Chapter 4
Côte d’Ivoire
Raphaël Ouattara
Introduction
Looking back, Côte d’Ivoire experienced unparalleled political stability
within a sub-region weakened by numerous military coup d’états.
Houphouët Boigny, the founding father of the independent state of Côte
d’Ivoire enjoyed unquestioned historical legitimacy. Indeed, at the beginning
of the 80s, it was one of the rare countries in the sub-region that was led by a
civilian government. Côte d’Ivoire was considered a haven of peace and was
also an economic beacon that attracted the citizens of neighbouring countries
who came seeking a better life. President Houphouët Boigny’s government
encouraged this immigration of cheap labour in order to consolidate the
country’s position as the economic and even political powerhouse of the subregion. Later on, however, the same immigrants became an electoral weapon
in the hands of the government, to be brandished in the face of the growing
demands of the opposition. Thus, in the 80s and 90s, the cyclical economic
difficulties and the democratic aspirations of the population created a climate
poisoned by the exacerbation of ethnocentric and nationalist reflexes, thus
making way for all sorts of sectarian and exclusionist excesses. Of course,
the most obvious targets were foreigners; those brethren who in the past had
been courted for their labour, but were now considered out of place and were
accused of being the cause of every ill. Like the economic fabric, the social
fabric started to give way. Crime and delinquency began to undermine the
tranquillity of the population, spreading from cities to the countryside.
Gradually, acts of aggression were no longer carried out against individuals,
but against small interest groups, then against communities and even states.
The issue of the security of individuals, goods and borders became an
overriding concern.
President Houphouët passed away on 7 December 1993. The right of
succession was governed by the highly controversial article 11 of the 3
November 1960 constitution, which generated confusion at the summit of
74
Raphaël Ouattara
government because both the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Henri
Konan Bedie and the incumbent prime minister, Mr. Alassane Ouattara,
sought to succeed the president. Finally, Mr. Konan Bedie, escorted by the
national gendarmerie, declared himself president of the republic in a nationwide television broadcast. By this unprecedented act in the political and
constitutional history of the country, the defence and security forces lost
their unity and neutrality and became central players and arbiters on the
democratic field.
A feeling of mistrust was thus established between the existing
government and the national armed forces. The ‘Silent One’ had just broken
its silence and began to make itself heard, even making certain corporatist
demands. In response, on 24 December 1999, the army took over political
power and put Brigadier General Robert Guei at the helm of affairs. He
suspended the constitution and dissolved all institutions of the republic by
ordinance on 27 December 1999. The military transition was established
under the collective leadership of the National Council of Public Safety
(CNSP), presided by the general himself.
Among other things, the CNSP set itself the task of revising the
constitution and organising general elections for the purpose of handing over
political power to civilians. However, persistent divisions in the security
forces between partisans and opponents of the overthrown government led to
a split. Many conspiracies and pseudo-conspiracies were foiled, followed by
a wave of arrests and summary executions. Armed groups were formed,
trained and assigned to do the dirty work.
After the referendum on the constitution in July 2000, when Guei
decided to stand for election as president, against the advice of his principal
lieutenants and contrary to the promise made to Ivorians, the division
became even clearer and new splits appeared within the council, the military
hierarchy and among the rank and file. The day after the presidential election
that followed the referendum, the head of the CNSP, substituting for the
national electoral commission, the body in charge of organising, centralising
and proclaiming the results, proclaimed himself ‘elected’ as president of the
Second Republic. Candidate Laurent Gbagbo called on the population to
come out into the streets to counter the usurper. The situation deteriorated
and the general’s partisans were thwarted by the force of arms and the
popular movement. Laurent Gbagbo was ‘installed’ as de facto head of state
by the national gendarmerie and some soldiers who supported him even
before the results were published. The national electoral commission ended
up proclaiming Gbagbo elected.
But from that moment, the in-fighting within the security and defence
Côte d’Ivoire
75
forces found an echo in the political antagonisms and vice versa. Within this
environment, an unprecedented military/political crisis emerged, which
resulted in the armed insurrection of 19 September 2002. Since that date,
Côte d’Ivoire has been divided in two with the existing regime in Abidjan on
the one hand, controlling the southern half of the country and the rebels on
the other, occupying and controlling the northern half.
Today, much debate on SSR in the country focuses on the
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the former
belligerents. Following the Pretoria agreements, the national DDR
commission was established with the support of the international
community. Intense negotiations started, with the involvement of the prime
minister of the transition government and eminent personalities from civil
society. They led to an agreement on various stages that was expected to
culminate in the total disarmament of the pro-government and pro-New
Forces militia, starting from 27 June 2005 for the latter. Accompanying
measures, including a financial component (European Union Fonds Sud)
were also included, to ensure the success of the DDR exercise and prepare
the ground for elections. Presidential elections took place on 28 November
2010 but recourse to arms was necessary before the choice of the Ivorian
people was respected. The two armies that had been engaged in DDR
confronted each other, complicating significantly the security equation.
In this study, we shall start by describing the security apparatus and its
environment before going on to examine its strengths and weaknesses. In
conclusion, we shall suggest some guidelines for implementing reforms that
are capable of supporting democratic governance of this sector in Côte
d’Ivoire.
