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6.1 Energy and Climate Security
General Charles Wald
I have been interested in national security from an energy
standpoint since 1990, when I was at the National War College. As
you may recall, we had just gone into Iraq for the first time. The big
discussion for all of us colonels was, “What are the implications of
the Iraq War going to be for the United States?” When you really
General Charles Wald, Director and Senior Advisor to the Aerospace &
Defense Industry for Deloitte LLP, is responsible for providing senior
leadership in strategy and relationships with defense contractors and
Department of Defense (DoD) program executives. He is a subjectmatter specialist in weapons procurement and deployment; counterterrorism; and national, energy, and international security policy. Prior to
joining Deloitte, General Wald was the Vice President of International
Programs for L-3 Communications Corporation, based in Washington,
DC. Previously, as Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM), a position he held from 2002 until his retirement from
the U.S. Air Force in July 2006, he was responsible for all U.S. forces
operating across 91 countries in Europe, Africa, Russia, parts of Asia, the
Middle East, and most of the Atlantic Ocean. Prior to that, he served as
the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations
at the Pentagon. With over 35 years of service, General Wald was a
command pilot with more than 3600 flying hours, and 430 combat
hours. As the Supported Commander, he led the coalition air campaign
in Operation Enduring Freedom, leading to the extraction of Taliban
forces in Afghanistan. General Wald has received major military awards
and decorations, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal,
the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Distinguished Flying
Cross. He is a graduate of North Dakota State University and received
a master’s degree in international relations from Troy University. He
has also completed coursework at Harvard University and the National
War College. General Wald has been awarded an honorary doctor of
laws degree from North Dakota State University.
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thought about it, you had to ask yourself, “Why were we there in
the first place?” Although you can have all of the opinions you
want, oil was clearly one of the reasons.
In 1978, President Carter announced the Carter Doctrine,
which held as one of its tenets that U.S. national security interests
required that we protect the free flow of oil from the Middle East
with military force, if necessary, against any adversary. Since 1978,
that doctrine has been in place.
About 2 months ago, I testified with President Carter before
the Foreign Relations Committee. It was the first time that a president, or former president, had testified before the Foreign Relations
Committee in 30 years. Interestingly, he reiterated his Carter
Doctrine. Well, where have we been since 1978? For those of
you who are in the Navy, you know full well that the Fifth Fleet
has been in the Persian Gulf or the North Arabian Sea, whichever
name you prefer, since that time protecting, among other things,
the free flow of oil.
There have been studies done over the years that say we are
spending $50 to $60 billion a year just to maintain a military presence in the Persian Gulf, without taking into account the substantial costs for either the first or second Iraq wars. Although one
might reasonably argue that not all of those costs were incurred
because of energy, I am certain that we would not be spending
$50 to $60 billion year if energy were not in the picture.
Of course, one of the things we are doing in the Middle East
is supporting Israel. We are going to do as much as we can within
reason to protect the strategic partnership that we have with that
nation. But after that, there is oil. If it were not for oil, I think we
would probably be defending Israel from the Mediterranean rather
than the Arabian Sea. So you go down this path to 1990, when we
were in Iraq and it seemed the United States was the sole protector
of the lines of communication around the world, particularly for
energy. I used to say that the world expects to dial 1-800-US-NAVY
and that the Navy will show up and ensure the free flow of oil.
There are clearly costs associated with this expectation.
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Now, let’s fast forward to a period closer to today. When I was
at the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) in 2003, Secretary
Rumsfeld asked the combatant commanders to review the strategic
reasons underlying the way that our forces were postured. At the
time, European Command was under particular scrutiny because
we still had 115,000 U.S. personnel on active duty in Europe. A
reasonable person might ask what was the purpose for 115,000
U.S. military forces in Europe in 2003, including Navy, Marines, Air
Force, and Army, as well as Special Operations forces.
So, under the leadership of General Jim Jones, who was the
commander then, we went through the process. Along the way,
we discovered that we had not reviewed our strategic reasons for
being in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. We still
had war plans on the books that addressed the Soviet Union and
the Warsaw Pact. We did not know what the new world was going
to be like and we could not predict that. So we went through the
review and found that there were reasons for being in Europe.
One of those reasons is that virtual presence is actual absence.
If you are not in place operating with people, making relationships,
your influence wanes very rapidly. Of course, we are very interested and continue to be the leader of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
A second reason for being in Europe is that threats were emerging, threats that we had not really addressed very well either internationally or from the U.S. perspective. On September 11, 2001,
we received a wake-up call to which all of us can relate. A terrorist with a weapon of mass destruction is the biggest threat in the
world today.
As it turns out, Europe faces several other emerging threats. For
one, it is very vulnerable to energy disruption. So we started going
through other possibilities: immigration, illegal drugs, and pandemics; the avian flu pandemic is a big thing in Europe, as was severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
So, it became clear that we still have reasons for being in
Europe, the Navy in particular. Nothing has really changed for the
Navy from the standpoint of ensuring the lines of communication
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around the world, 80% of which is covered by water. This concept
is pretty simple to understand. So, ensuring global lines of communication is still a requirement of the Navy.
A somewhat more difficult issue to address is identification of
the conventional threat we face. I would argue today that there
is probably not a near-peer threat to the United States. Now the
problem in military planning is, first, that we are always conservative and, second, it takes a long time to get where you want to
go, so you must plan ahead. So I would say you have to hedge a
little bit on the conventional side, and you have to address new
threats on the nonconventional side, perhaps at the lower end of
the spectrum. And energy security is one of those issues for the
United States.
As Dr. Filadelfo mentioned, in 2007 the Center for Naval
Analyses started to look at different ways of viewing threats in the
world. One of the threats of concern was disruption in the supply
of oil. As we have seen, disruptions eventually lead to substantial
increases in price. Changes in price mean a lot to DoD because it
uses a lot of petroleum. In fact, for every $10 per barrel increase
in fuel cost, DoD’s overall operating costs increase by $1 billion.
Thus, when the cost of oil went from $35 a barrel up to $147
a barrel in 2008, DoD’s annual operating budget increased by
$11 billion.
I will admit that in my new position, I do not get a lot of sympathy when I discuss DoD funding. Yet, the fact of the matter is
that there is a certain amount of discretionary funding. Absorbing
an increase of that size is very difficult for any organization. It certainly wakes you up to the fact that we are vulnerable to disruption
in supply.
Climate change is another area of concern. Although wellintentioned people are still arguing about various aspects of
the science, I happen to believe there is a problem. It does not
matter if that is the case or not, but from a military perspective,
military people look at things not from just 100% or a zero or
black or white; there is gray in there, believe it or not. You would
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certainly do well to address a 50/50 problem that could end up in
catastrophic failure of some sort.
So we have started going down that path. In the CNA study, we
started out with 18 or 20 retired flag officers, all fairly high ranking. [1] Military people happen to be a little bit skeptical, generally. This skepticism is probably a healthy thing. We also realized,
however, that we were not scientists. We have not worked at The
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL),
although there are probably a few in the Navy who have worked at
JHU/APL or in other labs. We did not really know the science, but
we were curious, we could study, and we could listen to briefings.
So, we received briefings and presentations from various people.
Still, our going-in position was, let’s not try to pretend we are scientists and we are the authoritative voice on this. Let’s go into this
from a military standpoint and a planning standpoint and see what
we can come up with.
So, if you take a look at my perspective as a military person
at the time, I was very concerned for the United States from an
energy standpoint. Not just from the standpoint of climate, which
is valid, or say just pure economics, but from a catastrophic disruption of some sort (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Climate Change as a National Security Risk
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In fact, from a national security perspective, I have come to
regard energy disruption as an existential threat to the United States.
Avoiding such disruption is a compelling reason for decreasing our
dependency on places such as the Middle East (Figure 2). In addition, we need to look at the climate implications of using fossil
fuels. In the end, it does not matter whether you are the greenest
environmental activist in the world, the biggest hawk in the world
who cares only about the security of America, or just a pure Adam
Smith economist who cares only about the economy. In this case,
all perspectives intersect. No matter what angle you take on why
we should solve this problem, reducing our demand for foreign oil
provides obvious benefits.
So, we went through this process of rationalizing why we were
going to do the study. I think General Gordon Sullivan said it better
than anyone else. Here, I paraphrase: When military officers start
planning, they need to look at solution sets based not only on
what is 100% certain to happen, but also on the worst thing that
could happen. When you look at the future climate effects that
Figure 2. U.S. Dependence on Foreign Oil
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scientists have predicted, you see that some have truly catastrophic
implications. We have a responsibility to our children to hedge
against the worst case.
So, we started looking at the world again, with all its geopolitical and economic interconnections. Along the way, we thought
about eventualities that would never have bothered us before. We
looked, for example, at the potential for a bird flu pandemic starting in Russia and Asia and then sweeping across Europe and then
down into Africa. It would be catastrophic.
But why should we care about that? Well, first of all we care
about human beings. Second, who usually responds in catastrophic events? I guarantee it is the Navy and the Air Force, Army,
and Marines. Who responded after the catastrophic earthquake in
Haiti? The U.S. military responded. We are glad we can do that.
And by the way, it is interesting that this happened during a period
in which people are saying that the U.S. military is stretched so thin
we cannot go any further. We went into Haiti without blinking an
eye. I think this will always be the case. So we need to be prepared
for the climate effects that may come down the road.
In 1996, Mozambique was struck by two nearly simultaneous
typhoons that ended up flooding the whole country. Think about
it. Mozambique is a large country. The only organization that could
respond rapidly was the U.S. military. Within a very short period of
time, our forces rescued some 250,000 people. We must be able
to do that more and more in the future.
There are currently some 6.5 billion people in the world. The
number continues to grow. By 2015, India will have passed China
to become the most populous country in the world. By 2045, the
Earth’s population is expected to grow to 9 billion; that means
2.5 billion more people to feed.
Although China and India have laid different paths to where they
are going, both have the ultimate goal of raising around 600 million people out of poverty by 2030—600 million each, which is
1.2 billion, into the middle class. That is four times the population of the United States. Just think about the impending resource
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competition, whether for food, water, or energy. China today owns
or has access to 90% of the rare earth minerals in the world.
