Defence Committee
7 October 2015
In response to the Defence Committee's call for written evidence, the Strategy and Security
Institute at the University of Exeter submits three papers. Each paper 'stands alone' but together
they represent a set of observations about the nature of the threats facing UK and Government's
capacity to anticipate and deal with them.
Sir Paul Newton uses MOD as a case study to illustrate a lack of capacity - and inclination - in
HMG to 'think the unthinkable'. In paragraphs 14-19 he suggests practical, proven steps that could
be taken (including by the Defence Committee) to weigh threats, test them against UK's ability to
respond, and so plan more effectively.
Prof Patrick Porter notes that the UK faces a deteriorating security environment. A complex mix of
revolution, geopolitics and war could produce a simultaneous set of problems in forms that are
hard to foresee, beyond the capacity of its overstretched resources.
Dr David Blagden observes that key changes in Britain’s threat environment owe to the ongoing
return of major power competition and conflict to the international system. He suggests
improvements in UK threat assessment processes to better handle such an emerging threat
landscape.
1
Thinking the Unthinkable: the MOD as an Indicative Case Study
Sir Paul Newton
Professor of Strategy and Director of the Strategy and Security Institute
University of Exeter
What is the Government’s ability to ‘think the unthinkable’ and how flexible are the UK’s thought
process and planning process to meet the wide range of credible potential dangers?
1.
Although most of us use the phrase, logically there is no 'foreseeable future'. Yet whilst
'surprise' in an inherently unpredictable world is inevitable, prudent preparation can help absorb
surprise and prevent systemic, strategic 'shock'. Shock causes paralysis or ill-judged action.
Reflecting upon US decision-making after the shock of 9/11 Deputy Secretary of State Rich
Armitage admitted "we were angry". Resilience (and wisdom under pressure) demands of
decision-makers and their officials the ability, and especially the inclination, to think beyond policy
norms and departmental boundaries, to adapt structures and established processes in order to
'think the unthinkable' before the unthinkable happens, out of a clear blue sky. Generating such an
ability is a matter of choice. UK (and MOD in this particular case) has chosen not to adopt
practical, proven, affordable techniques that can improve both evaluation of, and resilience to, an
expanding range of threats.
2.
The Government can build a more coherent threat picture and, crucially, test the
robustness of the deductions that flow from it. The capacity to evaluate depends upon
technologically-advanced collection and dissemination of vast quantities of information. Expert
judgement must then transform data into timely, usable intelligence and relevant policy options. As
cuts in Whitehall (eg in the FCO and Defence Intelligence) bite, capacity to evaluate is diminishing
relative to the growing scope and scale of threats. So capacity is a concern. However, at least as
important is the inclination to test the resilience and relevance of a set of (often implicit)
assumptions and beliefs on which we build our military strategy.
3.
Current MOD structures and processes are not optimised to detect "the weak signals" of
irrelevance, as US General Marty Dempsey calls them. The MOD’s assessment of the Future
Character of Conflict (FCOC, 2009) introduced the notion of ‘hybrid’ threats; a toxic cocktail of
traditional and novel risks, manifesting concurrently. However, Whitehall seems to view hybrid
threats mainly through the prism of a 'rules based' international system made up of at least semifunctioning states, when the reality is of an increasingly disorderly neighbourhood where the
'unthinkable' is already happening. Strategy is inherently competitive, but perversely, these hybrid
threats are not weighted and then tested against our own current and future defence capabilities.
Such creative, deliberately disruptive evaluation requires institutional and personal professional
cultures that encourage, reward and indeed require, 'constructive scepticism'.
4.
UK has considerable resources, but it must get more strategic value from them. The
creation of a National Security Secretariat (albeit small and focused on the current business of the
National Security Council) enables better policy integration. And Whitehall attracts bright,
dedicated people with a public service ethos. Furthermore, the adoption of a 'risk based' approach
to strategy could provide a set of processes and incentives for 'thinking the unthinkable'. There are
three inter-locking elements to risk as a decision-support tool; likelihood, impact and a self-aware
assessment of preparedness. It is the third of these factors that is under-represented in MOD
decision-making. Policy is accorded a high degree of deference, at times achieving totemic status;
'thinking the unthinkable', if it challenges policy and other informal norms, is not usually the route to
smooth inter/intra-departmental relationships - or career success.
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5.
This is a troubling picture; diminishing capacity (a quantitative issue) exacerbated by a
conservative institutional preference (a qualitative factor). Under such conditions the inevitable risk
of surprise mutates into growing vulnerability to shock. Rectifying this requires a quiet revolution,
not a gentle bureaucratic evolution. It will demand two concurrent, complementary types of
organisational behaviour: a willingness to adapt (i.e. evolution from current norms, such as
revisiting SDSR10 decisions about Maritime Patrol) and more challenging, an appetite to innovate
(which is a disruptive, creative and non-linear approach.)
