King’s College London
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
This paper is part of an examination of the College counting towards
the award of a degree. Examinations are governed by the College
Regulations under the authority of the Academic Board.
MA/MSc EXAMINATION
7AAN4021
General Philosophy
SUMMER 2013
TIME ALLOWED: THREE HOURS
Candidates should answer THREE questions, from THREE DIFFERENT
sections. Please note that Section E (Logic) is all one question.
Candidates should note that the paper covers two different syllabi and
so they should not worry about the appearance of some questions on
material that they did not cover.
Avoid overlap in your answers.
DO NOT REMOVE THIS PAPER FROM THE EXAMINATION
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2013 © King’s College London
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7AAN4021
Section A: Epistemology
1. Can Nozick solve the Gettier problem?
2. Has the contextualist solved the sceptical puzzle? (If you answer this
question, please discuss the core commitments of the contextualist
view.)
3. Are there any properly basic beliefs (i.e., beliefs that are justified
without deriving their justification from other justified beliefs)?
4. What is the strongest argument for internalism about epistemic
justification? Is it successful?
5. Either Discuss the best response to the skeptical argument from
ignorance (i.e., You don't know that you aren't systematically
deceived. If you do not know that you're not systematically deceived,
you cannot know anything about the external world. Thus, you cannot
know anything about the external world.) OR Explain whether it's
possible to be justified in believing something on the basis of an
inductive inference.
6. Do Quine's arguments show that it is impossible to have a priori
knowledge?
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7AAN4021
Section B: Ethics
7. Why does Mackie believe morality is too 'queer' to believe in? Should
we embrace his error theory?
8. Some critics of consequentialism object to the view on the grounds
that it does not respect the normative separateness of persons. Is
there anything to this objection?
9. Should we embrace the hedonist's theory of well-being? (If you think
that we should, discuss Nozick's experience machine example. If you
think that we should not, critically discuss Mill's proof of the principle
of utility.)
10. Is it ever permissible to violate Kant's categorical imperative?
11. Can we ever be morally responsible for acting in a deterministic
universe?
12. If we assume that the foetus has the right to life, is abortion ever
permissible?
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7AAN4021
Section C: Political Philosophy
13. ‘No man that hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or
otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every
Subject is author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth
another, for the actions committed by himselfe’ (Hobbes, Leviathan,
II: 18). Discuss.
14. ‘But why isn’t mixing what I own with what I don’t own a way of
losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don’t?’ Discuss
this question in relation to Locke’s account of property rights.
15. ‘The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and
protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each
associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still
obey himself alone, and remain as free as before’ (Rousseau, The
Social Contract, I: 4). Does Rousseau succeed in providing the solution?
16. Does Mill offer a clear account of when society is justified in
interfering with an individual’s liberty of action?
17. ‘What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own
grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally
inevitable’ (Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto). Discuss.
18. Critically assess the role of the original position in Rawls’s theory
of justice.
19. ‘Securing and maintaining equality requires violating the rights of
self-ownership’. Does it?
20. ‘At very best the principle of fair play can hope to account for the
political obligations of only a very few citizens in a very few actual
states; it is more likely, however, that it accounts for no such
obligations at all’. Do you agree?
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Section D: Metaphysics
21. In what sense, if at all, is the individuation of material continuants
sortal dependent?
22. How, if at all, should we understand the possibility that a material
object may survive the loss of a part?
23. Are persons essentially persons?
24. Does the necessity of identity provide a good argument against the
physicality of pain?
25. In what sense, if any, are secondary qualities mind-dependent?
26. Is free will compatible with determinism?
27. Can the truth conditions of indicative conditionals be given simply
using material implication?
28. Is there an interesting sense in which, although the past is closed,
the future is open?
29. Does Mackie provide a compelling metaphysical argument against
moral realism?
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