Chapter 7
Mauritania
Boubacar N’Diaye
Introduction
If a coup d’état is the ultimate proof that a country’s security sector is not
functioning as it should, then Mauritania has demonstrated this twice in three
years. First on 3 August 2005, then again on 6 August 2008, senior officers
took over political power ‘on behalf of the armed and security forces’.1 The
first putsch overthrew Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid’Amed Ould Taya who
himself had acceded to power through a coup on 12 December 1984. For 21
years, Ould Taya had maintained himself at the helm of affairs through
repression and fraudulent elections. On 3 August 2005, the armed and
security forces ‘unanimously decided’ to remove him from office. These
were the terms used by the Military Council for Justice and Democracy
(CMJD), in its first communiqué. This marked the start of a critical phase in
Mauritania’s political evolution. Certain analysts qualified this coup d'état as
unusual, both in terms of its form and the events that followed it.2 The
sceptics felt, on the contrary, that it had little chance of bringing about the
promised ‘justice and democracy’ and that it seemed too much like a palace
coup that would certainly not be the last of its kind.3
On the other hand, the 6 August coup overthrew Mr. Sidi Ould Cheikh
Abdallahi, the president who had been democratically elected by the country
barely a year and a half before, after a transition that had too hastily been
described as exemplary.4 This coup d'état ran counter to the political trend on
the continent, now in favour of democracy and also to the desire of the
African Union to see an end once and for all to unconstitutional regime
changes, for which Africa holds the record.5 Setting aside the fact that coups
d'état, in particular the last one, constitute flagrant violations of this common
desire to turn the page on the political anachronism of overthrowing
governments by force of arms, these interventions raised the whole issue of
the role of the security sector in the functioning of a democratic state. This
nth coup and its repercussions demonstrated that Mauritania still had serious
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obstacles to overcome, in particular with respect to defining the place and
role of the security sector, as well as its links with republican institutions,
civil society and the ordinary citizen.
In order to understand better why the military interfered in political
activity, especially after the first putsch and the democratic transition (20062007) that had engendered such hope, these events must be examined in the
light of the historical and socio-political context that led to the crisis that
Mauritania has been grappling with since 6 August 2008. We will then
review the organisation and the actors involved in a security sector that has
been weakened by excessive politicisation and ‘ethnicisation’, monopolistic
use of executive power and systematic human rights violations. This will
give a clearer picture of the many challenges facing the country, as well as
the means that have to be employed to overcome them. Finally, a number of
recommendations will be made in order to bring about the much needed and
long postponed security sector reform (SSR).
The security apparatus and security environment
The socio-political context
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania became a sovereign state on 28
November 1960, under the leadership of the young lawyer Moctar Ould
Daddah, who enjoyed the support of the French colonial power against his
internal political adversaries and the expansionist ambitions of neighbouring
Morocco. The country has 3.2 million inhabitants of the Moslem faith and is
made up of three ethno-cultural groups. The first, the ‘Negro-Mauritanians’,
is made up essentially of four sedentary ethnic groups (the Halpulaar, the
Soninke, the Wolof and the Bambara), who live mainly in the South and in
the West, in urban areas. They represent about one third of the total
population. These groups regularly attempt to have their (non-Arab) cultural
identity recognised and demand a more equitable share in political and
economic power, from which they are almost totally excluded. The second
group, the Arab-Berber nomads (also known as Beydane, Bithaan or ‘white
Moors’), live mainly in the North, centre and East of the country. They are
organised in more than 150 distinct tribes and clans and also represent
almost a third of the population. The Arab-Berbers dominate all institutions
and exercise almost total monopoly over political and economic power. They
identify mainly with the Arab world and insist on the Arab and Islamic
nature of the country. Over the years, this monopoly has enabled them to
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present Mauritania to the outside world as an exclusively Arab country. In
recent years, a deliberate policy of reducing the links with West Africa has
further enhanced this trend. The third group, the Haratine and the Abeed,
probably the largest, is made up of descendants of black African slaves.
They identify culturally and psychologically with their former Beydane
masters with whom they share a language (Hassaniya, a dialect of Arabic)
and the Arab-Islamic culture, as well as their tribal organisation. A notable
recent development has been the emergence of Haratines on the political and
social scene, despite the internal divisions that weaken them. Their demand
for a greater share of political and economic power has nevertheless
remained fruitless. Repeated droughts, soaring urbanisation and the policy of
accelerated Arabisation have totally transformed Mauritanian society over
the past 30 years. However, these divisions and the questions of coexistence
that they raise, as well as the responses envisaged by different regimes
continue to seriously affect the political evolution of the country, including
with relation to all aspects of security sector management.
Up until the time that he was overthrown in a bloodless coup d'état on
10 July 1978, the first president Moctar Ould Daddah had managed to forge
a Mauritanian national identity. Through a measured ethnic policy and
regional balance, he had cleverly succeeded in maintaining ethnic, cultural
and political tensions within manageable proportions. He had also
successfully laid the foundation for an internationally respected and viable
state, as well as a promising social and economic development programme.
He nevertheless committed the error of engaging his country alongside
Morocco in the war to conquer Western Sahara, at the time under Spanish
control, during which the army engaged in systematic plunder. Worn out by
a war that seemed impossible to win despite the logistic support provided by
France, due to the repeated assaults of the Polisario Front6 and a lack of
popular support (at least psychologically), the military overthrew him and
assumed power. In his memoirs, published posthumously, President Ould
Daddah suggested that the coup d'état was sparked by the corruption of
certain senior officers and their fears of being sanctioned.7
Whatever the real causes, this coup marked the start of a new era in
civil military relations in Mauritania. The military were deeply convinced of
their mission as the ‘repositories of national legitimacy’, according to the
words used in the first communiqué read out on national radio by the late
Major Jiddou Ould Saleck, one of the main instigators of the 10 July 1978
coup and a close relative of Colonel Moustapha Ould Mohamed Saleck, the
head of the military committee for national recovery (CMRN). This
committee steered the affairs of the country after the coup d'état. Quite
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obviously, the military has never really abandoned power since, in spite of
the façade of democracy inaugurated in 1992. The original junta was
transformed into the military committee for national salvation after the
putsch led by Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif, who overthrew Colonel Ould
Saleck. In December 1979, Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould
Haidalla seized power after the sudden death of Ould Bouceif in a plane
accident off the coast of Senegal. Ould Haidalla was in turn removed from
office by Ould Taya. These events continue to influence the way in which
the security sector is organised.
