Power and Democracy in the
Nordic Countries
Jørgen Goul Andersen
Aalborg University
Keynote Speech at the Opening of the Project
Power and Society in Finland
Säätytalo, Helsinki, 8 March 2007
The Nordic democracies always described as more
close to democratic ideals than other countries:
• Strong representative democracies resting on a solid popular base
• Strong governments resting on a belief in The Possibility of Politics
(Ringen, 2006).
• Strong mass based parties and people's movements leading to high
and equally distributed political participation.
• Supported by high economic equality ensured by solidary wage
policies and redistribution via the tax/benefit system.
• Low levels of poverty. High levels of gender equality.
• Relatively strong regulation of business to make it comply with
social goals.
• High political literacy, engagement and participation in elections.
• Trust in politicians who are uncorrupt and democratically
accountable.
• And rich economies with a high capacity to secure the welfare of the
citizens.
At least by comparative standards, the
Nordic democracies remain quite healthy
• This is well-documented for Norway, Sweden and
Denmark. We know less about Finland and look forward
to the results generated by this big research programme
in the next four years. But from what we already know,
we would be surprised if this overall conclusion was not
largely supported in Finland as well.
Troubling observations and
challenges
• troubling observations in most countries:
- Declining party membership, declining electoral
participation and declining political trust
- Weakening of voluntary associations
- Concentration of economic wealth and power.
• a number of challenges:
- Internationalisation: Economic globalisation/
European integration
- Changes in decision making structures
- Immigration and multiculturalism
- Individualisation
- Decline of class-based politics.
• These worries and these challenges have been among the main
arguments for mapping the power relations in society and for
assessing the state of democracy in the last generation of the Nordic
power and democracy studies, including the current Finnish one.
Among the members of the ad hoc Committee of the Danish
Parliament which initiated the Danish power project, there clearly
was a feeling of losing power, and more generally, there is a feeling
that there are increasing threats to the democratic idyll in the Nordic
countries.
• In the following, I shall try - however incompletely - to summarize a
little bit of the evidence from the previous studies. I shall also reflect
a little bit about which new subjects were added by the different
generations of power projects. Finally, I shall also comment a little
bit on methodology. As some of you might know, the latest round of
Danish and Norwegian projects were carried out at exactly the same
time but reached quite different conclusions
• To begin with the main subjects, concepts and theories
of the power projects, there are some marked
differences, but also a lot of cumulativeness between the
Nordic power studies.
• It all began with the Norwegian study 1972-1980 which
was really impressive in its conceptual achievements,
guided not least by organisation theory - but perhaps
slightly less impressive in its empirical findings. They
described the corporatism of the Norwegian society, they
launched new concepts and analyses of the negotiated
economy, segmentation and routine politics. They
launched the idea of grass-root actions - or ad hoc
participation - as an independent form of political
participation - and partly as an effect of segmentation
and routine politics that would leave some issues
outside. They also addressed the issue of the mediadistorted society.
• But perhaps most importantly, they coined the
concept of the Parliamentary chain of
governance which served to structure the entire
description. The Parliamentary chain of
governance is an ideal type which roughly
speaking summarizes democracy according to
the constitution: Parliament is elected by
universal suffrage and responsible to the people;
Government is responsible to Parliament and
controls the Administration. The administration is
unpolitical, carries out the law, directed by the
minister, and bureaucrats cannot take any action
unless the law grants them the right to do so the principle of legality. In short, the
parliamentary chain of governance describes the
rights of democratic accountability.
• As an ideal type, The parliamentary chain of governance is
extremely well suited for describing all sorts of deviance. However, it
should be underlined that it is an ideal type which has never existed
- it is not a description of the past. For instance, all sorts of other
actors had influence 100 years ago, and the early welfare state was
a bunch of strange mixes between public and private insurance
arrangements. Secondly, it should be underlined that it is an ideal
type, not an ideal. In particular, it sketches a rather elitist model of
democracy that does not grant the people much influence in
between the elections.
• However, at a subconscious level, the ideal type may easily come to
be perceived both at an ideal and as something real. In that case,
we easily come to compare current reality with an idealised and
distorted image of a golden age.
• I can just add that I happened to be a member of a somewhat
smaller (but still unusually big) Danish "power project" 1978-1982
which actually replicated a good deal of the data collection of the
Norwegian project. The most original result, however, probably was
the finding that wherever we sought to measure power perceptions,
we always found the feeling that "power belongs to the others".
The Swedish project 1985-1990 was also
innovative:
• It studied political participation and political
culture under the headline of Citizenship.
• It introduced the notion of small-scale democray
as a way of getting influence in daily life, at the
workplace, in service institutions, etc.
• It illuminated the limits of state power and
planning - and the alienating and disempowering
effects of the big welfare state (the people's
home).
• It emphasized the "soft" forms of power such as
the power of discourse and ideas.
