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2
INTRODUCTION
The Security Sector and Counter-Trafficking
Cornelius Friesendorf
Introduction
Over recent years, many states have stepped up efforts against human
trafficking.1 However, counter-trafficking continues to suffer from
shortcomings. There is still a lack of political will, operational capacity, and
knowledge on trafficking and on what counter-strategies work best. As a
consequence, human trafficking continues to thrive. By focusing on the role of
the security sector, this book offers ways of making progress against a pressing
contemporary problem that undermines the security of states, societies, and
individuals. This introduction first highlights the contribution of the security
sector to counter-trafficking. It then examines the scope and nature of
trafficking and discusses different perspectives on the problem. Finally, this
introduction summarises the chapters of the book.
1. Conceptualising the Role of the Security Sector
The fight against human trafficking has three components: the prosecution of
traffickers, the protection of trafficked persons, and the prevention of
trafficking. In addition, and cutting through these “three Ps”, national and
international cooperation among the various actors constituting the countertrafficking security sector is needed.
Who are these actors? There is no common definition of the security sector. A
narrow definition includes core security actors such as the police and military,
but does not include, for example, NGOs and the media.2 The narrowest
1
For discussions on trafficking and counter-trafficking I thank the chapter authors, Beate Andrees, Mike
Dottridge, Louise Shelley, and many other researchers and practitioners. Special thanks go to Benjamin
S. Buckland. The views expressed in this introduction may be different from those of institutions and
individuals contributing to this book.
2
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security
System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007), 22.
17
definition would not even include the judiciary, but focus instead on “power
ministries” such as the Ministry of Interior and Defence, and their respective
agencies.
When looking at counter-trafficking, the security sector should be defined
broadly.3 For the purpose of this book, it encompasses: core security actors
(such as the armed forces, regular police, border police and immigration
services), judicial personnel (especially prosecutors and judges), security
management and oversight bodies that hold security agencies accountable, and
non-statutory security forces (such as private military companies).
Moreover, a definition of the counter-trafficking security sector must take into
account the essential role of state-run social service and protection agencies, as
well as NGOs. Including these “non-coercive” actors in the definition of the
security sector is not intended to “securitise” counter-trafficking efforts.4
Securitisation tends to give rise to inappropriate coercive practices that lack
democratic oversight and a proper balance of prosecution with protection and
prevention.
Most of the actors in this list operate primarily on the national level. However,
human trafficking is very much a transnational problem. International
Organisations (IOs) have become crucial in promoting and implementing
counter-trafficking policies, and are therefore included in the definition of the
counter-trafficking security sector.
This book pays special attention to the role of “coercive actors”, such as the
police, judiciary, and armed forces.5 These actors not only put pressure on
traffickers, but also have a stake in protecting trafficked persons and in
preventing trafficking. However, to reduce trafficking, more is needed than
improving law enforcement or preventing the involvement of peacekeepers in
trafficking. Good security sector responses must combine the activities of
“coercive actors” with those of other government agencies, IOs, NGOs,
parliaments, private businesses, and the media.6
3
See also Heiner Hänggi, “Making Sense of Security Sector Governance,” in Challenges of Security
Sector Governance, ed. Heiner Hänggi and Theodor H. Winkler (Geneva: DCAF, 2003): 3-23, here p.
10.
4
On securitisation see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
5
This book does not discuss in depth the role of parliamentary oversight committees, private businesses,
the media, or prison guards. This is not meant to deny these actors’ potential or actual contribution to
counter-trafficking.
6
On private actors in international affairs, see Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini, ed., Private Actors and
Security Governance (Münster: LIT and DCAF, 2006).
18
By analyzing counter-trafficking responses both on a national and international
level, this book draws on three, overlapping, concepts that inform all activities
of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
First, proper counter-trafficking responses require Security Sector Reform
(SSR). A poorly governed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to
sustainable development, democracy, and security. SSR is aimed at developing
a security apparatus that provides security to the state and its people within a
framework of democratic accountability. SSR-oriented counter-trafficking
efforts are needed, not only in countries that emerge from violent conflict, but
also in more stable settings. For example, police forces, border guards, or
prosecutors need training to identify and properly treat victims of trafficking,
no matter where.7
Secondly, to ensure cooperation among the various counter-trafficking
stakeholders on a national level, as well as democratically accountable state
responses to trafficking, Security Sector Governance (SSG) needs to be
enhanced.
