Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein
Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Head of Mission
of Egypt to the UK
Centre for Energy and Security Studies
2010 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference
March 4th - 6th, 2010
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Let me begin on a personal note by saying that I am really delighted to be
back in Moscow for the first time since my posting here 20 years ago. In
this respect I wish to extend my thanks and deep appreciation to Dr. Anton
Khlopkov, the Director of the Centre for Energy and Security Studies, and
his team for inviting me to participate in my personal and academic capacity
to discuss the NPT review conference and the central issue of the M.E
Nuclear free zone.
1. The NPT and the 2010 Review Conference
The NPT remains the only international instrument that not only seeks to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but that also embodies a firm
legal commitment to eliminate these weapons. In 2000, the nuclear powers
made an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and all
parties adopted a practical plan for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
However, this practical commitment still has not seen the light at the end of
the tunnel .
The 2010 NPT Review Conference represents a real window of opportunity
to build on previous commitments - and to take concrete steps to achieve
progress towards a nuclear weapon free world. The responsibility to achieve
that lies with all of us - nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states.
The preparatory meetings suggest there is a real willingness on the part of
many members to strengthen the treaty. At this juncture, it is worth
recalling that key successes included South Africa's historic decision to
dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the Treaty, decisions by Brazil and
Argentina to roll back their nuclear programmes and create a bilateral
verification agency, and the decisions by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
to transfer nuclear weapons back to Russia after they seceded from the
Soviet Union. The actions by these states to give up nuclear programmes
and weapons deserve greater recognition and acknowledgment, for they set
an excellent example for other states with weapons and military nuclear
programmes to follow.
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For this purpose, the NPT should be strengthened and ideas on its
institutional development should be well considered.
2.The New Agenda Coalition
More than ten years ago, the foreign ministers of seven countries - Brazil,
Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden - joined
together to form the New Agenda Coalition to give fresh impetus to the
efforts to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament. The need for such
energy is as strong as ever today and is increasing by the minute. We need
a revitalized New Agenda Coalition to work closely with the nuclear weapon
states to accelerate the implementation of agreed practical steps and to
identify the critical challenges facing us today..
The New Agenda Coalition campaigns for the world envisaged by the NPT—
a world in which nuclear weapons have no role. Its philosophy is that the
world will be safe only when nuclear weapons are eliminated and we can be
sure they will never be produced or used again. The New Agenda Coalition
calls for the universality of the NPT. The Review conference will need to
address this.
3.The Middle East
Let us now turn our attention to the Middle-East. The Middle East should be
in the heart and centre of all this nuclear disarmament effort and activity,
because it is particularly vulnerable to nuclear proliferation. The 1995
Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the NPT Review and Extension
Conference recognized the region's special status, as did the Final
Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Insofar as it pertains to the
NPT, particularly its review, implementation and universality, the 1995
Resolution on the Middle East focused on achieving the following clear
objectives:
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The establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.
The accession to the NPT by states in the region that have not yet
done so.
The placement of all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under fullscope IAEA safeguards.
Fifteen years have elapsed since the adoption of the 1995 resolution and
little progress has been made. It is very clear that impetus must be given to
this agenda or the faith of states in the region for the non-proliferation
regime will suffer. The regime cannot afford a loss of faith, and we cannot
afford to lose the regime.
I support the suggestion that the Review Conference should decide to
appoint a Special Coordinator or a standing committee whose role would be
to oversee implementation of the resolution. This will help to build
confidence that this objective - so central to the indefinite extension of the
NPT in 1995 - is being taken seriously.
Such a Coordinator or a standing committee could be tasked with facilitating
a route to constructive dialogue in the framework of the 1995 Middle East
resolution and to begin practical steps to convene an International
Conference in the Middle East under UN auspices to address a zone free of
nuclear weapons in the Middle East with the objective of establishing a
legally-binding, internationally and effectively-verifiable treaty for such a
zone. Although this would just be a start, significant wider beneficial
consequences can be envisaged.
It is important to recall that the 2000 NPT review conference urged all
states not yet party to the treaty, “to accede to the treaty as non nuclear
weapon states promptly and without condition, particularly those states that
operate un-safeguarded nuclear facilities”. The 2000 NPT conference
reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the
placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards
in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the treaty in the M.E.
 Looking forward from here, universality of the NPT is critical to
regional and global security, because states remaining outside the
Treaty fundamentally weaken it by undermining the benefits of
membership for their neighbours and by maintaining nuclear
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programmes that constitute a continuing nuclear danger to their
neighbours and the rest of the world.
 For 2010, the Review Conference should seriously consider
establishing an NPT Universality Adherence Support unit to consult
everyone and address directly the mechanisms that will bring states
outside the treaty into the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.
 The Review Conference should call for the convening by early 2011 of
an international conference to launch negotiations with participation of
all States of the Middle East on an internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
in the Middle East;
 The Review Conference should further request the IAEA to prepare
background documentation for the above-mentioned conference
regarding the modalities for verification of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
in the Middle East, based upon the work previously undertaken by the
Agency relating to the establishment of the zone, and the
implementation of similar international agreements establishing
nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.
4. The Nuclear Zero
For the vision of zero to be credible, the permanent members of the UN
Security Council should take the lead at an early stage both at the
international and regional level including the Middle East. We have recently
seen the link between disarmament and non-proliferation explicitly
acknowledged by several key statesmen in the US and Russia - this is to be
warmly welcomed.
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Success in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends at some
fundamental level on the ability to make a credible and compelling
argument that they are neither necessary nor desirable, that whatever
advantages they confer are outweighed by the costs. It is difficult to sustain
this argument when the large and powerful states that possess nuclear
weapons proclaim that such weapons provide crucial security benefits.
The ideal normative environment for promoting non-proliferation is one in
which nuclear weapons are universally regarded to be illegal, illegitimate,
and immoral. That is, to inhibit nuclear proliferation it is desirable not only
to devalue nuclear weapons but also to delegitimize them.
We must keep the momentum generated by the NPT Review Conference.
We must keep our eyes on the goal - the elimination of nuclear weapons
and the assurance that they will never be produced or used again. This will
require the active negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention, as called for
by the UN General Assembly, and recently endorsed by the UN Secretary
General. This is the logical conclusion to the current campaigns for global
zero, and all states including the ones in the Middle East need to engage
seriously with this project.
Finally, the time has come for serious people from all political perspectives
to engage in thoughtful, transparent negotiations with the clear objectives
of ending potential proliferation and eliminating nuclear weapons, working
towards an agreed target date.
To abolish nuclear weapons, leadership by the United States and Russia is
imperative in this respect. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) also has a
special role that it can play in nuclear disarmament. It is a unique forum
that includes the P-5 plus the non-NPT members. It should immediately
establish an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with
nuclear disarmament at both the international and regional level .
Almost a year ago, in a speech in Prague, the president of the United States
reconfirmed his intention to seek a nuclear-weapons-free world.
In Cairo two months later, President Obama defused the charge of double
standards that has been levelled at the nuclear-weapons states throughout
the 40-year history of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and he said I
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quote: “No nation should pick and choose which nation holds nuclear
weapons”. End of quote.
The Middle East is no exception in this respect. Any Double standards will
only produce instability, noncompliance and encourage those who seek to
challenge the NPT regime itself, and that will only increase the risk of
conflict and nuclear proliferation. It is time to implement the 1995 M.E.
resolution to get out of the present bottleneck.
Thank you
Sameh
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