Dr Cecile Hoareau
Berkeley CSHE & Maastricht School of Governance
Presentation for 13th February 2012 CHEER Sussex
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Comparison between two higher education reform
processes in Europe and the US
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The Bologna process (Europe)
Degree profile experiment (US)
Why did the Bologna process lead to major changes
in Europe but similar attempts have been more
limited in the US?
An example of theoretical adjustment
(from Hoareau, 2011)
For Comparative Journal of Education
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European HE reforms: the Bologna process
The Bologna process as ‘deliberative governance’
Research questions
Multiple methodologies
Widespread changes in Europe
A European style of reforms for US HE?
Explaining differences: the limits of deliberative
governance
Conclusion
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Who?
◦ 46 member states
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What does it seek to achieve?
◦ European HE becoming more like the
UK system?
◦ Facilitate comparability
 Accessible Higher education
 Consistent measurement of credits
 Define and measure learning
outcomes for all disciplines
◦ Tackle more sensitive questions e.g.
role of the Government in higher
education management, financing
etc.
Member states of the Bologna process
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Why is it important?
◦ In economic terms, higher education a major
‘export industry’
 1st in terms of output generation in the UK (UUK, 2006)
 Top third before the entertainment industry in the US
(Douglass, Edelstein and Hoareau, 2011)
◦ For Europe
 Facilitate movements across borders
 Start a European-wide debate on learning and its value
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Why?
◦ Concern about the quality of European higher
education (Attali, 1998: annex 8).
◦ In perspective of international competition
 Growing influence of India, China, Brazil and Australia
in the economy and higher education (Allègre, 1993;
interviews FF1, 02 May 2007, FCM1 28 April 2007)
◦ ‘Prepare […] for the brain competition that the 21st
century will constitute’ (Allègre, 1997)
From…
To…
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No coercion
A set of ministerial
declarations
A complex network of
agencies, programs,
evaluations
 Eg. Tuning Europe produces
‘reference points’ on what is
being learnt
Tuning programme
Deliberative governance (Hoareau, 2011)
A mode of governance relying on:
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Deliberation
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•
•
•
Resulting in
•
•
Justify positions with reasoned arguments
Open to each other’s arguments
Reciprocity
Problem solving, ‘framing’, learning, incremental policy change
Gehring, 2003; Habermas, 1984; Risse, 2000; Teague, 2001
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Is it possible to obtain significant policy
change without coercion?
◦ A ‘talking shop’ or a consequential policy tool?
 Does it change participants’ opinions?
 Does it lead to policy reforms?
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Unit of measurement: individual opinions and
subsequent domestic reforms
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Multiple methodologies
◦ 72 interviews in Europe & 40 in US
◦ Cases of deliberations Archival work & secondary
sources
◦ Analysis of reforms from 1999
◦ Online survey of 160 participants (25% response rate)
 Retrospectively measure to which extent participants have
changed their opinions and how much weight they give to
participations to deliberations
 Various dimensions of relevant to the Bologna process
(institutional management, qualifications, quality assurance)
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Objective: triangulation
Logistic and multinomial regression results
Object
Models
Delib.
Prox. maj
Profession
Instit. manag.
1
2
0.62
0.80
*
0.38
0.41
-2.64
-2.95
****
****
0.45
0.47
-0.36
-0.36
Country.
0.37
0.42
Implemt.
0.34
0.11
Age
Constant
N
LR chi2
P > Chi2
Log-likeld
0.42
-0.47
**
0.21
2.24
****
0.66
203
58.27
0.00
-107.40
Qualifications
1
2
0.57
0.69
**
***
0.22
0.25
-0.19
-0.75
***
0.24
0.25
-0.14
-0.00
0.39
0.60
*
0.37
-0.20
0.21
0.32
*
0.19
-0.01
0.23
0.46
**
0.22
-0.09
0.44
-0.35
0.23
-0.21
*
0.12
-0.04
0.36
464
13.76
0.00
-303.84
0.23
2.11
***
0.68
206
70.32
0.00
-139.17
Quality control
1
2
0.39
0.74
*
0.40
0.45
-0.35
-0.97
**
0.38
0.42
-0.03
-0.13
0.35
0.13
0.42
-0.16
0.40
0.55
0.27
-0.06
0.33
0.70
*
0.42
-0.11
0.14
-0.44
0.20
0.04
0.25
-0.28
0.40
472
63.57
0.00
-400.90
0.59
161
7.1
0.3
-106.92
0.70
163
25.81
0.01
-161.59
0.51
0.00
Note: The first line represents log-odds; standard errors are on the second line for each
category.