The security apparatus and its environment
In line with the conventional nomenclature, we can distinguish between
those forces in charge of protecting and defending territorial integrity and
those in charge of internal security. These different units are not organised
formally. The national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) are under the
authority of the chief of staff, while the gendarmerie, police force, customs
service, the navy and the forestry service are under separate and independent
command structures.
76
Raphaël Ouattara
The national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire
Defence is provided by the national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI),
which include the air force, the navy and the army. Since the military coup
in December 1999, the army has often been involved in politics. The head of
the FANCI is the chief of staff, appointed by the president of the republic,
who is also the commander in chief of the armed forces according to the
terms of article 47 of the constitution. The air force and the navy are each
under the command of senior officers from their units, who are under the
authority of the chief of staff.
Because of the current situation, it is difficult to give a precise
estimate of the real strength of the FANCI. Until recently, the Ivoirian army
was made up of 15,000 men. This figure may have increased to 17,000, not
including auxiliaries, since 19 September 2000.1
National gendarmerie
The FANCI are supported by the national gendarmerie when necessary. The
gendarmerie is considered to be a well-equipped and well trained elite unit.
Since its principal mission is to maintain law and order, in the past its
equipment only included light weapons. However, because of the role that it
was compelled to play in the recent history of the country, the gendarmerie
is now equipped with tanks and cannons, which were used to rout General
Robert Guei’s men during the attempt to ‘steal’ the elections.
There might be a total of up to 2,000 gendarmes throughout the
national territory. Almost every administrative constituency has its own
gendarmerie post or brigade. Gendarmes are recruited by means of a
competitive exam and are trained in the national gendarmerie training
school, which is situated in Abidjan and headed by a senior officer. The
school also provides upgrading and refresher courses for non-commissioned
officers and officers currently in service. The gendarmerie was given
military status, at its own request, in the 1980s. The gendarmerie falls under
the authority of a senior commander. Today, this corps is probably overequipped.
Customs
The customs service provides surveillance at the borders and seeks to protect
the national economy from smuggling and financial crime. Its functions are
mainly related to internal revenue. Customs officers are armed with
Côte d’Ivoire
77
handguns to foil the attempts of criminals who take advantage of the porous
borders to carry out activities that are harmful to national economic activity.
The customs service remains a paramilitary force whose supervisory ranks
are trained at the national school of administration in Abidjan, while the
agents in uniform are trained at the customs training school. Because of the
advantages linked to military status, the customs service has been demanding
to be included in the military for many years, as did the gendarmerie and the
national police force.
National police force
Internal security is provided by both public and private forces, whose
missions are not always clearly delineated. The national police force is the
main agent of internal security: it ensures order and security for goods and
persons. When necessary, the gendarmerie intervenes as back-up to the
police. The police force was able to obtain military status and enjoys the
attendant prerogatives (specific status within the public service, a special
military provident fund, free accommodation, etc.). Police stations are found
in almost all the main urban centres. The police force is under the authority
of a director general.
The criminal investigation department is in charge of investigations
and prosecutions that are ordered by the public prosecutor or by the court, in
the case of common law offences. The commercial police department is in
charge of preventing and sanctioning economic crime. There is a department
of territorial surveillance, which provides intelligence using civilian
personnel who are nevertheless authorised to carry handguns. They fall
under the authority of the director general of national security.
The navy
Security on the seas and lagoons is provided by the personnel of the
department of maritime and port affairs: the navy is in charge of training the
river and coastal police in maritime waters and lagoons that fall under
national jurisdiction and also contributes to regional coordination of
coastguard activities, while participating in policing fishing activities and
other security related activities.
Security of fauna and forests
Security of the fauna and forests is provided by a paramilitary force called
78
Raphaël Ouattara
the forest police. The forest wardens carry handguns and rifles. They take
their orders from a director general.
The republican guard
This is in fact a militia in charge of protecting the presidential palace and the
president of the republic. Until very recently, their weaponry was limited to
rifles, machine guns and a few cannon for parading.
Private security forces
This situation dates back to the start of the armed insurrection in September
1999, but it clearly shows the main problems that have to be resolved in
order to guarantee the security of persons and goods. Insecurity has led to
the establishment of self-defence militias (alongside the regular forces
described above) in certain popular neighbourhoods, to provide security at
night: these militias were in charge of sounding the alert and therefore acted
as watchdogs and were rarely armed. In certain areas, the population called
on the services of traditional hunters, who were reputed to have supernatural
powers: they were armed with locally manufactured hunting rifles. It is
impossible to say just how many such informal security organisations exist.
This uncontrolled proliferation of paramilitary groups, a consequence
of the failure or the incapacity of authorised forces to provide adequate
security of goods and persons, was of even greater concern in light of the
fact that some weapons that had come into circulation during the 1999 coup
remained unaccounted for. Similarly, weapons coming in from neighbouring
Liberia could be purchased dirt cheap from refugees. In addition to these
groups, other watch brigades set up business providing guards for various
premises, offices and private residences. These more or less structured
organisations had been stifled during the military transition. However, they
were able to resume their activities after the inception of the Second
Republic.
The issue of security in Côte d'Ivoire has been redefined in different
terms since the politico-military crisis of September 2002. The tragic
confrontations of 19 September 2002, which have been qualified by some as
an armed insurrection, by others as a military-civilian crisis and by yet others
as a civil war or aggression, certainly complicated the situation considerably.
