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POLAND, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE EURO:
Poland’s Long Journey to Full European Integration
By
Richard J. Hunter, Jr. *
And
Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V.**
“I am convinced that Poland is ready for a civilisational acceleration, although the
world is being shaken by the economic crisis.” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk
ABSTRACT
This article will discuss the political and economic background behind Poland’s decision
to join the Euro-Zone, perhaps as early as 2012. The article describes important
political events and summarizes key economic data presented at the end of 2008, as well
as providing important “pro and con” arguments surrounding this controversial move.
In addition, the article provides a context to Poland’s “march to Europe,” as it has
moved to full membership in the European Union, including its single currency.
1. Introduction
On January 1, 1999, Europe launched its “grand experiment with a shared
currency” with four purposes in mind: to lower borrowing costs; ease restrictions on
trade and tourism; boost economic growth, development, and foreign direct investment
and; and strengthen the European community. In fact, in the last six years alone, 15
million new jobs have been created by “making trade and travel easier through a single
currency.”1 With the inclusion of Slovakia in the single currency on January 1, 2009,2
328 million of the 500 million people in the European Union will share the single
See Matt Moore & George Frey, “Euro Currency turns 10; seen fulfilling promise,” Aruba News,
citing the Associated Press, December 29, 2008, p. B8. Not all of the news has been positive, however. In
January of 2009, the International Herald Tribune reported that economic sentiment had “plunged to an
all-time low in December.” The European Commission’s business climate index tumbled by -3.17
points—the lowest level reached since records started in 1985. “Economic sentiment plunges in euro
zone,” International Herald Tribune, citing Reuters, at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/08/business/euecon.php (January 8, 2009).
1
For a discussion of the Slovak decision, see “Slovakia hopes euro move brings stability,” at
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/12/31/euro.slovakia/index.html, December 31, 2008.
2
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currency.
When Poland joined the European Union in 2004, it committed itself to adopt the
euro, the currency of the European Union (EU),3 as its national currency at some
“appropriate time” in the future. With the fear that a continued depreciation of the Polish
zloty against the euro might result in “higher loan repayments” than investors had
foreseen, many Poles have found it increasingly difficult to repay euro-denominated
loans with rapidly depreciating Polish currency. A move to adopt the euro was seen as a
remedy for this potential difficulty. Nevertheless, a debate has emerged concerning the
implementation of this strategy.4
In November of 2008, Poland’s government, under the leadership of Prime
Minister Donald Tusk, announced a plan, or what it described as a “roadmap,”5 to adopt
the euro by 2012, although the Prime Minister stated that should adverse circumstances
arise, the plan was open to “discussion.”6 This move, although not altogether
unanticipated, was nonetheless controversial since it would require an amendment to
Poland’s Constitution and would also require the unusual cooperation of Poland’s two
major political parties—now bitter rivals on the Polish political scene.
The current version of Poland’s Constitution7 allows only Poland’s Central Bank
For a general discussion of the euro at its 10th “birthday,” see Joanna Slater & Joellen Perry, “On
Euro’s 10th Birthday, No Music,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2008, p. C1. The authors note: “Even
as some countries are eager to crowd under the euro’s umbrella, the financial crisis and deepening recession
have unleashed the biggest challenge of European currency’s lifetime.”
3
See, e.g., John Czop, “The Euro and Poland’s Security,” The Post Eagle (Clifton, N.J.), December
10, 2008, p. 2. The author notes that this negative may impact adversely on Poland’s ability to guaranty its
national defense in a time of increasing tension with the “former” Soviet Union over United States’ plans to
include Poland in a Western European “nuclear shield.”
4
See “Poland may get referendum on euro,” BBC News, at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk, October 28,
2008. For an outline of Poland’s probable steps towards adoption of the euro, see the Appendix, “The Path
to the Euro.”
5
6
Polish News Bulletin, December 10, 2008, quoting Gazeta, December 9, 2008.
7
Adopted by National Assembly on April 2, 1997; Confirmed by Referendum in October 1997.
Dziennik Ustaw, No. 78, item 483 (1997). According to Section 2 of Article 227, “the organs of the
National Bank of Poland shall be: the President of the National Bank of Poland, the Council for Monetary
Policy as well as the Board of the National Bank of Poland.” The Polish Constitution of 1997 is organized
as follows:








Chapter I - The Republic
Chapter II - The Freedoms, Rights and Obligations of Persons and Citizens
Chapter III - Sources of Law
Chapter IV - The Sejm and the Senate
Chapter V - The President of the Republic of Poland
Chapter VI - The Council of Ministers and Government Administration
Chapter VII - Local Self- Government
Chapter VIII - Courts and Tribunals
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(Narodowy Bank Polski–NBP) to set monetary policy.8 So, any plan to adopt the euro
and scrap the Polish zloty and swap it for the euro9 would require a change in Poland’s
constitution as well as possibly necessitating holding a national referendum on the issue,
although a national referendum is not strictly required to amend the Polish Constitution.
The mechanism of adopting the euro will be fully discussed in Part 4 of this paper.
How did Poland travel down this path towards full participation, not only in
Europe’s political and economic integration, but also in the full integration of Poland’s
monetary system with sixteen nations which have adopted the euro as their medium of
exchange?10
2. Poland’s Accession to the European Union in 2004─A Brief Look Back11





Chapter IX - Organs of State Control and for Defense Of Rights
Chapter X -Public Finances
Chapter XI - Extraordinary Measures
Chapter XII - Amending the Constitution
Chapter XIII - Final and Transitional Provisions
8
For a detailed discussion of the NBP and the role of its former President, Leszek Balcerowicz, see
Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., “A Primer on the National Bank of Poland: A Central
Institution in the Transformation Process,” European Journal of Economics, Finance, and Administrative
Sciences (on line), Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005).
9
Analysts from JP Morgan stated that it expected that the zloty would strengthen against the euro to
2.81 at the end of 2009. The U.S. dollar was expected to weaken to 2.25 zlotys at the end of 2009.
Reported in PAP News Wire, December 11, 2008.