Yet SSR and SSG are insufficient, both as conceptual tools and as practical
guidance for counter-trafficking. SSR and SSG must be complemented, thirdly,
with Security Governance. This concept takes into account the transnational
nature of contemporary security problems. Effective, efficient, and legitimate
responses against human traffickers demand cooperation among national actors
and their foreign counterparts. In counter-trafficking and other realms, states
can no longer act (if they ever did) as monolithic entities—they need to create
horizontal policy networks that quickly and flexibly reach across borders.
These networks should comprise state agencies such as the police and border
guards, but also IOs and NGOs.8
Because counter-trafficking efforts integrate the know-how and material
resources of many actors, they are a prime example of the shift from
government to governance.9 They also underline the need to broaden traditional
security concepts and practices hitherto focused on state security and the
military. A move towards the concept of human security, whereby the security
7
The term victim is here used in a legal sense (a victim of a crime); it does not deny that people make
choices, even under difficult circumstances.
8
On networked security governance, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004); Elke Krahmann, “Security Governance and Networks: New
Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no.1
(2005): 15-30.
9
See Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, ed., Governance Without Government: Order and
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
19
of individuals is the main reference point of security activities, is warranted in
the field of counter-trafficking, as in other fields. Since the 1990s, when many
programmes were initiated, efforts against human trafficking have often been
skewed toward inappropriate law enforcement strategies that have undermined
both the human rights of victims and the ability of states to prosecute
traffickers.10 Trafficking is too complex to lend itself to simplified assumptions
and counter-strategies.11
By focusing on “coercive” actors, this book does not intend to contribute to the
prolongation of practices such as the deportation of trafficked persons that are
problematic both normatively and functionally. Instead, we argue that a human
security approach, which emphasizes the rights and needs of trafficked persons,
also defends state interests, such as the arrest of traffickers.
Our focus on the security sector disregards crucial aspects of countertrafficking. Even if all actors discussed in this book (ranging from the police to
NGOs and IOs) properly engaged in counter-trafficking (which is not the case
yet), trafficking would continue. Progress against trafficking hinges on the
presence and amenability of conditions as diverse as poverty, gender-based
discrimination, a lack of legal migration and employment opportunities, the
Internet as a facilitator of migration and commercial sexual services, the
demand for cheap, unregulated labour, advances in transport technology,
violence against women as a tactic of war, and many other phenomena.
Security actors can mitigate some of the causes and consequences of
trafficking, but not all of them. For example, institutions looking after victims
of trafficking have little leverage over discrimination, poverty, and other
conditions that push people to migrate under risky circumstances. Security
sector responses are therefore only one element in a larger puzzle. But they are
an important one.
The authors of this book also acknowledge that there are no technical solutions
to trafficking (even though there is much room in the ways technical programs
10
Cornelius Friesendorf, “Pathologies of Security Governance: Efforts Against Human Trafficking in
Europe,” Security Dialogue 38, no.3 (2007): 379–402.
11
It is widely acknowledged, for instance, that trafficking affects particularly women. But appreciating
the gendered impact of trafficking must go beyond simplified assumptions. In Central Asia, some of the
men who migrated and then got trafficked were unable to send money home (although not all men who
failed to send money home were trafficked). This process increased trafficking risks for their wives,
leading some of them to be exploited in the agricultural sector (although not all women exploited in
agriculture in this particular country were victims of trafficking, and not all wives of men who did not
send money home were trafficked). Thus, there is a link between gender and trafficking, yet it is a
complex one. Source: Interview with an official from a Geneva-based international organisation,
Geneva, March 2008.
20
are implemented). Counter-trafficking efforts are political in nature—and often
mired in ideological disputes. Counter-trafficking responses reflect a mix of
power, as well as constantly changing norms and perceptions.12 They also
involve trade-offs and are prone to causing negative unintended consequences,
even if intentions are good. Yet pointing out diverse views on trafficking and
the problems related to security sector responses is a precondition for
improvement.
By discussing the opportunities and problems of counter-trafficking, and
offering recommendations to policy-makers and practitioners, this volume
contributes to more effective, efficient, and legitimate counter-trafficking
efforts.
