Regional Seminar
on Parliamentary Oversight in
the Area of Security
in West Africa
Dakar, Senegal, 21-22 September 2010
National Assembly of Senegal
Regional Seminar
on Parliamentary Oversight
in the Area of Security
in West Africa
Dakar, Senegal, 21-22 September 2010
Parliamentary OversightNational
in the
Areaofof
Security in West Africa
Assembly
Senegal
1
Non-responsibility clause
This publication is a compilation of the documentation relating to the regional seminar
“Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa”, co-organised by The Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Inter-parliamentary
Union (IPU), in collaboration with the National Assembly of Senegal and the Parliament
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and held in Dakar, Senegal,
21 - 22 September 2010.
The organisers of the seminar accept no responsibility or liability with regard to the
information or viewpoints expressed in this publication. The organisers of the seminar
cannot guarantee the accuracy or veracity of the content of this publication.
2
Regional Seminar
Table of contents
4
Synthesis
5
Summary of debates
6
Conclusions and recommendations
11
List of acronyms
I.
II.
Opening statements 13
III.
Presentations
23
Session 1. A comprehensive approach to parliamentary oversight in the area of security 24
Prof. Boubacar N’Diaye
25
Ms. Karin Grimm
29
Honorable Ibra Diouf
35
Session 2. Defence/ security committees and parliamentary mechanisms applied
to the security sector 40
Honorable Sango Patekile Holomisa
41
Prof. Eboe Hutchful
46
Honorable Mamadou Bamba Ndiaye
48
Honorable Bréhima Béridogo
52
Session 3. Parliamentary oversight of security budgeting
57
Ms. Lena Andersson
58
Honorable Laurent Akoun
62
Honorable Alice Foyah
64
Annex
68
Concept paper
69
Seminar programme
70
List of participants
73 IV.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
3
List of acronyms
4
ASDR
African Security Dialogue and Research
ASSN
African Security Sector Network
AU
African Union
CSO
Civil Society Organisation
DCAF
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
IPU
Inter-Parliamentary Union
MP
Member of Parliament
NGO
Non-Governmental Organisation
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SADC PF
Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum
SADSEM
Southern African Defence and Security Management Network
SSG
Security Sector Governance
SSR
Security Sector Reform
UEMOA
West African Economic and Monetary Union (known as UEMOA from its name in French,
Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine)
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNOWA
United Nations Office for West Africa
WANEP
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
Regional Seminar
I. Synthesis
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
5
Summary of debates
Mr. Okey Uzoechina
Representative of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
to the ECOWAS
Session 1: A Comprehensive
Approach to Parliamentary
Oversight in the Area of Security
Presentations
Professor Boubacar N’Diaye’s presentation
highlighted the achievements and challenges
faced by West African parliaments in their
oversight role in the political development
of West African states. It traced the origin
of West African parliaments under military
rule for over four decades and observed an
increase in accountability and a greater role of
parliamentarians in oversight of the security
sector. The presentation however identified
continuing constraints to effective oversight by
parliaments and recommended measures such
as: elaboration of constitutional and legislative
framework for security governance, monitoring
and evaluation of security policy, establishment of
a cooperation framework between the executive
and parliament on security and defence matters,
budgeting and financial transparency.
Ms. Karin Grimm’s presentation, which focused
on integrating a gender perspective into
parliament’s contribution to the security agenda,
identified women both as victims of conflict
and as active participants to peacekeeping and
peace negotiations. The presentation also gave
graphic illustration of the male-to-female ratio
in parliaments in West Africa, at different ranks in
the security sector and in peacekeeping forces,
and found that women were not proportionately
represented in security institutions. It called on
parliamentarians to contribute to gender-sensitive
security sector by ensuring conformity between
national, regional, African Union (AU) and United
Nations (UN) texts, and by encouraging increased
participation of women in security policymaking
and implementation, budgeting and resource
management.
6
Regional Seminar
Interactive session (Q & A)
Issues raised and discussed during the interactive
session touched on: constraints based on culture
and tradition which place the social status of the
man above that of the woman, under-education
of women, how to reverse the disproportionate
representation of women in security institutions
in two to three generations, other dimensions
or matrix of gender mainstreaming beyond
sufficient representation of women in parliaments
and the security sector. It was made clear that
women integration could not happen overnight.
It was also noted that low women representation
in the military could be linked to the history of
the military in West Africa as agents of brutality
which run contrary to the image of the woman
as fountain of motherly care and the social milieu
within which the African woman is raised.
Panel 1: Parliamentary Ethics and
Transparency
Hon. Mamadou Lamine Thiam’s discussion
described parliamentary ethics as voluntary
constraints and rules of expected behaviour,
criteria
against
which
behaviour
of
parliamentarians is judged. Rules of ethics guide
parliamentary action towards improving the
population’s image of its elected representatives,
strengthening citizens’ trust in the parliament,
improving the credibility of parliamentary
institutions, effectively combating all types of
corruption and strengthening participatory
democracy. The discussion identified eight main
rules of conduct for every parliamentarian as:
honesty, integrity, transparency, impartiality,
loyalty, frankness, objectivity and responsibility.
Recommendations included the development of
codes of ethics and conduct, public declaration of
assets upon assumption of public office, and laws
with strict punishment to combat corruption.
Hon. Joseph Ghartey’s discussion traced the
political history of tyranny and dictatorships
in West Africa. He argued that due to high
expectations of the citizens, high standard of ethics
is necessary to sustain parliamentary democracy.
Weaknesses faced by parliaments were identified
to include corruption, unfavourable constitutional
arrangements, and lack of citizen participation in
parliamentary processes. To promote parliamentary
ethics and transparency, he recommended change
in militaristic mindset, gender balance, formation
of multi-party committees to examine security
issues, avoidance of cultural contradictions in
copy-pasting Western codes of conduct, building
strategic and formal relationships with civil society
organisations (CSOs) and security agencies, and the
review of anti-corruption treaties and conventions
to track ratification and harmonisation with local
laws and values.
Interactive session (Q & A)
The interactive session touched on issues
ranging from the absence of a living wage for
parliamentarians as a contributing factor to
corruption, the need for parliamentarians to
report periodically to their constituencies, to
balancing expectations of the electorate in terms
of provision of public goods and capital projects
against the constitutional role of parliamentarians.
Party discipline and executive patronage were
also identified as constraining factors.
On the state of ethics in respective parliaments, it
was noted that in Sierra Leone, parliament does
not handle cash for constituency projects; the
constitution does not permit parliamentarians
to speak against their party or they risk being
removed; and parliamentarians resign their seat
upon appointment into the cabinet. In the Gambia,
rules of ethics relate to confidence building,
image and credibility of parliamentarians; the
constitution prohibits cross-carpeting and shift
in political allegiance during a particular tenure;
and parliamentarians do not hold executive post.
Parliamentarians from Guinea Bissau pointed out
that the government funds political parties to an
extent and opposition parties fall victim to undue
influence.
Session 2: Defence/Security
Committees and Parliamentary
Mechanisms Applied to the Security
Sector
Presentations
Hon. Sango Patekile Holomisa’s presentation
focused on drawing lessons for West Africa from
experience in strengthening parliamentary
oversight in Southern Africa. It identified oversight
as a process, not an event. It highlighted some
of the achievements of SADC-PF to include the
promotion of democracy and good governance,
peace and stability, electoral assistance,
development and support of a model law on
HIV/AIDS. The presentation also identified
challenges of parliaments especially defence and
security committees to include lack of capacity
and authority, high turnover after elections,
executive dominance and authority, corruption
in procurement processes, and lack of access to
classified information. Drawing from experience,
it strongly suggested that CSO resources should
be leveraged in strengthening parliamentary
capacity in West Africa.
Professor Eboe Hutchful’s presentation focused
on the contribution of civil society to security
governance and oversight in West Africa. It noted
that CSOs bring critical resources and experience
to the table in promoting security sector
governance. CSO activity and value include:
promoting public participation in governance
of the security sector, opening the security
arena to public scrutiny, policy development,
training and capacity building, and independent
African capacity in security sector reform (SSR)
and security sector governance (SSG). The
presentation gave instances of CSO engagement
in security processes and suggested that
parliaments could in turn offer CSOs the political
space to operate and a cover of legitimacy.
Recommendations made include that parliaments
and CSOs should forge strategic partnerships,
and parliaments and security institutions should
forge political partnerships. The presentation
concluded by arguing that CSOs’ work to
improve professionalism and management feed
into parliamentary oversight by making security
institutions more governable.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
7
Interactive session (Q & A)
Issues raised and discussed during the interactive
session ranged from how parliament-CSO relations
could be made formal, how CSOs could move
beyond making only general recommendations
to proposing laws and guidelines, to whether
CSOs should be held on the same standards
and tenets of responsibility and accountability
as everybody else. It was pointed out that
intergovernmental organisations such as the AU,
the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) are much less ambiguous
in their relations with CSOs than their member
states and governmental institutions. The AU and
ECOWAS were said to have no reservations with
drawing up memorandum of understanding or
cooperation agreements with CSOs: the African
Security Sector Network (ASSN) and West Africa
Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) respectively.
Like parliaments, CSOs are equally free to choose
who to relate with. It was however argued that
political parties should be included in the dialogue
with CSOs as they form the base for recruiting
parliamentarians and government officials.
Panel 2: Defence/Security Committees and
Parliamentary Mechanisms Applied to the
Security Sector
Hon. Mamadou Bamba Ndiaye in his discussion
highlighted the roles of these committees to
include: discussion of the budget before its
adoption, monitoring and evaluation of activities
of security institutions and ministries, invitation
of government ministers to parliament to answer
question, review government policy on security.
He also identified peculiarities and challenges of
parliamentary oversight of the security sector as:
the sensitive nature of the security sector which
is often considered an exclusive domain of the
executive, restriction of access to information by
legal provision on official secrets, and difficulty
in overseeing the intelligence services whose
operations are by nature secret. The discussion
concluded by recommending cooperation and
sharing of experiences between and among West
African parliamentary committees on defence and
security.
Hon. Bréhima Beridogo’s discussion admonished
that the security sector could not be left solely
8
Regional Seminar
in the hands of the military. It noted that in
Mali the military operated more as a sub-state,
and during military rule, the defence budget
was not considered by the National Assembly.
Also, requests for visits to military premises
were addressed to the Chief of Staff but never
answered. The discussion also identified tools
for parliamentary oversight to include questions,
interpellations, investigations and visits to the
premises of armed forces. These tools were said
to be available but seldom used. Self-censorship
by parliament was pointed out as a constraining
factor. It concluded by recommending capacity
building for parliamentarians to boost their
courage (attitude) in carrying out oversight, and
increased cooperation with the executive.
Interactive session (Q & A)
Issues raised and discussed during the interactive
session related to justification for the difference
in standards of confidentiality between military
forces and intelligence services and the need to
develop political strategy to change executive
circumstances. It was pointed out that different
instrumentalities were required for oversight
of the police, intelligence and the military. For
instance, intelligence services may still be invited
to answer to questions by parliamentary defence
and security committees; in such cases evidence
could be heard in camera and members of the
committee sworn to secrecy. Some progress by
Senegal and regression by Mali in parliamentary
oversight of the executive in security matters
were also noted. On relations with parliament,
it was observed that the executive and security
services in Senegal and Mali were not responsive
to parliament when invited or sent letters. For
instance, to visit military premises, the Senegalese
parliament first wrote to request authorisation
from the military hierarchy instead of giving notice
of its intention to visit military premises stating the
days, time and purpose of the visit. On the other
hand, it was observed that the National Assembly
of Burkina Faso does not make any request before
visit; it only gives notice of such visit to the military
and security forces.
Outcomes of Day One
Mr. Okey Uzoechina summarised the main points
and recommendations of day one drawn from
the panel discussions and interactive sessions, as
including the following :
•
The need for training and capacity building
given the technical and complex nature of
defence and security matters and the limited
capacity of parliamentarians in relation to
the executive and security services. Interparliamentary fora should be created for
exchange of good practices, challenges and
lessons learnt between and among national
and regional parliaments.
•
The need to change the militaristic mindset
of executive dominance especially in issues
related to defence and security, and to move
towards democratic control of security and
transparency. The shift from military security
to comprehensive human security framework
should be institutionalised.
•
The need to view mainstreaming gender into
the security sector as going beyond steps
to increase the numerical representation
of women in the security sector and
in parliaments. It was noted that low
representation of women in the military could
be attributed to: (1) the history of the military
in West Africa which were seen as agents of
brutality; (2) constraints based on culture and
tradition.
•
The need to develop cooperation framework
involving parliaments and the executive
and security services, and to form strategic
partnerships between CSOs and parliaments
on issues of defence and security, human
rights, budgeting and transparency.
•
The need to promote the credibility of
parliamentary institutions and protect the
image of parliamentarians through the
adoption of parliamentary codes of ethics and
conduct. Parliamentary codes should raise
the bar from a criminal standard to an ethical
standard to prohibit unethical conducts which
are nonetheless not criminalised.
Session 3: Parliamentary Oversight
of Security Budgeting
Presentation
Mrs. Lena Andersson’s presentation focused
on best practices in security sector budgeting. It
revealed that the budget was one way of seeing
if plans and policies were being implemented.
Security budget should therefore relate back to
the national security policy as a way to avoid overbudgeting. The presentation further described the
four phases of the budgetary cycle: formulation,
approval/adoption, execution (procurement) and
monitoring/auditing (oversight). It also pointed
out the need to establish liaison officers from
parliament to the supreme audit institution or
Office of the Auditor General, and vice-versa.
Authority (legal mandate), ability (human,
financial and material capacity) and attitude (will)
were identified as factors that contribute to the
effectiveness of budget scrutiny. Strong attitude
was however identified as a critical success factor.
Panel 3: Parliamentary Oversight of
Security Budgeting
Hon. Laurent Akoun’s discussion gave an account
of how economic and financial crimes commissions
and other institutions assist parliamentarians in
a posteriori monitoring of compliance with the
budget and fighting corruption. It recommended
that to exercise its significant power of the purse,
parliament should be involved in the approval of
supplementary budget and there should be no
post-facto regularisation after implementation.
Factors that constrain parliamentary oversight
over security budgeting were identified to include
party loyalty and politicisation, and limited
knowledge and capacity of parliamentarians in
complex budgeting and procurement processes.
Hon. Alice Foyah’s discussion focused on the role
of the Sierra Leonean parliament in oversight of
security budgeting. It explained the security and
defence budget as an effective policy instrument
for allocating resources for military equipment,
personnel, infrastructure and programmes. Active
participation of the parliament, especially the
Public Accounts Committee, was described as vital
because the budget provides a comprehensive
account of a state’s priorities. The discussion
clarified that since allocation of funding to the
security sector often competes with the social
and development sectors, parliament has a role
to maintain balance between the needs of society
and the needs of the security sector. It however
revealed that parliamentary oversight over
security budgeting is generally weak where the
executive is strong.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
9
Interactive session (Q & A)
The interactive session touched on issues ranging
from the abuse of the military by the executive
to secure its hold on power and avoid overthrow,
executive indiscretion in shielding the military
against the parliamentary supervision, to the
imperative for parliamentarians to be assertive
enough to balance the scales and effectively
oversee the security sector. Discussants also
flagged the challenge that there was no defence or
national security policy in many African States to
direct security budgeting and oversight, and that
the executive often relied on conflict and states
of exception to justify the marginalisation of the
role of parliament in budget. To reverse the trend,
it was recommended that parliament should be
involved from the initial budget formulation phase
(discussion of objectives, outcomes). Notably,
reference was made to the intention to harmonise
budget process via UEMOA in Francophone West
Africa and efforts to harmonise budget processes
in Anglophone West Africa via ECOWAS particularly
in Liberia, Nigeria and Ghana.
It was noted that in Ghana, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank weight on
the Ministry of Defence since the Structural
Adjustment
Programme
has
promoted
accountability. However, there was still lack of
accountability of intelligence expenditures and
the national security council. In Côte d’Ivoire,
the President voted the budget by ordinance
since 2002, so there was little role for parliament
in approving security budget. Parliamentarians
from Sierra Leone noted that parliament relies on
external auditors; however some issues classified
as top secret are shielded from parliament and
parliament has no role in sending troops to
peacekeeping missions.
10
Regional Seminar
Conclusions and recommendations
Rapporteur
Honourable Mamadou Bamba Ndiaye
Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee
National Assembly of Senegal
On 21 and 22 September 2010 the National
Assembly of Senegal hosted a seminar on
parliamentary oversight in the area of security
in West Africa, in collaboration with the Geneva
Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) and the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU),
with the support of the parliament of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The parliaments of the following countries
were represented, together with the ECOWAS
Parliament: Benin, Burkina Faso, DR Congo, Côte
d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, and Togo.
The following organisations also participated in
the seminar: the African Security Sector Network
(ASSN), the Africa Center for Strategic Studies
(ACSS), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
and the United Nations Office for West Africa
(UNOWA).