I see a trend here that is not very good for our country. We
need to start looking at how we put ourselves in a more competitive position. One of the ways to make the United States more
competitive, in my estimation one of the huge ways to do this, is to
do something about energy.
As we well know, other types of climate-related problems
plague Africa. We have all heard about the human tragedy occurring in Darfur. Let’s take a quick look at the problem, using a map
of Africa (Figure 3). Darfur is part of the Sudan, and Sudan alone
is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi. The Darfur
region is as large as Texas. There are 7000 United Nations (UN)
troops in that area. By way of contrast, there are 55,000 police in
New York. So, we should not expect that the UN troops are doing
much in Darfur. The conflict there is not over who should be in
charge, but it is over access to arable land. The Black Africans are
farmers; the Arabic Africans in the same area are herders. They
were fighting over land. Climatologists tell us that we are going to
have more of that.
Figure 3. The Case of Darfur
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As it turns out, Sudan is interesting from another perspective
as well. It seems that China is interested in Sudan. Why, you might
ask? The answer is oil. China has made substantial investments in
Sudan for oil. China is also considering working with Saudi Arabia’s
Bin Laden family to build a bridge across the Red Sea. They are
also going to build a city in Yemen and one in Djibouti. Overall,
they expect to spend $200 billion in the region. Their plans have
been delayed by the world recession, but they are still expected to
happen. Why are they doing all this? China takes the competition
for resources very seriously.
Let’s take a quick look at water. You know, one of the ultimate
ironies to me is that although 80% of the world is covered by water
we are hurting for water now. I think one of the big breakthroughs
in the world will be whether we make desalinization more affordable. One possibility for providing the necessary power is the
fusion reactor that they are working on at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. If it works, it has the potential to change the
way we live. The basic idea is to use lasers to compress deuterium
molecules into tritium and then use the neutrons that come out to
heat a sleeve of molten salt. The heated salt is used to turn water
into steam that can then be used to power an electrical generator.
The process would be self-sustaining, would have very little waste,
and would be relatively low cost. It is projected that it would cost
about $4 billion to build a plant that would provide the electrical
energy required for a city the size of San Francisco.
Still, $4 billion is not chump change, although it is less than the
$10 to $12 billion required today to build a new nuclear reaction
that relies on fission. So it is reasonably affordable. We could use
this type of capability to make clean water, although perhaps only
in the United States or the Arab Emirates or other places that can
afford it. In places that have far fewer resources, such as Africa, we
will need to look for other ways to provide clean water.
A few months ago, I attended a Marine Corps symposium and
in the process learned that, by 2025, the majority of the world’s
population will live in the littorals, along the coastlines of the world.
Many of those people will live in massive cities with populations
as large as 40 million. And many of those 40 million people will
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live in slums. Those of you who have been to Lagos, Nigeria, have
some idea of what these places might look like. Imagine 40 million
people living in a city, many of them in destitute poverty, not a lot
of hope for young people growing up. As we well know, this is a
very good recipe for extremism. We should expect that we will see
more of that as the norm.
So, as we did our study for CNA, we soon reached the conclusion that climate change and energy are actually threat multipliers that will increase the severity of our future problems. Issues
related to demographics, human migrations, and competition for
resources are going to cause more and more volatility. And like
it or not, we are not going to be able to identify just a selective
few crises that are strategically important to the United States. The
world is increasingly interconnected. A significant crisis anywhere
eventually affects all of us (Figure 4).
My experience has been that we respond to virtually every crisis
that occurs. We responded in a major way after the Indonesian
tsunami. We responded after the earthquakes in Pakistan, Turkey,
and Morocco. The latter case actually provides an interesting perspective. When the earthquake occurred in Morocco, one of our
Air National Guard units that is matched up with the Moroccan Air
Force was able to respond almost immediately. They flew over in
Figure 4. Interrelation of Challenges Related to
National Security
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their KC-135 tankers to start helping with humanitarian aid before
the U.S. government gave them approval. Although the ambassador did not like it too much, that is how DoD reacts, and we will
continue to react to those types of things in the future. To those
who argue that we need to be more selective in what we do and
where we go, all I can say is it is not going to happen.
Okay, so what should DoD do about addressing the climate
and energy concerns? We think it is an urgent threat. One of
the things I hope will happen is that Ms. Sharon Burke, the new
Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), will be able to pull together the
Air Force, the Marines, the Army, the Navy, and maybe even the
Department of Energy, to develop a true joint approach to DoD’s
energy problem. Although I like the Navy’s approach, there is no
reason the Air Force, the Navy, and everybody else should not do
this as a group. I think it is urgent and we need to do something
about it now.
Although I love free markets, I do not think we have time for
the free markets to fix this one alone. I think we are going to need
a little nudge from maybe the military’s ability to do some research
and development, help set the market, and see what happens
from there.
So again, we see that the combination of geopolitical considerations, climate change, and economics has placed us in a vulnerable position, I think, as a military.
Energy is playing a part in our decision making regarding Iran
and underlies a lot of what we have done in recent years in the
Middle East. It weakens our leverage. If Iran did not have any
energy, it would be in a tougher spot. Energy is why the Chinese
are not with us on sanctions; China wants to get energy from Iran
and the Middle East. Energy concerns entangle us with hostile
regimes. Now, if you look at who owns the world’s petroleum
reserves, the 10 largest are nationally owned. Number 11 is Exxon.
Exxon had the largest single profit in the world during the third
quarter of 2008, $25 billion.
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Now I do not begrudge that, I am just telling you they are the
11th largest holder of petroleum reserves in the world. All of the
other large reserves are nationally owned, which means, for those
who believe in free markets, the free market is not the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), I guarantee you.
FedEx is committed to shifting over to biomass, probably something such as algae, by 2025. So is Virgin Airways, by the way. That
is a big commitment. Those are market indicators that I think will
start helping us quite a bit.
But in 2008 when oil went up to $4 a gallon, which seems
to be some trigger for some reason, the result was an additional
expense of about $3500 per family. For those who were right on
the edge as far as qualifying for home loans, $3500 is about what
they would need to make it. Now that is not why we have an economic problem, but what triggered it was energy cost. The Venn
diagram (Figure 4) has a real sweet spot in it, and although you can
argue all you want, it is time to get on with it.
Fortunately, there are a lot of potential solutions; I will describe
just a couple. An oil pipeline was being built from Kazakhstan to
deliver some 1.5 million barrels of petroleum a day. The United
States strongly supported this from a strategic standpoint. In fact,
the USEUCOM commander at the time was tasked with helping
set up protocols to ensure that the pipeline was adequately protected. At that point, the United States had put in $350 million to
make sure the countries that owned that resource had the capacity
to protect it. Although we can argue about whether this investment
is in our strategic interest, it is worth noting that no one else was
out there.
We went out to Azerbaijan to talk to the British Petroleum personnel who were running the consortium. They were leading a
$20 billion program to build this 1700-mile pipeline. After listening
to their presentation, I asked the project director, “Why do you
think a four-star general is out here getting this briefing from you?”
He said, “That is a good question.” So I asked him a rhetorical
question: “You are a British company. Has anybody from the U.K.
military been here? No? How about NATO? No? Okay, the United
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States is here. You know why? Because we are putting $350 million into protecting the pipeline.” From that time on, whenever I
visited I could not get enough attention.
The reason I am telling you this story is that the United States
is doing this again and we have to get off this kind of cycle. As
another example, let’s look at what is going on along the west
coast of Africa where we have helped set up the Gulf of Guinea
initiative. Fifteen countries are along the west coast of Africa talking about the $100 billion U.S. investment to extract oil from
the area.
Although we have known for some time that substantial oil was
there, we have begun to extract it only recently. In the past, we
did not have the technology to drill deep enough to reach the oil.
It turns out that you need to go down to depths of roughly 25,000
feet. The oil companies have now developed the technologies to
do that. The problem is there is no protection there for the drill rigs
or the pipelines.
Figure 5 shows several photographs from Nigeria that put into
perspective why there are so many problems out there. This is
the enemy for the Nigerian Navy. The Nigerian Navy has nothing
like that; of course, they would not want it. The right-hand side of
Figure 5 depicts what is called the Militia for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta. Nigeria is a huge country, with 166 million people.
It is the fourth most populous nation in the world, half Muslim, half
Figure 5. The Case of Nigeria
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Christian. All the oil is in the southern half, all in the delta in very,
very complex fingers of water. It is tough to get the oil out, and
you’ve got these pipelines all over.
The way the Nigerian government works is that the central
government, which is now in Abuja in the central part of the country, collects the revenue and then distributes it to the states. And
when they distribute it to the states, the constitution of Nigeria says
that the governor of the state does not have to be accountable for
where it goes. So where do you think it goes other than right into
his pocket?
So this money goes to the central government, not back to the
south. The people in the south, who are living as shown in the
right-hand side of Figure 5, end up not getting any of the money.
So they basically became Robin Hood. They started tapping into
these pipelines.
In 2003 when oil was $35 a barrel, the cartel was tapping in
for about $3 to $4 billion a year. At $147 a barrel, you do the math.
They went from being Robin Hood and giving money back to the
people, to simply being “robbers” and keeping it. Now they are
out there kidnapping and attacking drilling rigs and storage bunkers. Where is the security? This is what we are depending on right
here—a lot of instability.
The Marines gave me the picture shown in Figure 6. It is one
of my favorite pictures from the last couple of years. The photo
depicts the Khyber Pass going into Afghanistan. I was at the Khyber
Pass, ironically, 7 days before 9/11 and I was getting a briefing from
the Pakistanis. We had just taken sanctions off Pakistan for detonating a nuclear weapon some years previously and they were allowing U.S. military people to start going back in. I was lucky enough
to be one of the first ones. While I was there, I said that I wanted
to go up to the Khyber Pass; it is a historical spot. They agreed to
take me there.
So we flew from Islamabad to Peshawar, got into a Russian
ZIL limousine with trucks filled with soldiers in front and back.
