Washington
July 2011
Dr. Sameh Aboul Enein
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Let me begin by extending my thanks and deep appreciation for
inviting me in my personal and academic capacities, to discuss the
outcome of the 2010 NPT review conference and the central issue
of the M.E. Nuclear weapon free zone.
In April 2009, in a speech in Prague, the president of the United
States reconfirmed his intention to seek a world “without nuclear
weapons”. In Cairo two months later, President Obama defused the
charge of double standards that has been levelled at the Nuclear
Weapons States throughout the 40-year history of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and he said, I quote: “No nation should pick
and choose which nation holds nuclear weapons”. That’s why I
strongly reaffirmed America’s commitment to seek a world in
which no nations hold nuclear weapons.” End of quote
By agreeing to a coherent Middle East plan of action, the 2010
NPT Review Conference has taken a significant step toward
addressing the long-overdue implementation of the 1995 Middle
East resolution, which aimed at the eventual establishment of a
zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass
destruction.
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The 2012 conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear
weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and
their delivery systems provides such a framework for constructive
engagement between all the states of the region, including all
members of the League of Arab States, Iran and Israel. Viewed
strategically, the 2012 Conference could advance the broader cause
of peace and security in the region. The process of establishing a
WMD-Free zone in the Middle East can become a new tool for
peace. The sequencing in this process is delicate, requiring states to
both deepen and strengthen efforts towards moving the peace
process forward.
Despite unique challenges, the Middle East will need to follow a
similar pattern to other regions that have established nuclearweapon-free zones. The Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga,
Bangkok and Pelindaba have all involved negotiation of a treaty
text, agreement on verification models with the IAEA and an
institution-building process.
And like all these zone regimes, a Middle East nuclear-weaponsfree zone should encourage the use of nuclear science and
technology for peaceful purposes, and enable states to pursue
bilateral, regional and international cooperation on nuclear energy
to support their economic, medical and technological development.
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There are, of course, major security and disarmament challenges
that are unique to the Middle East. Serious engagement by Israel,
will be crucial. It is widely believed that Israel continues to operate
the unsafeguarded Dimona plutonium-production reactor for the
production of weapons grade fissile material, and that its
capabilities may extend to tritium production - activities that
cannot be overlooked. Israel will need to take significant steps in
the denuclearisation process, such as dismantling the facilities at
Dimona, disclosing information on stocks of special fissionable
material, destroying them, and placing the facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive
safeguards.
However, the international community remains only focused on
the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme. While Iran cooperates
with the IAEA to the extent it believes necessary to fulfill its
safeguards responsibilities and to demonstrate non-diversion of
declared materials under safeguards, IAEA reports continually
refer to resistance on the part of Iran to address outstanding
questions regarding its nuclear programme. To resolve this
situation, it is vital that the door of dialogue and diplomacy with
Iran remain open.
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It is also notable that recently the IAEA has also requested Syria
“to provide access to the information, material, equipment and
locations previously indicated by the Agency to resolve questions
about its nuclear activities.
The IAEA would likely bear most of the verification burden to
ensure that no nuclear materials are diverted to prohibited weapons
programmes. Its expertise will also be vital in verifying the
complete dismantlement of any weapons stockpiles in the region,
and in ensuring that all facilities producing weapons-grade fissile
material in the region are decommissioned. It may also undertake
technical studies to examine the modalities necessary to establish
the zone. The agency would need a budget increase to enable it to
carry out such crucial tasks effectively.
The latest study on safeguards requirements for the zone was
conducted in 1989. This study could usefully be updated to reflect
the latest developments in safeguards techniques and technologies.
Regional co-operative monitoring should be explored in this study.
This may not be as difficult as it sounds as the region has had
valuable experience of cooperative monitoring and verification
systems (notably under the Sinai disengagement agreements I and
II in 1974 and in 1975 as well as the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty in
1979).
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To start an overdue process towards implementing these
commitments, the conference can consider facilitating and
supporting negotiations between prospective zonal states on a
legally binding text that codifies the establishment of WMD Free
Zone in the Middle East.
