GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF
ARMED FORCES (DCAF)
POLICY PAPER
IRAQ: SYMPTOM, CATALYST OR CAUSE OF
FRICTION BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA?
István Gyarmati
Geneva, July 2003
GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF
ARMED FORCES (DCAF)
POLICY PAPER
IRAQ: SYMPTOM, CATALYST OR CAUSE OF
FRICTION BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA?
István Gyarmati
Geneva, July 2003
DCAF Policy Papers Series
DCAF Policy Papers include essays designed to contribute to the broader policy debate
on issues which are not necessarily part of the core mission of DCAF, but nevertheless
are of relevance for the political and security environment in which the Centre is
operating. These essays are commissioned by DCAF. The views and opinions expressed
are, however, those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of DCAF.
About the Author
Ambassador István Gyarmati is currently Senior Advisor of the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Chairman of the Board of the Centre for
Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy in Budapest. He has been a Foreign Service officer
since he graduated from the Budapest University of Economics, Faculty of Diplomacy, in
1974. His postings include member of the Hungarian delegation to the MBFR and IAEA
(1981-86, Vienna), to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting (1987-89, Vienna), Head of Delegation to
the CFE, CSBM, Opens Skies Negotiations (1990-92, Vienna), Head of Security Policy
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Budapest, 1992-96); Personal Representative of the
CSCE/OSCE Chairman-in-Office in Georgia (1992-93), Chechnya (1995) and the
Negotiations on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), Chairman of the OSCE Senior
Council (1995), Executive Secretary of the Budapest CSCE Summit (1994); Under-Secretary
of Defense (1996-99), Chairman of the Missile Technology Control Regime (1998-99), Chief
Adviser of the Foreign Minister on Security Policy and Chairman of the OPCW (1999-2000),
Senior Vice President for Policy and Programs of the EastWest Institute. Ambassador
Gyarmati holds a PhD in Political Science and is an expert in Strategic Studies. He is
member of the IISS and Associate Professor at the Zrinyi Miklós National Defense University.
Ambassador Gyarmati is the author of numerous publications on security policy, European
security, conflict management and Hungarian defence policy.
IRAQ: SYMPTOM, CATALYST OR CAUSE OF
FRICTION BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA?1
István Gyarmati
Europe and America have rarely been split as deeply as they are these days. France
de facto vetoed a resolution in the United Nations Security Council which was
presented by its closest allies. French fries were renamed “Freedom fries”. Millions of
people have demonstrated against “American imperialism” on the streets of Europe.
Gerhard Schroeder won the election on riding the wave of anti-war and antiAmerican sentiments. The United Nations, the North-Atlantic Alliance and the
European Union are split along lines that were previously unheard of. Interestingly,
the split also perpetrated through all the parties in Europe, left and right alike. The
pro-war coalition, as well as the anti-war group, is composed of political parties of all
orientations.
What do we see? Is it a conflict over Iraq? After loosing several battles, have Osama
bin Laden and Saddam Hussein finally won the war by inflicting a fatal wound to the
“West”? Is the United Nations out of business? Is NATO is the same situation? What
about the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and
Defence Cooperation? Have they died before even being born? Why did all of this
happen and why now?
The author is convinced that the crisis in this transatlantic relationship was
unavoidable. The major glue of the relationship, i.e. the Soviet/Communist threat, has
been gone for quite some time. Furthermore, although the foundation of commonly
shared values remains, whether these shared values are sufficient to maintain this
privileged relationship or whether Europe will simply become one of America’s allies,
friends and competitors like Japan, Australia and others, still needs to be
investigated, analyzed and discussed.
1
Europe and America are imperfect short-hand terms for two groups of states, or schools of thought.
Europe, which for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, means the “old Europe”, consists of part of continental
Western Europe that is led by France and, to some extent, also by Germany; America stands for a
group of states, led by the US, and includes many Western European countries and most of the former
Communist states. Russia is a hesitant, undecided, unsure and still insecure, non-crucial player.
1
The answer to this question lies in discovering the reasons, including those
concerning Iraq, as to why transatlantic relations have collapsed and why the fabric
of international law, international institutions and alliances is in such a deep crisis.
Transatlantic relations had a firm foundation in the second half of the 20th Century,
and one must not forget that what we term “transatlantic relations” only emerged after
World War II. This foundation was based upon the commonly shared values of these
democracies on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. However, above and beyond this
the most vital security interests, concerning matters of life and death, also linked
Western Europe and North America together. The Soviet Union threatened the West
and especially Europe militarily and endangered the very existence of its states.
Moreover, Communism challenged the common values and threatened the very
existence of the socio-economic order of these countries.
Transatlantic relations, mainly as expressed in the NATO Alliance, reflected the fact
and the recognition that Europe acting alone was unable to defend itself against the
Soviet threat. Thus, the relations with the main guarantor of security, i.e. the United
States, were the most important element of European policy. However, the reliance
was mutual. Although the United States has always been more powerful than the rest
of the Alliance together, even the United States was not able to carry out its most
important military-security objective, being the defence of Western Europe without
Europe. This mutual interdependence was the strongest guarantee that transatlantic
relations, and thus also NATO, were unquestionable. Therefore, even though serious
disagreements between the United States and Europe emerged from time to time,
they were bound to be resolved from the moment they emerged, and the solution
always occurred under American leadership, which remained unquestioned until the
end of the 20th Century.