These acts benefited from the lax and corrupt economic and social fabric, as
well as the weakness of institutions of democratic governance and the fact
that political quarrels had been transposed into the armed forces.
Côte d’Ivoire
79
The direct consequence of this situation was the restructuring of
private entities that are authorised to use force. While some have closed
down, others have been set up more formally and yet others have been
created. Following the resumption of hostilities in November 2004 and the
subsequent scenes of violence in Abidjan against foreigners and the French
in particular, the security sector has been ‘enhanced’ with the establishment
of private security agencies mainly in charge of protecting French citizens
and their property and businesses from the violence aimed at them and of
which some had been victims.
This trend can be explained by the incapacity or the lack of
willingness on the part of the Ivoirian authorities to provide protection to the
citizens of a country that they have portrayed throughout the crisis as hostile.
The proliferation of such private security companies is also a reaction to the
alleged activities of the ‘death squads’, which are believed to have operated
throughout the political and security crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. All that is known
about these squads are the acts that are rightly or wrongly attributed to them.
Whatever the case may be, the emergence of private security agencies only
contributes to making the security equation even more complex as they are
potential players in the use of violence, the Ivoirian state having lost its
monopoly a long while back.
Thus, increasingly, and especially in Abidjan, the economic capital,
the neighbourhood militias are armed. Most of the traditional hunters joined
the armed rebellion and have practically disappeared from Abidjan and the
areas controlled by loyalist forces. They are found mostly in the extreme
north and serve as auxiliary forces for the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Other new
so-called patriotic militia groups have been set up and claim to be armed to
‘defend’ the existing legal authority and ‘free’ Côte d’Ivoire from the
‘assailants’.
Faced with such a picture, it becomes clear that the security equation
is increasingly complex and even more difficult to resolve. Indeed, security
sector reform should be applied not only to organised forces (both loyalist
and rebel), but also to armed groups and security agents who have no fixed
leaders.
Security forces without leaders
With regard to structure, the security forces are faced with a multiplicity of
centres of command. Although this ensures a formal division of tasks, it is
nevertheless a challenge in terms of administrative management and
operational coordination, in particular within a context of civil war. The task
80
Raphaël Ouattara
is even more arduous because in the operational dimension, the separation
between defending territorial integrity and ensuring internal security of
goods, persons and communities is not so clear in a failed state whose
authority is called into question.
The situation is made more complicated today with the excessive
politicisation of the military as a result of the effects of the 1999 coup and
the fact that party heads and leaders all want to have their men in the armed
and security forces. Today, indiscipline and insubordination have become
entrenched in the military, transforming it into a many-headed monster. In a
2001 report assessing the state of democracy in Côte d’Ivoire, the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs uncovered the personal
rivalries within the army, which have been compounded by disobedience and
the creation of various groups with divergent loyalties, especially during the
military transition.2 There is also the bitter feeling that the authorities of the
Second Republic have not entirely succeeded in restoring civilian control
over the military, and it quickly becomes clear that the renegade forces
continue to pose a threat to national stability.
Thus, indiscipline, frustration with mismanagement, partisan
positions, ethnic and religious divisions, massive and uncontrolled flows of
weapons of war from hot zones and/or neighbouring countries (Liberia,
Sierra Leone) and the desertion of many soldiers have led to the total
disintegration of cohesion in the defence and security forces.
Today, it is quite obvious that the formal security forces have failed to
fulfil their mission of protecting goods and persons. A person who carries
weapons inspires more fear than trust in the population. Even worse,
suspicion has now sunk its roots among security agents, not only between
the different forces, but also within the ranks of these forces. Communities
no longer trust each other and distrust is generalised: stakeholders in the
security sector whose vocation is to serve as an interface and protect the
population have failed to reassure the latter of their ability to fulfil this role.
It must be said in their defence that the logistics and resources at their
disposal are inadequate for the growing requirements of their duties.
Furthermore, the excessive importance accorded to external threats does not
allow for balanced and clearheaded resource management to face the
numerous dangers. All these imbalances are accompanied by a feeling that
internal security forces are the ‘poor relations’ compared to others who are
seen as more privileged. This uneasiness is due to the terrible dilemma of
having to choose between giving priority to security along the borders and
guaranteeing internal security. One consequence of choosing to go to war to
Côte d’Ivoire
81
save the republic has been a proliferation of self-defence militias and private
security forces.
Security sector management and oversight
In a democracy, the conventional channels for civilian control of those
bodies in charge of the security of persons and goods are the institutions of
the republic and the main depository of sovereignty, namely the citizenry,
through grassroots organisations.
Parliamentary oversight
Where the legislative branch is concerned, the 225 national assembly
members are divided into only six standing committees that do not even
have rooms for their meetings. In the absence of a parliamentary majority,
small parties are at an advantage as they can ‘sell’ their votes to the ruling
party, thus distorting the exercise of democracy and discussion of ideas in
the assembly. Against such a backdrop, it is not surprising that parliamentary
control of the executive is almost inexistent.