Issues such as the geographical limitations of the zone, the scope
of zonal obligations and prohibitions, verification modalities as
well as the complaints and compliance mechanisms for the future
zone need to be addressed . Once targeted negotiations on the zone
starts, states in the region can consider adopting a variety of
measures to demonstrate good faith and positively contribute to
negotiations on the zone.
Importantly, all regional facilities producing weapons grade fissile
material in the region will have to be shut down and
decommissioned or converted to civilian uses under standard
international safeguards.
Verification in the zone should be twofold, verifying compliance to
Treaties, and verifying dismantlement and destruction of nuclear
programs in the region.
In all these efforts, the example of South Africa – the first country
to voluntarily abandon a fully developed nuclear-weapons
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programme – should serve as a model. It took five years to build
the country’s first nuclear device and a total of 16 years to
construct its six-weapon arsenal. Ending and fully dismantling the
program and all its facilities, however, took less than 24 months.
South Africa’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon state
shows that it is possible in principle to roll back a nuclear
capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented integrated
IAEA safeguards and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is
implementing its guidelines.
Past successes in reversing the nuclear tide include also decisions
by Brazil and Argentina to roll back their nuclear programmes
and to create a bilateral verification agency.
Another clear example – in addition to South Africa - in this
respect, is therefore the relationship attained by Brazil and
Argentine, in connection with the signature- in July 1991- of the
Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.
While recognising the sovereign right of every nation to have
access to nuclear technology for the scientific, technological,
economic and social development of their people, both these
countries created their Common System for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). The Agreement implied a
clear and definite compromise for the use of all the materials and
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nuclear facilities submitted to their jurisdictions or control
exclusively for peaceful purposes. It was within this context that
they created the Brazilian Argentine Agency of Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Materials- ABACC- in order to manage and
apply the SCCC.
The ABACC is a regional organization that should be examined to
derive lessons for the Middle East.The Middle East needs a
similarly bold vision to rid the region of nuclear weapons and
solidly put the region on a non-nuclear course.
A lot of work and determination will be required during the next
few years to kick-start this process, and the first concrete steps –
appointing a facilitator and a host country to convene the 2012
conference for establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East –need to be
taken soon. While it may not be easy, establishing a Middle East
WMD free zone is vital not only for the region but for the survival
and development of the international non-proliferation regime as a
whole.
In my personal view, the 2012 Conference process can take some
serious and constructive practical technical steps, including the
following:
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1. That the IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO, BWC secretariat and other
relevant international organizations can present documentation
files for the 2012 Conference, regarding modalities for a zone
free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously
undertaken and experience gained.
2. Negotiation of a treaty text (targeted negotiations based on
formulating a legally binding text);
3 . Setting agreed verification models and the role of the IAEA;
4. Civil Society Contribution ;
5. Building the necessary relevant institutions and additional
(non-regional) accessions;
6. Establishing a Universality Adherence Support Unit to
directly address the mechanisms that would bring Israel into
the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.
7. Signing up to a fissile material ban treaty.
8. Dismantlement and destruction of military nuclear programs.
9. Step-by-step implementation of all WMD
commitments, and maturity of the treaty regime.
10.
treaty
Entry into force (signing and rectifying) of treaty text.
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To conclude, success in preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons at both the regional and global levels depends, at some
fundamental level, on the ability to make a credible and
compelling argument that they are neither necessary nor desirable,
that whatever advantages they confer are outweighed by the costs.
I certainly believe that the 2012 conference process should be
inclusive to include a more genuine and candid interaction about
nuclear
disarmament,
dismantlement,
nuclear
roll-back,
transparency , accountability and verification .There has not been
such an interaction for many years, and all opportunities that exist
to make this happen should be utilised. Representatives of civil
society and academic institutes who can inject valuable
information and perspectives, as well as build bridges between our
communities, should be invited to help foster trust and better
understanding in this process.
In this respect, I have heard two points from Israeli participants in
the conference:
1) The idea of intermediate nuclear disarmament measures on
behalf of Israel and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons.
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2) The possibility of dismantlement of a nuclear program
regardless of the costs and its being a complicated technological
process.
The recent revolutions in the Middle East should provide
additional impetus for all to be more focused and to move forward
to achieve genuine stability and security for the region.
Thank you
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