Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Are we prepared for biological terror?
Nature and Duality
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Let us look at biological threats
Since 11 September 2001, 5 persons are thought to
have died from deliberate contamination with
Anthrax - none in Europe.
In the same period over 20 million people died from
AIDS, TB and Malaria.
Altogether natural infections probably killed over
100 million world-wide. Many diseases are
unrecognised infections - cancers caused by
viruses, heart disease caused by Chlamydia
pneumoniae etc.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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What use for biological weapons?
Toxins apart, BW are not battlefield weapons.
Living pathogens take time to incubate, but in the
period before engagement, can eliminate combat
readiness, destroy public morale and harm
economies. The “Spanish Influenza” of 1918-19,
which killed perhaps 50 million, probably did
more damage to the global economy than the
First World War!
For economic aggression - food supplies or
strategic capabilities may be targeted. For
example a bacterium might be developed
specifically to attack the lubricating oil used in a
weapons platform.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Duality is fundamental
The desirable biodegradation of petrochemical
spills might lead directly to an agent destroying a
weapons platform lubricant.
Should we ban research into oil-eating microbes?
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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The European Union and dual use: 1
Council of European Union 10 December 2003
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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The European Union and dual use: 2
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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The European Union and dual use: 3
30. A) 3)
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Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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The European Union and dual use: 4
30. A) 5)
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Vaccine development and weapon
development - one technology
Traditional vaccine technologies frequently use live
attenuated microbes grown in fermenters. These
same fermenters can be used for producing fully
active offensive agents (such as anthrax or smallpox).
Should dual use worries add another layer of difficulty
for vaccine producers? This will hurt children and
developing nations most.
Is this what we want?
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Technology moves fast - can we follow?
Technology Generation
Area
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Diagnostics
chemical testing, urea for
example
Enzyme-linked immuno-assays
PCR-based DNA assays
genome analysis, linked to
preventive intervention
Therapeutics
chemical substances,
biologicals isolated from
human and animal sources
antibiotics, therapies based on
biochemical or physiological
rationale
rationally derived
pharmaceuticals, from rDNA
and combinatorial chemistry,
sophisticated peptides and
hormones
cellular and gene therapies
directed primarily to the
individual. New therapies
resulting from intermediary
metabolism studies
Protection
whole cell killed vaccines
live attenuated vaccines,
purified antigen vaccines
rDNA rationally attenuated
vaccines, rDNA-derived
antigens
therapeutic vaccines, cancer
vaccines, vaccines as
mediators of gene therapy
Human materials
blood transfusion
skin grafting, kidney
transplantation between
relatives, improved tissue
typing, isolation of plasmaderived products
modulation of immune system
to control rejection.
widespread use of
transplantation technologies.
Replacement of human
materials by recombinant
analogues.
xenografting, in-vitro tissue
and organ growth, effective
and safe blood substitutes.
Related
instrument
development
bunsun burners, test tubes,
colorimeters,
spectrophotometers, manual
operation
microprocessor controlled
instruments. Sample volumes
down to less than 1 ml.
Complete integration of
analysis operations in robotic,
PC-controlled instrument with
individual microprocessor
controlled modules. Volumes
down to tens of microlitres.
Full instrumentation package
on a "chip". RISC PC control.
Up to 000s of analyses.
Sample volumes sub microlitre.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Biological weapons affect animals, plants
and biodegradable materials
In the First World War the British planned to use
anthrax to damage the German army’s transport
capability - then still dependent on horses.
The 1969-71 Southern Corn Blight outbreak
destroyed 15% of the USA’s maize crop.
The post-reunification German government supported
research to biodegrade the plastic body of East
German Trabant motor vehicles which constituted a
stock of ecologically undesirable organic material.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Concerns about biological weapons the up-side of dual use
Fear of deliberately aimed biological weapons
arguably is creating a useful capacity to react to “The
Next Virus”.
New R&D into pathogens, new vaccine production
capability and reinforced epidemiological surveillance
targeted at biological weapons use, have a direct and
positive effect on civil and military readiness for
Bioterror or Mother Nature’s next aberration.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Costs of biological agents - plants
In the opening years of the 21st century crop
losses from diseases and parasites cost the USA
up to $5 billion per annum.
This loss is to the benefit of foreign competitors.
When does economic competition step over the
line into economic warfare?