When we reached the pass, we received a briefing presentation
from a Pakistani colonel. A general officer was there as well; they
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were all very proper because they had been trained by the Brits,
bless their hearts. And at the end of this presentation, this guy is
flipping over the butcher paper, which is a typically British way to
brief, which I love. The last slide the guy flips over says Attila the
Hun, Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, the British Empire,
the Russians all lost. And the message is, do not ever come here.
Where are we now?
Well, one of the problems in Afghanistan is the logistics. There
are two ways to get into Afghanistan on the ground. They are
working on more, but for now there are just two main roads. One
goes through the Khyber Pass. You see fuel trucks all interspersed
in here. The Marines told me that 80% of the tonnage that has to
be carried to the battlefield in Afghanistan is liquid, either fuel or
water. It is an interesting coincidence that 80% of the casualties
are caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks on
convoys; many of these are civilian convoys, but many are not.
They had an article in the paper 2 days ago stating that the
number of IEDs in Afghanistan has doubled in the last year and the
number of casualties has quadrupled. Now that is a bad combination. And so the Commandant of the Marine Corps has told Colonel
Bob Charette, the Marine Corps Director of Expeditionary Energy,
Figure 6. The Khyber Pass
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that his job is to do whatever he can do today to reduce the requirement to get fuel out there and, by doing so, save some Marines.
The Marines recently conducted an industry day at Quantico
to talk about commercial off-the-shelf technology that could be
used to reduce the demand for fuel. Improving energy efficiency
is fairly easy for fixed installations. We know how to do that; it
is just a matter of will. In the case of expeditionary forces, it is
much more difficult. But there are good reasons for doing so. We
have talked about the cost, but we should also consider the sheer
complexity of the task, especially in a place like Afghanistan. The
terrain in Afghanistan, for those who have not been there, is just
unbelievable. It is the worst in the world. The existing infrastructure
is very poor. As a result, it is very difficult to get around.
As was mentioned, one of the major uses of energy in
Afghanistan is powering electrical generators. It gets hot in
Afghanistan, and it gets awfully cold in the winter, by the way. So,
you need to have cooling and sometimes you need to have heat;
both require a lot of energy. The Marines are doing some creative
things now, such as spraying insulation on their tents to improve
energy efficiency. Over the long term, we need to be a lot better
at making sure that we have the capacity to go out and fight and
sustain ourselves in more energy-efficient ways.
The Marines or soldiers on the ground, it does not matter
which, carry about 100 pounds of weight on the field. Amazingly,
10 pounds of that weight is made up of batteries. Almost every soldier or marine has a radio, everyone has to be able to download a
Predator video, power his or her night vision goggles, you name it.
All of these devices require a lot of power. So there is an imperative to do something in the near term to provide portable power for
our expeditionary forces.
But the real muscle mover for the DoD is providing fuel for
combat aircraft, ships, tanks, and other vehicles. You need an
energy source that can give you lots of power in a relatively small
volume. It is quite probable that the only thing that is going to do
that is something like fossil fuel. The task of finding acceptable
alternatives should be an imperative.
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So I think the U.S. solution will be to electrify a major fraction of our vehicle fleet. I participated in a study called Securing
America’s Future Energy, which, among other things, recommended that we jumpstart electrifying the U.S. vehicle fleet. [2]
The majority of the fuel that we use in the United States is used
for transportation, and 70% of that is basically oil-based fossil fuel.
That is not a very good thing.
If we say to ourselves, let’s just change over to battery vehicles.
The technology is there; you can plug it in. I went out and drove a
Tesla in California the other day. It had been plugged into a regular
110-V outlet on the showroom floor. We unplugged and I got in
the car, went out on the road, and accelerated from 0 to 60 miles
per hour in 5.6 seconds. It is impressive—all battery. It is kind of
expensive, but by 2011 Tesla Motors is going to have a sedan that
costs $50,000 and goes 500 miles on a single charge. It will carry
five people and will go from 0 to 60 in 5.8 seconds. That will probably work. And it can plug into a 110-V or 220-V outlet. I think we
need to go down that road in a very fast way.
The electrical grid is a key component of our critical infrastructure. To reduce the vulnerability of the grid and improve its efficiency, we need to make it “smart” (Figure 7). Our study showed
Figure 7. A Smart Grid Is Necessary
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that, by 2050, we could go to about 75% electrical vehicles and
save 75% of the fossil fuel we use today.
For those of you who ask why we do not we just do it tomorrow, the answer is we have 250 million cars in America. That is an
amazing number. It is equally amazing, I think, that we have 1200
vehicles for every 1000 drivers. Every time I look outside, I notice
that there are cars and gas stations all over the place. I do not know
how many gas stations exist in the United States, but sometimes it
seems like there are at least a billion. It is clear that moving to alternate energy sources will be a big shift. And studies show that if we
were directed to shift to electrical vehicles if they were available
today, it would take us 10 years just to swap out the fleet.
There are four vehicles per 1000 eligible drivers in China. In
India, lots of new $2500 cars are being built. The idea was to build
a car that was comparable in price to the cost of the mopeds that
Indians currently use for transportation. Within the next few years,
Tata hopes to be able to sell 2 million little cars every year. They
will all have combustion engines that emit greenhouse gases. So,
the cars will be adding more CO2 to the atmosphere.
It has been mentioned that fuel costs a lot of money. Delivering
fuel to the most remote forward operating bases in Afghanistan
really costs a lot of money because you not only have to buy
the fuel and ship it to Pakistan, but you then must deliver it into
Afghanistan and protect it along the way. When you finally add it
all up, you think, “Criminy, we’ve got to do something about this.”
One of my concerns today is that I’m not sure that we are
moving out rapidly enough to beat the race for the climate problem. The national security advisor in Germany told me a couple
of years ago that the only way Europe can ever make a decision is
in crisis. I am not sure that is not the way we are looking at it, too.
But if we wait too long, there may be no hope of recovery. That is
not a good way.
So I personally think the DoD needs to be a catalyst with private
industry by sending market signals to enable us to start going down
the path in a more rapid way. We are also likely to need some new
regulations. Those who remember the chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)
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issue from several years ago will recall that, once we learned what
they were doing to the ozone layer, we took the CFCs out of our
refrigerators and out of our air conditioners. That was a good thing,
but there was a regulation that said you had to do that. So, we may
require similar regulations now.
I am very heartened that the DoD is finally going to have a
Director of Operational Energy. That is something that has been
needed for years. And, I have to applaud the Navy. I think the Navy
is way ahead because, first of all, their leadership is committed. As
we’ve heard, Secretary Mabus and Rear Admiral Cullom are committed. The Navy has assigned some sharp people to look at this
problem. But all of the Services should be looking for efficiencies.
So the bottom line is, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
actually said what our report said, that this is a problem and we’ve
got to do something about it (Figure 8). [3] One of the things that
we think needs to be done is better planning, which is happening. We also need to reduce the burden imposed by DoD. We
need the military to be more aware. When the Secretary of the
Navy says we are going to reduce our carbon emissions by 50%
Figure 8. QDR Climate and Energy Recommendations
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by 2020, that probably gets people’s attention because you know
you are probably going to be graded on that.
When reducing energy consumption means something to
commanders in the field, it is going to make a difference. We need
to get on with this as rapidly as we can. Although there is no single
solution—a silver bullet as it were—there are a large number of
partial solutions that we need to consider.
What we are going to need to do is use every bit of energy we
possibly can to make electricity. We will need to make the electric
grid more robust. We will need to transfer ourselves off fossil fuel
as much as we can through efficiencies and through use of alternative fuels.
So, I hope I have made it clear that we need to get started
down this road. Today the United States consumes approximately
21 or 22 million barrels of oil per day. As we have heard, U.S.
consumption amounts to one fourth of the petroleum consumed
worldwide. That is pretty amazing when you think about it. We
have only 5% of the world’s population, but we use 25% of the
world’s petroleum.
If the economy starts going the way it is predicted to go, and
it probably will, by 2025 we will need 27 million barrels of oil a
day—5 million barrels more than we use today. Even if we succeed
in finding alternative sources to replace as much as 5 million barrels of oil, we will still be at the same point we are today. We will
still require 22 million barrels of oil. And even if we drill offshore or
in the Arctic, we will be able to satisfy only a relatively small part of
that demand. If we look at other types of fuels or energy sources,
we discover that only about 1.7% of our energy comes from alternatives. So we have a lot to do to get to where we want to be. Still,
we’ve got to get there.
References
1. Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of
Climate Change, Alexandria, Virginia: CNA, 2007, http://
securityandclimate.cna.org/report/.
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2. Energy Security Leadership Council, A National Strategy for
Energy Security: Recommendations to the Nation on Reducing
U.S. Oil Dependence, Sep 2008, http://www.secureenergy.
org/sites/default/files/936_A_National_Strategy_for_Energy_
Security.pdf.
3. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
Feb 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.
Q&
A
with Gener al Charles Wald
heard a lot about how our energy posture is a serious
Q: We’ve
and urgent threat and how we have operational energy and
installation energy issues. But I sense that we are doing a lot of things
around the margins. What I have not heard a lot about is how we use the
Joint Requirements Process to actually get things that are energy efficient
or improve our energy posture.
For example, Marine Corps installations are typically funded
through the the Marine Corps’ Military Construction (MILCON) funding line, which means that we have a hard time going back and retrofitting previously existing budgetary items to make our buildings more
energy efficient. When we look at our acquisition process, we get things
like the tanker that does not use the fully burdened cost of fuel; we get the
Littoral Combat Ship, which is probably going to be the most fuel intensive ship the Navy has in some time. So what role do you think the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the Joint Urgent Operational
Needs process can play to help us solve our problems?
General Charles Wald: I sat on the JROC often. I think it is a
great concept and I really admire the leadership that we have in
the military today, both in the services and in the Joint Staff. I do
not think the JROC does much. I’m sorry. They should; they are the
ones that should be doing this. They should be making it an issue.