The experience acquired in other African regions
(Southern African Development Community,
SADC) and in other sectors (civil society) also
served as a contribution to this review exercise.
A description of the procedures used and
difficulties encountered by the defence and
security committees of the national assemblies
of Mali and Senegal in carrying out their function
of controlling government action provided
an opportunity to identify the similarities
and differences in political environments and
parliamentary initiatives.
The presentations on current parliamentary
practice in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, in
the area of security budget control led to a very
valuable exchange of experience.
Finally, it was felt that there was a need to continue
and further develop the issues discussed.
Participants therefore:
The opening session was chaired by His Excellency
Mahamane Ousmane, Speaker of the ECOWAS
Parliament, and was attended by distinguished
guests, in particular Professor Iba Der Thiam,
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of
Senegal, representing Speaker Mamadou Seck.
1) Agreed on the principle of establishing
an informal contact and consultation
mechanism to serve as a link among the
committees in charge of defence, peace, and
security in the various national parliaments,
and in the ECOWAS Parliament.
The contributions by experts and participants
highlighted the conditions required to ensure
the credibility and effectiveness of parliamentary
action.
2) Exhort partners such as DCAF and the
IPU to continue raising awareness and
coordinating with speakers of national
parliaments and the ECOWAS Parliament
with a view to ensuring that this mechanism
is established as soon as possible.
Presentations by parliamentarians from Ghana
and Senegal served as a basis for lengthy
discussion of parliamentary ethical standards.
The focus was mainly on accountability for
parliamentarians, who are required to exercise
their constitutional prerogatives more vigorously,
especially in the area of oversight of government
action.
3) Encourage the publication of collected
national defence and security legislations
from different countries, in order to
promote their harmonisation.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
11
4) Call for the implementation of a
comparative study on the functioning of
defence and security committees in the
various West African countries.
Participants were able to focus their discussions
and identify avenues for further exploration and
action in three areas, among others:
Parliamentary ethical standards
•
Drafting of codes of conduct to promote
greater transparency in the behaviour of
assemblies and parliamentarians.
•
Improving the working and living conditions
of parliamentarians in order to make them less
susceptible to corruption.
•
Sharing the experience of parliaments in this
area.
Functioning of committees
•
Capacity building for parliamentarians and
officials in charge of assisting these committees
through training programmes, information,
provision of funds, documentation, etc.
•
Establishing operational frameworks bringing
together committees, government authorities,
and defence and security forces, in order to
ensure more effective parliamentary oversight.
•
Recognising the sensitive nature of the sector,
and defining clear objectives and modalities of
parliamentary oversight that take into account
the legitimate constraints related to defence
secrecy and military regulations.
Budget oversight
12
•
Sharing experience and best practices in the
area of budgetary control.
•
Technical training for parliamentarians and
parliamentary assistants, including simulation
exercises.
•
Increased involvement of parliamentarians
in budgetary issues, in particular in defining
orientation, execution, as well as evaluation.
Regional Seminar
II. Opening statements
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
13
Welcome address by
Dr. Jean-Jacques Gacond
Deputy Head of Operations, Africa and the Middle East
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Honourable Speaker of the ECOWAS Parliament,
Honourable Deputy Speaker of the National
Assembly of Senegal,
Honourable Chairperson of the Security and
Defence Committee of the National Assembly of
Senegal,
Distinguished Director of the Inter Parliamentary
Union, in charge of governance,
Honourable representatives of the ECOWAS
Parliament and National Assemblies of ECOWAS
Member States,
Honourable representative of the SADC
Parliamentary Forum,
Distinguished representative of the Swiss
Embassy,
Distinguished representatives of UNDP and
UNOWA,
Distinguished representatives of the African
Security Sector Network,
Representatives of civil society organisations,
Dear conference speakers, dear participants, dear
guests,
I wish to express the deep gratitude of DCAF for
the opportunity to be associated with the National
Assembly of Senegal and the Inter Parliamentary
Union (IPU) in organising this regional seminar on
parliamentary oversight in the area of security in
West Africa, which is organised with the support
of the ECOWAS Parliament.
DCAF (Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces) is an intergovernmental forum on security
sector governance and reform, which was created
in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government
and whose Foundation Council now comprises
14
Regional Seminar
55 Member States. The main objective of our
organisation is to contribute to improving security
sector governance and ensure human security
based on the rule of law, respect for human rights
and the principles of good governance such as
transparency and accountability, and, of course,
professionalism and efficiency of the armed forces
and security services.
One of the key dimensions in improving security
sector governance is democratic oversight, which
is aimed at supervising these services in such a way
that their engagement falls in line with the security
needs defined in the national security policy, that
is, by the country’s civilian authorities. Democratic
oversight starts with internal control within the
services and troop corps, and is consolidated by
executive control through the ministries that
are most directly involved (defence, interior, and
finance). Within the framework of its parliamentary
oversight attributions, the legislative power also
has a very important role to play. Finally, one must
not forget the work of civil society, par excellence
the voice of the people.
Under the framework of capacity building for
parliaments, DCAF has the privilege of maintaining
excellent collaboration with the ECOWAS
Parliament, in particular with the Speaker and
the Chairperson of the political affairs, peace,
and security committee, both of who are with
us here today. In particular, the DCAF is currently
working with the regional parliament to finalise a
parliamentary guide for security sector oversight
based on the manual published jointly with the
Inter Parliamentary Union in 2003, and which will
be distributed to participants later on. The guide
being prepared contains specific chapters for West
Africa and others that have been adapted from the
manual. This document will soon be submitted to
the plenary session of the ECOWAS Parliament for
review and adoption. Once it has been finalised,
the document will be a valuable tool for building
the capacity of parliaments in the area of both
regional and national parliamentary oversight of
defence and security.
In addition, DCAF enjoys equally excellent
collaboration with the National Assembly of
Senegal and in particular with its defence and
security committee with which it jointly organised
a workshop last June, on the security challenges
in West Africa and security sector governance.
I am also pleased to mention our partnership with
the IPU with which we organised last year a similar
seminar to the one that is starting today, for East
Africa and the Great Lakes region.
Beyond building the capacity for oversight in the
areas of defence and security, the West African
region, which faces many security challenges,
is fortunate to have, in ECOWAS, a strategic
framework for promoting peace and security. It is
however important to be able to link this regional
strategic framework to the national dimension,
both in legislative terms and in terms of security
policy and the role of parliaments and more
specifically, their defence committees. Beyond the
specific topics presented, this seminar provides
an opportunity to initiate dialogue on security
among the representatives of the regional
parliament and national assemblies of Member
States.
Furthermore, ECOWAS Member States and
institutions have adopted a strategic framework
for conflict prevention, which defines fourteen
specific areas for promoting security, and includes
the topic of security governance, which is a priority
for DCAF.
There are strong links between security
governance, security sector reform, and the
importance of enhancing democratic oversight
and thus parliamentary oversight. For this reason,
parliaments need to be operational and capable
of carrying out such oversight professionally and
effectively.
This seminar is a continuation of the seminar
organised jointly with the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation in June 2009 in Abidjan, focusing on
such priority issues as the role of parliaments in
the area of small arms and light weapons control,
and crime, in particular human trafficking
and drug trafficking. The present seminar
will be focusing on parliamentary ethics and
anticorruption, the role of defence and security
committees in promoting peace and security, and
the importance of budgetary control, specifically
within the area of defence.
It is important to emphasise that this meeting is
not an end in itself but rather a stage in a process
aimed at enhancing the role, competence,
and capacities of both regional and national
parliaments in the area of peace and security. It
is also aimed at promoting regional dialogue on
these matters among West African parliaments
and ECOWAS Member States. We hope that this
seminar will meet your expectations and enable
us to make progress in this direction.
Before I conclude, allow me to express my
gratitude to the National Assembly of Senegal
and to the IPU with whom we have had the
honour and pleasure of organising this meeting.
Particular thanks go to the National Assembly
and its Speaker for having accepted to host this
meeting.
I should also like to thank the Swiss government,
which provided funds for the design and
publication of the parliamentary guide for West
Africa and also covered a major part of the cost of
organising this seminar.
I also wish to thank the ECOWAS Parliament, and
in particular the Speaker and the Chairperson of
the political affairs, peace, and security committee
for their unfailing support, as well as for taking
the time to travel to Dakar while the regional
parliament is in ordinary session in Abuja.
My thanks also go to the representatives of the
SADC Parliamentary Forum who have travelled
from southern Africa to share their experience and
their challenges with us.
A warm thank you to our friends from the African
Security Sector Network with whom we enjoy a
very valuable partnership and who are also the
ECOWAS Commission experts on security sector
reform. The two representatives here are West
African experts, but they are also professors in
the United States and they travelled across the
Atlantic Ocean to be with us here.
I should also like to thank all the lecturers, speakers,
and moderators who have accepted to share their
expertise and skills with us.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
15
My particular and sincere thanks to all the
participants, namely, the representatives of West
African national assemblies.
And finally, I wish to thank the UNDP, UNOWA, the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, and all the other organisations
that have taken the time to travel here to be with
us this morning.
I wish you all an excellent seminar.
Thank you.
16
Regional Seminar
Inaugural address
Mr. Martin Chungong
Director, Division for the Promotion of Democracy
Inter-Parliamentary Union
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to
speak to you on behalf of the Inter-Parliamentary
Union. I welcome you all to this meeting, which I
hope will be fruitful and instructive.
Allow me to express my gratitude to the National
Assembly of Senegal and in particular its Speaker,
Mr. Mamadou Seck, for having accepted to host
our meeting. I also wish to express our gratitude
to the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control
of Armed Forces, our habitual and valuable coorganiser, and to thank the ECOWAS Parliament
for its support.
Distinguished delegates,
gaps along the coast of West Africa, trafficking
in arms and human beings, and increasingly in
drugs, is flourishing. The porous northern borders
of West Africa are also vulnerable to the same
criminal acts. Security is further threatened by
the existence of abundant natural resources
and inadequate control over their extraction
and trade. Finally, population growth, food
insecurity, and environmental degradation in the
region constitute additional areas of concern.
To complete the picture, unstable and weak
democratic structures that exclude whole swathes
of society from the political process, that enhance
social and economic equalities, and that pave
the way for poor governance, continue to sustain
insecurity in certain parts of West Africa.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Over the past two decades, certain regions of West
Africa have experienced unprecedented waves of
violence that affected the region as a whole. In the
face of such conflicts, the political authorities have
on several occasions decided to work together
in the region, through ECOWAS, to attempt to
curb the violence. Indeed, member states of
ECOWAS, an organisation that was originally
aimed at promoting greater regional economic
cooperation, have used this body at decisive
moments to establish and maintain peace in the
region.
These interventions, which reflect the current
state of thinking on the link between security
and economic development, have been at the
core of a gradual and continuous transformation
of ECOWAS into a fully-fledged regional security
body, focusing on human security and using
instruments such as early warning and preventive
diplomacy.
In the light of the persisting threats in West Africa,
the IPU is convinced that this concerted approach
to human security is essential. Due to the security
Distinguished delegates,
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is essential for the security sector to be
effective and accountable to non partisan civilian
authorities, in particular through the existence of
a strong parliament that works in the interest of
citizens.
Security sector management may be the privilege
of the executive, but the tools used must be
wielded in a responsible and transparent manner.
Parliament has a major role to play in this regard.
The aim is not to usurp the role of the executive,
but rather to work in partnership with it.
There is no doubt about the need for parliamentary
control of the security sector, but parliamentarians
who work in this area often encounter a two-fold
difficulty. On the one hand, the inherent technical
nature of the security sector has always raised
formidable difficulties. Parliamentarians do not
always have the required know-how nor the time
or the opportunity to acquire it because their term
of office in parliament is limited. Furthermore, it is
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
17
often impossible to have access to experts in or
outside the country.
On the other hand, in an increasingly complex
security sector, which is dominated today by the
requirements of human security and the growing
links among nations, parliamentarians are faced
with even greater challenges in seeking to obtain
results. At the same time, and precisely because
of this situation, parliamentary control is crucial
if we want responses in the area of security
to be designed and implemented with total
transparency, accountability, and efficacy.
The IPU welcomes the opportunity provided
through this seminar to work with West African
national parliaments and the ECOWAS Parliament
in order to face these major challenges. We
hope that the presentations and debates in this
meeting will generate ideas that are capable of
strengthening the framework for parliamentary
control of the security sector in your region and
thus provide effective answers to the existing
national and regional security challenges. The
IPU, in partnership with the Geneva Centre for
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, looks forward
to working with the parliaments represented here
in order to attain this objective.
Thank you.
18
Regional Seminar
Address by
Honourable Mamadou Seck
Speaker of the National Assembly of Senegal
Honourable Speaker of the ECOWAS Parliament,
•
Environmental security
Honourable colleagues,
•
Personal security
Distinguished DCAF Deputy Head of Operations
for Africa and the Middle East,
•
Community security
•
Political security
Distinguished Director of the IPU Division for the
Promotion of Democracy,
Distinguished guests,
Distinguished experts,
Ladies and gentlemen,
It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to your
home, Senegal, and to wish you an excellent stay
here with your Senegalese brothers and sisters.
I am also happy that this meeting on
parliamentary oversight in the area of security,
jointly organised by the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Inter
Parliamentary Union, and the National Assembly
of Senegal, is being held here in Dakar.
This meeting demonstrates that you are fully aware
of the magnitude of security challenges facing the
countries in our region. At the same time, you are
committed to ensuring that parliaments play a
greater role in fulfilling our peoples’ aspirations
to peace and prosperity. Peace and prosperity,
two concepts that require the contemporary
understanding of the concept of security.
The expanding concept of security is now defined
as human security, in an approach that is both
holistic and humanist. In 1994, the UNDP Human
Development Report entitled “New Dimensions
of Human Security” described seven essential
aspects of this concept:
•
Economic security
•
Food security
•
Health security
In August 2000, the United Nations Secretary
General noted quite aptly in his activity report to
the 55th General assembly, that “collective security
can no longer be defined simply as an absence of
armed conflict, be it between or within States. Gross
abuses of human rights, the large-scale displacement
of civilian populations, international terrorism,
the AIDS pandemic, drug and arms trafficking and
environmental disasters present a direct threat to
human security, forcing us to adopt a much more
coordinated approach to a range of issues”.
While everyone agrees today that there is a need
to expand and deepen the concept of security,
the international community is still attempting to
draft a consensual definition of human security.
The doubts and questionings expressed by certain
States, in particular during the United Nations
General Assembly held in May 2010, reflect the
fear that this concept might be used to justify acts
of interference in their internal affairs.
But they are also a reflection of the complexity
of the debate through which the United Nations
are expected to arrive at a single definition of this
concept. There are several theories. According
to the proponents of the broad definition,
human security concerns not only conventional
threats like war, but also threats to development,
especially with respect to areas such as health,
poverty, and the environment. Under the limited
definition, human security is limited to the most
violent threats such as antipersonnel mines, small
arms and light weapons, and intra-State conflicts.
I hope that your discussions over the next two days
will contribute valuably to clarifying this concept,
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
19
in particular as it relates to the peculiar context of
the West African region. Indeed, this region, more
than any other, gives credence to the saying that
no development is possible without security.
Each day, trafficking in illicit substances such
as drugs, smuggled cigarettes, and counterfeit
medicines undermine the economic security and
health security of our populations. Furthermore,
in all too many countries, violations of individual
rights, manipulations of the democratic process,
and the use of ethnic or religious arguments
contribute to political instability and violent
confrontations.
Mr. Chairman,
Dear colleagues,
Ladies and gentlemen,
All these factors tend to tragically annihilate our
development efforts and worsen the suffering of
our people, who are grappling with grave dangers
such as massive population displacements, the
malaria and AIDS pandemics, flooding, and other
ecological disasters.
Against this backdrop, parliamentary oversight
in the area of security in West Africa, the topic of
your workshop, is of capital importance. Indeed,
as parliamentarians, within the framework of
democratic institutions, we are the appointed
representatives of these populations that are
wracked by the effects of the security deficit.
It is therefore our abiding duty to faithfully
express their aspirations and ensure that they are
effectively covered by all national and community
policies.
One of the prerequisites for achieving this
successfully is to enhance the capacities of
parliaments and improve their ability to carry out
analyses and make proposals, and it is fortunate
that this seminar is contributing to this. Your
discussions about a comprehensive approach to
parliamentary oversight in the security sector will
certainly enable you to highlight the achievements
in this area, as well as the remaining challenges,
in particular with respect to the essential aspect
of mainstreaming gender in security-related
legislation.
20
Regional Seminar
I hope that the lessons you will learn from the
experience of our colleagues from southern Africa
will enable you to identify the ways and means
of enduring enhanced parliamentary oversight
in the definition and implementation of security
policies, in particular where budgetary aspects are
concerned.
