COMMISSIE VAN TOEZICHT
BETREFFENDE
DE INLICHTINGEN- EN
VEILIGHEIDSDIENSTEN
International Conference on
Strengthening Intelligence Oversight
in the Western Balkans
Conference Report
The Hague, The Netherlands
2 December, 2011
Strengthening Intelligence Governance in the
Western Balkans
Strengthening Intelligence Oversight in the Western Balkans –
Clingendael, The Hague, 2nd December, 2011
DCAF Conference Report
Introduction
In early December 2011, DCAF, Clingendael and the Dutch Review Committee on
Intelligence and Security Services co-hosted a one-day conference on “Strengthening
Intelligence Oversight in the Western Balkans.” The event took place at Clingendael’s
headquarters in The Hague and was made possible by the generous support of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. Parliamentarians, members of independent
oversight bodies and representatives of civil society organisations from across the Western
Balkans attended the conference. The conference was also attended by representatives of
intelligence oversight bodies from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as a
number of academics.
The conference took place within the context of a DCAF project (supported by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands) designed to support the development and
consolidation of the oversight of security and intelligence services in the Western Balkans.
The project places particular emphasis on developing parliamentary and independent
expert oversight of security and intelligence and intelligence services.1 The conference was
held as part of DCAF’s ongoing efforts to promote cross-national learning and experience
sharing between actors working on intelligence oversight. While the focus of this
conference and the project more generally is on the Western Balkans, the outputs and

The opinions expressed in this report are interpretations of participants’ interventions and do not
necessarily reflect the position of DCAF or any of the other institutions involved in the organisation of this
event.
For the sake brevity, the term “intelligence services” is used to refer to organisations that provide a “service”
by collecting, analysing, producing and disseminating intelligence for national security or military purposes.
Such organisations may be civilian or military and are variously labelled “security services or agencies,”
“intelligence agencies” and “secret services.” This covers organisations whose jurisdiction is limited to their
own state’s territory, the territory of foreign states, as well as those whose jurisdiction covers both domestic
and foreign intelligence1
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findings will have broader resonance with transition states throughout the EU
neighbourhood area and beyond.
The conference included panels on the challenges to intelligence governance in the region;
reconciling secrecy and transparency in intelligence governance; establishing effective
oversight bodies; and overseeing the use of personal data. This event also featured a
roundtable discussion among parliamentarians. All proceedings took place under the
Chatham House Rule and therefore, this report will not make reference to any individual or
institutional affiliation.
There was broad agreement that all countries in the region have passed through first
generation intelligence sector reforms. That is, they have all established legal and
institutional frameworks for intelligence services and their oversight. Panellists from
several countries asserted that these developments have been largely driven by the
prospect of European Union and/or NATO membership, and they issued a warning that this
progress could unravel if progress towards membership stalls.
Given that countries across the region have now established legal and institutional
frameworks in this field, there was broad consensus that the discourse on intelligence
oversight in the region should venture beyond general principles and models to focus on
challenges of implementing the laws that exist. The implementation of laws and the
development of effective democratic institutional processes and practices is an integral
part of what are often called “second generation” reforms.
Although most participants agreed that countries throughout the Western Balkans have
been relatively successful in legislating for the intelligence sector and creating many of the
institutions necessary for oversight of intelligence services, many speakers expressed
serious concerns about myriad obstacles to intelligence oversight. Indeed, all panels
featured the discussion of formidable challenges to intelligence accountability and to
further strengthening the oversight of intelligence services in the region. There were
striking similarities between the challenges identified both by parliamentarians and
members of civil society organisations from across the region. Summing up the current
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state of intelligence oversight in the region, one senior overseer stated that persons
involved in this field “should not be satisfied with the status quo.”
This report will outline a number of the main challenges discussed during the conference
as well as several of the proposals put forward for meeting these challenges and
strengthening oversight of the intelligence services.
Unconsolidated democracy and the impact of the broader social and political context
on intelligence oversight
A recurrent theme was the impact that broader societal and political developments have on
the oversight (and indeed, the reform) of intelligence services. A number of speakers
reminded participants that the reform of the intelligence sector and the development of
oversight structures does not occur in a vacuum. These processes are, of course, inherently
linked to broader processes of democratisation of governance structures and in society
more generally.
