Report: Regional Training on the Oversight Function of Parliament, Bishkek, 13-15 Dec 2006
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Introduction
Within
the
Commonwealth
of
Independent States, Central Asia still
experiences perhaps the strongest legacy
of the Soviet system. Internal conflicts,
imbalance among institutional powers,
substantial structural backwardness in
comparison to other CIS countries, as well
as geographical location, have constituted
a constraint for the full achievement of
democratic
reforms
and
human
development. In this respect, parliament is
a key player and its role becomes
extremely critical. Strengthening the
parliament as an institution is an
overarching challenge for both national
states and international community.
Strong and effective parliaments not only
guarantee more stability within the
country, but throughout their regular
oversight activities ensure implementation
of legislative mechanisms as well as
respect of rule of law.
Within the broader frameworks of UNDP
regional and national parliamentary
oversight and parliamentary reform
programmes, a three day training on the
oversight function of parliament was held
for parliamentarians and parliamentary
staffers in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from 13 -15
December 2006. The event was organized
by the UNDP Country Office in Kyrgyzstan,
the UNDP Regional Centre for Europe and
CIS and the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF). It took place under the auspices of
the Kyrgyz Parliament and brought
together
parliamentary
delegations
coming from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The discussion main topics covered were:
budgeting, security sector oversight and
the relationship between parliamentary
and extra parliamentary bodies.
Analysis: Central Asia Between
Obstacles and Challenges Towards the
Achievement of Democratic Governance
Obstacles to Effective Parliamentary
Oversight
What immediately emerged at the
roundtable and what was affirmed as a
leitmotiv throughout the discussion, the
oversight function of parliament is an
indispensable part of an effective
democratic system. Despite the fact that
each delegation referred to specific
country features, they all identified the
very limited oversight function of
parliaments in the regions as one of the
major shortcomings. In closer scrutiny, a
two-fold problem can be identified. Firstly,
the necessary legislative framework for
parliamentary oversight is weak or missing.
Some constitutions limit the oversight
functions while prioritizing legislative
functions. Secondly, there is lack of internal
capacity to adequately perform the
oversight function. These two institutional
weaknesses were generally recognized to
have led to ineffective or limited
parliamentary oversight.
The other obstacle that was identified is
the lack of adequate representation. It was
pointed out how the oversight function of
parliament becomes essentially hollow
when there is no adequate representation
of a large portion of the population. Three
main groups were identified as particularly
suffering from the lack of representation
within the parliament:
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Political opponents;
Ethnic and religious minorities;
Women.
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Report: Regional Training on the Oversight Function of Parliament, Bishkek, 13-15 Dec 2006
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The concentration of power within the
executive was identified as the primary
cause for this shortcoming. The problem
becomes evident at two different levels.
The first, and most recurrent in transition
situations, entails the factual power
differences between executive and
parliament. Central governments tend very
often to shrink parliament’s functions due
to their pervasive apparatus, de facto
clearing out the representative role of
parliament. The second, on the other hand,
regards more specifically the Central Asian
context and was highlighted by Mr.
Sarpashev, Vice-Speaker of the Jogorku
Kenesh (Parliament of Kyrgyzstan), in his
introductory speech. As a matter of fact,
given that district governments are
nominated by the central government, the
parliament is the sole political institution
that can counterbalance and oversee the
central government. This structural lack of
homogeneity further restricts parliament’s
oversight function as it becomes almost
locked among executive ramifications.
A further reason for the lack of
representation was also identified in the
substantial weakness of political parties.
Central Asian countries have inherited a
strong tradition of a singly party state and,
as a result, current parties often show a
deficiency of political capacities and
technical competencies. The overall
outcome is that these parties are not
always able to advocate for their
electorate. Sometimes, the problem does
not derive from parties’ weakness but is
more fundamentally due to the absence of
political actors.
During the roundtable special attention
was devoted to the issue of parliamentary
representation in post-conflict countries.
With reference to the Afghan and Tajik
experiences, it was stressed how in such a
situation the function of parliament
becomes absolutely crucial especially in
terms of representation. In such situations,
parliament can provide a platform where
controversies may be resolved within the
democratic arena and under the rule of law.
