University of California Berkeley
Center for
Catastrophic Risk Management
University of Colorado at Boulder
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CHALLENGE: Increasing exposure of
obsolete, defective, decayed, brittle,
non-resilient, non-sustainable
critical interdependent
infrastructure systems
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Ecosystem
Delta Critical Legacy Inderdependent
Infrastructure Systems
Levee
Railroad
Road
Water supply pipeline
Gas supply pipeline
Agriculture
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4-Year Project Goal
Develop and validate advanced
Risk Assessment &
Management (RAM) approaches
to help improve the Resilience
and Sustainability of the Delta’s
Critical Interdependent
Infrastructure Systems
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A Multidisciplinary
Economics
Venture
Law
Management
CCRM
Architecture &
City Planning
Public Health
Engineering
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Lessons from 600+ disasters
(research started in 1988)
Natural variabilities &
Model uncertainties
Intrinsic
Human & organizational
performance &
knowledge uncertainties
Extrinsic
>60 %
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‘The Spear’
Blunt
end
Regulators
organizations
Company
Sharp end Management
Operational
operators
Staff
Government
Operators
Actions
Accident
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Uncertainties
Taxonomy
Intrinsic
Inherent
Variability
Type 1
Analytical
Models
Type 2
Factors of Safety
Extrinsic
Human
Performance
Type 3
Information
Development
Type 4
Human Reliability
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Approaches & Strategies
Types 3 & 4 Uncertainties
Dominate Major Failures
Addressed by traditional
reliability & risk analyses
10%
10%
50%
30%
Type I
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
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probability of failure
Time dependent reliability
Type 4 uncertainties dominate
initial & final phases
Time
‘burn-in’ failures
‘service’ failures
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‘wear-out’ failures
Engineered ‘systems’
Operators
Structure
Organizations
Interfaces
Procedures
Hardware
Environments
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RAM Formulation
System ‘S’
Union = ‘or’
Probability of ‘failure’
P (FSi) = P (FSi I  FSi E)
Reliability attribute ‘i’
Intrinsic causes ‘I’
Extrinsic causes ‘E’
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RAM Formulation
Probability of failure due to intrinsic
causes given no extrinsic causes
Probability of failure
due to intrinsic causes
given extrinsic causes
P (FSi)=P(FSiI | E Si) P(E Si) +
P(FSiI | ESi) P(ESi) +
P(FSiE | E Si) P(ESi)
Term included in
traditional reliability
analyses
Probability of failure due to
extrinsic causes given extrinsic
causes
P(E Si)=1-P(ESi)=probability of no Extrinsic Causes
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Robustness
Proper configuration
High ductility
Excess capacity
ULS Capacity - %
100 %
Appropriate correlation
Robust
Ductile
Brittle
Damage or Defect - %
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Organization Performance
• Extensive process auditing
• Risk mitigating reward systems
• Higher quality standards
• Risk perception - early warnings
• Command & control systems
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Command and control systems
• Migrating decision making
• Redundancy - robustness
• Maintaining the ‘bubble’
• Formal rules and procedures
• Selection & training
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Loss or injury = ‘failure’
Probability of
failure
Consequences of
failure
Pf
Cf
Risk
Pf & Cf
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Managing PfiPfi
Concept
Definition
Design
Construction
Maintenance
Decommissioning
Reduce Likelihoods
Present
Future
Reduce Effects
Increase Detection
& Correction
Increase
Margins of Quality
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Cfi
Managing Cfi
Rescue
Repair
Recovery
Rehabilitation
Direct
Immediate
Indirect
On-Site
Off-Site
Delayed
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Employ three complimentary
Approaches
Proactive
knowable
Interactive
unknowable
Reactive
reactionary
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Apply three complimentary
Strategies
Reduce likelihood
of malfunctions
Reduce effects
Increase detection
& correction
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Reliability
Probability of developing
desirable:
Serviceability
Compatability
Safety
Durability
Resilience
Sustainability
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Resilience - time & cost to regain
Functionality
Good resililence
100 %
Functionality
Poor resililence
rehabilitation
rescue
recovery
repair
Time
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Benefits / Costs
Sustainability - Utility
during life cycle
High Sustainability
Initiation
Utility
Operation
Improvement
Decay
Low Sustainability
Time
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Technology Delivery System: TDS
Public
Inputs
TECHNOLOGY
Outputs
Nature
Industrial
Enterprise
Government
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Sacramento Delta Is ‘Choke Point’
for California
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GIS - an essential tool for
visualization and analysis
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Sherman Island Confluence of Critical
Legacy Infrastructure Systems
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Critical Interdependencies
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Power supply
Power demand
• Primary Challenge: Management of Change
• Primary Concern: Security (supply & demand, terrorists)
• Legal concerns - liabilities of research
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