Post-Conflict Demand for Secondary Education
in Timor-Leste
Ricardo Goulão Santos
PhD Candidate in Economics at IDS, University of Sussex
Visiting Researcher of the National University Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL)
Outline
Motivation & Findings
Background
• Motivation & Findings
• Background
• Theory and Empirical Review
• Data and Empirical Strategy
• Results
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
Conflict hurts Education – but there may be a peace dividend
Motivation & Findings
Background
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
About Fragile and Conflict Afflicted States, in UNESCO Education For All Global
Monitoring Report 2011 (35 countries):
•
More than 28 million children of primary school age out of school, or 42% of the
world total.
•
Gross enrolment ratios in secondary school are nearly 30% lower in conflictaffected countries (48%) than in others (67%), and are far lower for girls.
The study reviews and acknowledges the negative impacts of conflict on structural
variables that, in turn, are empirically shown to affect demand for secondary
education: returns to education (PhD paper) and quality of schooling.
Most notably, there are indications that the experience of violence and conflict may
have had a net positive effect on the intrinsic preferences of households for
secondary education.
Violence during the conflict
Motivation & Findings
Background
Literature Review
Civilian killed in each district (maximum, median, minimum) in each year
Aileu
Ainaro
Baucau
Bobonaro
Covalima
Dili
Ermera
Lautem
Liquiçá
Manatuto
Manufahi
Oecussi
Viqueque
72 73 74
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0
75
4
3,1
0,4
2,9
1,6
2,6
8,3
-0
0,9
2,2
3,3
0,4
0,1
76
1,2
1,1
1,4
0,6
0,3
0,2
3,9
1,4
0,2
0,7
1,3
-0
1,3
77
1,6
0,9
0,6
0,6
0,5
-0
2,9
-0
-0
1,4
1,2
-0
0,9
78
1,6
-0
3,8
0,5
0,5
0
4,6
0,1
0,2
1,5
2,1
-0
1,6
79
0,3
0,5
4,9
0,5
0,1
0,1
1
3,2
0,1
1,6
3,1
-0
2,4
80 81
-0 -0
-0 -0
1,3 0,2
-0 -0
-0 -0
1,6 -0
-0 -0
1,2 0,6
-0 -0
0,5 -0
0,2 -0
-0 -0
0,6 -0
Data & Strategy
Results
Deaths due to hunger and illness in each district in each year
Gradient of the number of killings per district and year
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,2 0,5 0,4 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0
-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0,4
-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0,7 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0,3 0,2 0
0,9 3,2 1,1 0,3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
-0 0,2 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0,2
-0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
-0 2,2 1,3 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
99 00 01 02 03
0,2 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,7 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,4 -0 -0 -0 -0
4,5 -0 -0 -0 -0
3,7 -0 -0 -0 -0
1,5 -0 -0 -0 -0
3,2 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,9 -0 -0 -0 -0
1,2 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,5 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,2 -0 -0 -0 -0
7,6 -0 -0 -0 -0
0,3 -0 -0 -0 -0
Source: Author’s calculations using CAVR (2006) data.
Demand for Education
Motivation & Findings
Background
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
•
Only became a topic of interest with human capital and the works of Schultz
(1960), Becker (1962) and Ben-Porath (1967).
•
Education is an investment in human capital and is expected to pay with higher
income in the future (Becker 1964). Returns to Education are the signal that
education pays as an investment (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974).
Education is a choice with direct costs but also indirect/opportunity costs (Becker
1964; Ben-Porath 1967; Wilkinson 1966; Heckman 1976; Lazear 1977; Mattila
1982)
Education demand reacts to differences in quality of schooling (Glewwe 2002)
Other notable contributions: Willis and Rosen (1975); Manski and Wise (1983)
Education and child labour: Ranjan (2001); Jafarey and Lahiri (2002)
Empirical applications: King (1993) on Puerto Rico; Kingdon and Theopold (2008)
on India
•
•
•
•
•
Education and Conflict
Motivation & Findings
•
•
•
Background
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
School enrolments decrease or increase less in conflict afflicted countries:
FitzGerald et al. (2001) and Stewart et al. (2001a); Stewart, Huang, and Wang
(2001) - mixed results in primary education; Kondylis (2010) - no statistically
significant impact of conflict on schooling in Bosnia.