The praetorian heritage and its effects
Over the years since it first took over power in 1978, the security apparatus
has become one of the least effective in Africa and also one of the most
delinquent. Up to that date, the military had kept a low profile and held itself
apart from the racial, cultural, ethnic, regional and ideological divisions that
already threatened the country. Soon after, probably following the 1984 coup
d'état, these divisions began to appear within the armed and security forces,
further aggravated by unrelenting personal rivalries. These trends were very
quickly demonstrated by the falling professional standards of the armed
forces (starting with the officers) and a contemptuous attitude towards
civilians and their institutions, which go hand-in-hand with the uncontrolled
exercise of power and sudden and unjustified acquisition of wealth. In the
1980s and 90s, Ould Taya shamelessly took advantage of these trends, as
well as the dysfunctions that they had generated. He even exacerbated them.
After the purge of non-Arab officers and men, following a conspiracy by
some of this group in 1987 at a time of heightened ethnic tensions, he carried
out an almost total Arabisation of all branches of the armed forces. To do
this, he sent hundreds of carefully selected officers and public officials for
training in military academies (and other similar establishments) in Arab
countries such as Iraq, Syria, Morocco and Algeria. These training courses,
which no doubt did not focus on principles such as professionalism, respect
of human rights and the role of armed forces under the rule of law, further
enhanced the politicisation of officers and non-commissioned officers,
thereby diminishing the little consideration they had for these values. The
result was a proliferation of nationalist Arab or Islamic ideologies and
groupings (Nasserist and Ba’athist), not only within the army,8 but
throughout all the security forces.
After 2002, the armed forces were even more affected by the selfcentred strategy pursued by Ould Taya, as he became increasingly
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preoccupied with ensuring the survival of his regime, after both the civilian
and military opposition became more radical.9 Following the coup attempt
that ended in bloodshed in June 2003, he strengthened the independent
presidential protection battalion (BASEP) and promoted loyal officers from
his own tribe and those of allies from the north, thus enhancing what has
been called the ‘vagrancy of the army’.10 These loyal officers were generally
placed in strategic command positions, or at the head of major para-state
establishments with almost official authorisation to help themselves to public
funds as they wished. Such measures not only weakened the military
institution, but also enhanced the bitter feelings among many senior and
subordinate officers who were thus deprived of their deserved promotions
and excluded from the largesse of the regime.
One of the consequences of these divisions was that relations between
the regime and the security apparatus that was supposed to support it were
undermined. Indeed, the survival of the regime was now dependent on the
loyalty of a handful of men; in particular the commander of the BASEP,
Colonel Ould Abdel Aziz, whose cousin, another colonel, happened to be the
director of national security. Both belong to the Oulad Bousbaas tribe, the
same tribe that was well known for being prosperous in business and which
was engaged in a passive competition with Ould Taya’s tribe, the Smassides,
for control over the Mauritanian economy and in particular the newly
discovered oil sector. When the two colonels took over power on 3 August
2005 as number one and number two of the junta, it was inconceivable that
they would accept to cede it again without conditions. In their minds, even if
they did not have full control over whoever succeeded them, it could only be
another coalition (to replace the coalition set up by Ould Taya after he
consolidated his power in the 1990s). Such a coalition could only be founded
on tribal, commercial, regional, ideological, or other interests. This
praetorian heritage, the tribal inertia, political moves and poor civil-military
relations are all factors to be borne in mind when considering the security
challenges facing Mauritania.
A failed transition
The armed forces refused to include civil society and political parties as fullfledged partners in managing the transition. They also refused to recognise
the legacy of state violence, as well as the militarisation of political activity.
Finally, the military regime did not take advantage of the opportunity
provided by the coup d'état to reconstruct the framework for security sector
governance and make a radical break with its former security policy and
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practices. They could have drawn lessons from the errors committed by the
former Ould Taya regime. This crucial and sensitive reform process should
have been undertaken by the civilian regime that succeeded the provisional
military regime. The task was however difficult given the fact that despite
being elected democratically after the 2005-2007 transition, the head of state
owed a lot to the military junta and in particular to its most influential
members. He therefore did not include SSR on the list of political priorities.
Many were convinced that his election for a single term of office (because he
would have attained the age limit at the end of his first term) was a way of
enabling the head of the military junta to return to the helm of affairs
through the ballot box. Mauritania was therefore very unlikely to experience
any democratic reform of its security sector. In 2007-2008, the fact that the
head of state was closely surrounded by many former members of the junta
who had benefited from the status quo led to doubts about the possibility of
any in-depth reform.11
The 6 August 2008 coup d'état gives the impression that the transition,
instead of leading to the democracy that Mauritanians had been aspiring to
since at least 1992, rather led to a political system that is the hostage of both
the security and praetorian heritage and the political and social dynamics in
place since the creation of the state of Mauritania, which were exacerbated
by the Ould Taya regime. Indeed, the CMJD never gave up the power of
initiative and was careful to maintain the ex-opposition political class and
civil society in the role of secondary partners, who were sometimes
consulted but generally placed before the fait accompli for major decisions.
Under the impetus of the two colonels mentioned above, the CMJD gave
itself every opportunity to maintain a central role in decision-making in the
country, with or without the existence of a democratically elected
government. This is the main problem with the security sector in Mauritania.
The security sector in Mauritania
The Mauritanian Armed Forces comprise the army as its central pillar, the
National Guard, the civilian intelligence services (housed in the department
of national security and attached to the presidency) and the gendarmerie. The
other components of the security sector are the national police force, the
customs service and the forest rangers.
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The armed forces
The army was initially made up of elements from the corps of colonial
troops, the Goumiers, who used camels for transport. Up to 1976, there were
only 3,000 men in the Mauritanian army. It was only during the Saharan war
and after the July 1978 coup d'état that it entered onto the national political
scene, where it has remained ever since. Mauritania’s army currently
comprises 15,000 active members.12 The country has no reserve forces. The
different branches (army, navy, air force and gendarmerie) are all managed
by chiefs of staff, under the authority of the ministry of defence. The air
force is very small, counting only 250 men and a small fleet of transport and
reconnaissance planes. The navy, which is made up of about 600 men, is
entrusted with patrolling and protecting the country’s immense fishery
resources and is equipped with a few, appropriate vessels for this purpose.
