ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY DECISION Date Signed: 07 May 2007 Application Code NOC07006 Application Category Import into Containment any New Organism under section 40(1)(a) of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act 1996 Applicant AgResearch Limited Application Purpose To import into containment Risk Group 2 anaerobic microorganisms associated with the human body, for research purposes to enhance knowledge of human intestinal function and health. Date Application Received 29 March 2007 Consideration Date 07 May 2007 Considered By A Committee of the Environmental Risk Management Authority (the Authority) 1 Summary of Decision 1.1 The application to import into containment cultures of the following new organisms: Risk Group 2 anaerobic commensal microorganisms associated with the human body for research purposes is approved, with controls, having being considered in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (the Act) and the HSNO (Methodology) Order 1998 (the Methodology). 2 Legislative Criteria 2.1 The application was lodged pursuant to section 40(1)(a) of the Act. The application was determined in accordance with section 45, having regard to the matters specified in section 44 and 37 and other matters relevant to the purpose of the Act, as specified in Part II of the Act. Unless otherwise stated, references to section numbers in this decision refer to sections of the Act. 2.2 Consideration of the application followed the relevant provisions of the Methodology, as specified in more detail below. Unless otherwise stated, references to clause numbers in this decision refer to clauses of the Methodology. 3 Application Process Application Receipt 3.1 Application NOC07006 was determined to comply with section 40(2) of the Act and formally received on 29 March 2007. Notification 3.2 Under section 53(2) of the Act the Environmental Risk Management Authority (the Authority) has discretion as to whether to publicly notify an application to import into containment any new organism. In this case, the application was not publicly notified (following ERMA New Zealand guidelines) because the importation into containment of these anaerobic Risk Group 2 microorganisms is not expected to be of significant public interest, nor is it likely that public notification would result in additional information relevant to the consideration of this application. 3.3 In accordance with section 58(1)(c) of the Act and clauses 2(2)(e) and 5 of the Methodology, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) Biosecurity New Zealand and the Ministry of Health were notified and provided with an opportunity to comment on the application. Neither agency raised any issues with this application. MAF agreed that the organisms described under this approval do not pose a significant risk to the population. Decision Making Committee 3.4 The application was considered by a sub-Committee of the New Organism (Non GMO) Committee of the Authority appointed in accordance with section 19(2)(b) of the Act. The Committee comprised of the following members: Dr Max Suckling (Chair), Dr Val Orchard and Dr Deborah Read. Information Available for Consideration 3.5 The information available for the consideration of the application by the Committee included: Application NOC07006 (Form NO2N) prepared by the applicant. 3.6 Recognised techniques were used in identifying, assessing, and evaluating the relevant information, as required under clause 24 of the Methodology. Techniques for identifying and preparing information on risks, costs and benefits were based on procedures specified in the ERMA New Zealand Technical Guides. 4 Sequence of the Consideration 4.1 In accordance with clause 24 of the Methodology, the approach to the consideration adopted by the Committee was first to examine the scope and purpose of the application, and the organisms applied for, then to look sequentially at identification, assessment and evaluation of risks, costs and benefits. Those risks identified as potentially significant were assessed in accordance with clause 12 of the Methodology. Costs and benefits were assessed in accordance with clause 13 of the Methodology. Qualitative scales used by the Committee to measure likelihood and magnitude of risks, costs and benefits are provided in Appendix 2 of this decision. 4.2 Interposed with the assessment of risks, costs and benefits was the consideration of the adequacy of the proposed containment regime, and the ability of the organisms to escape Decision NOC07006 Page 2 of 24 and establish self-sustaining populations (as required by sections 37 and 44 and clause 10(e)). Management techniques were considered in relation to the identified risks. The containment regime was considered in the context of a risk management regime for controlling the identified risks and costs (clauses 12(d) and 24). In doing so, the Committee set controls to provide satisfactorily for the matters in the Third Schedule (Part II) of the Act and additional controls were considered in relation to residual risks that required further consideration. 4.3 Benefits associated with this application were considered in accordance with clauses 9, 10, 13 and 14 of the Methodology and section 6(e) of the Act. 4.4 Finally, taking account of the risk characteristics established in accordance with clause 33 of the Methodology, the combined impact of risks, costs and benefits was evaluated in accordance with clause 34. The approach to the consideration follows the decision path outlined in Appendix 3 of this decision. 5 Purpose of the Application 5.1 The purpose of the application was to import into containment Risk Group 2 anaerobic commensal microorganisms associated with the human body for research purposes. AgResearch Limited is the applicant. 5.2 In accordance with section 45(1)(a)(i) of the Act, the Committee determined that this application was for a valid purpose within the scope of section 39(1)(h) of the Act being such other purposes as the Authority thinks fit. 6 Adequacy of Containment Regime 6.1 In carrying out its consideration, the Committee considered the adequacy of containment in accordance with section 45(1)(a)(iii) of the Act, and the magnitude and likelihood of the risks, costs and benefits alongside each other and in an integrated fashion. This is because the former interact with the latter and this is recognised in clause 12(d) of the Methodology and in section 45(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. For convenience in setting out the decision, the adequacy of containment is discussed first. Ability to adequately contain the organisms 6.2 i. In considering the adequacy of the containment regime and the ability of the organisms to escape from containment, the Committee considered the following: i. the biological characteristics of the organisms; ii. the containment regime; and iii. the potential pathways for escape of the organisms from the containment facility. Biological characteristics of the organism 6.3 The microorganisms to be imported are commensal organisms isolated from healthy humans, in particular from the intestinal tract. 