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Costs of biological agents - human
In Europe of the 25 EU members health delivery
is about 12% of GDP or about €800 billion. Total
cost of health delivery in the USA is about 15%
of GDP, $4,000 per person or over
$1 trillion!
About 15% of this gigantic total, about €300
billion will represent the overall costs of fighting
infection.
How much do we spend on preparedness?
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Infectious agents can ruin the EU economy
Man-made or natural infectious outbreaks could
decimate the global economy.
Randomly taking 20 million workers out of the
EU economy would have catastrophic
consequences. Treating 20 million sick, and
perhaps dying, would be an enormous
(insurmountable?) logistical challenge.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Since 1972 signatories to the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
have renounced weapons development
Most have honoured this commitment, but the
USSR and now Russia have been
conspicuously in breach. The USA has been
accused.
All G7 nations have the capacity (i.e. dual-use
potential) to move from vaccine production to
weapons production in days.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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New initiatives to prevent weapons
proliferation - are they realistic?
•
Restricting access to scientific data for
certain categories of person
•
Classification of certain areas of biological
research
•
Restricting access to the tools for genetic
manipulation
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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In my view - NO!
Responsible editorial practice has until now
limited the untoward use of potentially harmful
scientific information. Change is unnecessary.
The new biology has great potential to do good
in the world, yet unfounded scare campaigns in
the rich nations are preventing poor nations’
access to essential technologies.
Look at the EU’s ridiculous stance on food
produced from gene modified organisms.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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And NO again!
Why should the rich world have a say in how Iran
or Egypt develop vaccines? Our record is not
good. Where are the vaccines for malaria, AIDS,
or TB? Where are the plans for generating
economic growth in the most needy of nations?
It is easy to recruit poor individuals in poor
societies by telling them that the rich western
world is responsible.
Are we supporting terrorists by failing to address
global health and economic issues?
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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We create enemies!
Is the theoretical possession, or capability of
deployment, of "weapons of mass destruction"
(and the resulting isolation and sanctions) itself
used as an economic weapon against those
developing nations which dare to defy the
economic hegemony of the rich?
Will dual-use potential be used as an argument to
prevent access to essential technologies?
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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How is Europe preparing?
Together with the USA, Europe is a major
contributor to the growth of knowledge in life
science.
Overall Europe’s (EU plus Switzerland) public
sector probably spends about €10 billion on life
science research.
Europe’s private sector spends about €28 billion on
life science research (mostly in the pharmaceutical
sector).
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Biological research and defence
What basic research has relevance to defence and
preparedness for infectious or toxin agents?
Epidemiology
looks at disease in populations
Microbiology
looks at infectious agents
Immunology
natural response to infection
Vaccinology
vaccine surrogates for agents
Human, animal and plant biology
cover the range of
human health and economic consequences of attacking animal and
plant food sources.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Risk and Threat
The tools of modern biology are susceptible to misuse. This is also true for motor vehicles,
screwdrivers or kitchen knives. Any heavy object
can be used as a weapon.
So with modern biology a RISK of abuse exists. But
is it true to suggest that this risk translates into
THREAT that is to say a “real and present danger”.
Preparedness should seek to identify the
translation of risk into threat. When does a kitchen
knife become a weapon? When does a fermenter
become a weapon producing tool?
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Government/Industrial collaboration
European and US industry lead the world in
vaccine development capability, fermentation
technologies and fast response to challenges.
Together with public health laboratories and
academic research, industry can act quickly to
respond or to anticipate an epidemic disease
manifestation.
Government must catalyse the relevant dialogue
through structured initiatives that offer sensible
incentives to industrial and public sector partners.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Conclusions
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Dual use potential is everywhere
•
However, the risk in the area of modern biology
is - I believe - exaggerated
•
The naturally emerging Next Virus may be
deadly
•
Industry has capability but little incentive to be
prepared - dual-use issues are a constraint!
•
Sensible application of a BTWC protocol,
coupled with minor reinforcement of existing
regulatory regimes could avoid dual-abuse.
© Karl Simpson 2006
Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature
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Karl Simpson
Bénézech - Simpson
Hameau de Bobon
07610 VION
France
Tel: +33-4-75 06 86 30
E-Mail: karl@simpson.nom.fr
http://www.simpson.nom.fr
© Karl Simpson 2006