Chapter 2
Benin
Théodore C. Loko
Introduction
The Republic of Benin occupies a key geographical position in the West
African sub-region. As a result, any events that occur in its surrounding
environment can affect the country’s stability. This socio-political context
defines the opportunities and challenges related to implementing security
sector reform (SSR). Indeed since geo-strategy places the state within its
political, economic and social context, defence and security matters can only
be defined within a general view that requires the participation of all players
in the life of the nation. This obvious fact leads to a reassessment of
traditional approaches which only view national defence from the military
angle. Similarly, security, which goes hand in hand with national defence,
must be examined in its various dimensions, including human security, in
this new framework of understanding.1
In theory, the need for SSR is broadly accepted in Benin, both by
security sector officials and by the other components of society. This was
made clear during the geostrategic forum organised by the ministry of
national defence in February 2003, which brought together representatives of
the military and many other social groups. Present among the participants
were members of the national assembly, government officials, engineers,
academics, heads of non-governmental organisations, legal experts,
sociologists, historians, religious leaders, police officers, etc. In addition to
the very high level of representation from various levels of responsibility in
society, the working approach adopted also sought to be holistic. Indeed, the
forum was part of a series of national analyses regarding the country’s long
term prospects, which had led to the submission of an official report to the
head of state on 23 August 2001. This report described the deepest
aspirations of all citizens of Benin, from all walks of life, to a future filled
with happiness and prosperity for the country, as well as their belief that
these objectives could be attained. This was demonstrated by their
overwhelming acceptance of the ALAFIA (‘peace’) vision which by 2025
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aims at making Benin a country that is well governed, united and peaceful,
endowed with a prosperous and competitive economy and a beacon of
cultural influence and social wellbeing. The opening address at the forum
showed that the objective was to have a better understanding of all aspects of
security in Benin, with its multiple facets and, above all, to raise awareness
among stakeholders from the various sectors of national society.2
This approach is well in line with the new paradigm that is developing
in the sub-region. In the light of all the measures adopted by different states
there has been a notable change in the concept of security since the late 90s
and this has transformed armies, both in terms of their structures and their
organisation. The military has been entrusted with new responsibilities and
now carries out its traditional functions differently. The renewed interest in
security and defence sector reform analysis is linked to both the geopolitical
developments that are compelling African states to review their security
systems and to the central position of security and defence mechanisms with
regard to good governance in sub-Saharan African countries.
Furthermore, in francophone Africa, SSR falls within the general
framework of public service reforms. It can only be reassessed after an
overhaul of the administration, aimed at improving relations between
citizens and the government through the better provision of public services.
This improvement has a two-fold objective:


To provide a better response to collective needs (since satisfying the
needs of citizens is one of the missions of government) through more
appropriate and better managed services within the framework of
available resources;
Establish the link between citizens and public services, with respect to
the principles of the rule of law.
Although the security sector reforms implemented in francophone
sub-Saharan countries are rather limited in this regard, they are nevertheless
beginning to reflect the institutionalisation of security and defence sector
governance in West African countries.3
In Benin, the reforms provided an opportunity to integrate the security
sector in an overall framework that includes the concept of human security.
The government acknowledged the absence of a security policy and strategy
and decided to correct the weaknesses and dysfunctions. And yet, a review
of the current situation (cf. the recent wave of armed robberies), as well as
both the national and regional context, clearly shows that this task is still
immense. The challenges to be met include the ability of the security sector
to tackle organised transborder crime, ensuring a better understanding of the
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threats, as well as coordinating forces on the ground. These challenges raise
three series of questions related to the institutional, civil-military and
strategic dimensions. Civil-military relations require a systemic analysis of
the security sector. Where strategy is concerned, the issues raised relate to
problems of administration and management. This chapter begins with a
brief description of the environment for SSR, as well as the security
apparatus, before examining the many challenges to be met and finally
proposing some effective options for reform.
The security environment
Benin is the first African country to have moved peacefully from a
dictatorship to a truly multiparty system. Not only did the 1990 national
conference result in the referendum in which the people of Benin adopted
the 11 December 1990 constitution, it also, and more importantly, enabled a
return to democracy. Its direct impact on SSR was that the military withdrew
from the political scene, which very fortunately led to a slowdown in the
rearmament effort for state security. Nevertheless, faced with the spate of
armed robberies and given the slow pace of police reforms, the whole
question of the link between state security and human security arises again in
the following terms: is the security apparatus capable of protecting its
citizens and their property? When a state is weak or fragile, it is incapable of
protecting its citizens effectively, yet when it is too strong and when it seeks
to provoke other countries, it can become a source of insecurity.
Threats, weaknesses and internal dysfunctions
The security apparatus in Benin is finding it difficult to curb insecurity. This
is due to malfunctions in the security system,4 which is characterised by
inadequacies within the management and command structures and a shortage
of human, material and financial resources. The obsolete nature of existing
capacities and working methods only further highlights the inefficiencies in
managing the security sector, which are also demonstrated in the lack of
motivation on the part of personnel discouraged by their professional
difficulties, poor working conditions and meagre salaries. For many of them,
ethics and good conduct give way to corruption, misbehaviour and
indiscipline, thus making it impossible for the judicial system to combat
insecurity.5 In addition to these difficulties, there is the lack of collaboration
on the part of the population that is disappointed by the poor performance of
the security forces, the absence of a clear and effective security policy, the
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burden of political pressure and the struggles for influence between the
armed forces and the public security forces.
As a result of these dysfunctions, people in the hinterland continue to
represent an easy target for criminal activities that can be characterised as
endemic. There are two levels of crime in Benin: on a large scale, there are
transnational organised crime networks, responsible for cases of armed
robberies both in daylight and at night time in certain urban centres; holdups on highways often leading to the loss of human lives; trafficking in
stolen vehicles to countries in the sub-region, as well as other illicit forms of
trafficking (e.g. children, drugs, arms, foreign exchange, human skulls, illicit
medicines, petroleum products, etc.). On a more modest scale, criminal
activity consists of robberies and other forms of theft, road accidents and the
illegal exploitation of water sources.