6.4 A commensal relationship exists when one organism derives food or other benefits from another living organism without harming or helping it. In the case of these commensal microorganisms (the human intestinal micro-flora), the benefactor is the human host, as the bacteria help break down food and supply the host with the extracted nutrients and energy. Decision NOC07006 Page 3 of 24 6.5 Microorganisms can fall into one of three categories depending on the method they use for energy production: aerobes, facultative anaerobes, or strict/obligate anaerobes. 6.6 Aerobes use oxygen as the terminal electron acceptor for energy production (aerobic respiration), and cannot grow without it. Facultative anaerobes are aerobic microorganisms that can use fermentation or anaerobic respiration when molecular oxygen is absent, but use aerobic cellular respiration when oxygen is present. 6.7 Obligate anaerobes are microorganisms that are unable to use oxygen as a terminal electron receptor in energy production. Strict anaerobes cannot live in the presence of oxygen. Aerotolerant anaerobes are non-facultative anaerobes that are able to grow in the presence of molecular oxygen. Microaerophiles have low oxygen requirements and tolerance, meaning they are unable to grow with normal air concentrations of oxygen (20%), but do require some oxygen (2-10%) for normal growth. For example, nitrogen fixing bacteria have a growth preference for lower than normal atmospheric levels of oxygen. 6.8 The microorganisms to be imported are anaerobic; therefore, they do not require oxygen for growth. The presence of oxygen will kill or inhibit the growth of obligate anaerobes. Anaerobes therefore require a controlled environment with limited or no molecular oxygen for culturing. 6.9 The microorganisms to be imported are commensal; therefore do not cause disease in the normal course of inhabiting the human gastrointestinal tract. However, if they gain access to other areas of the body they may be able to cause disease; therefore, they are considered Risk Group 2 organisms. 6.10 The generic organism description could include bacteria belonging to the following genera: Actinomyces, Bifidobacterium, Eubacterium, Propionibacterium, Clostridium, Fusobacterium, and Veillonella. Many species of these anaerobes are commonly isolated from the human intestinal tract (or mouth), and are not commonly associated with disease in the gut environment. However, these organisms may be capable of causing infections in wounds, abscesses, bacteraemia, endocarditis (inflammation of the inside lining of the heart chambers and heart valves) and pleuropulmonary infections (the lungs, and associated membranes and chest cavity) if they are able to gain access to other areas of the body, for example through trauma. Some species are also linked to gingivitis, oral infections and dental caries. 6.11 It is likely that many of the organisms to be imported are established within humans in the New Zealand population, however, this group of organisms is not always well documented or identified, therefore an application has been made under the HSNO Act. For this reason, specific bacteria are not identified in this approval; the approval is to cover unknown or unidentified organisms that may be transitory in the human intestinal tract, or uncharacterised at the time of import. ii. Containment regime 6.12 The microorganisms will be imported into a containment facility registered by MAF under the MAF Biosecurity/ERMA New Zealand Standard 154.03.02 Containment Facilities for Microorganisms (Standard 154.03.02) at Physical Containment Level 2 (PC2). The requirements for PC2 are set out in the Australian New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 2243.3:2002 Safety in Laboratories: Part 3: (Microbiological aspects and containment facilities). 6.13 The Committee consider that PC2 is appropriate for these organisms because many of the organisms are not well characterised. Further research may result in some of the organisms being defined as Risk Group 1, at which time the organism could be transferred to another approval if appropriate. Decision NOC07006 Page 4 of 24 6.14 Standard 154.03.02 requires the facility’s containment manual to demonstrate how the physical construction and the operational procedures of the facility will contain the organisms, limit access to the facility and contingency plans for recovery/destruction should any escape from containment occur. 6.15 The Committee noted that in most cases, work with these organisms must be carried out within an anaerobic glove box for the survival of the organisms. An anaerobic glove box consists of an anaerobic chamber, where the oxygen levels can be strictly controlled, often accessed through an air-lock chamber. Work is carried out using sealed gloves; therefore, staff will not have direct contact with the organisms while working with them except during the transfer from storage and the anaerobic glove box. The Committee noted that the use of a gloveless anaerobic chamber would also be possible, with the use of gloves to protect the laboratory worker. 6.16 The Committee noted that in the case of aerotolerant anaerobes, work could be done outside the anaerobic chamber. The Committee consider that in such cases all ‘open container’ manipulations must be carried out in a class II biological safety cabinet. The Committee concluded that ‘open container’ manipulations must be carried out within an anaerobic chamber or a class II biological safety cabinet as per control 6.3. iii. 6.17 Potential pathways for escape of organisms from the containment facility The Committee considered the potential pathways of escape of the anaerobic microorganisms as: escape during transport to/from the containment facility; escape due to accidental/unintentional or deliberate removal from the containment facility by authorised people; escape due to accidental/unintentional or deliberate removal from the containment facility by unauthorised people; and escape from containment following natural disaster (flood, earthquake etc.) or fire. 6.18 The Committee considered that given the nature of the organisms and the specific environmental conditions required for growth, and in many cases survival, escape from containment of these organisms would require a deliberate human act. The Committee therefore considered that escape from containment during transport or following a natural disaster is highly improbable. 6.19 The Committee considered that escape by deliberate or accidental removal by authorised or unauthorised persons, is limited by the containment regime, particularly the security measures and audit components. In light of this, the Committee considered that escape by these pathways is highly improbable. 