In addition, the Ivoirian regime is more presidential than
parliamentary. As such, the president of the republic holds executive power
exclusively (article 41) and appoints people to civilian as well as military
positions (article 46) without needing the approval of parliament. He is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces (article 47). The president cannot,
however, declare war (article 73) or extend a state of siege beyond two
weeks without the authorisation of parliament. In the same vein, the status of
military personnel and staff of the national police is governed by law (article
71). The president may requisition defence and security forces without first
referring to the national assembly. He may also request that foreign troops be
stationed on the national territory under the same conditions.
Of course, the national assembly approves the general state budget but
it is clear that the real budget allocated to the defence forces is considered a
defence secret. Indeed, the same applies to information about the available
arsenal, the numbers of troops and the real salaries of senior officers.
Nevertheless, the minister of defence, like any other member of government,
may be summoned by the national assembly to give explanations about
issues relating to his ministry.
From a strictly governance point of view, like all other ministries in
Côte d’Ivoire, the ministry of defence has an inspectorate department that is
82
Raphaël Ouattara
in charge of ensuring the proper application of management standards and
procedures. This department is generally entrusted to officers at the end of
their career and, like its counterparts in other ministries it is severely
hampered by incompetence and corruption. Unfortunately, the government
inspectorate general, a sort of inspectorate of inspectorates, is in a similar
state. It must however be pointed out that although the minister of defence is
often – if not always – a civilian, he is very quickly ‘taken into hand’ by the
ministries of internal security and the navy, which are almost always headed
by senior officers of these national police force, gendarmerie and the navy.
Oversight by the judicial branch of power
The judicial power in Côte d’Ivoire is very much disputed because of its
complicity with the executive. The Ivoirian justice system takes its orders
from above and in the minds of the population it demonstrates the fact that
impunity is the rule. There is a double standard of justice in the country: a
permissive one for those in power, which allows them to do as they wish and
a stringent and exemplary one for the common people. Those in power are
above the law, but then so are defence and security force personnel. Indeed,
security forces have been accused of many transgressions and acts of
violence, for example a nocturnal intervention by commandos in a university
hostel in Abidjan in 1990, during which young female students were raped,
the massacres of civilians in 2000 during the demonstrations and counterdemonstrations that followed the presidential elections (mass graves in
Yopougon) and again in 2004 (killings during opposition protest marches in
March), not to mention flagrant human rights abuses. Nevertheless, no
sanctions were ever imposed.3 It would appear from this state of affairs that
wearing a military uniform confers a status of being untouchable by law. In
reality, the military are under the orders of the public prosecutor and the
state prosecutor, as far as criminal investigations are concerned.
Nevertheless, when military personnel are involved in a case related to their
functions, the public prosecutor is competent, acting on behalf of the military
prosecutor’s office. The criminal code and the military code define the scope
of application and the limits of both processes. It is however important to
note that the military tribunal is always presided over by a civilian judge
from the appeal court. The same applies to the high court, which is chaired
by a civilian judge from the Supreme Court.
This structure, in theory, enshrines the pre-eminence of the judiciary
in managing the security sector in Côte d’Ivoire. However, when we
consider the weight of the security forces in ensuring stability and
Côte d’Ivoire
83
maintaining regimes in place, including civilian regimes, it is easy to
understand that control by the judicial branch is only in existence outside of
the security apparatus but not inside it. Often the esprit de corps or solidarity
among ‘brothers in arms’ runs counter to the requirements of public
governance and accountability and has undermined the trust of the citizens in
their system of justice, especially when it comes to cases involving the
security forces.
Civil society
As indicated above, since the coup d’état of 1999, reports about human
rights violations by the security and defence forces against others or against
members of the forces have increased exponentially. Nevertheless, even in
well-documented cases of violence, rape and murder, the perpetrators enjoy
a level of impunity that has led to a clear deterioration of the image of the
military and its relations with the population. Faced with this situation,
political parties, who know that they must retain good relations with the
army if they wish to accede to power, hardly ever speak out against such
abuse.
The Ivoirian Human Rights League, the Ivoirian Human Rights
Movement, the Ivorian section of the Groupe d’Études et de Recherches sur
la Démocratie et le Développement Économique et Social, the Ivoirian
chapter of the International Association for Democracy in Africa and
sometimes religious groups are the only organisations that have been bold
enough to speak out to urge the authorities to face up to their responsibilities,
because no one, not even those who bear arms, should be above the law.
Some commissions of enquiry have thus been established in order to appease
the human rights defenders, but either they never arrive at any conclusions,
or no punitive measures are ever imposed. In actual fact, civil society
organisations only show interest in the security sector occasionally which
limits their impact on security sector management. Since there has never
been any serious analysis of human rights abuses by security actors, the
occasional statements and outcries of human rights advocates don’t produce
any results, since they are limited to reacting to isolated cases instead of the
processes behind them.
Ivorian civil society lacks cohesion, which prevents it from acting as a
lever that can have any real impact on governance. Thus, while a part of the
public denounces and condemns abuses and calls for sanctions, another part
attempts to justify or even legitimise the unjustifiable, or limits itself to a
silence that can only be seen as approval. For example, it might be recalled
84
Raphaël Ouattara
that demonstrations were organised by some sectors of civil society in
support of the person who murdered Jean Hélène, a journalist of Radio
France Internationale, who was shot by a policeman while on duty reporting
for the radio station.