6.
Whether this is plausible depends upon a greater awareness of the risks of shock. Past
experience may offer some signposts. At the height of the Cold War the physical and ideological
dimensions of the threat were extensively researched, largely known and bounded. The details of
intent (being a human factor) were naturally more opaque. During the Cuba and Berlin crises the
risk of miscalculation was acute, however, it was a relatively stable if adversarial relationship so a
rational-actor model of evaluation and strategy formulation was appropriate.
7.
As Prof Porter argues, such assumptions do not necessarily apply when weighing current
threats, given the profoundly volatile underlying strategic drivers. The West has struggled to
evaluate much less produce a true strategy for Europe's open 'southern flank'. Caught by surprise
by the Arab Spring, our responses since have created neither favourable local security conditions
as a ‘stable-enough’ platform for political progress, nor a vision in which locals have confidence.
Some long-hallowed strategic ideas are no longer working as originally conceived. Notions of
'containment' and 'deterrence' that had a strategic logic during the Cold War are of dubious value
when applied to the Syria, Libya or Yemen cases. A lack of 'thinking the unthinkable' has left
decision-makers unprepared for the scale and pace of insecurity arising in part from our action
(Libya) or inaction (Syria).
8.
Strategy is made within and is shaped by structures that are meant to be fit for that
purpose. The strategic community is meant to be served by processes that alert stakeholders to
evolving threats and opportunities. The norm in more stable times was a well-honed threat-based
planning process that worked within NATO structures. It was optimised for a known and
quantifiable set of Warsaw Pact military capabilities and options. Intelligence, scientific, military
and policy communities (larger than they are now) worked closely in a programme of National and
Alliance events specifically designed for the task. There were regular tutorials and tests; crisismanagement exercises during which the essential strategic elements of uncertainty, competition
and chance were represented. Politicians, officials and military leaders were coached in their ability
to evaluate and counter credible Soviet threats. Systematic 'war games' entered MOD's
'institutional DNA', creating a resilient professional community that had a sense of how different
actors might act under pressure. This also created some 'safe space' in which to 'think the
unthinkable'.
9.
The 'known unknown' Warsaw Pact threat provided planners, commanders, politicians and
officials with a rational-actor threat baseline from which concepts such as 'Forward Defence' and
'Flexible Response' were refined. From high-level strategies flowed investment in military
capabilities. Threat-based deductions shaped plans for the number and location of RN minehunters to keep specified UK ports open for pre-planned US reinforcement. The threat dictated
which Polish airfields and bridges be denied the Warsaw Pact to create favourable force ratios on
and over the battlefield. And analysis indicated the routes that 1st (British) Corps had to defend
against Soviet forces, known down to unit level, until US reinforcements could cross the Atlantic
before counter-attacking. Planning was supported by bespoke research and challenge
organisations such as the Soviet Studies Branch at Sandhurst. Yet even despite relative certainty,
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well-honed processes and bespoke structures, not all capability decisions were adequately
challenged.
The Cold War saw some dubious, bordering on fantastic, Defence decisions. UK's force structure
and equipment base was defined according to highly-refined - but in some cases deeply flawed military ideas. A self-delusion trap that awaits the incurious or the complacent. We can learn from
the fatal experience of employing concepts, weapons and techniques developed to counter a
Soviet threat which failed against far less capable adversaries. Sea Dart-equipped Destroyers
proved inflexible and vulnerable in the Falklands War. Applying their well-rehearsed Polish war
plan, several RAF Tornadoes were shot down over Iraqi airbases in the early hours of the 1st Gulf
War, forcing a radical change in the UK contribution to the air effort. Embedded Force and budgetdriving ideas failed when confronted with an eminently predictable threat reality. Self-delusion also
lay at the heart of the British Army's 'manoeuvre warfare approach'. Fortunately, it was never
tested in battle, but a cursory application of disruptive challenge shows it relied on wishful thinking.
Dug in on dominating ridges and villages, British infantry armed with Milan missiles were meant to
block the massed tanks of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany. Around these ‘bastions’ scarce
British armour was meant to concentrate, striking the Soviets in pre-designated 'killing areas'. The
inconvenient flaw was the Milan missile's known inability to defeat the main armour of Soviet tanks.
Even sharply-focused threat-aware planning can create dangerously false expectations, if not
subjected to rigorous challenge. Bureaucratic cultures and routines can ossify around a set of
convenient assumptions that result in what Daniel Kahnman terms "irrational perseverance".
Thinking the unthinkable is not just useful, it is vital.
10.