Literacy reduces, with persistence of illiteracy after conflict: Carlton-Ford and
Boop (2010)
Some channels: loss of parents (Evans and Miguel 2004, on Kenya; Akresh and de
Walque 2008, on Rwanda finds contradictory evidence); consumption smoothing
(Ibáñez and Moya 2006, on Colombia); expectation of lower returns to education
(Rodriguez and Sanches 2009); displacement (Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011;
Raeymaekers 2011; SWAY 2006); recruitment (Blattman and Annan 2007, Annan
2010); disruption of education institutions (Cranna 1994; Kondylis 2010; Blattman
2006 on Uganda; Shemyakina 2006 on Tajiskistan; Akresh and de Walque 2008, on
genocide in Rwanda; Swee 2009, on Bosnia; Lai and Thyne 2007; Ichino and
Winter-Ebmer 2004); health of the children (Verwimp, Bundervoet and Akresh
(2010; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2006); targeting (Justino and Verwimp
2006).
Secondary School Attendance as a Household choice
Motivation & Findings
Background
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
•
Let 𝑖 be a member of the household of school age (between 12 and 18 years old).
During the day, 𝑖 can use her time in the following activities: school, leisure, care
activities (fetch water or wood, domestic shores, childcare or eldercare) or work.
•
The household seeks to maximize 𝑖’s inter-temporal contribution to the
household’s wellbeing which includes 𝑖’s utility but also, via 𝑖’s wages and care
activities, the utilities of the other household members.
•
Future wages depend positively of 𝑖’s schooling and the quality of education and is
signaled by the expected returns to education.
•
The experience of conflict (and survival), both by 𝑖 and the head of household
influence the household ‘s preference for education. Given her age 𝑖 ′ s own
preferences are likely to take precedence.
Empirical strategy
Motivation & Findings
•
Background
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
Each year, the household decides whether 𝑖 will go to school, go to work or do both. Each
alternative 𝑛 ∈ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙; 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘; 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ generates a stochastic indirect utility:
𝑈𝑖𝑛 = 𝑉 𝑊𝑖𝑛 , 𝑌𝑖𝑛 + 𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝐸𝑖𝑛 , 𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑛 , 𝐶𝑎𝑖𝑛 |r, ρ𝑖 , Q, 𝑋𝑖ℎ , 𝐶𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛
•
School is selected if the respective indirect utility is the highest.
•
Let, therefore 𝑌1∗ be a latent variable that linearly expresses the probability of attending school
𝑃𝑟𝑠 , i.e., 𝑌1∗ = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀1 =
𝑉 𝑊𝑖,𝑠 , 𝑌𝑖,𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖,𝑠 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑠 , 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑠 , 𝐶𝑎𝑖 |𝐻𝑖 , 𝐶𝑎𝑖 , r, ρ𝑖 , 𝑄, 𝑋𝑖ℎ , 𝐶𝑓𝑖
= 𝑃𝑟
− 𝑉 𝑊𝑖,𝑛𝑠 , 𝑌𝑖,𝑛𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖,𝑛𝑠 − 𝐸𝑖,𝑛𝑠 , 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑛𝑠 , 𝐶𝑎𝑖 |𝐻𝑖 , 𝐶𝑎𝑖 , r, ρ𝑖 , 𝑄, 𝑋𝑖ℎ , 𝐶𝑓𝑖 ≥ 𝜀𝑖,𝑛𝑠 − 𝜀𝑖𝑠
•
Regression: Heckman Probit was tested – attendance was found to be exogenous of primary
school completion; Probit with District and Ethnic Fixed Effects; IV for HH Income.
Data sources
Motivation & Findings
Background
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
Datasets used:
• World Bank Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards 2006 : 4,477 households, 25,000
observations, 4,102 between the age of 12 and 18
• Benetech-CAVR (2006) data on Human Rights Violations: death (violent and by
deprivation) and alleged disappearances, fatal violations and graveyard census
Historical sources:
• CAVR (2005), Taylor (1990,1999), Mattoso (2005)
Contextual sources:
• Life stories interviews (21) and qualitative interviews (20)
Dimensions of Conflict
Violence
Background
Control
Motivation & Findings
Literature Review
Killings
And
Disappearances
Deaths due to
hunger
and illness
attributed to conflict
Data & Strategy
During Life
Yearly average
During School Years
Yearly average
Number of
Number of
Extreme years
Extreme years
Yearly average
Yearly average
Number of
Extreme years
Number of
Extreme years
Disputed.
