CHAPTER ELEVEN
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CONCLUSIONS
Philipp Fluri and Velizar Shalamanov
The present study proceeds from a discussion within the PfP Consortium of Defence
Academies Working Group on Security Sector Reform (SSR WG) on success,
adequacy, transparency and comprehensiveness of Security Sector Reform (especially
SSR programmes) and the wish for a timely and transparent reporting mechanism on
progress made. Representatives of different transition countries within the WG
volunteered to share thoughts and contribute articles to a volume addressing the
following questions:
•
What are the challenges, threats and risks to which your country’s national
security policy answers, and are they identified in official documents? Is there a
divergence between official and public perceptions of threats and risks to
security?
•
Which institutions are assigned to address which risks and threats, and what
legal and procedural provisions exist for their interaction and cooperation on the
local, national, regional and international (identify institutions) level?
•
Does the existing network of institutions and their cooperation leave important
problems untouched (e.g. corruption)?
•
Analysis of the SSR in key areas of Civil-Military-Security and Inter-agency
Cooperation. How is this cooperation developing, whom are these institutions
reporting to, and who intervenes in the case of problems?
•
Is there an asymmetrical development of institutions and are all these institutions
democratically accountable (e.g. Ministries of Interior)?
•
Are there problems in civil-military-security and inter-agency cooperation typical
for your country/region, how would you describe them, and how could they
eventually be overcome?
•
Assessment of the current state of the SSR and SSR Action Plan. Is Security
Sector Reform successful? Only in parts? Which institutions are the most
successful, and why?
•
In conclusion: would you claim that SSR in your country is comprehensive,
adequate and transparent, and what reporting mechanism on progress would
eventually need to be introduced to create such comprehensiveness, adequacy
and transparency in due time? What international and domestic institutions would
eventually need to be involved in such oversight functions? What role is there for
civil society?
Security Sector Reform as a Novel Concept
Security Sector Reform is a relatively novel concept, replacing earlier less
comprehensive programmes like force reduction, defence reform, and individual
adaptation of the individual security providing services to new threat perceptions and
financial possibilities, largely without a strong element of enhanced international and
domestic inter-agency cooperation. It is therefore no wonder that authors found it difficult
to find comprehensive answers to the questions proposed in the questionnaire.
The increasing powers and responsibilities of the institutions involved in the security
sector require adequate civilian and civil society oversight and control. Wide ranges of
international agencies play a role in supporting security sector reform, and it should not
surprise us that some political lobbyists travelling the transition countries are largely selfappointed, and/or represent the interests of powerful armament industries in the guise of
the honest broker. It is of importance that SSR processes be transparent and rooted in a
country’s culture. An uncontrolled executive can not be trusted to address the questions
at hand disinterestedly.
Reporting on Security Sector Reform
Apart from the long list of different objectives which all governments claim to have in the
implementation of reforms, they also have another thing in common: the absence of a
well-defined assessment and reporting process on the implementation of the SSR
programmes. Scholars and practitioners addressing the issue of success and failure of
reforms and adequacy of reform plans thus often have to rely on their own observations,
interviews with officials they may know, and vague feelings in the population on whether
things went ‘right’, or ‘wrong’.
In some of the countries under scrutiny, the system and the procedures are in place (first
generation aspects of SSR), but the performance and the cultural permeation lag far
behind the desired outcome. For a lot of reasons, Hungary and Poland, but also
Slovakia (the editors proved unable to motivate Czech authors and therefore lack
possibilities of qualified reference) are among the most successful transition countries.
As all three authors suggest, their respective governments failed to inform about SSR –
or rather: to involve – the electorate in a way that could have created a sense of
ownership. In the words of Professor Mihalikova security sector reform activities:
… took place largely outside the public eye and received little attention in the
media. In part, this is due to circumstances; it can also be partly ascribed to the
general lack of knowledge about security and defence. Expertise is very much
limited to the professionals working in the ministries. A community of security
experts outside the government hardly exists. The experts from nongovernmental organisations and academic institutions by and large are proNATO, but none has really developed options for defence policy. There is a lack
of well-informed debate among these analysts, while coverage in the media is
often tainted by the party orientation of the journalists. Thus discussion and
decision-making within official channels are to a great extent disconnected from
debate …
Questions of reform implementation oversight and cultural imbedding do become critical
if not irrelevant when there is a far-reaching absence of public interest (and for that
matter: expertise). Complementary to this is the human factor among the political
leadership: how many of the leaders are willing to subject their work to transparency and
oversight procedures and believe in accountability which is not enforced?
Strengthening Transparency and Ownership
The security sector is and will remain a politically sensitive area. This, however, is not to
imply that only the organs directly dealing with the security sector and its reforms, the
executive, ought to be involved in its oversight. On?/To the contrary: in mature
democracies there is not only a separation of powers in implementation and oversight
functions, but the civil society itself takes enlightened interest in security sector oversight
and reform matters, for the security sector is no longer a state within the state, providing
for itself and those in usurped power, but serves the human security interests of each
and every citizen who considers it its own. The security sector and those in charge of it
therefore have an interest to provide transparency.
Formation Programmes for Security Sector Governance experts
Knowledge is the key to understanding and overseeing the security sector, decisionmaking, planning and budgeting. It does not come as a surprise, then, that authors
suggest to invest in the formation of a new kind of experts – security sector governance
experts – with a comprehensive knowledge not only of the security challenges, but also
the cooperative mechanisms of meeting and overcoming them1.
Such experts would possibly have a solid background in one of the security providingservices, but would have been instructed and trained conceptually and practically in
inter-agency and international cooperation. He or she would thus have ‘the full picture’
and be able to advise, oversee, and understand comprehensively security sector reform.
The editors suggest the Consortium SSR Working Group look into a possible curriculum
comprising of both theoretical and practical parts for the formation of such experts in the
framework of the Consortium SSR WG and to disseminate the findings to the major
teaching institutions in the field.
1
The view expressed by the contributors to this Consortium Security Sector Reform Working Group study
confirms the findings collected and analysed in: Fluri/Law (eds.), Security Sector Reform Expert Formation
Programmes. Vienna/Geneva 2003
Does Security Sector Reform Work?
All authors suggest that Security Sector Reform is well under way in their home
countries, though the status of implementation remains on many accounts. This may be
explained by the scarcity of information available, but also by the sheer size of the task
and its complexity. This again makes the question more pressing of how many experts,
both governmental and nongovernmental, there exist in the transition countries capable
of comprehensively understanding, overseeing, and anticipating Security Sector Reform
in their own home country.
The Consortium Security Sector Working Group will continue to gauge means and ways
of documenting the status of reforms in the countries represented in the WG.