“A Zone Free of Nuclear and other WMD’s in the Middle East
Addressing Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament and NonProliferation”
Ambassador Dr. Sameh Aboul-Enein
NATO Defense Academy
Rome, 25-27 June 2013
Introduction
I would like to thank you for inviting me today to speak
in my personal and academic capacity to reflect some of
my views on how to move forward with the
establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear
weapons and all other WMD’s. I believe that the topic of
nuclear weapon free zones is of utmost importance,
even more so given the transformative changes
underway in the political landscape of the Middle East.
In my brief comments, I intend to address several issues
namely the Arab spring and the changes in the region,
the ME conference and the free zone, the way forward
to address nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
in the Middle East and some concluding remarks.
I. The “Arab Spring” and the Middle East Free Zone

The Arab Spring launched an era of sweeping political changes in the
countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The people's rising
demands for a stronger voice in their own governance have brought new
opportunities for reform and democratic transition giving rise to new
fundamental changes in political rights and civil liberties.

The “Arab Spring” has without a doubt changed existing fundamental
dynamics and has had significant implications on the political and
security settings in the Middle East. While it has undoubtedly affected
the capacity of states to engage constructively on the non-proliferation
and disarmament agenda, in the longer run it could be a positive gamechanger. Public opinion is already playing a much more significant and
prominent role in Arab societies and in this respect, will have a
fundamental role in the formulation of disarmament and security
issues. Arab governments are becoming more accountable to their
people and foreign policy is becoming more in line with domestic
aspirations and a reflection of popular demands. Parliaments, with their
foreign affairs, Arab affairs and National Security committees, are
expected to play an increasing role in foreign policy issues in Egypt, in
which nuclear issues will receive, without a doubt, considerable
attention.
The “Arab Spring” and the Middle East Free Zone (cont.)
 However, the Middle East remains a highly volatile region troubled
with protracted conflicts. The acquisition by states of nuclear
weapons, and WMD's at large, undoubtedly contributes to greater
instability, aggravates tensions, and leads to an accelerated arms
race in the region. It is imperative therefore; that the Middle East
follows other regional examples and completes the implementation
of existing regional nuclear weapon free zones and work actively to
establish such a zone given the exceptional challenges this region
brings to global stability.
II. The Middle East Conference and the Free Zone:
 18 years have elapsed, since the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons Review and Extension Conference adopted a resolution
on the Middle East that called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons
free zone (NWFZ) in the region. The resolution was an integral part of the
fundamental deal around the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and for
many states constitutes the fourth pillar of the NPT Regime, which is one
reason why many states parties feel aggravated with the lack of progress and
the apparent low priority given to the matter prior to 2010. Unfortunately, to
this day no practical ground steps have been taken to implement this
resolution, beyond the appointment of a facilitator.
 The fundamental role of the NPT must be reinforced in order to achieve
nuclear disarmament and re-enforce non-proliferation in the Middle East.
This is why the issue of NPT universality is a pressing issue in the Middle
East. Nuclear disarmament in the Middle East should also take place within
the global efforts made to implement the steps leading to nuclear
disarmament as agreed in the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences.
The Middle East Conference and the Free Zone (cont.):
 In this respect, there is a special responsibility on the Depositary
States that co-sponsored the 1995 Resolution, and the UN
Secretary General, to take visible concrete steps on
implementation of the Resolution and the 2010 Action Plan on
the Middle East. To maintain credibility, the conveners need to
fulfill their commitments and hold the conference without
further delay before the end of this year.
 While limited progress has been made, there is still need for
intensified work in order to finalize the agenda, modalities, and
the rules of procedure. There should be preparation for how the
issues of verification and compliance should be addressed. What
are the mechanisms? Which institutions will be entrusted with
this responsibility? What are the implications for noncompliance? Other issues such as security guarantees, the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear safety/security are
issues that should be prepared as well.
III- The Way Forward to Address Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation in the Middle East:
The efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the
Middle East are not in vacuum. The Middle East Zone is not beginning from
scratch. In fact, there are several building blocks that we can utilize in order to
achieve our common goal of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other
WMD’s in the Middle East.
A. Building Blocks:
1- Other Successful Examples of Regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
• First, in our attempts to provide a framework for a NWFZ in the Middle
East, it would be beneficial then to reflect on the treaties of other regional
nuclear weapon free zones such as the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba,
and Bangkok Treaties. Despite the contextual differences between these
zones and the Middle East, these treaties nevertheless can provide us with
guidance when it comes to formulating the technical, institutional, and
scientific dimensions related to a weapon free zone.
• Taking the Pelindaba Treaty as the latest example we would notice the
following provisions:
The Treaty prohibits the research, development, manufacture,
stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of
nuclear explosive devices in the territory of parties to the Treaty and the
dumping of radioactive wastes in the African zone by Treaty parties.
The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)