Territories
Number of years
Number of years
Control
By
the Resistance
Number of years
Number of years
Results
Results
(1)
Standard Model
(3)
(4)
Years w/ ext. kills during
Conflict Model
school
b/se
b/se
b/se
b/se
Probit (Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school year)
Constant
Age
Age2
Migrant
Married
Years of Education
E(Returns to Education)
Has Occupation
Insufficient Quality
Insufficient Security
-27.442***
(3.223)
3.133***
(0.410)
-0.097***
(0.013)
0.361*
(0.192)
-4.271***
(0.577)
0.517***
(0.039)
44.930***
(6.244)
-1.517***
(0.272)
-19.534*
(11.513)
-27.566*
(14.076)
Hunger during school
Years with extreme kills during
school
District fixed effects
Ethnolinguistic fixed effects
N
F test
F statistic
Prob
>F
Motivation
& Findings
Yes
Yes
4099
F(50,2270)
.
.
Background
(2)
Hunger during school
-25.209***
(3.153)
2.947***
(0.401)
-0.091***
(0.013)
0.303
(0.201)
-4.404***
(0.604)
0.508***
(0.037)
19.853***
(7.111)
-1.503***
(0.270)
-21.013*
(11.663)
-29.514**
(14.212)
-0.098***
(0.022)
Yes
Yes
-30.602***
(3.377)
3.451***
(0.420)
-0.106***
(0.014)
-0.028
(0.218)
-4.650***
(0.710)
0.485***
(0.037)
113.249***
(12.455)
-1.494***
(0.283)
-20.973*
(11.966)
-23.019
(14.655)
1.781***
(0.300)
Yes
Yes
4099
4099
F(51,2269)
F(51,2269)
.
.
.
.
Literature
Review
-28.390***
(3.388)
3.261***
(0.418)
-0.100***
(0.014)
-0.038
(0.221)
-4.559***
(0.745)
0.484***
(0.036)
85.771***
(14.101)
-1.496***
(0.283)
-22.562*
(11.911)
-25.201*
(14.552)
-0.074***
(0.023)
1.601***
(0.307)
Yes
Yes
4099
F(52,2268)
.
Data & Strategy .
(5)
Marginal Effects
b/se
0.470***
(0.061)
-0.014***
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.032)
-0.657***
(0.102)
0.070***
(0.003)
12.360***
(1.960)
-0.216***
(0.039)
-3.251*
(1.724)
-3.632*
(2.107)
-0.011***
(0.003)
0.231***
(0.043)
Yes
Yes
4099
Results-
Results: Synthesis of Marginal Effects
Motivation & Findings
Background
Variable
Age
Years of education
Being married
Has an occupation
Expected returns to education
Insufficient quality (prevalence)
Insufficient security (prevalence)
Conflict
Hunger during school
Years with extreme kills during
school
•
Literature Review
Data & Strategy
Results
D
Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit
St. Dev.
St. Dev.
St. Dev.
D value
+1 year
+1 year
1 = yes
1 = yes
1,25%
+2,3%
+1,3%
Avg. Mg. Effect
+22% to +30%
+ 7%
- 66%
- 22%
+15%
-7.5%
-4.7%.
St.Dev.
Unit
+3,6 people died/year
+1 year
-4%
+23%
St. Dev.
+ 0.4 years
+13.9%
Other variables, whose coefficients’ estimates were not statistically significant: Female;
Urban; Household size; Father attended school; Mother attended school; First child;
Adopted; Niece or nephew; Per capita hh expenditure; Hours of care activity; Insufficient
Access;
Next Steps
Motivation & Findings
Background
Literature Review
• Finishing writing up:
– Corrections
– Introduction and Conclusion
• Submit before January 19th 2015
Data & Strategy
Results
Next Steps
This research is a work in progress.
All your feedback is needed and valuable.
Thank You!
r.santos@ids.ac.uk
Synthesis of the conflict
Dili
Liquiça
Baucau
Manatuto
Aileu
Ermera
Bobonaro
Viqueque
Manufahi
Oecussi
Covalima
Ainaro
Political control variables:
• number of years of education in a district under dispute
• number of years of education in a district controlled by the Resistance
Lautem
Number of secondary schools in Timor-Leste 1973-2012
Sources: Estatisticas do Ultramar 1973; Timor-Timur Dalam Angka 1989, 1993; Saldanha (1994); GIS Timor 2000, 2002
and MoE EMIS (2012)
School attendance
Table 1: School attendance in 2004-05 per age (6 to 18 year olds) and gender
Age
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
25.8
49.7
72.4
81.4
80.3
81.8
73.4
59.4
47.2
32.6
15.8
15.4
-
-
-
-
-
2.9
10.5
25.3
35.4
46.9
57.7
51.4
24.0
49.4
71.6
76.8
83.3
81.4
78.6
68.6
51.3
44.6
24.2
20.9
-
-
-
-
-
2.7
8.4
18.2
28.1
37.3
50.0
48.9
24.9
49.6
72.0
79.1
81.8
81.6
76.1
63.9
49.3
39.0
20.3
18.1
-
-
-
-
-
2.8
9.4
21.8
31.7
41.7
53.6
50.2
Female
Prim.