One overseer remarked that the maturity of democratic institutions and processes has an
important impact on intelligence oversight. He provided the salutary warning that we
cannot reasonably expect oversight institutions, such as parliament, to scrutinise
intelligence services effectively if they are yet to establish effective oversight of other areas
of government activity. These other areas of government, such as education or transport
policy, are far more open and easier to scrutinise than the intelligence sector. In a similar
vein, it was argued that we cannot expect the intelligence sector to be transparent and
open to public accountability, when other areas of government – with less legitimate claims
to secrecy – remain opaque and resistant to public accountability. The message behind
these sentiments was that patience is required; democratic norms and practices need to
first take hold in other areas of government and they will gradually permeate the
intelligence sector
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However, another speaker offered a riposte to this view. He warned that states in the
region cannot afford to wait for all of the problems of democratic consolidation to be solved
and for democratic practices to take hold in all other areas of government, before
conducting proper oversight of intelligence services. Indeed, this speaker contended that
persons responsible for the oversight of intelligence – and particularly, parliamentarians –
need to place themselves at the forefront of efforts to strengthen oversight and
accountability of the intelligence sector. He ventured that they are not currently fulfilling
this role as drivers of change.
Beyond this debate, several speakers expressed concerns about the impact of undemocratic
societal (and cultural) norms and values on intelligence oversight. Foremost among these is
the perception that it is somehow normal for security and intelligence services to be a law
unto themselves, uncontrollable, unaccountable and, ultimately, untouchable (by
outsiders). It was suggested that this view is a relic of the region’s authoritarian past.
Various speakers argued that such perceptions are not confined to the political class but
extend to members of the public writ large. Concerns were expressed that such perceptions
present serious problems for intelligence oversight because they limit expectations in
terms of what is possible with regards to oversight in this field, and foster acceptance of
behaviour which should not be tolerated in a democratic polity.
Related to this issue is the widespread acceptance of secrecy which prevails in government
in many countries in the region. According to a number of speakers, government
transparency has not yet been fully embraced as a norm. In addition, it was suggested that
there is limited pressure (from the public) for greater transparency in the intelligence
sector.
Finally, it was argued that, in several countries in the Balkans, there remains a reluctance to
scrutinise and criticise the activities of senior officials who enjoy what we might term
“revolutionary pedigree” by virtue of their involvement struggles for national liberation or
independence. The fact that many such persons remain in the security sector and remain
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“untouchable” is a barrier to effective oversight and ultimately, to accountability in this
domain.
Parliamentarians are failing to serve as drivers of enhanced oversight
While many participants lauded the progress that has been made in legislating for and
establishing parliamentary committees for the oversight of security and intelligence
agencies, several panellists challenged parliamentarians to provide stronger impetus for
strengthening intelligence governance structures. It was submitted that parliamentarians
have, thus far, failed to be the motors of change in this field. Some criticism of parliaments
went further by highlighting perceived deliberate attempts by some parliamentarians
(included members of oversight committees) to undermine and unravel oversight
arrangements by weakening legislation. It was put forward that this behaviour can be
explained by unwillingness, on the part of some legislators, to sacrifice their own ties to
criminal networks.
Shortcomings of parliamentary oversight of intelligence in the region
In most Western Balkan states, parliament is the primary player in the external oversight of
security and intelligence agencies. Accordingly, much of the discussion focused on
evaluating the current state of parliamentary oversight arrangements. Overall, assessments
of the work of parliamentary oversight committees were fairly negative. Three particular
weaknesses were highlighted by speakers from parliaments and representatives of civil
society from across the region.
Firstly, many members of oversight committees lack the political will to undertake their
oversight mandate. This is most commonly a characteristic of members of oversight
committees from ruling parties who, in many systems, can use their majority to block
attempts to examine particular cases or activities of the security and intelligence agencies.
