relevant
international organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW, BTWC, CTBTO
and the NPT representative.
10. We must also take note that there is a special responsibility on the
nuclear-weapon States, especially the Depositary States that cosponsored the 1995 Resolution, to implement Resolution. It is clear that
the responsibility to implement the 2010 fourth Action Plan does not lie
with the States of the Middle East alone, but rather all parties must exert
efforts towards succeeding in implementing the 1995 Resolution, and the
Depositary States have a special responsibility in this regard by virtue of
their special role in supporting the Treaty as a whole and in co-sponsoring
the 1995 Resolution in particular.
In discussing ideas for the Middle East Zone, one must also focus on the
topic of the NPT, which is central to the future security of the region:
11. Nuclear disarmament in the Middle East should also take place within the
efforts made to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament as
agreed in the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. There is a need
to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and further
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enhance transparency. The Middle East should not be an exception in the
Global Zero campaign.
12. In the upcoming NPT review cycle, we need to encourage the participation
of non-governmental organizations from the Middle East. They provide
opportunities to present constructive ideas and initiatives that could be
helpful in achieving global disarmament. There is a necessity to
encourage and recognize the important role played by civil society,
research centers, and think tanks in contributing to the implementation of
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the NPT Final Document
Action Plan 2010.
In conclusion, we are not working from vacuum:
13. There are several precedents of nuclear rollback and dismantlement worth
recalling. Such key successes included South Africa's historic decision to
dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the nonproliferation treaty;
decisions by Brazil and Argentina to roll back their nuclear programs and
create a bilateral verification agency; and the decisions by Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons back to Russia after
they seceded from the Soviet Union. The actions by these states to give
up nuclear programs and weapons deserve greater recognition and
acknowledgment, for they set an excellent example for other states with
weapons and military nuclear programs to follow.
14. There are also successful regional free Zone examples. In this regard it
would be beneficial to reflect on the treaties of other regional nuclear
weapon free zones such as the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and
Bangkok Treaties. Despite the contextual differences between these
zones and the Middle East, these treaties nevertheless can provide us
with guidance when it comes to formulating the technical, institutional, and
scientific dimensions related to a weapon free zone. Aspects such as the
application of the Treaty, renunciation, prevention of stationing and
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prohibition of testing of nuclear explosive devices; dismantling,
destruction, or conversion of nuclear facilities for the manufacture of such
devices, mechanism for compliance and many other technical aspects
could be studied in detail based on the other NWFZ treaties.
15. I still believe that the ME Free Zone Conference and the process that
follows should be inclusive to allow a more genuine, candid and
necessary interaction about nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear
roll-back, transparency, accountability, and verification. There has not
been an interaction for many years and all opportunities that exist to make
this happen should be utilized.
16. The Forum held in Vienna by the IAEA in November of last year, in which
most States of the region including Israel participated in, was useful in this
regard. Several constructive proposals, made at the Forum, could be
taken into consideration such as taking stock of the importance of
declaratory policy, in particular, declarations of good intentions, identifying
specific and practical confidence building measures, continuing work
towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and to make the
best and most constructive use of every opportunity on the international
agenda.
17. I believe it is imperative for countries to realize how dramatically the
regional context has changed. This in turn, requires modifications in the
behavior and approach of many. What was possible and acceptable
before, may not necessarily be plausible or tolerable today. There is a
need to adapt to the changing realities on the ground and realize that the
current approach to security needs to be reviewed. The establishment of a
zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction
can safeguard both regional and international peace and security at this
critical moment.
Thank you
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Annex 1 (lessons learnt from NWFZ)
 There was a progressive evolution of the NWFZ Treaties drawing from
previous experiences. However, each new treaty also introduced
innovations, including creative legal arrangements, and unique features
depending on the specificities of each zone.
 There was the need to strike a balance between the value of prior
experience and the uniqueness of each region.
 Areas of application of each NWFZ had to be defined and accepted by
the parties concerned.
 The involvement from the outset of the NWSs was important, notably
through the issue of negative security assurances.
 The NWFZs were acknowledged as a major contribution to nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament.
 The establishment of NWFZs was possible despite serious obstacles,
such as geopolitical complexities, lack of trust, and an often lengthy
process of entry into force of NWFZ treaties. This could be achieved
through a combination of political will and commitment, dialogue,
flexibility, and an incremental step-by-step approach.
 The process of negotiation of treaties establishing NWFZs promoted
confidence and trust among the parties concerned.
 The establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East should not be seen in
the isolation from the broader context of international peace and
security.
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 Leadership from within the regions themselves was essential ingredient
in the establishment of NWFZs.
 Over the years, there was an increasing role of the Agency in providing
expertise and input upon request from the States involved in the
negotiations of NWFZ Treaties.
 The establishment of NWFZs aimed at the elimination of nuclear
weapons, as well as at the promotion and regulation of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy in the States concerned.
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