All of this is now history. There is no longer a Soviet Union, no Soviet threat, no Red
Army, and no Communism in Europe, however, there is also no general acceptance
of American leadership and no mutual interdependence of the most vital security
interests of the United States and Europe (or at least no obvious one which would be
recognized and perceived as such by both the United States and Europe). The
mission continues to define the coalition as we were reminded in such a blunt
manner just a few months ago by US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Therefore, the
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real question is, what has changed in the world which, after the disappearance of the
Soviet/Communist threat, would justify a new coalition called NATO.
The Collapse of the Westphalian World Order
Back in 1648, the Thirty Years War ended with a peace treaty, which was concluded
in the German city of Westphalia. The treaty proved to be much more than a simple
peace treaty. Its terms defined a new world order, and one which has been the basis
of international politics for the last three and a half centuries. Before the Treaty of
Westphalia, Europe, which in essence, at that time also meant the world, was built
upon a large number of entities. Some of these were states, but most of the entities
were parcels of land that were ruled by a count, a bishop, etc., who all held different
and distinct jurisdictions over their land and its inhabitants, and who had the right to
collect taxes, set up armies, fight wars, etc.
The Westphalian world order created the rule that only states i.e. nation states had
the right to use large scale organized force i.e. armies and thus they became the sole
building blocks of the international order. States happened to be nation-states, and
contrary to popular belief, in no way did this mean that they were homogenous, being
inhabited by one nation and one nation alone, despite being built around one nation.
The dominant populations of these states were Germans, French, Hungarians, and
Poles. Their language was the official language, their culture was the culture of the
state and their religion was the state religion. Other ethnicities who spoke different
languages, had different cultures and sometimes also different religions, lived on the
territory of these states and were also seen and dealt with as its citizens. In
particular, after democratization got underway with the French Revolution, citizens
became the foundation of the state, slowly replacing the role of ethnicity in a growing
number of them. However, ethnicity did not disappear; rather it remained an
important factor and one over which wars have been fought. Attempts were made to
create mono-ethnic states, but fortunately most of these attempts failed. Some large
multi-national empires, like the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, fell at the end of World
War I, while other multi-ethnic states such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, lasted
no longer than until the end of the century. Yet, overall the nation-state largely
prevailed until the middle of the 20th Century and only started to give way in the
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western part of Europe after World War II, when multi-ethnicity and multi-cultural
entities became of real value in democracies.
In this world order, states were the only recognized players in international politics
and although other players, churches, etc. were also present, they didn’t play a
significant role and were not recognized as partners of states nor did they have the
means to influence world politics in such a way and to the extent that states did. As a
result, everything was built upon states, including international law and international
institutions.
As we near the end of the 20th Century, this situation has begun to change. Non-state
actors have appeared on the political scene and have started to exert some influence
on the world. Above all, multinational companies, influential non-governmental
organizations and the press have started to influence the world in a manner in which
only states had done so previously. This influence, however, has not been disruptive
nor has it occurred outside the established world order. Whilst in many cases the
influence of these non-state actors on the world has rivalled that of states, for the
most part they behaved within the existing system and have generally observed the
law and all of the rules of the game.
At the end of the 1980s, however, as some states started to disintegrate, other nonstate actors appeared. Some national minorities started to behave as if they were
states and tried to establish themselves as states. This first occurred in Nagorno
Karabakh, then in many other places, including the former Yugoslavia. In many
cases, this led to bloody conflicts which the international community was, to a large
extent, unable to handle because all of the instruments at their disposal were geared
towards dealing with states and also because of the lack of a consensus on how to
handle these cases brought about by the conflicting interests of different regional and
global powers. It was thought that the only way to cope with these problems was to
handle these entities as if they were states, thus trying to force them to remain within
the system and play by the rules. This attempt produced the result that the entities
themselves started to behave as if they were states, and these problems have
remained ever since. International law and international institutions have been unable
to deal with them, and the best that could be done was to stop the bloodshed and
freeze the situation. These new entities themselves had a mixed attitude, they
4
wanted to become states, wanted to be recognized as states and therefore, partly in
response to the fact that the International Community treated them as if they were
states, they started to behave like states. The entities began to observe some of the
rules of international law, but unless they were actually able to achieve
independence, they would never fully make the transition.
At the same time, the disintegration of some states, the lack of strong state
institutions, failed states or the emergence of states that had never existed previously
and therefore lacked all institutions, are indispensable in making a state function.
They protracted though frozen conflicts and the short-sided approach of the
international community had then created the ideal circumstances for the emergence
of a new quality of international organized crime. A form of organized crime, which
according to many experts, became the second or third largest “industry” in the world
by the end of the 20th Century.
The lack of “law and order” and the high demand created by the conflicts, combined
with the insecurity of the people in these areas, gave organized crime a new
dimension, as the demand for weapons multiplied and diversified. The new “markets”
sought varied forms of weaponry: small weapons, mines, but also more sophisticated
and larger weapons and other equipment. Illegal weapons became the most
profitable trade, being comparatively easy and also relatively safe. In many cases,
states and/or state institutions themselves played an important role as a source of
information, but also as a source of weapons, customers or traders themselves.
The fall of the strongly controlled Communist states not only loosened the grip of the
police, which unfortunately also occurred in areas where it was undesirable, but also
created a new market for drugs as well as new routes for drug trafficking through the
former Communist countries. The weapons trade and drug trafficking became
strongly connected and produced enormous profits which, in turn, made the criminals
involved even more ruthless and greedy. High levels of unemployment and low
incomes also produced a new “industry", i.e. the trafficking of human beings, cheap
labour and prostitutes from the poor countries to the rich.
As a result, organized crime became extremely powerful; in fact it became more
powerful than ever before, encroaching on the institutions of many weak states, and
5
in some cases basically taking them over. It also attempted to intrude on the relevant
institutions of the western states, and the extent of its success remains unknown.