2. What Is Human Trafficking?
In May 2008, a daffodil harvester in the United Kingdom (UK) was stripped of
his licence.13 Accused of imposing debts on his workers, as well as threatening
them and their families, the Gangmaster Licensing Authority (GLA) cited
“abhorrent” living and working conditions as evidence that they had
“uncovered a disgraceful story of forced labour in 21st-century Britain.”14 The
story of the around 500 Polish workers employed by the gangmaster may be
less horrific than the accounts of forced prostitution that have made the
headlines since the late 1990s. It is, however, an important story because it
hints at three of the major themes that will run through this book.
Firstly, it illustrates the diversity of trafficking—a diversity that is sometimes
hidden by the overwhelming focus on sex trafficking. Daffodil pickers in
Suffolk are just some of the estimated 2.4 million people trafficked every year
into numerous sectors and industries, including prostitution, construction,
12
See Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Chapter 1.
13
I thank Benjamin S. Buckland for his significant contribution in researching and writing this section
and the following one.
14
Paul Lewis, “Daffodil Harvester Stripped of Gangmaster Licence and Accused of Using Forced
Labour,” The Guardian, May 8, 2008, available at:
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/may/08/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices (accessed December
5, 2008).
21
agriculture, fisheries, sport, begging, service, domestic labour, entertainment,
and war.15
Secondly, the story underlines the heterogeneity of traffickers. The billions of
dollars in profits generated by trafficking every year are shared, not only by
sophisticated organised crime groups, but by all those who transfer, harbour,
receive, or exploit trafficked people—many of whom are disorganised, smalltime, or one-off operators.
Lastly, the comments of other flower growers and those in the industry, cited in
the newspaper article, reveal some of the multiple driving forces of human
trafficking in countries of origin, transit, and destination. They talk of an
industry already short of workers, of supermarket chains holding down prices,
and of labour markets creating demand for cheap foreign workers.
So what is human trafficking? A trafficked person is someone who is
transferred across borders or within a state for the purposes of slavery or
servitude. Trafficking is characterised by the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or reception of persons when this is accompanied by the
threat or use of force, fraud, deception, or other means and when the purpose is
to exploit a person. These definitional elements are drawn from Article 3 of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature in Palermo, Italy, in
2000. The exact definition is as follows:
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use
of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or
of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;
(b) The consent of the victim of trafficking in persons to the intended
exploitation set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article shall be
15
International Labour Organization, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the
Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva: ILO,
2005), 10.
22
irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have
been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking
in persons’ even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under 18 years of age.16
Since the mid-1990s, trafficking had been steadily climbing the international
security agenda. Yet even before discussions on the Protocol began in Vienna
in 1998, counter-trafficking efforts suffered from competing definitions.17 With
no agreed definition, some actors stuck with that contained in the 1949
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, which contains no specific definition
of the term “traffic in persons” but which covers women in prostitution. Others
worked with an expanded concept that covered trafficking into all forms of
forced labour. Conceptual competition was harmful to early data-gathering
efforts and, by extension, to the counter-trafficking programmes, laws, and
strategies that this data was designed to inform.
The Protocol definition represented improvement. However, it soon became
clear that its convoluted structure is not easy to translate into national laws or
training guidelines. Where it has been directly transcribed, uncertainty
remained, undermining proper data gathering. Yet efforts by states to create
their own definitions have been problematic as well. Brazil, for instance, has
incorporated the Protocol definition into national law. Yet it sits on the statute
books alongside definitions drawn from the earlier 1949 instrument. This
situation has led to confusion on the part of lawmakers, enforcers, and
trafficked people themselves,18 and has made it difficult either to estimate the
number of people being trafficked in Brazil itself or to compare trafficking in
Brazil with the scope of the problem in other countries.
Thus, estimating the global scope of human trafficking is difficult.19 The US
Government has suggested that between 600,000 and 800,000 persons are
16
The Protocol is available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/18-12-a.E.doc.
17
See Melissa Ditmore and Marjan Wijers, “The Negotiations on the UN Protocol on Trafficking in
Persons,” Nemesis 4 (2003): 79–88.
18
Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women, Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking
Measures on Human Rights Around the World (Bangkok: GAATW, 2007), 88–89.
19
For an overview of data on human trafficking and data problems, see the first chapter in this book. See
also Frank Laczko and Elzbieta Gozdziak, “Data and Research on Human Trafficking: A Global
Survey,” Special Issue, International Migration 43, no.1–2 (2005).