The greater part of the Marine Corps is based in Nouadhibou, with a few
elements near Nouakchott. The gendarmerie for its part has its own staff,
which is in charge of coordinating brigades and companies spread
throughout the national territory. The gendarmerie is in charge of
maintaining law and order, gathering and transmitting intelligence in all
forms, as well as combating crime in particular through criminal
investigation missions.
The presidential guard
The presidential guard (the famous BASEP) is part of the armed forces and
is at the heart of the security apparatus, because its command is directly
responsible to the president. For the past 15 to 20 years it has been under the
command of General Ould Adel Aziz, the general who foiled two coup
attempts, before carrying out the last two coups d’état himself and becoming
president. Obviously this position has enabled him to ensure that the men in
the BASEP are loyal to him and to take advantage of this to become the
central leader of the security apparatus. One former minister recently
qualified the BASEP as practically a private armed militia.13 It is rumoured
that this battalion was trained and equipped by the Israeli secret service.14
Given the role that it has played in recent years, it is clear that any serious
reform of the security apparatus must include a total overhaul of this
battalion, including its personnel and a redefinition of its mission.
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The national police force
The national police force has become vital for maintaining the political order
that was often threatened under the Ould Taya regime and after the 2008
coup d'état. Its numbers increased exponentially in recent years; the total
number of police officers is confidential, but it is estimated that there are at
least 3,000 men spread out among the regional security departments and
their police stations. The accuracy of this figure is however disputed, given
the (very high and secret) number of civilian intelligence agents who are part
of the police force. There are so many policemen that in certain police
stations, police officers only go to work every other day. The national
security department is based in Nouakchott and its activities are guided by
political concerns rather than fighting organised crime and protecting the
state and its citizens. The police force is reputed for its corruption and
influence peddling. There are numerous, often unauthorised, road
checkpoints where police officers systematically extort money from
unfortunate drivers. Indeed, there have been many studies on this endemic
corruption.15 This state of affairs was noted again recently in a May 2009
report by the president of the Bar Association. According to him, ‘various
sources are in agreement that torture is common practice’. At the height of
the accelerated Arabisation process, it was not rare to find Arab Berber
shepherds who were illiterate but could recite the Quran appointed overnight
to the position of police inspector or even police commissioner, without
having received any training. The current police force is the product of this
past practice. Although there is a police academy, it is not very likely that
the training provided there will change this situation much. As a result of the
intensification of both open and concealed political repression since 1986,
the police force and intelligence services have played and continue to play a
leading role. President Ould Taya, himself a former military intelligence
officer, politicised these forces to the extreme and instrumentalised them to
the benefit of his regime. The changes that have taken place since 2005 have
not modified this practice to any significant degree.
The 2000-man strong National Guard is under the authority of the
ministry of interior and regularly participates in law and order and other
administrative police missions in rural zones.
The customs service
Like in many similar countries, the customs service is considered even more
than the police to be a stronghold of corruption, because it is often managed
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by army officers or officers from the gendarmerie who invariably become
some of the richest men in the country. Given that its mission is to protect
the national economy and collect customs duties which constitute a major
part of the national budget, the customs service is obviously essential to the
smooth functioning of the state. Any reform exercise aimed at improving its
performance and reducing corruption can only be beneficial for the country.
The forest rangers
The forest rangers represent another paramilitary corps. They are in charge
of preserving the fauna and flora of an essentially desert country that is
affected by the huge advance of the Sahara. Despite being important for
protecting the environment, the forest rangers seem to be the poor relations
of the security sector.
Non-state actors
Since Mauritania has not experienced any open conflict, there are no armed
groups outside of state control or who are seeking to overthrow the regime.
Nevertheless, between 2003 and 2005 a group of former military personnel
set up the Cavaliers du changement (Knights of Change) with the objective
of overthrowing the Ould Taya government by force of arms. At the height
of the repression against Negro-Mauritanians, another group made up of
elements of the Front for the Liberation of Africans of Mauritania (FLAM)
briefly took up arms and launched attacks on the Mauritanian Armed Forces
from Senegal. Today, it is well known that there are Mauritanians in the Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) group. As far as private security
companies are concerned, although they have increased in number in recent
years they have not yet reached the critical threshold that would make them
major players in the security sector. This seems to be confirmed by the fact
that there is no legislation on such companies.
Compared to the size of its population, Mauritania has one of the
highest ratios of men in uniform in the West African region; the total number
of the security forces is around 21,000 men (including 5,000 in the
gendarmerie), In comparison, Senegal and Mali, neighbouring countries
where the population is three times higher, have 15,620 men including 5,000
gendarmes and 15,150 individuals, with an additional 4,800 other
paramilitary forces, respectively.16 The human needs of Mali and Senegal,
which have to deal with rebellions, appear to be more obvious, even if these
rebellions are rather low key. As a percentage of GDP, the defence and
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security budget of Mauritania is much higher than that of its two
neighbours.17
Security sector management and oversight
As indicated above, the president of the republic is the main actor in the
security sector, a role that is conferred upon him by the constitution. Article
30 grants the power to conduct the defence and security policy of the
country; article 32 grants him the power to appoint people to civilian and
military office and article 34 stipulates that he is the commander in chief of
the armed forces and ‘shall chair the higher defence councils and
committees’. These constitutional bodies are not operational; the Dakar
agreement that brought an end to the crisis used article 34 of the constitution
as the basis for a new role for the military junta that had taken over power in
August 2008. The practice of power has always gone well beyond the
prerogatives granted to the president by the constitution. Given the
importance accorded to security by all Mauritanian presidents since 1978,
management of security issues has indeed become the exclusive
responsibility of the president, although the constitution also stipulates that
the government ‘shall be responsible for the administration and for the
armed forces’ (article 43). As suggested above, this has contributed to the
dysfunctions of the security sector by excluding other legitimate views and
players such as parliament and civil society.
Parliament
The parliament is made up of the national assembly and the senate. Although
the legislative power has never really been involved in security sector
management, the Mauritanian constitution grants parliament (generally in
addition to legislative power) a certain number of powers that make it an
important element in security and defence. Article 57 for example stipulates
that the general rules organising national defence shall be governed by law.