Organised crime created a new danger, a new threat to the international order posed
by a new non-state actor, which did not and never intended to integrate and play by
the rules of the Westphalian state order.
Then came September 11th 2001, and the magnitude of the change that it brought to
the world has still not yet been fully recognised. The devastating terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon destroyed buildings and thousands of
people, but also destroyed the world order that existed prior to the events of
September 11th – or rather made it visible that the state order no longer existed. The
attacks made it clear that something had dramatically changed in the world, that new
players had appeared on the scene who did not and would not play by the rules.
Their aspirations were not integrated into the system and thus they fail to be
recognized as equal partners, so they have set out to destroy the very system itself.
A new kind of terrorism had occurred: global terrorism; which is global in its reach, in
its goals, in its means2 and has no constraints whatsoever regarding the destruction
and casualties its strikes can cause.
This new terrorism is very different from terrorism as we used to know it in Europe
and elsewhere. “Traditional” terrorists, like the RAF, the IRA and others have
concrete, limited objectives: they want to achieve a regime change, they want their
independence, i.e. they want to fight against the independence of somebody else,
etc. Global terrorism is global; the objective of ‘global terrorists’ is nothing less than
the destruction of our societies, our way of life and our democracy, and they do this
in the name of Islam, which they have essentially hijacked to use for their own
purposes.
Global terrorism does not fit into the Westphalian world order. It is a non-state actor
that has no intention of playing by the rules. Not only do ‘global terrorists’ violate the
rules, but they want to destroy the rules and everything related to them. They are
2
The world has, as yet, been unable yet to define terrorism. Although we generally think that defining
terrorism is actually quite easy: i.e. anybody who uses indiscriminate force against civilians to achieve
certain political objectives is a terrorist. This definition has both pluses and minuses. It’s major plus is
that it is simple, easy and does not allow the categorization that a terrorist is a freedom fighter. Its major
minus is similar: it does not allow the categorization that a terrorist is a freedom fighter.
6
much worse than “simple” criminals. Criminals do not have a desire to destroy the
state and the world order; they just do not want to obey them. Criminals do not want
to be seen, they will do everything they can to be invisible. On the contrary, terrorists
need that visibility. That’s why they do what they do to achieve maximum visibility.
Sometimes simple criminals do obey the rules because they don’t want to die. On the
other hand, terrorists are not afraid of death; they view it as martyrdom and are
honoured to die in action. In fact, most terrorists actually plan to die in carrying out
their horrible plans.
The final nail in the coffin of the Westphalian world order was the threat that terrorists
have obtained, or have come close to obtaining weapons of mass destruction.
Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists pose a threat that has been
unknown to humankind until now. Weapons of mass destruction were not created to
be used. They have always been weapons of deterrence, although they were used
once, at the end of World War II, when people were not aware of their destructive
power, nor were they aware of they had unleashed. However, from then on a
threshold for the use of these weapons was created, and one which has never been
crossed, not by the Communists nor even by the worst dictators.
There is a very simple reason for this. Until now, weapons of mass destruction were
only owned by states. States who behave more or less rationally, and who fear
destruction are vulnerable and therefore are subject to this deterrence. Deterrence
only works for those players who do not want to be destroyed and do not want to die.
The only prerequisite is that both or all sides possess an equal, or similar, capability
to impose such destruction which is unacceptable to the other because it would
threaten its very existence and the lives of its leaders. It sounds mad and indeed it is
MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction, but it works.
Unfortunately, this does not work with mad players, mad in the sense of not behaving
rationally, of not being afraid of death, and not having state structures that can be
threatened by retaliation. Deterrence does not work with terrorists. International law
does not work with terrorists. International institutions do not work with terrorists.
Terrorists only understand the language of force in the short-run. They can only be
stopped if their resources dry out, and in the long-run they can only be stopped if
they are unable to mobilize the masses behind them and do not receive support from
7
any one country. It is only a combination of sheer force, police work, intelligence,
financial tools and long-term nation and state building that can lead to an acceptable
result, i.e. the cessation of this kind of terrorism.
The danger that terrorists may obtain weapons of mass destruction also raises the
question of how to deal with this threat. The use of these weapons will have such dire
consequences that the world cannot afford to wait until these weapons are used and
then retaliate. The use of weapons of mass destruction must be prevented
completely. Prevention can only be effective in two ways: through deterrence or preemption. As we have seen, deterrence doesn’t work with terrorists. Accordingly, we
must accept that in some cases pre-emptive action will be unavoidable.
This is not a very comforting thought. The fact that we live in an era when the whole
world order is changing does not give us much consolation. The fact that we can see
that international law, in some cases, cannot serve as the foundation of our policies
is horrifying. The fact that our institutions do not work is terrifying. But then the fact
that we have to face the use of weapons of mass destruction which can cause the
death of hundreds of thousands or even millions of human beings and that terrorists
may succeed in disrupting our everyday life is beyond our comprehension. Yet, we
have to face it if we want to avoid it occurring.
Our first line of defence is prevention; meaning preventing terrorists from obtaining
these weapons. This means that all those who possess these weapons and/or the
capability to produce them, must introduce and vigorously implement control
mechanisms. This is extremely difficult. States do not like to control their own
production. They always fear, and in many cases rightly so, that others will use it to
take their place in the fierce competition. Free trade doesn’t usually tolerate such
measures: they will, if strictly implemented, pose some problems in world trade.