According to a number of participants, the lack of political will to conduct effective
oversight is most commonly manifested in failures to undertake statutory oversight tasks,
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as well as an unwillingness to make full use of the powers granted by law. We heard several
examples of parliamentary oversight committees declining to access information about
given activities, which they could have lawfully accessed and, indeed, should have accessed
as part of their mandate. This issue is a good illustration of what we might call, as
mentioned above, the “second generation problematique.” States in the region have passed
through the first generation reforms developing the legal and institutional frameworks for
parliamentary oversight, but members of parliamentary oversight committees are not
making proper use of these frameworks and, thus, “second generation” reforms and
consolidation of oversight are stalling.
Secondly, and closely linked to the lack of political will, is the problem of parliamentary
oversight being too politicised. While some panellists argued that the politicisation of any
committee work is inevitable, others felt that oversight is too politicised, to the extent that
it undermines the effectiveness of oversight. A number of parliamentarians commented
that committees are failing to fulfil their statutory tasks because governing majorities block
oversight which may be politically damaging for their own party. Some participants
conceded that his form of political self-preservation is unavoidable.
Another speaker cautioned that it is not only parliamentarians from governing parties who
permit political considerations to undermine oversight. In fact, he reserved particular
criticism for opposition parties’ complicity in undermining parliamentary oversight
committees. He asserted that, in his country, oversight committee members from leading
opposition parties have often failed to take an assertive approach to oversight (and
strengthening oversight arrangements) because they are aware that they may soon return
to power and do not wish to be faced with a powerful, proactive oversight committee. In
response to these discussions, a prominent expert from outside the region spoke of the
need members of parliamentary oversight committees to subordinate their party interests
and loyalties to the greater goals of upholding on the integrity of parliament and protecting
the constitutional order. He added that the inability of many parliamentarians to do this is
one the main reasons that parliaments are not always the most appropriate bodies for
overseeing intelligence services.
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Finally, several participants referred to oft-cited deficiencies of insufficient human and
financial resources in parliamentary oversight committees. They argued that a lack of
knowledge and expertise of security and intelligence matters remains the pre-eminent
obstacle to parliamentary oversight in the region.
The creation of expert oversight bodies as a response to the shortcomings of
parliamentary oversight of intelligence services
While bemoaning many of these shortcomings, participants also devoted much of their
discussion to considering options for overcoming these challenges. Several speakers
approached this discussion from the starting point that the inherent weaknesses of
parliamentary oversight (not only in the Western Balkans) are so profound that
parliaments should not be given primary responsibility for external oversight of
intelligence services. Accordingly, at least three speakers advocated the creation of expert
non-parliamentary oversight bodies in several Western Balkan countries.
Speakers discussed examples of these bodies from Belgium (Standing Intelligence Agencies
Review Committee – Standing Committee I), Canada (the Security Intelligence Review
Committee) and the Netherlands (the Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security
Services). These expert oversight bodies are mandated to perform oversight of intelligence
services on an ongoing basis and not only in reaction to scandals. Speakers explained that
such bodies are generally made up of independent persons who are not members of
parliament or the executive, and are appointed by one or a combination of parliament, the
executive and the judicial branch. The main arguments put forward in support of the
“expert oversight body” were:
a) they are less politicised than parliamentary oversight committees, and
b) they normally have full-time members who can devote significantly more time to
oversight than members of parliamentary oversight committees who have many
other commitments.
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While these bodies were widely praised, the limited time available meant that participants
did not have the opportunity to engage in a more detailed discussion about
appropriateness of this model for countries in the region.
Beyond the discussion of expert bodies, one panellist spoke in detail about the Canadian
Parliament’s 1990 review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act of 1984. He
recommended that countries in the Western Balkans could benefit from undertaking
periodic evaluations of their intelligence governance systems. Such reviews can help to
ensure that inter alia the weaknesses of oversight arrangements are identified and
(hopefully) remedied. Several participants identified this as a topic which requires further
discussion at future events.
A lack of transparency in the intelligence sector
Numerous participants regretted the lack of transparency in the intelligence sector
throughout the Western Balkans and they argued that this remains one of the most
significant barriers to oversight and, consequently, to promoting public trust in intelligence
services. Several speakers warned participants that public perceptions of services will not
evolve until they have a better understanding of services’ roles and powers in a democratic
polity.
In response to this, one panellist spoke persuasively of the importance of oversight bodies
in promoting greater transparency with regards to intelligence services. Through public
reporting on their reviews of intelligence service activity, oversight bodies can play a key
role in educating the public about what intelligence services do and do not do. It was
pointed out, however, that in order for overseers to perform this role, they too need to be
transparent. Notably, they need to produce public versions of their reports and hold some
open hearings.