23
trafficked worldwide each year, 80 per cent of whom are women.20 Yet this
figure does not include trafficking that occurs within the borders of a country,
generally known as “internal” or “domestic” trafficking, which may well
account for more people than those trafficked across borders. The best global
figure available comes from the International Labour Organization (ILO),
which in 2005 estimated the total number of people trafficked at around 2.4
million people (and the annual turnover of the industry at around $32 billion).21
However, the real figure could be much lower or higher.
A lack of primary data on the scope, loci, and most prevalent types of
trafficking is obviously a major challenge: the less visible a phenomenon is, the
harder it is to formulate and implement effective counter-policies. This holds
true with regard to drug trafficking, terrorism, or insurgency, and also human
trafficking.
Existing data on human trafficking is weak because researchers have had to
project total values from relatively small numbers of known cases. The fog
surrounding human trafficking is a result of various factors. While trafficking is
an almost universal phenomenon,22 countries may understate the extent of
trafficking because of embarrassment, or because they lack legislation,
enforcement, or capacity to collect data and information. Moreover, collected
data is often not properly collated or shared, but remains quarantined on the
files of state agencies, IOs, and NGOs.
The very nature of human trafficking compounds these problems of collecting
good and comprehensive data. Trafficking is a clandestine activity hidden by
traffickers. Moreover, while it is not a “victimless crime”, as is the case with
the illicit drug industry where both buyers and sellers usually lack incentives to
contact the police, even victims of trafficking are often reluctant to speak out.
They may hide their predicament for fear of reprisals by traffickers, or because
they fear returning home and facing communities who often shun those whose
migration projects have failed, especially those who have worked in
prostitution. Also, trafficked persons may not realise they have been trafficked,
viewing their situation perhaps as terrible and exploitative, yet “better” than it
20
US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington D.C.: US Department of State,
June 2007), 8.
21
International Labour Organization, “A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour,” 10.
22
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns (Vienna: UNODC,
April 2006), 17.
24
was at home. The notion of exploitation is thus more ambiguous than
commonly suggested.23
Moreover, even though the Protocol underlines that trafficked people should
not be made liable for immigration offences committed as part of the
trafficking process, many trafficked people do not know this and are afraid of
contacting the authorities. This fear is not unjustified, given that countries of
destination often simply deport victims, a practice that both violates human
rights and hampers the successful prosecution of traffickers.24 This book
underlines that flawed law enforcement, i.e., practices that are not based on a
human rights approach, aggravates the problem of trafficking.
3. Disputing the Nature of the Problem
Trafficking has been approached from a number of angles, each representing
the perceptions and interests of various parties. The Abolitionist view takes
some of its cues from the 1949 Convention. Informed by elements of radical
feminism and developed more recently by NGOs such as the Coalition Against
Trafficking in Women (CATW), it disputes that there can be truly consensual
prostitution. Abolitionists argue that the abolition of prostitution and
criminalisation of demand are the most promising solutions to the problem.25
States such as Sweden have subscribed to this view, claiming to have made
great strides against trafficking by criminalising demand for commercial sex.
The administration of George W. Bush also leant in this direction, arguing that
legal prostitution fuels trafficking by increasing demand.
This book includes few comments on the highly-charged debate about the pros
and cons of different prostitution regimes. However, it is obvious that many
men, women, and children are trafficked into sectors other than the sex
industry.26 Moreover, various factors drive both migration and trafficking. Last,
23
See Vanessa E. Munro, “Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discourses of Degradation and Exploitation in the
Context of Sex Trafficking,” Journal of Law and Society 35, no.2 (June 2008): 240–264.
24
Dina F. Haynes, “Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immigration Benefits to Protect the
Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of Traffickers,” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no.2
(May 2004): 221–272.
25
See, for example, Donna M. Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of
Trafficking in Women,” Journal of International Affairs 53, no.2 (Spring 2000): 625–651.
26
Due to space constraints and to the quite different policy recommendations they entail, this book does
not examine in depth child trafficking, forced marriage and the organ trade, except where they directly
overlap with sex and labour trafficking.
25
it is not clear yet whether criminalizing (the demand for) commercial sexual
services has produced positive results.27
Governments view trafficking primarily as a problem of transnational
organised crime. This standpoint has informed the drafters of the UN Protocol.