Enforcement is extremely difficult, especially when some states only do it halfheartedly, or when others do not have the internal capability to enforce such
measures. Export controls require a new level of international cooperation between
export control authorities, but in this case also of intelligence agencies, police and
others. This is also extremely difficult. Modern weapons of mass destruction in the
initial phases of production (which might mean right up to the very last phase) cannot
be distinguished from other harmless instruments or substances. Export controls and
8
restrictions are seen by many countries, and especially those of the less developed
world, as a means to keep them less developed and exposed to the will of the rich –
and in some cases that is also true. Some countries do not abide by export control
rules; they make it their most profitable business to trade dangerous instruments and
substances. Finally, in many cases production can be, and in fact is, indigenous and
thus not sensitive to export controls.
It is obvious therefore that export controls are extremely important, but export
controls alone will not bring about the solution, given that they are only a part, albeit a
very important part, of the solution. Nevertheless, strenuous efforts are needed to
improve the existing export control and verification regimes and, where necessary, to
create new ones. Arguments that such regimes are not waterproof, as suggested in
relation to the verification protocol of the biological weapons convention, do not hold
because they can help to significantly reduce the scope of the danger and can also
help gather information which can reveal if violations do occur. It is also true,
however, that such treaties and regimes cannot be seen as solving the problem on
their own.
Deterrence, and not only by military means, is still very important. While it is true that
terrorists cannot be deterred, it is also true that terrorists cannot operate in a vacuum.
They need territory to plan and operate. They need financial institutions to provide
them with the necessary resources. This means that they always have to use the
territory of a state, or states and institutions, which can be controlled by the states
themselves. These states can be deterred, or discouraged if you will, from rendering
assistance or tolerating such activities, and they should be. Deterrence either by
sanctions, political, diplomatic, economic means and, ultimately, the threat of force or
the use of force against these states remains in the toolbox of the fight against
terrorists.
When the ultimate situation does arrive, i.e. once the terrorists have obtained
weapons of mass destruction or are extremely close to doing so and in addition there
is no doubt of the terrorist’s intention to use them if given the chance, the decisive
and pre-emptive use of military force is unavoidable. This is an act of self-defence –
maybe not according to the letter, but most definitely in the spirit of the Charter of the
United Nations. Self-defence against a ruthless enemy, under hitherto unknown
9
circumstances, let alone at the time when the Charter was drafted, self-defence and
the defence of others is morally and politically justified, it cannot be unlawful.
This, of course, raises a number of issues which cannot be easily dealt with. One
cannot possibly tell in advance who is entitled to use force pre-emptively and who is
not. Yet, it is certain that we cannot insist on it always happening according to the
rules of the game, with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council or
with the agreement of the state concerned, simply because in most cases there will
not be enough time to obtain such authorization or agreement. In other cases, the
realities of the world will not allow the states to obtain such authorization or
agreement because of the other players disagreeing. Should it prevent us from
defending ourselves and humankind from the devastating effects of the use of
weapons of mass destruction? It is in fact a new situation. Democracies have been
built upon the assumption that the right thing to do is also the legal thing to do. Given
the fact that international law lags behind the changes in the world, cases will arise
where one has to choose between the right or the lawful thing to do, and actions will
have to be carried out, at least outside international law, if not against its letter,
although most definitely not against its spirit. The real responsibility for it does not lie
with those who are forced to do it and who are courageous enough to do it, but with
those who force us to do so as well as with those who oppose any necessary
changes in international law enabling it to be better adapted to the current situation.
One has to be very careful to avoid making this exception the rule. The suggestion
that the United Nations, together with NATO and other international institutions, has
outlived itself and that in general international law does not apply, that the era of
treaties and agreements have passed, must be fiercely opposed because such
beliefs do not solve the problem, but rather lead to even more confusion and chaos.
There are no simple, black-and-white solutions to this problem. The rule of law must
remain the rule, but one is forced to acknowledge that in this situation, exceptions to
the rule of law will be more numerous. These exceptions will have to be dealt with on
a case-by-case basis and this can only be done in an orderly manner if the
democracies of the world show the readiness, maturity and willingness to do it
together. Clearly, this is not how they acted in the case of the Iraq crisis.
10
Transatlantic Relations in the post-Westphalian World
It is obvious that transatlantic relations too, must be adapted to this new situation.
Any attempts aimed at restoring these relations are doomed to fail. The author has
much respect and appreciation of the efforts of those who want to bring back the
“good old days”, when America and Europe worked together more or less smoothly.
In order to do that, the Soviet Union would have to be restored, since that was the
main reason for the emergence of this particular transatlantic relationship. This is
neither possible nor desirable. Therefore, as a first step, we must look at the nature
of transatlantic relations in the new world; are they still justified? If yes, what kind of
relations are necessary and desirable and what is the objective?
As mentioned above, the foundations of transatlantic relations are the values that
Europeans share with Americans. Many suggest that Europe and America, whilst
sharing the origins of those values, have essentially lived apart during the last two
centuries and no longer share those same values; that the American way of life is so
different from the European way of life that we cannot speak of shared values
anymore. The author is deeply convinced that this is not true. Yes, many things have
changed and in many respects the American way of life is different from how we live
in Europe. Shared values, however, do not mean that they have to be identical in
every respect. Our basic values, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of
law and others can be exercised very differently and yet still remain the same at the
core. This is exactly what has happened between America and Europe, where the
same values are implemented, but this implementation is carried out in a different
manner. Therefore, this should not call into question the fact that our values and the
foundations of our societies essentially remain the same. Americans and Europeans
share the same values and this has not changed with the collapse of the Westphalian
world order.
