Lecture XXIV

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LECTURE 24

THE NATURE OF

PERSONS

PHYSICALISM AND

DUALISM

(“WHAT AM I?)

ORDINARY INDIVIDUAL THINGS

(TABLES, CHAIRS, CABBAGES,….)

ORDINARY INDIVIDUAL THINGS ARE MADE UP

OF PHYSICAL PARTS. A PHYSICAL PART OF

SOMETHING IS AN INDIVIDUAL THING OF THE

SORT STUDIED BY PHYSICS.

AT PRESENT (ACCORDING TO VAN INWAGEN)

THE MOST BASIC SORTS OF PHYSICAL THINGS

ARE THOUGHT TO BE QUARKS AND

ELECTRONS (AND CERTAIN OTHER PARTICLES).

DEFINITION OF PHYSICAL THING

A PHYSICAL THING IS A THING

COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF THE

SORTS OF INDIVIDUAL THINGS

INVESTIGATED BY PHYSICS. (OF

COURSE PHYSICS MAY DECIDE

THAT THERE ARE EVEN MORE

FUNDAMENTAL INDIVIDUAL

THINGS.)

WHAT AM I?

WE ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH OURSELVES

THAN WITH ANYTHING ELSE THAT THERE IS.

BUT WHAT KIND OF THING ARE YOU?

(1) I AM A PHYSICAL THING: A LIVE HUMAN

BODY. (PHYSICALIST ANSWER)

(2) I AM NOT A PHYSICAL THING. I AM AN

ENTITY THAT HAS A BODY (AT PRESENT). I

AM A NON-PHYSICAL THING: A MIND, A

SOUL, A SELF, OR A “PURE EGO.” (DUALIST

ANSWER)

ARE YOU IDENTICAL WITH YOUR

BODY?

PHYSICALISM: A PERSON IS A HUMAN

ORGANISM, A PHYSICAL THING.

STRONG PHYSICALISM: EVERY INDIVIDUAL

THING IS A PHYSICAL THING.

PROPERTY PHYSICALISM: EVERY PROPERTY OF

ANYTHING IS A PHYSICAL PROPERTY

(A PHYSICAL PROPERTY IS ONE THAT CAN BE

POSSESSED BY PHYSICAL THINGS AND ONLY

PHYSICAL THINGS)

IS MIND SWAPPING POSSIBLE?

VARIOUS STORIES IN FICTION HAVE PLOTS

ACCORDING TO WHICH TWO PEOPLE CAN

EXCHANGE BODIES – THE MIND ASSOCIATED

WITH ONE BODY BECOMES ASSOCIATED WITH

ANOTHER, AND VICE-VERSA.

WHICH PERSON WOULD BE WHICH? IS SUCH A

THING REALLY EVEN POSSIBLE? IF A PERSON IS A

BODY, HOW CAN IT BE A DIFFERENT BODY? (ALSO

THERE ARE STORIES WHEREIN TWO MINDS

OCCUPY ONE BODY).

DUALISM

DUALISM IS THE THESIS THAT PERSONS ARE

NON-PHYSICAL THINGS (WE IGNORE

THEORIES ACCORDING TO WHICH PERSONS

ARE “AMALGAMS”: COMPOSED OF PHYSICAL

AND NON-PHYSICAL PARTS).

DUALISTS USUALLY MAINTAIN INTERACTIONISM:

THERE IS CAUSAL INTERACTION IN BOTH

DIRECTIONS BETWEEN A PERSON AND

HIS/HER BODY.

INTERACTIONISM HAS PROBLEMS

MANY PHILOSOPHERS HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY

SEEING HOW IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A NON-

PHYSICAL THING TO CAUSALLY INTERACT

WITH A PHYSICAL THING (HOW CAN I, IF I AM

A NON-PHYSICAL THING, CAUSE PHYSICAL

CHANGES IN MY BODY?)

RENE DESCARTES

ON INTERACTION

THE SOUL CAN ONLY INTERACT WITH

THE BRAIN VIA THE PINEAL GLAND

ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM

“DESCARTES’ ARGUMENT”

I CAN CONCEIVE OF THERE BEING

NO PHYSICAL BODIES.