Mr. Chairman,
Dear colleagues,
Ladies and gentlemen,
By way of conclusion, allow me to emphasise
once more the importance of establishing an
effective mechanism to monitor and evaluate the
conclusions of your meeting, which, I hope, will
entrench a tradition of dialogue and shared action
on human security issues among our parliaments,
through their relevant committees.
This will be proof of the success of your meeting.
Thank you for your kind attention.
Address by
His Excellency, Honourable Mahamane Ousmane
Speaker of the Parliament of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Honourable Speaker of the National Assembly of
Senegal,
Honourable Speaker of the National Assembly of
Senegal,
Honourable members of national assemblies of
ECOWAS Member States,
Honourable members of national assemblies of
ECOWAS Member States,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Distinguished guests,
I would not wish to anticipate on the proceedings
that are about to start soon, with the participation
of qualified security experts.
I thank you for the honour granted to the ECOWAS
Parliament, through me, to speak at the opening
of this seminar on the topic of “Parliamentary
oversight in the area of security in West Africa”.
As you know, the question of security is essential
for peace and stability in Member States and the
Community as a whole.
It implies a set of complex notions that include
the duty of governments to protect their
citizens, which in turn requires the acquisition of
various types of weapons; designing adequate
information systems, and training individuals
and adopting rules for their deployment. They
also include drafting standards to guarantee
that all these material, informational, and human
resources shall be used exclusively for the purpose
of ensuring the individual and collective security
of individuals and legitimate institutions.
Parliamentary oversight of the security sector falls
within this context, and relates to the role that
parliaments must play in ensuring that the means
and mechanisms put in place to fulfil this dual
requirement are sufficient and effective, and are
not misappropriated for other purposes.
I should however like to touch upon the question
of the purpose of the armed forces and security
forces in general, which remains of great concern
to the community. Indeed, the hopes generated
by the inception of the democratic era in the
1990s, which was characterised by the military
returning to their barracks and affirming their
republican vocation, have gradually faded away in
many countries.
In certain ECOWAS Member States, there have
been coup d’états in various forms, as well as
acts of violence committed by the security forces
against the very citizens whom they are supposed
to protect. Such acts once again raise the question
of the role of defence and security forces.
Although they have sometimes contributed
to bringing an end to excesses and unstable
situations, parliaments nevertheless have some
questions to answer with respect to their role in
ensuring that the values of truly republican armed
and security forces are well entrenched. These
values include total dedication to protecting
individuals and legitimate institutions that have
been democratically appointed by the people, as
well as protecting the territorial integrity of the
country.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
21
Honourable Speaker of the National Assembly of
Senegal,
Honourable members of national assemblies of
ECOWAS Member States,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Where ECOWAS is concerned, you will have
noticed that the question of security has gained
increasing importance over the past few years.
Various parts of our community space have been
affected by crises and conflicts, as demonstrated
by the different extraordinary summits of ECOWAS
heads of state that have been held to consider
one or the other situation in a member country,
and sometimes in several members countries at
a time: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, etc.
Indeed, the most recent extraordinary summit
was held less than a week ago in Abuja to review
the cases of Guinea and Guinea Bissau.
Experts are in a better position to speak about
the community mechanism on this matter, both
with respect to the circulation of arms in the
ECOWAS area and the measures currently being
taken to effectively implement the stand-by force.
There is also the outlook for armed and security
forces reforms undertaken by certain Member
States such as the Republic of Guinea and Guinea
Bissau.
ECOWAS parliamentarians must play their
role. As representatives of the populations of
this Community, they have the considerable
responsibility for keeping watch over the activities
of sectors that contribute to the wellbeing and
peace of mind of the population, in particular the
security sector.
It is therefore important and even imperative that
they be assisted to acquire a better vision of:
•
Their role in this area, which is often considered
sensitive, secret, and opaque.
•
The tools available to them, which are often
unfamiliar or misused.
Such knowledge will subsequently enable them
to enhance their capacity to do the following:
22
•
Adopt appropriate legislation on essential
issues.
•
Carry out effective parliamentary oversight.
Regional Seminar
This is why the ECOWAS Parliament has been
resolutely engaged in a process of collaboration
and cooperation to produce a manual, a practical
guide for the use of parliamentarians, which is
adapted to our regional context.
The ECOWAS Parliament already held a major
workshop on this subject in June 2010 in Cotonou,
with the participation of the political affairs, peace,
and security committee and the legal and judicial
affairs committee, sitting as a joint committee.
The proceedings of this workshop will no doubt
further enrich the substance of the guide on
parliamentary oversight of the security sector that
is currently being drafted jointly by the ECOWAS
Parliament and DCAF.
Honourable Speaker of the National Assembly of
Senegal,
Honourable members of national assemblies of
ECOWAS Member States,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Allow me, once again, to express the gratitude of
the community parliament. I thank you for your
kind attention.
And, God bless you.
III. Presentations
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
23
Session 1
A comprehensive approach to parliamentary
oversight in the area of security
24
Regional Seminar
Parliamentary oversight within the context of West Africa:
an overview of successes and challenges
Pr. Boubacar N’Diaye
African Security Sector Network
The College of Wooster
Wooster Ohio, United States
There is no true democracy without a legislative
power that plays its role fully as legislator,
controller of the action of the executive, and
representative of voters’ interests. Also, without
effective and competent parliamentary oversight
of security policy and the activities of the security
apparatus there cannot be (and will never be)
true reform, and thus no good governance, of
the security sector. In other words, security sector
reform in West Africa, which is a prerequisite
for many other things, cannot be achieved if
parliamentary oversight is not a vital part of the
process. This should be the almost unquestionable
starting point from which to launch any attempt
to assess the achievements of parliaments in
this region over recent years, as well as any
consideration of how to enhance their ability
to improve the way in which they play their role
in bringing about true democratisation of our
societies and our political systems.
When I think about parliamentary oversight of
the executive power, and more specifically of
the security sector in West Africa, I cannot help
but think back to two events (among many
other similarly symbolic ones), which to my mind
demonstrate the hopes, misfortunes, and dangers
that the parliamentary institution inspires, with
respect to the political evolution of our region.
One of these events occurred in February 2007
when members of the Guinean parliament
unanimously refused to approve the state of
siege declared by the late president Lassana
Conte, the head of the hard pressed regime.
This was in spite of the fact that 90% of the
seats in the National Assembly were held by his
political party. The second more recent event is
the role played by a large number of MPs and
senators in the Mauritanian parliament (a group
which subsequently earned the name of the
“parliamentary brigade”) during the takeover of
power by General Ould Abdel Aziz in the coup
d’état against the first democratically elected
president in the history of that country, on 6th
August 2008. This was a parliament in which he
had enjoyed support from an overwhelming
majority until then.
Of course, I would be the first to acknowledge that
the complexity, the wealth of experience, and the
challenges facing West African parliaments, as well
as the successes recorded over the two decades
that followed the process of democratisation
of African political systems cannot be reduced
to these two events alone. In any case, a brief
presentation such as this one cannot do justice to
this rich experience and all the lessons it teaches.
In this light, another highly significant event
that could be cited is the fact that the Nigerian
parliament blocked to the insidious attempts
by President Obasanjo to seek a third term of
office despite the provisions of the country’s
constitution.
These events however clearly demonstrate what
parliamentarians can accomplish to inspire hope
in the democratisation process, in spite of certain
inherited traditions, a certain reflexive tendency
to conform, and the political burdens and
pressures of the moment. They also demonstrate
that parliamentarians can dash these hopes, even
when the choices placed before them are very
clear.
There is no doubt that in the political evolution
of our countries, which are faced with a great
number of challenges in a world that has become
increasingly restrictive and complex, West African
parliaments, like all other institutions, are faced with
the constraints imposed on them by these factors.
In judging them, therefore, these constraints must
be kept in mind. Any evaluation of the recent
achievements of West African parliaments, even if
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
25
it is only a cursory one, must start by recalling the
road travelled by these institutions. Collectively,
they have come a long way.
In West Africa, during the four decades of single
party, openly authoritarian regimes (civilian and
military), the role of parliament consisted mainly
of approving and endorsing decisions generally
taken elsewhere. In practice parliaments became
rubber stamp parliaments whose only reason for
existing was to give a legislative cast to decisions
taken by the head of state or his party. This was
even more so when such decisions related to the
armed and security forces or generally to defence
and security (in the broadest sense), where control
was vital for the survival of the regime.
The security sector was supposed to be the
exclusive domain of the head of state, his security
advisers, and high-ranking officers of the armed
forces. The concepts of “defence secret” or “state
secret” were misused to cover certain opaque
practices and to intimidate the rare statutory
oversight bodies. As we well know, acts of
embezzlement and human rights abuse went
unpunished. Within this environment, parliament
was totally excluded from defining, implementing,
monitoring, or evaluating defence and security
policy. The same could be said of civil society, as
well as the ordinary citizen. Any assessment must
take into account this institutional and political
heritage.
At the beginning of the 1990s, West Africa, like
the rest of the continent started a new phase in
its socio-political evolution. It quickly became
clear that the tradition of exclusive management
of security issues was not compatible with the
aspirations of the population for true democracy.
Through the national conferences, and in reaction
to the excesses arising out of the concentration of
powers in the hands of presidents, in countries like
Benin and Togo the powers of the executive were
reduced and those of parliament were increased.
Nevertheless, this positive evolution soon slowed
down because of the heritage mentioned above
and the determination of the different executive
powers to recover their omnipotence that had
been temporarily undermined, albeit timidly.
The positive evolution was also hampered by the
accumulated weaknesses of the parliamentary
institution and parliamentarians themselves. This
seems to demonstrate a lack of awareness of
the urgent need to strengthen the institution of
26
Regional Seminar
parliament and in particular to enhance its role in
the area of security. For instance, parliamentarians
are often as ill-informed about security matters as
their constituents and prefer not to deal with such
issues, voluntarily leaving them to be managed by
the executive.
Seen through a number of studies in which I
have been involved, the experience of several
West African countries shows that parliamentary
oversight in the area of security and defence has
been broadly inexistent. In many West African
parliaments, this applies to budgetary procedures,
but also to the activities of the defence and
security committees. And this remains true today,
even when democratic elections have taken place
and different political parties that were in favour
of change are represented in the new parliament.
The situation is the same, even in cases where
security is the leading concern of the population.
During the workshop on parliamentary oversight
held in August 2008, this fact was inadvertently
demonstrated in the speech given by the
president of the defence and security committee
from one of the countries in this region. In his
address, he stated that between 1994 and 2008,
that is, a period of 14 years, “more than a dozen
questions were addressed to government on
security matters”. Given the prevailing security
difficulties in that country since 1994, a parliament
that was playing its oversight role fully in the area
of security should have put much “more than a
dozen” questions, carried out investigations, and
undertaken more initiatives in relation to the
mission of parliament in the area of security.
Thus, in spite of the establishment of (sometimes
faltering) political pluralism in several West African
countries, parliamentary oversight as an essential
component of democratic governance in the
security sector is not yet a reality. Furthermore,
in addition to the political and institutional
constraints, there is also the lack of material and
human resources, which are just as important to
enable parliaments to carry out their constitutional
and legal obligations in the following areas:
•
Legislation
•
Supervising the policies and activities of the
executive power
•
Representing voters and their interests
•
Providing services to constituents/citizens
directly
A quick tour of the premises of many parliaments
(which I have had the opportunity to do in several
West African countries) shows how they are almost
totally lacking in many resource. It also shows the
various difficulties facing members of defence
and security committees, as well as the conditions
in which they are required to play their role. Of
course, this is due to a large extent to the fact that
these countries are poor and are in a situation of
almost chronic economic crisis. Nevertheless, one
of the paradoxes of this lack of material and human
resources is that parliament has power over the
budget and should therefore in theory, and under
the provisions of the constitution of almost all
West African countries, be able to endow itself
with the required equipment (office equipment,
libraries, archives, etc.) in addition to the expertise
required to carry out its mission.
Parliaments, and in particular the committees in
charge of defence are sorely lacking in support
staff with the necessary training and motivation
to facilitate the task of parliamentarians by
providing them with the required technical
resources that will enable them to take informed
decisions on issues related to national security.
Such technical support is even more vital as there
is a generally high rate of turnover in parliaments.
This material shortage is also in part one of the
consequences of the long-standing practice of
giving precedence to the executive when it came
to providing different state institutions with
material and human resources. Parliament was
not considered a priority institution for the proper
functioning of government or for entrenching
democratic traditions. In spite of the changes that
have occurred since the end of the era of single
parties and military regimes, this situation has
not changed much. It is therefore urgent today to
institute and institutionalise what must be called
a “culture of democratic oversight”, applied to the
security sector in particular.
One area in which this culture could begin to be
applied is in combating corruption. Corruption is
rampant in our governments and societies, but
it seems almost paradoxically to have somewhat
spared our parliaments. This is no doubt due
to the fact that this institution is not a centre of
power (compared for example to the United
States Congress, where in 2006 cheques issued
by various business lobbies were distributed
during the plenary while Congress was in session).
Parliament can and must play a vital role in this
fight. Members of Parliament must be determined
and bold. They must take the initiative of fully
exercising their powers with respect to the
budget, including carrying out the necessary
investigations and enquiries, to ensure that
public funds are being used in a transparent and
appropriate manner. This will require courage,
determination, and a true understanding of the
institutional mission of Parliament. This is the
price that West African parliaments are required
to pay to be able to participate fully in deepening
democracy and forging a place in the sun for this
institution which is so vital to any democratisation
process, and of course also for good governance
of the security sector.
From this point of view, security is seen as a public
good and therefore as the business of every
individual (ordinary citizens, civil society, and state
and non-state institutions); but first and foremost,
it is the business of parliament. In practice, the
following measures need to be taken:
•
Acknowledge explicitly that the past policies
of excluding parliament and other actors from
oversight of the armed and security forces
have been detrimental to democratic practice
and to efficiency.
•
Involve parliament in drafting, implementing,
monitoring and evaluating all defence
and security policies, in particular through
specialised committees.
•
Establish a constitutional/legal framework for
defence and security governance in which
parliament plays its role fully.
•
Enhance the capacities of parliament by
providing expertise and material, human, and
financial resources to enable it carry out its
legislative mission fully and provide oversight
of the security sector.
•
Establish a framework for consultation and
cooperation between the executive and
parliament through specialised parliamentary
committees, in order to ensure optimum
management of security and defence matters,
both with respect to human rights and in the
area of budgetary and financial transparency.
•
Establish a balance between the legitimate
need for confidentiality and the requirements
of transparency with respect to defence and
security sector financing and activities.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
27
•
28
Establish procedures that will enable all actors
in the security to sector to fulfil their respective
missions and render accounts, including
before parliament.
Regional Seminar
Security Sector Reform and Gender:
the Role of the Parliament
Ms. Karin Grimm
Project Coordinator Gender and SSR
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
How to define the security sector?
Providers of Security and Judicial Services
Non official service providers
Official agents of security/justice
•Private military and security firms
•Non-State armed groups
•Organised crime networks
•Political party militia
•“Conventional” service providers
•Defence forces
•Paramilitary forces
•Intelligence and secret services
•Police and gendarmerie
•Border guards and customs service
•Criminal courts, prisons
Private
Public
Civil society
Formal oversight mechanisms
•NGOs
•Media
•Research centres
•Voters
• Executive and civilian management
bodies
•Legislature
•Legal framework
Governance and Oversight Bodies
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
29
What is security?
- “perception” and/or “reality”?
- “expectation” and/or “experience”?
Traditional security
agenda
“New” security agenda
(non-traditional)
Expanding the concept
of security
Attention focused on
military security
And non-military
security (political,
economic, social, etc.)
Deepening the concept
of security
State security
national security
And individual security
human security
Basic concepts of gender and SSR
Definition of gender?
•
•
•
•
Women, men, boys, and girls
Socio-culturally constructed roles
Changes through different cultures and time
Women, men, girls, and boys have different security needs and different experiences with
the security sector
Whose security?
30
Regional Seminar
Advantages of a gender-sensitive security sector
1. Participation
Drafting process
Consolidated drafting process
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
31
2. Effective and efficient security and
judicial service delivery through:
a.
Truly representative security institutions
---
---
32
Gender policy – national/sector
Human resource policy (access criteria,
eligible positions, salaries, maternity
leave, conditions and modalities
governing marriage, etc.)
Infrastructure and clothes/equipment
Code of conduct
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b.
Prevention of, and effective response to,
sexist and sexual violence
-----
Competent and well-trained security
agents
Appropriate mandates and structures
Codes of conduct
Checking recruits’ prior records
3. Enhanced control and empowerment
4. Compliance with national, regional,
and international instruments and
legislation
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
33
Legal and policy frameworks
health services for men and women.)
Do resource allocations enable effective
implementation?
•
UN Secretary-General’s report on SSR
•
UN Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW)
•
ECOWAS framework document on conflict
prevention (2008)
•
Others
----
UN Security Council Resolutions 1325,
1820, 1888, and 1889
Protocol to the AU African Charter on
the Rights of Women (2003)
National gender and SSR policies, e.g.
on the implementation of Resolution
1325 (national action plan)
What can parliament do?