Every time you go down this path, we are going to have this—it is
going to be energy efficient, it is going to make a difference, and,
by the way, it is going to be Machiavellian, those that compete with
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good systems that can do the combat mission. Remember that—
we still need to do the mission. If that did not matter, we would just
throw away half our ships and airplanes and do something else.
But, frankly, I fully agree with you. I think the JROC should have
more teeth; I really do. Basically, it is a matter of leadership and
will and if the OSD guys want to give the JROC more power, then
they should do that.
very much appreciate your describing climate change as a
Q: Inational
security issue. My concern is that our national secu-
rity structure under the 1947 National Security Act is antiquated. In
my civilian job, I am in the reserve component; I work for the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I participated in
trying to get the Department of Commerce and NOAA to respond to the
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, and now I am living the same frustrations in Haiti. How do you get the whole of government to respond? You
talked about Darfur, and, in my view, the Department of Agriculture
is essentially playing a national security role there. But our laws, our
structures, our appropriations and authorizing structures really are not
responsive or structured to deal with these nonmilitary-type missions.
Could you perhaps comment on that?
General Charles Wald: I think from the broad perspective that
is probably in the context of what we need to address. For those
of you who are going to have another career after the military, it
is kind of fun because you get involved in things that I would consider important and probably could make a difference. So some of
the studies I am involved with are talking about stabilizing fragile
states, the reorganization of the national security apparatus to better respond to growing threats.
General Jim Jones, for those who know him, believes that we
need to have a different approach to national security issues, one
that involves the whole of government. You are now seeing this in
the QDR. We talked about this in European Command, maybe not
in the same exact terms, but about how do you use all the tools
of government to address issues? I was on the Hill yesterday talking about this with several senators and congressmen, and they
all kind of get it. Today, of course, we are doing this mostly in
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the context of post-crisis reconstruction given our ongoing involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We need to do better; people are often critical of the State
Department—they do not have the responsive team they need,
they do not have enough people who can go work in foreign countries. Finding people to staff such positions is going to be difficult, I
agree, but we also need to do it up front. In my view, there are two
ways to look at this—there is post-crisis response, which is cumbersome and expedient and not efficient.
We had the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
and the European Command do a study for us that aimed to tell us
what benefit we get for a dollar of prevention if we, for example,
build a partnership, stabilize the fragile states, invest in infrastructure and better governance, build a place where an economy can
actually grow versus simply responding. [1] And the reason we initially looked at it is that if you look at UN Peacekeeping missions
around the world—at that time there were some 16 or 17 missions—13 of them were in Africa.
The way I look at it is when a crisis occurs and you finally
respond, you are invariably a little late. It is cumbersome to get
where you need to go, but you send 7000 troops to Darfur, let’s
say. And then they stay there forever, and the costs mount up, and
all you are really doing is keeping people from killing each other;
you are not fixing anything. That is a bad business case. By the
way, the United States pays 27% of all the UN costs. We pay 27%
of NATO costs, too. These are costs that mean something.
The question we should be addressing is: How do we prevent such situations from occurring in the first place? We need to
be able to stabilize fragile states, a task that requires the whole of
government. Today we rely heavily on our combatant commanders. As a result, they are some of the most influential individuals in the world today. When the combatant command (COCOM)
commander goes out to a country in his area of responsibility, he
invariably gets to meet with the national leader. When that leader
says, “What do you think, what should we do?” the COCOM commander gets to say, ”I think we should do this.” Although I love our
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ambassadors, they are often unable to meet with the host-nation
leadership with the same frequency.
I do not think that is the way it should be. We do not need
Roman pro counsels out there; we need U.S. government representatives. Why don’t we have a senior ambassador who can do
the same thing, for example, and have power and then use all our
tools in a better way? We need to start thinking in those terms. We
are talking about it; the QDR has addressed it significantly from
the standpoint of building partnerships, relationships, and stabilizing fragile states, all of the things that we have talked about before.
I think we are going to get there.
I think the U.S. military’s senior leadership is about as enlightened as you can get, frankly. The Hill has huge respect for the U.S.
military leadership, and the military leadership today is saying we
want more government–U.S. civilian involvement in decisions. We
want more civilian leadership out there. We need to start getting
preventative. For every dollar spent on prevention, you save $10 in
reaction. There is a business case to be made.
So I gave that speech to the parliamentarians in the European
Union one day. When we were having lunch afterwards, one of the
parliamentarians said, “Hey, General Wald, you know, that business case about $1 per $10, that is a good one, I like that. The
problem is I cannot sell it. With prevention, nothing happens. So,
my people will not buy it. It is a leadership issue.”
References
1. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism:
Actions Needed To Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, July 2008, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08860.pdf.
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6.2 Roundtable 4: Operations
in Europe and Africa
Moderator’s Summary
Colonel Edward (Ted) A. Smyth
So with that, I will kick off our discussion of future naval operations in Europe and Africa. To start, let me point out that this whole
issue of climate and energy is not a new one. If you go back to
1970, the late statesman George Kennan, who most of you know
was the architect of the U.S. policy of containment, recognized
The moderator is Colonel Edward (Ted) A. Smyth, a Fellow within the
National Security Analysis Department (NSAD) and a Fellow and former President of the Military Operations Research Society (MORS).
Mr. Smyth is a former Marine Corps Colonel with 30 years of active service, during which he commanded Marine Corps units at the company/
battery, battalion, and regimental level. His primary military occupational specialty was artillery/fire support with subspecialties as a military operations analyst and historian. Since joining The Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), he has served as
Director of the Campaign Analysis Team of the Surface Combatant 21
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis, as the Director of Land
Attack Warfare Studies, and as Supervisor of the Ground Operations
Section of the NSAD. He has also coordinated efforts in support of
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Sea Strike analyses,
served as the Supervisor of the Joint Effects Based Operations Group,
developed and organized a 3-day symposium sponsored by MORS on
the subject of “Analysis of Urban Warfare,” and served as the Senior
JHU/APL Analyst in support of the National Security Agency’s Signals
Intelligence Requirements Office. His most recent activities include
active contributions to the 2006–2009 Johns Hopkins University
Symposium on Unrestricted Warfare and leadership of a MORS special
meeting on the subject of “Wargaming and Analysis,” an Analysis of
Alternatives on the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS), and a study of
the implications of economic and financial issues and actions on U.S.
national security.
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the linkage between ecological change and the potentially serious
implications for the international community (Figure 1).
So this is not a new phenomenon with which we are dealing.
However, unlike the 1970s, today’s security concerns are somewhat different to say the least. We no longer live in a bipolar world,
but rather one in which we are witnesses to rather dramatic shifts
in global demographics, wealth, and power. Any or all of which
may interact, as the Secretary of Defense points out (Figure 1), “to
produce new sources of deprivation, rage, and instability.”
Furthermore, and we have heard this from several of our speakers already, if our projections are accurate, our planet will see an
increase of several billion more people by the year 2025. Feeding,
clothing, and housing these people will impose enormous pressures on our ecology, and in particular on energy, food, and water
supplies, and thereby raise the possibility of significant shortages as
demand outstrips our supplies.
As noted on the plus side, by several of our previous speakers, the recently published Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
has finally recognized the linkage between climate change, energy
Figure 1. Observations of Kennan, Gates, and the QDR
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security and economic stability. [1] So I view that as a plus.
Hopefully, we are now moving in the right direction.
Let me turn our attention specifically to Europe and Africa
(Figure 2). Before we turn our focus to the challenges that will confront our naval forces that are operating in those theaters, I would
like to simply point out to you the sheer magnitude of this region—
not simply in terms of area size or length of coastline, but also in
terms of the populations themselves. When combined, these two
continents are home to 25% of the world’s population. From an
economic perspective, the two continents are very much a study
in contrast (Figure 3). Although Europe’s economic strength as
measured in its gross domestic product is significant and contains
5 of the 10 most wealthy nations on earth, Africa remains one
of the more impoverished areas with 11 countries ranked below
Somalia in terms of wealth. To me, that serves to put the continent
of Africa in perspective.
In terms of energy issues, Europe and the United States both
rank as major consumers of petroleum and natural gas. As we have
Figure 2. Comparison of Europe and Africa
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Figure 3. Comparison of Population, Economic Status,
and Energy in Europe and Africa
seen, a high percentage of the petroleum destined for European
and U.S. consumption originates from either the highly volatile
Middle East or from the sometimes less-than-cooperative Russian
Federation. I would also hasten to point out that in 2009, just this
past year, 13% of the U.S. daily consumption of petroleum originated in Africa, including regions, as we heard from General Wald,
that frequently witness political, cultural, and economic strife.
With this economic and demographic information as background, what do we believe will happen in terms of energy on
both of these continents? Over the past decade, Europe has experienced some of its warmest years on record and has also seen
record floods (Figure 4). As we have heard, shrinking sea ice
opens new areas for natural resource exploitation and may raise
tensions between Arctic nations and maritime states over the designation of important new waterways as international straits or
internal waters.
Extreme weather events, including heat waves, droughts,
and floods, are projected to become more frequent and more
intense. Many projections identify Southern Europe, the Alps, the
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Figure 4. Climate Changes in Europe and Africa
Mediterranean Basin, and the Arctic as the areas most likely to be
impacted. In a similar context, Africa is expected to see significant
increases in temperature, particularly in the Sub-Saharan region,
and parts of Southern Africa, as well as dramatic decreases in precipitation that may potentially expose even more significant numbers of the population to water stress and subsequent decreases in
agricultural production.
Given this information, there are a couple of points I would like
to make before I turn the podium over to our experts. First, I would
hope that there is no disagreement with the premise that Europe and
Africa are of critical importance to our national security. Similarly,
I hope there is no disagreement that climate changes and energy
issues are having, and are projected to have, continuing adverse
impacts on those interests. Secondly, I will also suggest that naval
forces, which are at the root of this symposium, have provided and
will continue to provide numerous capabilities in support of U.S.
national security interests. In fact, Captain Al Collins referenced
several of the capabilities ascribed to on Figure 5 in his description
of the Navy’s role in the Haitian Relief effort.
