Evaluation of Intuition 1
Running Head: AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF INTUITION
Should Emotions Have a Stake in Decision-Making? An Empirical Evaluation of Intuition.
Skyler G. Jacobs
Thesis completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Honors Program in the
Psychological Sciences
Under the Direction of Dr. Craig Smith and Dr. Leslie Kirby
Vanderbilt University
April 2011
Evaluation of Intuition 2
Abstract
The construct of intuition has gained recent attention in the literature on decision-making and
emotion. Of particular interest are measures of decision-making style that claim to assess
individual differences in intuitiveness and deliberativeness. Study one analyzed the extent to
which these measures assess intuitiveness and deliberativeness, developed a brief, derived
measure of decision-making style, and explored suspected dispositional correlates of decisionmaking style. Study two explored the effects of individual differences in intuitiveness and
deliberativeness on quality of interpretation in an experiment in which participants provided
advice to a fictional person in a moral dilemma under experimentally manipulated time pressure.
Key dispositional features of decision-making style as well as key features of intuitiveness and
deliberativeness in practice are identified and discussed.
Evaluation of Intuition 3
Should Emotions Have a Stake in Decision-Making? An Empirical Evaluation of Intuition.
Suppose you plan to get married. You meet someone and marry him/her in the same day.
You do not bother to consider anyone else. You meet, spend the day together, and get married
that night; it just feels right. You are unsure of your new spouse’s family history, religious
beliefs, political inclinations, and views on raising children, but you are not worried. You know
that whom you choose to marry will greatly impact your quality of life, but you are comfortable
basing your choice on a “feeling” you experience after spending a single day together.
Most of us would deem this a poorly made decision. It is widely believed that when faced
with an important decision, one should think “hard” about the choice—break it into simpler
pieces, analyze each piece individually, and anticipate the consequences of each alternative—
only then can an informed decision be made. We commonly employ strategies such as “TCharts” based on the belief that organizing the available information into concrete reasons that
can be weighed against one another will provide greater insight into the “right” choice. Because
humans are uniquely endowed with the introspective ability to think about our thoughts, we tend
to assume that good decisions are the result of careful, conscious deliberation.
Intuition v. Reasoning
Contrary to popular belief, recent research suggests that reasoning may not be the most
effective mechanism for decision-making in all cases and provides support for an alternative, less
wieldy approach to decision-making: intuition. Nicknamed the “go with your gut” approach,
intuition can be conceptualized as rapid interpretation of low-level feelings of ease or unease.
Unlike reasoning, which relies on slow, conscious, serial analyses of limited judgments, intuition
is driven by associative processing of affective signals (Smith & Kirby, 2000). Because
associative processing allows for fast, automatic, and simultaneous analyses of unlimited
Evaluation of Intuition 4
information, recent research suggests that intuition may present a better mechanism for complex,
affective decisions in which there are multiple abstract factors, while reasoning may be more
suited for simple, utilitarian decisions in which there are few, concrete factors (Dijksterhuis, Bos,
Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). Without the need for conscious awareness, intuition guards
against the threat of suboptimal weighting, has the flexibility of a greater processing capacity
that does not rely on semantics, and results in less instances of reduced post-choice satisfaction
making it well-suited to many of life’s most nuanced and fundamental decisions (Wilson &
Schooler, 1991; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Smith & Kirby, 2000; Wilson & Kraft, 1993; Wilson, Lisle,
Schooler, Hodges, Klaaren, and LaFleur, 1993; Dijksterhuis and van Olden, 2006).
Suboptimal Weighting. The effectiveness of intuition as a mechanism for complex
decision-making is bolstered by the absence of the threat of suboptimal weighting present in the
reasoning process (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Reasoning involves successive, discrete analyses
of semantically encoded components that are ascribed a certain value or weight within the
holistic decision (Smith & Kirby, 2000). Implicit within this process is great potential for skew
or suboptimal weighting of the factors relevant to the decision.
Wilson and Schooler (1991) demonstrated the phenomenon of suboptimal weighting in a
study that compared participants’ preferences for different brands of strawberry jam with the
ratings of trained sensory experts. In the first condition, participants simply tasted each jam and
ranked them from best to worst. In the second condition, participants did the same but were
provided with the list of criteria used by the sensory experts to consider while deliberating. The
presence of ranking criterion in the second group induced reasoning of numerous complex and
esoteric factors, while the first group was free to make more preferential decisions based on the
Evaluation of Intuition 5
most salient features of the jam. Results indicated that rankings by the first group reflected expert
opinion more consistently than rankings by the second group.
Wilson and Schooler (1991) argued that forced reasoning in the second condition resulted
in less optimal decision-making because participants engaged in suboptimal weighting of the
various criteria used by the trained sensory experts. The presence of ranking criteria in the
second condition provided participants with additional reasons on which to base their decisions;
however, because participants lacked the expertise to successfully evaluate and weight the
criteria, these conditions increased the likelihood of suboptimal weighting. Even though the first
group also lacked expertise, their own preferences showed greater consistency with the
preferences of the experts, because they remained ignorant of criteria they were not qualified to
assess and based their decisions on the most relevant features of jam such as taste and texture.
By taking a relatively simple decision, jam preference, and imbuing it with complexity, Wilson
and Schooler’s jam study establishes the effectiveness of an intuitive approach for complexdecision-making in which we lack expertise.
Limited Processing Capacity of Consciousness. The limited processing capacity of
consciousness can also explain the threat of suboptimal weighting by restricting the amount of
information available for simultaneous consideration during reasoning (Dijksterhuis, 2004). The
maximum amount of information that can be consciously considered at one time is about seven
(plus or minus two) units, while the unconscious can simultaneously draw upon anywhere from
40-60 units of information per second (Dijksterhuis, 2004). As a consciously mediated process,
reasoning limits our consideration to some, but not all, factors relevant to a decision, while
intuition, an associatively mediated process, has the unconscious capacity for many relevant
factors. Without the ability to simultaneously weight all of the factors relevant to a decision
Evaluation of Intuition 6
against one another, reasoning is less suited than intuition for making accurate, holistic
assessments of complex decisions.
Furthermore, in addition to restricting the number of factors that we can simultaneously
evaluate, the limited capacity of consciousness also limits the type of information available for
conscious consideration to that which can be semantically encoded (Smith & Kirby, 2000). As an
affectively charged process unencumbered by consciousness, intuition accommodates the
inclusion of sensations and instincts that cannot be formally articulated into the decision-making
process, while reasoning discards or dilutes sensations these feelings for semantics. Yet, it is well
established that emotions are both informative and have desirable and adaptive effects on
decision-making, suggesting that pure reasoning may eclipse meaningful sensations and lead to
less optimal outcomes (Smith & Kirby, 2000).
Wilson and Kraft (1993) demonstrated this phenomenon in a study that required
participants to list and evaluate reasons for being in romantic relationships. After providing an
initial report about how they felt about their relationships and specific partners, one group of
participants was asked to provide reasons for their feelings, while the other group was asked to
consider an unrelated topic. Participants in the forced-reasoning condition brought to mind
thoughts that were inconsistent with their initial reports and changed their attitudes in the
direction of those reasons, while participants who reasoned about an unrelated topic
demonstrated little attitude change.
Wilson and Kraft (1993) argued that participants who were forced to reason through their
feelings could not adequately translate the sensations into words, but rather came up with
superficial list of reasons that skewed their original feelings about their relationships and partners
with enough significance to prompt attitude change in the opposite direction. These findings
Evaluation of Intuition 7
suggest that emotions, despite their semantic incongruence, are not only germane to the decisionmaking process, but also often lead to less optimal decision-making when excluded, providing
evidence for intuition over reasoning as the best mechanism for decisions that are affective in
nature.
Reduced Post-Choice Satisfaction. Whether it is the result of suboptimal weighting, the
limited capacity of the consciousness, or both, construal of the factors involved in a decision has
measurable effects on post-choice satisfaction. Because the quality of our choices is subjective to
decision-makers—there is no universal standard that predicts decision quality—post-choice
satisfaction is an important operationalized, self-report measure of decision quality. Wilson,
Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, Klaaren, and LaFleur (1993) demonstrated an association between
reasoning and reduced post-choice satisfaction in a poster study. In the study participants were
instructed to select a poster of their choice to keep. In one condition, the group was instructed to
quickly select a poster. In the other condition the group was instructed to provide reasons for
their selection (Wilson et al., 1993). Upon follow-up with the participants three weeks later,
Wilson et al. found that those who had reasoned their choice demonstrated less post-choice
satisfaction than those who had simply chosen a poster (Wilson et al., 1993).
Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) confirmed and extended the findings of Wilson et al.
(1993) by demonstrating that variation in time of post-choice evaluation did not mediate
satisfaction. Whether participants took a test of post-satisfaction a few weeks or a few months
after selecting their poster they still demonstrated less post-choice satisfaction than the control
group, maintaining that reasoning increases the likelihood of reduced post-choice satisfaction.