Poor ideas can put down deep roots, especially where the inevitable institutional imperative
is to maintain consensus. Consensus allows decisions to be made; it justifies force structure; and it
leads to a costed equipment plan on which all major stakeholders can agree - albeit with varying
degrees of enthusiasm. There are modern examples of consensus resulting in the sort of strategic
wishful thinking described above. And many of the safeguards that, at least in theory, should have
evaluated and filtered the specious - or totemic but sadly irrelevant -capabilities and plans, have
been discarded since the Cold War. In UK Defence planning, the prominence of threat has been
superseded by a capability approach, which in turn is dominated by resource-aware policy.
11.
An unaffordable defence strategy is mere fantasy; and in theory, a capability approach
should integrate all factors, including a holistic assessment of the threat. Yet where a focus on
efficiency and process is not balanced by a critical evaluation of core military ideas, risk is layered
on risk. Strangely, whilst the technical specification and cost of a given piece of equipment is
scrutinised, there are no equally stringent 'gateways' through which the core military ideas must
pass. In an era of 'evidence based decision making', this is an odd anomaly, putting assertion
presented as ‘military judgement’ in a privileged position. From Carrier Strike to the Army's notion
of Air Manoeuvre, the core military contentions about the way these capabilities should work
against adaptive adversaries were not subjected to robust challenge. There is no testing (if
necessary to destruction) of military assertion.
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12.
Airborne and amphibious 'theatre entry' are two examples of force-driving - and hugely
expensive - military ideas that have not been re-evaluated. Yet the contemporary threat reality is
that proliferation has put technologically-advanced, sophisticated air and maritime access-denial
systems in the hands of several potential adversaries. Theatre entry - other than under nearbenign circumstances - may no longer be an 'act of war', even for the US. What explains this
anomaly? In MOD's 'force testing' procedures, the adversary is not represented. The MOD holds
'war games' without a war. Unlike in the Cold War, these are 'games' where chance - fundamental
to the nature of conflict - is conveniently removed. These are mechanistic staff-driven processes,
not command-led simulations of credible (much less unthinkable) scenarios. Joint force packages
are 'tested' for policy compliance and affordability; they are not put into simulated battles and
campaigns against a cunning 'Red' adversary. Defence is making optimistic, untested assumptions
about the design of our Forces when the reality is diversifying, expanding, disruptive hybrid threats.
Dr Frank Hoffman at the National Defense University laid down this provocative challenge to
military force designers; "Would you fly in an aircraft whose design had not been thoroughly tested
in a wind tunnel?"
13.
This 'blue-sided' approach to Defence planning has been exacerbated by an assumption in
SDSR10, that in the future UK would have the freedom and wisdom to exercise far greater
'discretion' over where, when and why it engaged in conflict; an assertion laid bare mere months
later by intervention in Libya, yet done in a way that ignores the lessons of regime removal in Iraq.
Another example of untested assertion (noted by the NAO) was the sweeping changes to the
Regular/Reserve mix that followed an unaffordable SDSR10. What makes this state of affairs more
dangerous is a crusade against 'bad inter-service behaviour'. Today, any inter-service capability
challenge risks having the perpetrator being labelled 'parochial' or 'un-joint'.
Some Practical Improvements
14.
As FCOC warned, the threat is constantly evolving. For instance, urbanisation is a profound
change for which the Armed Forces are poorly adapted. There are well-tested techniques that
could be mandated at low or no cost to enhance UK's capacity to weigh the significance of
disruptive trends; to anticipate shocks; model threats; and plan in a more flexible, urgent manner.
The result would be more agile, relevant and resilient Armed Forces and less brittle strategic
decision-making. It is a matter of habit and choice that these approaches are not embedded in
Whitehall's core structures and processes. This paper now focuses on some practical measures
that could be taken.
15.
Crisis Management Exercises. Whitehall, led by the MOD, should run a mandatory
programme of adversarial crisis management simulations or 'exercises'. These would ensure that
senior military and civilian decision-makers across Whitehall, as individuals and as a community,
are 'Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel' (SQEP). In other professional fields, including
within the Armed Forces following the damning Report (sub-titled 'A Failure of Leadership') into the
Nimrod disaster, 'SQEP' is a mandatory legal and moral requirement. Strangely, it is not for
ministers and senior officials. Whilst tactical units, be they ships, squadrons or the Lead Armoured
Task Force are prepared systematically, evaluated and then held 'at readiness', decision-makers
are not subject to the same rigour. No matter how intense Whitehall's daily routines, as the 9/11
Commission noted, leaders and staffs require bespoke preparation for the extraordinary pressures
of sudden crises and conflict. Exercises and scenario planning (pioneered by Shell during the
1970s) can stress-test policy, people and military capabilities, as in the US Millennium Challenge
series, where on one occasion Red famously defeated Blue in minutes, rather than conveniently
conspiring in their own defeat.
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16.
Experimentation. Experimentation is a focused form of simulation. It can help set the
conditions for change. In Southampton the Army recently demonstrated the potential of adversarial
scenario-based experimentation when it tested the practical implications of urbanisation during a
simulated operation against a hybrid adversary in real built-up areas where Red got a vote.