•
Legislation and drafting security policies:
----
Gender-balanced security laws and
policies
Inclusive security laws and policies
Laws and policies that are in line with
the international legal and political
framework
•
Representative and effective security
sector institutions
•
Representative parliamentary decisionmaking
•
Equitable resource
management
•
Parliamentary oversight – monitoring and
evaluation
budgeting
and
Gender-sensitive budgeting
Example: Defence sector
•
•
34
Do general allocations allow for equitable
security services for women, men, girls,
and boys?
Does the budget include special funds
for women, men, girls, or boys? (For
example, by allocating funds for recruiting
women, maternity and paternity leave,
Regional Seminar
•
Does the budget include gender-specific
activities, resources, and costs (e.g. for
gender training)? Do resource allocations
enable effective implementation?
•
Are gender specialists/advisors involved in
the budget cycle?
Recommendations
1. Support the signing, ratification, and
implementation of international and regional
conventions on mainstreaming gender in the
security sector.
2. Increase
representation
of
women
parliamentarians by applying quotas,
reforming electoral systems, and providing
capacity building for female candidates.
3. Increase
representation
of
women
parliamentarians in defence and security
committees.
4. Provide capacity building on gender for
both male and female parliamentarians, in
particular members of defence and security
committees.
5. Involve civil society, especially women’s
organisations in drafting security policy
through broad consultations, public audiences,
and other formal and informal mechanisms.
6. Establish a gender group comprising both
women and men to study and support gendersensitive budgeting and legislation.
7. Introduce and support gender-sensitive
budget initiatives and carry out studies on the
gender impact of security policies.
8. Commission and request data on gender
mainstreaming and membership of security
sector institutions, broken down by gender.
9. Oversee the deployment and execution of
peacekeeping missions.
Parliamentary ethical standards
Honourable Ibra Diouf Niokhobaye
Member of the National Assembly of Senegal and Member of the ECOWAS Parliament
Contribution presented at the seminar by Honourable Mamadou Lamine Thiam
Member of the National Assembly of Senegal
Introduction
Holding
parliamentary
office
involves
parliamentarians accepting a series of constraints
and rules both within and without the boundaries
of the parliamentary institution. Parliament
expects a high degree of assiduity and punctuality
from members.
Parliament requires that its members comply
with rules of ethics and good conduct in their
contacts with the outside world, because some
behaviour might be an offence to parliament.
In all their actions, members of parliament must
demonstrate a responsible social conscience with
respect to the parliamentary institution on one
hand, and the general public on the other.
This is why it is important to have a code of
parliamentary ethics or good conduct, which
must serve as an instrument to fight against the
general lack of confidence not only in parliaments,
but in all political institutions in West Africa.
Parliamentary ethical standards establish the
principles and rules to be used in judging the acts
and behaviour of members, as well as the motives
and consequences attached thereto.
Expectations of the population
There are many extremely important issues and
challenges. In all instances, the question to be
answered is this: how can we do better in order
to:
•
Improve the image of elected officers to the
general public
•
Enhance the trust of citizens in parliaments
•
Improve the credibility of our parliamentary
institutions
•
Demonstrate the usefulness of elections and
elected officers
•
Make politics meaningful
•
Effectively fight
corruption
•
Consolidate representative and participatory
democracy
against
all
forms
of
Although they may sometimes pursue personal
objectives, parliamentarians essentially lead a life
of public service. In their daily lives, their actions,
conduct, and behaviour must be in line with the
norms and rules of behaviour of the environment
in which they live.
Members of parliament must set the example by
observing the highest standards of good conduct.
Parliamentary institutions and parliamentarians
are rightly or wrongly becoming increasingly
unpopular, and there is therefore a need to draft a
parliamentary code of ethics in West Africa.
Clear, comprehensive, and appropriate rules must
be adopted to guide members of Parliament and
thus build and consolidate the trust of citizens
in West African parliamentary institutions. The
aim of such rules is to promote a political culture
that is based on honesty, integrity, transparency,
loyalty, selflessness, objectivity, frankness, and
accountability.
A parliamentary code of ethics would make it
possible to restore the good reputation and good
image of parliamentarians, as well as the credibility
of parliamentary institutions. Representative
and participatory democracy would thus be
strengthened.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
35
Eight important rules for
parliamentarians
•
•
Honesty: parliamentarians must avoid all
forms of conflict of interest and take measures
to protect the public interest.
Integrity: in carrying out their activities,
parliamentarians must not make any
undertakings to persons or external bodies that
could influence them in their parliamentary
functions.
•
Transparency: parliamentarians must ensure
that every single act, from its conception to its
implementation, follows clear rules.
•
Loyalty: parliamentarians must demonstrate
respect for institutions and the texts that
govern them, as well as the mandate that has
been entrusted to them by their constituents.
•
Selflessness: in carrying out their functions,
parliamentarians must only make decisions
that serve the public interest.
•
Objectivity: in their relations with agents of
the public administration/state, para-state,
or private enterprises, parliamentarians must
give precedence to the general interest and
merit.
•
Frankness: in carrying out their duties, in
making decisions, and in all activities that they
undertake, parliamentarians must be sincere
and frank.
•
Accountability: parliamentarians must be
totally accountable for their decisions and
their acts. They must render account to the
general public and be subject to the bylaws of
the assembly, as well as existing laws.
The general public expects parliamentarians to
obey these rules in carrying out their duties on
the basis of their personal convictions and their
commitment to serving the public interest, rather
than on their aspirations to hold power for their
personal benefit. By obeying these rules, members
of parliament can break down the wall of mistrust
and thus build and consolidate the trust of citizens
in parliamentary institutions.
36
Regional Seminar
Objective limitations to the work
of parliaments in West Africa and
suggested solution
In most West African countries, voting along ethnic
or religious lines has a direct or indirect influence
on the behaviour and conduct of members
of parliament and the rules of conduct to be
complied with, and thus represents a challenge
for true supporters of the republic.
In an environment where an individual defines
him or herself first by the ethnic or religious group
to which they belong, rather than their political
affiliation, the political culture remains strongly
influenced by this state of things: people do not
adopt positions on behalf of all citizens, but rather
on behalf of their ethnic group, their region or
their religious community.
To remedy this situation, a consensual code of
conduct would need to be drafted and applied
after broad consultation with all stakeholders. The
emphasis should be placed on raising awareness
with elected members of parliament so that they
understand that their mandate is both general
and representative:
•
General because parliamentarians represent
the whole nation and not just a group of
voters.
•
Representative because parliamentarians
cannot be bound by an order emanating from
one voter or a pressure group, ethnic group, or
religious group.
Combating corruption and the role
of parliaments: a major challenge
Corruption is a universal phenomenon that
can be found in all countries of the world.
It exists in both developed and developing
countries. Nevertheless, the manifestations and
consequences of corruption vary according to the
degree of development of each country.
In West Africa, corruption is a major obstacle
to sound (financial, human, and material)
resource management, and thus undermines all
development efforts. This is why fighting against
corruption is a duty for all individuals and more
particularly for members of parliament, who
are the representatives of the people. Fighting
against corruption not only makes it possible to
have sound resource management and improved
governance, but also contributes to setting or
restoring the rights of all citizens.
Political vagrancy or transhumance is
when a member of parliament changes
their political affiliation after having been
elected through a party or a coalition of
parties.
Corruption may occur in different circumstances/
departments:
•
•
•
•
In most West African countries (e.g. Mali,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Benin) such a
move does not lead to sanctions.
When public and private sector agents are
involved in public procurement
In the tax administration, for revenue
collection or taxation of certain financial and
commercial transactions
Police, gendarmerie, or customs departments
In the judicial administration To a lesser degree, but which also affects citizens,
corruption involves civil servants who are often
underpaid or simply greedy and who demand
payment for services that users are entitled to
receive free of charge: issuing a driving licence
or passport, authorisation to engage in certain
businesses, etc.
The general causes of corruption are bad
governance, lack of transparency, weak
institutions in charge of controlling public policy
implementation and/or the fact that mechanisms
created for this purpose are not independent,
inadequate press freedom, poor salaries, and a
lack of civic mindedness.
West African parliamentarians must also find the
right solution for financing political parties and
using the money generated by their activities
in particular during electoral campaigns, when
peoples’ consciences (votes) are most likely to
be susceptible to payment. This is a growing
phenomenon in the region. This situation needs
to end urgently, in order to avoid skewing the
democratic process. Similarly, there is a need to
bring an end to the phenomenon that is known
as “political vagrancy or transhumance” (see box
below).
In Senegal, however, article 60, paragraph
4 of the constitution stipulates that “the
mandate of any member of parliament
who resigns from his or her party in the
course of the legislature shall automatically
be terminated. He or she shall be replaced
according to the conditions defined by an
organic statute.”
There are a number of national and regional anticorruption instruments in place. The difficulty
however lies in their effective application.
These instruments include the following:
•
Courts of accounts
•
General Inspectorates
government
•
Parliaments (more specifically their specialised
committees)
•
The Protocol on the Fight against Corruption,
signed by all members of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
in 2001 in Dakar
•
Laws establishing the national committee for
combating non-transparency, corruption, and
embezzlement (in Senegal, this committee was
established by law n° 2003-35 of 24 November
2003).
of
finance
and
In carrying out the mandate entrusted to them
by the constitution, which is to legislate, oversee
the activities of the executive, and represent the
people, parliaments have a key role to play in
fighting to eradicate corruption.
There is an urgent need to draft codes of conduct
for parliamentarians, which in addition to general
principles, outline standards of behaviour. There
is also the need to draft a law which will make
it possible to ensure that the behaviour and
actions of parliamentarians comply with the
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
37
highest standards, and also stipulate appropriate
sanctions in case of violations. To do this, an ethics
committee must be established. Its membership
must reflect the political diversity.
Recommendations for parliaments
and parliamentarians
•
Establish standards of integrity for
parliamentarians
and
other
public
personalities, in particular ministers and other
agents of government, and ensure that they
are applied. Such standards would include
in particular, codes of ethics/conduct, and
declaration of assets, and would also govern
conflicts of interest.
•
Pass anti-corruption laws that include
sufficiently severe sentences and other
measures that are dissuasive enough to
prevent repeat offences. Introduce provisions
that leave no leeway for corruption in the
criminal code, administrative law, and all other
relevant areas of law. Stipulate sufficiently
deterrent sanctions.
•
Ensure the adoption of the required legislation
with respect to oversight, in order to provide
transparency and accountability in public
management.
•
Encourage governments to sign and/or ratify
the relevant international instruments, and
ensure that national legislation is aligned on
such provisions, and that they are effectively
applied.
•
Ensure the adoption of legislation governing
freedom of information, which obliges the
executive branch to divulge information that
is considered necessary for parliamentary
deliberations, in particular with respect to
reviewing cases of corruption.
•
Ensure the adoption of legislation on the
funding of political parties and electoral
campaigns that enhances the transparency
of the electoral process and thus grants
greater legitimacy to elected candidates.
Among its provisions, such legislation should
make it obligatory for political parties and
organisations to declare their sources of
funding, and should stipulate heavy sentences
for violations of these provisions.
•
Ensure the adoption of legislation to prevent
various forms of corruption, in particular
through the following measures: guarantee a
satisfactory level of social protection for each
citizen; introduce salary scales in the public
The role of the media is also extremely important.
It is essential to ensure freedom of information
and access for the general public.
Parliamentarians are also citizens, and they must
be called to account for their acts before the
appropriate courts of the land if they violate the
law, in particular with respect to human rights.
Nevertheless, under circumstances where there
is a need to turn the page in the interest of peace
and stability, “truth and reconciliation” committees
may be set up in certain countries, as was the case
in Liberia, for example. This requires a nation-wide
consensus, in a spirit of patriotism and discernment,
in the clear interest of a whole population.
Parliaments and parliamentarians
The majority of West African parliaments and
parliamentarians are empowered to establish the
legal framework for organising and managing
public affairs. Generally speaking, they should
endeavour to ensure that national constitutions
include grand principles such as integrity for all
politicians, transparency in the public service, and
the credibility of institutions.
Because of their roles and prerogatives,
parliamentarians should put constitutional and
legal mechanisms to the best use to oversee the
activities of the executive branch, and thus ensure
transparent and responsible management of
public affairs.
As representatives of the people, members of
parliament must always seek to improve their
image by adopting proper rules of conduct. They
also have a duty to ensure that the voice of the
population is heard in the management of public
affairs.
Parliaments also have a key role to play on the
international scene. To this end, they have a
moral duty to ensure that international affairs
are managed in accordance with the highest
standards of ethics and integrity. This international
dimension of the work of national, regional, and
continental parliaments requires more effective
inter-parliamentary cooperation in fighting
against corruption and money laundering.
38
Regional Seminar
service that do not encourage corruption, and
establish rapid and transparent administrative
procedures that enable all individuals to
participate in decision-making processes
under equal conditions.
•
Consolidate the laws and regulations that
make it possible to guarantee transparency in
public procurement procedures, tax regimes,
the administration of justice, etc.
•
Establish and/or consolidate parliamentary
mechanisms that enable the executive
power to account for its activities (questions
to government, systematic referrals to
committees to review and monitor public
affairs, in particular those related to security
and human rights).
•
Ensure that the process for drafting and
executing the national budget is transparent
and includes guarantees against all forms
of misappropriation in administering public
funds and resources. To this end, parliaments
could envisage establishing parliamentary
standing committees such as the public
accounts committees, or enhance the powers
and resources of the latter, as required.
•
Ensure the establishment of oversight
institutions such as the court of accounts,
the general auditor or a parliamentary ethics
committee. Ensure that these institutions
are provided with the necessary resources
and that their reports are given the required
attention by parliament.
•
Ensure that the opposition is sufficiently
represented in parliamentary bodies,
and is able to express its views about the
management of public affairs on equal terms,
including the possibility of reporting acts of
corruption, or investigating allegations of
corruption.
•
Encourage the government to establish
transparent and stringent mechanisms for
appointing individuals to positions of high
public office, in order to ensure that only
the most competent and honest people are
appointed to such positions. Set up effective
mechanisms for punishing government
agents who misappropriate public funds while
in office.
•
Encourage the general public to report and
punish corruption. To this end, provide all those
who play an active role in fighting corruption
with effective support and protection from
intimidation, in particular through legislative
measures.
•
Promote a heightened sense of probity and
moral integrity through awareness-raising
campaigns. Include and promote civic
education in school curricula.
•
Promote international cooperation among
parliaments and parliamentarians with a view
to fighting corruption, through exchange of
experience and best practices, etc. To this
end, encourage parliaments to participate in
regional and interregional seminars that foster
the exchange of information on effective
anti-corruption techniques and laws, as well
as research on the issue, and also facilitate
a review of institutional arrangements and
processes to improve their functioning.
Such measures should also be coordinated
at regional level by the ECOWAS Parliament
and at continental level by the Pan-African
Parliament.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
39
Session 2
Defence/ security committees and
parliamentary mechanisms applied to the
security sector
40
Regional Seminar
The role of the SADC Parliamentary Forum and civil
society in Southern Africa in promoting governance of
the security sector in the SADC region
Honorable Sango Patekile Holomisa
Member of the SADC Parliamentary Forum’s Standing Committee
on Democracy and Governance
Introduction
Control of the security sector is ordinarily vested in
the Executive. While oversight over the Executive
is the constitutional prerogative of Parliaments,
oversight over the security sector is inherently
a complex task inter alia because of the very
technical issues, the significant size and the secrecy
laws and rules involved.1 From a contemporary
perspective, meaningful and effective oversight
should take place in a constructive and nonadversarial manner, as oversight is ultimately
about accountability and good governance.2 This
focus on oversight is a fundamental principle in
promoting good governance.
Those departments which have access to weapons
and the ability to utilise organised violence, as
part of their mandate, are quite different from,
say, the departments of health and education,
and as such they should be treated differently.3
It is, therefore, important that they should utilise
this power in a responsible manner for the benefit
of society, rather than in an uncontrolled and selfserving fashion.4 Our continent’s violent history
attests to the dire consequences of the utilisation
of the security sector in a self-serving fashion.
In creating checks and balances to prevent this,
most societies have insisted on the subordination
of this sector to the political authority of the day.
The notion that ‘oversight is a process and not an
event’5 also confirms that in the case of security
matters, it should not be allowed to be utilised
for short term political gain, but be viewed as an
investment in safeguarding a specific way of life.
This view goes to the heart of good governance
which pivots around transparency, accountability,
representivity, accessibility and effectiveness.
It is against this background that this brief
will discuss the role of the Southern African
Development Community Parliamentary Forum
(SADC PF) and civil society in promoting
governance of the security sector in general, and
that of South Africa as a case study from where
possible lessons can be learnt.