The ministry of interior and public security is responsible for
implementing the national public security policy. The national internal
security council provides guidance according to developments in the global
security situation. In addition to its strategic dimension, an evaluation as a
response to the problem of governance would also serve as a form of
mediation by facilitating information exchange and coordination among
independent actors who are involved in a partnership of public action.
The regional context
Insecurity in the region is mainly due to the threat of international terrorism,
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the increasing
occurence of cybercrime. Benin’s participation in the activities of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s committee on development
information, science and technology should make it possible to counter the
latter activity.
The growing interest of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation in subSaharan Africa can be linked to the terrorist threat facing the region, in
particular as a result of the widespread weakness of central governments and
corruption. Other factors also compound this situation: cultural and ethnic
differences that go beyond geographical borders, as well as the competing
(and sometimes convergent) interests of various Islamic groups with
differing aims, strengths and weaknesses.
Furthermore, Africa remains a lucrative market for small arms and
light weapons, although the continent is poor and apparently only of
marginal financial interest to the global arms market. Weapons circulate on
the market, attracting countries and manufacturers seeking to get rid of the
surplus stocks left over from the cold war, or weapons made obsolete by
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technological advances. Some do not hesitate to place more recently
produced weapons on the African market. According to some experts, armstrafficking continues to be a major security problem in sub-Saharan Africa,
which has already been the theatre of many bloody conflicts.
In the maritime domain, countries in the Gulf of Guinea are faced with
various scourges such as piracy (including abductions of fishermen in
territorial waters by pirate boats), over-fishing, poaching, pollution and
trafficking in various goods, in particular petroleum products. Indeed, each
year, more than 70 000 barrels of oil are stolen from the Gulf, representing
an annual loss of 1.5 billion dollars.6 In order to resolve this problem, the
authorities of the various countries must demonstrate political will and focus
on regional solutions.
The maritime threats should compel governments to improve
governance, with the aid of sub-regional and international organisations and
with a view to obtaining improved harmonisation and coordination of
measures to combat insecurity. According to the minister of national
defence, measures to combat maritime insecurity should fall within a robust
regional operational framework, underpinned by the appropriate instruments
and legal capacities, as well as effective institutions. It is therefore necessary
to identify the security concerns and the means to counter threats, before
defining the right instruments for implementation. Measures should be
adopted with a view to consolidating national legislation and putting the
institutional means in place.
In addition, the privatisation of war also has had paradoxical
consequences both within the sub-region and on the continent, as shown by
the gradual diminution in the capacities of regular African armies. Fearing
coup d’états and military rebellions, many African presidents, several of
whom seized power through military coups themselves, transformed the
regular armed forces into ‘ceremonial armies’, while ensuring their own
safety through well equipped praetorian guards and private militias. These
corps are made up of loyal men who usually belong to the same ethnic group
as the country’s leader. Clearly, this method undermines the foundations of
the state, in favour of entities that exist beyond its reach (ethnic groups,
religious communities, etc.) or outside of the state (criminal networks,
mining and agriculture multinationals, etc.). West Africa is home to a wide
variety of non-state armed groups, ranging from pro-government militias to
rebel groups. These groups are unstable, and their motivations, loyalties and
the scope of their missions change constantly. They tend to continue to exist
beyond their political usefulness and are capable of reinventing themselves,
when given enough incentive. In the end, local communities are the victims.
In Benin, like in other parts of the region, this phenomenon contributes to
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increasing crime (mainly hold-ups). The scope of the problem shows that
West African governments do not yet understand the precise nature of the
threats.
The security apparatus
In Benin, the inception of democracy had a positive impact on institutional
reforms. Audits were carried out in government bodies and the
administration was decentralised, in order to bring the public service closer
to the population. This enabled civil society organisations to gain ground.
Other reforms are still underway, although their effects have been limited
considerably by difficulties related to a lack of financial resources.
As far as security sector reform is concerned, the keystone of the texts
that govern the security system in Benin is still law n° 90-032 of 11
December 1990, establishing the Constitution of the Republic of Benin.
Each component of the armed forces is governed by some specific
provisions drawing inspiration from provisions on human rights and human
security, as well as the more nebulous concept of governance. The
constitution outlines the principles governing the organisation, use and
supervision of the armed forces. Any infringement of its provisions can lead
to checks and sanctions by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.
However, due to widespread illiteracy and lack of knowledge about these
provisions, all this remains purely theoretical.
The structure of the security sector in Benin is rather complex. Despite
the multiplicity of forces the most important question, in terms of
governance, is to determine how they are to be deployed and controlled.
There is also the subsidiary question of the large number of command
centres and control bodies. The best way to review these forces and their
command structure is therefore to examine them from the point of view of
their missions. The security forces legally constituted to protect national
interests comprise the following entities:
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

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


The armed forces;
The national gendarmerie;
The national police force;
The customs service;
The forest rangers;
The fire brigade;
The intelligence service (this service is invisible, but is perceived as
being attached to the presidency because its role is linked to state
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security; since the revolutionary period, it has been the source of bad
memories for the people of Benin).
Authorities with a mandate to implement the national security system
The national conference held in February 1990 between the key national
stakeholders established the Superior Council of the Republic, in charge of
drafting the constitution that was adopted by referendum on 11 December
1990. The desire to safeguard the institutions of the state was reaffirmed in
the wake of this national conference. It was thus decided to reform the armed
forces, in order to refocus them on their principal role of protecting the
integrity of the national territory. This fundamental choice was enshrined in
the constitution. In accordance with article 62, the president of the republic
is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, appoints the members of the
higher council of defence in the council of ministers and chairs the meetings
of the former.
General organisation of the armed forces
The armed forces comprise the army, the navy and the air force. The army is
between 8,000 and 9,000 men strong.7 To this can be added the 3,000 to
4,500 men of the national gendarmerie, which carries out military missions
in times of war. The air force comprises between 500 and 800 men. The
armed forces are however embryonic and under-equipped.
The minister of defence is in charge of implementing the national
defence policy, under the authority of the president of the republic. He is
responsible for organising the armed forces, providing them with equipment
and infrastructure and ensuring that they are ready to deploy. In addition, he
has the responsibility for military cooperation with other countries. To carry
out these tasks, the minister is assisted by the chief of staff of the armed
forces, who is also a military advisor to the government.