The same applies to the decision to declare war or to determine the
‘fundamental guarantees granted to civil servants and members of the
military’ in carrying out their missions. Like other African parliaments, the
Mauritanian parliament has never fully exercised its constitutional
prerogatives, in particular that of controlling government activity, as security
is often left to the executive and more specifically to the head of state.
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Both chambers of parliament each have a standing committee in
charge of justice, the interior and defence. Under the terms of article 19 of
the rules of procedure of the national assembly, members may set up special
commissions to study certain draft bills and proposals and article 20 grants
the right to establish ad hoc commissions to examine issues that do not fall
within the competence of a standing committee. These instruments are
supposed to enable the parliament to carry out its oversight of government
activity and contribute to the establishment of a legal framework within
which defence and security policies must be applied. The 2005 coup d’état,
which led to the election of a parliament whose membership made it possible
to have a system of democratic control worthy of its name, also enabled the
emergence of a timid culture of parliamentary oversight. However, the 2008
putsch brought an end to this episode, although it did not stand to reason that
the legislature elected after the transition was really engaged in reaffirming
its constitutional prerogatives. Prior to the putsch, unlike his predecessor,
President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi had attempted to respect the powers
and independence of parliament, as well as of the judicial power. However,
the required steps were not taken to enhance the capacities of the two
standing committees when the opportunity arose.18
The judicial system
Like the legislative power, the judicial power which under the terms of the
Mauritanian constitution is stated to be ‘independent of the legislative and
executive powers’ (article 89), has never been truly independent. The
constitution does not grant any specific powers in defence and security to the
judicial branch. As far as security is concerned, such power is limited to
stating the law independently and protecting the constitutional rights of
Mauritanians. And yet, since independence, the justice system has always
been under the strict control of the president of the republic who often used
it as an instrument against political opponents. Neither the endemic
corruption in the security sector nor the numerous human rights violations
have ever given rise to any legal sanctions. Up to the time of the coup d'état
in 2005 the government had never managed to guarantee its citizens the
individual and collective freedoms that are essential to any modern concept
of security. During the 15 months of the democratic interlude, the country
was able to experience to some extent what it meant to have an independent
judiciary, but the 2008 putsch seems to have brought this to an end and
renewed the practices of the Ould Taya regime. This is demonstrated by the
fact that President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi swore his oath of office before the
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same constitutional council that had approved the coup d'état and the
decisions of the junta although they were manifestly in violation of the
constitution. It therefore seems that the worst practices of misuse of the legal
system that existed prior to the 2005 putsch are back in full force. A report
by the president of the bar association, published in May 2009, spoke about
the ‘inhumane conditions in prisons, arbitrary sequestrations, flagrant
violations of the rules of procedure, misuse of justice, excessively long
periods of temporary detention and repression of demonstrators.’ He
concluded that ‘the system of justice in Mauritania has no credibility and
enjoys no trust’.19
Civil society
Given that the powers granted by the constitution to parliament and the
judicial branch have never been exercised fully because of the pervasive
presence of the executive, it is not surprising that democratic control of the
security sector by civil society organisations and Mauritanians as individuals
has not been possible either. Following the transition from 2005 to 2008,
Mauritania experienced an unprecedented expansion of individual and
collective freedoms, when compared to the period from 1992 to 2005, which
started with the democratic opening in 1991.
The massive human rights violations perpetrated in the country
throughout the years and in particular between 1989 and 1992, led to the
establishment of a large number of human rights organisations. In spite of an
amnesty law promulgated in 1993, with the intention of sweeping all the
killings and ethnic cleansing under the carpet once and for all, these ‘events’,
which in Mauritania political jargon are called the ‘humanitarian deficit’,
continue to pollute the political climate. A great number of civil society
organisations have taken upon themselves the mission of getting the
Mauritanian state to assume full responsibility for the human rights
violations; guarantee compensation for victims and their successors and in
particular work to develop a culture of respect for human rights. Among
these are the National Human Rights Forum, the Collective of Victims of
Repression, the Association of Victims of Events, the National Human
Rights Commission (CNDH), the Assistance and Sharing Group and the
Coordination of Former Mauritanians Soldiers in Exile. The objective of
SOS esclaves, one of the oldest existing civil society organisations is to
eliminate the after-effects of slavery.
Other organisations that have developed exponentially include
independent press organs and other more or less reliable associations that
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have all contributed their views in the debate on political and security
developments. It must be noted however that there are no indications in
governing texts or in practice that civil society organisations are considered
as legitimate partners in security sector management and oversight. It
appears clear that the 2008 putsch has brought about a loss of some of the
ground conquered starting from 2000.
External agents
Ever since independence, Mauritania has had to count on external partners
(in particular the former colonial power France) to ensure its internal and
external security as well as its stability. This cooperation (dependence, for
some) was governed by the technical and military assistance agreement
signed on 19 June 1961. According to the first article of this agreement,
France undertook to provide Mauritania, with ‘the assistance of French
military personnel to organise, supervise and train the Mauritanian Armed
Forces’. In 1973, Mauritania demanded a revision of the agreement, but this
did not prevent France from providing assistance to the military when it
found itself in a difficult situation during the Sahara campaign, between
1975 and 1977. With the accelerated Arabisation process launched by the
military regimes after 1978, cooperation with France gradually gave way to
enhanced military and security cooperation with the Arab world.
At the end of the 1980s, the regime resolutely turned to Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, which was at the time a rising power and whose pan-Arab
discourse was just as attractive as the generous civilian and military
assistance provided, including training of officers from all the armed forces.
This was a departure from the policy of the previous leader Lieutenant
Colonel Ould Haidalla, who had rather sought to draw closer to Colonel
Gaddafi's Libya. As indicated above, for many years, security cooperation
shifted entirely from France towards the Arab world, although France
continued to remain in the picture through the presence of a few instructors
in the military academies. Relations in the area of military cooperation
between the two countries deteriorated considerably when the French legal
system brought charges against a Mauritanian officer on training in France.20
Feeling threatened, Ould Taya attempted to move closer to the United States,
in particular by focusing on the issue of the terrorist threat. Although
relations with France in the area of security were subsequently restored, up
until he was overthrown Ould Taya remained suspicious of this country. He
seemed to count on the increasingly close cooperation with the United States
and Israel for his protection.