6.20 The Committee concluded that escape from containment, by the anaerobic commensal microorganisms in this approval, via the identified pathways, is highly improbable. Conclusion on adequacy of the containment regime 6.21 The Committee has considered the ability of the organisms to escape containment given their biological characteristics, the proposed containment regime and the potential pathways of escape. Taking all of these considerations into account the Committee concluded that it is highly improbable that the organisms would be able to escape from containment by deliberate or accidental means and that the proposed containment regime is adequate to contain these organisms. Decision NOC07006 Page 5 of 24 7 Ability of the Organism to Establish a Self-Sustaining Population 7.1 In accordance with sections 44 and 37 and clause 10(e) the Committee considered the ability of the organisms to form self-sustaining populations should they escape containment, and the ease of eradication of such populations. 7.2 The Committee noted that the organisms to be imported have the potential to form selfsustaining populations within a host’s intestinal tract. These organisms have very specific environmental requirements for survival and growth, in particular absence or very low levels of oxygen. 7.3 The organisms are isolated from the human intestinal tract, and are therefore capable of colonising this environment. However, the potential for these organisms to escape from containment and gain access to this type of environment is limited by the containment regime and good laboratory management practices. The potential is further limited by the inability of the organisms to survive outside this environment, and the competition they would face from the hosts native micro-flora. 7.4 The Committee also considered that it would be difficult to identify such a population if it were to establish, as it could not be distinguished from the hosts indigenous microflora. The Committee noted that intestinal micro-flora differs between individuals and changes can occur depending on diet or lifestyle changes including the use of antibiotics. 7.5 The Committee concluded that the establishment of a self-sustaining population is improbable and such a population would be difficult to distinguish from the host’s native micro-flora. 8 Identification and assessment of potentially significant adverse effects (risks and costs) 8.1 In accordance with clause 9(c) the Committee has categorised potential adverse effects into environmental, human health, Māori culture, market economy and social categories. These adverse effects have been considered in terms of the requirements of clauses 12, 13, and 14 including the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of adverse effects, whether or not they are monetary, and the distribution of costs and benefits over time, space and groups in the community. Risk characteristics are considered in terms of clause 33. The degree of uncertainty attached to evidence is taken into account, as required under clauses 25, 29 and 30. 8.2 The Committee noted that the organisms are classified as Risk Group 2 organisms. Risk Group 2 organisms are defined by AS/NZS 2243.3:2002 as pathogens that can cause human, plant or animal disease, but are unlikely to be a serious hazard to laboratory workers, the community, livestock, or the environment; laboratory exposures may cause infection, but effective treatment and preventative measures are available, and the risk of spread is limited. Potential adverse effects on human health and safety 8.3 The Committee considered the ability of the organisms to cause adverse effect to human health and safety and noted that the organisms are isolated from humans, and are classified as Risk Group 2. The Committee noted that any adverse effects were dependent on the highly improbable event of the organisms escaping containment. Decision NOC07006 Page 6 of 24 8.4 The Committee considered that the ability of the organisms to cause disease is dependent on accessing a suitable site in the body to cause disease, ie a wound or entering the blood stream. The Committee noted that the organisms normally inhabit the human intestinal tract, and do not cause disease in this capacity, but have a commensal relationship with the human host. The pathogenic ability of these organisms only becomes apparent when they gain access to other parts of the body, resulting in infection. The Committee also noted that such infections can be treated with antibiotics, and are normally limited to individuals, rather than groups of people or whole communities. The potential adverse effects can therefore be considered minimal. 8.5 The likelihood of these adverse effects occurring is limited by the escape of the organisms and the ability to access a suitable host. The protective barriers of the human body, including the skin and the mucosal membranes, limit access by the anaerobes to suitable sites of infection. The Committee considered that the likelihood of any potential adverse effects on human health and safety occurring is highly improbable. 8.6 The Committee considered that the potential magnitude of adverse effects on human health and safety is minimal and the likelihood of those effects occurring is highly improbable. The Committee concluded that the potential adverse effects on human health and safety are negligible. Potential adverse effects on the environment 8.7 The Committee considered that the potential for the organisms to cause adverse effects to the environment was dependent on escape from containment, and pathogenic infection of a suitable host. The Committee considered that the likelihood of escape from containment was highly improbable. 8.8 The Committee considered the organisms may inhabit the intestinal tract of many animals, and do not cause disease in this capacity. The Committee also noted that as with humans, the organisms could potential cause disease in animals. In addition, such a disease could also be treated, and would be limited to individuals rather than whole populations of animals. The Committee therefore, considered the magnitude of any potentially adverse effects on animals to be minimal. 8.9 The Committee considered the likelihood of these potential adverse effects occurring to be highly improbable as they are dependent on escape from containment and infection of a suitable host. 8.10 The Committee did not identify any potential adverse effects on plants or other aspects of the environment. 8.11 The Committee considered that the magnitude of any potential adverse effects on the environment is minimal, and likelihood of any potential environmental effects is highly improbable. The Committee concluded the potential adverse effects on the environment are negligible. Potential adverse effects on Māori and their culture and traditions 8.12 The Committee considered the potential Māori cultural effects of this application in accordance with clauses 9(b)(i) and 9(c)(iv) of the Methodology and sections 6(d) and 8 of the Act, using the assessment framework contained in the ERMA New Zealand User Guide “Working with Māori under the HSNO Act 1996” in assessing this application. 