MIDTERM EXAMINATION
THE MIDTERM EXAMINATION WILL BE ON
FRIDAY, MAY 2, IN THIS CLASSROOM,
STARTING AT 1:00 P.M. BRING A BLUE BOOK.
THE EXAM WILL COVER: CHAPTER 1 (i.e.,
INTRODUCTION, pp. 1-22), CHAPTERS 2, 3, 5,
6 (IN PART), THE ASSIGNED READINGS (EXCEPT
FOR THE SPINOZA AND BRADLEY EXCERPTS),
AND THE MATERIAL ON THE HANDOUTS.
LECTURE 11
OBJECTIVITY
(continued)
OBJECTIVE TRUTH
• THE COMMONSENSE WESTERN METAPHYSIC
SHOULD (PERHAPS) BE TAKEN TO INVOLVE A
BELIEF IN OBJECTIVE TRUTH.
• WHAT OBJECTIVE TRUTH IS NOT: (A)
OBECTIVE TRUTH IS NOT THE SAME AS
CERTAINTY OR EVEN KNOWLEDGE. (B)
OBJECTIVE TRUTH IS NOT “WHAT IS TRUE
FOR YOU” OR “WHAT IS TRUE FOR ME.”
SOMEONE WHO BELIEVES IN
OBJECTIVE TRUTH DOESN’T HAVE TO
CLAIM TO KNOW WHICH THINGS ARE
OBJECTIVELY TRUE.
“THERE IS LIFE ON OTHER
PLANETS” MAY BE OBJECTIVELY
TRUE (IF NOT: “THERE IS NO LIFE
ON OTHER PLANETS” IS
OBJECTIVELY TRUE).
THE NOTION EXPLAINED
SUPPOSE WE CONFINE OUR DISCUSSION TO
BELIEFS (OTHER THINGS MAY BE TRUE OR
FALSE AS WELL: ASSERTIONS, SENTENCES,
THOUGHTS).
“A BELIEF IS EITHER (OBJECTIVELY) TRUE OR
(OBECTIVELY) FALSE BECAUSE OF THE WAY
THE WORLD IS. BELIEFS (OR PERCEPTIONS)
DO NOT CAUSE THE WORLD TO BE A CERTAIN
WAY.”
MEANINGLESS BELIEFS AND VAGUE
BELIEFS
SOME BELIEFS MAY BE MEANINGLESS.
HEIDIGGER CLAIMED TO BELIEVE THAT “THE
NOTHING NOTHIINGS.” MAYBE HE HAD
SOMETHING IN MIND WHICH CAN BE TRUE
OR FALSE, BUT HE HAS NOT COMMUNICATED
IT VERY WELL.”
SUCH “BELIEFS” MAY NOT BE EITHER TRUE OR
FALSE.
VAGUE BELIEFS
“ANDERSON WAS TALL”
AT ONE TIME I WAS 5 FEET 11½ INCHES TALL.
WAS I TALL? SOME BELIEFS MAY BE NEITHER
TRUE NOR FALSE BECAUSE OF VAGUENESS.
EXCLUDING MEANINGLESS AND VAGUE
BELIEFS, IT IS CLAIMED BY THE
“REALIST” (ABOUT TRUTH) THAT
SOME (OR PERHAPS ALL) BELIEFS ARE
EITHER OBJECTIVELY TRUE OR
OBJECTIVLEY FALSE.
A PUZZLE ABOUT ANTIREALISM (ABOUT TRUTH)
(AR) “NO BELIEFS ARE
OBJECTIVELY TRUE.”
QUESTION
IS (AR) BEING CLAIMED TO BE TRUE?
OBJECTIVELY TRUE? THE ANTI-REALIST WILL
HAVE TO SAY “NO, (AR) IS ‘TRUE’ IN A SPECIAL
SENSE” (WHICH I WILL EXPLAIN).”
THE PUZZLE IS THIS: ALL ARGUMENTS OF THE
FOLLOWING FORM SEEM TO BE DEDUCTIVELY
VALID: _P____
IT IS (OBJECTIVELY) TRUE THAT P
HERE P IS A MEANINGFUL,
DETERMINATE, DECLARATIVE
SENTENCE
ACTUALLY IT IS PLAUSIBLE THAT THE ARGUMENT
IS VALID IN MANY OTHER CASES. ALSO THERE
ARE OTHER QUALIFICATIONS TO BE MADE
ABOUT SENTENCES CONTAINING PARTS OF
SPEECH WHOSE MEANINGS VARY WITH
CONTEXT. NONE OF THOSE ARE PRESENT IN
THE CASE OF (AR).