Now, if you are willing to buy into my premise, and I hope
you are, what then are the implications for naval forces from these
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Figure 5. Implications for the U.S. Naval Forces
in Europe and Africa
changes? What actions are necessary today and in the near term to
maintain our capability? What future roles should our naval forces
be prepared to address? These are some of the questions that we
hope to address in our subsequent presentations and in our discussion. To address these issues, we have assembled a panel with
considerable experience in the theaters of operation.
REFERENCE
1. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
Feb 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.
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6.3 Naval Operations
in Europe and Africa
Admiral Harry Ulrich III
First, I would like to express my gratitude to CNA and The
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL)
for hosting this conference. My remarks today will be based in large
part on a paper that was done by the Center for New American
Security in 2008. The report was titled Uncharted Waters, the
United States Navy and Navigating Climate Change. [1] I encourage you to read it.
A 1972 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Harry Ulrich III
has served in a broad range of sea and shore assignments during his
35-year career in the Navy. He served his sea tours with units of the
Atlantic Fleet and participated in deployments to South America, West
Africa, Northern and Southern Europe, and the Arabian Gulf. His shore
assignments included over 10 years in Washington, DC, working for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. In 1981,
Admiral Ulrich earned a master of science in physics from the U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School, and in 1989 he studied at the National War
College in Washington, DC. During the last 4 years of his career, he
served in Europe, first as Commander of the Sixth Fleet and subsequently as Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe, where he was
responsible for providing overall command, operational control, and
coordination of U.S. naval forces in the European Command area of responsibility, including Africa. He concurrently served as Commander
of Allied Joint Force Command Naples, where he had operational responsibility for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions
in the Balkans, Iraq, and the Mediterranean. Admiral Ulrich retired
from the Navy in February 2008. Since retiring he has accepted positions as a Distinguished Fellow at the CNA Corporation, Director of
the Atlantic Council, Director of the First Tee of Jacksonville, Director
of Oto Melara (NA), Director of MVM Incorporated, and as Executive
Vice President of Enterra Solutions.
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I also wanted to point out that I had the opportunity to discuss
my remarks with Admiral Jim Stavridis, the current Commander of
the U.S. European Command, when he was back in the States last
weekend. Once again, it should not surprise you that his views and
my views are generally aligned.
So let me start by focusing on energy. You have heard from the
Secretary of the Navy, Rear Admiral Phil Cullom, and others that
the Navy and the Department of Defense (DoD) are reducing their
consumption of fossil fuels as directed by legislation and executive
orders. Most of the effort so far has been focused on shore-based
establishment and support functions. But the operating forces will
be increasingly affected out of necessity.
I believe that commanders are increasingly considering energy
costs, including the carbon footprint, when they develop their
operational plans and their requests for forces. That is as it should
be. To stay relevant, naval forces must reduce their energy consumption by (1) operating more efficiently and (2) producing more
energy-efficient platforms in the long term. We do not want to
price ourselves out of the marketplace.
Now, notably our carriers and submarines are particularly
attractive in this regard. But our surface forces have their work
cut out for them in the coming years. I know the Office of Naval
Research and others have been working on this effort for years.
But we now need to implement efficiency improvements by backfitting our existing fleet when possible and realizing efficiency in
our construction designs and our construction programs.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been mentioned
and it certainly comes to mind in this regard. We will soon down-
select between two existing variants. But I sense that it is probably too late to make fuel efficiency a key parameter in the source
selection deliberations. And that is unfortunate. But it should have
been considered and undoubtedly will be considered in our next
round of ship programs. Such consideration is in alignment with
the Chief of Naval Operation’s direction that the Navy take total
ownership costs into account. The LCS ships, although they will
not be nearly as energy efficient as we would like, will be the
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workhorse for many of the future missions in Africa and Europe
for years to come. Although it is too late to affect the design, we
will need to achieve efficiencies in the way in which we choose to
operate those ships.
Shifting to climate change, I am going to highlight and offer
some thoughts on how naval operations could morph given the
following three factors: first, the frequency and severity of storms,
which has been discussed already; second, different operating
environments; and, third, the opportunity for new sea lines of communications in the Arctic as has been discussed.
With regard to changing weather patterns, you do not need to
be a meteorologist to note that storms seem to be more frequent
and violent. I certainly do not need to tell people in Washington,
DC, about that. The immediate impact on naval forces is to pay
attention and be increasingly agile in outmaneuvering these brutal
forces of nature. The naval forces should not be a victim of weather.
But it is not news that the Navy is becoming the force of choice
for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. This growing role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief has now
emerged as a critical and high-profile new mission area in our new
maritime strategy. We explicitly state for the first time that this is
part of our mission areas.
Given that disaster relief is part of what we do and given that
we are told to expect increasingly volatile weather, the Navy needs
to dedicate even more intellectual effort in disaster relief mission
planning and operational exercises. Above all, we need the right
forces deployed to execute these kinds of contingencies. Now, to
be clear, the Sixth Fleet has many missions it needs to be prepared
for. Disaster relief is but one. So the challenge before our force
planners is this: How do we develop a blended force capability
mix that will be suboptimized for any particular mission yet has
the capacity to handle them all? Solving that problem will require
some science and a lot of art.
At this point, it is worth stating the obvious. Our European allies
have a robust capability in the European area of responsibility; our
African partners not so much. So I recommend that we need to
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encourage NATO to include African disaster relief operations in its
ambitions and in its plans. We need to be part of that team.
The second point I want to make is with regard to the different
operating environment we are going to face. There is a reason the
Navy has an established corps of meteorologists. We have long
known that operating at sea is not for the faint of heart. But it sure is
easier if you understand and can predict your environment. Over
the years, we designed the most sophisticated models to help us
operate in, over, and under the sea. I am hopeful that our meteorology and oceanography specialists are gauging whether these
models are robust enough to accommodate even the direst of climate change assertions.
For one, I believe that undersea warfare is the most difficult
of our profession’s challenges. If, as predicted, the ocean currents
change course, temperature gradients become inverted, acidity
increases, and salinity levels fall, we need to be able to answer
these questions: (1) What impact will these phenomena have on
our existing sensors, models and weapon systems? And (2) which
technical tools or tactics that were abandoned long ago because
they did not work would be relevant in tomorrow’s potential new
climate and the Navy’s new situational reality?
Now I will shift to my third point—the possibility of new sea
lines of communications in the Arctic. Many have predicted it.
And if this is to be true and there will be a need to operate in the
high latitudes, will our ships and aircraft be capable of operating in
such harsh environments? How well do we understand the environment? So before we commit to saying we are going to operate
there or we will be able to operate there, I think we need to ask the
naval engineers to give us a thorough assessment of what our current fleet can and cannot do and what modifications we can make
to them if we are asked to operate in the high north.
I would like to digress for just a minute to point out and
observe that the first two points—changing weather patterns and
new ocean environment—are operational and tactical issues.
Though complex, these issues can be solved by applying modern
science, technology, and computers. But access to the Arctic is a
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very strategic matter that will undoubtedly challenge us for some
time to come.
No country owns the Arctic Ocean. But Russia, Norway,
Canada, Denmark, and, of course, the United States border the
Arctic Ocean. In 2005, the Northeast Passage was opened for the
first time. In 2007, the Northwest Passage was opened. And, by
2008, both were navigable. So keep in the back of your mind that
there is gold in those hills or under that water so to speak. In the
area is a whole stockpile of natural resources that I do not think we
completely understand yet. When we open the door to the Arctic,
not only will there be seaborne transit, but there will be seaborne
extraction of some sort for sure.
It should be clear that the high north is becoming an area of
special strategic interest. Will it be a zone of cooperation, competition, or conflict? Which one of those “C’s” will it be? This is a
matter for great statesmen to determine. But to be sure, naval forces
will be useful tools as they posture and deliberate. Before this issue
heats up too much, I recommend we set a course for cooperation
by assembling the maritime forces of the intrinsic countries, getting
them together, and working on collaborating on matters of import
in science and navigation. I also argue that the established Arctic
Council is the proper umbrella organization for this effort. In fact,
its charter was designed for just this.
Note that I specially stated that maritime forces of interested
states. I believe that the U.S. Coast Guard has the comparative
advantage to lead the U.S. effort in this regard. If the Navy took
the lead, it might appear to be the first step towards militarization
of the Arctic, which is exactly what we want to avoid. However, I
do not want to leave you with the impression that our Navy ships
and aircraft should not be operating there. Indeed, I believe just the
opposite. We need to make the statement that these are international waters and freedom of navigation applies; hence, my earlier
comment that we need to understand and adapt our forces to be
able to operate in the high north.
In closing, I wish to make four main points. First, we need to
understand and accept that energy will only get more expensive
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and, therefore, that the Navy needs to become even more cost
effective. Second, the demand for humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief will only grow. Third, being on the cutting edge of
the science of oceanography has been and will continue to be
fundamental to mission success. And, fourth, we need to shape the
debate on access to the Arctic region. Thank you very much for
your attention. I look forward to taking your questions.
Reference
1. Sharon Burke, Jay Gulledge, Michael Horowitz, Christine
Parthemore, and Nirav Patel, Uncharted Waters: The U.S. Navy
and Navigating Climate Change, Alexandria, Virginia: Center for
New American Security, 2009, http://www.cnas.org/node/849.
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6.4 Strategic Environment
and Implications of
Climate Change
Colonel James G. Welton
Let me begin my pointing out that U.S. Africa Command
(USAFRICOM) has been in discussions with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Defense Science
Board to establish a task force focused on climate change in Africa
and its implications for U.S. national security. That task force
hopefully will get underway within the next couple of months and
address the issues of climate change and how the United States,
Department of Defense (DoD), and the military can be prepared
to respond.
I will start this presentation by offering a few maps of Africa
for your review (Figures 1 and 2). It is always good to have pictures and maps in a presentation. I particularly like maps because
they both tell a story and provide a frame of reference regarding
locations. Over the past 20 years, many African countries have
moved toward democratization processes, good governance, and
rule of law.