Shared values do create special relations. Especially as these values, whilst we tend
to label them “universal”, are in fact only shared by roughly one third of the world’s
population. This third of the world also happens to hold the overwhelming majority of
its wealth. People think, and the author thinks, that we are right in believing that there
is a strong correlation between the values we share and the fact that the states that
are based on these values are the most successful and thus the wealthiest.
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However, this is not what the majority of the rest of the world thinks. Consequently,
there is an inherent contradiction, a threat if you will, which makes our cooperation
indispensable. Moreover, the emergence of international organized crime, global
terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the combination of all
of these factors have created a new threat which is no less dangerous than the
Soviet threat used to be. Thus special, privileged transatlantic relations are justified.
These relations, however, must be very different from the transatlantic relations of
the Cold War era. It is essential to define the common interests which justify and
require these special relations. It is only these interests that can serve as the real
basis for close relations, including military cooperation within the NATO Alliance. In
doing so we also must address the issue of how we, Europeans and Americans,
should address these questions which are essential but unclear. What is the role of
international law and how do we deal with exceptions? How do we enforce decisions
taken either by the United Nations Security Council or by other institutions, such as
NATO? What is the role of military power and how do we use it under the totally new
circumstances of the Revolution in Military Affairs and amidst growing opposition to
the use of force in most democracies? How do we reconcile the fact that we are
going to see fierce competition between the United States and the European Union in
most economic and trade issues, whilst at the same time we would like to see the
strongest possible cooperation between them in the field of security? How can NATO
and Common European Defence co-exist and cooperate? Moreover, what will be the
role of Russia and China, etc?
The Role of International Law and International Institutions
As previously stated, international law does not reflect current realties and it is
therefore difficult to maintain that every action in the fight against a new threat will be
carried out in full conformity with existing international law. For the first time in the
history of democratic nations we have to face a situation where, in some cases, the
right course of action might not also be the legal one. In several cases legitimate
action will not actually be legal and this will have serious repercussions on the
international order.
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Democratic nations base their policies on the rule of law, both internally and
externally. There are however significant differences between domestic and
international law. Domestic law is more up-to-date. It only takes the action of one
parliament to adopt a new law to tally with any new requirements. Even this process
may become difficult at times, if and when the public opinion and/or lawmakers fail to
recognize that the realities have changed to such an extent that the existing laws are
no longer able to respond to the current challenges. International law is even more
difficult to change because it requires a consensus amongst most nations of the
world, basically within the framework of the United Nations. Yet the United Nations
itself is also, to a large extent, in serious need of adaptation since its present
composition, and especially that of the Security Council, reflect the realities of the
post-World War II era, which have little to do with the present realities. For
international law to ultimately be changed is an extremely difficult and long process in
itself, let alone in a situation where the world changes so dramatically and we are
light-years away from a consensus regarding the nature of the changes and their
implications on the world order.
International law also has another major inherent flaw. In real life there are certain
activities which are generally prohibited for everybody, a few examples being spying,
arresting others, etc., but domestically the ability exists to create legislation
authorizing certain institutions, such as the police and secret services to carry out
such actions within the law. There is nothing similar to this in international law, yet
the need for such actions is very real and this is especially true in the fight against
terrorism and organized crime. Therefore, such actions are, as a rule, carried out by
individual states and not on behalf of the international community and hence these
results are then dependent on the states.
We will have to accept the fact that in the years to come there will be cases where
we are forced to act outside international law, and in some cases even against its
letter, and in the end maybe even against its spirit. We have to be very careful
though not to let this exception become the rule. What is more, we have to be very
clear as to the reasoning behind these exceptions when they are made, and be even
more scrupulous in observing international law in all of our other actions. Needless to
say, this will put a strain on international relations. There will be cases, like in the
Kosovo campaign, where most democratic countries will agree that such action is
13
necessary and in such cases we will “only” have to deal with the outrage in other
parts of the world. However, in many cases, like in Iraq, the democratic nations
themselves will also be divided. We have to learn to live with this situation and,
without legalizing illegal actions, recognize its legitimacy in certain cases and, most
importantly, not allow such disagreements to undermine the foundation of our
relations and our most important institutions, such as the European Union and
NATO.
The Use of Force in the 21st Century
The use of force has undergone significant changes throughout the course of history.
Before the Westphalian world order, the use of force was the inherent right of
anybody who possessed the capability to obtain such force. At that time, the
Westphalian order limited the use of large-scale organized force to states alone. It
was not until the beginning of the 20th Century that the right of states to use force –
ius ad bellum – was limited for the first time by the Briand-Kellogg Pact and then,
ultimately, by the Charter of the United Nations, which determined that force can only
be used legally in self-defence and collectively by the United Nations. Nuclear
weapons reinforced what international law suggested, and the devastating capacity
of those weapons made their use impossible, leaving states in a situation where their
most effective military weapons were condemned to be solely used for deterrence.
States, of course, have used force in many instances during the past century, yet
nothing challenged the proposition that they were the only ones who had the right,
and indeed the capacity, to do so. This situation began to change at the end of the
20th Century. Emerging non-state entities started to build and use armies and armylike forces themselves, and in some cases such as in Columbia, even organized
crime became a state-like actor. Then came September 11th, when a lone group of
terrorists managed to inflict damage on such a scale that it had previously been
impossible for anybody but the states themselves to cause.
The danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists has ultimately
dramatically changed the nature of the use of force. The threat of devastation
became real. The weapons made for deterrence suddenly become the weapons of
choice for some, and the world proved to be unable to put a handle on it; neither
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international law, nor other instruments at our disposal could offer an absolute
guarantee that such weapons could not, and would not, be used by terrorists in the
future.