10
It appears that Iceland and Denmark may likewise be reconsidering earlier decisions taken not to
join the euro-zone, which currently consists of sixteen nations. When the euro was initially launched for
“non-cash,” financial transactional purposes in 1999, 11 countries were part of the arrangement: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain. Bank notes and coins were
added on January 1, 2002. The original group has been joined by Cyprus, Greece, Malta, and Slovenia.
With the inclusion of Slovakia on January 1, 2009, the total is now 16. Iceland had rejected calls to join the
European Union itself, on grounds of protecting its “national sovereignty,” fearing that “the bloc’s common
fisheries policy would strip it of control over a vital natural resource. However, in the fall of 2008, Iceland
was forced to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund, as its currency fell by 80 percent against
the euro. As of December 2008, 60 to 70 percent of Icelanders now favored joining the EU. See Carter
Dougherty, “Some Nations That Spurned the Euro Reconsider,” New York Times (on line),
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/02/business/worldbusiness/o2euro.html, December 2, 2008. Denmark
had rejected the common currency in two national referenda—the most recent of which occurred in 2000,
spurred by opposition from the Socialist People’s Party which was concerned about currency speculation
and making the EU’s agricultural policies more environmentally friendly. Id. Current poling data in
Poland indicates a similar 60 to 70% of Poles favoring the adoption of the euro.
For a contextual discussion of the issue of Poland’s accession to the European Union within the
broader range of issues concerning Poland’s economic and political transformation, see Richard J. Hunter,
Jr., Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V. & Robert E. Shapiro, Poland: A Transitional Analysis, pp. 125-145 (2003). This
section of the paper has been adapted from Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., “The Ten Most
Important Economic and Political Events Since the Onset of the Transition in Post-Communist Poland,”
The Polish Review, Vol. LIII(2), pp. 183-216, 203-209 (2008).
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It may seem quite ironic now, but Poland’s “march to Europe” began even before
the process of fundamental political and economic transformation had begun in 1989,
when diplomatic relations were established between Poland and the European Economic
Community in September 1988. In July 1989, the Polish Mission at the European
Community was established in Brussels. In early 1990, Jan Kułakowski was appointed
as Poland’s first ambassador to the European Union, a position he held until June 1996.
The formal process of Poland’s reintegration into Europe began in May 1990, when the
government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki submitted its official application for
the opening of accession negotiations in Brussels. On 16 December 1991, Poland and
the European Economic Community signed the European Treaty, assuring Poland’s
associated country status.12 Poland’s eventual participation in the single currency would
be contingent upon meeting the criteria established in the Maastricht Treaty. These
criteria included targets for inflation, interest rates, government borrowing, and the size
of government debt.
Another important event occurred on 13 December 1993 when the EU summit in
Copenhagen officially agreed to enlarge the membership of the organization and set a
target date of May 2004 for the admission of new member states. The Copenhagen
Summit approved ten new members—the majority of which had been members of the
former Soviet Bloc and the Warsaw Pact. Poland would be the largest and most populous
of the new EU member states—its population nearly one-half of all candidate EU
members. The Minister of Foreign Affairs formally submitted Poland’s application in
April of 1994. Poland’s accession would be assured by the satisfactory achievement of
three requirements:



Sustaining a functioning market economy with the capacity to meet competitive
standards and market forces within the EU community;
Stabilizing foundational political institutions, essentially providing evidence of a
functioning “civil society,” including creating political and social institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for minority and human
rights; and
Demonstrating an ability to assume the obligations of full EU membership,
including those delineated in the acquis communitaire, the body of the EU’s
legislative requirements.13
In August 1996, the Committee for European Integration was established in
Poland. The Committee consisted of a group of Cabinet Ministers who would bear direct
12
The European Treaty took effect on 1 February 1994. It provided for the gradual reduction of
restrictions on trade in industrial goods between Poland and the European Economic Community (later, the
European Union or EU) and for limited liberalization of trade in agriculture — the single issue that would
continue to be the most vexing one in future negotiations between Poland and the EU.
See European Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency,” Copenhagen, June 21-23, 1993,
SN/180/93, p. 13, adapted from “Enlargement,”
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ enlargement/enlargement.htm.
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responsibility for the integration process, with Professor Danuta Hubner of the Warsaw
School of Economics serving as its first chair. In January 1997, the Polish Council of
Ministers adopted the National Integration Strategy, a document that systematized
integration responsibilities and tasks to be completed in the period preceding EU
membership. Later, on 13 December 1997, the EU Summit in Luxembourg officially
invited Poland and several Central European nations—the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Slovenia, as well as Cyprus—to initiate formal membership negotiations.
The road for Poland, however, was not always a smooth one. In fact, negotiations
would be long and difficult. Starting in 1997, the EU Commission began to issue regular
progress reports on candidate nations. The Commission made it clear that progress
would be judged not on the basis of uncertain promises or vague generalizations, but
rather on the basis of “actual decisions taken, legislation actually adopted, international
conventions actually ratified (with due attention being given to implementation), and
measures actually implemented.”
In its 1997 Opinion on Poland’s application for membership, the Commission
concluded: “Poland’s political institutions function properly and are in a condition of
stability…. There are no major problems over respect for fundamental rights. Poland
presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule
of law, human rights and respect for protection of minorities.”14 The Report, however,
noted that there were “certain limitations” on the freedom of the press (mainly, relating to
media ownership questions) and that Poland had to “complete procedures for
compensating those whose property was seized by the Nazis or Communists”—raising
the delicate and difficult issue of reprivatization.15
The Commission’s conclusions regarding Poland may be found in “Agenda 2000, Commission
Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership in the European Union,” Brussels, July 15, 1997. See
also Stefan Wagstyl, John Reed & Christopher Bobinski, “The Long March Towards Union with Europe,”
Financial Times, April 17, 2000, p. I; “Milestones of Transition,” Transition, Vol. 11, No. 1, February
2000, pp. 16, 31, noting “Poland is urged to speed up EU entry process.” The web site for this World Bank
publication is www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/WEB/trans.htm.
14
15
Reprivatization is the process of identifying government-confiscated or nationalized property and
attempting to return it to its rightful owners or to their heirs. Restitution means returning property to
former owners; reprivatization signifies putting state property that had been confiscated from private
owners back into private hands. “Reprivatization can refer to the restoration of property to the original
proprietor; but it also describes transfer of state property (that once was private) to any private party.