The chief of general staff provides the general command of the armed
forces with the assistance of the various force commanders and the heads of
the joint force units. He also serves as liaison with his foreign counterparts.
The military high command is thus made up of a chief of general staff; a
deputy chief of general staff; the various force commanders and the heads of
the joint force units.
The armed forces of Benin have acquired practical experience in a
number of theatres of operation such as:
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Théodore C. Loko
Defending territorial integrity in the dispute between Benin and Niger
over the Lété islands in 1963;
Protecting national territory from foreign invasion during the Biafra
war (1967-70) in Nigeria (in this instance, the greater part of the
equipment mobilised was shown to be faulty);
Peacekeeping missions with the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations blue helmets (Côte
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.).8
These missions raised issues of command and control of the
components of the Beninese forces. The frequent external interventions also
led to some anxiety on the part of the country’s leaders who were afraid that
the soldiers would become envious of the allowances paid to soldiers on
international duty. Furthermore, on several occasions, the ineffectiveness of
its activities (due in large part to inadequate equipment) has revealed the
operational limitations of the army.
Public security
In certain exceptional circumstances, the armed forces, which are under the
authority of the president of the republic, may be called in as back-up for the
conventional security forces, the gendarmerie and the national police force.
The subordination of the armed forces to a civilian authority has always been
enshrined in the constitution. This did not however prevent the military from
interfering in the democratic process, as shown by the various putsches
during the 1960s and 70s.
The most recent example of an armed forces intervention on national
territory was within the framework of the activities of the national
commission in charge of controlling illicit sales of petroleum products,
which resulted in the loss of human lives.
National gendarmerie
The gendarmerie is one of the main components of the security forces. The
Beninese gendarmerie bears a close resemblance to the French gendarmerie
and was created on 1 August 1961. Since 2006, it has been under the
command of a brigadier general and is made up of 2,800 officers, other ranks
and gendarmes, representing 30% of the country’s armed forces personnel.
The gendarmerie has competence over 90% of the national territory and 81%
of its population. Its missions include those of administrative police,
criminal investigation and military police. It also contributes to protecting
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many sensitive sites and areas and has a contingent of about 250 men who
can take part in peacekeeping missions.
To carry out its missions, the gendarmerie has its general headquarters
in Porto-Novo, operational and training units, three regional squads (one
mobile squad, one prisons squad and one services squad) and a national
gendarmerie school, which houses the advanced criminal investigation
training centre. It has headquarters in each region, as well as brigades in all
rural and urban districts. In the rural areas, it carries out a number of
missions of the national police force. Like the police, the gendarmerie
ensures the security of persons and goods. Its scope of action extends to
almost all of the national territory, but it is mainly responsible for security in
the countryside and on major highways. In peacetime, it is responsible for
territorial surveillance, protecting the population, ensuring public security
and civil defence. It is also in charge of criminal investigations in rural areas,
under the authority of the appropriate judicial authorities. The gendarmerie
may sometimes be requisitioned for public security missions under the
supervision of civilian and military authorities such as mayors, regional
prefects, the minister of interior, or the minister of defence.
National police force
The police force is headed by a director general and comprises several
specialised rapid intervention groups: the criminal investigation brigade, the
compagnies républicaines de sécurité, whose headquarters are in Cotonou
and their units stationed in the regional capitals.
The general directorate, which falls under the authority of the ministry
of interior and public security, centralises and coordinates the activities of all
technical departments (police administration, public security, criminal
investigation, general intelligence and territorial surveillance and the
national police academy) and external departments (regional, central police
stations, local police stations, special police units, border posts and stations),
as well as the compagnies républicaines de sécurité (CRS), the anti-crime
squad (BAC), the research, action, intervention and deterrence group
(RAID) and the coastline protection and antipollution squad (BPLP). The
republican security units are organised to operate in constituted groups. They
are mobile reserve units that can be deployed throughout the national
territory with the following duties: to support the urban police force in
maintaining law and order; to provide assistance to citizens in case of any
serious incidents or public disasters; and to carry out actual surveillance
missions involving highway patrols, motorised police, official escorts,
airport and port surveillance and communication channels. The BAC, CRS,
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RAID and the BPLP are elite armed units of the police force. They were
created as part of the attempt to adapt the public service to the latest
requirements in the field.
In principle, the police may intervene on the request of any individual
who requires their assistance. In practice, however, there are many violations
of individual security in town centres, which is an illustration of the
inadequacies of the police force. With the implementation of
decentralisation, it is to be hoped that innovative measures will be taken with
a view to setting up local police services. There is a good degree of interest
in setting up a municipal police service in the new communes. Since January
1999, the mayors are in charge of ensuring the security of goods and persons
in their towns. In spite of their limited capacities, these communes are
nevertheless legal entities that enjoy a certain autonomy that allows them to
set up municipal police services. Unfortunately, given the scope of demand
and the limited means available, this reform may not produce the expected
results. These ideas have been put forward on the assumption that there
would be an extended wave of disturbances, but there has been no real
discussion of the matter. For the moment, however, it is not a question of
deciding between the central and the peripheral levels; insecurity should be
the main subject of debate, especially if citizens increasingly feel threatened.
During the revolutionary period, Benin had a ‘militia’, a very
effective, but politically indoctrinated local police organisation. The main
question is whether the municipal police project will be a carbon copy of the
revolutionary militia. This may not be the case, since the previous system
was aimed at giving the authorities political control over the whole of the
national territory, while the decentralisation policy seeks to bring
governance closer to the citizens and thus improve security in the broadest
sense. There are however some problems about transferring central
government powers and resources to the decentralised local authorities. It is
not certain that the regulatory texts adopted in 1990 to reorganise the police
services took into account the current concerns of decentralisation.
The customs service
The customs service, which is present along the country’s borders, ensures
that import and export taxes, as well as customs duties on goods that transit
through the country are paid. It is also required to make sure that such taxes
and levies are paid in to the public treasury. The customs service monitors,
protects and regulates the national economy, while also enforcing
prohibitions on the import, export, or transit of certain goods, as decided by
the appropriate national authorities. Customs officers play a very important
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role in the country’s economy because the national budget relies mainly on
the taxes collected. Furthermore, given the regional vocation of the port of
Cotonou, indiscretions in management can sometimes lead to problems at
the highest level of government. In addition to this highly sensitive point,
there are some cross border issues that also fall under the responsibility of
customs.