At the same time, most democracies grew unwilling to fight. Long decades of peace,
security, welfare and democracy had led to a situation where the use of force was no
longer seen by some, if not most democracies, as a legitimate means of politics. This
is in essence a reflection of their internal situation where in post-modern societies
much more elaborate and sophisticated instruments, other than force, are the
accepted means of conflict-management and the use of force is considered to be
both illegal and amoral.
This, however, is unfortunately not true in international relations where many players,
including the majority of the existing states in the world, not to mention terrorists and
criminals, still view the use of force as a legitimate and viable option, since in premodern societies the use of force is one of, if not the most important, conflict
management tools.
The democracies of the post-modern world therefore face the challenge where at the
international level they have to deal with players who play a different game, or play
the same game using different rules, methods and instruments, some of which are
not acceptable to the population of these democracies, yet they are absolutely
necessary and, in fact, in the era of global terrorism, indispensable, in their foreign
policy.
These contradictions are especially visible in most western European states and
societies which rely heavily on the United States to do the dirty work of fighting and
then either satisfy themselves by providing support for the post-war rehabilitation, in
the best case, or, rather hypocritically, just criticize the Americans for their use force
in the first place. The Americans themselves on the other hand, tend to be heavyhanded. In many cases, and especially in the past years, they have ignored the
nuances and sensitivities of the European public opinion and, in effect, confront their
European friends and allies with the choice of supporting them or facing their
unilateral action.
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Russia and China: Superpowers of the Past and the Future
Russia and China, two major former and also possibly future superpowers, find
themselves in a very strange and difficult situation. Russia has lost most of its
influence on the world, yet still remains a significant power. It is currently in a deep
identity crisis, looking for a new personality and role in international relations. These
country’s painful search has been made more difficult by reminiscing about the past,
by the continued existence of the political elite of the Soviet Regime which continues
to try to “rebuild” some of the Soviet Empire, if not in the form of a real empire, in the
form of a Russian sphere of influence and maintaining a role for Russia which is not
justified by its capabilities but by its history and aspirations.
Much of this is justified. Russia is, and should remain an important regional power
with an important role in global politics. It is, however, not a superpower and it is
more than doubtful that it will ever become one again. Its main focus is on its external
role and the investments made to divert the attention from the devastation of the
Soviet Regime to the internal transition and rebuilding of the country. The West
makes it even more difficult by sometimes treating Russia as a superpower and then
expecting Russia to behave as such, thus in effectively endangering, or at least
rendering it more difficult, for Russia to carry out the inevitable changes required, if it
wants to become a stable country, or even democracy, in the foreseeable future.
China is beyond a doubt a rising power. This rise, however, is full of contradictions
and dangers. The tension between the economy and the political system becomes
more and more unbearable by the day, and the author is convinced that it will not be
possible to maintain this level of tension in the long run. It is also obvious that the
tensions between the rich and poor in China are invariably increasing. Therefore,
while China remains a rising power with the potential of becoming a superpower
within a decade or two, these tensions may erupt in an unforeseen conflict within
China or may even redirect Chinese foreign policy towards a much more assertive
trajectory.
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Accordingly, one has to be able to address those challenges posed by Russia and
China, and this requires firm cooperation between democracies. There is a good
chance that a coordinated and strategic approach can help both China and Russia to
carry out their necessary reforms, to join the democratic countries and become “one
of us”, but the possibility of other scenarios including a hostile Russia and/or China or
even their collapse, which would not be any easier to handle, cannot be excluded. In
both cases, coordinated action and strategy will be needed.
A new approach is needed in order to achieve this. Until now, the West favoured
Russia by offering her a special place in the G7/8 and also in NATO, i.e. the NATORussia Council. We see, however, that these institutional steps did not bring about
the necessary results. The NATO-Russia Council failed to move our cooperation with
Russia to a new level, and basically very little has changed compared to the
Permanent Joint Council. Also, the G7, now the G8, remains a mostly empty formula
since Russian participation in the group of “most industrialized nations” is a joke, it is
purely of political nature, which does not really fit the “institution”, the result of this
being that Russia does not participate in the real working organs of the group and its
participation essentially acts as a demonstration. Russia’s relations with the
European Union are even worse. Although Russia now pushes for a NATO-Russia
Council type of cooperation with the European Union, it is clear that even if such an
institution is created, which we support, it will remain an empty shell, much like the
NATO-Russia Council, as long as we lack a vision and a strategy vis-à-vis Russia.
This strategy, if based on the good results of practical cooperation in several areas,
should determine where, what kind and the strength of cooperation that is possible.
Furthermore, the strategy should establish the nature of the objectives that are to be
achieved and the common interests on which the whole cooperation rests.
The situation with China is even worse than that of Russia. China is not part of any
meaningful strategic dialogue, let alone cooperation with the West, although the
cooperation is deeper than it appears on a few concrete issues, like North Korea.
The lack of strategic vision and dialogue is to a large extent due to the result of
Chinese hesitation to enter into such a dialogue with the West. China is aware of its
vulnerability due to the above-mentioned internal tensions and the uncertainties of
the future stemming from these tensions. Therefore, China will remain very hesitant
to institutionalize its relations with the West for quite some time upon.
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The real question, however, is not institutionalization. It only makes sense if it is part
of a substantive process or if it facilitates such a process. In the case of Russia,
unfortunately, institutionalization has been a substitute for substance. Also,
substantive cooperation in Russia, if carried out at all, was done somewhere else
and mainly in a bilateral context. In the case of China, substantive cooperation is
rather sporadic and therefore institutionalization is not desired by either side, or at
least not yet.