The Treaty also prohibits any attack against nuclear installations in
the zone by Treaty parties and requires them to maintain the highest
standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and
equipment, which are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
To allow for the verification of its nuclear non-proliferation
undertaking, the Treaty requires parties to conclude comprehensive
safeguards agreements with the IAEA equivalent to the agreements
required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
A mechanism to verify compliance, such as the African Commission
on Nuclear Energy, has been established by the Treaty.
The African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), in addition
to being a compliance mechanism, will be responsible for encouraging
regional and sub-regional programmes for co-operation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.
The establishment of AFCONE would also: encourage African states to
take responsibility for their natural resources, and in particular
nuclear material; and protect against the dumping of toxic waste.
The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)
2- UN Guidelines for Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
The UN guidelines and principles for the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are
also an important reference that must be thoroughly utilized (UN
Disarmament Commission report of April 30, 1999), some of which are as
follows:
A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear
science and technology for peaceful purposes and could also
promote, if provided for in the treaties establishing such zones,
bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the peaceful
use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic,
scientific and technological development of the States parties.
The nuclear-weapon States are to be consulted during the
negotiations of each treaty and its relevant protocol(s)
establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to facilitate their
signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the
treaty.
The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)
A nuclear weapon free zone will help to strengthen the security
of States that belong to such zones, as well as being an important
disarmament tool that contributes to the primary objective of
strengthening regional peace and security and, by extension,
international peace and security.
 It can also be considered an important regional confidencebuilding measure. The establishment of a nuclear weapon free
zone reaffirms the commitment of the States that belong to such a
zone to honor their legal obligations deriving from other
international instruments in force in the area of nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament to which they are parties.
 The obligations of all the States parties to a treaty establishing a
nuclear weapon free zone should be clearly defined and be legally
binding, and the States parties should fully abide by such
agreements.

The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)
There are also successful examples of regional verification
and cooperation institutions from Europe and Latin
America:
3- Euratom (The European Institutional Experience)
 Furthermore, it could be useful, in our attempt to establish a nuclear
weapon free zone in the Middle East, to explore how the Euroatom
experience could be applicable in the Middle East, particularly when
it comes to the technical dimension. The Euratom was initially
created to coordinate the research programs for the peaceful use of
nuclear energy and pool knowledge, infrastructure, and funding of
nuclear energy. It ensures the security of atomic energy supply within
the framework of a centralized monitoring system and acts in several
areas connected with atomic energy, including research, the drawingup of safety standards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This
experience is worth investigating in more detail and see how it could
be applied in our region.
The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)
4- ABACC (The Argentine/ Brazil Institutional
Experience)
 The ABACC is a regional organization that should be examined to derive
lessons for the Middle East. The Middle East needs a similarly bold vision
to rid the region of nuclear weapons and solidly put the region on a nonnuclear course:




The relationship attained by Brazil and Argentine, in connection with the
signature- in July 1991- of the Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of
Nuclear Energy is in this regard a significant example.
While recognizing the sovereign right of every nation to have access to
nuclear technology for the scientific, technological, economic and social
development of their people, both these countries created their Common
System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC).
The Agreement implied a clear and definite compromise for the use of all the
materials and nuclear facilities submitted to their jurisdictions or control
exclusively for peaceful purposes.
It was within this context that they created the Brazilian Argentine Agency of
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials- ABACC- in order to manage
and apply the SCCC.
The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)
There is also the unprecedented example of a South Africa’s
dismantlement of its Nuclear Programme:
5- South African Example
In all these efforts, the example of South Africa – the first country to voluntarily abandon a fully
developed nuclear-weapons programme – should serve as a standard model for relevant
disarmament and dismantlement. It took five years to build the country’s first nuclear device
and a total of 16 years to construct its six-weapon arsenal. Ending and fully dismantling the
program and all its facilities, however, took less than 24 months.
South Africa proceeded to:
 Dismantle the six completed gun type devices at Armaments Corporation of