In addition to the customs service, the police force, in particular
border police, are also responsible for coordinating security and for the
surveillance of activities related to migratory flows along the country’s
terrestrial, maritime and aerial borders. These services centralise and process
information and statistics that they receive regularly from the various border
posts.
It is not enough to re-define the mission of the customs service; issues
of logistics and ethics must also be taken into account. There is an even more
obvious need for reform at the moment, in particular since the ministry of
economy and finance organised a seminar during which senior officials of
that ministry could make recommendations that, if applied, would contribute
greatly to implementing the government’s programme of action.9
In order to improve the effectiveness of customs services, reforms
should include provision for establishing automated one-stop services and
also for improving communication with the public. In the long term, the
public service will have to be gradually overhauled and control mechanisms
at the Cotonou port and along the borders will need to be strengthened, in the
same way as the system of sanctions against customs officers whose
behaviour could be detrimental to the state. Other reforms should establish a
well defined framework of exemptions and rewards to be granted to
deserving customs officials (citations, bonuses, etc.).
Alongside its mainly fiscal and economic role, the customs service
also carries out a number of functions that have been entrusted to it over
time due to its constant presence along the borders and its effective
intervention techniques. Apart from the assistance provided to other
administrative departments in carrying out their missions, the customs
service applies a number of protective measures adopted by legislation with
respect to persons and goods crossing the border. These relate to public
health, public security, public morals, consumer protection, industrial and
commercial property rights and the protection of cultural heritage and
endangered species.
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Private security companies
Many private security companies have been established recently in Benin,
especially over the past ten years, with the inception of a democratic
renewal. Approximately 50 licences have been granted by the ministry of
interior. These companies are not all equal to their task, but they are
supervised by the public security forces. They have however shown proof of
their usefulness and some public institutions use their services.
The private security sector is regulated by provisions governing the
activities of watch and guard companies, as well as private companies in
charge of protecting persons and goods.10 The regulatory text stipulates the
scope of application, the conditions for obtaining a licence, as well as the
terms of recruitment and training. It also organises the supervision of the
sector. In order to carry out watch, guard and protection activities, or to
manage such a company, a person has to be born in Benin or have acquired
Beninese nationality at least five years prior. Individuals who have been
found guilty of immoral or dishonourable acts, or who have violated the
security of persons and their property, or who have been sentenced or even
granted an amnesty are prohibited from carrying out such functions. The
prohibition applies also to persons who have declared bankruptcy or whose
affairs are being administered under court supervision.
The ministry of public security is the supervisory body for this sector.
Since the former needs to be reformed, the question of whether or not to
consolidate private sector regulation must be considered. Another difficulty
is the fact that private companies are responsible for training their recruits:
given the lack of any form of accountability, there is the risk that the budget
allocated to such programmes could be extremely limited, thereby leading to
insufficient training. The new government has expressed its position through
the minister of public security who stated in a meeting with private sector
managers that he intended to put some order in the situation. A new policy
may be expected.
In Benin, anything linked to public security is considered confidential.
It is extremely difficult to gain access to documents and since information is
not available, businesses, organisations and individuals find it difficult to
have their rights respected. What is even more difficult is to have an overall
vision of public security as defined by the executive and ensure that the
legislative power and civil society accept this approach.
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Security sector management and oversight
The national assembly
The principal prerogatives of the national assembly include passing laws,
approving and amending the financial law and adopting the general state
budget. As a result, the assembly has several opportunities to exercise
control over the security sector. Where the general state budget is concerned,
parliament in Benin may revise the amounts allocated to the sector upward
or downward. It may also reallocate budget shares to sectors that it considers
to be of priority. It may, as appropriate, decide on the total amount to be
allocated to the security sector.
The assembly may also exercise its control on draft bills submitted
that apply to the security sector. It also has other powers in the area of
security, in particular with respect to adopting laws ratifying agreements
related to international alliances and assistance in case of attack. Finally, any
intervention by the armed forces outside the national territory requires the
approval of the national assembly.
The national assembly is endowed with considerable powers. In
wartime, it may mobilise forces to defend the national territory. Similarly, it
must approve any new alliance or military cooperation agreement. The
national assembly’s national defence committee specifically deals with all
matters related to the national security system.
Parliamentary standing committees
The national assembly has a standing committee on security matters to
which draft bills from the government are submitted and which can also
propose draft bills on security issues. At any time, the assembly may also set
up an ad hoc commission, if it becomes necessary to carry out a
parliamentary enquiry in the security sector. In certain cases, such enquiries
may lead to oral questions directly addressed to the executive authorities in
charge of managing the sector. In others, the case may be brought before the
constitutional court. Most often, the aim is to invalidate certain decrees
passed by the executive power.
In Benin, parliamentary oversight of the security sector is no different
from other forms of control. The enquiries rarely ever produce concrete
results and the oral questions often only lead to recommendations that are
not binding on the executive branch. There is therefore a need to educate
assembly members on the importance of parliamentary oversight in this area.
Moreover, it is important to inform civil society better, in both urban centres
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and in villages. This is why it is necessary to organise seminars in Benin
with reports on the experience of other countries, rather than sending
officials to take part in international meetings without providing feedback
when they return. Such seminars provide an opportunity to exchange views
with parliamentarians from other regions and countries and compare
experiences.
The role of the judiciary
The Constitutional Court is the main guardian of fundamental rights and
public freedoms. It is the regulatory body that governs the functions and
activities of public authorities. It is worth noting that this very strategic
institution within the Beninese democratic system has issued a number of
opinions concerning the functioning of some of the organs that make up the
national security system. Although it has competence to control all decisions
and actions by the authorities, the constitutional court restricts itself mainly
to the security agencies. Nevertheless, on many occasions, it has ruled on the
constitutional invalidity of laws passed by parliamentarians and also
government decrees, thus protecting citizens’ rights. Other rulings handed
down have involved cases of mistreatment perpetrated by the police and
gendarmerie.