It fits human trafficking within the same conceptual framework as trafficking
in arms and drugs, and consequently assumes that measures against organised
crime can work against human trafficking as well. Human trafficking has
become a profitable activity of organised crime groups. Moreover, trafficking
meshes with other organised crime operations in various ways. For example,
trafficking can occur along the same routes as trafficking in drugs or weapons;
in “combined retailing” schemes,28 traffickers may sell both drugs and sexual
services provided by trafficked persons; or, a person may be used as a “drug
mule” en route, before ending up in forced labour in a destination country.
It must be noted, however, that the focus on transnational organised crime
networks engaged in human trafficking has been problematic. Much trafficking
is run by small-time, disorganised, unsophisticated, and only loosely networked
groups, as well as by individuals acting alone. Moreover, this framework has
given rise to coercive law enforcement strategies that, while not always
contributing to successful prosecution, have been detrimental to the interests of
migrants in general and trafficked persons in particular.
A related framework views trafficking primarily as a migration problem. This
analysis stresses that it is not the very poorest who leave their homes. Instead,
slight increases in economic development, combined with a growing
knowledge of relative poverty, drive people to migrate. Rejecting the
assumption that the majority of trafficked people are bundled up and
transported to their destinations, this conceptual framework asserts rather that
trafficking is driven by increasing mobility and a desire to migrate. Trafficking
results from the interplay of ever-tighter migration controls attempting to
27
The Swedish government says the policy works. The Swedish National Rapporteur on Trafficking in
Human Beings, as well as a former special advisor to the Swedish government on prostitution and
human trafficking, claim that the policy, among other effects, has decreased the percentage of men
purchasing sexual services and prevented the trafficking of foreign women to Sweden by organised
crime networks (Gunilla Ekberg, e-mail communication with the author, December 2008). Other
sources are more sceptical, however. See, for example, US Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Anti-trafficking
Efforts Abroad, report no. GAO-06-825 to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary and the
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. Washington DC, July
2006, 25.
28
Phil Williams “Drugs, Human Trafficking, and Fraud as a Security Threat” (presentation, Geneva
Centre for Security Policy, June 25, 2007).
26
frustrate migration of people without valid travel or work documents, the desire
of people to migrate (for reason ranging from the need to escape persecution to
a desire for adventure), and the presence of criminals willing to exploit the
paradox of migration controls in the era of globalisation.
More recently, a fourth approach for conceptualising trafficking has focused on
human rights. This framework developed in parallel and in response to the
security trope that has dominated much trafficking discourse and practice.
Human rights violations, according to this analysis, are perpetrated in two
directions. In one direction, they are the acts of violence, coercion and
exploitation exacted by traffickers. In the other, they are the acts of states who,
seeking to secure their borders, may violate the human rights of trafficked
people and other vulnerable groups, especially asylum seekers.
While the human rights approach has gained traction among an increasing
number of counter-trafficking actors, commitments, especially by governments
of net destination countries, are often not translated into practice. This
publication takes a close look at trade-offs and unintended consequences of
counter-trafficking efforts. The human rights consequences of security sector
responses against trafficking run all the way through the chapters.
The final framework to inform counter-trafficking has been the labour market
approach. Viewing trafficking as only one element of forced labour, this
approach examines the factors that drive demand for labour, as well as the
regulatory frameworks that allow the dark side of a globalized labour market to
flourish. Championed especially by the ILO, this approach seeks to engage
governments, trade unions, workplace inspectors, and other actors. The forced
labour approach looks at both legal and political methods of improving
conditions for foreign and migrant workers generally and trafficked people in
particular.
The focus of this book on security sector actors precludes an in-depth
discussion of labour market forces. But some of the authors have a great deal of
sympathy for the hypothesis that trafficking is a labour market phenomenon,
the solutions to which must involve the main market actors.
27
4. The Structure of the Book
This book is intended to contribute to better security sector responses to human
trafficking. Geographically, the chapters refer to many examples of trafficking
and counter-trafficking from Europe and North America. But we also discuss
human trafficking patterns and counter-efforts elsewhere, especially in the
countries of origin for many of those trafficked to Europe and North America
(noting, of course, that states may be countries of origin, transit, and destination
simultaneously).