Additionally, Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006) added another condition to their study in which
participants viewed the posters, were distracted by an unrelated task, and then instructed to
Evaluation of Intuition 8
immediately choose a poster. Result indicated that this third group of unconscious deliberators
demonstrated greater post-choice satisfaction of any condition. Dijksterhuis and van Olden
argued that unconscious deliberation led to higher rates of post-choice satisfaction, because the
unrelated distraction task allowed participants to unconsciously mull over each choice in order to
inform their eventual decision, provides support that unconscious deliberation increases postchoice satisfaction. Together the findings of Wilson et al. (1993) and Dijksterhuis & van Olden
(2006) suggest that intuition, a minimally conscious process, may be a more successful, optimal
approach to decision-making than reasoning (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006).
As human beings we will all encounter complex, affective decisions in which we lack the
necessary expertise to identify and evaluate all of the relevant factors. In fact, many of life’s
most impactful decisions, such as mate selection or deciding to have children, involve an implicit
amount of uncertainty and reliance on gut; leaps of faith. Even if we were able to anticipate all of
factors relevant to such decisions, the limited processing capacity of the consciousness makes it
unlikely that we could accurately determine how much influence or weight each factor should
carry within the decision unless we have sufficient experience. Yet, the majority of us will not
choose a spouse or have enough children to make these types of decisions with enough
frequency to develop expertise. Furthermore, emotions, an undeniably significant source of
motivation in decision-making of this nature, must be adequately accounted for and considered.
Taken as a whole, the current literature on intuition and reasoning suggest that many of life’s
most nuanced and pivotal decisions, those of which are undeniably complex and affective in
nature, benefit from a more intuitive approach, and that applying reasoning to such decisions
may result in less optimal outcomes.
Evaluation of Intuition 9
Individual Differences in Decision-Making
Regardless of the approach, the inclination to base our decision-making on a specific
deliberative process affects the information that we use, how we consider that information, and
the satisfaction we experience after our decision has been made (Betsch, 2008). Recent interest
in individual differences in decision-making has prompted the development of several scales to
measure individual differences in decsion-making (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Betsch, 2008; Scott
& Bruce, 1995; Burns & D’Zurilla, 1999). Most of the current decision-making style scales
include subscales that identify intuitiveness and deliberativeness, while some also include
additional constructs. Because subscales for intuitiveness and deliberativeness are separate, and
are not mutually exclusive, it is possible to demonstrate high or low preference for both
intuitiveness and deliberativeness, just one, or neither. Four of the most prominent decisionmaking style inventories include: The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) (Pacini & Epstein,
1999), the Preference For Intuition or Deliberation Scale (PID) (Betsch, 2008), the General
Decision-Making Scale (GDMS) (Scott & Bruce, 1995), and the Perceived Modes of Processing
Inventory (PID) (Burns & D’Zurilla, 1999).
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). Pacini and Epstein’s (1999) RationalExperiential Inventory (REI) consists of 40 items rated on a five-point Likert scale designed to
assess preferences for rationality and experientiality information processing. The measure
proposes that people process information on two, parallel, interactive systems. The rationality
subscale, measured by an adapted Need for Cognition scale emphasizes a conscious, analytical
approach (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). While the experientiality subscale, measured by the Faith in
Intuition (FI) scale, emphasizes a pre-conscious, affective, holistic approach (Pacini & Epstein,
1999). The REI differs from other decision-making style scales in that it assesses individuals’
Evaluation of Intuition 10
beliefs about their ability to successfully use their preferred mode in addition to individual
preference. (Betsch & Iannello, 2010).
Preference for Intuition or Deliberation Scale (PID). Betsch’s (2008) Preference for
Intuition or Deliberation Scale (PID) consists of 18 items rated on a five-point Likert scale that
evaluates intuitiveness with its subscale: preference for intuition, and deliberativeness with its
subscale: preference for deliberation. The PID differentiates between intuition and deliberation
by the information source. Intuition is explicitly stated to rely on affect and implicit knowledge,
while deliberation relies on explicit knowledge and are considered in a rule-governed way
(Betsch, 2008). While most other decision-making style scales measure information processing
in general, the PID differs from other scales in its explicit assessment of strategy preference in
decision-making situations (Betsch & Iannello, 2010).
General Decision-making Style Scale (GDMS). Scott and Bruce’s (1995) General
Decision-making Scale (GDMS) consists of 25 items rated on a five-point Likert scale. The
items are distributed among five subscales of decision-making style: rational style, intuitive
style, dependent style, avoidant style, and spontaneous style. Rational style is characterized by
logical analysis and evaluation of alternates while, intuitive style is characterized by attention to
detail in information flow (Scott & Bruce, 1995). The GDMS measures decision-making style in
a much broader sense than other decision-making scales, going beyond simply intuition and
reasoning with three additional subscales that are not found in the other decision-making style
measures (Betsch & Iannello, 2010).
Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI). Burns and D’Zurilla’s (1999)
Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PMPI) consists of 18 items rated on a five-point
Likert scale. The PMPI is used to assess a person’s awareness and perception of his/her dominant
Evaluation of Intuition 11
mode of information processing. The scale measures three different processing styles: rational
processing, emotional processing, and automatic processing (Burns & D’Zurilla, 1999). Unlike
other decision-making style scales, the PMPI claims to measure coping-style. However, the
PMPI’s automatic and emotional processing subscales measure intuition in a uniquely nuanced
way by distinguishing between the affective and cognitive features of intuition, while reasoning
is measured more directly by the rational processing subscale (Betsch & Iannello, 2010).
Though slightly varied, each measures of decision-making style measures individual
differences in intuitiveness and deliberativeness. Identification of individuals’ decision-making
style would allow people to seek conditions that promote decisional fit in order to optimize the
outcome of their decisions (Betsch & Kunz, 2008). Additionally, pairing knowledge of decisionmaking style with an understanding of optimal decision-making mechanisms by case—intuition
in the case of complex, affective decisions and reasoning in the case of simple, utilitarian
decisions—would allow individuals to anticipate the circumstances in which their characteristic
decision-making style is most or least beneficial. In theory, this knowledge should provide
individuals with the ability to optimize the outcome of their decisions by maintaining or
modifying their characteristic tendencies by case as needed.
Research Aims
This research aimed to further our understanding of intuition as both a general construct
and preferred mode of decision-making. The first study determined the degree to which the
different measures of decision-making style truly assessed intuitiveness and deliberativeness by
examining intercorrelation across scales. The first study also assessed the relationship between
intuition and various correlates. Findings from the first study contribute to our understanding of
how intuition is conceptualized and measured within the literature. An additional aim of the first
Evaluation of Intuition 12
study was to generate a brief, composite measure of decision-making style, based on the four
scales, to use in the second study. The second study compared the nature of interpretations made
by intuitives (those who demonstrate high levels of intuitiveness) and deliberatives (those who
demonstrate high levels of deliberativeness). Participants responded to a moral dilemma that
favored intuitive style under conditions that either promoted or inhibited deliberative style by
manipulating time pressure. Findings from the second study contribute to our understanding of
individual differences in decision-making and their effects on interpretation quality.
Study 1
The following study is a comparative analysis of four major decision-making style
inventories: the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), the Preference
For Intuition or Deliberation Scale (PID) (Betsch, 2008), the General Decision-Making Scale
(GDMS) (Scott & Bruce, 1995), and the Perceived Modes of Processing Inventory (PID) (Burns
& D’Zurilla, 1999), all of which claim to measure both intuitiveness and deliberativeness. The
following study explores how well each scale measures these constructs and to what extent
intuitiveness and deliberativeness are conceptualized similarly across the scales. Additionally,
conceptual analysis of the four scales and face validity of their individual items, allowed us to
generate a brief, composite measures of decision-making style for use in study two.
The present study also assessed the construct of intuition as it relates to other variables
such as emotional intelligence, mindfulness, outcome-related measures, personality, and
appraisal style. As an affectively charged process, it is likely that individual differences in
preference for intuition might exist based on individual differences in sensitivity to emotional
signals. Thus, we expected intuitiveness to be positively associated with emotional intelligence,
and deliberativeness to negatively associated with emotional intelligence. Salovey and Mayer
Evaluation of Intuition 13
(1990) define emotional intelligence as “a subset of social intelligence that involves the ability to
monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, and use this
information to guide one’s thinking and actions. Individuals classified as high on emotional
intelligence are thought to be sensitive to the emotional signals their body generates, and to be
adept at using these signals in guiding their behavior. Thus, successful reliance on affective
processing should reinforce emotionally intelligent individuals’ intuitiveness over time.
Based on the same principle, we expected deliberativeness to be positively associated
with mindfulness and Alexithymia, and intuitiveness to be negatively associated with
mindfulness and Alexithymia. Mindfulness is bringing one’s complete attention to the
experiences occurring in the present moment in a non-judging and accepting way, while
Alexithymia is a personality trait indicating deficiency in understanding, processing, and
describing emotions (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Bagby, Parker, &
Taylor, 1994). Individuals high on mindfulness and Alexithymia are adept at viewing things
objectively and without affect or attachment, such that their emotional feelings do not influence
their perceptions. Thus, successful filtering of emotional signals should reinforce mindful and
Alexithymic individuals’ deliberativeness over time.
Furthermore, based on the hypothesized relationship between intuitiveness and the use of
emotional signals, we are able to make further inferences about the relationship between
decision-making style and various outcome-related measures. Like emotional intelligence, we
expected intuitiveness to be positively associated with self-esteem and satisfaction with life, and
negatively correlated with state-trait anxiety (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). We also assessed the
relationship between decision-making style and personality. Our treatment of these analyses was
more exploratory, and we did not have any concrete expectations.