8.13 The Committee noted that the potential adverse effects on Māori and their culture and traditions are dependent on escape from containment and that the magnitude of such effects would be minimal. The Committee agreed with the assessment of the project Decision NOC07006 Page 7 of 24 team that the potential adverse effects on Māori and their culture and traditions are negligible. Potential adverse effects on the market economy 8.14 The Committee considered the information available and did not identify any potential adverse effects on the market economy. Potential adverse effects on society and communities 8.15 The Committee considered the information available and did not identify any adverse effects to society and the community. 9 Identification and assessment of potentially significant beneficial effects 9.1 The Committee considered the potential beneficial effects associated with the application, in accordance with sections 5 and 6(e) of the Act and clauses 9(c), 10, 13, and 14 of the Methodology. The Committee identified the following direct beneficial effects: Increased knowledge of key signalling mechanisms between intestinal cells in response to commensal anaerobes Increased understanding of the human intestinal tract Generation of intellectual property relating to the points above 9.2 An indirect benefit is the potential to develop novel functional food products with sound scientific basis for maintaining or enhancing intestinal health. 9.3 The Committee consider these benefits combined are of minor to moderate value and likely to be realised and hence non-negligible. 10 Establishment of the Approach to Risk in the Light of Risk Characteristics 10.1 Clause 33 of the Methodology requires the Authority to have regard for the extent to which a specified set of risk characteristics exist when considering applications. This provides a route for determining how cautious or risk averse the Authority should be in weighing up risks and costs against benefits. In the present application clause 33 is influenced by the organisms being “in containment” and the conclusion that the containment provisions and other controls will reduce most biological and physical risks to a low level. 10.2 The Committee determined that all identified risks and costs (adverse effects) were assessed, individually and collectively, as being negligible. Therefore, additional caution was not warranted. 11 Associated Approvals 11.1 The Committee noted the need for the applicant to obtain the following associated approvals: An import permit from MAF Registration of the facility as a containment facility by MAF. Decision NOC07006 Page 8 of 24 12 Overall Evaluation of Risks, Costs and Benefits 12.1 The overall evaluation of risks, costs and benefits set out below was carried out in accordance with section 45 of the Act and clause 26 of the Methodology, having regard to clauses 22 and 34 of the Methodology. 12.2 The Committee has assessed the potential adverse effects (risks and costs) of importing these organisms into containment as being negligible. 12.3 The Committee considers that the beneficial effects (benefits) are non-negligible. 12.4 The Committee has concluded that the establishment of self-sustaining populations of the anaerobic microorganisms in New Zealand, should they escape, is improbable. The proposed containment regime, based on Standard 154.03.02 and additional controls, is adequate considering the risks posed by the organisms. Additionally, it is highly improbable that the organisms would be able to escape from containment. 12.5 The Committee was unable to find common units of measurement with which to combine risks, costs, and benefits in accordance with clause 34(a). There were no dominant sources of risk (clause 34(b)). Because the risks as a whole are negligible the decision is made in accordance with clause 26 (not clause 27) of the Methodology. 12.6 The Committee considered all of the controls, set out in Appendix 1, taking into account the cost effectiveness of the controls in preventing the escape of the organisms and effectively managing any risks. The Committee, having regard to these matters, is satisfied that the organisms can be adequately contained, and that it is evident that the (beneficial effects) benefits of the application outweigh the adverse effects (risks and costs). 13 Decision 13.1 Pursuant to section 45(1)(a)(i) of the Act, the Committee is satisfied that this application is for one of the purposes specified in section 39(1) of the Act, being section 39(1)(h): such other purposes as the Authority thinks fit. 13.2 Having considered all the possible effects in accordance with sections 45(1)(a)(ii), 45(4) and 44 and pursuant to clause 26 of the Methodology, and based on consideration and analysis of the information provided and taking into account the application of risk management controls specified in this decision, the view of the Committee is that the adverse effects (risks and costs) associated with the importation into containment of these organisms are outweighed by the beneficial effects (benefits). 13.3 The Committee is satisfied that the containment regime, as set out in Appendix 1, will adequately contain the organisms as required by section 45(1)(a)(iii) of the Act. 13.4 In accordance with clause 36(2)(b) of the Methodology the Committee records that, in reaching this conclusion, it has applied the balancing tests in section 45 of the Act and clause 26 of the Methodology and has relied in particular on the criteria set out in the following sections of the Act: section 44 additional matters to be considered; section 45 determination of application; section 37 additional matters to be considered; and the Third Schedule-Part 2, matters to be addressed by containment controls for new organisms. Decision NOC07006 Page 9 of 24 13.5 The Committee has also applied the following criteria in the Methodology: 13.6 clause 9 - equivalent of sections 5, 6 and 8; clause 10 - equivalent of sections 36 and 37; clause 12 – evaluation of assessment of risks; clause 13 – evaluation of assessment of costs and benefits; clause 20 – information produced from other bodies; clause 21 – the decision accords with the requirements of the Act and regulations; clause 22 – the evaluation of risks, costs and benefits – relevant considerations; clause 24 – the use of recognised risk identification, assessment, evaluation and management techniques; clause 25 – the evaluation of risks; clause 26 - the risks are negligible and it is evident benefits outweigh costs; clause 29 and 32 – considering uncertainty; clause 33 – the risk characteristics; and clause 34 – the aggregation and comparison of risks, costs and benefits. The application to import into containment cultures of the following organisms: Risk Group 2 anaerobic commensal microorganisms associated with the human body for research purposes is approved, with controls, in accordance with section 45(1)(a) of the Act. As required under section 45(2) the approval is subject to the controls listed in Appendix 1 of this decision. ____________________ 07 May 2007 ______ Dr Val Orchard Date Acting Chair of the Committee Approval code: NOC002493 Decision NOC07006 Page 10 of 24 Appendix 1: Controls Required by this Approval In order to satisfactorily address the matters detailed in the Third Schedule Part II: Containment controls for new organisms excluding genetically modified organisms, of the Act, and other matters in order to give effect to the purpose of the Act, the approved organisms are subject to the following controls: 1 To limit the likelihood of any accidental release of any organism or any viable genetic material: 1.1 The approved organisms shall be imported into a containment facility that complies with these controls. 