However, both experts and participants
also highlighted that the above causes
should be analyzed in close connection to
the
electoral
system.
Many
parliamentarians,
representing
both
majority and opposition parties, stated
that rigid electoral systems may become
detrimental for effective oversight. High
electoral thresholds, for instance, may
inhibit access of a relevant political actor,
jeopardizing
parliament’s
oversight
activity.
Box 1: Obstacles to Parliamentary Oversight in
Central Asia
Parliamentarians identified and ranked in order of
priority the following issues as key obstacles for
parliamentary oversight in the region:
1
Lack of representation
2
Concentration of power within the executive
3
Weak rule of law
4
Insufficient institutionalization of oversight
5
Corruption
6
Lack of technical competencies
7
Insufficient access to information
8
Lack of clear, long-term strategies
9
Lack of an independent judiciary
Among other problems that hinder the
implementation of sound oversight
mechanisms participants identified a weak
level of the rule of law, lack of real separation
of powers, lack of independent judicial
power,
and
an
insufficient
institutionalisation of oversight mechanisms.
It was testified that initiatives are often
carried out in a piecemeal fashion and in
the absence of a precise and binding legal
framework. Corruption was also identified
among the main problems while an
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Report: Regional Training on the Oversight Function of Parliament, Bishkek, 13-15 Dec 2006
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insufficient institutionalisation of oversight
mechanisms also brings about the
institutionalisation of corruption. Political
traditions and mentality were also
identified among the impediments for an
institutionalization of parliamentary oversight.
The Challenge of Intra-Parliamentary and
Extra-Parliamentary Cooperation
At the regional training in Bishkek, as
already stated, a clear consensus emerged
that many oversight weaknesses depend
on the presence of individual approaches
and singular strategies adopted by the
actors involved and that sound oversight
will not be achieved unless full and strong
cooperation among the main stakeholders
is established.
This consensus was linked to at least two
considerations. Firstly, there is the urgent
need to strengthen the links between
parliament and other oversight bodies, as
well as to reinforce the collaboration
within parliament itself. Secondly, it was
also highlighted that relationships among
relevant actors should be:
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Continuous
Not Asymmetric
Institutionalised
Discussions also revolved around the
meaning of oversight. Most participants
noted that it was necessary to establish a
clear definition of what oversight was and
what it deals with. This would require the
involvement, agreement and cooperation
of all the relevant stakeholders. It was
clearly expressed that it was indispensable
to reach consensus on a common
understanding of oversight and its
components. Furthermore, it was noted
that
parliament
needs
to
seek
collaboration from extra-parliamentary
bodies, given its intellectual and financial
constraints. As an institution, parliament
cannot do everything, and cooperation
becomes instrumental to avoid an
overburdened
parliament.
and
thus
ineffective
One of the most important and difficult
areas of cooperation for parliament is its
relation with the government. In transition
countries, relationships between the
legislative and the executive branches often
tend to be seen as merely adversarial. As it
was testified in Bishkek, this perspective
may also have a detrimental effect for the
parliament, leading to increased obstacles
and compromising oversight. Therefore it is
essential for the legislative branch to find a
sound balance between its regular
oversight activities and the need of a
collaborative approach towards the
executive branch.
This can be illustrated with reference to the
budgetary process. As it was stated at the
workshop, the budgetary process requires
full and conscious involvement of both
legislative and executive. It was pointed
out that Central Asian parliaments should
strengthen and sustain their engagement
in the whole budget cycle, including
budget formulation, approval and execution.
This requires parliamentary capacities to
review the budget, budgetary allocations,
examine the benefits, costs, effects and
consequences their decision may have,
and ensure the accurateness of financial
reporting by the executive. The budget
approval should not be reduced to a mere
ratification of a budget tabled by the
executive. Furthermore, while looking at a
case study from Central Europe, at least
two additional issues were raised by
attendees concerning the involvement of
parliament and government in the
budgetary process. The first point related
to the creation of parliamentary oversight
mechanisms in between budget approval
and budget execution. It resulted that
Central Asian parliaments are substantially
lacking such a tool, whilst other countries
are furnished with accounting committees
that are mandated to undertake this task.
The second, on the other hand, referred to
the executive’s power to change budget
lines’ within the approved budget.