It was suggested that several countries in the region have improved mechanisms and
practices for public access to information. Nevertheless, two participants spoke of the need
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for raising greater public awareness about the right to access information from state
bodies. One also argued that all state authorities, including in the intelligence sector, must
accept that the burden of demonstrating why information should be kept secret and
exempt from freedom information requests rests firmly on their shoulders. This practice
has not yet taken root in the region.
Related to this issue is the problem of over-classification. Several experts spoke of the need
for a more reasoned approach to classification; crucially, classification should be fully
justified and not simply stamped onto documents as a label or applied to entire classes of
documentation.
Limited budgetary and financial oversight
Participants from several countries highlighted a lack of external scrutiny of intelligence
service budgets and finances. It was submitted that both parliaments and supreme audit
institutions play a very limited role in this regard because they do not have sufficient
authority to examine secret parts of budgets/accounts, or they simply do not make use of
their statutory powers in this area. By contrast, one speaker argued that the Albanian
Parliament has made significant progress in its budgetary oversight of the intelligence
services – the National Security Committee has apparently played an increasingly active
role in ex ante scrutiny of the budget. However, overall, this was one of the areas that both
parliamentary and civil society participants identified as needing urgent attention.
Some international capacity-building work is undermining progress towards greater
oversight and accountability
Speakers from several states expressed strong concerns that states from outside the region
have taken measures that undermine the development of accountable, rule-of-law
compliant services. Notably, one senior overseer argued that while donor states have
invested heavily in strengthening the operational capacity of security and intelligence
services, they have failed to provide adequate support to strengthening oversight bodies. It
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was suggested that much of this support to operational capacity building has focussed on
enhancing the ability of security and intelligence service to counter terrorist threats. Yet,
several participants criticised this focus, arguing that terrorist threats are not a relevant
priority in the region. Indeed, this argument was reflected in discussions of regional
security threats throughout the conference, which focussed on the problems posed by
trans-border organised criminal groups.
In spite of this, several participants argued that more international support is required in
improving intelligence governance. One speaker pointed out that the EU and NATO
accession criteria and associated support initiatives do not include provisions directly
related to intelligence services. He spoke of a pressing need for the promulgation of
international standards and benchmarks on democratic oversight of intelligence services,
and that these standards should be built into the EU and NATO accession criteria. In
response to this recommendation, it was pointed that there is now a UN compilation of
good practices on intelligence agencies and their oversight. This compilation was mandated
by the Human Rights Council and developed under the auspices of the Special Rapporteur
on Counter Terrorism and Human Rights. It could serve as a useful set of benchmarks to
both guide and evaluate intelligence governance reforms in the Western Balkans.
Recommendations
Throughout the conference, participants put forward recommendations for strengthening
intelligence oversight in the Western Balkans. This final section highlights some of the key
suggestions, which are explained in more detail above.
Participants addressed most of their recommendations to parliamentarians in the region.
Perhaps the most profound among these was a call for parliamentarians with oversight and
legislative prerogatives in the intelligence sector to prioritise holding the executive to
account and upholding the rule of law and democratic constitutional order with regards to
intelligence activities. It was recommended that, with regards to the intelligence sector,
such duties should come before any party political considerations.
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Another key recommendation was for oversight bodies to redouble their efforts to engage
with the public and ensure a greater level of transparency in their own work. Several
speakers recommended that this could be achieved through the publication of public
versions of reports and by holding periodic public hearings. It was argued that such
measures are essential to promoting greater public confidence and understanding in both
intelligence services and oversight processes.
As already mentioned, several speakers also urged lawmakers to consider creating expert
oversight bodies to exist alongside parliamentary oversight committees. Such bodies would
be given responsibility for the, in-depth, day-to-day independent oversight of intelligence
services and could complement the work of parliamentary committees.
A final important recommendation was directed towards the international community, and
particularly the EU and NATO. These organisations were urged to provide further guidance
on the minimum standards which should apply to intelligence services and their oversight,
and to ensure that such standards are incorporated into accession criteria.
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