The structure and nature of the
SADC PF
The SADC PF was established in 1996 with its
main goal “[t]o strengthen the implementation
capacity of SADC by involving Parliamentarians in
the work of SADC.” It is a consultative and advisory
inter-parliamentary forum without law-making
powers. It is the voice of Parliamentarians covering
fourteen SADC countries with over 3 000 Members
of Parliament. It works with and through national
Parliaments. The Plenary Assembly of the SADC
PF is the highest policy-making and deliberative
organ, which meets twice per year to make policy
decisions and recommendations to the Summit
of Heads of State and Government on various
issues affecting the SADC region. The SADC PF
has a Secretariat which is headed by a Secretary
General.6
In pursuit of its objectives, the SADC PF undertakes
activities in the following programme areas:
•
Democracy and Governance
•
Regional Integration
•
Capacity Building
Parliamentarians
•
Gender
•
HIV and AIDS
for
Parliaments
and
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
41
SADC PF’s and South Africa’s
contribution to the governance
of the security sector, peace and
stability in Southern Africa
SADC PF
related protocols; other efforts include initiating
and amending various pieces of legislation to
facilitate the good governance of the security
sector such as:
•
The Constitution:7 Section 55(2) requires the
provision of mechanisms to (a) ensure that all
executive organs of state in the national sphere
of government are accountable to it and (b)
maintain oversight of the exercise of National
Executive authority, as well as any organ of
state. Section 92(2) renders Cabinet Members
accountable to Parliament collectively and
individually for the exercise of their powers
and the performance of their functions, which
include the political responsibility to account
for policies and financial accountability for the
expenditure of public funds.
•
The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and
Related Matters Act, 20098 which, for the first
time, gives Parliament a tool to amend Money
Bills and ensure that money is also spent on
priorities as informed by its constituents.
•
The Public Finance Management Act
(PFMA)9, 1999 provides the primary
legislation for financial accountability of the
security sector. The main objective is to ensure
transparency, accountability and sound
management of the revenue, expenditure,
assets and liabilities of all public institutions.
•
The Rules of the National Assembly (NA)
and the National Council of Provinces
(NCOP) include sections that deal with how
Committees conduct their business;10 and
the general powers of Committees. They
cover the authority to issue summons, receive
representations and submissions, conduct
public hearings and exercise powers assigned
by the Constitution, legislation and other
provisions. Sub-rule 201(c) states specifically
that Committees, as part of their functions,
may monitor, investigate and enquire on issues
concerning the budget of a department11,
including the security sector departments.
Similar rules regulate the workings of the Joint
Committees of the two Houses of Parliament.
•
The National Strategic Intelligence Act, the
Defence Act and the South African Police
Service Act are laws that are continuously
being scrutinised and amended to ensure that
these are keeping abreast with developments
in their respective environments.
Over the last ten years, the SADC PF has placed
emphasis on the importance of parliamentary
capacity development and standards setting by
developing regional instruments that parliaments
and governments alike can use in promoting good
governance and deepening democracy, thereby
ensuring peace and stability in the SADC region.
These include:
•
•
•
In the area of Election Observation, the SADC
PF has developed Norms and Standards for
Elections in the SADC Region (2001) and this
has resulted in the strengthening of electoral
institutions.
A Model Law on HIV/AIDS (2008) to address
all of the relevant areas in need of legislative
reform has been developed. It provides a
comprehensive framework for harmonisation
of HIV and human rights laws and remains an
important point of reference and sounding
board for legislative reforms.
Participation in the SADC Regional
Consultative Initiatives on the Protocol on
Gender and Development. The Protocol was
welcomed by both women and men in the
region as a progressive move towards gender
equality. It also successfully established
national and regional women’s parliamentary
caucuses.
•
The Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures
in Southern Africa is an important selfassessment tool and point of reference on best
practices for parliaments. This is in the process
of being finalised.
•
Advocating the ratification, domestication
and implementation of SADC protocols and
other decisions for the benefit of citizens of
the region.
South Africa
South Africa has also done well to contribute to
the development of its security sector; and besides
being a signatory to a range of security sector
42
Regional Seminar
Other contributions include:
•
Various peace-keeping missions on the
continent since 1996 have made South Africa
one of the largest troop contributing countries
in the world.
•
South Africa has been instrumental in
establishing and maintaining the SADC
Stand-by-Brigade and the African Stand-byForce. South Africa does not only contribute
the required soldiers and policemen, but
also assists with training and other capacity
building efforts.
•
•
Bilateral cross-border liaison between security
sector departments to enhance the influx
of goods and people, as well as exchanging
related intelligence. The co-operation and coordination of cross-border activities between
countries is a crucial aspect in border control
and this has been prioritised because of,
among other things, the challenges that South
Africa faces regarding illegal immigrants.
Enhancing the understanding of the roles of the
various stakeholders through, among others,
civil-military relations and civil education
courses. These efforts have been supported by
various actors such as the United States, the
United Kingdom military establishments, as
well as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
•
Constitutional and legal deficiencies, as well
as issues like gender disparities.
•
Weak legislatures and civil society formations,
poorly resourced watchdog institutions, and
very strong executives.
•
Lack of intra-party democracy.
•
Slow programme implementation and
continuity due to the high turnover in the
membership of Parliaments.
•
Inadequate, financial (specialised) human
resource capacities in Parliaments.
South African challenges
In South Africa some of the challenges include:
•
The improved involvement of civil society in
decision-making processes of Government.
Although this is done on a regular basis, it is
the actual accommodation and manifestation
of inputs made during public participation
processes that are often problematic, as these
are often left by the wayside.
•
Improving access to information through
simplifying processes to obtain it. While the
South African Constitution13 allows for citizens
to access State information through specific
processes, these need to be expedited and
simplified. The Protection of Information Bill14
currently before Parliament is controversial
as some believe that it will restrict access to
information even further. Yet at the same time
it needs to be recognised and accepted that
under certain circumstances the state must
keep secrets for the security and safety of its
citizens. The challenge lies on maintaining
the necessary balance between having an
informed citizenry and securing that citizenry
and the sovereignty of the state.
•
Corruption, especially in procurement processes.
The so-called ‘Arms Deal scandal’15 in South
Africa has alerted the Government to the
pitfalls inherent in these transactions, and
processes are being put in place to ensure
that these kinds of transactions are above
board. Various whistle blower and reporting
mechanisms have also been put in place to
allow citizens to alert Government of possible
breaches in this regard.
What are the remaining challenges?
SADC-PF challenges
As mentioned earlier, various initiatives have been
launched to improve governance of the security
sector and these have in the main been successful.
The remaining challenges at the SADC PF level
relate to:
•
Inter-institutional relations between the SADC
Summit and the SADC PF. To overcome this
challenge, the SADC PF Secretariat and the
SADC Summit Secretariat have resolved to
hold regular Joint Working Sessions.
•
Ineffective collaboration between state actors
and non-state actors which was described
as ‘the missing link’ in the current efforts
towards regional integration and economic
cooperation.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
43
submissions and presentations during the
legislative processes relating to the security
sector as with the recent:
From an internal parliamentary perspective
regarding the governance of the security sector,
some of the challenges that relate to management,
continuity and support are:
•
The loss of institutional memory with each
new Parliament.
•
The strengthening of support to Committees,
especially as it relates to research and
administrative functions.
•
The heavy workload of NCOP Select
Committee Members serving on the Joint
Standing Committee on Defence and the Joint
Standing Committee on Intelligence, as they
serve on more than one Select Committee.
•
Overlapping and duplication regarding
oversight visits, departmental presentations
and scheduling of meetings.
What has been the role of civil
society in improving governance
of the security sector in Southern
Africa?
The SADC PF values the strategic role that civil
society organisations (CSOs) play in strengthening
Parliament’s capacity to effectively oversee
the security sector. For instance, CSOs have
infrastructure and capacity in terms of research
and timeous access to current and relevant
information which most Parliaments and
Parliamentarians lack.
A number of CSOs such as the Institute of Security
Studies and the Centre for Defence and Security
Management of the Witwatersrand University in
South Africa have done research and publications
in the area of defence and security and oversight
of the sector in SADC. This has strengthened the
capacity of various actors to perform the important
watchdog function over governments with regard
to the governance of the security sector. SADC PF
is also developing a sustained capacity building
programme for the relevant Committees of
national Parliaments in collaboration with DCAF.
In the South African case, the value of the civil
society organisations manifests in various ways:
•
44
CSOs and individuals are invited to make
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- Independent Police
Directorate Bill
Investigative
- The Protection of Information Bill
- Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Bill
- Defence Amendment Bill
•
Civil society also participates through
engaging departments at the ‘coal face’ of
implementation and give feedback regarding
service delivery such as borderline and border
post management, the conduct of police,
military and intelligence personnel.
•
Engaging civil society through the mainstream
media and public interfaces such as military
bases and parades; police stations and
exhibitions; and research with surveys and
public opinion polls.
•
South Africans also have the opportunity
to approach state institutions supporting
democracy16 such as the Public Protector,
Human Rights Commission and the
Commission for Gender Equality.
Conclusion
The security sector is one of the vital components
in effective governance, as it not only assists in
ensuring the territorial integrity of a country
but also with the maintenance of law and order
internally. The SADC PF has recognised this and has
launched various initiatives to assist Parliaments
in its region to improve governance in general
and in the security sector specifically. Challenges
regarding co-operation, legal deficiencies and
intra-party democracy are issues that need to be
addressed. It is, however, crucial that civil society
as a significant contributor should also be allowed
to play its role to the fullest extent.
As also indicated, Parliaments in general play a
crucial role with their oversight function to ensure
that the security sector departments meet their
constitutional and legal obligations. Examples
from the South African case study have been
utilised to illustrate some of the practices that can
hopefully be considered by other Parliaments.
It is worth mentioning again that the overall
objective is the smooth and effective functioning
of a country, and this needs to be facilitated by a
responsible, accountable and effective security
sector that serves the needs of the country as a
whole.
Endnotes
1. IPU-DCAF, 2003. Parliamentary oversight of the security sectorprinciples, mechanisms and practices. Geneva Center for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Geneva.
2. James Ngculu, 2001. Parliament and defence oversight: The South
African Experience. African Security Review, Vol. 10, No. 1. p. 2.
3. Bailes,A. Schneckener, U. Wulf, W. 2007. Revisiting the State
Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Force. Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper, No. 24.
4. Simon Baynham. 1992. Civil-Military Relations in Post-Independent
Africa. South African Defence Review Issue No 3.
5. Ngculu, 2001, p. 2.
6. This paper is partly based on a paper by Kurusha, S. 2010. The Role
of the SADC Parliamentary Forum and of Civil Society in Southern
Africa in Promoting Governance of the Security Sector in the
SADC Region. SADC PF, Windhoek, Namibia.
7. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
8. Act No 9 of 2009.
9. Act No 1 of 1999.
10.Rules of the National Assembly. 2008. Parliament of the Republic
of South Africa. Rules 124 to 139.
11.Other relevant parts include Part 10 which deals with the
Committee on Public Accounts and Part 10A which deals with
the Committee on the Auditor-General. Part 9 in conclusion deals
with Specific Rules applicable to Money Bills.
12.The National Strategic Intelligence Act No 39 of 1994 regulates
the Intelligence sector, while the White Paper on Intelligence
established the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence as a
parliamentary oversight body. The Defence Act No 42 of 2002
and the White Paper on Defence directs the management of the
Defence Force, and Defence Review assist with guiding defence
policy. The South African Police Service Act No 68 of 1995 and the
White Paper on Safety and Security guides the management of
the SAPS, with the Independent Complaints Directorate assisting
with oversight over the police, especially regarding misconduct
of police members.
13.In terms of Section 32 of the 1996 South African Constitution, as
well as the Promotion of Access to Information Act, No 2 of 2000
and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No 3 of 2000.
14.Protection of Information Bill. Accessed at http://www.info.gov.
za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=118894
15.IPS, 2010. Arms deal threatens democracy in South Africa.
Accessed at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46291
16.See Chapter 9, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
45
The contribution of civil society
to security sector governance and its oversight
in West Africa (presentation outline)
Pr. Eboe Hutchful
Executive Director of African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)
Chair of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN)
The role of civil society
organisations in the security sector
In many African countries civil society
organisations (CSOs) have emerged as the cutting
edge of research, advocacy, and policy analysis
and development in the security arena.
•
Key instrument of public participation in
governance of the sector
•
Working independently to throw open the
security arena to greater public scrutiny
•
Key drivers of the security sector reform (SSR)
agenda
Examples
• Role of CSOs in the South African defence,
police and intelligence reforms in the 1990s,
and have remained vigilant in research and
monitoring of crime and security trends.
46
•
CSOs have had considerable influence on the
evolution of the African Peace and Security
Architeture (APSA) and other key African
Union (AU) security-related policies.
•
One CSO network (ASSN) is supporting the AU
in developing its SSR policy framework.
•
Two (ASSN and WANSED) are currently
assisting the ECOWAS to develop its security
sector governance framework.
•
Gender profiling of West African security
institutions (Women Peace and Security
Network).
•
OLUCOME (Observatoire de Lutte contre la
Corruption et les Malversations Economiques)
investigates corruption and embezzlement in
the security sector in Burundi.
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•
Many CSOs are involved in parliamentary
training and capacity-building across the
continent.
•
Many more are working in cognate areas such
as small arms, conflict analysis, violent crime
statistics, early warning, etc.
•
Not only local, but also international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like
Saferworld, International Alert, Conciliation
Resources, the International Centre for
Transitional Justice, etc., are active in this area,
and work to various degrees with local NGOs.
Many members of these CSOs are highly educated
researchers, analysts and journalists, or (as is
often the case) retired defence and security
practitioners.
However, CSO capacity remains low and unevenly
distributed:
•
Many CSOs are still reluctant to engage core
security issues, and few of those who do
have the necessary skills and access, or lack
the attention span (e.g. Defence Reviews in
Uganda and Sierra Leone as opposed to South
Africa).
•
Political space to operate is often limited:
many governments are reluctant to legitimise
CSOs, particularly in the area of security
(Ethiopia). Hence, while the AU articles give
considerable role to CSOs in the development
and promulgation of the APSA, at the national
level space for CSOs often remains contested.
•
Both capacity and impact are thus very much a
matter of context. Nevertheless, it can be safely
concluded that CSO capacity and involvement
in this sector is less than in other sectors of
CSO activity.
•
•
However, through networking and by pulling
resources CSOs are able to overcome some of
these constraints, as well as leverage political
space where it is currently restricted.
By calibrating their activities within the
security sector (i.e. confining them to their
areas of expertise), a broad range of CSOs are
able to impact the sector.
Also:
•
It is often suggested that CSOs themselves
do not have the necessary accountability or
transparency, and may enjoy questionable
mandate from the public.
the security institutions, (c) civil society, and (d)
the various committees within the legislature
itself.
•
Creating more inclusive oversight by bringing
on board, and in the process empowering,
civil society organisations and non-traditional
stakeholders.
What CSOs bring to the table: critical resources
(capacity to raise independent resources)
CSOs can function as ‘force multipliers’ for
parliament, especially in light of the serious
pressure on parliamentary resources:
•
Expertise
Parliament and civil society:
a strategic partnership
•
Policy Research (state of the art)
•
Analysis
Collaboration between parliament and civil
society in the oversight area is particularly vital,
given the overall weakness of both internal and
external oversight mechanisms.
•
Advocacy
•
Training (capacity enhancement)
•
Promoting security literacy
Oversight of the security sector faces many
political and technical obstacles.
•
Monitoring
•
Transparency
•
Protection of the public interest
There are political constraints emanating from
the executive and the security sector (which are
unused to such oversight).
Parliament itself (particularly members from
the ruling party) often lacks the political will, as
well as the technical capacity and resources to
investigate the sector, and for this reason we seen
great variation in the role of national parliaments.
Nevertheless, one has to begin with the recognition
that Parliament is central to accountability, where
greater public participation and accountability
can be leveraged, and is a strategic entry-point
and catalyst for transforming the conduct of the
security sector:
•
Addressing broader security governance
deficits and constraints to oversight.
•
Stimulating policy development. With few
exceptions, setting policy is rarely seen as an
area of direct concern to African Parliaments.
•
Promoting broad-based and inclusive dialogue
and debate.
•
Cultivating partnerships between (a) the
security ministries and executive agencies, (b)
What Parliament offers in turn
•
Access and platform
•
Political cover and legitimacy
Other areas of contribution of civil
society
CSOs also work in other areas to more broadly
strengthen management of security among line
ministries, equity and accountability within the
security institutions, and the overall quality of
civil-security relations. Improved governance in
turn improves prospects –and at the same time
lessens the need– for oversight.