1.2 The construction, operation, and management of the organism containment facility for the import of new organism shall be in accordance with the: 1.2.1 MAF Biosecurity Authority/ERMA New Zealand Standard 154.03.02: Containment Facilities for Microorganisms1. 1.2.2 Australian New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 2243.3:2002 Safety in Laboratories: Part 3: (Microbiological aspects and containment facilities)1. 1.2.3 Physical Containment Level 2 (PC2) requirements of the above Standards. 1.3 The person responsible for the operation of the containment facility shall inform all personnel involved in the handling of the organisms of the Authority’s controls. 1.4 The containment facility shall be approved by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), in accordance with section 39 of the Biosecurity Act. 2 2.1 3 To exclude unauthorised people from the facility: The identification of entrances, numbers of and access to entrances, and the security requirements for the entrances and the facility shall comply with the standards listed in Control 1.2 of this document. To control the effects of any accidental release or escape of an organism: 3.1 Construction and operation of the containment facility shall comply with the requirements of the standards listed in control 1.2 relating to the control of the effects of any accidental release or escape of an organism. 3.2 If a breach of containment occurs, the facility operator must ensure that the MAF Inspector responsible for supervision of the facility has received notification of the breach within 24 hours. 3.3 In the event of any breach of containment of the organism, the contingency plan for the attempted retrieval or destruction of any viable material of the organism that has escaped shall be implemented immediately. The contingency plan shall be included in the containment manual in accordance with the requirements of standards listed in control 1.2. Any reference to this standard in these controls refers to any subsequent version approved or endorsed by ERMA New Zealand. 1 Decision NOC07006 Page 11 of 24 3.4 4 The applicant shall comply with the requirements of the standards listed in control 1.2 listed above relating to the maintenance of records demonstrating compliance with the standards, as required by the quality assurance programme, and documented in the containment manual. Inspection and monitoring requirements for containment facilities: 4.1 The inspection and monitoring requirements for the containment facility shall comply with the standards listed in control 1.2 of this document. 4.2 The containment manuals shall be updated, as necessary, to address the implementation of the controls imposed by this approval, in accordance with standards listed in control 1.2. 5 5.1 6 Qualifications required of the persons responsible for implementing these controls: The training of personnel working in the facility shall comply with the standards listed in Control 1.2. Additional Controls: 6.1 Any person using this approval for the first time shall notify ERMA New Zealand and the MAF Inspector responsible for the supervision of the facility of their intention to do so in writing. 6.2 All packages of organisms imported in accordance with this application shall be clearly labelled with the relevant ERMA New Zealand approval code and the direction that the primary package should not be opened at the border. This documentation should be attached to that package in such a way that the primary package does not have to be opened to access the documentation. 6.3 All ‘open container’ manipulations of all organisms covered by this application shall be performed in a class II biological safety cabinet operated in accordance with AS/NZS 2243.3:2002, until such time that the user has assessed and documented that aerial dispersal propagules are not formed by the organism being examined. For the purposes of this approval, ‘open container’ manipulations do not include those carried out inside an anaerobic chamber. Decision NOC07006 Page 12 of 24 Appendix 2: Qualitative scales for describing adverse effects Modified from the ERMA New Zealand Technical Guide to Decision Making. Qualitative Risk Assessment This section describes how the Agency staff and the Authority address the qualitative assessment of risks, costs and benefits. Risks and benefits are assessed by estimating the magnitude and nature of the possible effects and the likelihood of their occurrence. For each effect, the combination of these two components determines the level of the risk associated with that effect, which is a two dimensional concept. Because of lack of data, risks are often presented as singular results. In reality, they are better represented by ‘families’ of data which link probability with different levels of outcome (magnitude). The magnitude of effect is described in terms of the element that might be affected. The qualitative descriptors for magnitude of effect are surrogate measures that should be used to gauge the end effect or the ‘what if’ element. Tables 1 and 2 contain generic descriptors for magnitude of adverse and beneficial effect. These descriptors are examples only, and their generic nature means that it may be difficult to use them in some particular circumstances. They are included here to illustrate how qualitative tables may be used to represent levels of adverse and beneficial effect. Decision NOC07006 Page 13 of 24 Table 1 Magnitude of adverse effect (risks and costs) Descriptor Examples of descriptions - ADVERSE Minimal Mild reversible short term adverse health effects to individuals in highly localised area Highly localised and contained environmental impact, affecting a few (less than ten) individuals members of communities of flora or fauna, no discernible ecosystem impact Local/regional short-term adverse economic effects on small organisations (businesses, individuals), temporary job losses No social disruption Minor Mild reversible short term adverse health effects to identified and isolated groups Localised and contained reversible environmental impact, some local plant or animal communities temporarily damaged, no discernible ecosystem impact or species damage Regional adverse economic effects on small organisations (businesses, individuals) lasting less than six months, temporary job losses Potential social disruption (community placed on alert) Moderate Minor irreversible health effects to individuals and/or reversible medium term adverse health effects to larger (but surrounding) community (requiring hospitalisation) Measurable long term damage to local plant and animal communities, but no obvious spread beyond defined boundaries, medium term individual ecosystem damage, no species damage Medium term (one to five years) regional adverse economic effects with some national implications, medium term job losses Some social disruption (e.g. people