Heavy objects and small children: Developmental data extend the
passive frame theory
Cheshire Hardcastlea, Eliah Whiteb, Heidi Kloosc, and Valerie Gray Hardcastlec
aBioscience
Division, SRI International and Stanford Hospital & Clinics, Menlo Park, CA
94025-3493; bDepartment of Psychological Science, Northern Kentucky University,
Highland Heights, KY 41099; cDepartment of Psychology, University of Cincinnati,
Cincinnati, OH 45220-0376.
cheshire.hardcastle@sri.com
whitee9@nku.edu
http://artscience.nku.edu/departments/psychology/facstaff/ft-faculty/White.html
heidi.kloos@uc.edu
http://www.artsci.uc.edu/departments/psychology/fac_staff.html?eid=kloosa&the
comp=uceprof
valerie.hardcastle@uc.edu
http://www.artsci.uc.edu/departments/psychology/fac_staff.html?eid=hardcave&t
hecomp=uceprof
Abstract: Passive frame theory is compatible with modern complexity theory and the idea that
conflict drives the emergence of a novel structural organization. After describing new
developmental data, we suggest that this conflict needs to be expanded to include conflict not
only between action options, but also between action and perception.
Morsella et al. argue that we should understand conscious perception via the interplay between
(1) conscious content created through a conflict of action options and (2) the chosen action after
the conflict is resolved. The proposed passive frame theory (PFT) situates consciousness in the
context of action-related decision making, rather than in the context of purposeful symbol
manipulation. It is passive in the sense that it is a low-level mediator between different action
opportunities. Such action-based consciousness departs from traditional views of consciousness,
which typically attribute it to high-level planning and executive function, and moves it down to
the level of actions.
There are many strengths in this approach, including its compatibility with embodied
cognition and the idea that action-based processes drive the experience of conscious content
(Juarrero 1999; Thompson & Varela 2001). It is also in line with advances in nonlinear
dynamics, including the idea that consciousness gives rise to a multi-stable system characterized
by self-organized criticality (Bak 1996; Werner 2007). Most importantly, the proposed PFT is
compatible with modern complexity theory, specifically the idea that conflict drives the
emergence of a novel structural organization (Swenson 1997). Here we focus on this latter idea
and suggest that conflict needs to be expanded to include conflict not only between action
options, but also between action and perception.
There is a large body of research that provides evidence for a discrepancy between actual
action capabilities and beliefs about such actions capabilities (e.g., Kozhevnikov & Hegarty
2001; Krist et al. 1993). The traditional explanation is that such discrepancy is the result of two
encapsulated systems: an action system, which guides the movements, and a judgment system,
which predicts actions. Such dichotomy of structures not only runs counter to PFT, but is overly
simplistic, as illustrated in a preliminary study we carried out to investigate the ability of children
to predict how far they can throw balls after feedback.
Participants were 12 children from a Midwestern day care serving middle-income
families. The children ranged in age from 4 to 10 years, half of them being younger than 72
months (M = 5.04 years), and half of them being older than 72 months (M = 7.94 years). A
hallway at the day care, approximately 16 feet long, was taped off to create an area in which to
throw medicine balls. Three medicine balls that differed in heaviness were used. The heaviest
medicine ball weighed 6 pounds, the middle ball weighed 4 pounds, and the lightest ball weighed
2 pounds. A yellow square at the end of the hallway acted as a place for the children to stand
while throwing the different balls. The researcher prompted each child to “guess how far you can
throw the ball.” The child was then instructed to stop the researcher, who was walking
backwards towards the end of the hallway, in order to indicate how far they thought they would
be able to throw the medicine ball. After the child stopped the researcher, the distance between
the researcher and the yellow square was measured and recorded. Finally, the researcher left the
hallway, and the child was told to “throw the ball.” As needed, the researcher reminded the child
to throw underhand if the child tried to gain momentum by throwing the ball from the side. The
spot where the medicine ball landed was marked, measured, and recorded. This procedure was
repeated twice for a total of three trials for each of the balls.
The absolute difference between the predicted distance thrown and the actual distance
thrown was determined for each throw and then averaged across trials and children. Figure 1
shows the results obtained. Although the older children were better able than preschoolers to
perceive the distance they could throw a ball, there was an interaction between accuracy and ball
weight. Specifically, the improvement with age was only for the lightest balls, not the medium
and heaviest balls. Their ability to accurately adjust their predictions for how far they could
throw the medium and heaviest balls was not statistically different from younger children. Hence,
for the heavier balls, older children were no better than younger children at self-correction.
[COMP: INSERT FIGURE 1 with Fig. 1 Caption HERE]
Our results add to the list of findings showing a discrepancy between perceived action
capabilities and actual capabilities, even after feedback. Although perception and action can
align after experience (e.g., Zhu & Bingham 2010), and although there can be a positive
relationship between preschoolers’ self-perceptions of the physical ability and fundamental
motor skills (Robinson 2010), this is not always the case (cf. Kloos & Amazeen 2002). Our
results show that such a discrepancy does not fit a theory of independent action and judgment
systems. This is because the heaviness of the ball actually matters. To accommodate such context
effects, a dichotomous model of action and perception would have to be expanded ad hoc to take
into account object weight. Instead, we propose that prediction, as well as action, results from
intricate interaction of idiosyncratic constraints, which differ not only as a function of the task
(“predict” vs. “throw”) but also as a function of perceptual features (ball heaviness).
The PFT would suggest that older children are better at predicting their “throwability,”
given that they have had more experience in using conscious information to inform behavioral
outputs than preschoolers. Finding that there are circumstances in which predictability does not
improve with experience requires expanding PFT. It needs to incorporate not only conflict
among potential actions, but also conflict between perception/judgment and action. We conclude
that, although compatible with PFT, developmental studies open up the approach to new ways of
investigating its tenets.
<C-Text ends>
<RFT>References [Cheshire Hardcastle, Eliah White, Heidi Kloos, and Valerie Gray
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<refs end>
<Figure>
Figure 1. Average absolute difference between children’s predicted distance thrown and the
actual distance thrown, separated by age group and ball weight. Error bars represent standard
errors. Measures are in centimeters.
Average Absolute
Difference
(Predicted vs. Actual)
120
100
80
Light Ball
60
Medium Ball
40
Heavy Ball
20
0
Younger
Children
Older Children