•
By running courses and seminars (e.g. the
Security Sector Governance and Management
course in Ghana or the Executive Seminars run
by the Southern African Defence and Security
Management Network (SADSEM))
•
By strengthening gender and human rights
awareness, etc.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
47
Defence and security committees and parliamentary
mechanisms applied to the security sector:
the case of Senegal
Honourable Mamadou Bamba Ndiaye
Chairman of the Defence and Security Committee
National Assembly of Senegal
The concepts of defence and security are now
understood in very broad terms, covering
practically all areas of life of citizens, especially
since the international community has been
promoting a holistic understanding of human
security. Nevertheless, a review of the legal
framework in Senegal shows that the attributions
and instruments available to the National
Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee are
very clearly defined. After describing the main
components of this framework, I shall describe
the action plan used by the committee to carry
out its tasks, as well as the challenges that it faces,
and which require that some improvements be
introduced.
Legal framework governing
oversight of defence and security in
Senegal
Article 62 of the constitution and article 24 of the
bylaws of the National Assembly are the specific
texts that define the roles of the National Assembly
and its different technical committees. Other
articles of the bylaws also define the mechanisms
that can be used by the committees in carrying
out their tasks.
The role of the Defence and Security
Committee
The Defence and Security committee is entrusted
with carrying out the tasks assigned to the
National Assembly in areas related to defence and
security. These include the following: preserving
territorial integrity; guaranteeing the security of
persons and goods and any restrictions thereto
for the requirements of national defence; defining
the fundamental principles (not the operational
modalities) of the general organisation of national
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defence; the budget of the Ministries of Defence
and the Interior; the programme laws that
determine the objectives of government action
with respect to defence and security; international
military cooperation; military and paramilitary
establishments; defining the status of armed
forces civilian and military personnel and their
wage structure; public safety, which relates to
preventing the risk of accidents and damage and
injury to goods and persons, and the gendarmerie
and military justice system.
Three other technical committees could be
involved in these areas:
•
The Foreign Affairs committee, which
reviews international treaties, as well as
issues of defence and security that may arise
in diplomatic relations, in particular with
neighbouring countries.
•
The Laws committee, which reviews the
budget of the Ministries of Interior and Justice
and expresses an opinion, and is also in charge
of human rights issues, in particular with
respect to violations by the security forces.
•
The Finance committee also works in these
areas when it comes to reviewing the overall
government budget. It makes a report to
the plenary on the budgets of the different
ministries, including Defence and Interior. The
Finance committee may set up a temporary
mission of its members to evaluate and control
budget execution.
Mechanisms of the Defence and Security
Committee
The bylaws of the National Assembly provide the
Defence and Security committee with a number
of mechanisms aimed at enabling it to play its
role. These include consideration of the budget
and other laws, as well as various reporting and
oversight instruments. The challenge however
remains in the area of monitoring and evaluation.
Review of the budget and other laws
The debate on budget orientation provides
parliamentarians with an opportunity to express
their opinion about the orientations of the defence
and security budget for the following year.
Each year the committee receives the draft budget
from the armed forces ministries and reviews it
in the presence of the minister and his staff. The
appropriate questions are put to them, and the
committee expresses its opinion in a report to be
submitted to the Finance committee.
The committee reviews and gives its opinion
about all draft bills (submitted by government)
and private member’s bills (introduced by
parliamentarians) related to defence and security.
Instruments for reporting and oversight
Members of the committee and other members
of the House may put questions to the ministers
in charge of the armed forces and the interior by
addressing written or oral questions or topical
questions. The latter are required to provide
responses either in writing (for the written
questions) or orally, before the plenary session of
the National Assembly.
Members of the committee and other
parliamentarians may suggest that the National
Assembly set up a parliamentary committee of
inquiry to gather information on specific issues
related to defence and security, and submit their
conclusions to the National Assembly, which will
then decide on the next steps to be taken.
The Defence and Security Committee may set
up temporary fact-finding or study missions. The
objective of a fact-finding mission is to collect
information about a given situation that is of
concern to parliamentarians in carrying out their
duties. The study mission is aimed at studying
a problem that is of major interest, and which
parliamentarians need to understand, to help
them be more efficient in their work.
The committee may invite any person to appear
before it to answer questions, including ministers
and senior public officials. In the case of a
government agent, the competent minister is
required to express his opinion. If the request is
not granted, the minister must explain why. In
that case, the Speaker of the National Assembly
is informed and may submit the question to the
President of the Republic. Where the person is not
a government agent, no provision is made for the
case where the person fails to come before the
committee.
The committee may be informed of the policy
applied by the ministers over whom it has
competence, by its representatives on the board
of administration of certain public bodies such
as the national veterans and war victims’ office
or the national small arms and light weapons
committee.
The committee may also travel outside the
National Assembly to tour any site and speak
to people on the ground. Although these have
been generally used by the various committees
in recent years, these reporting and control
instruments are not defined in the bylaws of the
National Assembly.
The challenges of monitoring and evaluation
These different instruments are only of value if
they enable the National Assembly to carry out
true and effective oversight of the executive. This
requires the existence of effective monitoring and
evaluations mechanisms.
Under the current terms, the National Assembly
is not allowed to set up a temporary mission
of its members to evaluate and control budget
execution. However, the Speaker is an ex-officio
member of the Finance committee, which does
have that prerogative.
In the same way, the text does not indicate a
mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the
commitments made by government in answering
oral, written or topical questions. However, there
is no prohibition to setting up such a mechanism.
Representatives on the various boards of
administration are obliged to present periodical
written reports.
Specificities of parliamentary oversight of
defence and security
This legal framework is applied in a peculiar sector
that is managed by the executive within the ambit
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
49
of so-called “sovereignty” ministries. This is a
particularly delicate sector where the concept of
secret finds true meaning. This in part explains why
certain senior officials are reluctant to hear about
any parliamentary oversight initiatives. Such
oversight is also limited by the legal provisions
on the concept of “defence secret”, as well as
military regulations. There is also the fact that it is
difficult to oversee any operations carried out in
the field by the armed forces, the gendarmerie,
the police force, and the intelligence services.
Parliamentary oversight must therefore adapt
to these specific conditions, in particular by
providing for rules of confidentiality in the use of
oversight mechanisms, if necessary.
Oversight is however necessary. Parliament cannot
relinquish its right to monitor a whole sector of
government activity. As far as the defence and
security forces are concerned, some of their senior
officials explained in a recent meeting that they
needed to have contact with the Parliament to be
able to express their budgetary needs and have
them taken into account, without depending
exclusively on the decisions of officials of the
ministry of finance.
Parliamentary oversight should be extended
to the informal security sector and in particular
private security organisations that serve political
or religious leaders and which in certain cases
could act as “militia” and undermine public peace.
An oral question on this issue was raised by a
member of the National Assembly.
Activities of the Defence and
Security Committee
The Speaker of the National Assembly undertook
to revitalise the technical committees to enable
the institution to fulfil its duties better. As part of
the process, the Security and Defence Committee
is implementing an action plan focusing on the
following points:
Establishing a framework for collaboration
with ministries
The idea is to develop permanent interaction with
senior officials of the ministries concerned. The
aim is to promote direct contact in order to make
relations smoother, and maintain an atmosphere
of trust with a view to minimising possible
misunderstandings and reservations. Working
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sessions have been organised with ministers, their
cabinets, and the staff of the armed forces and
gendarmerie.
Field visits
The committee has been out in the field to tour
armed forces, gendarmerie, and police barracks
in order to take stock of the reality of budget
implementation, and hear about the outstanding
needs, among other things.
For example, through such a visit, members of the
National Assembly became aware of some of the
adverse effects of the new public procurement
code and brought them to the attention of the
Minister of Finance.
Capacity building for committee members
The committee endeavours to enhance the
capacities of its members in the area of defence
and security. The meetings with the military staff
are aimed in particular at providing members of
the committee with precise information about the
nature and organisation of the former’s activity.
The committee has organised or plans to organise
training workshops on specific topics such as the
following:
•
Organisation of defence and security forces
and the concept of “defence secret”
•
Security issues in West Africa
•
ECOWAS Small Arms Protocol
•
Parliamentary oversight of the security sector
Observations and recommendations
Stability of the committee
To have effective oversight, there must be a
minimum of stability in membership of the
committee. Failing that, capacity building
programmes must be organised each year. Even
though change is inevitable, a central core of
membership must be preserved throughout each
legislature.
Monitoring budget execution
The bylaws must be amended to enable technical
committees to set up permanent missions or
subcommittees in charge of monitoring and
evaluating the budget of each ministry. The
Finance committee is only able to evaluate overall
budget execution by the ministry of finance.
Refusal to attend hearings
The law must make attendance by persons invited
to a hearing of the commissions, including a
parliamentary committee of enquiry, explicitly
obligatory, and stipulate sanctions for refusing to
attend.
Improving the material resources of the
committee
The financial resources of the National Assembly
may not be sufficient to organise all the training
missions, fact-finding missions, studies, and
investigations. Additional resources must be
sought.
Capacity
building
administrative staff
for
parliamentary
Members of the parliamentary administration
need to develop technical knowledge on defence
and security matters. The documentary resources
available also need to be improved. The committee
also needs to have parliamentary assistants who
have the required skills to assist it in its work.
Collaboration among West African Security
and Defence Committees
Because of the increasingly regional scope
of defence and security issues, it would be
appropriate to envisage a framework for exchange
and cooperation among the various defence and
security committees in West African national
parliaments and in the ECOWAS Parliament.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
51
Defence and security committees and parliamentary
mechanisms applied to the security sector:
the case of Mali
Honourable Brehima Béridogo
Member of the National Assembly of Mali
If, as Georges Clemenceau said, war is too serious
a matter to entrust to military men, the same may
be said of defence and security in times of peace.
This sector must be accountable to the elected
representatives of the people, and the latter must
strive to ensure that the actions of defence and
security agents are in line with national legislation
and the conventions to which Mali is a party.
Article 71: War shall only be declared after
authorisation by the National Assembly, sitting
specifically for this purpose.
Which parliamentary mechanisms apply to the
security sector in Mali? What are the underlying
principles of oversight of government action in
the area of defence and security? Which are the
areas for oversight? What methods and means are
used by defence committees, and what difficulties
do they encounter?
The authorisation of the National Assembly is
however required, to extend the duration beyond
ten days.
Does parliament truly play its role in this area in
Mali? Does it take advantage of all the means at
its disposal?
These are some of the questions that we shall
attempt to answer in speaking about the
experience of the Malian parliament.
Underlying principles of oversight
Parliamentary oversight of defence and security
forces is based on the powers conferred upon
parliament by the constitution of the Republic
of Mali, as well as the bylaws of the National
Assembly.
Powers granted by the constitution
The following articles allow for collaboration
between parliament and the executive power in
the area of defence and security, and even enable
the former to carry out oversight of the latter:
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The President of the Republic then informs the
nation in a message.
Article 72: A state of emergency or a state of siege
shall be decreed by the Council of ministers.
A law stipulates the conditions.
Article 77: The finance bill is submitted to the
National Assembly at the beginning of the ordinary
session preceding the budget period. The finance
bill must include the income required to cover all
expenditure.
Powers granted by the bylaws of the
National Assembly
A certain number of articles in the bylaws of the
National Assembly enable parliament to carry out
democratic oversight of the defence and security
sectors through the following mechanisms:
amendments to texts, discussion of resolutions
to the Prime Minister, written questions, oral
questions, motion of inquiry to government,
information
committees,
special
inquiry
committees, motion of confidence in government,
vote of no confidence, etc.
These are enshrined in particular in the articles
found in the chapters indicated in the following
box.
Section Two: Legislative procedure
Chapter VI: Amendments
Article 82: Members of the National Assembly
and government may present amendments to
texts submitted to the National Assembly for
public discussion.
Section Three: Parliamentary oversight
Part One: National Assembly information and
oversight procedure
Chapter I: Resolution – Written questions –
Request for information - Observations and
inquiries
Article 86: The National Assembly may include
discussion of resolutions to the Prime Minister
on its agenda, upon the initiative of one of its
standing committees.
Article 87: Any member of the National
Assembly who wishes to put a written question
to government must submit the written text to
the Speaker of the National Assembly who shall
communicate it to the head of government. He
shall inform the conference of chairpersons.
Written questions shall be published in the
Official Bulletin, after the verbatim report.
In the month following such publication, the
responses from ministers shall also be published
in the Official Bulletin.
Should there be no answer to a written question
within the month, a reminder shall be sent,
following which an additional period of fifteen
days shall start.
If there has been no answer to the question
following this additional period, the author may
at the next session transform this into a motion
of inquiry to government.
Chapter II: Oral questions and motion of
inquiry
Article 88: Upon the initiative of the speaker
of the National Assembly or one of its standing
committees, the National Assembly may entrust
one or several of its members with a fact-finding
mission.
Article 89: Special committees of inquiry
may also be established within the National
Assembly.
Article 90: Any member of the National Assembly
who wishes to put oral questions to government
must submit such questions in writing to the
Speaker of the National Assembly who shall
communicate them to the appropriate recipient.
Should a question be called for the third time
in public session because a minister has been
absent on two successive occasions, and if the
minister is once again absent, the author of the
question may immediately transform this into a
motion of inquiry to government.
In addition to the motions of inquiry stipulated in
the previous paragraph, and under article 89, any
member of the National Assembly who wishes to
query government about the implementation of
a programme adopted by the National Assembly
or any topical issue, shall so indicate in public
session and submit the request immediately.
(…)
As part of oversight of government action, the
full debate on oral questions, topical questions,
and motions of inquiry is broadcast live or played
back by the government media.
Articles 91 and 93: Motion for a vote of
confidence in government.
Article 92 – Motion of no confidence:
Submission of a motion of no confidence shall be
registered when a document entitled “Motion of
no confidence” is submitted to the speaker of the
National Assembly in public session, followed by
a list of the signatures of at least one-tenth (1/10)
of the members of the National Assembly. (…)
The conference of chairpersons shall set the date
for discussion of motions of no confidence, which
must take place at most three days after the
session during with the motion was submitted.
(…)
This debate shall be broadcast live by the
government media.
A vote of no confidence by a majority of two
thirds (2/3) of the members of the National
Assembly shall automatically lead to the
resignation of the government.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
53
Areas of oversight
Difficulties
•
Corps: armed forces, police, gendarmerie,
National Guard and goum, and the intelligence
services
Lack of transparency and resistance to
parliamentary oversight on the part of the
executive
•
Equipment and infrastructure: arms and
ammunition, logistics, etc.
Lack of transparency
•
Purchase of equipment and procurement
•
Budget: article 77 of the constitution
Methods and means of oversight
Permanent oversight
Through its mode of organisation and functioning,
the National Assembly has permanent oversight
of defence and security.
Thus, according to article 28 of the bylaws,
each year after the election of its bureau, the
National Assembly shall establish eleven standing
committees, including one in charge of national
defence, internal security, and civil defence.
Through this committee, parliament has links
with, and oversees the activities of government
bodies in charge of national defence and security.
In reviewing laws on defence and security
matters, the national defence, internal security,
and civil defence committee provides advice
and recommendations to inform and guide the
plenary.
Specific and temporary oversight
•
Examination of the finance law
On behalf of the plenary, the committee in charge
of national defence, internal security, and civil
defence examines the budget of the ministry of
defence and veterans’ affairs, as well as that of the
ministry of internal security and civil defence.
54
•
Following a crisis situation (war, state of siege,
etc.)
•
On the initiative of a member of parliament or
one of the bodies of the National Assembly, on
the basis of the powers granted by the bylaws
of the National Assembly.
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In legal terms, Mali has experienced about ten
years of military regime and twelve years of
political monolithism. The national defence and
security budgets were state secrets that were
not discussed in parliament. The same applied to
many other areas that would have been subject
to parliamentary oversight under a democratic
regime.
The establishment of political pluralism, starting
in 1992, did not radically change the role of
parliament in its oversight of the defence and
security sector.
Certainly, defence and security budgets are now
discussed in parliament. However, the old reflexes
are still in place, in particular mistrust of civilians
and especially politicians.
Furthermore, what is the difference between
peacekeeping in the north and a war situation?
Was parliament systematically informed before
troops were deployed?
Intelligence: there is no link between the secret
services and parliament. Even the budget makes
no mention of them.
Resistance to parliamentary oversight on the
part of the executive
Sometimes government, through one of its
ministers, opposes some of the activities of
parliament, even when they fall within the
prerogatives of the latter. For example, since
2007, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs
has refused to allow the committee in charge
of national defence, internal security, and civil
defence to visit any military barracks.
Conflicts of competence between the
executive and the legislative powers
In practice, the executive power considers that
certain issues related to defence and security
are its sole prerogative and rarely involves
parliament, thus depriving the latter of its powers
of oversight.
For example, parliament is not systematically
informed or involved in resolving intercommunity conflicts, popular uprisings and riots
(inter-community conflicts in Fafa, in the Ansogo
district, riots in Kita, Kadiolo, and Bamako, etc.),
and military demands, etc.
Fafa in the Ansogo district is the theatre of an
armed conflict between Peulhs and Tuaregs for
control of natural resources, among other things.
Government rejected the initiative of a joint
mission suggested by parliament, to resolve the
conflict. The minister of territorial administration
and local authorities refused to allow the Member
of Parliament for the area to be part of a delegation
that was to travel to the site at the height of the
crisis.