Where civil society organisations or the media have focused critically
on the security sector, it has indeed become quite commonplace to see or
hear of defence forces breaking into the offices of one NGO or the other, or
one press house or the other to carry out an unauthorised search, on the
pretext of maintaining law and order or state security. Even more
commonplace is the sight of honest citizens being brutalised, assaulted, or
humiliated by representatives of the security forces for something as simple
as an identity check, And woe betide any individual who would dare bring
such a case to court.
Many civil society organisations have set themselves up as the proxies
for political parties and groupings, thus riding roughshod over the very
principles that they are supposed to defend or promote. The most glaring
example of this is the media, which, for the most part, have chosen to engage
in propaganda, rather than wielding the powerful tool of informing the
public.
By openly showing themselves to be partisan, NGOs and associations
that promote and defend democracy, as well as the media and other non
partisan popular instruments of expression considerably reduce their chances
of playing a significant role as stakeholders in the governance movement in
Côte d’Ivoire. Each day they disqualify themselves even more either by
inappropriate statements or their guilty silence that calls into questions their
integrity and legitimacy.
But such doubts must be tempered by taking into account the
numerous obstacles that journalists and other activists have to overcome to
access information about security, thanks to the secrecy that surrounds
decisions on defence, as though the right to information and the principle of
accountability did not apply to this sector. Each side has its responsibilities
and they must be faced jointly.
Trade unions and professional associations
Professional organisations, in particular teachers’ unions, were at the
forefront of the popular struggle that compelled the one-party state to return
to a fully fledged multi-party system in 1990, as stipulated by the
constitution. During the troubled years of structural adjustment programmes,
trade unions were the voice, the conscience and the hope of the people: with
Côte d’Ivoire
85
bravery and integrity, they took up the mantle of the responsibilities and
expectations placed on them.
Today, political interests have undermined corporatist solidarity
among workers. How else can one understand the fact that the legitimate
demands of cocoa producers’ unions have not been taken up by any others to
date? How else can one interpret the fact that there was no movement of
union solidarity to support the magistrates who went on strike, following
brutal acts of violence against a number of judges at their workplace by socalled ‘Young Patriots’ unhappy about their appointment?
Religious Groups
Unfortunately, even religious groups have been affected by this sad turn of
events. Indeed, believers have also been affected by the political divisions
that undermine the ability of all citizens to live together. Certain places of
worship and prayer, of all religions and denominations, have become fora for
the dissemination of extremist ideas. Most Christians quickly identified with
President Laurent Gbagbo, while the majority of Muslims rallied behind
Alassane Ouattara. This led to the conclusion by some uninformed observers
that there was a religious component to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
These preconceptions, which have been promoted by the militants and
supporters of the two leaders, have now contaminated the security forces and
a Christian soldier or agent in uniform is now automatically wary of any
Muslim soldier, gendarme, or policeman and vice versa. Very often, people
are categorised solely on the basis of their name.
All in all, public opinion appears particularly polarised, lacking any
dependable basis or ethical references. It has been intoxicated, rather than
fashioned or informed. It has been manipulated and divided by a political
class that is power hungry and cares little about the danger to which it
subjects national cohesion. Certainly, before the events of 19 September
2002 and increasingly after the Marcoussis accords,4 which were supposed
to bring an end to the war, activities have been carried out within the defence
and security forces to raise awareness and educate them about human rights.
However, the acts of violence perpetrated against people and their property
remain unpunished or are even denied outright and civil society appears not
to appreciate the role it can play to exert pressure and bring about security
sector reform. Is this due to corruption, a lack of interest or resources, or
have they simply given up? Maybe it is all this at once!
86
Raphaël Ouattara
Challenges of security sector governance
The military/civilian crisis that started on 19 September 2002 no doubt
constitutes the key element of the security situation in Côte d’Ivoire today.
How to bring an end to the military/civilian crisis?
DDR remains the stumbling block of the whole reconciliation process. Past
agreements have not produced any results since the Forces Nouvelles
constantly asked for solid guarantees before their implementation.
Implementation of the most recent agreement appeared to have been slowed
down following the massacres perpetrated in the western part of the country
in 2006 and the continued presence of armed, pro-government militia in the
region. But while the DDR process remained at an impasse, the political
agreement signed in Ouagadougou on 4 March 2007 between the central
government and the former rebellion gave rise to hope for a return of peace.
The national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme
which is now to be carried out by the Integrated Command Centre (CCI),
under the responsibility of the chiefs of staff of the FANCI and the armed
forces of the Forces Nouvelles has made good progress, for example in
identifying and equipping the sites before regrouping former combatants.
While regrouping operations have effectively begun, nevertheless there is
still a lot left to be done.