Note2: * significant at p ≤ .1; ** significant at p ≤ .05; *** significant at p ≤ .01;
****significant at p ≤ .001.
Note 3: 1 and 2 indicate models 1 and 2, respectively the logistic regression and the
Qualifications
framework
Quality control
.9
.8
.7
.3
.4
.5
.6
Probability
.6
.5
.4
.2
.1
0
0
0
.1
.1
.2
.2
.3
.3
.4
.5
Probability
.6
.7
.7
.8
.8
.9
.9
1
1
1
Institutional management
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Total number of meetings
LB pr(1)/UB pr(1)
institutional management
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Total number of meetings
LB pr(1)/UB pr(1)
qualifications framework
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Total number of meetings
LB pr(1)/UB pr(1)
quality assurance
‘Minds matured and mentalities changed and everyone was aware over all
the territory that if we do not agree on what we should do, in any case we
cannot leave the system like this.’ (Interview FCM 3, 15 June 2007)
1
Other reforms as riders, e.g. France 2003 and 2007
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Interpretation
◦ Deliberative governance can lead to a significant
change of opinions and coordinated policy change
in Europe (Hoareau, 2010)
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Increasing attention to the Bologna process (Adelman,
2008 and 2009; Gaston, 2010; Lumina, 2011)
◦ ‘The world has changed. The borders between the US and
European higher education are now somewhat leaky […]. A
European in America is now somehow thinkable!’
(Robertson, 2009)
◦ ‘Three states […] examine the Bologna process to
determine the forms and extent of its potential in U.S.
contexts. Scarcely a year ago, such an effort would have
been unthinkable’ (Adelman, 2009: 8)’.
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Why does the US care?
◦ Accountability debate
 So far limited to general skills (AAC&U; 2007; Gaston,
2010)
 Especially around for-profits (Douglass, forthcoming)
◦ Threat to international supremacy
 Relationship with intellectual supremacy and attracting
talents (Gaston, 2010: 11)
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Tuning USA by Lumina foundation (2008)
 Indiana, Minnesota, Utah and Texas establish study groups
 Deliberation between administrators, labour market
representatives and students
◦ Document
 Degree qualifications profile (2011)
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But : Low take-up rate
◦ No major reform
◦ widespread skepticism
◦ No further state support
Europe
USA
Start
1998
Late 2008
Nature
A wide pan-European process
An experiment
Number of
participants
46 +European Commission +
associations etc.
4
Level
Governments, universities, EU
institutions
Universities and states
Topic
Quality assurance
Qualifications framework
Learning outcome
Social dimension
Tuning
Tuning
Learning outcome
Impact
Widespread national reforms (e.g.
France)
?
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US efforts do not meet the same impact or
popularity as the Bologna process
◦ 4 years after its launch, the Bologna process had already
led to major domestic reforms in France, Germany and Italy.
◦ Tuning USA has not had such impact
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Why is there no Bologna process of the US?
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Deliberative governance
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Needs-based argument
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Incentive-based argument
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Deliberative governance
◦ Led to some agreement in the US (degree profile)
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But does not account for differences in
◦ Reforms undertaken
◦ Differences in the number of participants between
Europe and the US
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Needs-based argument should be dismissed
Tertiary graduation rate
EU 19 average
OECD average
United Kingdom
United States
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
US = 15th out of 34 OECD countries
Source: OECD (2010)
◦ Concerns on overall quality of US higher education
 45% of undergraduates show no learning gain after two
years in higher education
 35% of undergraduates show no learning gain after
four years in higher education (Arum and Roksa, 2011)
‘We’ve had a good run - as the saying goes,
but we are no longer at the cutting edge.
US higher education can no longer sail on
the assumption of world dominance,
oblivious to the creative energies, natural
intelligence, and hard work of other
nations’
(Adelman, 2009: 9)
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Incentive-based argument
◦
The paradox of autonomy
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European universities have more incentive to convert to reform
processes than US ones due to heavy Government steering
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Examples
 Funding structure
 Block grant vs performance based funding (Salmi and
Hauptmann, 2006)
 Evaluation
 quality assurance in Europe broader than US accreditation
schemes
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In Europe: difference between de jure and de
facto autonomy
US universities do not have these constraints,
so do not have the same incentive to enlist in
a widespread reform process
◦ A paradox
 Government steering in Europe is meant to illicit
university ‘autonomy’ (Bologna declaration, 1999;
Vernon, 2011)
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Explain why higher education reform
processes are different in the US and Europe
◦ ‘Need’ for reform exists
◦ But the incentive structures for higher education
differ between Europe and the US
 Paradox of autonomy in higher education in Europe
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An example of theoretical adjustment
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Illustrates the limits of deliberative governance and the
importance of incentive mechanisms for change
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Further research
◦ Have more comparable data for US/Europe
◦ How do these change processes in higher education
relate to broader socio-economic change?