THE ANTI-REALIST MIGHT JUST DENY
THAT THIS IS VALID
• IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT TO DO WHEN
TWO NORMAL SPEAKERS DISAGREE ABOUT
THE VALIDITY OF AN ARGUMENT – AT LEAST IF
IT IS AN ARGUMENT AS SIMPLE AS THIS. IF IT
WERE COMPLICATED, WE COULD PERHAPS
APPEAL TO SOME PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC AND
SHOW THAT IT IS VALID.
THIS IS AN IMPASSE
SOME OF THE THINGS THAT WILLIAM ALSTON
SAYS IN HIS PAPER ARE RELEVANT TO THE
PRESENT DISPUTE (ABOUT VALIDITY).
WE TURN NOW TO A DISCUSSION OF HIS PAPER
“YES, VIRGINIA. THERE IS A REAL WORLD.”
WILLIAM ALSTON
(1921-2009)
ALSTON GIVES A GENERAL
CHARACTERIZATION OF REALISM
“WHATEVER THERE IS IS WHAT IT IS
REGARDLESS OF HOW WE THINK OF IT. EVEN
IS THERE WERE NO HUMAN BEINGS,
WHATEVER THERE IS OTHER THAN HUMAN
THOUGHT WOULD STILL BE WHAT IT IS….
[T]HERE ARE THINGS INDEPENDENT OF
HUMAN THOUGHT.” (PP. 779-780)
BUT HE SOON FOCUSES ON TRUTH
(LIKE VAN INWAGEN)
• “OUR STATEMENTS ARE ISSUED WITH A
(REALISTIC [I.E. OBJECTIVE]) TRUTH CLAIM (A
CLAIM TO TRUTH IN THE REALIST [OBJECTIVE]
SENSE).” (P. 780)”
• THIS SOUNDS A BIT WEAK, BUT HE MIGHT
ADD THAT SUCH A STATEMENT, IF IT IS NOT
OBJECTIVELY TRUE, IS OBJECTIVELY FALSE.
THIS IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE
PUZZLE DISCUSSED ABOVE
ORDINARILY, IF SOMEONE SAYS P, THEN
(ACCORDING TO ALSTON) THEY ARE CLAIMING
THAT P IS OBJECTIVELY TRUE (I.E., TRUE IN THE
REALIST SENSE). THIS IS JUST TO SAY THAT
THE ARGUMENT MENTIONED ABOVE (FROM
P, TO INFER “IT IS OBJECTIVELY TRUE THAT P”)
IS VALID.
SOME CONCEPTS OF TRUTH
DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHERS HAVE OFFERED
DIFFERENT ‘DEFINITIONS’ OR ‘ANALYSES’ OF
TRUTH. THESE ARE RELEVANT TO ALSTON’S
DISCUSSION:
(1) THE CORRESPONDENCE ‘THEORY’ OF TRUTH
A BELIEF OR STATEMENT IS TRUE IF AND ONLY IF
IT CORRESPONDS TO A FACT.
THE COHERENCE ‘THEORY’ OF TRUTH
(2) A BELIEF OR STATEMENT IS TRUE IF AND
ONLY IF IT COHERES WITH OUR OTHER
BELIEFS OR STATEMENTS (IN AN APPROPRIATE
WAY).
ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS HELD SOME SUCH THEORY.
ACCORDING TO THEM, THERE ARE ‘PARTIAL
TRUTHS’ THAT FIT TOGETHER INTO AN ALL
INCLUSIVE AND INTEGRATED WHOLE (THE
WHOLE TRUTH, THE ABSOLUTE).
PRAGMATIST ‘THEORIES’ OF TRUTH
(3) A BELIEF OR STATEMENT IS TRUE IF AND
ONLY IF IT WOULD ACCEPTED BY THE IDEAL
INVESTIGATORS (AT THE END OF THE DAY)
[CHARLES PEIRCE]
(3’) A BELIEF OR STATEMENT IS TRUE IF AND
ONLY IF IT CAN BE ASSIMILATED, VALIDATED,
CORROBORATED, OR VERIFIED [WILLIAM
JAMES]
ANOTHER PRAGMATIST ‘THEORY’ OF
TRUTH
(3”) A BELIEF OR STATEMENT IS TRUE IF AND
ONLY IF IT IS INSTRUMENTAL IN AN ACTIVE
REORGANIZATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT….”
[DEWEY]
ALSTON CRITICIZES THESE AND SOME MODERN
VERSIONS, ARGUING THAT THEY ALL ASSUME
A (FALSE) ACCOUNT OF MEANING:
VERIFICATIONISM