On Tuesday, 8 July 2008, the Integrated Command Centre held a
meeting at its headquarters in Yamoussoukro with all of its partners involved
in the programme for disarming and dismantling the militias, to identify the
zones and examine the major outlines of the operation. This meeting brought
together the majority of self-defence groups from the Great West, as well as
the military prefects of the western region, the national civil service
programme, the national community reintegration and rehabilitation
programme, the support unit from the Prime Minister's office and
representatives of the United Nations Office in Côte d’Ivoire, the Force
Licorne and the United Nations Police. The ‘Compagnie Scorpions
guetteurs’ militia based in the political and administrative capital,
Yamoussoukro, which is close to the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), the
governing party, openly displayed its opposition to the process. Major
Bamba Die, the head of the group, declared to the press with pictures to
support his claim that he and his men had fought alongside the loyalist forces
in Bouake, M’bahiakro and Logouale.5 For Major Die, disarmament and
dismantlement of the militia (DDM) in his zone of influence could only take
Côte d’Ivoire
87
place if general Mangou and the authorities of the FPI fulfilled their
commitments made to him. Because, as he stated forcefully:
Côte d’Ivoire was not liberated by the FANCI: it was us, the militia, who
took up arms to liberate this country. Operation ‘Dignity’6 depended on us.
Mangou and the authorities of the FPI made us promises.
This gives an idea of how difficult the task is, because how can these
promises be fulfilled – if such promises were made – to militia members
whose role and numbers are not known precisely?
Nevertheless, since January 2008, all the security forces have
effectively been grouped together. However, when it comes to disarming the
ex-belligerents of the FN, it has been very difficult to group them together;
this exercise only started on 2 May 2008.
Various parties have expressed their opposition to both the DDR and
the DDM processes, demonstrating the fears of the ex-belligerents that they
will lose the privileges that they had been accorded and have been clinging
on to for the past six years. For them, disarmament sounds the death knell
for their life as ‘kinglets’. Since the start of the war, they have been illegally
collecting money in the form of parallel taxes levied, as well as through the
plundering of the mining and agricultural resources in their zones of
competence. Needless to say, the militias are in no hurry to be dismantled
either.
If viable reforms are to be implemented, there is a need to address this
reluctance to disarm, which is hampering the process and complicating the
situation and work on overcoming the opposition to DDR and DDM, Those
involved in the Ivorian crisis, including the international community and in
particular the African Union and especially ECOWAS, do not yet fully
understand the nature of the obstacles to be overcome.
The challenges to security sector governance, as well as their solutions
do indeed have an obvious regional and sub-regional dimension, as is shown
by the efforts deployed by these organisations and their authorities to arrive
at an agreement and bring an end to the crisis. Setting aside its economic
importance (Côte d’Ivoire represents 40% of trade within the CFA zone), its
proximity to other areas of tension such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea
also makes it one of the key countries for security in West Africa. In Sierra
Leone and Liberia, bloody civil wars have only recently ended and Guinea
has been experiencing strong turbulence, in the aftermath of the coup that
followed the death of president Conte. Indeed, many combatants, who either
participated in confrontations among armed militias or in the massacres of
88
Raphaël Ouattara
civilian populations in the west of Côte d’Ivoire came from Liberia, Sierra
Leone and even Guinea, all neighbouring countries that are engaged to
varying degrees in DDR programmes or are restructuring their security
apparatus. Thousands of demobilised ex-combatants who now find
themselves at a loose end and, due to a lack of alternatives, are often ready to
respond to any call to take up arms again, represent a permanent threat to
regional security, requiring a holistic approach to the various DDR
programmes within the sub-region.
The sub-region has also been the theatre of large population
movements after each outbreak of violence, and thousands of people were
displaced at the outset of the conflict. This is why it is important to include
the sub-regional dimension in any attempt to overhaul the security system in
Côte d’Ivoire, if there is any hope of finding well-designed solutions (in
particular DDR in all its components) that are applied to this end. This
requires sustained cooperation with all its neighbours not only on DDR, but
on all aspects of prevention and intervention in the security sector.
The dilemma of France
Côte d’Ivoire has signed defence agreements with France, the former
colonial power. During the events of 19 September 2002, the head of state
seemingly requested the intervention of the French forces stationed at Port
Bouët, a neighbourhood of Abidjan located close to the airport. The French
authorities apparently refused to intervene, claiming that the agreements
only applied in the case of an external attack. The authorities in Abidjan felt
that it was indeed an external attack and pointed their finger at neighbouring
Burkina Faso. This was the first difference of opinion that served to further
darken the horizon in the relations between Abidjan and Paris, which had
been rather cool ever since the inception of the Second Republic.
In spite of efforts by the two capitals to normalise their relations, trust
is far from having been restored. The conference in Linas-Marcoussis was
the first opportunity for the Ivorian head of state to visit France after he was
sworn in, but he has no fond memories of this visit because the agreements
signed by the principal political parties in Côte d’Ivoire stripped him of most
of his constitutional prerogatives. Immediately upon his return, President
Gbagbo quickly denounced the agreements, which his supporters had termed
a ‘constitutional coup d’état’.
This unfortunate divergence between Paris and Abidjan in the
assessment of the military/political crisis must be understood as part of a
broader picture because today the security and defence forces, or at least
Côte d’Ivoire
89
what remains of them, have become an instrument of political power. One
might be tempted to write that they defend regime security and not that of
the republic. On the other hand, the regime is a hostage to these forces,
which are now aware of the role that they play in maintaining it in power.
This has resulted in a vicious circle which is reassuring for no one, in
particular the neighbouring countries, many of whose citizens live in Côte
d'Ivoire. The latter are accused of all ills and are often the prime target of
uncontrolled elements of the security and defence forces. How long will
these countries continue to tolerate such abuse, especially if they can take
advantage of the disorder within the security forces?