Exercise Urban Warrior involved 'players' ranging from the 4* Commander-in-Chief to tank
crewmen and helicopter pilots. Participants were invited from MOD Main Building, NATO, other
Armed Services, the Police, DfID and academia. The results were compelling if uncomfortable; live
tests showed that Bowman radios lost over 50% of their theoretical range in built-up areas;
modelling the battle for a single tower block showed that ammunition planning was woefully
inadequate; and helicopter-reliant casualty evacuation drills honed in Afghanistan were exposed as
impractical when reviewed by experts in congested city 'battlespace'. The experiment also
challenged the emerging orthodoxy that 'Main Battle Tanks are Cold War relics'. Results were
captured by DSTL and used to inform Army 2020, not least in changing the composition and
primary task of tank units making them relevant to modern needs. They now focus on providing
intimate support to infantry in the urban fight, rather than aspire to sweep across a conveniently
open desert. Experiments like Urban Warrior have limitations but they offer a way of assessing
relevance; they provide a platform (and a necessity) to 'think the unthinkable'; and they can reduce
the chance of paralysing shock.
Exercise Urban Warrior: an Experiment to
Assess Army Capability
Concepts Tested on Real Terrain
Player Briefing: Red Surprise Blue and Drive
UK Forces Back into Southampton
Joint and International Players Assess the Utility of
Air Support in the Urban 'Clutter’: West Quay,
Southampton
17.
Integrated Evaluation. Complex threats need integrated evaluation. UK should create
(either in MOD or ideally within an expanded National Security Secretariat) an Office of Net
Assessment (ONA). Staffed on an inter-agency model like the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, an
ONA would independently supplement the excellent work done by the Assessments Staff. The
Assessments Staff produce Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) papers which often answer
bounded, specific questions related to the current security agenda. JIC papers draw heavily upon
secret intelligence sources (which may not offer comprehensive coverage); and no matter how
good they are, they are distributed to a small group of vetted users. There is no staff and no forum
specifically tasked with 'thinking the unthinkable', following the cost-cutting disbandment of the
Advanced Studies and Assessment Group at the Defence Academy. Indeed, there are official
obstacles which constrain thinking. The Development Doctrine and Concepts Centre's Global
Strategic Trends (GST) programme looks out 30 years. GST draws on excellent analysis, flags
potential ‘Black Swans’ and provides policy prompts. However, the draft Report is edited by
Whitehall. Any trend that contradicts policy is liable to be removed. In the 2009 version the
possibility that Iran would develop nuclear weapons was deleted because HMG policy was that
Iran should not. An ONA could provide the missing element of constructive challenge; test
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alternative policy assumptions and assess old and new security and military ideas on a system-ofsystems basis. It would use techniques such as Red Teaming to provide a channel for contrarian
challenge. Red Teaming and systematic Scenario Planning campaigns are used extensively in
industry to test strategic options; they are used by strategists in Israel; and they are now used
routinely in military tactical HQs where military staffs develop courses of action and test plans that
are war-gamed, Red against Blue. Perversely, such tools have not been embedded to provide
decision support in Whitehall, or MOD Main Building. The ONA is not a novel idea: the Pentagon
and the Prime Minister's Office in Singapore have long-established Offices of Net Assessment,
fusing classified, official sources with the broadest possible base of expertise to model credible
threats, options and plans. A Cabinet Office or MOD-based ONA could do sophisticated, long-term
modelling supported by (a recently much-reduced) DSTL providing a more sophisticated and
imaginative 'thinking' service for the security and defence community.
Conclusion and Recommendation
18.
This submission flags a strategic gap in UK's ability to envisage the complex threats that
challenge our security and risk making our military capabilities irrelevant. As seen recently (first
with the Arab Spring and then in Ukraine), major strategic discontinuities do occur. Even in
situations where UK has tried to bound its liability (such as by toppling the Libyan regime, but
leaving the consequences on the ground to local power brokers) the reality of proximate failed
states poses compound threats. If there is a gap in Whitehall's capability and intent to 'think the
unthinkable', the Defence Committee might set an example.
In 2012 Exeter University established the Strategy and Security Institute (SSI) to teach an MA in
applied security strategy. Preparing for the first course, the Institute held a simple one-day
scenario planning exercise on Syria. At that time the orthodox view was that Assad would go,
because Assad should go. SSI predicted that the Assad regime would not collapse and the most
likely case was Balkanisation on sectarian lines. Further, and more 'unthinkable', SSI used
scenario planning to highlight the risks from 'catastrophic success' (the sudden and unmanaged
collapse of the Syrian regime leaving in its wake an Iraq or Libya-like vacuum, spiralling terrorism
and retribution). In 2012 SSI concluded that Assad should be part of a power transition. British and
US policy-makers reached the same conclusion, in late 2015.