Colonel James G. Welton is the Deputy Director for Programs in
the Strategy, Plans, and Programs Directorate, Headquarters (HQ)
U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Stuttgart, Germany. He is responsible to the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Programs for coordinating
staff actions assigned to the directorate pertaining to political–military
issues, military-to-military engagements, and Department of Defense
(DoD) theater security cooperation programs, activities, and events
in support of U.S. foreign policy in the command’s 53-country area
of responsibility (AOR). He oversees the staff actions of five divisions
involving bilateral relations with African partner nations, other U.S.
Unified Commands, allied military, international military, and regional
organizations. Colonel Welton received his commission from Officer
Training School, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, in 1981.
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Figure 1. Population Density in Africa
In January of 2009, just over a year ago, Ghanaian voters conducted their fourth free and fair election in 15 years. For the second
time, the opposition replaced a ruling party peacefully. For those
who do not know, Ghana is located in West Africa; it is about the
size of Oregon and is home to 23 million people.
In October 2009, Botswana, which is a country in southern
Africa, where the Kalahari Desert is located, successfully held
its 10th democratic presidential elections since independence in
1966—the most of any postcolonial Sub-Saharan African country.
Botswana has roughly 2 million people in an area the size of Texas.
Africa as a continent is the least responsible for greenhouse gas
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Figure 2. Natural Vegetation in Africa
emissions. If you look at Africa at night from space, you do not see
many lights in the center of the continent.
However, Africa is almost universally seen as the continent
most at risk for climate-induced conflict. It is a function of reliance on climate-dependent sectors such as rain-fed agriculture
and a history of resource-related, ethnic, and political conflict.
Often living on marginal land and disaster-prone areas and with
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few governments able to adequately respond to disasters, African
populations are particularly vulnerable to climate change.
The map in Figure 1 depicts population density per square
mile. Nigeria, at more than 149 million people, is the most populous country on the continent. It is twice the size of California,
which has just 37 million people. So if you doubled the population of California to 74 million and that amount of land space, that
is about how crowded Nigeria is. In Nigeria, the median age is
19 years. For comparison, the median age in the United States is
37, and it is 44 in Germany and Western Europe. So there are a
lot of young people in Nigeria without jobs, without security, and
without hope; this will probably become a problem at some point
in the future.
In terms of area, Sudan is the largest country on the continent. Sudan’s area is slightly more than a quarter of that of the
continental United States. Sudan’s population is 41 million people.
The median age in the Sudan is also 19 years. Throughout Africa,
there is a youth bulge with a lack of adult supervision from those
who have lived long enough to be able to provide guidance and
sage counsel.
The greatest population densities as shown on the map in
Figure 1 are along the water sources, in West Africa, and in the
Great Lakes region where Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Eastern
Congo, and Kenya are located. The continent has more than
987 million people today, a third of which live in drought-prone
areas. Africa’s population is projected to double by the year 2050.
The oil-rich Niger Delta is home to 20 million people. In West
Africa 40% live in coastal areas that are prone to flooding. Africa
has about 800 ethnic groups across borders. Approximately 1000
languages and dialects are spoken there, although English, French,
Arabic, and Portuguese are the most common international languages and serve as official languages in most nations.
The map in Figure 2 shows natural vegetation across the
African continent. The Sahara Desert is larger in square miles than
the entire continental United States. Natural disasters over the
past 50 years have had devastating impacts to populations across
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the continent. In the year 2000, there were two cyclones that hit
Mozambique, which is located in the southwest Pacific Ocean
in the Mozambique Channel, which displaced nearly 500,000
people and left nearly 1 million dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival. Put in terms that we understand, those were
Hurricane Katrina proportions. Yet Mozambique is about twice the
size of California with 21 million people. And it does not have the
resources of the U.S. government to respond to natural disasters of
this type.
It has also been reported that, over the 30 years between 1960
and 1990, more than 500,000 people died of droughts in the Sahel
region in the Western Sahara. Climate change in the north could
decrease yields of rain-fed and semiarid coastal areas. Previously
malaria-free highland areas in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi,
and Southern Africa could also experience rises in malaria transmissions due to climate change.
In West Africa, changes to coastal environments would have
negative impacts on the mangroves, fisheries, and agricultural
crops due to flooding. Food security, which is already a humanitarian crisis in many areas of Africa, is likely to be further aggravated
and exacerbated by climate change.
The establishment of U.S. Africa Command was essentially an
internal reorganization of the DoD command structure. It is not a
plot by the Department of Defense to take over roles and missions
of the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) or its other agency, the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance. DoD does not want to get into those roles. The
purpose of Africa Command is to support U.S. government efforts,
support the Department of State foreign policy, support USAID’s
development in areas of Africa, and when requested be able to
respond to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
Africa Command is now the sixth geographic combatant
command. The other five commands include the U.S. Central
Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific
Command, and Southern Command (Figure 3). So Africa is our
command’s focus and is the DoD’s single focus on Africa.
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Figure 3. Combatant Commands in Africa
President Obama, in his address in Accra, Ghana, in July 2009,
reaffirmed Africa’s strategic importance to the United States. Africa
is a continent of vast resources, strategic minerals, and energy
sources. It is indeed in the U.S. national interest to ensure access
to markets of all the global commodities that are necessary in
today’s world to support our standard of living. These commodities
include mineral ores, such as cobalt and coltan, which is used to
make capacitors, cell phone circuit boards, other technology products needed by the U.S. military, as well as other technologies that
we now take for granted.
The bottom line is that Africa Command has the same responsibilities as all the other geographic unified commands, but with
a difference: There is no nation in Africa that we view as a state
threat to our security. But it is the conditions on the continent
that challenge and threaten our security. As a single focus for all
DoD activities in Africa, we concentrate our efforts on helping
our African partners build capable and professional militaries that
are subordinate to civilian authorities, respect human rights, and
adhere to the rule of law.
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U.S. foreign policy objectives are to build the capacities of
African militaries so that African nations can better service their
populations by providing a secure and stable environment that will
allow each nation to promote democracy, expand development,
and provide for its common defense (Figure 4). By fulfilling this
mission, U.S. Africa Command supports the national security interests of the United States by assisting African nations encountering
transnational threats from violent, extremist organizations and illicit
trafficking in humans, narcotics, and weapons.
By strengthening African security, we help to deter and diminish both the potential for and the consequences of humanitarian
disasters, whether man-made or natural, that cause loss of life and
the destructive movement of displaced peoples or threaten global
access to natural resources and commodities that the world relies
on to advance standards of living.
As has been mentioned several times before, Africa is a large
and diverse continent with a landmass that is three and a half times
that of the continental United States (Figure 5). There are vast distances to overcome. The distances between the northernmost tip to
the southernmost tip is equal to a flight from New York to Moscow.
The flight time from Frankfurt, Germany, to Johannesburg, South
Figure 4. Mission Statement for U.S. Africa Command
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Africa, is 11 hours, roughly the same time as Frankfurt to Los
Angeles. The east–west distance across Africa exceeds that of a
flight from Chicago to Honolulu.
These distances are exacerbated by Africa’s lack of internal
infrastructure. In many cases, traveling from one country to another
requires flying through Europe to make the connection. There are
few roads that connect countries together to promote trade. All of
the roads and railroads that were built in colonial days were there
to extract resources, not to promote development or prosperity of
the African peoples.
Africa’s challenges require a holistic view of security that
includes defense, law enforcement, and customs and border security. Africa is dealing with the effects of widespread conflict after
the independence movements of the last half of the 20th century.
Some are still ongoing today.
The map shown in Figure 6 is based on an article in Foreign
Policy magazine, “Failed State Index of 2009.” [1] Of note, no
Figure 5. Understanding Africa’s Landmass
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African countries were judged to be “stable” or “most stable.” Our
challenge is to facilitate African solutions to African problems by
identifying root causes and finding ways to enable African solutions. Many factors affect the probability of armed conflict, such
as poverty level, natural resources, population characteristics, and
ethnicity. Remember, there are more than 800 ethnic groups that
cross borders. The comparatively low educational levels of the
population are yet another factor driving disagreements.
So it is these nonclimatic factors that will largely determine
whether and how climate change moves from being a challenge
to presenting development opportunities to presenting a security
threat to the continent and writ large to the rest of the world, including the United States. The thin lines between security and insecurity and stability and instability will be affected by climate change
and the ability of African populations and governments to adapt.
Figure 7 includes two maps. The one on the left shows gross
domestic product (GDP) growth of 2008. It reflects a positive GDP
Figure 6. Foreign Policy Concerns in Africa
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growth over the past 5–10 years. As in the case of Angola, much of
this growth is driven by natural resources. The challenge to African
nations is to develop diversified economies with wealth derived
from these energy resources.
The Nigeria and Gulf of Guinea area is a large source of oil
for the United States. As I recall, one of our earlier speakers said
that the United Stares receives 13%–15% of its oil from Africa.
Almost all of that oil comes from the Gulf of Guinea region. It
is light, sweet crude and it is perfect for U.S. refineries. As was
shown earlier, it is just a direct transit across the Atlantic to get to
the United States. But the area around the Gulf of Guinea is beset
by a lot of problems, especially regarding Nigeria. Just recently, oil
was discovered off the coast of Ghana. So, they are set to have an
oil boom. The principal challenge that Ghana will face will be to
determine how to capture a portion of that wealth and put it back
into their economy for development and growth.
Figure 7. GDP Growth in Africa
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The map on the right of Figures 7 and 8 shows the United
Nations Human Development Index (HDI). It is measured as basically one-third GDP per capita, one-third life expectancy, and
one-third literacy. The HDI rank orders countries from all over
the world. No African state ranked above 50. The highest-ranking
African state was the Seychelles, out in the Indian Ocean. What
causes the discrepancy? Corruption and weak government institutions are one cause. Lack of security and stability to allow for
growth and development and prosperity of its people is another
cause. Why do we show this figure? Africa’s greatest challenges
revolve around economic development; combating poverty; battling disease such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and others; and providing
basic education. These complex challenges require a whole-ofgovernment approach. DoD really has only a limited role to play.
