Stakeholder Comment Form
ISO Rules Process – Special April 2009
Long Lead Time Energy Dispatches and Directives Rules
Appendix 7 – Payment for Incremental Generation Costs for Long Lead Time Energy Directive and Generator Outage Cancellation and Reporting
Date of Request for Comment:
Period of Consultation:
March 5, 2009
March 5 through April 3 2009
Comments From: _______________
Date: _______________
Contact: _______________
Phone: _______________
E-mail: _______________
G1
Definitions
“long lead time energy” means energy produced by a long lead time generating asset.
� Support
"long lead time energy directive" means a directive issued by the system controller to a pool � Oppose
participant to provide long lead time energy.
� Indifferent
“long lead time generating asset” means a generating asset that:
a) requires more than one hour to synchronize or deliver its energy to the AIES under normal operating
conditions; and
b) is not delivering all of its energy for reasons other than an outage.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
6.3.5.1
Authority to Issue a Long Lead Time Energy Directive
The system controller may, in accordance with this rule 6.3.5, issue a long lead time energy directive to
a pool participant with a long lead time generating asset.
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� Support
� Oppose
� Indifferent
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
6.3.5.2
Requirements and Directives
a) Long lead time energy with respect to a long lead time generating asset must be declared to the ISO
by a pool participant, upon request by the system controller in accordance with ISO Operating
Policies and Procedures.
b) A pool participant whose long lead time generating asset is not synchronized to the AIES must
submit to the ISO the time of day that such asset will be synchronized to the AIES, in order to have
such asset dispatched according to the energy market merit order.
c) A pool participant whose long lead time generating asset is synchronized to the AIES but has long
lead time energy not reflected in its available capability due to asset constraints, must reflect the
availability of such energy by appropriately adjusting the available capability of such asset in order to
have such energy dispatched according to the energy market merit order.
d) The time of day and the adjustment to available capability referenced in rules 6.3.5.2 (b) and 6.3.5.2
(c) must represent the physical condition of the long lead time generating asset as determined by
either the time of the last notice of the long lead time generating asset’s intention to start or the time
of such asset’s last dispatch off, as it relates to the operating constraints submitted to the ISO under
rule 3.5.3.4. The time of day and the adjustment to the available capability must be submitted at least
two hours prior to the beginning of the settlement interval.
e) Subject to subsections 18(1) and 18(2) of the T-Reg, and in accordance with ISO Operating Policies
and Procedures, the system controller may issue a long lead time energy directive to a pool
participant for a specified settlement interval, if the adequacy assessment pursuant to ISO
Operating Policies and Procedure forecasts insufficient supply to meet AIES demand during such
settlement interval. The system controller must cancel the long lead time energy directive once the
adequacy assessment indicates there is sufficient supply to meet AIES demand in subsequent
settlement intervals.
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� Support
� Oppose
� Indifferent
f)
Subject to rule 6.3.5.2 (g), a pool participant that has complied with a directive to provide long lead
time energy and to stop providing long lead time energy may be eligible to receive payment for
incremental generation costs from the ISO in accordance with section 1 of Appendix 7.
g) A pool participant that elects to participate in the energy market prior to receiving a directive, or after
receiving a directive to stop providing long lead time energy and such election results in the directive
being cancelled, is not eligible for payment for incremental generation costs. A pool participant that
has received a long lead time energy directive may change the availability of the long lead time
energy in accordance with rules 6.3.5.2 b), 6.3.5.2 c), and 6.3.5.2 d). In such circumstances, the
system controller must cancel the long lead time energy directive and dispatch the long lead time
generating asset according to the energy market merit order and the pool participant is not eligible
for payment for incremental generation costs in accordance with section 1 of Appendix 7.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
6.3.6.2
Conditions for Dispatch Down Service Dispatch
The system controller must dispatch off operating blocks in the energy market merit order that have
offered eligible DDS when the conditions described in rules 6.3.6.2 a) or 6.3.6.2 b) or in both exist.
a)
With respect to DDS for transmission must-run quantities the conditions are:
i) The system marginal price is less than or equal to the reference price; and
ii) A source asset has been issued a transmission must-run dispatch or directive; and
iii) The sum of the transmission must-run quantity (MW) and the long lead time energy directive
quantity (MW) is greater than constrained down directive quantity (MW) as calculated by the
system controller,
b)
With respect to DDS for a long lead time energy directive the conditions are:
i) The pool participant has received a long lead time energy directive;
ii) The long lead time generating asset is delivering its energy in accordance with such directive;
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� Support
� Oppose
� Indifferent
and
iii) The system marginal price is less than or equal to the highest priced operating block in the
energy market merit order for the current settlement interval.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
6.3.6.3
Determining Dispatch Down Service Dispatch Quantity
a) Subject to rules 6.3.6.2 a) and 6.3.6.2 b), the DDS dispatch quantity (MW) is the lesser of:
i) the transmission must-run quantity (MW) and the long lead time energy directive quantity
(MW) less the constrained down directive quantity (MW). The DDS dispatch quantity (MW)
cannot be less than zero MW.
� Support
� Oppose
� Indifferent
ii) the eligible quantity of DDS offers.
b)
Operating blocks in the energy market merit order that have been dispatched off with respect to
DDS for transmission must-run quantities will be dispatched on by the system controller prior to
dispatching operating blocks that are greater than the reference price.
c)
Operating blocks in the energy market merit order that have been dispatched off with respect to
DDS for a long lead time energy directive will be dispatched on by the system controller following
the dispatch of the highest priced operating block in the energy market merit order for the current
settlement interval.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
8.1.1
Settlement at Pool Price
For each source asset and for each settlement interval the pool participant will receive the amount
calculated by the following formula:
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� Support
� Oppose
Energy payment in $ = ((energy production in MWh) minus (net settlement instruction MWh volumes
in MWh)) multiplied by (pool price in $/MWh)
� Indifferent
where:
“energy production in MWh” is the metered MWh value for generating assets or the interchange MWh
schedule across the interconnection for importing assets.