• And not least, it put gender inequality close to
the top of the priority list.
• Conceptually, the Norwegian and Danish
projects 1998-2003 were probably less
innovative. But the problems addressed
were new: What was the effect of
economic globalisation, Europeanisation,
Internationalisation, Immigration,
individualisation, concentration of
economic power, etc.
• As to economic globalisation, there has been agreement that it
represents a qualitative change with deep impact on society. But
there is also agreement that as small, open economies, the
Scandinavian countries are well acquainted with intense
competition. Further, the direct impact on the tax/welfare system, or
on equality is exaggerated, or tantamount to blame avoidance. All
agree that many theories about negative effects of globalisation on
the welfare state are exaggerated
• The Danish and Norwegian reports disagree slightly, however, as
regards the impact on equality. Is increasing inequality an
unavoidable effect? Personally, I would argue that increasing
inequality is much more attributable to political factors. That tax
competition does not lead to a "race to the bottom", and that this
becomes obvious when we look at the intervening mechanisms.
• Everybody would agree, however, that there is a certain decline in
the level of ambition of macroeconomic steering, and that the
number of instruments at the government's (or National Bank's)
disposal has declined. In the Danish case, however, the stabilisation
of the economy coincides with the decline in instruments available
for economic stabilisation policy.
Other fields of agreement
• Everybody agrees that Europeanisation is important. However, one
should not be misled by purely quantitative accounts. A study of
some of the most important political decision-making processes in
major reforms in Denmark reveals that the European perspective
plays a wholly insignificant - and actually declining - role.
• Increasing judicialisation is a common trend in Denmark and
Norway. The Norwegian project has put particular emphasis on the
development of international law without any control by parliaments,
for instance in the field of human rights. I think this is a very subtle
and thought-provoking analysis; the only question is how much this
should count in the overall picture.
• There is also agreement that there is a considerable concentration
in business life.
• And there is agreement that the market has overall gained
importance. Not only vis-a-vis the state, but also in the management
of the state, e.g. in the shape of privatisation, outsourcing, new
public management etc. The Norwegian project speaks of a certain
"hollowing out of the state" - vis à vis the international level, and vis
à vis the market.
• But there is disagreement about how these trends should be
interpreted!
Three selected priority areas of the Danish project:
• Immigration. This has completely changed the political
conflict structure in Denmark. It has generated a new
form of inequality and the threat of an underclass.
Citizenship of immigrants become a central concern.
• Studies of Political Decision-Making Processes.
• Diversified studies of Media and Media impact:
- Campaign Journalism
- Routine Journalism. News criteria, news routines
- Interaction between politicians using media and
media using politicians
- Reception of information from media, and influence
on citizens: Competent citizens
- Key Decisions: Media often absent! Not much
agenda setting on most important issues
How should changes be interpreted?
1.Increasing deviation from the
parliamentary chain of governance?
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If one makes a very systematic account, one can assess how much
increased deviation from the parliamentary chain of governance.
The Norwegian project finds a lot of increasing deviation. The Danish
project finds few if any NET changes.
Part of the explanation is variation in the assessment of the evidence
Part of the explanation is that the Danish and Norwegian situation is
different.
Specific differences + Differences in timing
Taking a very broad view, Denmark has in many respects been the political
forerunner in Scandinavia. In building modern political institutions. And in
dismantling them.
decline in parties occurred early. parties have learned to live with it
political distrust and electoral volatility occurred early.
weak minority governments came early. Learned to govern anyway!
European Union membership is not new
2. Should the Parliamentary Chain of
Governance be the normative Standard
of Evaluation?
I think not:
(1) It is not an ideal. But unconsciously come to
serve as an ideal
(2) It has never been an adequate description of
the past - idealised past / golden age problem
(3) It too much involves taking criteria of the past
for assessing the present. You can hardly avoid
seeing decline rather than change.
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Point of departure: Multilevel governance: The right question is not to
ask whether the nation-state has lost power but whether there is adequate
democratic control at the other levels of govermance.
As such, there is not a decline in democracy by making decisions at a
European level. It might even be more democratic, if it is at this level
we find the capacity to deal with the problems.
Functional equivalence: What disappears, what replaces it?
- Linkage between political decision makers and the citizens.
- Decline of parties. Is there any replacement. How does it work?
- Does increased participation at the outcome side serve as a
replacement for decreased participation at the input side of politics?
- Are there new forms of participation building up to replace those
which decline?
- Decline in class based politics. But in return increasing social
equality in other forms of participation
•
New democratic criteria: Deliberation, participation, dialogue. Responsive
government. Is there a public debate? The parliamentary chain of
governance has nothing to say about this.
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New democratic problems in the speed of change in decision-making. And
we even noted that the media were often absent in these processes. Almost
strengthening of the parliamentary chain of governance – but not of the
quality of democracy