19.
The Defence Committee could adopt scenario planning to supplement its traditional
evidence collection. Using expertise in Exeter and elsewhere, it could run scenario-based strategic
excursions, generating more nuanced debate and insights. Leading by example, close to the heart
of Government, the Committee would help create an appetite to 'think the unthinkable'.
6
Flexible Response? An SDSR Checklist of Potential Threats
Professor Patrick Porter
Academic Director of the Strategy and Security Institute
University of Exeter
What are credible threats to the UK?
What is the Government’s ability to ‘think the unthinkable’ and how flexible are the UK’s thought
process and planning process to meet the wide range of credible potential dangers?
1.
It would be tempting to frame current threats as a product of dangerous regimes. Certainly,
a range of ‘agents’ are implicated in causing the security challenges that confront the UK. We
could ‘list’ the following: the Sunni supremacist Islamic State (ISIL) that attracts disaffected British
youth to its banner; Vladimir Putin’s imperial adventurism in the Crimea and Ukraine that now
brings Russian ‘probes’ to Britain’s air, nautical and ‘cyber’ space; and Bashar al-Assad’s
predatory and destabilising regime in Syria, that helps drive refugees to Europe. ‘Dangerous
regimes’ are a real source of threat.
2.
Each of these problems, however, stems also from a larger set of conflicts and ‘macro’
historical processes that make them possible in the first place. We see the unravelling of historic
settlements and strategic order of the Middle East in a complex mix of revolution and war, not least
through the Arab Spring and the Saudi-Iran ‘cold war.’ We see the collision of the Euro-Atlantic
world with Russia over contested space in the ‘near abroad.’ Neither can we ignore the escalating
rivalry between China and the US and its allies in East Asia, where economic growth stimulates
the return of geopolitical competition.
3.
In practical terms, this means that ISIL could not have seized territory straddling Syria and
Iraq without the longer-term sectarian divisions in the Iraqi state exacerbated by the vacuum
opened up by invasion, the empowerment of Iran and the resulting Shiite ascendancy in Baghdad.
Putin’s revanchism in the Crimea and Ukraine would not be possible without the surge of Russian
nationalism in a state that is struggling to cope with economic decline, and the failure to negotiate
some kind of regional order in Eastern Europe. And Assad’s predations cannot be comprehended
without the interlocking of the Arab Spring revolutions and escalating regional rivalries. Thanks to
systemic turbulence, the ‘cast’ of threats may change again.
4.
Additionally, ‘threats’ are produced not only by external conditions, but by their relationship
with the UK’s capabilities and preparedness. We should frame ‘threat’ as the product of the
interaction of dangerous developments around the flanks of the Western security community, and
Britain’s incapacity, or insufficient capacity, either to shape that environment or to respond.
5.
We cannot confidently foresee what specific threats this deteriorating environment will
produce. Indeed, ‘non-linearity’ is part of the problem, the unexpected sudden breaking of patterns.
A prudent standard to apply is the UK’s capacity to handle a set of concurrent crises that these
historical processes could throw up, without warning. We can imagine, in the ‘worse case’, some
mixture of Russian adventurism within NATO Baltic States and a confidence/credibility crisis within
NATO itself, an economic meltdown within a volatile nationalist China; an escalation in conflict in
the Middle East and North Africa driving ever more refugees ‘northward.’
6.
Added together, this process menaces the security of the UK’s institutions and social
cohesion, and vital material qualities like its credit-worthiness, its capacity to import and trade, and
the integrity of the NATO alliance. I say ‘menace’, rather than using the overblown term ‘existential
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threat’. Keeping proportionality and historical perspective in mind, there is a deteriorating security
environment that is worse than the interim period between 1989-2001. It is not comparable to the
major crises that the country withstood in the twentieth century. The UK can disrupt and ward off
threats by using its capabilities, such as its power-projection strength, to turning its geographical
distance into a defensive asset. Equally, it would be wise not to run an experiment in wishful
optimism. Security problems could be magnified by the hope that the difficulties above will recede
in our time of ‘commercial peace.’
7.
Britain’s capacity to respond is strained by the combined weakening effects of the longterm erosion of its economic base and the scarcity of resources, in the wake of the Global Finance
Crisis; a depleted armed force that is only thinly distributed across a wide range of commitments
and not sufficiently augmented by allies and partners, along with the steady drawdown of US
security provision in Britain’s neighbourhood.
8.
If properly nurtured and applied with discipline, British capabilities can be applied to
mitigate, deter or neutralise threats. One capability that can be more effectively developed is the
mental ability to cope with what Sir Michael Howard called ‘the utterly unpredictable, the entirely
unknown.’ There is presently a lack of sufficient ‘practice’, through wargaming and thought
experimentation. To prepare policymakers, the UK needs more intensive ‘red teaming’ across
government, from a ‘shadow national security strategy’ at the top, all the way down to crisis
scenario simulation.