Finally, privatization (prywatyzacja) means making state property private.” See Marek Jan Chodakiewicz
& Dan Currell, “Restyytucja: The Problems of Property Restitution in Poland (1939-2001),” in Marek Jan
Chodakiewicz, John Radzilowski & Dariusz Tolczyk, eds., Poland's Transformation: A Work in Progress,
pp.157-193 (2003). Because of the unique history of settlement of Jews in Poland prior to World War II,
at issue may be more than 180,000 properties (among them claims by as many as 35,000 to 40,000 Jews)
confiscated from private owners by the Nazis in occupied Poland (1939-1945) or by the Communist
government (1945-1989). Many of these properties were sold or transferred to private individuals by the
Polish government after the fall of Communism in 1989. Reprivatization is still quite controversial and
remains politically unpopular in Poland. As noted by Joan Griffith, “ After avoiding the issue for more
than 50 years, Poland is now considering claims of people of Polish descent who owned property before
1939.” See Joan Griffith, “Reprivatization: Claiming Family Property in Poland,” at
http://www.polishclaims.com.html, cited in Richard J. Hunter & Leo V. Ryan, "A Field Report on the
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The October 1999 Report of Commission President Romano Prodi, however, was
less than positive for Poland and other Central European applicants. Prodi concluded that
candidates had not “progressed significantly” in adapting legislation, institutions, and
governmental structures to EU criteria. Specifically, the Prodi Report concluded that
while Poland had made significant progress in establishing a market economy and in
attaining institutional political stability, it had not achieved satisfactory progress in
implementing reforms in such areas as curtailing government aid for ailing Polish
industries (especially its dinosaurs or WOGs—the Polish acronym for “Great Economic
Organizations”16), modernizing Poland’s agricultural sector, harmonizing its statutory
framework to the acquis, and expanding its inadequate infrastructure, especially its
backward network of roadways and highways.
As 2001 arrived, Minister Kułakowski, still Poland’s chief negotiator in the
Background and Processes of Privatization in Poland," Global Economy Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1, Article 5,
at: http://www.bepress.com/gej/vol8/iss1/5 (2008). However, there are groups who are opposed to
reprivatization, including those who may have acquired properties from the Polish government “in good
faith,” as a part of a normal business operation, or through a sale or lease, and more problematically, those
who own buildings on land with “questionable titles,” and whose property might have been acquired
illegally and from whom they can trace their own now questionable or defective titles. Compensation has
been the subject of heated, sometime tragically demagogic, debates in the Sejm, in the Polish mass media,
in certain religious circles, and in the Polish legal system. Although numerous legislative proposals had
been introduced in the parliament, none obtained the required majority for passage. In March 2001, the
Parliament finally voted to enact a restitution law, but the law was vetoed by the former President,
Aleksander Kwaśniewski on budgetary grounds. Despite the uncertainty and lack of legislative progress,
the Ministry of the Treasury had assigned nearly $3 billion in funding for reprivatization efforts should a
law eventually pass the Parliament. See also Toby Axelrod, “Polish Holocaust survivors press on with
restitution claims,” at http://www.jta.org.html, April 7, 2004. It is also interesting to note that in October
of 2008, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Poland owed no compensation to ethnic Germans
expelled from its territory in 1945. In rejecting the claims of the group called “The Prussian Trust”
(Preussische Truehand), the Court concluded that claims of inhumane treatment were inadmissible, as
Poland did not have actual and de jure control of its German territory between January and April 1945,
when the forced expulsions took place. The Court also concluded that the Polish Government could not
have breached the European Convention of Human Rights and its core guarantees concerning property
rights as Poland only ratified the treaty in 1994. See “Court Rejects German Compensation Claims Against
Poland,” at www.djnews.plus.com, October 10, 2008.
As an update, in late 2008, Marcin Zamojski reported that the Minister of the Treasury,
Aleksander Grad, declared that a new reprivatization act would be circulated sent in November for an
interdepartmental review and agreement. The Tusk government indicated that it would allocate 6 billion
euro for this target. The act will specify the minimal sum of money that the government will spend for
planned compensations. The Minister underlined that the budget could not afford to spend more for
compensation. Minister Grad explained that the Polish inheritance law will be applied to the planned
reprivatization. A right to make use of this compensation will apply to those who were citizens of Poland
when their properties were nationalized. Such persons must also present suitable applications and provide
evidence that they were the owners of the estates. Applications will be considered first in an administrative
procedure. Then, a list of “proposed compensations” will be prepared. See Marcin Zamojski, “Six billion
euro for reprivatization,” at www.news.Poland.com, September 22, 2008.
See Ramnath Narayaswamy, “Poland: The Reform That Never Was,” Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 16, pp. 778-779 (April 16, 1988), commenting on the relationship of the politicallyconnected WOGS to transformation of the Polish economy.
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government of Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, succinctly reiterated Poland’s objectives in
joining the EU:




Poland aims at a full-fledged membership in the EU, without any kind of secondclass membership;
Poland wants to possess a “healthy economy” within the single European market
and desires to be a “strong state” within the EU;
Poland desires to be an active EU member, contributing to the stability and
development of the region; and
Poland is committed to the “idea of European integration” and to the full
development of the European Union.17
By the time of its 2001 Regular Report, however, the Committee found that
Poland had in fact “fulfilled the political criteria.” The Report continued: “Since that
time [1999], the country has made considerable progress in further consolidating and
deepening the stability of its institutions guaranteeing democracy.”
A further Report, again more favorable to Polish interests, was issued in 2002.18
By the time the 2002 Report was issued, Poland had closed 27 of the negotiation
“chapters” or outstanding issues. Again, while the Report was largely positive, there
were still several negatives. On the negative side, the Report noted, “Corruption remains
a cause for serious concern.” The Report suggested that the focus for the future must
remain on ensuring “a coherent approach to corruption, implementing the legislation and
above all on developing an administrative19 and business culture, which can resist
corruption.”20 However, “Overall, Poland has achieved a high degree of alignment with
the acquis in many areas.” In short, the Report concluded that Poland would be ready for
Remarks of Minister Jan Kułakowski, Brussels, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS),
February 8, 2001, at http://ceps.be/Events/Webnotes/020801.php.