Fortunately today, in the name of national reconciliation and peace,
such acts are becoming less frequent. The decision has also been taken to
merge the New Forces with the security forces, thus placing individuals who
had taken up arms against each other under a single command structure (the
integrated command centre). With the dismantling of the 43rd Battalion
d’Infanterie Marine (with troops being integrated into Operation Licorne)
and challenges faced by the United Nations blue helmets, it is not yet clear
how difficult this mix will be. However, when the DDR/DDM process nears
completion, restructuring of the security forces may become a priority
challenge for Côte d'Ivoire.
Recommendations
Security and defence forces have an undeniable place in a democracy. The
role of each of these agents must be clearly defined in order to avoid them
becoming an obstacle to this same democracy. And when security forces
turn away from their traditional framework for intervention (as has been the
case in Côte d'Ivoire) there is a need to take a certain number of measures to
safeguard the integrity of democracy.
The security forces must achieve self-reconciliation
Security forces are commonly described as a ‘corps’. This term translates the
idea that the army is – or should be – a unit, just like a body whose
constituent elements must strive to meet the same objective, in coordination
and perfect synergy. It is therefore vital that all these components be
mobilised together to meet the same objective. If they do not have the same
understanding of the objective, not only will they not meet it, but the
situation will lead to internal tensions that cannot be compatible with the
90
Raphaël Ouattara
idea of a ‘corps’. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire the following needs to be done:






Include the missions of the security forces within the framework of
the republic and redefine these missions; the forces must be in the
service of the state and the population and not in the service of the
regime;
Protect the security sector institutionally against any attempts at
intimidation or manipulation by political forces;
Undertake enlightened and professional awareness-raising in the
security forces;
Redefine career profiles and plans according to objective criteria and
in line with existing standards in the military profession.
Consequently, all new recruits who joined the military between 2000
and 2004 would have to be evaluated under the supervision of the
United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire and only those who comply
with criteria of eligibility for the military profession should be
retained. The state must then find a solution for the reintegration of
the remaining ex-combatants;
Identify mechanisms to discourage any temptation towards political
partisanship. For example, an allowance in the form of an additional
pension to all agents of the security forces who are considered
‘politically upright’;
Set up a mechanism for monitoring ethics and equity within the
security forces.
These measures could enable the security forces to achieve a measure of self
reconciliation, which is a prerequisite for their cohesion, albeit insufficient in
and of itself.
The security forces must inspire trust
Another no less important challenge is to reconcile the security forces with
the civilian population that they are supposed to protect. The acts of violence
and other forms of abuse committed during the military transition, in
addition to the physical, moral and psychological injuries, have left lasting
scars. It is essential to re-establish trust between these two entities. In order
to do this:

The issue of security must not be dealt with as though it plays an
important role solely during elections; it is a question that needs
Côte d’Ivoire



91
further reflexion and long-term commitment;
The temptation to establish a security system based on ethnic
affiliation or allegiance to a regime must be abandoned; this must be
understood clearly by all communities;
Participative events must be organised periodically to debate issues of
common interest in the security field. Depending on the topic, the
moderator could be either a personality from civilian society or from
the military;
The principle that the military is not above the law must be clearly reestablished by enhancing civic instruction, providing training on
human rights and reinforcing the role of the judiciary.
Conclusion
There is a clear need to redefine the roles and responsibilities of each of the
components of the defence and security apparatus within a democratic
system. The security sector will also need to assimilate the rights and duties
of the citizens that they are to protect and occasionally supervise and should
have the resources to build a professional and republican army. The criteria
for recruitment, career profiles, as well as discipline in military and civic
training should be drafted formally.
The greatest challenge however lies in maintaining the military apart
from political turbulence and intrigues. There will no doubt be a need to go
beyond simply indicating formally in the constitution that exercise of a
military career is incompatible with holding any political office. Impunity
must be banished and military tribunals must play their role fully and set the
example by sanctioning any acts that run counter to the duties and ethics of
the military.
Nevertheless, to be able to implement the reforms suggested above,
hostilities must come to an end. The guns have now fallen silent. The
principal stakeholders have demonstrated a firm determination to hold
elections as quickly as possible, as this is the best means of resolving the
crisis. One wonders, however, whether there is a real understanding of the
challenge implied in restructuring the defence and security forces according
to a timetable that is related more to electoral considerations than to the
nature of the problem. If the sub-regional, regional and international aspects
of the issue are neglected or not integrated, it will unfortunately not be
possible to definitively remove the risks of a resurgence of violence, which
could compromise the success of all the reforms undertaken within the
Raphaël Ouattara
92
framework of the various programmes.
We must make no mistake: security cannot be guaranteed in any
country as long as its neighbours are torn apart by conflict. Any security or
stabilisation strategy necessarily depends on the efforts and progress
accomplished by the immediate neighbours. The history of the birth of our
nations invites us to move in this direction and geography compels us to do
so. The only viable security policy is one that is based on a comprehensive
understanding of the nebulous concept of sovereignty and whose acts and
messages are rooted in the people and not those who hold power.