If the energy production in MWh is less than the net settlement instruction MWh volume then the pool
participant is deemed to have purchased the MWh volume difference from the power pool. The pool
participant must pay to the ISO in respect of electric energy received by it in a settlement interval an
amount equal to the energy payment.
Payment for emergency energy production installed and producing during an emergency transmission
outage outside of an energy market suspension event will be paid based on the energy payment calculation
noted above.
The calculation of payment for emergency energy production installed and producing during an emergency
transmission outage outside of an energy market suspension event will be based on metered energy
submitted to the ISO as per rule 8.3.2 b).
The calculation of payment for energy production as a result of a long lead time energy directive outside
of an energy market suspension event will be based on metered energy submitted to the ISO as per rule
8.3.2 a). If the pool participant’s total variable costs for the energy production are not fully recovered by
rules 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, an additional payment will be paid in accordance with the terms set forth in Appendix
7.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
8.4.2
g)
Final Pool Statement
Long Lead Time Energy Directive Costs
The ISO may charge an ISO fee to recover the costs associated with a long lead time energy directive.
The contribution paid by a pool participant shall be determined by prorating the amount paid to the pool
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� Support
� Oppose
� Indifferent
participant issued the long lead time energy directive over the total energy consumption of each pool
participant during the settlement intervals where the long lead time energy was required. Where the
long lead time energy was subsequently not required, the contribution paid by a pool participant shall be
determined by prorating the amount paid to the pool participant issued the long lead time energy
directive over the total energy consumption of each pool participant during the settlement intervals
where the energy was forecast to be required. The long lead time energy costs will be invoiced with the
pool statement.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
APPENDIX 7 - PAYMENT FOR INCREMENTAL GENERATION COSTS FOR LONG LEAD TIME ENERGY DIRECTIVE
AND GENERATOR OUTAGE CANCELLATION AND REPORTING
1.0
PAYMENT FOR INCREMENTAL GENERATION COSTS FOR LONG LEAD TIME ENERGY DIRECTIVES
1.1
Definitions
“incremental generation costs”, for the purpose of rule 6.3.5 means, where the system controller has issued
� Support
a directive to a pool participant to start and run a long lead time generating asset, reasonable costs
� Oppose
incurred to start and run an asset in response to a long lead time energy directive, and which may
� Indifferent
reasonably be determined to have been avoided but for a long lead time energy directive, including,
without limitation, the following:
(i)
variable STS charges which is the actual cost of all variable charges from Rate Schedule STS of the
ISO Tariff, including the applicable loss factor charge or credit;
(ii)
variable O&M charges;
(iii)
fuel cost to start and run the asset; and
(iv)
other related reasonable costs.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
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1.2
(a)
Payment for Incremental Generation Costs
Payment for incremental generation costs to a pool participant that has complied with a long lead
time energy directive is intended to keep the pool participant whole, to the extent that energy
receipts received as a result of the directive do not recover incremental generation costs.
(b)
In the event a pool participant is eligible for payment for incremental generation costs and does not
recover its incremental generation costs from the hourly revenue received or associated with the
hourly energy production, the ISO may pay an additional amount up to, but not more than, the
incremental generation costs net of such revenue.
� Support
� Oppose
� Indifferent
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
1.3
Financial Settlement
Where a long lead time generating asset has complied with a long lead time energy directive, then:
a)
� Support
within 40 business days after the end of the settlement period in which such directive was issued,
� Oppose
the pool participant must issue to the ISO a statement showing:
� Indifferent
amount owing or owed as calculated in accordance with rules 1.2 and 1.3 of this Appendix 7
along with supporting documentation; and
(i)
(ii)
such other information as the ISO considers appropriate and has requested;
b)
the pool participant must provide to the ISO the supporting data used to determine the amount
specified in any such statement, including all data necessary to confirm the costs, charges and other
items specified in rule 1.2 of this Appendix 7;
c)
settlement in respect of any such statement shall occur on or before 40 business days following
receipt by ISO of the statement and supporting data specified in rules 1.3 a) and 1.3 b) of this
Appendix 7; and
d)
any disputes in respect of any such statement shall be resolved in accordance with rules 8.5 b), 8.5
c), 8.5 d) and 8.5 e), applied mutatis mutandis on the basis that the ISO is the disputing party in
respect of a statement provided by the pool participant pursuant to rule 1.3 a) of this Appendix 7.
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Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
3.
REPORTING
In the event the system controller issues a directive to cancel a generating asset’s scheduled outage or
issues a long lead time energy directive the ISO must prepare a report and post such report on the AESO
website. Such report must include:
a)
an explanation of the circumstances that caused and are related to the cancellation of a scheduled
outage or the issuance of a long lead time energy directive, (e.g., date, duration, quantities (MW)
affected);
b)
chronological events and material market impacts;
c)
d)
reasons for a decision to depart from the prescribed steps set out in rule 5.1.2.2; and
any other matters the ISO deems appropriate.
Reason for Stakeholder Positions:
Alternate Proposal:
Please return this form with your comments by April 3, 2009, to:
Staff
Title
E-mail: XXX
Phone: (403) XXX
Fax: (403) XXX
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� Support
� Oppose
� Indifferent