NPT 2010-2015: The Way Forward
Sameh Aboul-Enein Proliferation Analysis, March 31, 2011
The action plan agreed during the last Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Review Conference in May 2010 strengthened the voice of those who believe that the
NPT is the most effective multilateral path towards global nuclear disarmament. The
ratification of New START, the US-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which
came into effect in February 2011, is another positive development on this path, but
there is still a long and essential road ahead, particularly in the Middle East. Success
at the 2015 Review Conference, and thereby the future of the whole nonproliferation
regime itself, is increasingly contingent on achieving genuine progress on two key
issues: progress by the Nuclear Weapon States toward meeting the commitments they
undertook in 2010; and the clear and credible commitment on the part of
participants—including from the region—to the forthcoming 2012 conference to
establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in
the Middle East. The 2010 NPT Review Conference reconfirmed that without goodfaith progress on these two issues, member states will continue to be increasingly
resistant to calls for tighter restrictions on the transfer and use of nuclear technology
to increase confidence in the nonproliferation regime, or to attempts to strengthen
measures against non-compliance and withdrawal .
Nuclear Disarmament, Verification and Transparency
The nuclear-weapon states committed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to report
on their “undertakings” toward disarmament to the NPT’s Preparatory Committee in
2014. The 2015 Review Conference will then take stock and consider the next steps
for the full and long-overdue implementation of Article VI of the Treaty. The action
plan on disarmament contains benchmarks to measure the implementation of Article
VI, including practical steps over the next five years. In particular, Action 5 calls
upon the nuclear weapon states to “engage with a view toward”
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Rapidly moving towards a reduction in the global stockpile of all nuclear weapons,
regardless of type or location;
Further diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines
and policies; and discussing policies to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and
contributing to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament;
Considering the interests of non-nuclear-weapon states in the disarmament process;
and further enhancing transparency.
These undertakings essentially imply that the subsequent Review Conferences,
beginning in 2015, could potentially work on a roadmap for the gradual, ultimately
total, elimination of nuclear weapons. Those resistant to this idea need to reflect upon
the legal responsibilities of the nuclear weapon states under the nonproliferation
treaty, re-enforced by the Final Documents in 2000 and 2010. In this context, it is
clear that verifying nuclear disarmament will become an important component in
achieving effective disarmament. The nuclear-weapon states should consider ways of
promoting transparency, such as opening their testing sites and weapons facilities to
international inspection. This would not only set a leading example but would also
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serve to build confidence.
Identifying which items, activities and facilities should be monitored is the first step
towards effective and efficient verification. In order to increase transparency and
confidence in a comprehensive verification scheme, nuclear-weapon states should
provide annual declarations to a register maintained by the United Nations. These
could include:
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Total current numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, deployed and in
storage;
Projected arsenal size at next NPT Review Conference;
Fissile material inventories;
Plans to place excess fissile materials under international inspection; and
Plans for the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
Beyond such unilateral transparency measures, efforts by the P-5 to open up, first
attempted in London in September 2009 and to be repeated in Paris later this summer,
need to be accelerated. With the entry into force of the frankly modest New START
in February 2011, the multilateralization of nuclear disarmament talks at an early
stage is critical. Lofty language used in international communiqués and resolutions
surrounding the need to work towards establishing the conditions for nuclear
disarmament is all very well. However, the most important conditions are reduction in
the actual numbers and readiness of the nuclear arsenals themselves and universality
of the NPT. For the nuclear weapon states to justify their continued possession of
nuclear weapons on the basis of their fears of nuclear proliferation underestimates the
threat posed by their own arsenals and the impact these arsenals have as drivers of
onward proliferation.
In any such disarmament efforts, dialogue must be inclusive. As noted by Jonas Gahr
Støre, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “non–nuclear-weapon states
should cooperate with nuclear ones to develop the technologies required for verifying
nuclear disarmament.” This should focus on but not be limited to:
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Developing a generic model for the entire dismantlement process, including all
verification objectives and technologies, and identifying open and inclusive
verification procedures for each dismantlement action;
Identifying inspection points and measurement technologies and
Developing procedures to resolve compliance concerns involving national security.
The UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has a special role in this
respect, as it comprises both the P-5 and the non-NPT states that posses nuclear
weapons. The CD should immediately establish an appropriate subsidiary body to
oversee nuclear disarmament at the international and regional levels, as agreed in the
2010 Review Conference action plan.
A Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons
In his June 2009 speech in Cairo, President Obama stated that “no nation should pick
and choose which nation holds nuclear weapons.” States in the Middle East should be
no exception in this “nuclear zero” campaign. The continued application of double
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standards regarding nuclear haves and have–nots has significantly contributed to
instability in the nonproliferation regime and has encouraged those who seek to
challenge the NPT.
By agreeing to a coherent Middle East plan of action, the 2010 NPT Review
Conference has taken a significant step toward addressing the long-overdue
implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution, which aimed at the eventual
establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass
destruction. Indeed, it became evident at the 2010 Review Conference that its
successful conclusion depended on such an agreement. The stakes have now risen.
Future agreements on nonproliferation initiatives will depend in turn on a
demonstration of good faith in implementing this plan of action.
There are, of course, major security and disarmament challenges that are unique to the
Middle East. Serious engagement by Israel, for example, will be crucial. It is widely
believed that Israel continues to operate the unsafeguarded Dimona plutoniumproduction reactor for the production of weapons grade fissile material, and that its
capabilities may extend to tritium production—activities that cannot be overlooked.