17
Commission on the European Communities, “2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Toward
Accession,” Brussels, October 9, 2002. Poland’s status on the various Chapters was evaluated in three
sections — Progress, Assessment, and Conclusions, pp. 48-134.
18
Part of the reform of the administrative culture involves establishing what are termed “commonly
accepted norms of civil service functioning,” including separation of the public and private sectors;
separation of the political sphere from the bureaucratic one in decision making; assuring individual
responsibility for decision-making; establishing clearly specified rights and duties, job protections,
employment stability, and a pre-determined and specified level of state officials’ salaries; assuring open
and competitive selection of employees; and assuring organizational promotion based on achievement at
work and not on political connections. In short, administrative reforms were designed to assure the
functioning of a civil society in Poland, as opposed to the continuance of the discredited nomenklatura
system. See European Commission, “Report on the European Commission’s Reform,” March 2000,
referenced in “Serving a More Perfect Union,” Polish Voice, No. 34, pp. 15, 17, July 31, 2003. Contrast
this standard to an evaluation of the role of the nomenklatura in pre-transition Poland, a system which had
become a “lunatic collage of incompetence, privilege, pandering and outright corruption.” See Lawrence
Weschler, Solidarity: Poland in the Season of Its Passion, p. 46 (1982).
19
20
“2002 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress Toward Accession,” p. 20.
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entry into the EU in May 2004—but only if Polish voters concurred.
referendum was scheduled for June 2003.
A national
The Agreement
After a final round of intense diplomatic and political summitry, accession
negotiations were completed on 13 December 2002 in Copenhagen when an agreement
was reached on chapters involving Competition Policy, Agriculture, and Finance and
Budget. Contrary to many negative expectations, Poland was able to negotiate final
terms that were favorable both to Poland’s domestic and international positions.21
The negotiating team that Prime Minister Leszek Miller22 had assembled included
“veteran” SLD members, Agriculture Minister Jarosław Kalinowski, Finance Minister
Grzegorz Kołodko, Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, and primary
negotiators, Jan Truszyński and Minister for European Affairs, Professor Danuta Hubner.
Building on nearly fifteen years of history, the group established a three-pronged
strategy: negotiate additional budgetary concessions for Poland in order to meet
anticipated accession costs and to reduce the potential negative effects of accession on
the Polish budget; negotiate a more favorable scheme for Poland’s agricultural sector,
especially in the first years of EU membership; and, on a more practical level, secure
higher milk production quotas and agricultural parity payments.23 Success would be
seen in all three major areas, as well as several others.
Despite spirited opposition from many segments of Polish society—especially
those on the “Polish right—throughout the period of negotiations concerning Polish
accession to the EU, support for Poland’s entry into the EU remained relatively steady, in
the range of 55 percent to 65 percent. At one point, in May 1996, support for the EU
reached an incredible 80 percent. Considering the importance that all post-transition
governments have placed on Polish accession to the EU, one can heartily agree with the
sentiments expressed by European Commission President Romano Prodi, who had
apparently experienced an epiphany concerning Poland’s accession to the EU: “A great,
proud nation is turning the page of a tragic century and freely takes the seat that should
have belonged to it right from the start of the process of European integration.”24
The “final” Polish position is outlined in Malgorzata Kaczorowska, “EU Negotiations: Milking an
Issue,” Warsaw Voice, December 15, 2002, p. 5.
21
22
During the period immediately preceding the Denmark meeting, Prime Minister Miller met with
the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Prime Minister of Denmark, the Chancellor of Germany, the Prime
Ministers of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), the Prime Minister of
Spain, the Prime Minister of Italy, Pope John Paul II, and the Prime Minister of Sweden in an
unprecedented diplomatic effort to secure support for Poland’s EU membership application. These efforts
resulted in significant support for Poland’s efforts to join the EU.
See generally Malgorzata Kaczorowska, “Triumph of the Will,” Polish Voice, December 22-29,
2002, pp. 7-8; Post Eagle (Clifton, N.J.), January 22, 2003, pp. 1, 16.
23
Reported in Breffni O’Rourke, “Poland After EU Vote, Poles Wonder Where They Go From
Here,” at http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/cer_inthepress_2003.html, June 9, 2003. This article also appeared
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Official results from the 7-8 June 2003 national referendum indicated that 77.45
percent of Polish voters approved Poland’s membership in the EU. The turnout was a
surprising 58.85 percent, which was well over the required “50 percent plus 1” threshold
required to make the result legally binding. At the signing of Poland’s accession treaty to
the European Union on 23 July 2003, President Kwaśniewski added: “Who would
imagine that one day, in this room, this same room in which on May 14, 1955, the
Warsaw Pact was created, nearly 50 years later, we would witness Poland’s return to an
undivided Europe.” It may be ironic in a historical sense that Germany’s Foreign
Minister, Joschka Fischer, had become the most forceful advocate for EU enlargement,
noting: “We must allow Poland in the heart of Europe, lest we accept the legacy of Hitler
and Stalin.”25
The government of Prime Minister Leszek Miller formally brought Poland into
the European Union on 1 May 2004—the day before Miller was forced to resign his
position as Prime Minister amidst allegations of scandal and official corruption. The first
Polish elections to the European Parliament were held on 13 June 2004. After more than
four decades of isolation from its Western European roots, Polish membership in both
NATO and the EU had finally begun to erase the tragedy and betrayal of Yalta and
Potsdam and the legacy of a system that Stalin himself had reportedly once remarked
“fits Poland like a saddle fits a cow.”26
3. The Political Context
Despite a general consensus about Poland’s membership in the EU, there is a
major split today in Poland over the adoption of the euro that cuts across deep partisan
lines. Fundamental differences exist as a result of the parliamentary elections which took
place in 2005, and those that occurred two years later, on 21 October 2007. A brief
overview is in order to provide the proper political context.
Polish Electoral Politics27
The parliamentary elections of 2005 had resulted in an overwhelming victory for
two parties of the centre-right, the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) and the liberalconservative Citizens Platform (PO), and an overwhelming defeat for Poland’s poston the website of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
25
See “Kwaśniewski Ratifies Poland’s EU Vote,” Polonia Today, August 2003, p. 12.