This book is both a scholarly work and a practical tool containing concrete
recommendations for security policymakers and practitioners. Our
recommendations take into account both regional and issue-specific
idiosyncrasies, but are, to a large extent, also universally applicable. Moreover,
they are concrete and focused on implementation (without, as noted above,
pretending to offer technical “solutions”).29 This book does not duplicate
existing works on trafficking (of which there has been a veritable explosion
over recent years), but rather complements them. It does so by crossreferencing existing toolkits,30 manuals, and scholarly writings as much as
possible. The book adds value to existing works on trafficking for several
reasons, as an overview of the respective chapters shows.
Part I: Issues
First, we discuss issues related to trafficking that are often mentioned, yet
rarely discussed systematically. Francesca Bosco, Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia,
and Anvar Serojitdinov begin Part 1 with an overview of global trafficking
patterns. The authors discuss the scope of trafficking, data problems, and which
forms of trafficking occur where. They also examine causes and consequences
of human trafficking.
In chapter two, Leslie Holmes explores the links between trafficking and
corruption. This link is often assumed to exist, yet this study is among the first
to explore, in detail, how corruption facilitates trafficking, and what policy
responses might help to mitigate the problem. Looking at what forms of
29
On the need for recommendations that take into account implementation challenges, see Gordon Peake
and Otwin Marenin, “Their Reports Are Not Read and Their Recommendations Are Resisted: The
Challenge for the Global Police Policy Community,” Police Practice and Research 9, no.1 (March
2008): 59–69.
30
One of the best toolkits available is the: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Toolkit to Combat
Trafficking in Persons (UNODC: Vienna, 2006),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Trafficking_toolkit_Oct06.pdf (accessed January 18, 2009).
28
corruption facilitate trafficking, this chapter draws on both empirical examples
and theoretical debates. Without neglecting the limits, trade-offs, and
unintended consequences of counter-corruption policies, Holmes provides
recommendations for reducing trafficking-related corruption.
Links between trafficking and organised crime are not as clear and simple as
they seem. Chapter three, written by John T. Picarelli, critically examines the
extent to which organised crime groups have been involved in human
trafficking. Comparing current and historical trends, he shows that there is
much diversity with regard to the individuals and groups involved in human
trafficking. One of his main conclusions is that counter-traffickers need to
better understand their adversaries.
Trafficking and smuggling in people each have their own protocol to the UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Smuggling is defined as
the illegal transfer of migrants across international boundaries. While trafficked
people are posited as victims, this is not the case for smuggled persons. In
contrast to this legal divide, Benjamin S. Buckland argues that there is much
cross-over and overlap between the two groups. Buckland suggests that, while
the categories of “smuggled” and “trafficked” may be clear-cut at the extremes,
there is a trafficking-smuggling continuum at the middle of which definitions
blur to the point that they often become unworkable.
Part II: Actors
The second part of the book also seeks to fill a gap in the literature. It does so
by looking at the role of specific security sector actors, providing concrete
recommendations for appropriate responses. The chapters also analyse the
trade-offs and unintended consequences of security actors’ participation in
counter-trafficking efforts. Jana Arsovska and Stef Janssens open this section
by discussing a central contributor to counter-trafficking: the police. Issues
examined include the practical and political difficulties of apprehending
traffickers and the challenges of transnational police cooperation.
Fred Schreier, in his chapter, argues that counter-trafficking activities should be
intelligence-led. The author highlights challenges of forging intelligence-led
coalitions and bridging institutional and national boundaries, as well as issues
of accountability and oversight in applying intelligence-led strategies against
organised crime in general and human trafficking in particular.
In chapter seven, Richard Danziger, Jonathan Martens and Mariela Guajardo
discuss the contribution of migration management to counter-trafficking. As
29
well as examining the roles of a variety of actors, the authors explain that
migration management strategies can have a detrimental impact on the rights of
trafficked persons and migrants more generally, and propose strategies for
avoiding negative consequences of counter-trafficking efforts, particularly
those focusing on “source” countries.
International staff participating in peace operations have exacerbated problems
of exploitation and abuse, including trafficking. Soldiers, private military
contractors, police, and NGO staff have all been involved in exploitation and
abuse. This has not only led to human rights violations, but also undermined
stabilisation and peacebuilding objectives. In his chapter, Keith J. Allred
explores ways of improving strategies against abusive practices by personnel
participating in peace missions, discussing the loopholes and implementation
challenges that remain to be confronted.