The police are also subject to various forms of judicial control by the
administrative, civil and criminal courts. The administrative judge has
competence to hear requests for damages resulting from police interventions
and cases related to the misuse of power, for which it is possible to have the
illegally imposed measure overturned. The rulings are generally very
satisfactory when it comes to settlements; however they are rather
ineffective when they concern temporary measures (for example, prohibiting
a meeting).11 The civil courts also have general competence to hear cases of
personal fault or, where personal liability is involved, for acts of violence
committed by a police officer. Finally, criminal courts are the competent
body for complaints about arbitrary acts and acts of aggression carried out
by the police (assault, verbal violence, murder, etc.).12 Informal means of oversight
Some local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in
Benin are working with the authorities to study the functioning of the
national security system. These bodies very quickly recognised the strategic
importance of this area for the democratic process underway in Africa. They
also realised that a harmoniously functioning security sector is of vital
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importance in the life of a nation. For this reason, when there is no
mechanism that allows citizens to carry out any form of oversight over the
smooth running and effectiveness of the sector, it becomes necessary to
encourage the participation of the various components of civil society. In
this way, this powerful instrument, which could easily become destructive
and be used to undermine democracy, is not left in the hands of just one
authority or institution. For example, Amnesty International’s annual reports
on human rights, which review the way in which the security sector
functions in each country, are very useful. They expose human rights
violations carried out by the various security forces and on this basis, they
draw conclusions about the strengths, weakness and dysfunctions in the
country involved.
Oversight of the national security sector by NGOs also takes the form
of training seminars, organised for the benefit of various components of the
system. In addition, press releases condemning abuse and misconduct by
different security organs are a way of drawing the attention of the national
community and the sector itself. For example, the Research Group on the
Democratic, Economic and Social Development of Africa set up an
independent commission of enquiry to investigate the role played by the
different parties involved in the tragic events of 18 August 2004 in PortoNovo. In this case, government efforts to restructure the oil industry had led
to riots, which resulted in the loss of human lives. The enquiry highlighted
the weakness of the regulatory framework governing the oil sector, as well
as some shortcomings in its application. It also demonstrated the socioeconomic inadequacies of the sector. The results of the investigation were
published and submitted to the authorities to serve as a guide for any future
initiatives.
In addition, civil society can count on the support of sub-regional
institutions in its security initiatives. Thus, as part of the small arms control
mechanism, the United Nations launched a five year programme for
coordination and assistance for security and development. The objective of
the programme is to provide technical assistance to ECOWAS in the efforts
to establish a climate of peace and stability in the sub-region, through the
national small arms and light weapons anti-proliferation commissions. With
the exception of Liberia, all ECOWAS member states have established their
national commissions. Benin’s national commission was set up on 14
February 2003. Various coalitions are actively mobilising the population to
implement the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture
of Light Weapons, signed by ECOWAS Heads of State and government on
31 October 1998 for a three-year renewable period.
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Théodore C. Loko
On the whole, the issue of SSR remains a matter of debate among
experts. The police force is not very proactive; it remains reactive. Citizens
and civil society only show interest in reform in times of crisis. Since the
press and the general population often do no more than comment on events,
judicial control becomes a luxury.
Civil society could contribute more to educating individuals about
security, because very few people are aware of their rights. Various
components of civil society, the media, as well as national and international
NGOs do exercise some form of oversight over the security sector in their
own way. However, it is true that the debate focuses only on the credibility
of civil society itself.
Oversight by the media is limited to publishing articles, accounts and
reports or investigations. Some press organs and groups also organise
debates focusing on the failures, dysfunctions and shortcomings of the
national security system and on its internal crises. Both the oral and written
press report on events that involve state security, as well as the security of
persons and goods, which makes it possible to draw the attention of the
population to the various inadequacies of the national security system. The
different ministries claim to want to enhance their dialogue with the press,
either as a simple communication strategy, or with the aim of enhancing
transparency.
Challenges of security sector governance
The challenges facing francophone African countries with respect to
improving their security sector governance are related to the challenges
facing African countries in general. This is the phenomenon of a continuum
of conflict that threatens the state itself. The objective of ensuring state
security must go hand-in-hand with a reform that emphasises human
security. Within this context, the challenges are polymorphous and the
solutions may come from different directions: the United Nations system,13
development partners,14 regional organisations15 and the countries
themselves.
That being the case, the vision of making Benin a country of freedom
and security is clear and unambiguous. The requirements to be met are as
follows:

Make security a priority by means of a development policy that is
applied in an environment of peace and tranquillity;
Benin




33
Put in place adequate security conditions that will reassure and attract
investors;
Enable the population and agents of development to focus on creating
wealth in a secure environment;
Promote the values of civism and citizenship among the police forces
and the population as a whole;
Promote human security within the national security framework as a
means of protecting lives, the country's heritage and the
environment.16
For now, this vision appears to be a vain wish, given the numerous
and varied obstacles, which relate among others, to the regional
environment, inadequate knowledge of the threats, the need for capacity
building and the lack of coordination among the various stakeholders.
New management and role of police forces
As far as SSR is concerned, the principle of mutability is extremely
important. It has made it possible to envisage a new concept for the
management and the role of the police force; a master plan for the
development of police personnel starting from 2009 and the possibility of
organising joint operations. The following are the main principles guiding
the national security policy:







To define a strategic plan based on an assessment of the geopolitical
environment;
To rationalise objectives, action, methods and resource deployment
and accompany these with guarantees of ethics and proper conduct;
To improve exchanges and synergies;
To do away with overlaps and duplication of activities;
To take account of the territorial breakdown of the different
government services;
To optimise management of staff and resources;
To set up joint, or at least convergent, training programmes.
To meet these objectives, the director general of police who, under the
authority of the minister of interior, represents the police with regard to the
nation, institutions of the republic and also abroad, will become more of a
corporate leader than a simple day-to-day manager. Thus, as an enlightened
visionary, he will choose to steer the activities of the police towards
34
Théodore C. Loko
preventing crime and seeking longstanding and fruitful collaboration in all
social sectors where the police have a role to play.