26
Quoted in D.S. Mason, Revolution in East Central Europe, p. 40 (1992). For an interesting
contemporary discussion of the decisions taken at Yalta, see H. W. Brands, Traitor to His Class, pp. 800803 (2008).
Adapted from Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., “An Update on the Polish Economy:
Meeting the Criteria for a ‘Normal Country,’” European Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 375381 (2008).
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communist left.
The center-left government of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) was
soundly defeated. PiS and PO combined won 288 out of the 460 seats, while the SLD
retained only 55 seats of the 216 seats they had won in the 2001 parliamentary elections.
In the 2005 elections, PiS won 155 seats while PO won 133. The outgoing Prime
Minister, Marek Bełka, lost his own seat in the Sejm.
In the Senate, PiS won 49 seats and PO 34 of the 100 seats, leaving eight other
parties with the remaining 17 seats. Amazingly, the SLD totally collapsed as an
independent functioning political grouping and won no seats in the Senate, after having
held 75 seats in the previous body.
PiS and PO were two center-right political parties that were strongly rooted in the
anti-Communist Solidarity trade union movement.28 However, they differed on issues
such as budget and taxation matters. The PiS agenda was generally considered more
“populist” and included tax breaks and continued state aid for the poor. The PiS pledged
to uphold traditional family and Christian values. Many in the PiS leadership voiced
skepticism of economic liberalism and of the leadership of Leszek Balcerowicz at the
National Bank of Poland. PO was considered as more “business friendly” and promoted
the ideals of a “free market.” It supported a flat 15% rate for income, corporation, and
VAT taxes. PO also promised to move faster on deregulation of Polish industries, and to
foster and hasten privatization and the adoption of the euro, at the earliest possible date.29
Despite a popular belief that these two parties would govern Poland in a coalition,
post-election negotiations between PiS and PO concerning the formation of a new
government collapsed in late October, precipitated by political disagreements regarding
who would become speaker of the Sejm and over the assignment of major ministerial
posts in the new government. On 1 November, PiS abandoned coalition talks with PO
and instead announced it would act to create a minority government headed by Kazimierz
Marcinkiewicz as the new Prime Minister. The delicate negotiations between PO and PiS
were further impacted by the 9 October presidential election, in which the PiS standard
bearer, Lech Kaczyński, the twin brother of the PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, defeated
Donald Tusk, the candidate of the PO.
A minority (coalition) government formed by PiS would be in fact dependent on
the support of the radical Samoobrona [Self Defense] and the ultra-conservative League
of Polish Families [Liga Polskich Rodzin, or LPR] in order to govern. On 5 May, PiS
formed a coalition government with Samoobrona and LPR. However, the political scene
remained fraught with petty disagreements, reports of corruption, and general weariness
See Federico Bordonaro, “Poland’s Rightward Turn and the Significance for Europe,” Power and
Internet News, at www.pin.com/report, January 23, 2008.
28
29
At the time of the 2007 elections, most observers placed the adoption of the euro to be in the year
2012, at the earliest. This prediction seems to have been accurate.
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on the part of the population with the conduct of some of the major players on the Polish
political scene.
After more than a year of continued stalemate and further internal squabbling
among coalition partners, Marcinkiewicz resigned (or was forced out) as Prime Minister
in July of 2006, following reports of a rift with PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński.
Jarosław Kaczyński subsequently formed a new government and was sworn in as Prime
Minister on 14 July 2006—despite having earlier declared that he would not be a
candidate should his brother win the Presidency.30 Poland was now “governed by the
twins!” The government of Jarosław Kaczyński itself lasted a little more than fifteen
months, beset by scandal, charges of obsession with purging ex-Communists from public
life, vetting or lustration,31 squabbling, frequent embarrassment, and political infighting
verging on internecine warfare with its coalition partners. After the coalition collapsed,
early parliamentary elections were scheduled for the fall of 2007. At the conclusion of
the 2007 parliamentary campaign, then candidate Tusk signed what have been called the
“Ten Commitments” that PO pledged to fulfill during its parliamentary term. These
commitments included promises to accelerate Poland’s economic growth, to increase
wages in the public sector, to increase pensions and social benefits, to develop the
country’s network of highways, to raise the quality of education and improve access to
the Internet, and to reform Poland’s healthcare system. Tusk also promised to introduce a
flat income tax, to abolish over 200 “administrative fees,” to speed up the construction of
stadiums required for “Euro 2112” (the European soccer championships), to encourage
Polish émigrés to return home to invest in Poland,32 to conclude Poland’s mission in Iraq,
and to take on a “real fight against corruption.”
The elections of October 2007 resulted in a decisive victory for PO and the
formation of a coalition government between the victorious PO33 with 209 seats and the
Radoslaw Markowski, “The Polish elections of 2005: Pure chaos or a restructuring of the party
system?” West European Politics, Vol. 29(4), pp. 814-832 (2006).
30
31
According to the Polish Lustration Act, all candidates to the Sejm, Senate or nominees for
government posts were to announce whether they collaborated with secret services of the communist
regime of Poland. The declaration would then be printed on all official lists of candidates.
32
According to the Polish Information and Investment Agency (PAIiIZ), foreign direct investment
(FDI) will fall to zl.37-5-45 billion in 2008 from zl.62.1 in 2007. This reduction is seen as a result of the
global economic downturn and may result in an increase of investment in service-based industries and a
decrease in production-based investment. Similarly, the Financial Times predicts a drop in FDI from $18
billion to $14 billion in 2009. Thus, a major effort must be maintained to increase non-FDI finance in the
Polish financial market. Stefan Wagstyl, “Government pins hopes on consumers,” Financial Times,
December 9, 2008, p. 3. The website of the Polish Information and Investment Agency may be accessed at
www.paiz.gov.pl.
33
Much of the information concerning Polish political configurations has been adapted from the
individual political party websites. Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) wishes to be known as a
party in the traditions of a Western European Christian-Democratic Party. In Poland, PO operates as a
hybrid “liberal-conservative” political party, combining traditional liberal—essentially free market—
stances on economic issues with traditional, conservative stances on many social and ethical issues,
including continued opposition to abortion and gay marriage, euthanasia, and fetal stem cell research.
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Polish Peasants’ Party [Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, or PSL] with 31 seats. PO itself
took 41.39 percent of the vote (adding 76 seats to its 2005 total) to 32.16 percent for
PiS,34 13.2 percent for the Left and Democrats [Lewica i Demokraci, or LiD],35 and 8.93
percent for the PSL.