Evaluation of Intuition 14
Finally, because emotional signals play such a prominent role in intuition, we suspected
that intuitiveness was probably also related to appraisal. Appraisals are meaning analyses that
serve as the cognitive antecedents of emotions, such that given appraisals predict given
emotional responses (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). At the same time, two individuals may appraise
the same situation differently, and therefore may exhibit characteristic appraisal styles (Smith &
Lazarus, 1990). We expected intuitiveness to be positively correlated with emotion-focused
coping potential, appraisal of one’s ability to emotionally adjust to one’s circumstances, such
that people who demonstrated high levels of intuitiveness would appraise their emotion-focused
coping potential to be high. Our treatment of the other aspects of appraisal style—problemfocused coping potential, motivational relevance, and motivation congruence—was more
exploratory, and we did not have any concrete expectations.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Online users participated in a large-scale survey used to validate measures of
intuitiveness. Participants accessed the survey from websites in which they could volunteer to
participate in ongoing psychological research. Participants were 388 online users, 85 of which
were male and 303 of which were female. Participants’ ages ranged from 18-63 with a mean age
of 25. The majorities were Caucasian, currently located in North America, and classified
themselves as students. Participants completed the survey online at a time and pace of their
choosing.
Measures
The survey included measures of decision-making style and suspected correlates of
intuitiveness and deliberativeness.
Evaluation of Intuition 15
Decision-Making Style. Four separate scales measured decision-making style. Each
measure was evaluated on a five-point Likert scale in which 1= not at all true of me, 2= slightly
true of me, 3= moderately true of me, 4= very true of me, and 5= extremely true of me. The first
scale was the 40-item Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The REI
has two subscales: 1) rationality and 2) experientiality. In the present study the internal
consistencies (alpha) for rationality and experientiality was .87 and .92, respectively. Construct
validity of the REI has been verified through correlations with the NEO-FFI (Koele & Dietvorst,
2010). The REI’s rationality subscale correlates positively with the NEO-FFI subscales of
openness to experience (.44) and conscientiousness (.32), and correlates negatively with the
subscale of neuroticism (-.38) (Koele & Dietvorst, 2010). However, the REI’s experientiality
subscale shows no substantial correlations with any of the NEO-FFI factors (Koele & Dietvorst,
2010).
The second scale included as a measure of decision-making style was the 17-item
Preference For Intuition or Deliberation Scale (PID) (Betsch, 2008). The PID has two subscales:
1) preference for intuition and 2) preference for deliberation. In the present study internal
consistencies (alpha) for preference for intuition and preference for deliberation was.78 and .79,
respectively. Construct validity for the PID has been verified by correlations between the PID
and REI in which the preference for deliberation subscale of the PID and the rationality subscale
of the REI demonstrate moderate correlation (.51), and the preference for intuition subscale of
the PID and experientiality subscale of the REI demonstrate strong correlation (.84) (Koele &
Dietvorst, 2010).
The third scale included as a measure of decision-making style was the 24-item General
Decision-Making Scale (GDMS) (Scott & Bruce, 1995). The GDMS has five subscales: 1)
Evaluation of Intuition 16
rational style, 2) intuitive style, 3) dependent style, 4) avoidant style, and 5) spontaneous style. In
the present study the internal consistencies (alpha) for rational style, intuitive style, dependent
style, avoidant style, and spontaneous style was .76, .78, .90, .90, and .85, respectively. Little has
been concluded about the construct validity of the GMDS (Koele & Dietvorst, 2010).
The fourth and final scale that measured decision-making style was the 32-item Perceived
Modes of Processing Inventory (PID) (Burns & D’Zurilla, 1999). The PMPI has three subscales:
1) rational processing, 2) emotional processing, and 3) automatic processing. In the present study
the internal consistencies (alpha) for rational processing, emotional processing, and automatic
processing was .89, .88, and .83, respectively. Construct validity for the PMPI has been verified
by correlations between the PMPI and REI in which the rational processing subscale of the PMPI
was positively correlated with the rational subscale of the REI, while the automatic processing
subscale of the PMPI was positively correlated with the experiential subscale of the REI (Koele
& Dietvorst, 2010).
Finally, based on a conceptual analysis of the four decision-making style scales and the
face validity of their individual items, we selected a subset of 18 items, drawing on a couple of
items from each scale, to generate a brief, composite measure of decision-making style to use in
study two. The brief measure’s individual items and their associated scales of origin are listed in
Appendix A. The brief measure includes two subscales: 1) intuitiveness and 2) deliberativeness.
Nine items were used to measure intuitiveness: two items from the experiential subscale of the
REI, three items from the preference for intuition subscale of the PID, two items from the
intuitive style subscale of the GDMS, and two items from the emotional processing subscale of
the PMPI. In the present study the internal consistency (alpha) of the brief intuitiveness measure
was .87. Nine items were also used to measure deliberativeness: two items from the rational
Evaluation of Intuition 17
subscale of the REI, three items from the preference for deliberation subscale of the PID, two
items from the rational style subscale of the GDMS, and two measures from the rational
processing subscale of the PMPI. In the present study the internal consistency (alpha) of the brief
deliberativeness measure was .82.
Correlates of Intuitiveness and Deliberativeness. Hypothesized correlates of decisionmaking style included emotional intelligence, mindfulness, Alexithymia, outcome-related
measures, personality, and appraisal style. The 48-item Trait Meta Mood Scale (TMMS) was
used to measure emotional intelligence (Goldman, Kraemer, & Salovey, 1996). The TMMS has
three subscales: 1) attention to mood, 2) clarity in discrimination of feelings, and 3) mood repair.
In the present study the internal consistencies (alpha) for attention to mood, clarity in the
discrimination of feelings, and mood repair was .88, .91, and .86, respectively.
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) was used to measure Alexithymia (Bagby, Parker,
& Taylor, 1994). Only subscales from the TAS determined to be most relevant to decisionmaking style were included in the survey, totaling to 12 items. The TAS subscales selected for
the survey were 1) difficulty identifying feelings and 2) difficulty describing feelings. In the
present study the internal consistencies (alpha) for difficulty identifying feelings and difficulty
describing feelings was .86 and .83 respectively.
The Five Facet Mindfulness Inventory (FFMI) was used to measure mindfulness (Baer,
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). Only FFMI subscales determined to be most
relevant to decision-making style were included in the survey, totaling to 15 items, The FFMI
subscales included in the survey were 1) non-judging of inner experience and 2) non-reactivity to
inner experience. In the present study the internal consistencies (alpha) for non-judging of inner
experience and non-reactivity to inner experience were .91 and .85, respectively.
Evaluation of Intuition 18
Three separate scales measured outcome-related variables. The first scale used to
measure outcome-related variable was the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg,
1965). In the present study the internal consistency (alpha) for the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
was .89. The second scale used to measure outcome-related variables was the 5-item Satisfaction
with Life Scale (SWL) (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). In the present study the
internal consistency (alpha) for the Satisfaction with Life Scale was .89. The third scale used to
measure outcome-related variable was the 20-item trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). In the present study the internal
consistency (alpha) for the STAI was .91.
The 60-item NEO-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) was used to measure features of
personality (Costa & McCrae, 1985). The NEO-FFI has five subscales: 1) openness to
experience, which includes traits like having wide interests, being imaginative, or insightful, 2)
conscientiousness, which includes traits like organized, thorough, and prepared, 3) extraversion,
which includes traits like talkative, energetic, and assertive, 4) agreeableness, which includes
traits like traits like sympathetic, kind, and affectionate and 5) neuroticism, which includes traits
like tense, moody, and anxious. In the present study the internal consistencies (alpha) for
openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism was .78,
.88, .86, .82, and .89, respectively.
Finally, the Cognitive Appraisal Style Questionnaire (CAS), which includes 12 scenarios,
each with 4 corresponding items, totaling to 48 items, was used to measure appraisal style
(David, Kirby, & Smith, 2007). The CAS predicts characteristic appraisals based on personality.
The CAS, as used in the present study, has four subscales: 1) problem-focused coping, which
measures an individual’s belief that he/she can improve his/her current situation, 2) emotion-
Evaluation of Intuition 19
focused coping, which measures an individual’s belief that he/she can accept his/her current
situation, 3) motivational relevance, which measures an individual’s belief about the relative
importance of his/her current situation, and 4) motivational congruence, which measures an
individual’s belief about the desirability of his/her current situation (David, Kirby, & Smith,
2007). In the present study the internal consistencies (alpha) for emotion-focused coping,
problem-focused coping, motivation relevance, and motivational congruence was .88, .89, .90,
and .73, respectively.
Results and Discussion
Decision-Making Style Scales
Intuitiveness and deliberativeness subscales were analyzed separately to determine
intercorrelation among the four decision-making scales and our brief measure. Results for
intuitiveness are reported in Table 1. From Table 1, we can see that the intuitiveness subscales
were highly intercorrelated with one another. These findings suggest that intuitiveness is
conceptualized similarly across scales. Additionally, Table 1 also demonstrates the especially
high correlation between the four scales and our brief intuitiveness measure, suggesting that our
derived scale is a reliable representation of intuitiveness. Results for deliberativeness are
reported in Table 2. From Table 2, we can see that most of the deliberativeness subscales were
highly intercorrelated with one another and our brief deliberativeness scale, except for the REI’s
rationality subscale. These findings suggest that deliberativeness is conceptualized similarly
across most scales with the exception of the REI, which resulted in notably weaker correlation.