New staff structure in the national police force starting from 2009
At the time of writing, the staff of the national police force (headquarters,
technical departments, central services and specialised units, i.e. CRS, BAC,
RAID and BPLP) numbered 2,143, comprising 197 police commissioners,
209 inspectors, 406 officers and 1,349 sergeants and policemen.
With large numbers retiring and a few deaths, these numbers will be
reduced drastically if nothing is done urgently. Starting from 2009, steps will
gradually be taken to correct the security coverage ratio, bearing in mind
government resources available, the cost of training and the inherent cost
and charges involved for any new recruitment. According to forecasts there
will be between 500 and 1,000 new police personnel recruited in 2008 and
between 750 and 1,000 in 2009, before the rate stabilises at around 500 per
year for the period from 2010 to 2018.17
Moreover, as a result of the rising problem of armed robberies in
Cotonou, the government will recruit 1,000 new gendarmes to strengthen the
ranks of the public security forces and enable them to curb the crime wave
that is spreading throughout the country.18 It is essential that these steps are
implemented to ensure that levels of public security are maintained.
Organising joint operations
There is a real problem of lack of coordination among the different
government bodies in the area of defence and security. The three forces,
namely, the police (urban security), gendarmerie (rural and suburban
security) and the army (territorial defence) have never learned to work
together. From time to time, when it becomes necessary, they are compelled
to do so, without any prior preparation. When the intervention takes place in
town, the police should play the leading role, with possible support from the
gendarmerie and in some extreme cases, from the army. However, because
the army is larger and has better equipment, it is likely to play the leading
role, although it is not necessarily well prepared for this type of activity.
In addition, the difficult relations among the three forces do not
facilitate joint operations, especially because stereotypes abound: the
military feel that they have operational superiority, while the police feel that
they are intellectually superior. The military also considers that police agents
are generally corrupt.
Benin
35
For several years now, senior Beninese military officials have been
considering the issue and have come up with some answers that, for the
moment, have not gone beyond the drafting stage. A joint operation carried
out on 18 December 2008 with the support of the public and in particular the
help of zémidjan motorbike-taxis to capture the perpetrators of a hold-up at
Continental Bank in Cocotomey demonstrated that such an exercise is
feasible: five criminals and two fraudsters were arrested and roughly twentyone million francs were seized.
Clearly, there is a need for such collaboration. To demonstrate its
usefulness, a scenario was drafted based on two recent hold-ups (the most
bloody ever recorded) that took place right in the centre of the Dantokpa
international market in Cotonou, to enable elements of the Benin armed
forces and their colleagues from the public security forces to carry out an
exercise in a hotel in Cotonou. The army chief of staff and the director
general of police, together with the minister of state in charge of national
defence and several other officers of the Beninese armed forces and public
security forces, monitored an intervention carried out jointly by components
of the naval forces, the air force, the army, the gendarmerie and the national
police force.19 Speaking on condition of anonymity, an officer in charge of
one of the units engaged in an exercise supervised by Belgian, American and
Dutch armed forces confided: ‘Our security apparatus has often been
unsuccessful in dealing with these criminals because there was not such
coordination between the armed forces and the public security forces.’ For
the minister of state in charge of national defence, this type of exercise
enables the government to prepare its forces to improve their response when
faced with serious crime.
Public finance and external aid
The principle is the following: expenditure for security relates to sovereign
expenditure, which makes it quite clear that the only party that is prepared to
invest totally in the security of the people of Benin is the state itself. It is the
sovereign duty of a government to guarantee state survival, as well as peace
and tranquillity. For this reason, a government must be prepared to bear the
financial cost of the operation.20
The country can however count on the support of its partners to
transfer technology and new methods. One example that can be cited is the
cooperation between Benin and France in the area of consolidating internal
security in Benin. The main aim of the project is to effectively curb all forms
of crime by equipping the security forces (gendarmerie, national police force
36
Théodore C. Loko
and customs) with a modern, high-performance IT tool that satisfies the
requirement of protecting personal data. The project covers three phases:



Training personnel on the use of the computerised tool and operating
the network, as well as on the use of new procedures that take into
account the ethical dimensions of the use of electronically stored
personal data;
Establishment of a common database for the three forces, based on a
network of about forty computer terminals deployed throughout the
national territory, which will make it possible to draft reliable crime
statistics and serve as a valuable decision-making tool;
Putting in place the required legislative and regulatory framework.
Public security and decentralisation In Benin, the effect of the decentralisation policy has been to transfer certain
competences and the related resources to the local authorities. The transfer
of power to local elected officials has enabled democracy to advance.
Citizens’ expectations are expressed better than in the past, but practical
solutions to the long-standing problems inherent to local development are
still being delayed.
In the area of public security, the objective is to have a police force
that is close to the population and its expectations and which works in an
integrated manner, that is, as a complement to the society. The municipal
police should draw lessons from the experience of the people’s militia during
the revolutionary period in the People’s Republic of Benin. With the support
of neighbourhood and village chiefs, these militias were real guardians and
monitored all movements both during the day and at night, for the greater
interest of the people. Many people can bear witness to this. In this area, it
would be worthwhile trying to better understand the positive (as well as the
negative) impacts of informal security actors.
By decree n° 2009-027 of 4 February 2009, defining the modalities
governing the exercise of powers of administrative police by the mayor in
communes with a specific status, the government authorised the
establishment of a police service called the municipal police service, under
the authority of the mayor, in these three communes (Cotonou and PortoNovo in the south and Parakou in the north). These communes are part of a
wider transfer of competences to the communal level.
The adoption of this decree consolidates implementation of the
provisions of article 76 of law n° 97-029 of 15 January 1999, organising the
communes of the Republic of Benin, which stipulate that ‘the mayor shall
Benin
37
have responsibility for the administrative police in the commune’. Thanks to
this initiative, a municipal police pilot programme could be launched in the
seventy-seven communes of Benin.
Since the municipal police are under the authority of the mayor, some
people already fear a possible conflict of competences between the national
police force and the municipal police service. Since the municipal police is
also in charge of ensuring order, peace and security, its boundaries must be
clearly defined and it should be endowed with adequate means. Every effort
must also be undertaken to avoid recruiting policemen from among the
‘strong arms’ of the mayor’s political party, which would run the risk of the
security forces being misused.