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Report: Regional Training on the Oversight Function of Parliament, Bishkek, 13-15 Dec 2006
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Parliamentarians affirmed the shortage of
tools and procedures to tackle this
common practice.
deficiency not to be underestimated,
which may undermine the overall function
of the Chamber of Accounts.
Box 2: Requirements for Enhancing
Parliamentary Oversight in Central Asia
Another major area of cooperation for
parliamentarians concerns the relationships
between legislative branch and civil
society. The Soviet Union apparatus
restricted public involvement in politics.
Participants at the training affirmed that
this legacy is still influential today in that it
created a distance between the
institutionalized political world and civil
society. Enhancing cooperation and
bridging this gap should be considered as
an overarching challenge. It was also
stressed out that civic oversight may
assume a very crucial role in ensuring
transparency and accountability. For
instance, civil society may bring public
attention to issues that would otherwise
not be considered by political actors. It
therefore becomes essential to guarantee
civil society with full access to information.
Both parliamentarians and members of
civil society pointed out that the
parliament should, for instance oversee
that freedom of information acts are in
place and adhered to and that all
information is readily available (i.e.
furnishing full transcripts of plenary
sessions etc.). What became evident at the
workshop is that full cooperation between
parliament and civil society does not only
enhance effective oversight per se, but can
also help address the representational
shortcomings. It also became evident at
the workshop that citizen and civil society
involvement are successful when based on
strategic approaches and when adequate
timing and mechanisms for a public
process and a new type of policy-making
are established.
1
2
Clearly defining the oversight function of
parliament
Developing professional capacities of
parliamentary staffers and parliamentarians
3
Increasing the political will of governments
to accept parliamentary oversight
4
Professionalizing the civil service
5
Clearly defining the mandate and
procedures of parliamentary oversight
6
Developing indirect forms of parliamentary
oversight
Ensuring that the tool of parliamentary
investigations is effectively used
Organizing the existing oversight functions
more coherently
7
8
The discussion on mechanisms of
oversight over the budgetary process and
collaboration among different oversight
bodies, benefited from the representation
of the Kyrgyz Chamber of Account. As was
stated by Mr. Ernest Abakirov, Auditor of
the Kyrgyz Chamber of Accounts: the
Chamber is responsible for supreme
financial
control.
However,
the
effectiveness of this crucial function can
somehow be undermined by its own
composition and internal structure. In
Kyrgyzstan, the Chamber of Accounts is
formed by 14 members, whereof 12
auditors. Whilst the chairman is jointly
nominated by the president and the
parliament, and therefore maintains his
own independence, 50% of the auditors
are elected by parliament and 50% are
appointed by the president. While those
elected by the parliament can be
dismissed only after a long consultation
process within the parliament and only
based on strong factual evidence, the half
appointed by the president can basically
be dismissed according to the president’s
will. This lack of homogeneity was felt as a
Finally, a constructive discussion took
place on the role of the opposition in
parliamentary oversight. One session was
lead by the head of the Kyrgyz Parliament's
opposition Mr.Tekebaev. It was pointed
out that there is no long history of
opposition in the countries of this region.
Of course, some criticism was possible in
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Report: Regional Training on the Oversight Function of Parliament, Bishkek, 13-15 Dec 2006
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former times, but not one that would
challenge the system. This had an
influence on the capacities of the
opposition as well as on the capacities of
the government to work with the
opposition. It was pointed out that the role
of
the
opposition
should
be
institutionalized by national legislation and
parliament's rules of procedure. For
instance, the election and proportion
system have a significant influence on the
institutionalization of the opposition.
Other important points are:
1) Financing of parties;
2) Existence of a written programme for
the opposition’s work in the
parliament to guide the opposition
and serve as a public manifesto. The
opposition should always have the
possibility to propose alternative
programmes to those of the
government;
3) Institutionalization of the opposition
in the parliament through internal
parliamentary procedures, distribution
of committees and chairs, involving
more people from the opposition in
the work of committees, commissions,
as deputy chairs, etc;
4) Good communication with the massmedia.