Israel will need at some point to take significant steps in the denuclearization process,
such as dismantling the facilities at Dimona, disclosing information on stocks of
special fissionable material and placing the facilities under IAEA comprehensive
safeguards.
However, the international community remains focused only on the dispute over
Iran’s nuclear program. Whilst Iran cooperates with the IAEA to the extent it believes
is necessary to fulfill its safeguards responsibilities and to demonstrate non-diversion
of declared materials under safeguards, IAEA reports continually refer to resistance
on the part of Iran to address outstanding questions regarding its nuclear program. To
resolve this situation, it is vital that the door of dialogue and diplomacy with Iran
remains open.
The conference on a Middle East Zone of nuclear weapons and other WMD and their
delivery systems provides such a framework for constructive engagement between all
the States of the region, including all members of the League of Arab States, Iran and
Israel. Viewed strategically, the 2012 Conference could advance the broader cause of
peace and security in the region. The process of establishing a WMD-Free Zone in the
Middle East can become a new tool for peace. The sequencing in this process is
delicate, requiring states to both deepen and strengthen efforts towards moving the
peace process forward.
But despite these unique challenges, the Middle East will need to follow a similar
pattern to other regions that have established nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaties
of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba have all involved negotiation of a
treaty text, agreement on verification models with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and an institution-building process. And like all these zone regimes, a
Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone should encourage the use of nuclear science
and technology for peaceful purposes, and enable states to pursue bilateral, regional
and international cooperation on nuclear energy to support their economic, medical
and technological development.
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The IAEA would likely bear most of the verification burden to ensure that no nuclear
materials are diverted to prohibited weapons programs. Its expertise will also be vital
in verifying the complete dismantlement of any weapons stockpiles in the region, and
in ensuring that all facilities producing weapons-grade fissile material in the region
are decommissioned or converted to civilian use under standard international
safeguards. It may also undertake technical studies to examine the modalities
necessary to establish the zone. The agency would need a budget increase to enable it
to carry out such crucial tasks effectively.
In all these efforts, the example of South Africa—the first country to voluntarily
abandon a fully developed nuclear-weapons program—should serve as a model. It
took five years to build the country’s first nuclear device and a total of sixteen years
to construct its six-weapon arsenal. Ending and fully dismantling the program and all
its facilities, however, took less than twenty-four months. South Africa’s decision to
embrace its responsibilities as a non-nuclear-weapon state shows that it is possible in
principle to roll back a nuclear capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented
integrated IAEA safeguards and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is
implementing its guidelines. Past successes in reversing the nuclear tide include, in
addition to South Africa: decisions by Brazil and Argentina to roll back their nuclear
programs and to create a bilateral verification agency; and the decisions by Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine to transfer nuclear weapons to Russia following the breakup
of the Soviet Union. The Middle East needs a similarly bold vision to rid the region of
nuclear weapons and solidly put the region on a non-nuclear course.
The NPT is critical to regional and global security. States remaining outside the
Treaty fundamentally weaken it by undermining the benefits of membership and by
maintaining nuclear programs that constitute a continuing nuclear danger to
neighbors. If an NPT Universality Adherence Support Unit were to be established it
could directly address the mechanisms that would bring outside states into the NPT as
non-nuclear-weapon states. The NPT remains a vital tool for nonproliferation and
disarmament, as demonstrated by its success in securing a commitment to establish a
Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone, an initiative long championed by Egypt.
A lot of work and determination will be required during the next five years to kickstart this process, and the first concrete steps—appointing a facilitator and a host
country to convene the 2012 conference for establishing a zone free of nuclear
weapon and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East—need to be taken
soon. While it may not be easy, establishing a Middle East WMD free zone is vital
not only for the region but for the survival and development of the international
nonproliferation regime as a whole.
Conclusion
Success at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, whilst limited, was only possible
because commitments were entered into in good faith that require a significant shift in
course, most notably progress in disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, and in the
establishment of a process leading to complete WMD disarmament in the Middle
East. If key states were to walk back these commitments, or fail to invest sufficient
energy in realizing them, this will undermine the constructive spirit that the 2010 NPT
Review Conference triggered and could compromise the success of the next NPT
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review cycle.
A more genuine and candid conversation about nuclear disarmament, dismantlement,
nuclear roll-back, transparency and verification is needed. There has not been such an
exchange for many years, and all opportunities that exist to make this happen should
be utilized. Representatives of civil society and academic institutes who can inject
valuable information and perspectives, as well as build bridges between disparate
communities, should be invited to help foster trust and better understanding. The
recent developments in the Middle East should provide additional impetus for all to
be more focused and to move forward to achieve genuine stability and security for the
region.
Editor's Note:
In addition to the challenge Iran’s noncompliance poses to the prospects for a WMD
free zone in the Middle East, it is notable that the IAEA has also requested Syria “to
provide access to the information, material, equipment and locations previously
indicated by the Agency” to resolve questions about its nuclear activities. See IAEA
GOV 2011/8, dated 25 February, 2011.
Dr. Sameh AboulEnein is Deputy Ambassador of Egypt to the United Kingdom and a
visiting lecturer on disarmament at London Academy of Diplomacy. He previously
was Egypt’s alternate representative to the Conference on Disarmament and the UN
Office at Geneva and an expert delegate at the 2005 and 2010 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conferences. He is an alumnus of the American
University and the University of London; this article forms part of his postdoctoral
research at the University of East Anglia. He is contributing these views solely in his
academic and personal capacity.
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