Organising the private sector
Decision n° 101/MISAT/DC/DGPN/DSP/SA of 5 August 1997 regulates the
activities of private agencies that provide watch, guard and individual
protection services. The companies covered by this regulation are those that
provide individuals or legal entities with all forms of protective services for
moveable or immoveable goods, as well as for persons, on a permanent,
exceptional, or sporadic basis. Major factories and other bodies that
personally employ more than six guards are also subject to the terms of this
regulation to the extent that they are allowed to have their own internal
security service under the same conditions as specialised companies. Apart
from the abovementioned activities, the specialised companies are prohibited
from supplying any other services that are not related to security. They are
also prohibited from monitoring the expression of political, religious, or
trade union views, as well as from interfering in a labour dispute or any other
related events.
To be able to carry out guard and watch activities, private agencies
have to first obtain an accreditation from the minister in charge of security.
Management and staff who wish to carry out such activities must also fulfil
certain conditions. The license granted to the company may be suspended or
withdrawn in the following cases:


Infringement of any of the provisions of the regulation;
Trial and sentencing of the managers.
Only those employees in charge of watch and guard activities are
obliged to wear uniforms and insignia that should in no way resemble those
of the security forces or the armed forces. On the other hand, employees in
charge of protecting individuals are not authorised to wear a uniform. The
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Théodore C. Loko
characteristics of these uniforms are decided by the ministry of interior and
are the same for all guard and watch companies. Nevertheless, the use of
army combat uniforms, also called fatigues, and the green army beret is
prohibited; as are any insignia that may resemble those of the police and
armed forces in any way.
Agents in charge of watch and guard missions may carry sophisticated
weapons, as long as they are concealed and subject to the conditions
stipulated under decree n° 61/39 PR/MI/AM of 7 February 1961 governing
weapons, ammunition and explosives for civilian use in the Republic of
Benin. On the other hand, agents in charge of protecting individuals may not
carry weapons. The use of sophisticated weapons, as well as any cutting or
sharp instrument or suffocating gas or smoke bombs is not authorised except
in legal situations of self defence.
The major problem to be resolved is that of the quality of personnel
recruited, in particular with regard to their moral standing, as well as the
reorganisation of the profession, especially the wages paid. This is a very
sensitive sector although the administration is slow in understanding this. If
the right care is not taken, there is a risk that this could quickly become a
breeding ground for criminals, in particular within the current context of
widespread insecurity.
Conclusion
There are two dimensions for action: the first is within the framework of
domestic policy, and the second is within the framework of the interaction
between national and international policy. In establishing priorities there are
several possible options. The government of Benin intends to set up a
programme to reorganise the security sector. This includes a number of
urgent measures with regard to passing the appropriate laws and adopting
specific regulations, as well as major reforms related to the creation of a
municipal police service. Nevertheless, this reorganisation will not change
much on the ground if it is not preceded by a number of sub-regional and
international measures, which take into account the sub-regional context and
its related problems. Such measures should bear on the effective interaction
between national and international security policy, as well as how the
ECOWAS early warning system can be applied to the area of SSR.
Benin
39
Reorganising the security sector in terms of domestic policy
The government programme provides for several types of action: raising
awareness with local elected officers and the population21 in order to
encourage them to participate in security sector management; organising
sporadic patrols, crackdowns and dismantling of mafia-type networks;
updating major text and statutes, as well as the gradual overhaul of security
material and equipment; creating adequate security infrastructure
(construction, rehabilitation and equipping of police stations, constructing
and equipping army barracks) and increasing the number of security
personnel.
Reorganising the security sector will need to be carried out in several
stages:22



Defining a strategic plan based on an assessment of the geopolitical
environment;
Rationalising objectives, action, method and resource deployment,
without neglecting to accompany these with guarantees of ethics and
proper conduct;
Bringing the various stakeholders to work together and improving
exchange of information and synergies, do away with overlaps and
duplication, taking into account the territorial coverage of the various
government departments, improving personnel and resources
management and set up joint or at least convergent training
programmes.
Parliament and measures to be taken urgently
The adoption of a number of draft bills and regulations is still pending before
Parliament:




The law establishing the status of national police force personnel;
The security orientation and programming law;
The decree establishing a code of ethics and conduct for the police;
Various other purely administrative decrees relating in particular to
careers, housing, incentive and motivation allowances, as well as
bonuses for working in difficult conditions, etc.
40
Théodore C. Loko
Civil society
The effort to raise awareness with civil society must be sustained, both in
urban centres and in villages. In this vein, it would be useful to organise
seminars in Benin itself with reports about experience from other countries.
Such activities could also be supplemented with an exchange of views with
parliamentarians from other countries and regions in order to compare their
experience in this area.
Interaction between national policy and international policy
This depends on three factors: the design of an overall security system that
includes the participation of all stakeholders in development; immediate
reactivation of the frameworks for cooperation with Nigeria (see below);
reactivation of existing channels and application of the ECOWAS early
warning system to control major crime and transborder organised crime.
Designing an overall security system that includes the participation of all
development partners
Benin has initiated cooperation on security matters with several development
partners. Increasingly these partners work as a network and often carry out
joint operations in the field. It would be appropriate therefore to suggest a
joint strategic forum focusing on essential security issues in order to rapidly
identify the adequate solutions. Such networking should facilitate on the one
hand the functioning of the automatic identification system for the naval
forces (the result of cooperation with the United States) and on the other, the
activities of the national maritime protection, security and safety council
whose role is not very well known.
Immediate reactivation of the frameworks for cooperation with Nigeria
These frameworks for cooperation involve joint patrols on land and sea and
require the participation of the intelligence services of both countries. Given
the nature of transborder problems to be resolved, Nigeria is an important
partner. There are several instruments governing this type of partnership:

The 13 February 2007 Benin-Ghana-Nigeria-Togo memorandum of
understanding on a co-prosperity alliance zone;
Benin



41
The memorandum of understanding between the Republic of Benin
and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on transborder matters, dated 14
August 2003;
The extradition treaty between the Republic of Benin, the Republic of
Ghana, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Togolese Republic,
dated 10 December 1984;
The treaty on transborder cooperation between the government of
Benin and the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which
has been initialled but not signed.