9.
The goal of simulation is not primarily to ‘dress rehearse’ hypothetical crises, as we can’t
know what future ones will be and are bound to forecast badly. Its value is to condition
policymakers to make informed choices under pressure, to accelerate interdepartment/interagency cohesion, to spot overlooked potentialities, and to test and probe
assumptions by introducing the ‘unthinkable’ (such as an Iranian nuclear bomb, a disruption of
seaborne trade and food supply, a North Sea confrontation) into the collective mind. This is not
politically easy, as it entails the contemplation of failure of current policy, and so requires farsighted leadership within government.
10.
The UK is also not as well prepared as it might be for an important part of this turbulent,
‘non-linear’ environment, namely the need for geopolitical flexibility given ever-shifting power
balances and a dynamic ‘threat picture.’ Given that it is difficult for the US-led West in a time of
austerity to tackle every problem at once, it may need to regard some adversaries or rivals also, at
times, as informal partners. ISIL, for instance, may not be toppled without an effective military
ground campaign in concert with forces from Kurdistan, Syria and Iran, while the continued
restraint of Iran’s nuclear programme demands the co-operation of Russia and China. The logic of
‘my enemy’s enemy’ may not always be wise, but it would be costly to reject the suggestion of
compromise out of hand.
11.
To achieve Western aims in each context, it may require uncomfortable bargains and
compromise with regimes that offend the UK’s conception of the ‘rules based’ international order.
Part of ‘thinking the unthinkable’ is imagining some of today’s enemies as tomorrow’s potential
partners. In this spirit, the Strategy and Security Institute at the University of Exeter is committed to
contributing to the regeneration of the UK’s thought and planning processes.
2
The Return of Great Power Competition: Implications for UK Threat Assessment
Dr David Blagden
Lecturer in International Security and Strategy, Strategy and Security Institute
University of Exeter
This evidence submission focuses on changes in the UK’s overall strategic environment, and
subsequent consequences for the various specific questions posed by the inquiry. It is offered in
an individual professional capacity, as an academic researcher of UK foreign and defence policy
with elements of relevant policy and military experience. It is intended to complement the
submissions from my SSI colleagues, Lieutenant General (Retd) Professor Sir Paul Newton and
Professor Patrick Porter, but we benefit from a constructive tension – rather than perfect alignment
– over some elements of our respective assessments. It focuses on the implications for the UK
strategic environment of the return of major power competition, and possible improvements to UK
threat assessment processes.
Relative Power Shifts and the UK Threat Environment
1.
The fundamental change in the UK’s strategic environment that is currently
underway – and that must be the principal background condition in analyses of Britain’s
future threat environment – is the return of ‘multipolarity’: a situation of multiple competing
great powers. The 1990s and 2000s were characterised by ‘unipolarity’: US preponderance so
overwhelming that it could pacify all other major power relationships simultaneously. The
associated absence of major state-based threats compared to the pre-1990 era in turn enabled
certain forms of British strategic behaviour. Most obviously, there was a shift in emphasis from the
deterrence and containment of overseas threats towards direct military intervention – primarily
under US leadership – aimed at political transformation and the resolution of instability abroad. A
quarter-century of globalization-enabled catch-up growth for key emerging economies is bringing
the ‘unipolar moment’ to an end, however, and this is already having important strategic
consequences for Britain.
2.
In my recent research, I have identified five key results of the return of multipolarity, and the
competitive and confrontational international environment that it tends to create, which in turn carry
implications for the UK’s strategic environment.

The resurgence of Russia – although its economy is now stalling in the face of
sanctions – has already brought Moscow back to the point where it possesses the
capabilities and resolve to threaten the territorial integrity of NATO, and to directly coerce
the UK itself via various means.

The US ‘pivot’ to Asia as Washington attempts to contain China may leave
European NATO powers having to do more for their own defence as the US proves
increasingly unwilling – and eventually unable – to shoulder the security burdens of its
European, Middle Eastern, and Asian allies simultaneously.

An increased risk of overseas military crises in which the UK has a stake taking on
an element of major power confrontation and escalation.

An increased risk of nuclear proliferation, as the best deterrent against coercion by
the conventionally powerful – or at least, an unconducive environment for disarmament and
arms control efforts.
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
Increasingly vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLOCs) – vital to the UK, as a
trade-dependent power – as US command of the global maritime commons becomes
increasingly contested and other NATO states’ ability (including our own) to make
meaningful naval contributions dwindles further.
3.