delayed) Major Significant irreversible adverse health effects affecting individuals and requiring hospitalisation and/or reversible adverse health effects reaching beyond the immediate community Long term/irreversible damage to localised ecosystem but no species loss Measurable adverse effect on GDP, some long term (more than five years) job losses Social disruption to surrounding community, including some evacuations Massive Significant irreversible adverse health effects reaching beyond the immediate community and/or deaths Extensive irreversible ecosystem damage, including species loss Significant on-going adverse effect on GDP, long term job losses on a national basis Major social disruption with entire surrounding area evacuated and impacts on wider community Decision NOC07006 Page 14 of 24 Table 2 Magnitude of beneficial effect (benefits) Descriptor Examples of descriptions -BENEFICIAL Minimal Mild short term positive health effects to individuals in highly localised area Highly localised and contained environmental impact, affecting a few (less than ten) individuals members of communities of flora or fauna, no discernible ecosystem impact Local/regional short-term beneficial economic effects on small organisations (businesses, individuals), temporary job creation No social effect Minor Mild short term beneficial health effects to identified and isolated groups Localised and contained beneficial environmental impact, no discernible ecosystem impact Regional beneficial economic effects on small organisations (businesses, individuals) lasting less than six months, temporary job creation Minor localised community benefit Moderate Minor health benefits to individuals and/or medium term health impacts on larger (but surrounding) community and health status groups Measurable benefit to localised plant and animal communities expected to pertain to medium term. Medium term (one to five years) regional beneficial economic effects with some national implications, medium term job creation Local community and some individuals beyond immediate community receive social benefit. Major Significant beneficial health effects to localised community and specific groups in wider community Long term benefit to localised ecosystem(s) Measurable beneficial effect on GDP, some long term (more than five years) job creation Substantial social benefit to surrounding community, and individuals in wider community. Massive Significant long term beneficial health effects to the wider community Long term, wide spread benefits to species and/or ecosystems Significant on-going effect beneficial on GDP, long term job creation on a national basis Major social benefit affecting wider community Decision NOC07006 Page 15 of 24 Likelihood in this context applies to the composite likelihood of the end effect, and not either to the initiating event, or any one of the intermediary events. It includes: the concept of an initiating event (triggering the hazard), and the exposure pathway that links the source (hazard) and the area of impact (public health, environment, economy, or community). Thus, the likelihood is not the likelihood of an organism escaping, or the frequency of accidents for trucks containing hazardous substances, but the likelihood of the specified adverse effect2 resulting from that initiating event. It will be a combination of the likelihood of the initiating event and several intermediary likelihoods3. The best way to determine the likelihood is to specify and analyse the complete pathway from source to impact. Likelihood may be expressed as a frequency or a probability. While frequency is often expressed as a number of events within a given time period, it may also be expressed as the number of events per head of (exposed) population. As a probability, the likelihood is dimensionless and refers to the number of events of interest divided by the total number of events (range 0-1). Table 3 Likelihood Descriptor Description 1 Highly improbable Almost certainly not occurring but cannot be totally ruled out 2 Improbable (remote) Only occurring in very exceptional circumstances. 3 Very unlikely Considered only to occur in very unusual circumstances 4 Unlikely (occasional) Could occur, but is not expected to occur under normal operating conditions. 5 Likely A good chance that it may occur under normal operating conditions. 6 Very likely Expected to occur if all conditions met 7 Extremely likely Almost certain 2 The specified effect refers to scenarios established in order to establish the representative risk, and may be as specific as x people suffering adverse health effects, or y% of a bird population being adversely affected. The risks included in the analysis may be those related to a single scenario, or may be defined as a combination of several scenarios. 3 Decision NOC07006 Qualitative event tree analysis may be a useful way of ensuring that all aspects are included. Page 16 of 24 Using the magnitude and likelihood tables a matrix representing a level of risk can be constructed. In the example shown in Table 4, six levels of risk are allocated: A, B, C, D, E and F. These terms have been used to avoid confusion with the descriptions used for likelihood and magnitude, and to emphasise that the matrix is a tool to help decide which risks (benefits) require further analysis to determine their significance in the decision making process. The lowest level (A) is, in most circumstances, equivalent to ‘negligible’. In this table ‘A’ is given to three combinations; minimal impact and an occurrence of improbable or highly improbable, and minor impact with a highly improbable occurrence. For negative effects, the levels are used to show how risks can be reduced by the application of additional controls. Where the table is used for positive effects it may also be possible for controls to be applied to ensure that a particular level of benefit is achieved, but this is not a common approach. The purpose of developing the tables for both risk and benefit is so that the risks and benefits can be compared. Table 4 Level of risk Magnitude of effect Likelihood Minimal Minor Moderate Major Massive Highly improbable A A B C D Improbable A B C D E Very unlikely B C D E E Unlikely C D E E F Likely D E E F F Very likely E E F F F Extremely likely E F F F F The table presented here is symmetric around an axis from highly improbable and minimal to massive and extremely likely, however, this will not necessarily be the case in all applications. Impact of uncertainty in estimates Uncertainty may be taken into account in two ways. Firstly, when describing a risk a range of descriptors may be used. For example, a risk may be allocated a range of very unlikely- improbable, and minor-major. This would put the range of the risk as B through E. Alternatively, the level of risk (or benefit) may be adjusted after it has been estimated on the grounds of uncertainty. Decision NOC07006 Page 17 of 24 Appendix 3: Decision Pathway and explanatory notes Decision path for applications to import into containment any new organism (non GMO) Context This decision path describes the decision-making process for applications