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During the 90s, the Ould Taya regime came under pressure from both
the international and the national community (the political opposition was at
the time mainly clandestine) with regard to human rights issues. In an
attempt to place himself in the good books of the United States, he
established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999. Apart from a certain
easing up in the Department of State’s annual reports on human rights, the
regime also benefited from US economic and military assistance to combat
terrorism, in the framework of the Pan-Sahel Initiative established by the
American government to coordinate security operations by Sahelian
countries. Later on this programme was transformed into the ‘Trans-Saharan
Counterterrorism Partnership’, still with the same desire to encourage
Sahelian countries to improve their control over the vast desert territory that
they share and thus preventing this area from serving as a base for the
terrorist acts of groups such as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC). Attacks in recent years against the Mauritanian Armed Forces,
embassies and foreign nationals from Europe and the US give the impression
that Mauritania is facing a terrorism threat. This view has been encouraged
by the ploys of the various military powers to manipulate western countries
into offering unconditional assistance, as confirmed by two very credible
reports on the issue.21
In 2000, Mauritania withdrew from the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). The emergence of a sub-regional
government that would include a certain oversight by the organisation on
issues of governance obviously did not suit Ould Taya. During the transition,
the debate about Mauritania's return to ECOWAS was stifled. Mauritania
cannot therefore benefit from the instruments drafted by the organisation to
help member states improve their individual and collective management of
conflict factors and other effects of the dysfunctions of their political
systems and security sectors. Nevertheless, because of its geographical
situation and its human, economic and cultural links with the rest of West
Africa, other countries in the sub-region cannot fail to be affected by the
consequences of an instability that seems inevitable for as long as the
underlying problems have not been resolved. In order to understand these
problems better, the legacy left by the military, in particular Ould Taya, must
be taken into account.
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Problems to be resolved
After the transition that followed the 3 August 2005 coup d’état, the armed
and security forces had no intention of withdrawing from the political scene.
It therefore did not come as a surprise when another coup d’état was
organised less than a year after a president had been elected democratically,
thus extending the country’s long praetorian night and making it even more
difficult to carry out the needed security sector reform process. This reform
has been postponed for so long that the intensity, urgency and complexity of
the longstanding difficulties facing the country have only been exacerbated.
The problems are numerous, including the politicisation of the security
apparatus and the military in particular, with the monopoly held by the
executive (in fact, the president); the emergence of terrorist activities;
organised crime; drug trafficking; the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons; systematic human rights violations and endemic corruption. The
most pernicious of these problems is no doubt the degeneration of one of the
main components of the security sector: the military.
A ‘quite republican’ military?
During the transition, the head of the military junta had declared on Radio
France International on 22nd November 2005 that the Mauritanian military
was and would always be, ‘quite republican’ and that it was only concerned
about proper management of the affairs of Mauritania. He tried to be
reassuring and indicated that the future democratically elected president,
would have nothing to fear from the military as long as he ‘managed
Mauritania in the right way’ and for ‘all Mauritanians’. Without explaining
what this ‘right way’ was, Colonel Ould Mohamed Vall who at that time
literally embodied the armed security forces, also made it clear that this was
the ‘only condition that needed to be fulfilled’ for the military to remain out
of politics in the future. The political class, which still hoped that the end of
the long execrated Ould Taya regime would lead to the start of a truly
democratic era, did not seem to grasp the true meaning of his words. In
reality, the military had positioned themselves to continue to cast a long
shadow over the political system, even after the transfer of power to civilians
following a transition that had been carried out largely according to their
wishes.22
Contrary to the statement made by Colonel Ould Mohamed Vall, the
Mauritanian military has long ceased to be the republican military that it was
supposed to be when it was created ex nihilo at the same time as the state of
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Mauritania. Already during the first years of the republic, inspired by
Guinea’s experience of a ‘people's army’, president Moctar Ould Daddah
had imposed the model of a military that would be used as a political
instrument, because it was made up of ‘militants in uniform’ in the service of
development. This was the beginning of a process of politicisation that
would only worsen through the grave ethnic and ‘racial’ incidents that
rocked Mauritania in 1966. During this crisis, the first serious threat to his
regime, Ould Daddah granted ‘full powers’ to restore order in Nouakchott to
Captain Ould Saleck, by decree n° 66.028 of 10 February 1966. This showed
that the politicisation of the military could lead to a takeover of power. This
is what happened on 10 July 1978 after the disastrous episode of the war in
Western Sahara during which, through the systematic plundering of the
former Spanish colony, several officers and soldiers of the rank and file
became fabulously rich and acquired a taste for luxury.
Even under the best of circumstances, when the military exercises
power, it generally leads to a breakdown of any attempt at professionalism or
desire to respect the apolitical and republican nature of the military. In
Mauritania, not only was political activity and the society in general
militarised, but the coup led to a succession of coup attempts and counter
coups, the most bloody of which occurred on 16 March 1981 and 6 June
2003 and which failed. These have often been the result of underlying
ideological, identity and political rivalries which oppose many small
groupings, for the most part Arab nationalists of all schools of thought. Like
in other parts of Africa, the military regime led to the emergence of a
military elite that rapidly grew wealthy through its control of state
institutions and became more concerned about preserving its wealth,
extending its influence and remaining in power than ensuring compliance
with discipline and professionalism or maintaining the republican nature of
the military. In fact, under the Ould Taya regime, the largesse granted to
officers was the price paid for the strong determination to maintain close
control over the security apparatus by increasingly concentrating its
management in the hands of the presidency of the republic.
Security controlled by the regime
The presidential monopoly over all areas of security must be broken by
democratising security management and oversight. In practice this means
involving other actors such as parliament and civil society, but this will only
be possible after a revision of the concept of security as it has existed this far
and which has been limited to ensuring the security of the head of state and
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his regime. Ever since the regime converted from a military to a civilian
status in 1992, the tradition of systematically entrusting the ministry of
defence to a loyal and dedicated civilian has once again been applied in the
country. Nevertheless, it is well-known that the real powers of decision
remain within the hands of the president and none other. The Mauritanian
political system is a very strong presidential regime, which gives a
predominant role to the president of the republic as commander in chief of
the armed forces. However, security has also become ‘presidential’ so to
speak, mainly as a result of the politicisation of the security forces and their
own tendency to intervene, which represents a risk for the president of the
republic (who took over power by force of arms himself). This is the proof
of the attention that the president accords to the military and its corporatist
interests, in particular those of senior officers, some of whom need to be
reassured and protected. Indeed many of them were accused of participating
in the ethnic cleansing within the different corps during which more than
500 black Mauritanian soldiers of all ranks were killed under horrible
circumstances.23 This number is exceptionally high, considering the numbers
of the Mauritanian military at the time and especially the non-Arab
component. The military also played a role during the period of exception in
the River valley, as well as during the 1989-1991 crisis between the
Senegalese and Mauritanian governments when tens of thousands of black
Mauritanians were humiliated and deported.