The initiative and the substance, as well as real institutionalization, must come from
the West. This, however, will not be possible until we know what we want and how
we want to achieve it. It does not mean that we should idly sit and wait for the
enlightenment to come, but it means that we have to be very pragmatic at this stage,
and this also applies to building the foundation for a future strategic concept and
cooperation with real, substantive institutionalization. This requires some serious
thinking by the West as well as some strategic dialogue on these issues. It is,
however, difficult to imagine such a strategic dialogue happening when there is no
strategic dialogue occurring in the West at all.
The Role of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union
In this new world order international institutions also face the need to adapt, and we
shall have to find out what role they will play in the coming decades, during a period
of time when the new world order will still be taking shape.
It is especially difficult to give a clear answer regarding the role of international
institutions in times of change, and especially concerning changes that are
significant in magnitude. Human nature and the instincts of most politicians prefer
easy, simple and quick fixes. There has always been a call for a (new) international
order, or new international security system, and institutions have been tested against
this supposedly emerging “new order” and the way in which they would fit into the
“emerging new security system”.
The attempts to define this new order have been numerous. Some claim that the
world has become unipolar. Others argue that unipolarity cannot exit, or at least not
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in the long run. Many oppose unipolarity on the grounds of principles, yet many more
are opposed to it due to their fear that a unipolar world led by, who else but the
United States, would lead to the degradation of their own country’s role and their own
influence on world politics. There is some confusion regarding the distinction
between unipolarity and unilateralism, and multipolarity and multilateralism. In our
view there is a clear distinction: unipolarity means that the world consists of one
state, whereas multipolarity means that the world consists of two or more states
(entities), which can unilaterally take and implement decisions because their political,
economic and military might is so strong that nobody can successfully challenge
them. Unilateralism, in turn, means that a player of international politics – big or small
– makes decisions and takes actions alone.
On the other hand, multilateralism
signifies that they seek multilateral solutions. The leading power of a unipolar world
can be both multilateral and unilateral in this approach, whereas in a multipolar world,
many countries can still be unilateral in their policies.
Today’s world is not unipolar, except in a military sense, and even then only in a
limited way. Even the United States of America is unable to do everything it wishes
solely based on its own decisions. Numerous other players also have a say, and the
Americans always have to take that into account when they come to make a
decision. This, of course, doesn’t mean that the Americans can not do or achieve
anything alone, and naturally this also applies to other states. The difference is, of
course, significant; the freedom of action of the Americans is much greater. The
United States is the strongest country in the world. Nobody can even think about
challenging the American militarily as, should they do so, they would then face the
fate of those who have tried to do so the past. However, this does not mean that the
Americans are free to launch any military action that they desire. They are
constrained by others too. The difference between the United States and other states
is significant in that the Americans can afford much more than the others.
Nevertheless, others can also act alone, and they certainly do. Having a country
which is stronger than the others, and which dominates in militarily terms, does not
mean that the world is unipolar.
Unilateralism is a greater danger. In many cases countries choose to act on their own
and do not accept advice from others. This in itself is not unilateralism. Unilateralism
is a pattern whereby a country, or a group of countries, consistently ignores the
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others, only follows its own interests and in so doing hurts the interests of others. In
this sense, the United States is not unilateral, but under the current administration it
has become much closer to this than any other countries have in the past. One has
to acknowledge that large, strong countries always act much more “unilaterally” since
they can afford to do so, whereas smaller countries cannot. In no way does this
justify unilateralism; rather, it calls for an understanding that acting alone does not
always constitute unilateralism.
The situation is especially difficult in times of change when there is no consensus,
even concerning the most important rules and objectives. As shown above,
nowadays international law, which provided some guidance for states in respect to
their behaviour in international politics, is in many respects out of touch with reality
and thus can no longer be seen as the sole regulator of states’ behaviour. At such
times unilateralism is much more possible and even necessary than in “normal”
times. There is always a gap between those who recognize, and those who may just
“feel” the change, and these, are for the most part the global powers, since they have
to confront these changes directly. This is why the United States has moved away
from its earlier stance and now behaves more “unilaterally”, and this is also why
many European countries can still afford to not respond to the new, real challenges.
Moreover, this is an explanation of why certain European countries can afford to
ignore the threat and insist that everything must be done on the basis of the rules of
the previous world order. This is in no way a justification for the insensible and, in
many cases, unprofessional way Americans unfortunately try to sell their case, when
in fact they are using it for their own sheer partial interests.
In such times, international institutions suffer as they do today. Nevertheless, this is
not their fault; the institutions simply reflect the changing reality, and their fate
depends on how well and how quickly their members are able to adapt to the
challenges of this new situation.
The United Nations is in an even more difficult situation. It was created after World
War II and it fully reflects the circumstances and beliefs of that time, which are very
different from the current beliefs. Its reform is extremely difficult for several reasons.
Firstly, those who are beneficiaries of the outdated distribution of power, i.e. mainly
certain permanent members of the Security Council, without whose agreement no
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reforms are possible, are reluctant to give up their privileges. Secondly, the majority
of the member states do not belong to the most developed democracies of the world
and therefore are not interested in the changes which would reflect democratic
principles and would allow those principles to materialize through the United Nations
system.
The United Nations, nevertheless, is too important in the new world to just be given
up on and marginalized. Admittedly, it will not be able to play a crucial role in each
and every case. Naturally, in the most controversial cases, meaning the ones which
are the clearest reflection of the changing nature of the international world order, like
the war in Iraq, the United Nations might not be the institution of choice. However, in
many other cases it is the only option available, and in many cases it does function
well, is indispensable and worth maintaining. It is essential to push for a reform of the
United Nations, but this must be done without holding onto any illusions. It would be
a mistake to suggest that without these rather radical reforms, the United Nations will
become irrelevant. That said, it would be equally wrong to suggest that nothing can
be done without the United Nations. What is needed is for a balance to be found.