to import into containment any new organism that is not a GMO. These applications are made under section 40 of the HSNO Act, and determined under section 45 of the Act. Applications to import a new organism into containment require consideration of section 44 (section 37 plus ability to escape). Section 37 refers to the ability of the organism to form an undesirable selfsustaining population and ease of eradication. Introduction The purpose of the decision path is to provide the Authority with guidance so that all relevant matters in the HSNO Act and the Methodology have been addressed. It does not attempt to direct the weighting that the Authority may decide to make on individual aspects of an application. In this document ‘section’ refers to sections of the HSNO Act, and ‘clause’ refers to clauses of the ERMA New Zealand Methodology. The decision path has two parts – Flowchart (a logic diagram showing the process prescribed in the Methodology and the HSNO Act to be followed in making a decision), and Explanatory notes (discussion of each step of the process). Of necessity the words in the boxes in the flowchart are brief, and key words are used to summarise the activity required. The explanatory notes provide a comprehensive description of each of the numbered items in the flowchart, and describe the processes that should be followed to achieve the described outcome. For proper interpretation of the decision path it is important to work through the flowchart in conjunction with the explanatory notes. Decision NOC07006 Page 18 of 24 Figure 12 FLOWCHART: Decision path for applications to import into containment any NO (non GMO) (application made under section 40 of the Act and determined under section 45 of the Act) Decision NOC07006 Page 19 of 24 Figure 12 EXPLANATORY NOTES An application may include a number of organisms or may be for a ‘generic’ application. In both of these cases the organisms having similar risk profiles should be grouped into categories. Each category should be considered separately via the path below. Items 1, 2 & 3: The information that should be reviewed includes the application, the E&R Report and supporting documentation. In addition there may in some cases be information provided by experts and submitters. The review of information should occur in terms of section 40(2) of the Act and the following clauses of the Methodology – 8 (relevance and appropriateness of information), 15 and 16 (submissions), 20 (information from other jurisdictions), and 23 (further information). Additional information may need to be sought under section 52 or 58 of the Act. Item 4: If the applicant is unable to provide sufficient information for consideration then the application is not approved. In these circumstances the Authority may choose to decline the application, or the application may lapse. Item 5: Section 39(1) of the Act specifies the purposes for which the Authority may approve importation of a new organism. Item 6: Clearly identify the scope of the organism description with particular reference to whether the application is generic, or refers to a number of organisms. Item 7: Identify risks, costs and benefits The range of risks, costs and benefits to be identified should be that covered by clauses 9 and 10 of the Methodology (sections 5 and 6 of the Act). There are two steps within this part of the process: Step 1: Identify all risks, costs and benefits (adverse and beneficial effects) that can be thought of, to provide a starting position that is as comprehensive as possible. For adverse effects this will require identifying the hazards and pathways. For beneficial effects, this will require identifying the nature, sources, and pathways. Step 2: Undertake a preliminary evaluation of all risks, costs and benefits and remove from further consideration all those that can be readily concluded to be not potentially significant, having regard to the characteristics of the organism and the circumstances of the application. All risks, costs and benefits that are not judged to be potentially significant and which are not carried through to assessment should be documented and a record of why they have not been carried through to assessment maintained. Decision NOC07006 Page 20 of 24 Item 8: Section 45(2) requires the application of controls for all applicable matters specified in the 3rd Schedule. The Authority may consider other controls to give effect to the purpose of the Act. The impact of these controls also needs to be considered. Item 9: Assess risks (and costs) Assess all risks (and costs) identified in Item 7 as being potentially significant. Most of these risks and costs will relate to matters in sections 5 & 6 of the Act. In undertaking this assessment the Authority must take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (section 8, and clause 9(c)(iv)). The assessment should also consider the following matters listed below that have particular relevance for these types of applications. The ability of the organism to escape from containment (section 44) Although strictly speaking, this requirement applies only to field test applications and not to import or development applications (see section 45(1)(a)(ii)), it is prudent and good practice to consider it anyway. This element must be considered in an integrated way in the assessment process because the ability to escape depends on the containment controls set. Self-sustaining population (section 37). Section 37 of the Act requires the consideration to have regard to the ability of the organism to establish an undesirable self sustaining population and the ease of eradication if it were to establish such a population. Undesirable means (in effect) able to create significant risks. Additional matters Other matters to be considered in the assessment are: the extent to which the risk will be mitigated by the setting of containment and other controls, including the mandatory controls in the Act; and the extent to which the risk will be mitigated by the ability to eradicate the organism if it becomes established. The Methodology The assessment of risks (and costs) should be carried out in accordance with the following clauses of the Methodology - 22 (risks, costs and benefits), 25 (scientific information, uncertainty and other values), 29 to 32 (scientific and technical uncertainty), 12 to 14 (assessment of risks, costs and benefits and relevant risks, costs and benefits), 24 (recognised techniques) and 33 (approach to risk). Each risk (and associated cost) should be assessed individually, considering also the level of risk if containment or other controls fail, as well as the probability of such a failure. The approach to risk and the approach to uncertainty are addressed separately. Although the issue of how risk averse to be and that of dealing with uncertainties are different, in practical terms they are often addressed using similar approaches. The following three steps are not sequential and must be taken together for each risk: Decision NOC07006 Page 21 of 24 Estimate magnitude and likelihood (probability) Estimate the magnitude of the identified adverse effect if it should