Exceptions to Oversight? The Security
Sector as a Priority for Parliamentary Control
At the training, one session was entirely
devoted to the topic of security sector
oversight. Although participants showed a
good understanding of the differences
between human security and state security
as theorems, the working groups on
practical case studies revealed that many
still tended to equate human security with
national defence. At the same time, there
was an agreement that the security sector
should
not
be
excluded
from
parliamentary oversight mechanisms.
Participants agreed that there was a need
for both internal reforms by the security
sector but also for reforms within the
external environment, i.e. in particular the
governance framework applicable to the
security sector. Among internal reform
challenges, a key priority is to shift political
focus from external security to internal
security. This is linked to the recognition
that the majority of conflicts and political
crisis today are conflicts within rather than
between states. Reduction of military
expenditure was also listed as a priority, as
well as the reduction of oversized forces.
Both
matters
require
a
high
interoperability with other forces and the
modernisation
of
security
sector
management. In terms of external reforms,
participants agreed that above all, the
establishment of a proper legal framework
for political accountability over the security
sector and the strengthening of the
parliamentary oversight role were key
challenges. Within the general security
sector oversight framework five levels of
control were discussed: internal, executive,
parliamentary, public and judicial control.
In an ideal situation, all the five levels are
harmonized to ensure effective democratic
oversight. However, in practice, significant
gaps were noticed. Particularly, internal
and executive controls tend to form an
umbrella that hinders the execution of
security sector oversight by parliament and
other oversight bodies. For instance, these
obstacles are evident in terms of access to
and distribution of information. Kyrgyz
participants further stated that it was a
common practice in the Jogorku Kenesh
that the Ministry of Defence provides
different data to the Security and Defence
Committee than to other committees.
Overall, participants complained about the
absence of clear regulations on the access
of information and on the definition of and
rules applicable to classified documents.
The structural opacity of the security sector
was identified as a primary cause for the
limited political space currently available
for
institutionalising
regular
and
functioning oversight mechanisms.
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Report: Regional Training on the Oversight Function of Parliament, Bishkek, 13-15 Dec 2006
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Conclusion
Central Asian countries today are at a
turning point in their efforts to establish
democratic governance. Strengthening
oversight mechanisms and reinforcing
parliament as an institution are two major
elements of this challenge. In this respect,
the international community has an
absolutely critical function and assumes a
twofold role. On the one hand, through its
specialized assistance, it may support the
technical elements of parliamentary
oversight. On the other hand, it may also
result instrumental in fostering and
enhancing environmental components to
create and promote political space for
oversight.
As much as its economy, parliamentary
oversight is also in transition in the region
and shows conflicting features and
ambivalent indicators. Perhaps, what can
truly be learnt from the parliamentary
training held in Bishkek is that the real
challenge for Central Asian countries is the
transformation of their challenges into
opportunities. This workshop provided
participants with the opportunity to look
beyond current practices in the region and
to learn about different international
experiences. As participants recognized,
this workshop opened the door for further
discussions and contributed to the
establishment of an effective system of
national government that includes
efficient executive institutions monitored
through
independent
oversight
mechanisms in benefit of all citizens. The
international development community
must remain committed to playing a
relevant role in this process of democratic
transformation.
Box 3: Evaluation
The training was assessed by the participants as
useful and successful. Specifically:
ƒ
92% of the participants found the training
to be very useful in light of their
professional tasks, 8% useful.
ƒ
35% of the participants reported that they
increased their knowledge on security
sector oversight to a large extent, 60% to a
reasonable extent. 5% reported that this
objective was not achieved.
ƒ
35% of participants rated the session on the
legal framework of parliamentary oversight
as very useful, whilst 15% as good and 50%
as satisfactory.
ƒ
The session on parliamentary oversight in
Central Asia was found to be very good by
45% of participants, good by 35% and
satisfactory by 15% of participants.
ƒ
45% of the participants found it very useful
to discuss case studies from Central Europe,
45% useful.
ƒ
35% of the participants considered the
focus on budgetary oversight very useful,
60% useful, 5% not useful.
Gender-balanced representation: 7 out of 23
parliamentary participants (parliamentarians and
parliamentary staffers) were women. The goal of
promoting representation of female parliamentarians
at the training was met only partially. This is due in
part to the under-representation of women in the
parliaments of the region, but also due to a
somewhat strong male dominance.
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