Additionally, these findings demonstrate the reliability of our derived scale as a dependable
representation of deliberativeness. The success of our brief intuitiveness and deliberativeness
Evaluation of Intuition 20
scale justifies its use in study two, while the implications of the intercorrelation among the four
measures of decision-making style are further discussed in the general discussion section.
Subscales were also analyzed together to determine intercorrelation among the constructs
of intuitiveness and deliberativeness (-.342**) and reported in Table 3. From Table 3, we can see
that intuitiveness and deliberativeness is significantly negatively correlated, suggesting that
intuitiveness and deliberativeness, though not polar opposites, are somewhat distinct dimensions.
These findings are critical to the analyses used in study two.
Correlates of Intuitiveness and Deliberativeness
Correlations among our brief intuitiveness and deliberativeness scale and suspected
correlates were analyzed to determine the relationship between decision-making style and
various factors. Results related to mindfulness, Alexithymia, and emotional intelligence are
reported in Table 4. Reliable effects were observed for the FFMI subscale: non-judging of inner
experience, the FMMI subscale: non-reactivity to inner experience, the TAS subscale: difficulty
identifying feelings, and the TMMS subscale: attention to mood, while the TAS subscale:
difficulty describing feelings, the TMMS subscale: mood repair, and the TMMS subscale: clarity
in discrimination of feelings did not yield any significant effects.
Significant positive associations between deliberativeness and the FFMI subscales: nonjudging of inner experience (.138*) and non-reactivity to inner experience (.394**), as well as
the significant negative association of intuitiveness with the FFMI subscale: non-reactivity to
inner experience (-.127*) confirmed our expectation that mindfulness would be positively
associated with deliberativeness. The significant positive association between intuitiveness and
the TAS subscale: difficulty-identifying feelings (.176*), ran counter to our expectation that
intuitiveness would be negatively associated with Alexithymia. The significant positive
Evaluation of Intuition 21
association between intuitiveness and the TMMS subscale: attention to mood (.465**) and the
significant negative association between deliberativeness and the TMMS subscale: attention to
mood (-.208**), confirmed our expectation that intuitiveness would be positively associated with
emotional intelligence. Implications of these significant correlations and speculation about the
insignificant correlations are explored further in the general discussion section.
Results related to outcome-related variables, personality, and appraisal style are reported
in Table 5. Reliable effects were observed for NEO-FFI subscale: neuroticism, the NEO-FFI
subscale: openness to experience, the NEO-FFI subscale: agreeableness, and the NEO-FFI
subscale: conscientiousness, while the STAI, SWL, Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale, NEO-FFI
subscale: extroversion, the CAS subscale: emotion-focused coping potential, the CAS subscale:
problem-focused coping potential, the CAS subscale: motivational relevance, and the CAS
subscale: motivational congruence did not yield any significant effects. Implications of the
significant associations between intuitiveness and the NEO-FFI subscale: neuroticism (.214**),
NEO-FFI subscale: openness to experience (.170*), NEO-FFI subscale: agreeableness (-.155*),
and the NEO-FFI subscale: conscientiousness (-.254**), and between deliberativeness and the
NEO-FFI subscale: openness to experience (-.153*) and NEO-FFI subscale: conscientiousness
(.380**), as well as speculation about insignificant correlations are explored further in the
general discussion section.
Study 2
The following experiment explored how individual differences in decision-making style
may contribute to the nature of interpretations by assessing the impact of intuitiveness or
deliberativeness on affective reasoning under conditions that either promoted or inhibited
deliberative style. The experiment required participants to use affective judgment to interpret a
Evaluation of Intuition 22
morally charged dilemma in the presence or absence of time pressure. The use of time pressure
to manipulate intuition and deliberation is documented in the literature (Hortsman, Hausmann, &
Ryf, 2010). Nature of interpretation was judged by linguistic inquiry and word count, coherence,
and sophistication. Perceived quality of interpretation was also measured with questions that
deduced participants’ confidence the advice they gave.
We expected deliberativeness to result in impaired activity under time pressure; however
we expected no effect of the time pressure manipulation on intuitiveness. In other words, we
anticipated that intuitives (those who demonstrate high levels of intuitiveness) would
demonstrate more complex interpretation regardless of time pressure, while deliberatives (those
who demonstrate high levels of deliberativeness) in the neutral condition would demonstrate
more complex interpretations than deliberatives in the forced-time condition. We also expected
similar trends in terms of perceived quality of interpretations: intuitives would demonstrate high
confidence in the perceived quality of their interpretations both in the neutral and forced-time
conditions, while deliberatives in the neutral condition would demonstrate greater confidence in
the perceived quality of their interpretations than deliberatives in the forced-time condition.
Method
Participants
Vanderbilt undergraduates participated in a lab experiment for academic credit.
Participants were 75 students, 12 of which were male and 63 of which were female. The vast
majority of students were Caucasian with a mean age of 20 years. 33 students took the SAT and
had an average composite score of 1409 placing them in the 95th percentile, while 43 took the
ACT with an average composite score of 31 placing them in the 97th percentile.
Evaluation of Intuition 23
Procedure
Participants completed the experiment on the computer. The experiment was divided into
two parts: scenario-based questions and survey-based questions. First, participants were
instructed to read and familiarize themselves with the scenario. The scenario, a moral judgment
task adapted from Kohlberg’s moral interview was as follows:
Judy was a twelve-year-old girl. Her mother promised her that she could go to a special
rock concert coming to their town if she saved up from baby-sitting and lunch money to
buy a ticket. She managed to save up the sixty dollars the ticket cost plus another five
dollars. But then her mother changed her mind because she found out that the kids were
going to be unsupervised at the concert and she became very worried about the types of
people who were going to be there. She told Judy that it would be better to spend the
money on school supplies. Judy was disappointed and decided to go to the concert
anyway. She bought a ticket and told her mother that she had only been able to save five
dollars. That Saturday she went to the performance and told her mother that she was
spending the day with a friend. A week passed without her mother finding out. Judy then
told her older sister, Louise, that she had gone to the concert and had lied to her mother
about it. Louise wonders whether to tell their mother what Judy did (Kohlberg, 1963).
After reading the scenario participants responded to four open-ended scenario-based questions
while imagining that Louise, Judy's older sister, was their good friend and had come to them for
advice:
1) What would you advise Louise to do, and why? Please explain your reasons in as
much detail as possible.
2) Even though you might have mentioned them already, please list the reasons why
Evaluation of Intuition 24
Louise should tell her mother. Please list as many reasons as you can.
3) Even though you might have mentioned them already, please list the reasons why
Louise should not tell her mother. Please list as many reasons as you can.
4) If you were Louise, would you do anything different than what you've advised
Louise to do and why? Please explain in as much detail as possible.
The manner in which participants responded to the open-ended questions was dictated by
their condition assignment. In the time-pressure condition, participants were only given one
minute to respond to each question, with a total of four minutes to answer four questions. In the
neutral condition, participants were not given any explicit instructions and therefore, answered
the questions at their own pace. Following the open-ended questions, the procedure for
participants in both conditions was identical. First, participants respond to close-ended, scenariobased questions of confidence, and then to a short survey that was unrelated to the scenario.
Measures
Measures for the scenario-based portion of the experiment were used to determine
complexity of interpretation and perceived quality of interpretation, while measures used for the
survey-based portion of the experiment were used to determine decision-making style verify
construct validity.
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). Open-ended responses were run through
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) analysis to determine the complexity of
interpretations (Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007). LIWC is a computerized
text analysis tool that analyzes the various emotional, cognitive, and structural components
present in individuals’ verbal and written speech samples. The application uses an internal
default dictionary to group words that tap into a particular domain, such as causative words,
Evaluation of Intuition 25
within a target text.
Of all the domains LIWC offers for analysis, we selected those that deduce complexity
and depth of cognitive engagement. These domains included: 1) total word count, 2) words per
sentence, 3) words related to cognitive mechanisms, and 4) the various subcategories of words
related to cognitive mechanisms: a) insight words (e.g., think, know, consider, etc.), b) causation
words (e.g., because, effect, hence, etc.), c) discrepancy words (e.g., should, would, could, etc),
d) tentative words (e.g., maybe, perhaps, guess, etc.), e) certainty words (e.g., Always, never,
etc.), f) inhibition words (e.g., block, constrain, stop, etc.), g) inclusive words (and, with, include,
etc.), and h) exclusion words (but, without, exclude, etc.). Because we were interested in the
complexity of participants’ interpretations we not only reviewed the total word count, but also
looked at the number of words per sentence, based on the assumption that longer sentences
should reflect more complicated thinking. Additionally, we focused on words reflecting
cognitive processes in order assess nuance and depth of interpretation. The LIWC has been used
on a variety of different text sources and extensively validated by its developers (Pennebaker et
al., 2007).