As General Wald discussed, there are other U.S. government
departments and agencies that can and should provide efforts to
build institutions and agencies within those governments.
Figure 8. Human Development in Africa
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DoD’s position is that, for development to take hold, a government needs security and stability in order to have economic
growth. Thus, DoD’s role is to partner with other U.S. governments
and agencies to help build security capacity in countries where we
are putting money for development, to allow that development to
take hold and provide hope and promise for a better tomorrow for
the people in that country under the rule of law.
The left side of Figure 8 shows Transparency International’s
2009 Corruption Perception Index. [2] The one country that stands
out is Botswana, located just above South Africa at the bottom
of the continent. Botswana is the one African country that has
been effective at fighting corruption. That fact was highlighted
in President Obama’s speech in July 2009 when he said that the
democratization and good governments evident in Ghana and
Botswana are examples that other African countries should strive
to emulate.
So the challenges associated with the African Command are
great. There is a lot of corruption and plenty of weak government
institutions that undermine efforts to promote growth and prosperity. From a military perspective, many countries face the challenge
of paying their own troops so that they do not prey on the local
population. DoD’s role is to support defense sector reform initiatives in the larger area of security sector reform to build effective
government institutions.
The Venn diagram in Figure 9 helps us to summarize the strategic environment of our 53-nation area of responsibility. It also
allows us to distance ourselves from simplistic political rhetoric, which often attempts to place states on a linear sliding scale
between liberal democracies on one hand and tyrannies and dictatorships on the other.
Discussing the type of regime without discussing the strength of
the regime is a fool’s errand, especially in Africa. Contemporarily,
we could attempt to identify the transitional federal government in
Somalia as a parliamentary democracy or a dictatorship. But the
identification hardly matters when one considers that the Somalia
regime has absolutely no power to enforce its mandate over the
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Figure 9. Africa’s Political Landscape
Somalia population within the borders of that country, let alone
within the square mile of Mogadishu.
Somalia, regardless of its categorization, is a failed state, an
ungoverned space, which can threaten our homeland and our
interests abroad. Africa Command has a very specific role to play
in attempting to foster states toward the bottom left of the Venn
diagram; we want to reinforce success and help those states that
are in that area from slipping into a failed-state status. We are going
to work with other states in varying degrees of failed-state status.
It really will require a whole-community effort to make progress.
It is also valuable to look at the subject of peacekeeping as it
relates to our area of responsibility (Figure 10). Currently, 8 of 17
United Nations peacekeeping operations are in Africa and account
for approximately 75% of UN military, police, and civilian peacekeepers deployed worldwide. Knowing which states are consistently providing peacekeepers maybe a valuable point to consider
when identifying key partnerships for the United States. States that
provide peacekeepers may (1) have a degree of self-perceived
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stability that allows them to export security and (2) have demonstrated an interest in fostering regional and continental stability.
On the other side of the coin, states that consistently consume
peacekeeping resources tend to be sources of extreme instability
and conflict. Addressing their problems is likely to require a substantial investment of both resources and time. Without a congressional mandate, neither the Africa Command nor DoD will be able
to undertake the necessary nation-building activities.
For example, MONUC, the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
is the world’s single largest peacekeeping mission with more than
18,000 uniformed members. There are two peacekeeping missions
in the Sudan, UNMIS in the Southern Sudan and UNIMED, which
is a hybrid with the Africa Union, in Darfur. Together, these missions employ approximately 25,000 uniformed members, the most
UN peacekeepers in any one country in the world. It is also useful
to note that Nigeria provides over 5000 peacekeepers annually.
Figure 10. A Survey of Potential Partners in Peacekeeping
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Two countries in Central Africa, Uganda and Rwanda, also provide
peacekeepers in areas such as Somalia and Darfur.
In conclusion, Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents
to climate change. I have highlighted the situation, which is aggravated by the interaction of the multiple stresses. The science of
climate change is complex and debatable. The projected impact
of climate change on African societies is even more uncertain.
However, it is fairly evident that climate change represents very
real challenges to developments in progress for many African
countries. Projected climate changes for Africa suggest a future of
increasingly scarce water supplies, collapsing agricultural yields,
encroaching desertification, and increased food security.
The challenges faced by Africa today suggest that climate
change could be a tipping factor that threatens to derail development and the progress that has been made. Climate change also
has the potential to be a threat multiplier, making water scarcity
and food insecurity even greater challenges to peace, security, and
stability than they are at present.
The challenge to U.S. national security interests is to understand
the implications of climate change to African regional security. The
challenges are many. Many of those of particular concern for the
Navy arise from the continent’s vast size, which will affect our ability to provide the capacity and the capability that may be required
in the future. Thank you for your time; I look forward to any questions you may have during the question-and-answer session.
REFERENCES
1. “The 2009 Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, Jun 2009, http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_
states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
2. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” Transparency International,
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_
indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.
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6.5 Why Climate Change and
Environment Don’t Matter
Lieutenant Colonel Shannon Beebe
Yes, I did just get out of Angola. I have to be careful saying
that, because I am referring to Angola the country, not Angola the
maximum-security prison in Louisiana. Let me tell a funny story
before I start. Angola the country is a very tough place. Anyone
Lieutenant Colonel Shannon Beebe currently serves as the Assistant
Army Attaché, Defense Attaché Office, Luanda, Angola. His most current
previous assignment was as the Senior Africa Analyst, Office of United
States Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Washington, DC. A 1991 graduate of
the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, he has served
in numerous duty positions within the United States and internationally,
including assignments with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fulda,
Germany; the Third Infantry Division, Bamberg, Germany; Battlefield
Coordination Detachment, XVIII Airborne Corps; Commander Battery
A, 3-27 Field Artillery Regiment (MLRS); Headquarters Battery 18th Field
Artillery Brigade (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and assignment to 172d Stryker Brigade, Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He has served
in combat and stability deployments to the Balkans, commanded during
Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and prepared another unit for deployment to Kosovo in 1999. His unit was awarded the elite Army Superior
Unit Award for their actions under his command during Operation
Desert Fox. Lieutenant Colonel Beebe received a master of arts from
the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. He was
selected to become a United States Army Foreign Area Officer and has
served as the Army Attaché to Kosovo (2005–2006). As one of the most
recognized authorities on Africa within the Department of Defense,
Lieutenant Colonel Beebe played an instrumental role in the development of the newly formed U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). He is
recognized as one of the thought leaders on climate change and environmental security on the African continent and is the co-author of the
much-anticipated book The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon: Human
Security and the New Rules of War and Peace.
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who has been to Angola knows it is a very difficult working environment from a professional perspective. It is one of the few places
left in Africa where Russian and Cuban forces still maintain a presence. It is very difficult from a personal perspective as well.
A year ago, I had been in Germany attending a conference and
was just getting ready to return to Angola. On the way to Germany,
the airline had lost my luggage, so I had been in Germany for
about 10 days with the same set of clothes. I was looking pretty
scraggly. So I was sitting at the bar at the Frankfurt airport finishing
my last beer before getting back on the plane to go back to Angola.
About that time, Chatty Cathy and her browbeaten husband
with about 10 bags comes walking up to me and taps me on the
shoulder and says, “Excuse me, is this place taken?” I said, “No
ma’am. You can sit there.” So she starts talking to me. They had just
finished a great vacation in the Greek Isles and it was wonderful.
“Had I been there?” After some time, she looks at me and asks,
“So where are you from in this great big world?”
Before I knew what I was saying, I said, “Well, right now I’m
doing time in Angola.” There was just this gasp of silence. I thought
briefly about correcting myself but then decided, you know, that
silence is a beautiful thing. So around that time they announced
my flight to Rwanda. I got up and I said, “Ma’am, it is time for me
to get back.” She grabs me and says, “I just want you to know I
think everyone deserves a second chance.” And I said, “Ma’am,
I sure as hell hope so.” So anyway, this could possibly be my
second chance.
What I would like to talk with you about today is sort of conceptually threading together a lot of what you have heard. If there
is one takeaway I would give you, it is this: We can only achieve
that for which we have words. Now, if I had to entitle the presentation, I would take a slightly different angle and say why climate
change and environment will never matter to national security.
Now, how do I go about this? First, I would like to talk a bit
about how I started working with human security in the Chief of
Staff’s Office. Then, I plan to talk a little bit about climate change
and its impact on Africa, which has been highlighted. I am not
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going to go too very far into that, however. Finally, I hope to have
the opportunity to do what every West Point grad dreams of doing,
and that is to tell the Navy what to do and where to go.
So that being said, a little background about how I got started.
About 4 or 5 years ago, I was working with the Army Chief of
Staff’s Office and had the opportunity to brief the entire Army staff
on Africa. I started off with three points on Africa. First, Africa is a
continent; it is not a country. Second, Africa is a security enabler,
although it may be positive or negative depending on how we
handle it and depending on how we see it and work with it. Finally,
I said that there is a reason that Africa is shaped like a question
mark; it is because we really do not understand what security is in
African terms.
As I said, that was 4 or 5 years ago. We have moved a great
way since then. The Chief of Staff was fairly intrigued by this. So he
tasked me to go out and to talk with Africans. I had the opportunity
to go to about 14 or 15 different African countries and to canvas
various African leaders, ministers, politicians, and business owners,
all the way down to a few taxicab drivers—Somali taxicab drivers in Washington, DC—asking them how they viewed security
in Africa.
The four things that they came back with, with about a 90%
correlation, were as follows: first, poverty; second, health; third,
security sector reform, but security sector reform by an African
standard; and, finally, climate change. As a well-intentioned staff
officer, I had to find a way to brief this back to the Chief of Staff.
This was going to be pretty tough to do because, with the exception of security sector reform, none of those topics is in our definition of security.
What we came back with was that, although our strategic
security narrative is necessary, the military mission of the military
will always be to protect and defend the interests of the United
States. We then went on to argue that this approach provided an
insufficient basis for addressing the needs of Africans. African security, as Colonel Welton mentioned, is very much conditions based.
Although we are still very focused on ground forces, air forces, and
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naval forces, Africans and African nations tend to look first at the
forces of nature. And, there, they tend to see vulnerabilities rather
than threats.