These developments are highly relevant for this inquiry, because they underpin threats –
and enable prioritisation – across the different themes, regions, and domains that the Committee
asks about. So, in asking “is there a credible threat of an attack on UK cyber space?” (for
example), the threat is not “cyber” itself, but rather the powerful actors that might use cyber
capabilities in conjunction with other forces for coercion and/or espionage, and the crisis dynamics
that might unfold during this interaction (e.g. if a UK-Russia cyber exchange incentivised
conventional escalation). Likewise, it is not regions themselves that generate threat; rather, the
threat that the UK faces in any given region – and the strategic prioritisation that we should afford it
– is a function of the capabilities/intentions of the political actors active there and the level of UK
interests at stake. The same goes too for domains of conflict: “the sea” or “the air” do not
themselves constitute threats, but rather act as fields for the manifestation of threat by
(increasingly powerful) hostile states. We certainly need to pay attention to the growth of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities that challenge our ability to provide sea and air control, for
example, and to the renewed possibility of large-scale manoeuvre warfare in Europe. But again,
the return of great power competition is the principal underlying source of the threat; the domain
itself is merely the conduit for increasingly conflictual international politics.
4.
Sometimes, the manifestations of relative power shifts for UK security are obvious: that
NATO now once again faces a risk of conventional conflict with the potential for catastrophic
escalation on its eastern border, for example. At other times, causation is more subtle: the
possibility that a future major-power Brazil may significantly complicate the defence of the
Falklands, for instance, or that our efforts to bolster the US presence in the Gulf could yield a
confrontation with China (particularly if a US-China crisis was unfolding elsewhere). Either way,
however, the point is that the demise of unipolarity and the return of multipolar great power
competition is transforming the entire strategic environment in which the UK operates,
necessitating the revision of several assumptions about the automatic superiority of UK/allied
power that have endured since 1990. In terms of prioritisation more generally, furthermore, given
the capabilities of other major powers, one key implication of the demise of unipolarity is that the
UK must reconsider whether the (still) most likely threats, such as terrorism and weak-state
instability, are still the most important threats on which UK defence should concentrate (the
analysis offered here would suggest that they may not be).
Improving the Quality of UK Government Threat Assessment Capabilities
5.
Turning now to the issue of the threat-evaluation abilities of the British government, there is
clearly room for improvement here. The speed at which SDSR 2010 was exposed – given its
predication on (a) only deploying force if vital interests were at stake and (b) not needing various
‘gapped’ capabilities during the forecast period – betrayed an over-confidence in (1) stilldevelopmental risk assessment methodologies and (2) the government’s own military restraint.
The latter is an issue that it is only within the power of the National Security Council to address:
although contributions such as this can emphasise the heightened importance of conserving power
resources and prudent prioritisation of commitments in the face of renewed major power
competition. The former, however, is something that can be worked on.
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6.
While the 2010 National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) was admirable in attempting to
weigh likelihood against severity, this methodology has certain limitations. For one, it is a
methodology that relies on assigning good-enough quantitative values to variables
(likelihood/severity) for which we will inevitably lack high-quality quantitative data. For another, it
can struggle to recognise differences of likelihood/severity within types of threat (e.g. terrorism may
indeed be the most likely threat facing Britain, but there is a substantial difference of severity
between a 9/11-level attack and the Lee Rigby murder, and the same can be said of the difference
between catastrophic and nuisance cyber-attacks). It also inadequately captures the linkages
between domains of coercion and confrontation: in positing cyber-attack and major power military
crises as separate scenarios, for instance, rather than as linked – and potentially escalatory –
dimensions of state coercion. And such a risk approach can fail to recognise the extent to which
likelihood and severity are not wholly exogenous variables, but rather dependent outcomes of
prior/current UK and allied policy. For example, the 2010 NSRA’s coding of conventional attack on
NATO and attack on a UK overseas territory as mere Tier 3 risks may well have been justified –
although the former may soon face revision – but such threats are only low because of the strength
of the UK’s past and present deterrent posture, and are thus not guaranteed to remain so if UK
capability and/or resolve weakens.
7.
The above is not to suggest that a risk approach is devoid of utility; far from it. But there
needs to be better causal linkage between the NSRA and subsequent policy choices: it is not
clear, for instance, how several key strategic choices taken by the UK government in the 2010-15
period fit with countering their own four identified Tier 1 risks. In the absence of high-quality
quantitative data to make the likelihood/severity calculation reliable, moreover, there needs to be
more ‘red-teaming’ both within and outside government – as Sir Paul and Prof. Porter both
emphasise – to ensure that approximations of likelihood and severity reflect collective bestjudgement rather than prevailing fashions or group-think. And the NSRA’s prioritisation needs to be
connected to strategic prioritisation in a much more specific, concrete way. “Germany First” (the
Allies’ approach in World War II) is a famous example of a simple, specific, prioritised and
ultimately effective strategy; “Global War On Terror” (with its expansive lack of prioritisation and
maximalist goals) is an example of the opposite. Simply defining “international terrorism” and
“military crises between states” as Tier 1 risks in the 2010 NSRA similarly lacked specificity, and
has resulted in an open-ended commitment to countering “instability” – wherever and however it
appears – without any prioritisation by the capabilities/resolve of the actors involved or the level of
UK interests at stake. Indeed, the temptation with a risk-based approach is to start laundry-listing
All Bad Things, without identifying a few principal sources of threat as our first-order strategic
priorities.