The military had then ceased to be ‘apolitical’, ‘republican’, or even
‘national’ in nature. In the political jargon of Mauritania, these events
continue to be described as the ‘humanitarian deficit’ of the Ould Taya
regime. They significantly complicated the chances of normalising political
activity and overhauling the armed forces.24 More recently, after the 6
August 2008 coup d'état, this deficit was worsened further when the new
military regime had to repress the political forces that opposed its takeover
of power by organising demonstrations and other acts of insubordination.
For a long time now, the security services have been accused of
systematically using torture.25 The frequent beating, humiliation, extortion
and illegal imprisonment of Mauritanian citizens (generally black citizens)
and citizens of sub-Saharan African countries, demonstrate that the armed
forces and in particular the police have very little respect for individual
rights, especially when such individuals have no social or political support.
The renewed use of torture and maltreatment was confirmed by the president
of the Bar Association of Mauritania in his recent report.
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Absence of human security
The protection offered by the state of Mauritania to its citizens has always
been quite limited. Recently, human rights defence organisations protested
about the degrading treatment meted out to sub-Saharan African aspiring
emigrants in the internment camps of Nouadhibou.26 This coastal town has
become the hub for illegal attempts to travel to Europe on makeshift vessels.
The other components of the security sector also suffer from the same
dysfunctions, as well as the excessive concentration of resources on the
security of the head of state and his entourage. The coups d'état in 2005 and
2008 did not change much about this situation. On the contrary, the
disastrous management of the security sector by a hard pressed Ould Taya,
following the bloody coup attempt in June 2003, made the sector appear as a
multipurpose political instrument rather than the professional, republican and
apolitical apparatus described by Colonel Ould Mohamed Vall. There is no
need to recall that this attempted coup was led by an officer who had been
dismissed from the army.
Terrorism and crime
Terrorism represents another challenge. This is demonstrated by the three
violent attacks on military patrols and outposts in the northern part of the
country,27 the assassination of French tourists in the South at the end of
2007, the murder of an American in June 2009, as well as the attack against
the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott at the beginning of 2008. In addition to
this, all sorts of criminal activities are taking place. The abovementioned
attacks are presumed to be the work of the GSPC, now known as Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, which is active in the Sahelo-Saharan region where
it carries out other illicit activities: kidnappings and trafficking in weapons
and other goods such as contraband cigarettes. This vast desert area, which is
shared by several neighbouring countries, is extremely difficult to control. It
is also the theatre of armed rebellions in Mali and in Niger that have recently
been revived by demands related to cultural identity and socio-economic
factors. The activities of these groups seriously threaten stability in
Mauritania.
In recent years the country, like other countries in the sub-region has
become a major transit point for drugs destined for Europe.28 So far, the
national armed and security forces have been incapable of dealing with this
situation. Their inertia is rather conspicuous, as was the case during the three
attacks mentioned above. The only reaction by Ould Taya before his
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overthrow was to adopt a constantly changing stance. His ‘counter-terrorist’
decisions appeared to demonstrate more of a desire to make the greatest use
of the terrorist threat, for example by assimilating the political opposition (in
particular, the moderate Islamist movement) to a terrorist threat.29 Under
pressure from the international community, which was demanding a
reestablishment of constitutional order, the leaders of the 6 August 2008
putsch also seemed determined to place themselves in the good graces of
Washington by participating in the global war on terror in a region
considered by the Bush administration to be of great strategic importance.
Conclusion
This description of the security sector in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
demonstrates that the evident dysfunctions are the logical outcome of over
30 years of disastrous management and political and ethnic manipulation of
the sector. The fact that the security apparatus was used as a tool to maintain
the military regime and indeed a single man in place, has had disastrous
effects. These consequences appear very clearly today in the form of
massive human rights violations; lack of representativeness of the armed
forces and an absence of professionalism on the part of the officer corps.
They also highlight the failed transition that followed the 2005 coup d'état
and the stalemate caused by the return to power of the same people who had
organised the putsch in 2008, thus exacerbating the numerous problems that
the security sector and the political system as a whole must face:
dysfunctional civil military relations, the ‘humanitarian deficit’ and
terrorism. Against this backdrop, solutions have to be found and
recommendations formulated. Quite obviously, the country missed a
wonderful opportunity to reform its security sector at little cost after the 3
August 2005 coup d'état, which was considered redemptive. Another
opportunity was no doubt missed when the democratically elected president
Ould Cheikh Abdallahi took over power in April 2007.30 However, more
than ever before Mauritania needs to totally overhaul its security system.
All stakeholders have a role to play, but before that, the crisis sparked
by the overthrow of the democratically elected president will have to be
resolved. This requires the reestablishment of constitutional legality, thus
signifying ipso facto the reversal of the putsch and marking the start of a
new era in civil military relations in the country (and in fact in Africa as a
whole).
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As long as this crisis is not resolved by applying the principle of
subordination of the security apparatus to the democratically elected civilian
authority, coups d'état will remain a possible form of political action and
another opportunity to finally eliminate this kind of act (or at least strongly
reduce the probability) will once more have been missed. This nth coup
d'état had to fail, before any serious security sector reform could be
envisaged. If the junta had managed to remain in power, this would have
spelled the end of any reform for a long time. Even though it has been
possible, through political agreements negotiated with the aid of the
international community, to organise consensual elections (in part marking
the failure of the coup), any regime that emerges from these elections will
have to overcome the same obstacles, which have been aggravated by the
crisis.
The reestablishment of constitutional order provided another
opportunity to deal with this issue diligently. The following measures should
have been taken immediately: retire all those who have been involved in
putsches automatically and dissolve the BASEP or at least reorganise it
entirely and make it more professional, while finding the means to prevent
its command structure from becoming as powerful as in the past.