In Kadiolo in 2008, a riot broke out when a
“trigger-happy” police officer opened fire on
a fuel smuggler who had refused to pay him a
bribe. Without waiting for an invitation, some
parliamentarians travelled there to help restore
calm.
Self-censorship by parliament
Sometimes parliament censors itself by its own
behaviour, or its activities are limited by the
behaviour of some of its own bodies. A few
examples:
•
Parliament has never inquired about the
situation of the secret service (working
methods, budget).
•
Following police blunders that have led
to deaths or injury of unarmed citizens,
parliament should have systematically called
government to account.
•
An opposition parliamentary group informed
the ministers of health and justice of their
programme for visits to hospitals and prisons
in Bamako, and obtained the approval of those
ministers. However, the General Secretary of
the National Assembly wrote to the minister
of justice to inform him that such activities
fell under the prerogatives of the standing
committees and not parliamentary groups and
as a result, the minister of justice withdrew his
approval. Only the hospital visits took place.
The state of democratic oversight:
does parliament take advantage of
all the means at its disposal?
Taking into account the use made of the powers
granted by the constitution and the bylaws of
the National Assembly, what can be said about
parliamentary oversight in the area of defence
and security in Mali during the third and fourth
legislatures (2002-2009)?
•
Amendments to texts
Law N°8 – 01 – 4 I ratifying ordinance N°7-020/
PRM 18 July 2007 authorising the ratification of the
Protocol to the Organisation of the African Unity
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism:
Amendments were introduced, including three
substantive ones, with the aim of ensuring respect
for human rights and making the security forces
more efficient in combating terrorism.
•
Recommendations
Law N°8 – 01 – 4 l Three recommendations were
made along the same lines.
Law N°8 – 30 – 4 l establishing the department of
military academies:
Seven recommendations were made to make
training more effective and facilitate the socioprofessional reintegration of retired military
personnel.
•
Discussion of resolutions to the Prime
Minister on oversight of defence and security.
Given the prevailing situation in the north of Mali,
parliament has frequent discussion each year:
- Resolution N°06-04/AN-RM of 12 June
2006 on events in the Kidal region and in
the Menaka district of the Gao region since
23 May 2006
- Resolution N°06-05/AN-RM of 20 July
2006 on the Algiers agreement for the
reestablishment of peace, security, and
development in the Kidal region
- Resolution N°08-04/AN-RM 4è L of 19
June 2008 following a session of queries
to government on the problems in the
north.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
55
• Written questions on oversight in the area of
defence and security:
Parliamentarians therefore need to undertake the
following:
No written questions.
•
Oral questions on oversight in the area
defence and security:
Demand information and cooperation from
the executive in managing security issues
•
No oral questions. Following the recent police
excesses in Kita, Kadiolo, and Bamako, the Minister
should have been queried, since the behaviour of
these corrupt officers had led to loss of human
lives.
Participate in training sessions on their roles,
their prerogatives, and the procedures for
using such roles and prerogatives at the
beginning of their mandate and throughout
its duration.
•
Be bold enough to use the powers granted to
them by various texts.
•
•
Motions of inquiry to government
The motions of inquiry to government led to
the above-mentioned resolutions for the Prime
Minister.
•
Fact-finding missions on oversight in the
area of defence and security:
No fact-finding missions were set up.
•
Special inquiry missions on oversight in the
area of defence and security:
No special inquiry missions were set up.
•
Motion for a vote of confidence in
government with respect to parliamentary
oversight in the area of defence and security
There was never a motion put forward for a vote of
confidence in government
•
Vote of no confidence with respect to
parliamentary oversight in the area of defence
and security
No motion was submitted for a vote of no
confidence in the government.
Conclusion/Recommendations
The Malian parliament is endowed with the
tools for democratic oversight in the area of
defence and security. Its activities are however
limited by certain reactions on the part of the
executive, which date back to the time of political
monolithism.
Furthermore, parliamentarians themselves hardly
ever use the powers granted to them by the
constitution and their bylaws, and this is especially
due to lack of training and awareness about their
role.
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Session 3
Parliamentary oversight of security
budgeting
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
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Note on best practice in security sector budgeting
Ms. Lena Andersson
Independent consultant
Balkans Analysis Group
Budget as a tool for increased
democracy
The budget is one of the most powerful tools
used by governments. Many people have
ideas about what government should do and
sometimes these ideas are manifested in policies
and plans. But any meaningful government
policy must be supported through the budget’s
financial resources. Sound budgetary systems
are central to governments’ ability to implement
its policies, deliver services and reduce poverty.
Sound budgetary systems are also critical to fight
corruption and build effective states with the
necessary degree of capability, responsiveness
and accountability.
Political incentives affect the process of making
and implementing budget policy. The budget
is the result of political negotiations that reflect
underlying power struggles between competing
social forces. The exclusion of the weak and poor
from these processes is a key character trait of
social exclusion.
What is the budget process?
Public budgeting is a central function of the state
and the budget process involves a wide range
of stakeholders beyond governments, including
parliament, oversight agencies, civil society and
donors. The budget process is one whereby
parliaments authorise and enable governments
to carry out specific activities during each year.
It reveals how governments plan for the future
development and distribution of state-managed
resources and the value the states place on
security, justice, freedom and wealth. Moreover
it demonstrates whether there is a coherence
of policies and practices as well as a level of
transparency in financial matters achieved by the
executive.
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The main stages in the budgetary process are:
•
Budget formulation (including budget request
and central priority setting)
•
Budget legislation
•
Budget execution
•
Audit and scrutiny
Each of these stages lends itself to parliamentary
involvement.
What makes sector budgeting
special?
In accordance with the above reasoning the state’s
security budget is one of the most important
government policy statements in the field of
security. The security budget is the amount of
money spent over one fiscal year for the internal
and external security of the country. It reveals how
governments plan to develop their security sector
institutions, implement policies and provide
services to citizens in the area of security.
Security sector, in general and its budgets in
particular, are in most countries subject to a culture
of secrecy. This together with the complexity
of some of the activities and investments puts
additional challenges but also a greater demand
for the parliament to increase its involvement in
security sector budgeting.
What are the challenges?
There are a number of challenges in strengthening
the role of parliament in the budget process. In
some countries, there are formal limitations on the
budget authority of parliament, especially with
respect to proposing amendments that would
increase spending. In some cases changes to the
budget may trigger a vote of no confidence in the
government, and are, therefore, seldom enacted.
But even if there are no legal impediments to
greater involvement in the budget process by
parliament they often lack significant fiscal staff
or capacity to analyse the budget proposal.
Moreover the time given for the parliament for
budget review is often too short.
Despite these challenges there are numerous
examples where increased capacity for budgetary
analysis and review has helped strengthen the
legislature as an institution. It can increase the role
of parliament generally and help to create greater
checks and balances in systems that may have
been dominated by the executive for a long period
of time. Greater civil society involvement and
using the capacity of external audit institutions
can help compensate for limited capacity within
parliament.
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Parliamentary oversight of security sector budgeting:
the case of Côte d’Ivoire
Honourable Laurent Akoun
Chairman of the Security and Defence Committee
National Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire
Parliamentary oversight of the security sector
budgeting is an integral part of parliamentary
oversight of government activities. In the specific
case of security sector budget control, it must
be emphasised that the aim is to guarantee
the transparency of the commitments made by
government in the area of security, to ensure
the security of persons and goods. To this end,
budgetary oversight in part makes up for the
thorny issue of the balance of power between the
executive and legislative powers.
The budgetary cycle in Côte d’Ivoire covers four
phases inherited from the French system. These
are:
•
The budget preparation phase
•
The review and adoption of budget phase
•
The budget execution phase
•
The regularisation of national accounts phase
The National Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire is only
involved when the finance law is voted and when
the national accounts statements are submitted.
Security sector budgeting
Parliament plays a role in security sector budgeting
essentially through a review of four of the ten
documents that accompany the finance law:
•
The expenditure chapter
This document contains the expenditure
authorisations allocated to the different ministries
and institutions. It includes information regarding
the budget granted to the defence and security
forces (FDS), security institutions, and the
ministries of defence, interior, and security.
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•
Annexe 2 on the catalogue of new measures This document describes the projected
recruitments and end of service (retirement)
figures.
•
Annexe 7 B, which contains general comments
and detailed descriptions of the various items
of expenditure.
•
The fiscal annexe, which contains taxes and
other fiscal measures in favour of a given
sector of activity or government body.
Parliamentary oversight
Parliament reviews the documents in order
to understand them and ensure that security
institutions are provided with the necessary
resources in sufficient quantity, to carry out their
missions.
In addition, in the case of certain laws and decrees,
such as the law governing the status of staff of the
national police force and the decree establishing
specific national security commissions (the
national small arms and light weapons control
commission), the Ivorian parliament ensures that
the financial provisions and enabling decrees
of these laws are appropriate and effectively
applied.
Another form of budgetary control is carried out
through the regularisation law, which in principle
is supposed to be submitted to parliament at the
very latest at the end of the year following the
budget implementation year.
In the course of this legislature (the first legislature
of the second Republic) the only regularisation
laws that were submitted to parliament covered
the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. Due to the failure
to submit these regularisation laws, which has
been compounded by the crisis that broke out
in September 2002, members of parliament have
been unable to verify that resources allocated to
the security sector have been used appropriately.
Furthermore, following the various peace
agreements, and in line with article 48 of the
constitution, since 2006, the finance law has been
adopted by ordinance of the President of the
Republic. Members of parliament have thus been
deprived of their prerogative of reviewing and
adopting the finance law.
Relevant parliamentary committees
In the Ivorian parliament, the finance law is
supposed to be reviewed in depth by the
economic affairs and finance committee (CAEF).
However, article 59 of the National Assembly
bylaws stipulates that the proceedings of this
committee are open to members of parliament
from other committees. Members of the
parliamentary security and defence committee
therefore join those of the CAEF when the
discussion relates to the security issues.
In practice, all members of Parliament are
interested in security issues because each one
wants to ensure that the police stations and
gendarmerie brigades in their constituencies are
provided with a sufficient budget to carry out
their security missions.
Legal and constitutional framework
Since the security budget is included in the
finance law, they are covered by articles 79,
80, and 81 of the constitution, which authorise
parliamentarians to examine and adopt the
government budget and to regularise national
accounts.
In addition to the provisions of these articles,
the bylaws of the National Assembly stipulate a
number of means that enable Parliament carry out
control over government activity. These include
fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry, and
oral questions that may lead to debate.
The review of the finance law is governed by
organic law N°59-249 of 31st December 1959, on
finance laws.
Accountability and opportunities
The budgetary review must be seen as a
mechanism of good governance and as such
parliamentarians must ensure that the budgetary
allocations to organisations in charge of security
adequately match the security expectations and
realities of their country.
In order to ensure greater accountability on the
part of the executive, parliament must demand
that security expenditure be included in the
security sector programming law. This was the
approach adopted by Ivorian parliamentarians at
the start of the legislature. However, consideration
of the draft programming law that was submitted
to the National Assembly was disrupted by the
politico-military crisis that has affected Côte
d’Ivoire since 2002.
It is important to remind the executive of the duty
to comply with the constitutional requirement of
regularly submitting the regularisation laws that
would enable parliamentarians to carry out an
audit of public financial management.
All members of parliament (and not just members
of the CAEF) need to be trained to understand the
various documents that form part of the national
budget.
The importance of submitting the draft finance law
in a timely manner also needs to be underscored,
so that parliamentarians do not have to rush to
adopt it.
Finally, while underlining the institutional
weaknesses in the budget process, which are due
to a large extent to the hegemony of the executive,
and the marginal role granted to parliamentarians
in the process, it is up to members of the National
Assembly to demand greater transparency. This
transparency necessarily requires an end to the
culture of secrecy maintained by the executive
power, which considers that certain items of the
security budget are highly sensitive and should
not be revealed to the representatives of the
people.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
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The role of parliamentary oversight in relation to security
and defence in the state budget:
the case of Sierra Leone
Honourable Alice Foyah
Member of the Committee on Finance and Development
National Assembly of Sierra Leone
Introduction
Mr.
Chairman,
Honourable
Members,
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, it
is an honour and pleasure to present a paper on
the role of parliamentary oversight in relation
to security and defence in the state budget on
behalf of the Sierra Leone Parliament.
Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, a
government budget is a document that sets out
how a government proceeds to collect and spend
money over a given period. The budget could be
considered as a map as it implies that budgeting
must be more than simply compiling an annual
report to be approved by parliament. Technical
staff from all Ministry Agencies and Departments
(MDAs) should constantly monitor receipts and
expenditures and compare those to actual figures.
The budget is also an effective policy instrument.
However, defence budgeting is the process of
allocating financial resources for defence military
equipment, personnel, infrastructures and
programs. Its final product is the defence budget,
which provides an itemised estimate of projected
resources and operating expenses for the Ministry
of Defence and associated agencies over a set
period of time.
In the case of Sierra Leone, the Public Account
Committee plays a significant role in the
defence and security budget process. The
active participation of parliament in the budget
process is vital because it is the most important
economic tool of the government. It provides a
comprehensive account of the nation’s priorities,
based on the idea that every parliament is the
representative of the people and responsible for
ensuring that the limited available resources best
match the needs of the people.
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The role of parliamentary
democracy in Africa
Development malaise came under attack with
the demand for democratisation and good
governance. The contribution by African militaries
to “bad governance” on the continent became a
concern to the international donor community
when the World Bank’s technical and stringent
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) failed
to produce the economic reform required to halt
and reverse Africa’s developmental woes.
Within this context, the military as an obstacle to
development was correspondingly challenged
through a reduction in the defence budget.
However, reductions in defence spending did
not produce the expected proportional levels of
development. Moreover, this did not stimulate
any better governance. In some cases, investment
in basic infrastructures like roads, public health,
education and agriculture was declined, while
spending on diplomatic services and jobs
connected to the Presidency increased noticeably.
Consequently, something else, something more,
was needed to overcome the obstacle.
The challenge in consolidating security sector
governance is to develop both effective
parliamentary oversight mechanisms and
affordable security bodies capable of providing
security for the state and its citizens within the
context of democratic governance.
Parliamentary oversight of the
defence sector
Why is parliamentary oversight, particularly in a
democracy, critically important? A key feature of
a democratically elected government is its system
of “checks and balances” that helps prevent
autocratic rule, amongst other things.
In Sierra Leone, the parliament’s mandate
and
authorisation
to
scrutinise
and
oversee executive action is a constitutional
provision. The importance of constitutionally
institutionalising parliament’s powers is derived
from the acceptance and acknowledgment that
constitutions are not easy to change: voting
on constitutional reforms mostly requires a
qualified majority in the parliament or, as in some
countries, a popular referendum. Consequently,
the constitution represents an effective way
of protecting the authority and powers of the
parliament; similar to the way that parliament
protects the powers of other branches of
government.
What is the purpose of
parliamentary oversight of the
defence sector?
The main principle of parliamentary oversight
of the defence sector is to hold the executive
and the Ministry of Defence accountable and to
oversee that a balance exists between the needs
of society and the needs of the security sector
in pursuing governmental objectives. Although
there is no single set of norms for civil-military
relations, it appears that, in a liberal democracy,
the following main principles should be applied
to parliamentary oversight of the security sector:
•
The parliament is sovereign and therefore
has the last say in security and defence
policy. In this regard, parliament holds the
government accountable for the development,
implementation and review of the security
and defence policy.
•
The parliament has a unique constitutional role
in the authorisation and scrutiny of defence
and security expenditures as well as declaring
a state of emergency and the state of war.
•
The legitimate democratic authorities are the
only actors entitled to decide whether the
society needs more “guns or butter”.
In a democracy, where the rule of law must prevail
over the arbitrary use of violence, the parliament
is entrusted with substantial powers to ensure
that “the tools of coercion” are not abused by
neither the military nor the executive. Through
the powers vested in it, the parliament performs
a range of critical functions regarding the defence
sector.
Legislative powers: Parliament
makes and passes laws that govern
the defence sector
The constitutional framework of a democracy
constitutes the authority of the parliament’s
involvement in defence legislation. Although
parliamentarians may not be the main drafters
of legislation, the parliament nevertheless
constitutes the principal institution for debate
over and subsequently approve (or reject) draft
legislation. Toward this end, the parliament
exercises significant power in overseeing the
defence sector by, for example, stipulating what
concept of security must be adopted or approving/
rejecting the deployment of the armed forces
abroad in international peace missions.
Budgeting the security sector
Allocation of funding for the security sector often
competes with other areas of public spending, in
particular the social and developmental sectors.