6.6
Sec.
-
Male
Prim.
8.0
Sec.
-
All
Prim.
7.3
Sec.
-
Source: author’s calculations using TLSLS 2007
Household characteristics
Motivation
Background
Review
Data
Strategy
Urban
Rural
Variable
Attending School in
2004/05
Age
Household Size
Father Attended School
Mother Attended School
Migrated
First child
Adopted
Niece/Nephew
Married
Male
N=1044
20.1%
Female
N=1009
20.4%
(2.3)
3.4%
(18.0%)
1.8%
(13.4%)
1.3%
(11.5%)
30.9%
(46.2%)
2.2%
(14.7%)
3.4%
(18.3%)
0.1%
(3.1%)
(2.4)
2.5%
(15.6%)
1.2%
(10.8%)
1.9%
(13.6%)
28.2%
(45.0%)
1.9%
(13.6%)
4.1%
(19.8%)
2.3%
(14.9%)
6.1%
(23.9%)
3.4%
(18.1%)
8.7%
(28.2%)
21.1%
(40.8%)
1.9%
(13.6%)
9.5%
(29.3%)
0.1%
(3.1%)
N=4102
29.5%
15
(2)
(2)
(2.5)
All
15
7.3
7.6
7.6
6.9
Next steps
(45.6%)
(49.6%)
(2)
(2)
6.9
Female
N=992
43.8%
15
15
15
(2)
Male
N=1057
34.0%
(47.4%)
(40.3%)
(40.1%)
Results
(2.7)
7.4%
(26.1%)
3.3%
(17.9%)
8.7%
(28.2%)
21.6%
(41.2%)
2.0%
(14.1%)
11.1%
(31.4%)
1.4%
(11.8%)
(2.5)
4.8%
(21.4%)
2.4%
(15.4%)
5.1%
(22.1%)
25.5%
(43.6%)
2.0%
(14.0%)
7.0%
(25.5%)
1.0%
(9.7%)
Economic drivers and quality of education
Motivation
Background
Review
Data
Rural
Variable
(Completed) Years of
Education
E(Returns to Education)
Per capita Monthly
Household Expenditure
Hours of Care Activity
Has Ocupation
Male
N=1044
Urban
Female
N=1009
3
Male
N=1057
3
4
3
3
3
3
0.57%
0.67%
0.55%
0.60%
0.59%
1.21%
20.1
(10.1)
20.9
(10.8)
9.7
(7.5)
34%
(47.6%)
1.31%
(41.0)
13.8
(9.8)
30%
(45.9%)
1.07%
28.7
1.25%
29.9
(42.5)
7.8
(8.6)
11%
(31.9%)
Next steps
N=4102
5
3
1.36%
Results
All
Female
N=992
5
Strategy
24.9
(30.7)
10.9
(10.2)
10.5
(9.3)
9%
(28.2%)
21%
(40.9%)
Rural
Variable
Insuficient Quality
Insuficient Access
Insuficient Security
Male
N=1044
2.9%
(2.8%)
7.6%
(4.0%)
1.1%
(1.6%)
Urban
Female
N=1009
2.8%
(2.7%)
7.6%
(3.9%)
1.0%
(1.6%)
Male
N=1057
1.6%
(1.5%)
5.0%
(2.7%)
0.6%
(0.7%)
Female
N=992
1.6%
(1.5%)
5.1%
(2.9%)
0.6%
(0.8%)
All
N=4102
2.2%
(2.3%)
6.3%
(3.6%)
0.8%
(1.3%)
Conflict and Violence (adolescent’s experience)
Motivation
Background
Review
Variable
Kills during life
Data
Rural
Male
Female
N=796
N=742
7.6
7.5
(5.2)
(5.0)
8.0
Kills during school
(12.8)
Hunger during life
(2.8)
Hunger during school
(4.2)
Years with extreme kills during life
(0.5)
Years with extreme kills during
school
Number of years under extreme
numbers of deaths by
hunger/illness in the birth district
Number of school years under
extreme numbers of deaths by
hunger/illness in the birth district
Number of years in disputed
districts
Strategy
7.0
5.2
0.4
0.2
0.00
0.00
0.0
(0.0)
2.1
(3.3)
Number of school years in
disputed districts
(0.7)
Number of years in districts
controlled by the Resistance
(2.9)
Number of school years in districts
controlled by the Resistance
(0.6)
0.3
1.4
0.2
0.2