Coherence and Sophistication. Original coding schemes for coherence and
sophistication were also used to measure the complexity of interpretations. Six research
assistants coded for coherence and sophistication to evaluate the complexity of participants’
interpretations. Both measures were rated on a 7-point Likert scale in which 1=not at all,
4=moderately, and 7=extremely. Coherence was operationalized by the following questions: Is
the argument well written? Does one sentence flow to the next? Were all parts of the question
answered? Was the question answered in complete sentences? Modifications were made for the
last sentence of each response in the forced-time condition, which may have been incomplete
Evaluation of Intuition 26
due to the procedure. The average internal consistency (alpha) for coherence, across the six
raters, in the present study was .87. Sophistication was also measured. Sophistication was
operationalized by the following questions: How sophisticated is the argument? Is the argument
nuanced? Does the argument take multiple factors or perspectives into account? Is the argument
mature? The average internal consistency (alpha) for sophistication, across the six raters, in the
present study was .88.
Confidence Items. Additionally, confidence items were used to measure participants’
perceived quality of interpretation. After writing their open-ended responses, participants
responded to the following closed-ended scenario-based confidence items using a 7-point Likert
scale in which 1=not at all, 4=moderately, and 7=extremely:
1. How confident are you that what you would advise Louise to do is the best course to
take in this situation?
2. If you were Louise, how sure are you about what you would do in this situation?
3. If you were Louise, how conflicted would you feel about what to do?
4. If you were Louise, how difficult would it be for you to decide what to do?
5. If you were Louise, once you had made your decision, how comfortable would you be
carrying it out?
Survey Measures. A short survey that included similar measures of decision-making
style and correlates as the survey in study one followed the scenario-based questions. The brief
intuitiveness and deliberativeness scales derived in study one were included in the present study
and demonstrated internal consistencies (alpha) of .74 and .80, respectively. The TAS was
included in the present study and demonstrated internal consistencies (alpha) among its three
subscales: 1) identifying emotions, 2) describing emotions, and 3) externally-oriented thinking of
Evaluation of Intuition 27
.79, .84, and .59, respectively. The Rosenberg self-esteem scale was also included in the present
study and demonstrated an internal consistency (alpha) of .89.
Finally, a 33-item scale of motivational orientation was included in the present study’s
survey (Griner & Smith, 2000). The measure of motivational orientation has three subscales: 1)
performance orientation, 2) learning orientation, and 3) affiliate orientation. This scale was
included in the present study, but not in study one, to control for any effects of affiliative
tendency on decision-making elicited by the interpersonal nature of the moral dilemma. Thus, by
controlling for affiliative orientation we could assess the effects of intuitiveness more clearly. In
the present study the internal consistencies (alpha) of the performance orientation subscale,
learning orientation subscale, and affiliate orientation subscale was .90, .87, and .83,
respectively.
Results & Discussion
Overview of Analyses
Because intuitiveness and deliberativeness are not polar opposites, but negatively
correlated (-.342) somewhat distinct dimensions, we analyzed their effects separately. Both
intuitiveness and deliberativeness were measured as continuous variables on a 5-point Likert
scale. Unlike with analysis of variance, the use of multiple regression allowed us to look at
intuitiveness and deliberativeness as continuous scores. Measures of intuitiveness and
deliberativeness were centered and the data was analyzed using a two-step hierarchical
regression. The first step examined main effects of the time pressure variable and either
intuitiveness or deliberativeness by using the time-pressure condition variable (absence of time
pressure coded as= -1 and presence of time pressure coded as= 1) and either the intuitiveness
variables or deliberativeness variables as predictors. The second step examined the interaction
Evaluation of Intuition 28
between time pressure and either intuitiveness or deliberativeness by adding their cross products
to the equation and yielding means representative of the interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). For
cases in which the regression indicated significant main effects or interactions, representative
means were computed by solving the appropriate regression equation using representative values
of time pressure and either intuitiveness or deliberativeness factors. The values used were: -1 for
absence of time pressure, 1 for time pressure, and plus or minus one standard deviation to denote
high or low intuitiveness (st. deviation= .48) or deliberativeness (st. deviation= .59),
respectively.
Additionally, as noted in the methods, one issue we examined was the effect of affiliative
orientation on decision-making style. Preliminary analyses revealed that affiliative orientation
was not significantly correlated with intuitiveness or deliberativeness, nor was it correlated with
any of the outcome- related variables analyzed in this study. Thus, in no case were the results of
analyses in which affiliative orientation was included as a covariate substantively different from
analyses in which the covariate was not included. Therefore, for simplicity, only the results of
the analyses not involving affiliative orientation are reported.
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)
LIWC analysis yielded various significant results, trends, and interactions related to total
word count, words per sentence, and use of causation words, tentative words, and exclusion
words. No significant results for total cognitive mechanisms, or use of insight words,
discrepancy words, certainty words, inhibition words, or inclusion words were observed.
Implications of the following findings related to LIWC analysis are discussed further in the
general discussion section.
Evaluation of Intuition 29
Total Word Count. A main effect of time pressure on total word count, b= -.44.64, t
(72) = -3.45, p < .01, was observed with representative means of 318.96 words used under time
pressure and 408.24 words used in the absence of time pressure, indicating the use of fewer
words under time pressure. These results were expected given that the absence of time-pressure
allowed participants to write at their own pace and did not force them to cut their answers short.
A main effect of deliberativeness, b= 41.99, t (72) = 2.11, p < .05, on total word count was
observed. Taken together, the main effect of time pressure and deliberativeness demonstrated a
significant interaction, b= -.4767, t (71) = -2.16, p < .05. To evaluate this interaction, we solved
the resulting regression equation including the interaction term for representative values of both
the time-pressure manipulation and the deliberativeness scale.
The results of the interaction between time pressure and deliberativeness on total word
count are depicted in Figure 1. From the figure, we can see that in the absence of time pressure,
high deliberatives used significantly more words than low deliberatives with representative
means of 474.79 words and 368.99 words, respectively. However, in the presence of time
pressure the representative means of high and low deliberatives, 314.33 words and 321.05,
respectively, did not vary with any significance. Overall, participants wrote more in the absence
of time pressure, however, this was significantly true of high deliberatives. While these findings
are in line with our prediction that time pressure would impair the complexity of highly
deliberative participants, we did not expect high deliberativeness to be an advantage in the
absence of time pressure. Rather, we predicted no effect of deliberativeness in the absence of
time pressure. Additionally, a tendency for high intuitives to use more overall words than low
intuitives, b= 44.23, t (72) = 1.65, p= .10, was also observed, with estimated representative
means of 384.87 words for high intuitives and 343.44 words for low intuitives. This tendency did
Evaluation of Intuition 30
not interact with time pressure, b= -4.85, t (71) < 1, ns. Furthermore, the tendency for high
intuitives to use more words than low intuitives lends support for our hypothesis that
intuitiveness predicts greater complexity of interpretation regardless of time pressure.
Words per sentence. A tendency for high deliberatives to use more words per sentence
than low deliberatives, b= 1.82, t (72) = 1.82, p= .07, was observed with representative means of
21.44 words per sentence for high deliberatives and 19.30 words per sentence for low
deliberatives. No effects of time pressure b= -.02, t (72) < 1,ns, or intuitiveness, b= -.06, t (72) <
1, ns, on use of words per sentence were observed. These findings run counter to our hypotheses,
suggesting that deliberativeness is associated with more complex thinking, regardless of timepressure. Given our original predictions, we would have expected to see this association with
intuitiveness not deliberativeness.
Causation words. Main effects of intuitiveness on use of causation words, b= -.74, t (72)
ƒ= -2.72, p < .01, were observed with representative means of 4.09 causation words used for
high intuitives and 4.81 causation words used for low intuitives. There was no main effect of
time pressure on use of causation words, b= .16, t (72) <1, ns, nor was there an interaction
between time pressure and intuitiveness, b= -.58, t (71) <1, ns. Additionally, a tendency for high
deliberatives to use fewer causation words than low deliberatives, b= -.41, t (72) = -1.73, p= .09,
was also observed and did not interact with time pressure, b= .05 t (71) <1, ns. Overall, high
intuitives used significantly fewer causation words than low intuitives, while high deliberatives
demonstrated a tendency to use fewer causation words than low deliberatives. As an indication
of complexity, the findings related to causation words run counter to our hypotheses. Whereas
we expected intuitiveness would be associated with more complex interpretations, and therefore
greater use of causation words, it appears that low intuitives used significantly more causation
Evaluation of Intuition 31
words than high intuitives. Additionally, the tendency for low deliberatives to use more
causation words than high deliberatives also runs counter to our hypotheses in a similar manner.
Tentative Words. A main effect of deliberativeness on the use of tentative words, b= .54, t (72) = -2.41, p < .05, was observed with representative means of 5.30 tentative words for
high deliberatives and 5.94 tentative words for low deliberatives. A tendency to use more
tentative words in the presence of time pressure, b= .23, t (72) = 1.74, p= .09, was also observed
with representative means of 4.85 tentative words used under time pressure and 4.39 tentative
words used in the absence of time pressure. Overall, these findings indicate that high
deliberatives use significantly fewer tentative words than low deliberatives, while both intuitives
and deliberatives demonstrate a tendency to use more tentative words in the presence of time
pressure. As an indication of decreased complexity, these findings related to tentative words,
validate the time pressure manipulation, suggesting that it was sufficient enough to disrupt
conscious deliberation, such that the interpretations of both intuitives and deliberatives were
worded tentatively, as opposed to concretely. However, the effect of time pressure was
somewhat unexpected, because we would not have expected intuitives to be affected.