Epilogue
Terrible events have taken place in Côte d’Ivoire while this publication has
been finalised. Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to accept defeat in the 2010
presidential elections plunged the country into an unprecedented crisis as the
two belligerent sides of 2002 resumed their conflict. His regime decided to
follow to the letter the saying ‘those who want peace must prepare for war.’
This was made evident by the discovery of a formidable arsenal, despite
overt calls for ‘disarmament’ and a negotiated return to peace, following the
arrest of Mr Gbagbo. Yet the forces loyal to the declining regime had neither
the training nor the motivation to use these weapons. For this reason, the
atrocities and the war crimes committed particularly in the West of the
country can be attributed mostly to pro-Gbagbo mercenaries, militias and
hardliners within the army.7
Since the start of the post-electoral crisis, parts of the armed and
security forces (the majority according to sources close to President
Ouattara) have changed camp. On 17 March 2011, President Ouattara issued
an order to create the Republican Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI):
“…In accordance with the Treaty of Ouaguadougou, I have issued an order
to create the Republican Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire in order to put an end
to the chaos in the country. This new army is composed of the National
Armed Forces and the armed wing of the New Forces, under the leadership of
a general staff directed by a Chief of General Staff supported by a Deputy
Chief of General Staff…”8
However, it must be noted that the FRCI also abused its power and
participated in bloody reprisals in the West of the country, according to the
Amnesty International Report cited above. The FRCI reached Abidjan
Côte d’Ivoire
93
without meeting great resistance, but its capture proved to be much more
difficult than anticipated. Both sides perpetrated acts of violence in the
capital and eventually clashed when the FRCI attempted to capture the Radio
Télévision Ivoirienne, presidential palace and residence.
Poorly equipped, inexperienced, and simply incapable of capturing
these ‘fortresses’, the FRCI prevailed thanks to the implementation of UN
Resolution 1975 (2011) that called on the UNOCI and the French forces of
Operation Licorne to ‘prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian
population,’ a tactic employed by the pro-Gbagbo forces.
The UN intervention silenced the guns. President Ouattara won the
war, but it remains to be seen whether he wins the peace. The challenge of
controlling the armed forces has been further complicated by the
intervention of international forces. The address to the nation announcing
the creation of the FRCI suggests that the new authorities appreciate the
extent of the challenge:
“The primary mission of the new army is to ensure the security of the people
and property without distinction, as I outlined in my address to the nation on
Tuesday 15 March 2011. The army will also be responsible for the defense of
the national territory.
In all its actions, the new army will follow a code of conduct designed to put
the army at the service of all citizens. This will allow the army to contribute
effectively to the building of a modern, unified and democratic Ivorian
nation.
The new army must also be a powerful instrument of national unity and serve
as a practical school for civic duty, tolerance, transparency, good citizenship
and national integration.
The new army will be competent and professional, always prioritizing its
mission and the respect for citizens over private interests.
Our army must also be a tool in support of development, serving the people,
which means serving the Republic…”
This statement expresses the essence of the security sector reform
challenge in Côte d’Ivoire. However, it is up to the new authorities to adopt
concrete decisions and take real steps towards SSR. Neither speeches nor
mere goodwill suffice. President Ouattara must avoid the trap into which his
predecessor fell and avoid becoming the hostage of those who helped him
into the presidential palace. Appointments to the High Command present the
Raphaël Ouattara
94
first test. Will he keep the Generals who waited until the last moment to join
him? How is he going to manage the inevitable frustrations that follow the
promotion of some and the demise of others? And how to collect all the
weapons used during the conflict, some of which are still being kept by
militias or pro-Gbagbo elements?
Given the nature of the post-electoral crisis, the unification of the two
armies, which should normally be the goal of DDR, represents its beginning.
Indeed, Côte d’Ivoire seems to walk the path of DDR backwards. This is an
unprecedented situation that cannot be managed according to existing
frameworks. And more than ever, the international community has a critical
role to play.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
According to Military Balance 2009, the total number of active men was 17,050 (army
6,500, navy 900, air force 700, presidential guard 1,350, gendarmerie 7,600, militia
1,500).
National Democratic Institute, Côte d’Ivoire: National Reconciliation and the State of
Democracy. An Assessment Mission Report (July 2-13, 2001), 19.
After Gbagbo’s election, a mass grave was discovered near Yopougon on 26 October
2000. In his declaration, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, stated that he was deeply
distressed by this discovery (New York, United Nations, 30 October 2000, AFP).
The agreements, negotiated in Linas-Marcoussis under the auspices of France, formally
put an end to the conflict and set up a ‘government of national reconciliation’.
These towns were the theatres of operation during the 2002 military crisis.
This name given by loyalist forces to the military operation seeking to liberate the
‘occupied zones’.
Amnesty International, ‘Ils ont regardé sa carte d’identité et l’ont abattu : Retour sur six
mois de violences post-électorales en Cote d’Ivoire’. AI Index : AFR 31/002/2011
(London: Amnesty International, 2011). Available at : http://www.amnesty.org
See Alassane Dramane Ouattara, ‘Message du Président de la République aux Forces
Républicaines de Cote d’Ivoire’, Abidjan, 17 March 2011. Available at:
http://www.primaturecotedivoire.net/site/suite.php?newsid=117.