As a result of the elections, a coalition of PO (with 209 seats) and PSL (with 31
seats) formed a government with a working majority in the Sejm. Failing to meet the
legally required electoral threshold of five percent were two former PiS coalition
partners: Andrzej Lepper’s populist Samoobrona (1.54 percent) and Roman Giertych’s
nationalist and ultra-Catholic League of Polish Families (LPR) (1.3 percent).
Surprisingly, election turnout was 53.79 percent—the highest percentage of voters in the
last six parliamentary elections. In the Senate, PO holds 60 seats and PIS 39, with one
seat being occupied by an independent.
The new government, under the stewardship of PO, was headed by Donald
Tusk,36 who two years earlier had been defeated in his run for the Polish presidency, then
gathering 46 percent of the vote in losing to Polish President Lech Kaczyński.37 The
While the new government may in fact be as conservative as the prior one, many Polish voters (especially
younger voters and those who reside in Warsaw and Krakow) hoped that the PO would at least be more
tolerant of opposition views. Prime Minister Tusk’s government was officially appointed by President
Kaczynski and sworn in On November 16, 2007. For a discussion of the platform and performance of the
PO, see Adam Zdrodowski, “A contentious anniversary,” Warsaw Business Journal, November 17-23,
2008, pp. 8-9.
34
Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) was established in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins,
Lech, the current President of Poland, and Jaroslaw, the former Prime Minister. Many PiS members were
once closely associated with the now defunct Solidarity Electoral Alliance which operated in the 1990s or
with the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, under the leadership of the volatile and controversial
Leszek Moczulski.
35
Left and Democrats (Lewica i Demokraci) (LiD) is a center-left political coalition in Poland
formed by an electoral alliance of political parties in order to compete in the 2007 parliamentary elections.
These included:




Democratic Left Alliance (SLD);
Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL);
Labour Union (UP); and
Democratic Party (PD).
During the 2007 parliamentary elections, the LiD was headed by former President Aleksander
Kwaśniewski who announced his “retirement from Polish politics” soon after the disappointing election
results were known.
36
For an informative biography of Donald Tusk, outlining his long career as a Solidarity and
oppositionist activist, co-founder of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), Deputy Senate Speaker, and
since 2001, leader of the PO, see Witold Zygulski, “New Government, Old Conflicts,” Warsaw Voice,
November 25, 2007, pp. 6-7.
The Economist reported that “Since he won power a year ago, Poland’s Prime Minister, Donald
Tusk, has seemed less interested in ruling the country than in preparing for the presidential election in
2010.” “The tough go politicking,” The Economist, December 6, 2008, p. 68.
37
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government was comprised of some of the most notable figures in Polish politics:
Radosław (Radek) Sikorski as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jacek Rostowski as Minister
of Finance, Zbigniew Ćwiakalski as Minister of Justice, and Bogdan Klich as Minister of
Defense. Waldemar Pawlak, long-time head of the PSL, serves as Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of the Economy, and Grzegorz Schetyna serves as Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration.38
Sławomir Majman, political columnist for the Warsaw Voice, insightfully
commented on the importance of the fall 2007 Parliamentary elections, noting:





Poland will be “no more and no less” conservative than before the elections—
“only the type and quality of conservatism will change”;
Poland has opted for strong and powerful parliamentary government;
Poland effectively issued a “red card” to PiS, the winners of the previous election
and the party of Poland’s President Lech Kaczyński;
PiS will be a powerful voice of opposition in Polish political life; and
Poland is essentially a “normal country”—“Poland is a peaceful and stable
democracy which can cope very well with its own problems.”39
Financial Times columnists Jan Cienski and Stefan Wagstyl note rather incisively
that since 2007, the “confrontation between the two [Kaczynski and Tusk] is, in many
ways a fight between two visions of Poland.” President Kaczynski represents the more
traditional values of a “conservative, rural and Catholic country,” while Prime Minister
Tusk has “become the standard bearer of a younger, more outward looking Poland….
Many have acquired diplomas, often from the numerous private universities, and have
migrated from smaller villages to larger cities or abroad.”40 This dichotomy has played
out in both support and opposition to the adoption of the euro.
4. The Constitutional Case
What many Poles—especially members of the opposition Law and Justice Party
conveniently forget—is that Poland, by joining the EU, has already committed itself to
join the euro. The conundrum exists as to the mechanism and timing.41
Poland’s Constitution—most especially Article 227—directs that the National
38
For a complete listing of government Ministers in the initial cabinet, see www.premier.gov.pl (last
visited January 10, 2009).
39
Slawomir Majman, “The Night After,” Polish Voice, October 28-November 4, 2007, p. 24.
Jan Cienski & Stefan Wagstyl, “A tough task ahead for Mr. Tusk,” Financial Times (Poland),
December 9, 2008, pp. 1-2.
40
Adapted from Paul Foga, “Euro = Constitutional Amendment,” Warsaw Business Journal,
November 17-23, 2008, p. 8.
41
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Bank of Poland shall have the “exclusive right to issue money” and to “implement
monetary policy.” At present, Poland is what is termed, an “honorary” member of the
European System of Central Banks. As such, Poland remains free to set its own
monetary policy—at least for the time being. However, as a condition of entering the
EU, Poland committed itself to satisfying a set of fiscal and microeconomic criteria (The
Maastricht Criteria) set by the European Central Bank. These included:



Maintaining an inflation rate of no more than 2.3 percent;
Maintaining a budget deficit at or below three percent of GDP;42 and
Maintaining the level of Polish government debt at no more than 60 percent of
GDP.43
At the end of 2007, data indicated that Poland concluded 2007 with an annual
inflation rate of 3.5 percent and a budget deficit just below 3 percent, marking a
significant improvement from 2005 when Poland’s budget deficit was six percent.
According to current planning, at least two years prior to joining the euro-zone,
Poland is required to join the exchange rate mechanism called ERM II44 for at least two
years before formal adoption of the euro, during which time the fluctuation in the value
of the zloty to the euro may not exceed five percent.