Additionally, we did not expect deliberativeness to predict complexity of interpretation
regardless of time pressure. Rather, we expected an interaction in which complexity of
interpretations would be associated with deliberativeness in the absence of time pressure, but
would weaken in the presence of time pressure; however, there was no evidence that time
pressure hurt deliberatives complexity of interpretation.
Exclusion Words. A tendency for high intuitives to use more exclusion words than low
intuitives, b= .37, t (72) = 1.69, p= .10, was observed, with estimated representative means of
3.57 exclusion words for high intuitives and 3.21 exclusion words for low intuitives. There were
Evaluation of Intuition 32
no effects of time pressure, b= -.06, t (72) < 1, ns, or deliberativeness, b= .01 t (72) <1, ns, on use
of exclusion words. Exclusion words (such as but, although, and however) indicate
indecisiveness or tentativeness, which indicates lesser complexity. This tendency runs counter to
our expectation that intuitives would demonstrate greater complexity and certainty.
Coherence
Coded values for coherence were analyzed separately for the influence of
deliberativeness and intuitiveness using the two-step hierarchical regression. Coherence scores
were found to vary systematically with regard to experimentally manipulated time pressure, b= .52, t (72) = -4.37, p < .001, and deliberativeness, b= .43, t (72) = 2.09, p < .05. Beyond the
significant effect of time pressure on coherence, no main effects of intuitiveness on coherence,
b=.23, t (72) <1 ns, or interactions involving intuitiveness were observed. Overall, participants’
responses were more coherent in the absence of time-pressure regardless of demonstrated
decision-making style, coherence was also positively associated with deliberativeness regardless
of time-pressure, and intuitiveness was simply unrelated to coherence. While we expected an
interaction in which coherence would be associated with deliberativeness in the absence of time
pressure, but would weaken in the presence of time-pressure, there was no evidence that time
pressure hurt deliberatives ability to write coherently. Implications of these findings are further
explored in the general discussion section.
Sophistication
Coded values for sophistication were analyzed separately for deliberativeness and
intuitiveness using the two-step hierarchical regression. Sophistication scores were found to
vary systematically with regard to both experimentally manipulated time pressure, b= -.38, t
(72) = -3.11, p < .01, and deliberativeness, b= .53, t (72) = 2.49, p < .05. However, both of these
Evaluation of Intuition 33
effects were qualified by a significant interaction of deliberativeness and time pressure, b= .423, t (71) = -2.05, p < .05. To evaluate this interaction, we solved the resulting regression
equation including the interaction term for representative values of both the time-pressure
manipulation and the deliberativeness scale.
The results of the interaction are depicted in Figure 2. From Figure 2, we can see that in
the absence of time pressure, high deliberatives demonstrated significantly greater levels of
sophistication than low deliberatives with representative means of 5.55 and 4.49, respectively.
However, in the presence of time pressure the representative means of high and low
deliberatives, 4.31 and 4.25, respectively, did not vary with any significance. Beyond the
significant effect of time pressure on sophistication that was already reported with regard to the
analyses involving deliberativeness, no main effects of intuitiveness on sophistication, b= .40, t
(72) <1 ns, or interactions involving intuitiveness were observed. Overall, participants’
responses were more sophisticated in the absence of time-pressure, deliberativeness was
positively associated with sophistication when controlling for time-pressure, and intuitiveness
was unrelated to sophistication. While these findings are in line with our prediction that time
pressure would impair the sophistication of highly deliberative participants, we did not expect
deliberativeness to be an advantage in the absence of time pressure. Rather, we predicted no
effect of deliberativeness in the absence of time pressure. Implications of these findings are
further discussed in the general discussion section.
Confidence Items
Five closed-ended items of confidence that assessed: confidence in advised course of
action, certainty about advised course of action, confliction over course of action, decision
difficulty, and comfort with advised course of action were analyzed using the two-step
Evaluation of Intuition 34
hierarchical regression. Reliable effects were observed for certainty about advised course of
action and decision difficulty, while confidence in advised course of action, confliction over
course of action, and comfort with advised course of action did not yield any significant effects.
Certainty. Certainty about the advised course of action was found to vary systematically
with regard to intuitiveness, b= .74, t (72) = 2.38, p < .05, but not deliberativeness, b=.18, t (72)
<1 ns. High intuitives indicated significantly higher ratings of certainty than low intuitiveness
with representative estimated means of 5.35 and 5.09, respectively. Overall, intuitiveness was
positively associated with one’s certainty about the advised course of action regardless of time
pressure. While these findings do not demonstrate any effect of deliberativeness, they confirm
our expectation that intuitiveness would be positively associated with perceived quality of
advice, regardless of time pressure. Though perceived quality certainly does not translate to
objective quality of interpretations, these findings have interesting implications concerning
decision-making confidence discussed in the following general discussion.
Decision Difficulty. Decision difficulty was also found to vary systematically with
regard to a significant interaction between time pressure and intuitiveness, b= -.82, t (71) = 2.26 p < .05. To evaluate this interaction, we solved the resulting regression equation including
the interaction term for representative values of both the time-pressure manipulation (in which
the two conditions were coded as -1 and 1 for absence and presence of time pressure,
respectively) and the intuitiveness scale. For the intuitiveness scale, the equation was solved for
values representing participants who were one standard deviation above and below the mean,
respectively (Aiken & West, 1991). The resulting predicted means are depicted in Figure 3.
From Figure 3, we can see that low intuitives provided significantly greater ratings of
decision difficulty than high intuitives in the presence of time pressure, with representative
Evaluation of Intuition 35
means of 4.39 and 3.20, respectively. However, in the absence of time pressure the
representative means of low and high intuitives, 3.60 and 4.00, respectively, were not
significantly different. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that high intuitives
would experience less difficulty deciding under time pressure, while low intuitives would
experience greater difficulty.
General Discussion
Implications of the results of both studies inform our current understanding of decisionmaking style. Study one provided us with a conceptual understanding of intuitiveness and
deliberativeness and allowed us to begin identifying key, dispositional features associated with
decision-making style, while study two furthered our understanding of intuition by allowing us to
identify key, features of intuitiveness and deliberativeness in practice. Because both the construct
of intuitiveness and deliberativeness were found to be similarly conceptualized and consistently
measured across all four decision-making style scales, we were able to use our brief, derived
measure to assess the relationship of various measures and individual differences in decisionmaking style. The following discussion will examine the collective results of both studies and
draw connections within and between both sets of analyses.
Major Findings and Implications
Treatment of Emotional Signals. The relative treatment of emotional signals by
intuitives and deliberatives—where intuitives pay greater attention to and use significantly more
affective cues to inform their judgments, and deliberatives pay less attention to and use
significantly less affective cues to inform their judgments—is a defining feature that
differentiates decision-making style. For example, attention to mood, a subscale of our measure
of emotional intelligence (TMMS), was found to be significantly positively associated with
Evaluation of Intuition 36
intuitiveness and significantly negatively associated with deliberativeness, while non-judging of
inner experience and non-reactivity of inner experience, subscales of our measure of mindfulness
(FFMQ), were found to be significantly positively associated with deliberativeness.
However, while intuitives allot greater attention to their emotions, there is evidence to
suggest that they are less adept at interpreting emotional signals, indicated by a significant
positive association between difficulty identifying feelings, a subscale of our measure of
Alexithymia (TAS), and intuitiveness. When this association is considered in conjunction with
the significant negative association between non-reactivity to inner experience, a subscale of the
FFMQ, and intuitiveness, these results suggest that intuitives are not only less adept at
interpreting emotions, but also at regulating their responses to internal emotional stimuli. Finally,
while we expected to see similar associations between intuitiveness and the remaining subscales
of the TMMS, mood repair and clarity of discrimination of feelings, neither demonstrated
significant association with intuitiveness nor deliberativeness, suggesting that the tendency for
intuitives to pay greater attention to emotional signals may be lacking in overall utility.
Further, while we expected emotional intelligence to provide intuitives with the
advantage of judgments enriched with useful emotional cues, it appears that without the faculty
to use these emotional cues in meaningful ways, intuitiveness may, in fact, hinder the
deliberative process, while deliberativeness seems to provide an unanticipated, defensive
advantage. In light of these results, we might speculate that deliberativeness, by nature of
inattention to emotional signals, protects against the inclusion of mood in the decision-making
process, since neither intuitives nor deliberatives demonstrate significant ability to utilize
emotional cues.
Evaluation of Intuition 37
Associations among decision-making style and personality may also reflect the
relationship between use of emotional signals and intuitiveness and deliberativeness. Significant
positive associations of intuitiveness with neuroticism and openness to experience, and
significant negative associations of intuitiveness with agreeableness and conscientiousness were
observed. While we may have expected characteristics of openness to experience, such as
insightfulness, to be positively correlated with intuitiveness and negatively correlated with
deliberativeness, we did not anticipate an association between intuitiveness and characteristics of
neuroticism, such as moodiness. However, in light of the recent discussion, perhaps this
association of intuitiveness with neuroticism is related to the association between intuitiveness
and awareness of mood despite the absence of an association between intuitiveness and the
ability to utilize emotional signals. Without utility, intuitives’ awareness of mood may translate
to stable moodiness or increased feelings of anxiety that are characteristic of neuroticism.