The parliament has the power to approve,
disapprove or amend the defence budget, as
with the budget of any other sector. In order
to do so, however, the Parliament must have
comprehensive information on all budget
items (not just grand totals) regarding defence
expenditure. If necessary, the parliament can
request that external auditors report to the
parliament on the financial state of affairs of
each security force. Not only can the legality
of the budget spending be scrutinised, but
the parliament has also the right to investigate
whether the money is spent in an effective and
efficient way. In the same vein, the Minister of
Defence has to report to the parliament on any
budgetary changes. The latter then retains the
right to approve or disapprove any supplementary
budget proposals.
Challenges to effective
parliamentary oversight
It is generally accepted that a range of conditions
will determine the strength or weakness of
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
65
parliamentary oversight and the challenges that
are likely to arise. Furthermore, the formal oversight
powers, including constitutional and legal powers
can become muddled and disfunctional if the
executive is politically strong and non-compliant.
Therefore, the political will of the parliamentarians
to use their constitutional and legal powers is
needed.
Weakness of parliamentary
oversight
In considering the strength of the parliament to
oversee the defence sector, some political pundits
argued that countries with stronger legislative
traditions tend to emphasise the role of legislative
mechanisms entrusted with oversight roles, such
as committees on finance with the approval of
budgets, etc. Parliamentary oversight is generally
weak in countries where the executive is strong
and where loyalty to the party hierarchy is
sometimes confused with loyalty to the people.
Therefore, unless elected representatives have a
commitment to hold the executive accountable,
no amount of constitutional authority nor
resources will make them effective.
Capacity for parliamentary
oversight
In theory, parliament can exercise its control over
the executive because it controls the budget.
Clear guidelines for expenditure must be set and
understood by both the military, and those who
exercise control over the military.
In the case of Sierra Leone, capacity-building is
essential if the parliament is to exercise effective
oversight over the security. For example, within
the defence budget system, the parliamentary
committees need to understand the budgeting
process and develop skills to analyse, monitor and
advise on defence expenditure.
The expertise of the parliament is often weaker
than the expertise of the executive and the
security forces. The Sierra Leone Parliament has
only a very small number of research staff, whereas
the executive can rely on the staff of the Ministry
of Defence and other ministries dealing with the
security sector. Also, parliamentarians are only
elected for a limited term whereas the majority of
civil servants and military personnel spend their
entire career in the Ministry of Defence.
Limits of transparency
Some areas of defence policy are legitimately
secret. Nevertheless, there are practical measures
that can be implemented to allow legislative
oversight over secret policy areas if a relationship
of trust exists between the parliament, the
executive and the armed forces. Defence policy
and military activities shall be sufficiently
transparent to ensure meaningful parliamentary
and public scrutiny debate, insofar as this does
not endanger the lives of military personnel
or jeopardise the success of future military
operations.
Enhancing parliamentary oversight
To address the capacity and resource constraints
that affect parliamentary oversight, a number of
measures have been proposed and applied in
recent years. This is particularly the case in the
context of legislative development programmes
applied in post conflict countries. Some of these
measures include:
•
Parliaments making use of the expertise of
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
in their work (e.g. requesting research from
Resources Centres and inviting civil experts to
participate in public hearings).
•
International
parliamentary
assemblies
and international think tanks becoming
increasingly active in supporting parliaments.
Parliamentarians are often active in these
international assemblies, in which they
exchange experiences and viewpoints with
parliamentarians from other countries.
•
Parliamentary staff members (for both
individual
parliamentarians
and
for
committees)
following
national,
and
international, seminars and participating in
study tours.
Resources
The parliament must have the ability to carry out
its role. Members of parliament are entitled to
question ministers, but they need to be able to
ask the right questions. Effective parliamentary
oversight of the security sector requires expertise
and resources in parliament or at the disposal of
parliament.
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Conclusion
Mr
Chairman,
Honourable
Members,
parliamentary oversight of defence and security
in the state budget is crucial in ensuring that
the armed forces are managed the same way as
other public sectors would be. The best way of
trying to increase the willingness of members of
parliaments to engage in effective parliamentary
oversight is to improve the constitutional and legal
authority of the parliament, and its capacity to
carry out its role in terms of professional expertise
and technical capabilities.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
67
IV. Annex
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Concept note
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU), in collaboration with the National
Assembly of Senegal and the ECOWAS Parliament,
will organise a two-day regional seminar in West
Africa on parliamentary oversight in the area of
security and defence. This event is part of extensive
joint efforts by DCAF and the IPU to bolster the
contribution of parliaments, in particular their
defence and security committees, to security
sector governance.
In 2003, the organisations jointly published a
handbook entitled Parliamentary oversight of
the security sector: Principles, mechanisms and
practices, which provides parliamentarians
with a framework for effective parliamentary
action. DCAF, in collaboration with the ECOWAS
Parliament, is developing a guide on this topic
which is tailored to the needs of parliamentarians
in West Africa.
Democratic oversight of the security sector
contributes towards better security, poverty
reduction and respect for human rights. In West
Africa, parliaments’ roles have in the past been
challenged in a number of countries due to
conflicts and authoritarian regimes. The security of
the state often came above that of its citizens and
power tended to be concentrated in the hands of
the executive to the detriment of other branches of
government. Since the 1990s, however, a growing
democratisation process has taken place within
the region. This has created greater opportunities
for an effective role of parliament and civil society
in security sector governance in West Africa.
The regional seminar will first look more closely at
general principles of parliamentary oversight and
how they apply to the context of West Africa. It will
subsequently focus on particular ways and areas
in which parliaments can become more effective:
•
Norms related to good parliamentary ethical
standards and transparency ;
•
Integration of a gender perspective into
parliament’s contribution to the security
agenda ;
•
Good practices for effective parliamentary
committees (defence and security committees,
budget committees, etc.) ;
•
Mechanisms and approaches for more effective
budgetary oversight.
General Objective
The aim of the workshop is to facilitate the
exchange of knowledge and experiences within
West Africa on good parliamentary standards,
and to gain expertise for more effective oversight
of the security sector. Participants will acquire a
better understanding of their role in overseeing
the security sector and the necessary tools to
overcome some of the existing challenges.
Outcome
The participants will identify ways to strengthen
parliamentary oversight in West Africa, through
a better understanding and implementation
of ethical standards, improved efficiency of
defence and security committees and budgetary
oversight in the region. Seminar proceedings and
presentation papers will be made available.
Organisation
The different topics that are covered during
this two-day workshop will be presented by
parliamentarians and various experts in the field
of security issues. The event will be participatory
with a particular emphasis on discussion. On the
last day, the participants will propose different
solutions to the challenges identified.
Interpretation services will be available in English,
French and Portuguese, and key documents will
be translated into these languages.
Participants
The ECOWAS countries’ parliaments will be invited
to send a delegation, preferably comprised of
members of security and defence committees,
to take part in the seminar. Key members of the
civil society, including the media and contributors
to the ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF guide for West
African parliamentarians will also participate in
this event.
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
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Programme
Tuesday, 21 September, 2010
8:30-9:00
Registration of Participants
9:00-10:00
Welcome and Presentation
Welcome
Dr. Jean-Jacques GACOND, Deputy Head of Operations Africa and Middle East, DCAF
Mr. Martin CHUNGONG, Director of the Division for the promotion of Democracy, IPU
Hon. Mamadou Bamba NDIAYE, Chairman of the Commission on Defence and Security,
National Assembly of Senegal
Official Opening
Hon. Mamadou SECK, Speaker of the National Assembly of Senegal
Hon. Mahamane OUSMANE, Speaker of the ECOWAS Parliament
10:00-10:15
Coffee Break
Session 1. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT IN THE AREA OF
SECURITY
10:15- 11:30
Presentations:
Parliamentary oversight in the context of West Africa: an overview of
achievements and challenges
Pr. Boubacar N’DIAYE, Member of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN)
Integrating a gender perspective into parliament’s contribution to the security
agenda: Q & A
Ms Karin GRIMM, Gender and SSR Project Coordinator, Special Programmes, DCAF
11:30 - 13:00
Panel 1: Parliamentary Ethics and Transparency
Moderator:
Hon. Mahamane OUSMANE, Speaker of the ECOWAS Parliament
Panellists:
• Hon. Mamadou Lamine THIAM, Member of the National Assembly of Senegal
•
13:00- 14:30
70
Hon. Joseph GHARTEY, Member of Parliament, former Minister of Justice and former
Attorney General of Ghana
Lunch Break
Regional Seminar
Session 2. DEFENCE/SECURITY COMMITTEES AND PARLIAMENTARY MECHANISMS APPLIED TO
THE SECURITY SECTOR
14:30 – 15:30
Presentations:
Strengthening parliamentary oversight in Southern Africa: what lessons for
West Africa?
Hon. Sango Patekile HOLOMISA, Member of the SADC Parliamentary Forum’s Standing
Committee on Democracy and Governance
The contribution of civil society to security sector governance and its oversight
in West Africa
Pr. Eboe HUTCHFUL, Executive Director of African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR),
Chair of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN)
15:30-16:00
Panel 2: Defence/ Security Committees & Parliamentary Mechanisms Applied to
the Security Sector
Moderator:
Hon. Balado MANU, ECOWAS Parliament, Chairman of the Committee on Political Affairs,
Peace and Security (PAPS)
Panellists:
• Hon. Mamadou Bamba NDIAYE, Chairman of the Commission on Defence and
Security, National Assembly of Senegal
• Hon. Bréhima BERIDOGO, Member of the National Assembly of Mali
16:00-16:15
Coffee Break
16:15-17:15
Defence/ Security Committees & Parliamentary Mechanisms Applied to the
Security Sector (discussion)
19:30 – 21 :30 Cocktail buffet offered by the Swiss Embassy
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
71
Wednesday, 22 September, 2010
9:00-9:15
Summary of Day One and Objectives of Day Two
Rapporteur : Mr. Okey UZOECHINA, DCAF representative to the ECOWAS
Session 3. PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY BUDGETING
9:15-9:45
Presentation :
Best practice in security sector budgeting – The role of parliament
Mrs. Lena ANDERSSON, Independent consultant
09:45-10:15
Panel 3 : Parliamentary Oversight of Security Budgeting
Moderator :
Hon. Boni TESSI, ECOWAS Parliament, Member of the Committee on Economic Policies
and Budget Control
Panellists :
• Hon. Laurent AKOUN, Chairman of the Commission on Defence, National Assembly
of Côte d’Ivoire
• Hon. Alice FOYAH, Member of the Committee on Finance and Development, National
Assembly of Sierra Leone
10:15-10:30
Coffee Break
10:30-11:30
Parliamentary Oversight of Security Budgeting (discussion)
Session 4. WORKING GROUPS AND CONCLUSIONS
72
11:30-12:00
Working Groups session: Presentation, objectives, organisation of 3 Working Groups.
12:00-13:30
Lunch Break
13:30-15:00
Working Groups : Discussion and preparation in groups
15:00-15:45
Restitution by Working Groups (10 min each, plus Q&A)
15:45-16:15
Concluding Plenary Discussion
16:15-16:30
Coffee Break
16:30-17:15
Summary, evaluation and closing remarks
19:00
Cocktail buffet offered by the President of the National Assembly of Senegal – Hotel
Méridien Président
Regional Seminar
List of participants
Surname
First name
Fonction
ECOWAS Parliament
Ousmane
Mahamane
Speaker of the ECOWAS
Parliament
Manu
Balado
Chairman of the Committee
on Political Affairs, Peace and
Security
Tessi
Boni
Member of the Committee on
Economic Policies and Budget
Control
National Assembly of Senegal
Thiam
Ibra Der
1st Deputy Speaker
Mbodji
Aïssatou
3rd Deputy Speaker
Sow
Moussa
4th Deputy Speaker
Ndiaye
Daour Niang
Elected Secretary
Diallo
Aminata
Elected Secretary
Ndiaye
Mamadou Bamba Chairman of the Defence and
Security Committee
Niang
Mbaye
Member of the Defence and
Security Committee
Wade
Doudou
Member of the Defence and
Security Committee
Sarr
Pape Dib
Member of the Defence and
Security Committee
Cissé
Ndèye Gaye
MP
Ndong
Joseph
MP
Thiam
Mamadou Lamine MP
Diop
Khoudia
Technical Advisor to the Speaker
of the National Assembly
National Assembly of Benin
Gnonlonfoun
Isidore
Rapporteur, Defence and
Security Committee
Odon-Aro
André
Parliamentary Assistant
National Assembly of Burkina Faso
Konaté
Tiémoko
Member of the Foreign Affairs
and Defence Committee
Dicko Agaleoue Maria-Goretti
Member of the Foreign Affairs
Adoua
and Defence Committee
Email address
mahamane_ousmane@yahoo.fr
kwakubalado@yahoo.fr
bonitesia@yahoo.fr
ibaderthiam@yahoo.fr
aissatou.mbodj@yahoo.fr
moussasow@orange.sn
daourndiaye@gmail.ga
bambandiayemsu@yahoo.fr
doudouwade@hotmail.com
dibsarr@hotmail.com
ndeyegayecisse@yahoo.fr
ndongjoe@gmail.com
mlthiam@yahoo.com
diopkhoudia@hotmail.com
gnonisidoro@yahoo.fr
elsol_1963@yahoo.fr
ktiemoko@gmail.com
agaleoue.maria@yahoo.fr
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
73
Akoun
Frondo Yao
Gorgui
Jadama
Susso
Jatta
Ghartey
Vesa Gomez
Tumani
Dicko
Béridogo
Traoré
Mfulu Massaka
Ndamba
Musunda
Baku
74
National Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire
Laurent
Chairman of the Defence and
akounlaurent@hotmail.com
Security Committee
Michel
Rapporteur of the Defence and michelfrondo@gmail.com
Security Committee
Jean Jacques
Parliamentary Administrator
gorguijj@yahoo.fr
in charge of the Defence and
Security Committee
National Assembly of The Gambia
Lamin
MP
assembly.clerk@yahoo.co.uk
Saikou
MP
assembly.clerk@yahoo.co.uk
M.E. Buba
Assistant Secretary
bubamass@yahoo.com
Parliament of Ghana
Joseph
MP
jnghartey@gmail.com
National People’s Assembly of Guinea Bissau
Naluak
Chairman of the Defence
vesa.vincent@gmail.com
Committee
Mané
Secretary of the Defence
Committee
National Assembly of Mali
Bourema
Chairman of the Defense,
dicko620@yahoo.fr
Security and Civil Protection
Committee
Bréhima
MP
beridogo@yahoo.fr
Chacka
Parliamentary Assistant
Provincial Assembly of Bas-Congo (DRC)
Marie-José
Deputy Speaker
mjmfulu@yahoo.fr
afdin2010@yahoo.fr
Perfusion
MP
nsumbu.benjamin@yahoo.fr
Franck
Kalawa
Charles
Boyah
Komba
Foyah
Alice
Akoda Koffi
Kounsoumba
Takpaya
Joseph
Salissa
Kossi
Regional Seminar
Cabinet Director
Parliament of Sierra Leone
Chairman of the Defence and
Security Committee
Vice-chair of the Defence and
Security Committee
Member of the Finance and
Development Committee
National Assembly of Togo
MP
MP
Parliamentary Assistant
bakuf2001@yahoo.fr
kalatara06@yahoo.co.uk
kesbee2004@yahoo.com
foyahalice@yahoo.com
josephakoda@yahoo.fr
ksalissa@yahoo.fr
takpayakossi@yahoo.fr
Holomisa
Khuzwayo
Hutchful
N’Diaye
Andersson
Guinard
KrammeStermose
Konte
Pangalos
Viotti
Chugong
Huizenga
Gacond
Grimm
Uzoechina
Parliamentary Forum of the South African Development Community (SADC)
Sango Patekile
Member of the Standing
sholomisa@parliament.gov.za
Committee on Democracy and
Governance
June
International Relations Officer
jkhuzwayo@parliament.gov.za
African Security Sector Network (ASSN)
Eboe
Chair
eboehutchf@aol.com
Boubacar
Member of the Executive
bndiaye@wooster.edu
Committee
Consultants
Lena
Independent consultant
lena.andersson@
-Balkans Analysis Group
balkansanalysis.org
Observers
Nicolas
Security Sector Reform Adviser - guinardn@un.org
UNOWA
Friedrich
Resident Representative Senegal fes@fes-sn.org
- Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Saliou
Programme Manager - Friedrich fes@fes-sn.org
Ebert Foundation
Christianna
Policy Specialist (Parliamentary christianna.pangalos@undp.org
Development and Political Party
Strengthening) - UNDP
Roland
Chargé d’affaires a.i. - Swiss
rolland.viotti@eda.admin.ch
Embassy
Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU)
Martin
Director of the Division for the
martin.chungong@mail.ipu.org
promotion of Democracy
Rogier
Human Rights Programme
rh@mail.ipu.org
Officer
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Jean-Jacques
Deputy Head Operations Africa j.gacond@dcaf.ch
and Middle East Division
Karin
Project Coordinator Gender and k.grimm@dcaf.ch
SSR
Okey
Representative to the ECOWAS okeysoffice@yahoo.com
Parliamentary Oversight in the Area of Security in West Africa
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