South Africa Ltd (ARMSCOR) under controlled and safe conditions;
Melted and recast the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from these six devices as
well as the partially completed seventh device and returned it to the Atomic
Energy Corporation (AEC) for safe keeping;
fully decontaminated ARMSCOR facilities and returned severely contaminated
equipment to the AEC (such as a melting furnace);
Converted the ARMSCOR facilities to conventional weapon and non-weapon
commercial activities; and Destroyed all hardware components of the devices as
well as technical design and manufacturing information;
The Government then joined the NPT, signed the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA and submitted of a full and complete national initial
inventory of nuclear material and facilities, as required by the Safeguards
Agreement; and the first IAEA team came in Nov. 1991.
The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)
6-The IAEA Vienna Forum on Experience of Possible
Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone
(NWFZ) in the Middle East
The IAEA Forum on "Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East" held in Vienna by the IAEA
November of 2011 is useful in this regard as well. Several constructive
proposals, made at the Forum, could be taken into consideration such as:
 Taking stock of the importance of declaratory policy, in particular,
declarations of good intentions, and identifying specific and practical
confidence building measures.
 Issues such as studying the lessons of other regions in terms of the
context that prevailed there before a NWFZ was considered;

As well as reviewing existing, multilaterally agreed principles for
establishing such zones as well as reviewing the theory and practice of
establishing the five existing NWFZs and discussing the experience of
representatives from the five NWFZs in setting up and implementing
such zones and discussing the region of the Middle East in this context.
The Way Forward – Building Blocks (cont.)
7- The NPT Regime and Other International Treaties
On the way to negotiating a Treaty based ME Free Zone, it is important
to address the centrality of the NPT regime which include:
 IAEA safeguards, verification and inspection, to be
implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article
IV of the NPT, and to avoid hampering the economic or
technological development of the Parties or international
co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.
 The role of the CTBT in any future zone would also be of
importance. The commitment by States not to carry out any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion; and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear
explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control is one
of the building blocks for any future zone.
 This is in addition to other international Treaties such as the
CWC and BWC should be looked at with a greater degree of
attention on the way to establishing a ME free zone.
The Way Forward (cont.)
In addition to the building blocks there are also technical provisions that need
to be addressed to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in
the Middle East:
B. Technical Dimensions to the Zone:
The technical dimension of a Free Zone needs to be emphasized at this stage as
well. The following technical provisions of the free zone in the ME should be
addressed:
 Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear weapons






capabilities, facilities, and devices under international verification
mechanisms.
Renouncing nuclear weapons through refraining from conducting indigenous
development and activities related to nuclear weapons.
Prohibiting transit or stationing of any nuclear explosive devices in the zone.
Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone and the role of the CTBTO in
this regard.
Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only.
Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
Establishing the necessary relevant institutions and mechanisms/entities to
uphold such a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD’s and address the
issue of verification to identify the role of the IAEA and other relevant
organizations within such a zone as the OPCW and CTBTO and test bans.
IV. Conclusions:
 To conclude let me sum up by emphasizing a few points:
 A more constructive approach towards engaging with all the countries
of the region is required in order to guarantee their full participation in
the ME Free Zone Conference. I still believe that the ME Free Zone
Conference and the process that follows should be inclusive to allow a
more genuine, candid and necessary interaction about nuclear
disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll-back, transparency,
accountability, and verification. There has not been an interaction for
many years and all opportunities that exist to make this happen should
be utilized.
 The participation in the Middle East Conference should be inclusive.
The conference should include Israel, Iran, and the members of the
League of Arab States, as well as the nuclear weapon states and other
relevant international organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW,
BTWC, CTBTO, UN-ODA and the NPT Chair.
IV. Conclusions (Cont.):
 Achieving a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East will help
achieve the international objective of reaching global nuclear
disarmament. It will help in achieving the international initiative of
“global zero” dedicated to achieving the elimination of nuclear
weapons. The Middle East cannot be an exception in the Global Zero
campaign. In this regard, universal adherence to the Treaty in the
Middle East and subjecting all nuclear facilities in the region to the
IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime is of crucial importance.
 It is in this context, the establishment of a zone can positively
contribute to regional and international non-proliferation and
disarmament efforts as well as improving the overall security
environment in the Middle East. The convening of the conference on
the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other
WMD’s in the Middle East, as soon as possible, is integral to the future
stability of the region. This ME zone conference should launch a
sustained and serious process involving specific concrete steps and
measures to be taken within a specific time frame, and linked to the
successive sessions of the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 Review
Process of the Treaty with a view to convening the conference at the
end of 2013.
IV. Conclusions (Cont.):
 In this effort, and as indicated previously, there are several examples to
be utilized from successful regional zones and institutions such as the
Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC), which implied a clear and definite compromise for
the use of all the materials and nuclear facilities, submitted to their
jurisdictions or control exclusively for peaceful purposes. It was within
this context that it was created, in order to manage and apply a
Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(SCCC).
 In addition to South Africa’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon
state shows that it is possible in principle to roll back a nuclear
capability. Subsequently, South Africa implemented integrated IAEA
safeguards, joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is implementing
its guidelines.
Thank you