1.5
0.2
(0.7)
1.2
(2.8)
0.2
(0.6)
1.9
(3.1)
(0.6)
(3.0)
0.1
(0.6)
1.6
0.2
1.4
0.0
(0.0)
(3.0)
(0.7)
(2.9)
0.0
1.8
0.2
(0.7)
0.00
(0.00)
(0.0)
(3.1)
0.2
(0.4)
0.00
0.0
2.1
(3.2)
0.2
(0.00)
(0.0)
0.4
(0.5)
(0.4)
0.00
0.0
(0.0)
0.3
0.2
(0.00)
4.4
(3.6)
(0.5)
(0.4)
(0.00)
4.3
0.3
0.2
5.0
(2.5)
(2.8)
(0.5)
(0.4)
4.8
4.6
0.4
(0.5)
7.8
(11.7)
(2.2)
(3.3)
N=3289
7.4
7.8
4.7
4.2
All
(4.8)
(10.0)
(2.2)
(4.1)
(0.00)
8.2
5.1
4.6
(4.5)
(12.2)
(2.8)
(0.4)
Urban
Male
Female
N=897
N=854
7.1
7.4
(4.6)
(11.4)
Results
1.4
(2.9)
0.1
(0.6)
0.2
(0.6)
Next steps
Conflict and Violence (HH head’s experience)
Motivation
Background
Review
Variable
Kills during household head's life
Kills during household head's school
Data
Rural
Male
Female
N=796
N=742
9.9
(4.9)
13.3
(8.3)
(14.5)
Hunger during household head's school
(23.0)
13.0
5.1
0.2
2.4
(2.0)
0.2
(0.6)
14.8
(6.9)
14.9
1.1
(2.9)
5.5
(7.3)
0.4
(1.4)
2.0
6.4
0.4
(1.3)
1.6
(3.4)
5.8
(7.7)
0.8
(2.2)
14.6
(7.0)
(3.7)
(8.0)
0.2
(0.6)
14.2
2.1
5.5
(7.2)
0.3
(7.0)
(3.8)
2.0
(2.0)
(0.6)
14.5
1.1
(2.8)
1.7
0.3
(7.2)
0.2
(0.6)
(1.9)
(0.7)
(6.8)
0.3
1.5
0.2
1.8
(1.3)
(0.6)
(1.8)
(0.6)
1.6
0.3
2.3
8.4
(22.3)
(1.1)
(0.7)
(2.0)
9.5
1.5
0.2
(0.6)
5.8
(14.5)
(22.3)
(1.0)
11.7
6.4
8.2
2.0
9.3
(7.8)
(13.5)
(18.9)
(1.5)
10.6
6.8
8.2
N=3289
(4.4)
(7.4)
(13.9)
(24.8)
2.0
(0.6)
9.9
5.8
(7.6)
0.7
(2.1)
Next steps
All
8.9
(3.9)
(6.9)
(15.9)
7.7
(1.5)
8.7
(3.8)
(8.1)
Results
Urban
Male
Female
N=897
N=854
9.7
(4.8)
4.8
Hunger during household head's life
Years with extreme kills during
household head's life
Years with extreme kills during
household head's school
Years with extreme hunger during
household head's life
Years with extreme hunger during
household head's school
Total years in disputed districts household's head
School years in disputed districts household's head
Total years controlled by Resistance household's head
School years controlled by Resistance household's head
Strategy
0.6
(1.8)
Heckman Probit Model (selection)
Table 14: Secondary Education Demand – Binomial Probit with Selection (Heckman Probit) – Selection model
Selection Model
b/se
Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have completed primary school before the 2004/05 school year
Constant
Age
Age2
E(Per capita hh income)
Has occupation
1
Insufficient quality
Kills during school
Years with extreme kills during school
School years controlled by Resistance
District fixed effects
Ethnolinguistic fixed effects
Athrho
N
F test
F statistic
Prob > F
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
-19.112***
(2.733)
2.172***
(0.336)
-0.059***
(0.011)
0.020***
(0.005)
-0.399***
(0.126)
-20.834*
(10.644)
-0.075***
(0.008)
2.270***
(0.256)
0.224***
(0.074)
Yes
Yes
-0.756
(0.916)
4091
F(37.2279)
.