I CANNOT CONCEIVE THAT I DO

NOT EXIST.

THEREFORE:

I AM NOT A PHYSICAL BODY.

A LOGICAL PRINCIPLE

THE INDISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS

(OR: THE DISTINCTNESS OF

DISCERNIBLES)

(DD) FOR ANY PROPERTY F AND ANY

THINGS X AND Y, IF X HAS F AND Y

DOES NOT, THEN X IS NOT IDENTICAL

WITH Y.

THIS PRINCIPLE DD SEEMS

UNIMPEACHABLE

IF X AND Y ARE THE VERY SAME THING (NOT

JUST SIMILAR OR EXACTLY ALIKE), THEN

ANYTHING THAT IS TRUE OF X IS TRUE OF Y

(THAT IS, X).

IN LOGICAL SYSTEMS IT USUALLY IS CALLED “THE

SUBSITUTIVITY OF IDENTICALS.”

NEVERTHELESS, THERE SEEMS TO BE

SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE

ARGUMENT

• COMPARE:

• (1) I CAN CONCEIVE OF BATMAN NOT

EXISTING AND AT THE SAME TIME BRUCE

WAYNE EXISTING.

• (2) I CANNOT CONCEIVE OF BRUCE WAYNE

EXISTING AND AT THE SAME TIME BRUCE

WAYNE NOT EXISTING.

THEREFORE:

( 3) SO BATMAN HAS A PROPERTY THAT

BRUCE WAYNE DOES NOT.

THEREFORE (BY DD)

(4) BATMAN IS NOT BRUCE WAYNE.

???!!!

VAN INWAGEN’S DIAGNOSIS

ACCORDING TO VAN INWAGEN,

THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE

PHRASE”

“…CAN BE CONCEIVED BY ME NOT

TO EXIST”

DOES NOT EXPRESS (DENOTE,

DESIGNATE) A PROPERTY.

A TEST FOR EXPRESSING A PROPERTY

CONSIDER A SENTENCE CONTAINING A PROPER

NAME (OR OTHER DESIGNATOR OF AN

INDIVIDUAL) AND REPLACE THE NAME BY THE

VARIABLE ‘X’.

“OBAMA IS PRESIDENT”

“X IS PRESIDENT”

“ANDERSON IS A PHILOSOPHER”

“X IS A PHILOSOPHER”

CALL THE RESULTING EXPRESSION A

“LOGICAL PREDICATE”

THE TEST: A LOGICAL PREDICATE EXPRESSES

(DENOTES, SIGNIFIES, CORRESPONDS TO) A

PROPERTY ONLY IF THE RESULTS OF

REPLACING ‘X’ BY TWO DIFFERENT

DESIGNATIONS OF THE SAME INDIVIDUAL ARE

BOTH TRUE OR BOTH FALSE.

TRY:

“COMMISIONER GORDON KNOWS THAT X IS

BATMAN.”

THE LOGICAL PREDICATE IN

DESCARTES’ ARGUMENT

“X CAN BE CONCEIVED BY ME NOT TO EXIST”

CONSIDER THE TWO DESIGNATORS:

“THE INSTRUCTOR OF PHIL 100E (S 2014)”

“I”

BOTH OF THESE DESIGNATE ME. BUT THE

LOGICAL PREDICATE FAILS THE TEST. (WHY? A

VERY INTERESTING QUESTION. CF.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE).

A DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS

THE ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON TAKING

“CONCEIVE” IN A PARTICULAR WAY. IN ONE

WAY OF TAKING IT, THE LOGICAL PREDICATE

MIGHT BE SEEN AS PASSING THE TEST. TAKEN

THAT WAY, THOUGH, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT I

CAN REALLY CONCEIVE OF THE INSTRUCTOR

OF THIS COURSE AS NOT EXISTING.

A LEIBNIZIAN ARGUMENT AGAINST

PHYSICALISM

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