Christian Perspectives in Science
Seminar
Calvin College, October 3 2008
Should Christians be Structural
Realists?*
Elise Crull
History and Philosophy of Science
University of Notre Dame
*A work in progress. Portions of this talk concerning SR and
Poincaré have been adapted from collaborative work with
Dr. Katherine Brading (Philosophy Department, Univ. Notre
Dame)
Overview
Sketching the Terrain
•
•
What is structural realism (SR)?
Common objections
Incorporating Faith
•
•
Motivations for SR from Christianity
Objections to SR overcome by faith?
Poincaré’s Structuralism
•
•
What it looks like
What it might mean for faith-based SR
Conclusions
Sketching the Terrain
• Worrall (1989): “Structural Realism: The
Best of Both Worlds?”
– No Miracles argument (realism)
– Pessimistic Meta-induction (anti-realism)
– Case Study: Fresnel to Maxwell
Sketching the Terrain
• Worrall (1989): “There was an important
element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel
to Maxwell—and this was much more than a
simple question of carrying over the
successful empirical content into the new
theory. At the same time it was rather less
than a carrying over of the full theoretical
content or full theoretical mechanisms (even
in “approximate” form) … There was
continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the
continuity is one of form or structure, not of
content.” (117)
Sketching the Terrain
Structural Realism (SR):
(i)
Science aims to give an accurate representation
of the structure of the world
(ii) We’ve good reason to believe science is
successful with respect to this aim
Ontic Structural Realism (OSR):
(iii) this structure is all there is
Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR):
(iii) this structure is all we can know
Sketching the Terrain
Structural Realism (SR):
(i)
(ii)
Science aims to give an accurate representation of the structure
of the world
We’ve good reason to believe science is successful with respect
to this aim
Structural Empiricism:
(i)
Science aims to give an empirically adequate
representation of the structure of the world
(ii) Acceptance of this representation of the
structure of the world commits one only to belief
in the empirical adequacy of the structure
Sketching the Terrain
Structural Realism:
(i)
(ii)
Science aims to give an accurate representation of the structure of the
world
We’ve good reason to believe science is successful with respect to this
aim
Structural Empiricism:
(i)
(ii)
Science aims to give an empirically adequate representation of the
structure of the world
Acceptance of this representation of the structure of the world commits
one only to belief in the empirical adequacy of the structure
Structural Idealism:
(i)
Science aims to give accurate representation of
the structure of the world as we experience it
(ii) We’ve good reason to believe science is
successful with respect to this aim
Objections to Structural Realism
• “Structure all the way down”
• Ambiguity of term structure
– Mathematical structure not always continuous/
trivially continuous (Chakravartty)
– Form/content distinction not principled (Psillos)
• Realist enough ?
• Historically contingent on badly done history
• From logic: non-categoricity corollary of
Gödel’s 1st incompleteness theorem
(Howard)
The Scientific Process à la Poincaré
brute
facts
•inaccessibl
e
scientifi
c facts
(data)
•brute fact
+
language
“principles”
1st structural
moment:
interpolation
2nd
structural
moment:
equations/la
ws
•Reveals
intratheoretic
relations
•Enunciates
intratheoretic
relations
•Involves
generalizatio
n
(drawing
lines)
•Involves
generalizatio
n
(eqns
laws) to
•Involves
idealism
•Involves
idealism
•Contains
•Based on
eqn X :: eqn Y
•Reveals
intertheoretic
relations
•Involves
generalizatio
n
(some eqns
to
principles)
•Involves
idealism
•Based on
References/Suggestions for Further
Reading
Chakravarrty, A. (1998), “Semirealism”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29, No. 3,
pp. 391-408.
Chakravartty, A. (2003), "The Structuralist Conception of Objects", Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 5
pp. 867-878.
Folina, J. (1992), Poincaré and the Philosophy of Mathematics. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
French, S. (1999), “Models and mathematics in physics: the role of group theory”, in J. Butterfield and C.
Pagonis (eds.), From Physics to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 187-207.
French, S. (2006), “Structure as a Weapon of the Realist”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 106, No. 1,
pp. 170-187.
Ladyman, J. (1998), “What is Structural Realism?”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29,
No. 3, pp. 409-424.
Poincaré, H. (1902), Science and Hypothesis. Repr. New York: Dover, 1952.
Poincaré, H. (1905), The Value of Science. Repr. New York: Dover, 1958.
References/Suggestions for Further
Reading
Poincaré, H. (1913), Last Essays. Repr. New York: Dover, 1963.
Psillo, S. (1995), “Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?”, Dialectica, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 15-46.
Saatsi, J. (2005), “Reconsidering the Fresnel-Maxwell theory shift: how the realist can have her cake and EAT it
too”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 36, pp. 509-538.
Torretti, R. (1984), Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré, 2nd ed. Dordrecht: Reidel.
van Fraassen, B. (1980), The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Fraassen, B. (2006), “Structure: Its Shadow and Substance”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
Vol. 57, pp. 275-307.
Worrall, J. (1989), “Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds?”, Dialectica, Vol. 43, pp. 99-124.
Worrall, J. (1994) “How to remain ‘reasonably’ optimistic: scientific realism and the ‘luminiferous
ether”, Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 334-342.