According to Article 235 of the Polish Constitution, amendments may be
proposed by the President, or at least twenty percent of the members of the Polish
Parliament or Sejm or of the Polish Senate (Senat). Thus, in order to adopt the euro an
amendment to the Polish Constitution, once proposed, must be approved by a two-thirds
majority of the Sejm, following which the Senate must approve the amendment by an
absolute majority of Senators. In both cases, at least half of the members of both bodies
are required to vote. Once the Sejm and the Senate have adopted an amendment, the
proposed amendment would be submitted to President Kaczynski for his signature.
According to the Constitution, “the President of the Republic shall sign the statute within
21 days of its submission and order its promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the
Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw).”
42
The Tusk government has forecasted a budget deficit of 2.5 percent for 2008.
The European Commission forecasted that Poland’s gross debt is expected to decrease, falling
from 44.9 percent of GDP in 2007 to 43 percent of GDP in 2010. For an insightful evaluation of the ability
of several of the “ex-communist states” to meet the challenges of the Maastricht Criteria, as well as a
critique of these criteria as both “arbitrary,” and “harsh,” see the Economist (on line), “Time to change the
rules,” at http://www.economist.com/opinion, December 18, 2008.
43
44
On 31 December 1998, the ECU exchanges rates of the Euro-zone countries were frozen and the
value of the euro, which then superseded the ECU at par, was thus established. In 1999, ERM II replaced
the original ERM. Thompson Financial News reported that “Poland must enter the pre-euro exchange rate
mechanism ERM-2 at latest in the second quarter of 2009 to be ready in 2011 to adopt the common
currency….” Dagmar Leszkowicz, “Update 1- Poland c.banker sees ERM-2 at latest in Q2 2009,” at
www.forbes.com, September 25, 2008.
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Interestingly, a national referendum may be called by the President, the Sejm, or
the Senate within a 45 day period following approval of the proposed amendment by the
Senate. However, such a referendum is not required to amend Poland’s Constitution.
The issue, thus, is not one of law, but rather one of politics.
5. Arguments on Euro Participation: An Update on the Polish Economy and an Analysis
of the “Pro” and “Con” Divide
The Economic Backdrop
As 2008 comes to a conclusion, several important economic factors have come to
the forefront that might impact on Poland’s decision to fully implement its commitment
and adopt the euro. Several weeks after President Kaczynski agreed in principle that
Poland would join the Eurozone by 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB) came to an
agreement with Poland. The ECB would give Poland a 10 billion euro credit line,
described as a currency swap agreement, to prevent the further depreciation of the zloty.
By December of 2008, the zloty seemed to have stabilized.45
Why has Poland maintained its status as one of the leading transition economies,
presumably ready to adopt the euro as its official medium of exchange? Witold Orlowski
observed that one of the main drivers of Poland’s successful transition has been its
continued ability to attract foreign direct investment. Professor Orlowski notes that the
“investment attractiveness” of Poland has been based on the interplay of four solid
fundamentals: high labor productivity, moderate labor costs, safety of investments, and
good location.46 According to a report issued by the World Bank, Poland is described as
“having a robust financial system, a relatively sound banking system, and an overall
external debt which is relatively moderate compared to more vulnerable countries.”47
While current indicators do predict a slowdown in the Polish economy—perhaps
dropping the growth rate in Poland’s GDP from 5.5 percent to the range of 2.8-3.0
percent in 200948—most observers, however, predict that Poland will be able to avoid a
Reported by Stefan Wagstyl, “Lending fears may freeze the system,” Financial Times (Poland),
December 9, 2008, p. 6.
45
See Witold Orlowski, “Better placed than neighbors,” Financial Times (Poland), December 9,
2008, p. 6. Mr. Orlowski is the Director of the Warsaw University of Technology [WUT] Business School
and serves as an economic adviser to PwC in Poland.
46
World Bank, EU10 Regular Economic Report, reported in Anna Olejarczyk, “Fundamentally
sound,” Warsaw Business Journal, November 3-9, 2009, p. 3.
47
The European Commission has chimed in with its predictions for Poland’s GDP growth, asserting
that “Domestic demand will continue to be the main driving force of GDP growth, which is expected to fall
to 3.8 percent in 2009 and 4.2 percent in 2010.” See European Commission, Economic Forecast Autumn
2008, reported in E. Blake Berry, “An island of relative calm,” Warsaw Business Journal, November 1016, 2008, p. 5. For a discussion of Poland’s economic prospects in 2009, see Economist Intelligence Unit,
“The World in 2009” (Poland), January 2009, p. 115. The Economist predicts GDP growth of 3.8%; an
48
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serious recession in 2009 and 2010, continuing the “remarkable recession-free run that
began in 1992.”49 However, several potential negative factors loom on the horizon:
turbulence and uncertainty in foreign exchange, a negative credit outlook for the Polish
banking system that might result in an increase in credit costs by 2-3 percentage points, a
property slump, falling government revenues, and a slowdown in the export-oriented car
sector. On the positive side, Prime Minister Tusk was successful in enacting several bills
through parliament which were aimed at reducing bureaucracy and reforming what most
observers noted was a “dysfunctional pension system.”50 In addition, according to
official government estimates, the Polish economy “will expand in the first year of
membership in the euro zone by 0.23-0.58 percentage point, while in the fifth year—by
0.42-1.65 percentage points.”51
The Euro Debate: Economic and Monetary “Pros” and “Cons”
There are varied opinions on the issue of whether Poland’s economy is actually
prepared for adoption of the euro. Professor Janusz Bilski of the University of Lodz has
summarized some of the main arguments against the adoption of the euro.52 These
include:



A worldwide financial crisis and a recession will stop economic growth
for the next two to three years, ushering in a period of “soft economic
nationalism” at the expense of “mechanisms and regulations of monetary
unions.”
It is unrealistic to impose severe restrictions on the Polish economy amid
the crisis. The next two to three year period (2009-2011) may be the
“worst possible timing for the euro adoption since the moment of creating
the euro zone.” Only a monetary policy run by Polish national authorities
can effectively protect Poland’s poor and its pensioners against economic
recession in an environment in which the unemployment rate could once
again rise from 7.8% in 2008 to 9.9% in 2009.
The decision of “fast euro adoption” will add an external burden on
inflation rate of 3.8%; and a GDP per capita of $14,640—in PPP, $18,980.