Subsequently, a methodical process of reorganising the security sector would
have had to be undertaken, starting with a systematic review of all the
security threats facing Mauritania, based on a redefinition of the very
concept of security, the participation of national actors other than the
presidency and increased transparency. Because of the role played by the
BASEP in the last putsch, political negotiations had often stumbled over the
insistent demand of opponents to the coup that measures must be taken to
ensure that the battalion would never be able to act again. There is no doubt
that after the elections of 18 July 2009, this issue is still on the table.
In the final analysis, the armed and security forces will have to be
transformed into truly national forces. They ceased to be ‘national’ after the
ethnic cleansing of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which recently became
tribal and regional, in particular, due to the policy of deliberate exclusion
following the attempted coup in 2003 for which the Moorish tribes in the
eastern part of the country were blamed. These forces, both officers and rank
and file, must be entirely restructured and given theoretical and practical
training to truly serve Mauritania once it has finally established a democratic
system and turned its back on the practices of past regimes. A code of
conduct for the armed and security forces should be drafted to symbolise the
new way of conceiving their role within such a political system. Of course,
this applies to other components of the security sector as well, in particular
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171
the national police force and the customs service. They also need to be
reformed to better represent the population. Training and restructuring of the
armed and security forces, in particular the police, must focus strongly on a
scrupulous respect of human rights. A specific code of conduct should be
drafted and broadly disseminated for these corps on the basis of the models
from certain African countries, dealing explicitly with the issue of corruption
so that it becomes an offence that is easy to prove.
The Mauritanian parliament will have a leading role to play in these
reforms through the powers conferred upon it by the constitution and by law.
Since the situation in the security sector cannot be dissociated from the grave
infringements of human rights in past years, the parliament should start by
abrogating law 93-23 of 14 June 1993, which prohibits any investigation or
legal action related to the events that took place between 1989 and 1992.
Given the role played by civil society in the area of human rights and the
control of impunity, it is also important to establish a close link between
parliament and civil society organisations. The need for collaboration to
bring about a culture of human rights within the armed and security forces
can be a good starting point to launch the process of SSR. In a spirit of
reconciliation, but also as a duty to memory and state accountability,
parliament will have to carry out investigations, following the example of
countries that have experienced similar situations. This will also help to
explain the need for reforming the armed and security forces as a whole,
because if SSR has not been accomplished so far, it is also because the main
stakeholders did not understand the justification for undertaking such
reform. Also, members of the parliamentary standing committee on defence
and security should undertake to build their capacities with the help of
external partners in order to play their role fully in controlling the security
sector. Such capacity building should take the form of material and financial
assistance, but also intensive training workshops and seminars. These can
serve as points of entry for external partners who wish to make a
contribution to SSR in Mauritania.
So far, civil society associations and groups have contributed quite
well to fighting against impunity and protecting human rights and in doing
so have paid a heavy price. Nevertheless, like parliament and all other actors
who could legitimately have claimed a role in security sector governance,
civil society organisations failed to demand this role and sacrificed it to the
executive power through the generalised trend of deferring to the latter. This
collective abdication of responsibility is one of the reasons why the security
sector now finds itself in the present situation. Civil society organisations
will have to be educated and informed in order to make them understand the
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role they can play in security sector management. External partners can also
participate significantly in empowering Mauritanian civil society.
Finally, external partners also have an extremely important role to
play, even though some of them have been accused of having assisted and
supported those who organised the August 2008 putsch in their efforts to
impose their coup as a fait accompli. They contributed to restoring
constitutional order, that is, the defeat of the 6 August 2008 putsch and will
do so even more by supporting a hopefully democratic regime that emerges
from the elections. Without the aforementioned defeat, it would have been
illusory to speak of SSR, since the concept of the military as the ‘ultimate
repositories of national legitimacy’ will still have held sway. On the other
hand, the reestablishment of constitutional legality will make SSR possible,
or maybe inevitable, with improved chances of success. The donor
community, especially France because of its historic links, must insist in a
coordinated manner for priority to be given to SSR. Its financial assistance to
the democratic regime must be linked to the launch and strict
implementation of a reform plan for the different military corps and the
police. The first step towards a series of short and long-term reforms should
be the holding of an estates general of the armed and security forces as soon
as possible after a return of constitutional legality. A road map should be
adopted to guide these reforms, based on as broad a consensus as possible.
External partners should provide financial support in the implementation of
the various stages of this road map, which should of course also include the
vital issue of terrorism. This could be the obvious and legitimate point of
entry for involving the international community in the SSR that must
necessarily accompany the country’s democratisation. After all, the
international community has been involved in this democratisation process
since 2005 and the end of the Ould Taya dictatorship that marked the start of
the process.
Epilogue
More than a year has passed since this chapter was first written. Since then,
the international community and a large part of the political opposition who
fought with determination against the coup d’état of 6 August 2008, consider
Mauritania as having returned to ‘constitutional normalcy’ since the
elections that took place on 18 July 2009. However, the fact that the
instigator and principal beneficiary of the coup, General Mohamed Ould
Abdel Aziz, is now the President of the Republic suggests that in reality, the
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173
coup d’état was a success. With the support of the security apparatus, which
he made sure to leave in control of the state after his ‘resignation’ from the
army, as well as the complicity of certain members of the international
community, he managed to be re-elected in the first round with 52% of the
votes.31
This development suggests that the perception of the dominant role of
the army within the political system and society has prevailed. This also
means that a thorough reform of the security sector which would assure its
oversight through democratically elected civilian authorities, as well as the
institutionalisation of democratic control and accountability, will not be
undertaken as long as Ould Abdel Aziz is in power. The exacerbation of the
terrorist threat posed by AQIM and the decision by Ould Abdel Aziz,
supported by France, to counter it by military means, including by attacking
AQIM’s bases in Mali, suggest that the threat of terrorist attacks, although
real, is being used to avoid engaging in any true reform of the security sector
in Mauritania. The dysfunctions described in this chapter are certainly not
going to disappear by themselves.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
It must be indicated that the terms ‘armed and security forces’, ‘military’, and ‘army’ will
be used as synonyms designating the whole of the national security apparatus or system.
See Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Variation sur l’usage du coup d’Etat en
Mauritanie, Le Monde-Diplomatique, no. 620 (November 2005): 8-9.
See Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and democracy, or just another
coup?’ African Affairs 105, no. 420 (July 2006): 421-441.
Daniel Zisenwine, ‘Mauritania’s Democratic Transition: A Regional Model for Political
Reform?’ The Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 4 (2007): 481-499.
These are the 1999 Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the
2000 Lome Declaration on a Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional
Changes of Government, the OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing
Democratic Elections in Africa, adopted in 2002, and the 2003 Protocol relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.
The military movement that was engaged in an armed struggle to obtain the independence
of the territory, a former Portuguese colony.
Moctar Ould Daddah, La Mauritanie contre vents et marées (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 19.
Anthony Pazzanita, ‘Mauritania’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Protection’, Journal of
Modern African Studies 30, no. 2, (1992): 288-300.
After their failed attempt, the leaders of the June 2003 aborted coup d’état established a
clandestine armed movement, the Cavaliers du changement, whose objective was to
overthrow the Ould Taya government by force.
The army, which had been the initiator of the attempted coup in June 2003, as well as the
other corps, were deprived of the material resources they needed to function and
174
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
23
24
25
26
Boubacar N’Diaye
prevented from engaging in training manoeuvres. Access to weapons for example, was
also closely monitored.
Anonymous and Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania’, in Challenges of Security Sector
Governance in West Africa, eds. Alan Bryden et al., 205-223 (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008).
See Military Balance 2009.
Mr. Isselmou Ould Abdel Kadr did so during a television broadcast. As a result, the
military regime charged him with ‘attempting to undermine army morale and lying’.
Mounir B., ‘Coup d’Etat en Mauritanie: Le Mossad, le GSPC et Ould Taya’, Le Quotidien
d’Oran, 4 August 2005. Available at:
http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/mil/mauritanie.htm
See for example Giorgio Blundo ‘‘Graisser la Barbe’, Mécanismes et logiques de la
corruption en Mauritanie’, commissioned by the European Union Representation in
Mauritania, February 2007 (unpublished version).
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008 (London:
Routledge, 2008), 254-255.
CIA Factbook. 2008. Accessible at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/mr.html
For example, the standing committees failed to take the opportunity to participate with
their franchophone colleagues in the workshops offered free of charge by the African
Security Sector Network (an NGO specialising in security sector governance issues) in
July and August 2008.
Ahmed Salem Bouhoubeyni, ‘Rapport mensuel du Bâtonnier sur l’État de la justice,’ May
2009. Available at: http://www.ufpweb.org/fr/spip.php?article2278
See Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘The Effect of Mauritania’s ‘Human Rights deficit: The Case
against ‘To Forgive and Forget’’ African Journal of Policy Studies 8, no. 1 (2003): 17-35.
See International Crisis Group, ‘L’islamisme en Afrique du Nord IV : Contestation
islamiste en Mauritanie: Menace ou bouc émissaire?’ Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du
Nord, no. 41, (Le Caire/Bruxelles, 11 May 2005). See also Abdoulaye Diagana, Aboubakr
Ould Maroini, and Abdel Nasser Ould Yessa, ‘Impasse politique et réflexes sécuritaires
en Mauritanie. Comment fabriquer du terrorisme utile’, (July 2005).
See also Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Au bout de la transition, une démocratie sous tutelle
militaire?’ Unpublished essay. Contribution to the on-going debate on the military
transition in Mauritania.
See Human Rights Watch/Africa, ‘Mauritania’s Campaign of Terror: State Sponsored
Repression of Black Africans’, (New York, 1994); Mahamadou Sy, L’Enfer d’Inal (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 1998).
N’Diaye, The Effect of Mauritania’s ‘Human Rights deficit’, 2003.
In 2001, Captain Ely Ould Dah was arrested and charged by a court in France for acts of
torture against his black brothers in arms in the Mauritanian army. He escaped and was
sentenced in absentia, setting off a serious crisis between Mauritania and France. More
recently, a commissioner, Head of State Security under Ould Taya, was also charged in
France after a Franco-Mauritanian academic who was at the time the leader of a
clandestine opposition organisation lodged a complaint against him for acts of torture.
See Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: ‘Nobody wants to have anything to do with us:
Arrests and collective expulsions of migrants denied entry into Europe’’. AI Index: AFR
38/001/2008 (London, 1 July 2008). See also Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: Torture
at the heart of the state’. AI Index: AFR 38/0092008 (London, December 2008). Both
Mauritania
27
28
29
30
31
175
reports are available at: www.amnesty.org
These attacks took place in April 2005 in Leigheity, in June 2006 in El Ghallaouya, and in
August 2008 in Tourine. There was also an attack on four French tourists on 24 December
2007, not far from Boghe.
In 2004, a spectacular seizure of a large quantity of drugs at the airport at Nouadhibou, the
economic capital of the country, made headlines. Popular rumour has it that the various
security services, such as the police and customs were involved in this trafficking as it
would be impossible without the complicity of their highest authorities.
Diagana and his colleagues concluded emphatically that ‘the Mauritanian regime, either
through its political police or through influential smugglers, is attempting to create or
spark off terrorist acts on its territory’ in order to ‘legitimise a posteriori the 2003 text
governing control of mosques and justify today, the new ‘counterterrorist law’ that limits
the few liberties that exist in an environment that is already affected by State terror’ (see
EN. 13).
In November 2007, and again in February 2008, the author of this chapter sent a
confidential memo to the democratically elected president, drawing his attention to the
urgent need for security sector reform. The memo also warned him that neglecting this
need could compromise his political project of establishing the rule of law, and included
concrete proposals for starting the process. Even if his cabinet had ever acknowledged
receipt of this memo, there is no way to be certain that Mr. Ould Cheikh Abdallahi ever
personally read it.
During a visit to Nouakchott as a mediator for the African Union, Colonel Gaddafi openly
declared himself in favour of maintaining General Ould Abdel Aziz as Head of State well
before the Dakar Agreement. While the Mauritanian opposition to the coup and the
Commission of the African Union both insisted on the strict application of the AU’s
resolutions, which prohibits the instigators of coups from presenting themselves at
elections held after the coup, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner
suggested that the general should be allowed to present himself for election if he agreed to
resign from the army 45 days before it was held.