Applying the ECOWAS early warning system to controlling major crimes
and transborder organised crime
The ECOWAS early warning and rapid response system for conflict
prevention was born out of the desire of heads of state and government who
signed the 1999 Protocol on a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in the sub region.
Its aim is to facilitate the identification of the underlying causes of instability
in the region. As part of this observation system the 15 ECOWAS member
states have been divided into four zones that are coordinated from Banjul
(The Gambia), Cotonou (Benin), Monrovia (Liberia) and Ouagadougou
(Burkina Faso), with the observation and control centre being located in the
ECOWAS Secretariat at Abuja.
The observation system began its operations in 2001 with funds from
the European Union. Since that date it has collected and analysed
information and data on security in the region. Discussions are currently
underway to improve its logistic capacity through a U.S. proposal to
establish a military planning secretariat within the ECOWAS Secretariat, in
addition to two logistics bases. The aim of the latter, of which one would be
situated in a coastal country and the other in a country in the hinterland,
would be to reduce the reaction time necessary for deploying ECOMOG
(Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) troops in
times of crisis.
Armed robberies are also a serious cause of instability. It is therefore
urgently necessary to ensure that the system is capable of controlling such
acts, as well as major crimes. This would enable the police and the army to
be proactive and to work together in partnership.
In conclusion, it is clear that the government of Benin has the
responsibility for prevention in the area of security and crime. Nevertheless,
this is a long-term undertaking and the results depend on a number of
variables relating to the interaction between national and international
42
Théodore C. Loko
policy. It cannot be overstated, however, that SSR should also include the
domestic dimension within the general context of modernising the public
service in Africa, which covers various components, in particular access of
citizens to basic public services and the concept of ethics in citizens’
participation.
In Benin, after the national conference of the vital forces of the nation
in 1990 and the separation between police and the armed forces, the specific
missions assigned to the national police were as follows:

Maintenance of law and order, security and protection of state
institutions;
Ensuring respect for freedoms and protection of goods and persons
throughout the national territory;
The national police directorate was expected to carry out intelligence,
security and public protection missions, in support of the national
defence system.


While the missions assigned to the national police force by the laws
and regulations are being implemented to an extent, there is still a need to
revive the flame of dignity, the duty of loyalty, patriotism and a sense of
self-sacrifice in the supreme interest of the nation in the hearts of police
officers of all ranks. Indeed, overall development will only become a reality
if the population as a whole is mobilised and galvanised by the public
authorities to participate in tasks of general interest. For this purpose, the
role of the administration goes far beyond the domain of public service as it
is understood by civil servants.23 In the area of SSR in Benin, the constant
appeal launched by security forces to the general population is a
demonstration of this fact. Government has also made this a priority.
Notes
1
2
3
4
Ministry of National Defence, Rapport général du Forum géostratégique (Cotonou:
Imprimerie CACI), 34.
Ministry of National Defence, Actes du forum (Cotonou: Imprimerie CACI, February
2003).
Axel Auge, ‘Les réformes du secteur de la sécurité et de la défense en Afrique subsaharienne: Vers une institutionnalisation de la gouvernance du secteur sécuritaire’,
Afrique contemporaine, no. 218 (2006/2): 49-67.
Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Politique et stratégie nationale de sécurité
(Cotonou: Imprimerie CACI, June 2008).
Benin
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
43
On 11th February 2009, a seminar was organised by the national police union
(Synapolice), with the support of the Ministry of Interior and Public Security, to try to
seek a lasting solution to the phenomenon of extortion within the national police force.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) endeavours to raise awareness in the area
of terrorism control and oil trade protection in Africa. Bearing in mind its historic links
with the continent, the United States of America has declared readiness to make their
contribution.
Taken from the interministerial working document entitled ‘Fondements, principes et
objectifs’, La politique de défense du Benin.
Benin’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations started in 1985 and
subsequently decreased as a result of the military’s preference for domestic politics
(revolutionary period). After the national conference, Benin’s resumed its participation in
peacekeeping operations in 1994 as a sign of solidarity with other countries. This
engagement allowed Benin to gain very rich and diverse experience as the armed forces
carried out numerous missions involving almost three thousand soldiers and gendarmes of
all categories, liaison officers, general staff officers, and observers, in more than a dozen
operations on four continents (Europe, Africa, America, and Asia).
See Lettre de mission du directeur général des douanes et des droits indirects.
Décision n° 101/MISAT/DC/DGPN/DSP/SA, on the regulation of surveillance and
protection services by private companies.
Jean Rivero, Droit administratif (Paris: Dalloz, 1996), 396.
Rivero, 397.
See Security Council resolutions and the United Nations Development Programme,
Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
See measures adopted by the OECD and the EU with respect to security sector reform in
countries of the South.
See measures adopted by the Economic Community of West African States with respect
to marking and tracing small arms and light weapons.
Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Politique et stratégie nationales de sécurité,
(June 2008).
Ibid.
Recently, right in the centre of Cotonou, bandits robbed a shop and stole FCFA 2 million.
This operation resulted in two fatalities and dozens of injured.
After the attempted bank robbery in Cotonou, the bandits escaped off the coast of Benin.
The air force located them on the high seas and informed the naval forces that surrounded
the bandits and forced them to head for the beach where their boat ran aground. The
bandits then sought refuge in a hotel but were followed by the national police and
gendarmerie and then by the army.
Recruitment and training costs for police officers are estimated at FCFA 1,908,396 for a
police commissioner, FCFA 1,605,312 for a police officer, and FCFA 793,656 for a
police sergeant.
All the successful police and gendarme operations owe their success to the security
forces’ collaboration with the people. Officials of the public security services highlight
this point whenever the exploits of the security forces receive media coverage. In
addition, people have now developed the habit of calling on the fire service whenever
there is a road accident, which shows that the educational campaigns have been effective.
Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Politique et stratégie nationales de sécurité,
(June 2008), 13.
In 1959, Mamadou Dia declared before the National Assembly of Senegal that
44
Théodore C. Loko
‘development must be total, that is, it must apply to all urban and rural regions of the
country, to all classes of society, to all sectors of the economy, and to all levels of
individual and collective life’.