The North-Atlantic Alliance is in a similar situation; needing to change in order to
survive. The good news is that it is much easier to change than the United Nations
because of the greater homogeneity of its members. The change called for must
reflect the new realities, i.e. the new realities of the new world order, which for quite
some time will not be a real order, but rather a kind of chaos where now more than
ever, a policeman is needed. NATO, therefore, must become able to act in this
chaos based on the objectives and the principles of its member states. In order to
achieve this, NATO must undergo radical changes in its strategy, military doctrine,
command structure, force structure, bureaucracy, etc. The changes envisaged in
Prague, even if fully implemented, which is far from being certain to be achieved, can
only be seen as a moderate start. The sooner the disagreeing members in NATO
recognize that their core security depends on the success of its reforms, the sooner
we will succeed.
Finally, we come to the European Union. The European Union is the most ambitious
project that the Europeans have ever taken on. It has already produced astonishing
results, but has now reached a point where decisions must be taken regarding its
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final phase. The European Union can develop into a real confederation of European
states in which much of the decision-making will be transferred to a central institution,
as is the case in some areas today. If this is the way that the European Union is to
evolve, then there is no way around a common foreign policy and common defence.
The introduction of the Euro strongly pushes members in this direction, although the
author doubts that the politicians who took the decision were aware of this. It is
difficult to envisage a group of countries less closely associated with each other than
in a confederation with a common currency.
The second option is a European Union of nations where only a relatively small part
of the decisions are made by a central institution, and the most sensitive foreign
policy and defence issues remain under the control of national authorities. This is
how the European Union currently operates. It does not exclude common foreign and
security policies, nor even strong cooperation in defence, but it will always be a mix
of common and national decisions and the most difficult cases will always be dealt
with on the national level. In such cases, defence cooperation will remain mostly
limited to Petersburg plus objectives and NATO’s role as the sole guarantor of
security will remain unchallenged.
The European Union, however, possesses capabilities that no other organization
holds. Not only is it the most wealthy of all, but it is also the most comprehensive of
all. Accordingly, the European Union can be active in international relations wherever
it decides to. It can also become a significant provider of security in the military
arena, should it choose to do so. Furthermore, the European Union can become an
even more important player in nation-building if it manages to create a strategy and
rationalize its resources on that basis.
Conclusions
The international situation is difficult, but not hopeless. In order to be able to cope
with the new challenges and threats we have to acknowledge that we live in a period
of radical change. Consequently, we also have to accept that in the foreseeable
future there will be no “grand scheme”, no new international order, no new security
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system, but it will be a mix of what we have at our disposal, of what we will be able to
create and of ad hoc solutions.
Europeans and Americans have once more to learn how to cooperate with each
other. The strains, tensions and disagreement will not disappear after the war in Iraq.
The serious conflicts within the Western world around Iraq were a symptom of a
much larger change which the Americans and Europeans will have to consider most
seriously. They will have to conduct strategic dialogues to determine what it is that
binds them together, what interests warrant special, privileged transatlantic relations
and how the institutions are to be built around this common ground. The European
Union and NATO must be adapted to reflect these changes and they must be able to
defend and promote these common interests in an effective manner.
International law must remain the foundation of our politics. Yet, at the same time we
have to acknowledge that in many respects it is outdated and that it needs to reflect
the realities of the present. Consequently, there will be some cases when
international law might prove inadequate and our actions will have to take place
outside the international law, and in some cases even in violation of its written rules.
This is, beyond any doubt, a serious dilemma which poses a serious challenge to
democracies. Strenuous efforts must be made to alter the impression that the world,
and even more so, that democracies, have become lawless, that some – and in
particular the United States – place themselves beyond international law.
International institutions also must be reformed. As products of the post-World War II
and Cold War eras, they are unable to cope with the new challenges and threats
posed by the new players and methods. It does not mean, however, that we can live
without them. A world without international institutions and with unilateral players
would be even more dangerous. Nevertheless, we must not be formalistic when
dealing with international institutions. Coalitions of the willing, preferably with, but
sometimes without international institutions will play an increasingly important role.
We should be prepared to deal with such situations, and to use the international
institutions available to every extent possible to support such coalitions.
It will neither be a fast nor an easy process, but conflicts should not deter or
discourage us. On the contrary, these kinds of disagreements should serve as a
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catalyst to multiply our efforts to achieve what we all want, i.e. strong transatlantic
relations. As a result, we will have a much more secure, much more stable, much
more democratic world, where people can together live much better. A new
understanding of solidarity must be discovered between democracies and this means
that our interests will not always coincide and will sometimes even conflict, but under
no circumstances should this make us question our solidarity and the alliance of
democracies for the sake of a better, more democratic, more prosperous, more
secure and more stable world.
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Established in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government, the Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) encourages and
supports States and non-State governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen
democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, and promotes
international cooperation within this field, initially targeting the Euro-Atlantic
regions.
The Centre collects information, undertakes research and engages in
networking activities in order to identify problems, to establish lessons learned
and to propose the best practices in the field of democratic control of armed
forces and civil-military relations. The Centre provides its expertise and support
to all interested parties, in particular governments, parliaments, military
authorities, international organisations, non-governmental organisations,
academic circles.
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF):
rue de Chantepoulet 11, P.O. Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland
Tel: ++41 22 741 77 00; Fax: ++41 22 741 77 05
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