49
Cienski & Wagstyl, supra note 40, at 1.
50
The Associated Press reported that Polish lawmakers had overturned a veto by President
Kaczynski of a bill that would reduce sharply the numbers eligible for early retirement to around 240,000
from more than one million. The new law removes the right to an early retirement from about 750,000
workers. Generous provisions for early retirements were seen as a vestige of the communist, “full
employment,” era. See Associated Press, “Polish parliament overturns a presidential veto, passes law
cutting early retirement,” at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-ap-eu-poland-early-retirement,
December 22, 2008.
“Has Poland Chosen Worst Timing Even for Euro Adoption?” Polish News Bulletin (on line),
December 12, 2008, citing Rzeczpospolita, December 11, 2008, p. B12.
51
52
Arguments for and against the adoption of the euro have been adapted and extrapolated from id.
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

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economic policy “exactly at a time when it should be as flexible as
possible.”
The adoption of the European Central Bank’s interest rate may hurt the
Polish economy. In contrast to an emerging trend, “the government’s aim
seems to be to keep fiscal policy tight so that the central bank can cut
interest rates.”53
Restrictions adopted by many countries against worker migration and the
provision of services by Poles may distort the effect of any adjustment
mechanisms adopted by the EU.
On the other side of the equation, Professor Bilski notes some potential positive
benefits from the adoption of the euro. These include:



Adoption of the euro might be a spur to Poland’s attempt to reform its
public finance system and in its efforts to tame or control inflation.
The decision to adopt the euro “may be [one] of the country’s most vital
decisions in the next decade as it is likely to ensure good conditions for
stronger economic growth.”
For the Polish economy—which Professor Bilski terms as a “peripheral
economy—the adoption of the euro will be beneficial if it is a part of a
plan “ensuring better implementation of [Poland’s] strategic economic
goals.”
In addition, the World Bank has noted that the Polish plan to adopt the euro in
2012 is an important step in the further development of Poland’s financial environment.
According to Thomas Laurson, country manager at the World Bank for Poland and the
Baltic States, “Poland is really the only country now in the region that has a firm and, at
least as far as possible, a credible plan for adopting the euro.”54
6. Some Tentative Conclusions
Both proponents and opponents of euro adoption agree that the decision to join
the Euro-Zone will have lasting implications for the Polish economy, and by implication,
for Polish society. Poland’s economy, while generally robust and growing, albeit at
reduced growth rates, is still not fully developed. Poland has many microeconomic
economic issues to tackle within the context of maintaining reasonable economic growth,
so as to create a climate in which it can face and meet the expected competition from
some of the world’s leading economies. Even an opponent of euro adoption, Professor
Jan Bilski, is most aware of the core importance of speedy euro adoption.55 In sum, the
arguments boil down to a fundamental disagreement whether the adoption of the euro
53
“The tough go politicking,” supra note 37.
54
Anna Olejarczyk, supra note 47.
55
Rzeczpospolita, supra note 51.
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will amount to a “risky economic experiment” that will lead Poland into a prolonged
recession in which the European Central Bank’s interest rates might hurt the Polish
economy. It thus appears to all that an important interim step will be Poland’s joining the
ERM-2 during which it must stabilize the zloty-to-euro exchange rate and create suitable
adjustment mechanisms. Rzeczpospolita reports that in contemplation of this event,
“Narrowed margins for currency rate volatility are likely to lay new ground for Polish
economy functioning and it should be carefully monitored how the market reacts to
asymmetric shocks as well as what are the cost of their absorption.”56
It appears to many observers that the decision to adopt the euro has now been
made. Questions remain are how and when. Both opponents and proponents agree that
the adoption of the euro will impose some restrictions on the ability of the National Bank
of Poland to direct Poland’s monetary policy. The real question is when Poland should
take this dramatic step. Given the competing viewpoints, the position of the Prime
Minister may, in fact, be most correct: “The main obstacle to the carrying out of the plan
[to adopt the euro by 2012] according to Donald Tusk, may be the lack of political
consensus rather than the condition of Poland’s economy, which is fairly stable.”57
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APPENDIX
“The Path to the Euro”
STAGE 1:
Oct.-Dec. 2008:
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Finance Ministry and the central bank make preliminary preparations for
negotiating Poland’s entry in the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM-2)
Nov. 2008:
Appointment of government official to coordinate euro adoption process and
inter-institutional working groups
Dec. 2008:
Publication of central bank’s report on Poland’s euro zone membership
Q 1 2009:
Starting procedures to change Poland’s Constitution
2009:
Finance Ministry and central bank hold negotiations with EU institutions on
Poland’s ERM-2 entry
STAGE 2:
2009:
Poland to join ERM-2
2009:
Start of the public information campaign on the euro
2009:
Decision on symbols for Poland’s euro coins
2010:
Preparing legal acts for euro adoption
May-June 2011:
Poland’s procedures evaluated by various EU institutions
Mid-2011:
Ecofin (The Economic and Financial Affairs Council) decision to lift Poland’s
derogation clause (permitting Poland to suspend certain rights in narrowly determined
situations, particularly situations involving a public emergency)
Mid-2011:
Ecofin decision concerning setting the irrevocable conversion rate of the euro to
the zloty
STAGE 3:
By end of 2011:
Production of euro coins
After conversion rate set:
Start of dual display of prices and monitoring of price practices in the retail and
banking sectors
Dec. 2011:
Sales of “starter kits” to small companies and “mini kits” to citizens
Dec. 2011:
Preparation of cash machines and payment terminals to switch to the euro
Quarter 4 2011:
Final stage of IT and accounting systems convergence to the euro
June 24-26, 2009
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Quarter 4 2011:
Information and media campaign about practical aspects of euro adoption
STAGE 4:
Jan. 1, 2012:
Poland joins the euro zone. Euro notes and coins enter into public circulation
TBD:
Dual circulation period
After the dual circulation period:
Zloty stripped of official currency status—euro becomes the only official
currency in Poland
TBD:
Free zloty-to-euro exchange at banks
SOURCE: “Poland unveils plan to adopt euro as its currency by 2012,” Irish Times, as
reported by Reuters, October 29, 2008, at
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2008/1029/12251972731198.html.
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