Similarly, while we might have expected characteristics of conscientiousness, such as
being thorough, to be negatively associated with intuitiveness and positively associated with
deliberativeness, we did not anticipate a negative association between intuitiveness and
characteristics of agreeableness, such as being sympathetic. Perhaps this association is also
related to the relationship between intuitiveness and awareness of emotional signals in spite of
the relationship between intuitiveness and difficulty identifying feelings, such that perpetual
awareness of one’s own moods without the faculty to interpret or manage their effects may
interact with ones ability to demonstrate sympathy towards others. Whether or not these effects
could have reinforced themselves over time to become stable facets of personality is debatable;
however, speculations about the relationship between personality factors and use of emotional
signals seem plausible in light of the current findings.
Evaluation of Intuition 38
While the association between intuitiveness and neuroticism certainly provides a
rationale for the expectation of a relationship between state-trait anxiety and intuitiveness,
especially at the state level, no significant effects were observed. Similarly, significant effects
were neither observed for satisfaction with life nor for self-esteem, suggesting that decisionmaking style has insignificant effects on outcome-related variables that indicate at quality of life.
Additionally, no effects were observed for appraisal style. While we expected intuitiveness to be
associated with emotion-focused coping potential, such that intuitives would appraisal their
ability to emotionally adjust to their circumstances as high, the insignificance of this effect may
be related to the aforementioned association between intuitiveness and awareness of mood yet
insignificant ability regulate and repair mood. In light of this important finding and its relevance
to various associations, we might now expect emotion-focused coping potential to be negatively
associated with intuitiveness, given that intuitives appear to be demonstrating a pattern in which
they are aware of their feelings, but unable to interpret or utilize them with any significance.
In sum, while intuitives may be more aware of their emotions than deliberatives, there is
no evidence to suggest that this awareness informs decision-making in an advantageous way;
rather, there is evidence to suggest intuitives have difficulty interpreting, regulating, and utilizing
their emotions, implying that deliberatives may possess a protective advantage that keeps them
from becoming aware of moods for which they lack the capacity to manage.
Nature of Interpretation. The nature of intuitive and deliberative interpretations is also
a defining feature that differentiates decision-making style. Analysis of intuitives’ interpretations
reveled a significant negative correlation between intuitiveness and use of causative words, a
tendency for intuitives to use more exclusion words, and various insignificant results related to
other measures of complexity, all of which were not qualified by any significant interaction of
Evaluation of Intuition 39
intuitiveness and time pressure. Because use of causative words is associated with greater
complexity and use of exclusion words is associated with reduced complexity, these findings
establish the interpretations of high intuitives as significantly less complex than the
interpretations of low intuitives. Thus, we might expect to see more straightforward and simple
answers from high intuitives. These findings suggest that intuitiveness may present a
disadvantage when it comes to decision-making, such that is based on interpretations that may be
too superficial to yield favorable results.
On the other hand, analysis of deliberatives’ interpretations revealed significant
associations among deliberativeness and various measures of complexity, both in the presence
and absence of time pressure. For example, in the absence of time pressure, deliberativeness was
significantly positively associated with both sophistication and total word count, demonstrating
that conditions that enabled deliberativeness resulted in more complex interpretations. At the
same time, conditions that inhibited deliberativeness, namely time pressure, also yielded
significant associations between deliberativeness and complexity. For example, deliberativeness
demonstrated significant positive association with coherence and significant negative association
with use tentative words regardless of time-pressure. It seems likely that these relationships may
be related to the significant positive association between deliberativeness and words per
sentence, such that deliberatives were able to overcome the impairment of time pressure by
sacrificing their total word count, for fewer, more well-developed, concrete sentences. Taken as
a whole, these findings suggest that deliberativeness may possess a certain advantage of
resiliency that intuitiveness lacks.
In fact, the only case in which intuitives demonstrated significant desirable effects and
deliberatives did not, were related to ease arriving at a decision, indicated by a significant
Evaluation of Intuition 40
negative association between intuitiveness and decision difficulty, and confidence regarding the
decision, indicated by a significant positive association between intuitiveness and certainty of
advised course of action. However, because these measures are intended to assess perceived
quality of interpretation, as opposed to objective quality, these findings simply suggest that
intuitives experience considerably greater, yet unsubstantiated, confidence in their choices than
deliberatives. Furthermore, not only is this confidence unsubstantiated, but also significantly
undermined by poor efficacy, demonstrated by the negative association between intuitiveness
and complexity of interpretation. Contrastingly, the positive association between deliberativeness
and complexity of interpretation provides grounds for deliberatives to exhibit confidence;
however, neither ease arriving at a decision nor confidence regarding the decision was
significantly associated with deliberativeness, suggesting that deliberatives tend to underestimate
their efficacy.
Aforementioned associations between decision-making style and various dispositional
measures may explain these differences in confidence. For example, the tendency for intuitives
to experience overconfidence may also be explained by their use of emotional signals. While
intuitives demonstrate a significant association with attention to mood, they also demonstrate a
significant negative association with non-reactivity to inner experience and a significant
association with difficulty describing feelings. Taken together, these findings suggest that when
intuitives experience emotions after making a decision, they are more prone to react to those
emotions in spite of the difficulty they experience identifying them. Furthermore, the significant
association between intuitiveness and neuroticism may make intuitives more apt to label their
feelings as confidence and ease than doubt and difficulty, as a mechanism of protecting
themselves and reducing their characteristic feelings of anxiety. Yet, this overestimation of
Evaluation of Intuition 41
confidence could have significant negative implications the outcome of a decision is
unfavorable, especially because intuitives do not appear to posses the ability to repair their
moods, regulate their affect, or adjust their expectations with any significance.
Similarly, the tendency for deliberatives to underestimate their efficacy may be related to
use of emotional signals and personality. Significant negative correlation between
deliberativeness and attention to mood, suggest that deliberatives may lack the awareness to
accurately report feelings of confidence, since they are less prone to attend to their moods.
Additionally, significant positive correlations between deliberativeness and non-judging of inner
experience and non-reactivity to inner experience, imply that even if deliberatives possessed
awareness of mood they prevent themselves from analyzing or reacting to these feelings.
Furthermore, this pattern in use of emotional signals may be reinforced or qualified by the
significant positive association between conscientiousness and deliberativeness, such that
deliberatives are significantly more likely to prepare themselves for the worst. These
speculations, though most likely less innocuous than the intuitive tendency to overestimate
confidence that is unjustified, suggest that deliberatives may demonstrate unnecessary prudence
given the significant association of their interpretations with complexity.
In sum, the stable relationship between deliberativeness and increased complexity
indicates that deliberativeness may be a more adaptive and advantageous mechanism for
decision-making than previously expected. Deliberatives significantly outperformed intuitives in
the absence of time pressure, demonstrating greater complexity of interpretation. Even in cases
where deliberatives were unable to overcome the effect of time pressure, their performance was
simply on par with the performance of intuitives, never inferior. Furthermore, deliberatives
demonstrations of confidence, though somewhat inaccurate, pose less threat than intuitives
Evaluation of Intuition 42
demonstrations of confidence, providing additional support that deliberativeness is a more
durable and beneficial mechanism for decision-making.
Limitations
A notable limitation of this study was that the advice given by participants could not be
analyzed for objective quality. While LIWC analyses, and coding for coherence and
sophistication indicated an association between intuitiveness and decreased complexity as well
as an association between deliberativeness and increased complexity, complexity is simply an
indication of, but does not equate with, objective quality. By determining the objective quality of
the advice given in the moral dilemma, one could indicate direct relationships between individual
differences in decision-making style and decision-making quality. The implications of these
associations would be both interesting and of significant value to the current literature on
decision-making, emotion, and personality.
Another limitation of this research may have been the robustness of the confidence items.
The fact that intuitiveness demonstrated significant associations with certainty and decision
difficulty; however no associations among intuitiveness and confidence in advised course of
action, confliction over course of action, or comfort with advised course of action were observed
calls into questions the robustness of the items as they are intended to measure slight variations
in what is more or a less a larger domain of perceived quality. This discrepancy, suggests that the
effects may be fragile or specific and perhaps not that indicative or broad.
Future Directions
Many of the aforementioned findings are deserving of further attention and examination.
For example, explanations for why the REI rationality subscale demonstrated notably weaker
intercorrelation with the subscales of deliberativeness than any other deliberative scale may
Evaluation of Intuition 43
inform the literature of the REI’s efficacy considering that it is currently one of the most widely
used measures of decision-making. Additionally, given the observed positive association
between neuroticism and intuitiveness, the relationship between intuitiveness and state-trait
anxiety, which was insignificant in the present research, probably deserves re-examination.