In the final chapter of part two, Allison Jernow looks at the criminal justice
sector, as represented primarily by prosecutors and judges. Traffickers must be
prosecuted and victims of forced labour, including trafficking, protected, both
in courtrooms and before and after trial. The author examines the opportunities
and problems of criminal justice responses to trafficking, emphasising that
protecting the rights of trafficked persons should be at the core of prosecution
efforts.
Part III: Cooperation
The book’s third and final section focuses on the under-researched area of
counter-trafficking cooperation. Many argue that it takes networks to fight
(transnational) networks.31 However, “netwars”, striving at stealthy attacks on
criminal networks, tend to foster informal and often unaccountable governance.
Governments and their partners cannot emulate the practices of their criminal
opponents without running the risk of undermining their own legitimacy—licit
actors have to abide by rules that illicit actors can afford to ignore.32
Constructing viable counter-trafficking networks is difficult from a practical
perspective as well, with numerous obstacles hampering cooperation. These
include a lack of capacity; legal loopholes; competition and turf battles
between institutions; divergent worldviews, standard operating procedures, and
31
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 2001).
32
For a critique of the ”netwar” concept, see Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and
Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park,
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 261, note 15.
30
priorities of counter-trafficking actors; and a lack of trust due to fears over
corruption.
The literature on counter-crime governance and networks is still in its infancy.
With notable exceptions,33 existing works tend to focus on how specific actors,
especially states, fight specific crimes. What are needed are more systematic
assessments of how hybrid alliances, comprising both state and non-state
actors, can address more effectively illicit activities in which non-state actors
figure prominently. This third section addresses this deficit by offering
concrete recommendations for more effective, efficient, and legitimate countertrafficking cooperation between separate organisations within countries and
across borders.
In chapter 10, Phil Williams points out the obstacles to networked security
governance against human trafficking, and provides recommendations for how
to exploit vulnerabilities of criminal networks. Williams distinguishes between
different types of networks involved in human trafficking, showing that
networks have distinct advantages over hierarchically organised governments.
He thus takes issue with the claim that the power of illicit networks is
overestimated.34 At the same time, however, Williams argues that attacking
networks is not sufficient for reducing trafficking—approaches that attack
criminal markets are warranted.
Helga Konrad and Barbara Limanowska look closely at the conditions that
have stymied counter-trafficking cooperation, focusing on Southeast Europe.
Avoiding the rehearsal of commonplaces such as: “transnational police
cooperation must be stepped up”; “intelligence must be exchanged”; and “the
judicial sector must cooperate with civil society organisations”, Konrad and
Limanowska show that cooperation in the region has suffered from a law
enforcement bias. This bias is indicated by the dominance of “coercive” actors
such as Ministries of Interior in cooperation arrangements that has had a
detrimental impact on the protection of trafficked persons and the prevention of
trafficking. The authors posit that improving cooperation hinges on the
systematic protection of the human rights of vulnerable people.
Chapter 12 covers Transnational Referral Mechanisms (TRMs). Recognising
the progress made in coordinating national counter-trafficking responses,
Mariyana Radeva, Elisa Trossero, and Martijn Pluim offer a way forward for
33
See, for example, Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe.
34
See Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why
Al-Qaida May be Less Threatening Than Many Think,” International Security 33, no.2 (Fall 2008): 7–
44.
31
improving transnational cooperation. They discuss the objectives of TRMs;
their practical operation; links to National Referral Mechanisms; the challenges
faced by the TRM; and the conditions that must be present for TRMs to work
effectively.
The conclusion summarises the empirical findings and recommendations of the
book. It shows that further progress against human trafficking hinges on
progress in three (interrelated and overlapping) areas. First, international
agreements, national laws, and working practices must be better implemented.
Second, it is important to overcome the obstacles to better counter-trafficking
networking. Third, there is a need for more research on the scope and nature of
trafficking, and for evaluating the impact of counter-trafficking measures, in a
way that is free of political pressure, institutional competition, and prejudice.
In reducing trafficking, security sector activities are not sufficient, even if these
are effective, efficient, and legitimate. Whether progress can be made depends
on numerous conditions, many of which are beyond the remit of security
actors. Nevertheless, a properly functioning counter-trafficking security sector
is necessary for reducing human trafficking. By focusing on issues (Part 1),
security sector actors (Part 2), and counter-trafficking cooperation (Part 3), this
book offers a hybrid approach for improving efforts against human trafficking.
32