occur, and the likelihood of it occurring (pathway). In estimating the magnitude of the adverse effect take into account the extent to which the risk might be mitigated by how or whether it might be possible to eradicate the organism if a significant adverse effect eventuated (section 37). The risk characteristics listed below under ‘approach to risk’ will affect the estimate of the magnitude of the effect. When estimating the likelihood of the effect occurring, consider the full pathway, that is, all the possible steps that must occur before the final identified effect is realised. Estimating the likelihood requires combining (multiplying) all of the individual likelihoods for each link in the chain of events. Approach to risk (clause 33) When considering applications, the Authority must have regard to the extent to which the following risk characteristics set out in clause 33 exist: a) Exposure to the risk is involuntary: b) The risk will persist over time: c) The risk is subject to uncontrollable spread and is likely to extend its effects beyond the immediate location of incidence: d) The potential adverse effects are irreversible: e) The risk is not known or understood by the general public and there is little experience or understanding of possible measures for managing the potential adverse effects. Consider each risk in terms of the factors listed and decide whether to be risk averse by giving additional weight to that risk. This may be done as part of estimating the magnitude of the effect or where this is not relevant, it may be done separately. Where the Authority chooses to be risk averse, and there is uncertainty as well, the approach to risk may be consolidated with the approach to uncertainty by adopting a conservative approach such as the worst feasible case scenario. Decision NOC07006 Page 22 of 24 Approach to uncertainty (section 7 and clauses 29-32) Uncertainty For each component (magnitude and likelihood) consider the degree of uncertainty associated with the estimation of each component. In some cases it may be clear that the uncertainty could be reduced by gathering further information (undertaking more scientific tests, or extending the literature search). Before requesting or seeking further information it is important to consider how important the uncertainty is in terms of the decision (clause 29(a) – materiality), and to essentially consider the cost-effectiveness of gathering further information. Another approach to addressing uncertainty is to look at a range of scenarios and consider a best feasible-worst feasible scenario range. However, where there is a large degree of uncertainty, this may not be particularly meaningful for calculating the level of risk. In other cases, calculating the level of risk for each end of the range may result in a fairly similar level of risk. Where this does not occur, rather than presenting a wide range in the level of risk it may be better to concentrate on analysing why the uncertainty occurs and whether or not there is any obvious way of resolving it. Section 7 of the Act requires the Authority to be cautious where there is scientific and technical uncertainty. Caution may be applied by adopting a conservative approach in assessing risks, for example, adopting the worst feasible case scenario in calculating the level of risk. Additional controls Controls additional to those mandated in section 45(2) of the Act (see item 8) will need to be considered, in order to mitigate risks to whatever level is considered to be appropriate, and to provide adequate containment. Controls need to provide for the matters set out in the 3rd Schedule as well as providing for any other matters that are required to give effect to the purpose of the Act. Item 10: Consider each of the assessed risks in turn and determine whether it is negligible. Take into account the particular characteristics of the organism and the context of the application. Consider also the cumulative effect of the assessed risks. If each of the risks is considered to be negligible, but the risks cumulatively are not negligible, then take the clause 27 path. This may not be relevant to containment applications. At this point the decision path branches. Where all risks are negligible, and the cumulative effect of the risks is considered to be negligible then take the clause 26 option and move to item 11. If one or more of the risks is considered to be nonnegligible, or the cumulative sum of the risks is non-negligible, then take the clause 27 option and move to item 13. Decision NOC07006 Page 23 of 24 Item 11: If risks are negligible and there are no external non-negligible costs, then the fact that the application has been submitted is deemed to demonstrate existence of benefit, and no further benefits need be considered. The application can then be approved under clause 26 (via item 12). If risks are negligible, but there are non-negligible external costs then the decision must be made under clause 27 (via items 13 and 14). Item 12: If the organism description was revised in item 15, the considerations in this item should relate to the revised organism description. If, as a result of this consideration, further revision of the organism description is required, the determination as to whether the organism can be adequately contained should be repeated for the new organism description. Item 13: If some of the risks or external costs are non-negligible, or the cumulative sum of the risks and costs is non-negligible then assess the benefits in terms of clause 13 of the Methodology. Estimate the benefits in terms of the magnitude of the beneficial effect if it should occur, and the likelihood of it occurring. As for risks, there may be uncertainty about the benefits and this should be addressed in a similar manner to that described in item 9. Item 14: Weigh up the adverse and beneficial effects (costs, risks and benefits), applying clause 34 of the Methodology (aggregation and dominant effects). While the approach to risk has been considered for each individual risk it should also be applied to a review of the aggregate effect with respect to all risks. A similar approach should be taken to uncertainty, with reference to clause 29(b) (materiality), and section 7 (caution). Item 15: At this step the scope of the organism description for generic applications should be reviewed. If changes are made to the organism description, items 6 to 14 above should be repeated for the revised organism description. Then the weighing up process in this item for the revised organism description should also be repeated. The scope of the organism description has been identified in item 6. This step in the decision-making process confirms the scope of the organism description in such a way that the risk boundaries are defined. Controls have been considered at the earlier stages of the process (items 8, 9, and 12). However, this step confirms and sets the controls. Controls flow from, but are considered in conjunction with, the organism description. If controls are changed at this point, the previous steps from item 7 onwards need to be repeated. Decision NOC07006 Page 24 of 24