Most importantly, the fact that many of our predictions about intuitiveness were
unfounded, suggests that the relationship between emotion and intuition deserves considerable
attention. Specifically, assuming that the robustness of the confidence items did not present
significant limitation, the fact that intuitives were more apt to label their emotions positively, as
confidence and ease, than negatively, as doubt and difficulty, than deliberatives in spite of the
significant association between intuitiveness and difficulty identifying feelings deserves greater
attention.
One explanation might be that intuitives genuinely experience more positive emotions
after making decision, because they are able to decide and resume whatever they were doing
prior to the choice with considerable speed. At the same time, if this is the case intuitives
probably would have had to have been in a positive mood prior to the choice to demonstrate
positive mood after the choice. While this does little to account for intuitives who may have been
in a negative mood prior to the task, an experiment that assesses confidence in decision-making
and includes an emotion manipulation in which intuitives are made to feel positively or
negatively prior to the task, may provide greater insight. In conclusion, while the combination of
both studies shed light on the nature of intuitiveness and deliberativeness, they also raised at least
as many questions about the nature of these individual differences as they resolved in the
process.
Evaluation of Intuition 44
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Evaluation of Intuition 48
Table 1.
Intercorrelation of Intuitiveness Measures
PMPI:
Emotional
Processing
REI:
Experientiali
ty
PID:
Preference
For Intuition
GDMS:
Intuitive
Style
Brief
Intuitiveness
Scale
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
PMPI:
Emotional
Processin
g
1
REI:
Experiential
ity
GDMS: Brief
Intuitiv Intuitivenes
e Style s scale
.527**
PID:
Preferenc
e for
Intuition
.584**
.741**
.823**
276
276
0
1
275
0
.565**
240
0
.761**
276
0
.729**
276
0
.584**
276
275
0
1
240
0
.700**
276
0
.760**
275
0
.741**
275
0
.761**
275
240
0
1
275
0
.848**
240
0
.823**
240
0
.729**
240
0
.760**
240
240
0
1
276
0
276
0
275
0
240
0
.527**
.565**
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
.700**
.848**
276
Evaluation of Intuition 49
Table 2.
Intercorrelation of Deliberativeness Measures
PMPI:
Rational
Processin
g
PMPI:
Rational
Processing
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
REI:
Pearson
Rationality
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
PID:
Pearson
Preference For Correlation
Deliberation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
GDMS:
Pearson
Rational Style Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Brief
Pearson
Deliberativene Correlation
ss Scale
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
REI:
PID:
Rationalit Preference
y
for
Deliberati
on
.207**
.613**
GDMS: Brief
Rationa Deliberativ
l Style
e-ness
scale
.644**
.677**
276
0.001
1
276
0
.333**
276
0
.272**
276
0
.416**
276
0.001
.613**
276
276
0
1
276
0
.756**
276
0
.834**
276
0
.644**
276
0
.272**
276
276
0
1
276
0
.874**
276
0
.677**
276
0
.416**
276
0
.834**
277
277
0
1
276
0
276
0
276
0
277
0
1
276
.207**
.333**
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
.756**
.874**
277
Evaluation of Intuition 50
Table 3.
Intercorrelation of Intuitive and Deliberative Measures.
PMPI:
REI:
Rational
Rationality
Processing
PMPI:
Emotional
Processing
REI:
Experientiality
PID: Preference
For Intuition
GDMS:
Intuitive Style
Brief
Intuitiveness
Scale
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
Correlation
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
-.222**
-.330**
PID:
Preference
for
Deliberation
-.267**
276
.000
-.269**
276
.000
-.026
276
.000
-.280**
276
.000
-.183**
276
.000
-.300**
276
.000
-.074
276
.661
-.113
276
.000
-.036
276
.002
-.058
276
.000
-.077
275
.220
-.243**
275
.061
-.206**
275
.557
-.287**
275
.341
-.208**
275
.202
-.310**
240
.000
-.172
240
.001
-.227**
240
.000
-.209**
240
.001
-.171**
240
.000
-.251**
276
.004
276
.000
276
.000
276
.004
276
.000
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
GDMS:
Rational
Style
Brief
Deliberative
-ness scale
-.259**
-.319**
Evaluation of Intuition 51
Table 4.
Correlates of Intuitiveness and Deliberativeness: Mindfulness, Alexithymia, and Emotional
Intelligence
FFMQ: Non-Judging of
Inner Experience
FFMQ: Non-Reactivity
to Inner Experience
TAS: Difficulty
Indentifying Feelings
TAS: Difficulty
Describing Feelings
TMMS: Attention to
Mood
TMMS: Mood Repair
TMMS: Clarity in
Discrimination of
Feelings
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Brief
Intuitiveness
Scale
.077
.202
276
-.127*
.042
257
.176*
.015
189
-.013
.854
189
.465**
.000
189
.041
.578
187
-.085
.248
185
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Brief
Deliberativeness
Scale
.138*
.022
276
.394**
.000
257
-.072
.323
189
-.039
.596
189
-.208**
.004
189
-.052
.483
187
.124
.094
185
Evaluation of Intuition 52
Table 5.
Correlates of Intuitiveness and Deliberativeness: Outcome-Related Variables, Personality, and
Appraisal Style
Brief
Intuitiveness
Scale
STAI: State-Trait
Pearson Correlation .103
Anxiety Inventory
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.171
N
178
Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Pearson Correlation -.124
Scale
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.100
N
178
Satisfaction with Life
Pearson Correlation .029
Scale
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.698
N
178
NEO-FFI: Neuroticism
Pearson Correlation .214**
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.004
N
176
NEO-FFI: Extraversion Pearson Correlation .074
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.329
N
176
NEO-FFI: Openness to
Pearson Correlation .170*
Experience
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.024
N
176
NEO-FFI:
Pearson Correlation -.155*
Agreeableness
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.040
N
176
NEO-FFI:
Pearson Correlation -.254**
Conscientiousness
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.001
N
176
CAS: Emotion-Focused Pearson Correlation .042
Coping Potential
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.595
N
159
CAS: Problem-Focused Pearson Correlation -.038
Coping Potential
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.634
N
159
CAS: Motivational
Pearson Correlation .060
Relevance
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.449
N
159
CAS: Motivational
Pearson Correlation .153
Congruence
Sig. (2-Tailed)
.054
N
159
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Brief
Deliberativeness
Scale
-.027
.717
178
.030
.694
178
-.015
.841
178
-.029
.707
176
-.110
.146
176
-.153*
.042
176
-.054
.477
176
.380**
.000
176
-.033
.683
159
.008
.917
159
.023
.771
159
-.029
.720
159
Evaluation of Intuition 53
Figure 1.
Effect of Interaction between Time Pressure and Deliberativeness on Total Word Count
500
Average Total Word Count
450
474.79
400
350
321.05
368.99
300
314.33
250
200
Low Deliberatives
150
High Deliberatives
100
50
0
No Time
Pressure
Time Pressure
Evaluation of Intuition 54
Figure 2.
Effect of Interaction between Time Pressure and Deliberativeness on Sophistication
6
5.55
5
4.31
Sophistication
4.49
4
4.25
3
Low Deliberatives
2
High Deliberatives
1
0
No Time
Pressure
Time-Pressure
Evaluation of Intuition 55
Figure 3.
Effect of Interaction between Time Pressure and Intuitiveness on Difficulty Deciding
5
4.39
Difficulty Deciding
4
4
3.6
3.2
3
2
Low Intuitives
High Intuitives
1
0
No Time
Pressure
Time Pressure
Evaluation of Intuition 56
Appendix A
Brief Intuitiveness and Deliberativeness Scale Items
Brief Intuitiveness Scale (N=9)
1) When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts.
(GDMS: Intuitive Style subscale, Item 1)
2) When making decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition.
(GDMS: Intuitive Style subscale, Item 2)
3) To cope, I usually go with my instincts rather than trying to reason things out.
(PMPI: Emotional Processing subscale, Item 1)
4) My feelings usually determine how I will cope.
(PMPI: Emotional Processing subscale, Item 2)
5) I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
(REI: Experientiality subscale, Item 1)
6) I believe in trusting my hunches.
(REI: Experientiality subscale, Item 3)
7) I listen carefully to my deepest feelings.
(PID: Preference for Intuition subscale, Item 1)
8) My feelings play an important role in my decisions.
(PID: Preference for Intuition subscale, Item 5)
9) I am a very intuitive person.
(PID: Preference for Intuition subscale, Item 7)
Brief Deliberativeness Scale (N=9)
1) My decision-making requires careful thought.
(GDMS: Rational Style subscale, Item 3)
2) I make decisions in a logical and systematic way.
(GDMS: Rational Style subscale, Item 2)
3) I usually think of as many alternative ways of coping as possible before I decide what I
am going to do.
(PMPI: Rational Processing subscale, Item 3)
4) I usually try to get all the facts that I can before deciding how to cope.
(PMPI: Rational Processing subscale, Item 5)
5) I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.
(REI: Rationality subscale, Item 3)
6) I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
(REI: Rationality subscale, Item 6)
7) Before making decisions I first think them through.
(PID: Preference for Deliberation subscale, Item 1)
8) When I have a problem I first analyze the facts and details before I decide.
(PID: Preference for Deliberation subscale, Item 7)
9) I prefer making detailed plans rather than leaving things to chance.
(PID: Preference for Deliberation subscale, Item 4)