.
Heckman Probit Model (main)
Table 15: Secondary Education Demand – Probit and Binomial Probit with Selection (Heckman Probit) – Main model
(1)
Probit
b/se
(2)
Heckman Probit
b/se
Probit (Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school year)
Constant
Age
Age2
Urban
Household size
First Child
Is married
Years of Education
E(Returns to Education)
E(Per capita hh income)
Hours of care activity
Has Occupation
Insufficient Quality
Insufficient Security
Hunger during school
Years with extreme kills during school
District Controls
Ethnolinguistic Controls
N
F test
F statistic
Prob > F
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
-36.399***
(7.278)
5.279***
(0.902)
-0.152***
(0.027)
-0.587***
(0.209)
0.084***
(0.031)
0.490***
(0.185)
-4.759***
(0.798)
-0.746***
(0.134)
344.933***
(62.684)
0.018***
(0.006)
-0.017*
(0.010)
-1.790***
(0.295)
-62.009***
(21.600)
-74.897***
(28.804)
-0.383***
(0.119)
5.158***
(0.864)
Yes
Yes
1383
F(41,982)
18.73
0.0000
-20.479
(19.497)
3.262
(2.457)
-0.094
(0.070)
-5.164***
(1.378)
-0.663***
(0.200)
294.465***
(88.117)
-1.370**
(0.537)
-14.641
(17.190)
-65.405**
(27.611)
-0.373**
(0.176)
4.030***
(1.550)
Yes
Yes
4091
F(37,2279)
.
.
Robustness tests
Table 1: Secondary Education Demand - robustness to introduction of structural variables and migration
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Socio-economic
+ Education as Investment
+ Education as Consumption
+ Quality and Access
Non migrants
b/se
b/se
b/se
b/se
b/se
Probit (Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school year)
Hunger during school
-0.081***
-0.064***
-0.073***
-0.074***
-0.086***
(0.014)
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.028)
Years with extreme kills during school
1.148***
1.659***
1.599***
1.601***
1.687***
(0.182)
(0.282)
(0.308)
(0.307)
(0.379)
N
4099
4099
4099
4099
3887
F test
F(44, 2276)
F(46, 2274)
F(49, 2271)
F(52, 2268)
F(51, 2175)
F statistic
.
.
.
.
13.07
Prob > F
.
.
.
.
0.0000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 – Structural variables in each model: (model 1) Female; Age; Age2; Urban; Household size; Father attended school; Mother attended school; Internal migrant; First child; Adopted; Niece or
nephew; Married; District fixed effects; Ethnolinguistic fixed effects; (added in model 2) Years of Education; E(Returns to Education); (added in model 3) Per capita hh expenditure; Hours of care activity; Has Occupation;
(added in model 4) Insufficient Access; Insufficient Quality; Insufficient Security.
Table 2: Secondary Education Demand - robustness to age of start and threshold of extreme violence
(1)
(2)
Age of entry in school
(3)
(4)
(5)
Extreme Threshold (ET =)
(Main)
2 St. Dev.
b/se
(6)
(Main)
7 years old
8 years old
1 St. Dev.
3 St. Dev.
6 years old
b/se
b/se
b/se
b/se
b/se
Probit (Explained variable = Probability of child, between ages 12 and 18, to have attended secondary school in the 2004/05 school year)
Hunger during school
-0.074***
-0.170***
-0.181***
(-)
(-)
(-)
(0.023)
(0.035)
(0.039)
Years with extreme kills during school
1.601***
0.699***
0.407**
0.830***
1.601***
1.601***
(0.307)
(0.192)
(0.158)
(0.196)
(0.307)
(0.307)
N
4099
3528
3528
4099
4099
4099
F test
F(52,2268)
F(52,2018)
F(52,2268)
F(52,2268)
F(52,2268)
F(52,2268)
F statistic
.
10.90
11.11
.
.
.
Prob > F
.
0.0000
0.0000
.
.
.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 - – Structural variables in each model: Female; Age; Age2; Urban; Household size; Father attended school; Mother attended school; Internal migrant; First child; Adopted; Niece or nephew;
Married; Years of Education; E(Returns to Education); Per capita hh expenditure; Hours of care activity; Has Occupation; Insufficient Access; Insufficient Quality; Insufficient Security; District fixed effects; Ethnolinguistic
fixed effects. (-) Variable included in the model as control to robustness test.