8.
Other concrete steps could be taken to improve UK government threat assessment. A few
are suggested here.

First, as noted above, there should be greater ‘red-teaming’ of threats, suggested
prioritisation, and proposed solutions. Given the emphasis of the first part of this evidence
submission – the return of multipolarity – and given the absence of this condition from most
policymakers’ and implementers’ experience to date, a key focus should be restoring
consideration of great power opposition/escalation/coercion to all scenario planning and
simulation. As Sir Paul touches upon, such ‘red-teaming’ should widen its inclusion beyond
officials, and indeed, beyond the current network of a few savvy, opaquely-selected, closeto-government think-tanks and academics if it is to achieve genuine challenging of
conventional wisdoms. Only by widening the net in this way – and accepting the risk of
encountering unhelpful/irrelevant/disruptive voices that it brings – can the full spectrum of
contrarian thinking be accommodated and the group-think of impervious policy communities
avoided.
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
Going beyond this simple observation, and as Sir Paul elaborates, there needs to
be scope for ‘red-teaming’ featuring external expertise to acquire both institutionalised
access to senior decision-makers and, potentially, classified information. The example of
the US Defense Policy Board may be instructive (although the DPB’s current composition
runs the risk of simply duplicating current government voices with former government
ones). So too might be the external membership of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy
Committee (although that model too would be only a partial fit). The MOD already has nonexecutive directors, of course, but they are there to oversee the Department’s financial
business, not national security strategy. Sir Paul’s recommendation of a UK Office of Net
Assessment (ONA), similar to the US and Singaporean examples, would be an ideal
solution. Failing that – or in conjunction – a reinvigoration, institutionalisation, and
empowerment of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Strategic Forum, launched in 2009, could
also help. Either way, the point is that without institutionalised access to the ear of decisionmakers and some sense of the prevailing intelligence picture, such ‘red-teaming’ exercises
risk becoming simply an academic workshop between scholars and a few token officials,
rather than genuine ‘hard tests’ of policymakers’ threat assessments and preconceptions.

In a similar vein, there should be greater scope for national security-related
departments to bring external expertise onto their staff in a limited-term capacity, so as to
implant alternative voices directly to policymaking positions. Drawing again on the US
example, the International Affairs Fellowship in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
the Foster and Franklin Fellowships at the State Department, offer competitively-selected,
publically-advertised opportunities for external experts to take on one-year policy postings
as contrarian thinkers in the national security apparatus. Similar programmes at the FCO,
MOD, and Cabinet Office National Security Secretariat could make a similar contribution
here in the UK, as could external hiring to a newly-formed UK ONA (as the US practices).
Whether such voices can meaningfully alter the direction of vast government departments
is not the point; the point is that individuals able and willing to at least audibly challenge
core internalised assumptions are installed within earshot of senior decision-makers.

More could be done to provide space for thinking about security threats and
strategic prioritisation for officials at all levels, and even Parliamentarians. The Armed
Forces Parliamentary Scheme could be amended/complemented by the addition of further
strategic studies education and discussion, beyond the current RCDS lectures, and
endorsed by the major political parties as a prerequisite to a security-related frontbench
portfolio. Sir Paul’s suggestion of the Defence Select Committee itself taking a lead on ‘redteaming’ and simulation exercises is also an innovative potential contribution to addressing
the wider strategic challenge. At lower levels, meanwhile, military officers and civilian
national security officials should be afforded greater scope to pursue academic strategic
studies education beyond the strictures of the Staff Courses, up to and including PhD
research, and this should be regarded as a prized asset for senior command, rather than as
a career break to be squeezed in (or a dumping ground for mediocre personnel). The Royal
Navy’s ‘First Sea Lord’s Fellowship’ initiative is to be lauded in this regard as a series of
seminars, academic readings, discussion groups, and so forth, aiming to improve and
sustain the education of high-flying RN officers who have completed graduate-level
strategic studies training. The RAF’s Centre for Airpower Studies is a similarly valuable
conduit for Service-level strategic thought.
9.
Finally, of course, it is important that we continue to recognise the limits of risk assessment
techniques and the dangers of an overly-confident approach to forecasting. Preserving a balanced
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range of capabilities with the capacity to deter – and, if necessary, scale-up to fight – against a
range of possible opponents and in a range of possible contingencies is the necessary
consequence of such humility.
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