One of the previous speakers mentioned that our bureaucracies are ill prepared to deal with these types of conditions, these
creeping vulnerabilities of the 21st century, because conditions
such as climate change, lack of water, health concerns, and poverty tend to arise along the strategic seams of our national security
institutions. So that is all well and good. I went back and I briefed
the Chief of Staff: “Sir, it sucks.”
Now, there is more to it than that. We tried to understand the
basic narrative that we should be using, one developed around the
concept of human security. Many of our ideas came from a 1994
report, “The United Nations Development Program,” which basically said that as the tide of the Cold War rolls back, what we are
going to see is that security never really was about state-on-state
conflict. [1] It really was about the instabilities and the insecurities
of populations.
Unfortunately, we did not really take a very serious look at this
at the time. We were still too busy high-fiving ourselves for winning the Cold War. At my graduation at West Point, George Bush
gave the “Thousand Points of Light” speech. While we were down
in the Balkans, we thought: “Man, there are 1000 points of light
out out there.” Actually, it turned out that there were lots of busted
light bulbs. So we started seeing that something had systemically
changed.
What is the nature of the change that would require a need
for a shift in our security paradigm? I would argue that it is three
things: one political, one economic, and one information related.
Although we have discussed them to some extent, I will go through
them briefly.
First, politically we have shifted from a bipolar world to a multipolar world. As a result, the stability of the system starts to shake
a little bit. Economically, we have moved from our traditional statebased economy to globalization. And, because globalization has
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been fairly uneven, we do not yet understand all the ramifications.
We do know that it introduces more instability in the system.
From an information perspective, we have moved from where
the state could control information to basically the individual having
that power. How do you get a 23-year-old girl from Belgium over
to Iraq to blow herself up? That is a good question. How is it that
we have one of the largest Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
cases in the United States in Minneapolis, Minnesota, because of
linkages to Somalia terrorism? That is a good question.
What you see is that the defense architecture that was designed
to protect the system has been untethered. What you have now
seems to resemble a kid’s soccer match during which all the players go after the ball simultaneously. It seems as though there is
a new challenge almost every few months in Africa. Over the
last few years, we have gone from Sudan being the challenge to
Zimbabwe being the challenge to Congo being the challenge. The
essential security narrative for Africa has yet to be created. We
simply do not have the words to encapsulate the challenges.
In the case of human security, we need to recognize that there
is an inextricable link between development and defense. We
cannot break those apart. I know that especially within the beltway
there are a lot of Faberge rice bowls out there. Fortunately, there
has been a lot of rice. As the U.S. African Command (USAFRICOM)
was standing up, we heard numerous arguments that the command was going to be seen as an invasion of humanitarian space.
USAFRICOM was going to be banging swords into plowshares. I
think that we have to shift our thinking so that we understand that
the definition of security for the 21st century is going to be far different than it has been in the past.
Now, why is it that climate change will never matter to national
security? Because until that narrative changes, until it is seen truly
as an element of security and not as something totally separate,
we will continue to look at it on the fringes. We need to shift our
focus to overall human security and allow some of the nontraditional actors, such as the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
to play a larger role.
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Colonel Welton made an important point along those lines.
Department of Defense (DoD) has more in common with some of
these things than we have ever imagined. How is it that the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) is very willing to work with USAFRICOM
and very willing to work with our other commands on environmental issues? It is because the WWF understands the nexus
between environment and conflict. I was able to see this first
hand in Virunga National Park, where illegal charcoaling operations have led to the killing of the silverback gorillas. How is it that
Greenpeace is willing to work with the U.S. military? Because they
are slowly beginning to understand that we have more in common
and by pooling resources, by creating synergy, we can do far more.
I go to a lot of conferences and I hear a lot of the NGOs
and even other organizations say, “We are not doing enough in
Africa. We should do more in Africa.” I tend to be the skunk at
the party by standing up and saying, “Well, is it that we are not
doing enough in Africa? Or is it that perhaps that we are not doing
enough together in Africa?” Now, having had the opportunity to
visit some 20 odd countries in Africa, I would contend that it is the
latter. A lot of the time no one knows what is going on, how much
duplicative effort is happening with a perfect opportunity to seize
on those initiatives.
Turning back to problems that may be exacerbated by climate
change, we have talked a lot about the youth bulge. Three of the
world’s five largest cities in 2025 will be in Africa. Folks, this is not
a stable continent. Populations are migrating towards the coasts.
Most of the climate models forecast the very real possibility for
typhoons, hurricanes, call them what you want, to begin to spring
up on the west coast of Africa.
As I recall, one of our earlier speakers mentioned the west coast
of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea and the need to protect the oil
production facilities there. But what happens when that capacity,
not just for our oil security, or our energy security, what happens
when that capacity goes offline for world security, for international
security? And how are we thinking about those kinds of things?
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These are things that we can think about now or we can think
about later. Until we shift the narrative to a point at which this is
understandable, not just by military terms, we are going to continue to talk around each other. We need to arrive at a common
language that we all understand.
I go to the exact same conferences and say the exact same
things to the NGOs. I tell them that they need to understand what
the military is trying to do and in the process convince themselves
that it is not the evil invasion of humanitarian space. We all have
a vested interest in making things work. We are on the same ship
and it is burning right now. Until we are able to do that, we are
going to continue to marginalize the security threats, the security
challenges, to the 21st century.
At this point in my presentation, it is time for West Point to tell
the Navy what to do. As Admiral Ulrich pointed out, most African
countries lack meteorological services, and thus have no way of
forecasting weather and thus getting advance warning about major
storms or floods. If we are concerned about what is going on there,
not only just for the climate change, but environmental shocks in
general—floods, famines, all of those kinds of things—why aren’t
we helping to provide them with meteorological services? Doing
so would be nonconfrontational. It is not something that is militaristic in nature, but it is something that very much impacts the
security of those populations.
Had we known more about this in Mozambique in the 1990s,
we could have prevented some of the flooding deaths that occurred
there. Of course, this is more than just a U.S. issue. The international community has a role to play as well.
A lot of Africans explain away their continent’s significant corruption problem as being a result of neocolonialism and this new
rush for resources. I have been on the continent enough that I
would argue that it is not neocolonialism, but it is more like neomedievalism. In other words, it is like the concept in medieval times
that you have a king and if you needed anything you paid homage
to the king; you paid fees to the courts. And that is how you got
things done. Africa essentially works that way today. Only now the
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king is called the Prime Minister or the President. The members
of his court are now called the ministers. The king’s castle is now
usually called the capitol. Very little happens outside there unless
it is related to resources.
So again, it is a matter of understanding the context in which
we are working. And folks, it is what it is. That is actually one of
my favorite sayings about Africa. “It is what it is.” It is not what
you want it to be, it is merely what it is. And we have to deal
with it in those terms. We can talk a little bit more about this in
the question-and-answer session if you wish. With China, why is
it that China has had so much success in Africa? Well, because
they go in with their checkbook and say it is what it is. What do
we want to do together? They do not try to preach to the Africans
about democracy and transparency in government. Now, is that
important? Absolutely, it is. But the question is: Can you get more
done from the inside or from the outside? Those are the kinds of
questions that we have to answer.
Second, we talk about blue water navies. We talk about brown
water navies. In Africa, how about just clean water? The numberone killer of kids under 5 years of age is diarrheal types of infections. A significant fraction of kids, somewhere between 1 in 3 and
2 in 5, do not make it to their fifth birthday. What does that mean?
For parents it often means a real fear regarding the potential loss
of labor and future income, and that fear seems to translate into
having more and more and more children. So, once again we see
how seemingly disparate factors combine to make the overall situation worse.
Now, the basic reason that I think that climate change is just
one of the many variables that will affect Africa’s future is because
African security is not an algebra problem. We cannot solve for one
variable. It is a lot like a house of cards. You do not know which
one of the cards will cause the house to collapse until you pull on
it. You do not know if it is poverty, health, or climate change. You
do not know which one of those cards is the deciding factor until
it gets pulled out.
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But what you can guarantee is that when that card gets pulled
out, what happens? The house falls. You do not know how fast it is
going to fall. You do not know which way it is going to fall. But it is
going to fall. So we have to take a more holistic approach and open
the aperture a little bit more and understand that climate change is
just one variable. But it will have linkages to health and it will have
linkages to poverty.
So instead of arguing over our Faberge rice bowls, what is it
that we are doing to come together to solve the problem? How do
we solve it? We cannot argue that climate change will be the sole
cause of disaster and Armageddon for 2025. Climate change will
be just one of several variables affecting African security. How do
we come together and address those broader issues? I think that is
going to be one of the greatest challenges that we face. I think that
is what USAFRICOM is saddled with. That is what USSOUTHCOM
is going to be saddled with in the not-too-distant future. With that
being said, I will stop.
REFERENCE
1. United Nations Development Program, Human Development
Report 1994, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, http://hdr.
undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/.
Q&
A
Session with Panelists
security needs to vary tremendously among the difQ: Energy
ferent geographical areas, more specifically the geographical
COCOMs. Can you talk a little bit about where the priorities of energy
security are for your respective areas? And then can you also talk a little
bit about how you are using energy for phase-zero stability operations in
your particular areas?
Admiral Harry Ulrich : That is a really hard question. It is kind
of wide open. Let’s just start with energy security. More is better.
Get as much as you can.
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me be more specific. For instance, in the USEUCOM
Q: Let
area, are you focusing on whether Russia is going to turn off
natural gas? In the USSOUTHCOM area, are you looking at building
partner nation capacity? In the USAFRICOM area, are you trying to
create stability in certain sections and areas? How are you using energy
as a force multiplier?
Admiral Harry Ulrich : Well, in Europe, you are absolutely
right. The natural gas that heats Europe in the winter and cools it
in the summertime comes from Russia. That gas has become a tool
in their toolbox to make friends and influence people. There is no
question about it.
In some sense, Russia’s great power now flows more from their
natural gas than it does from their nuclear weapons. It does have an
influence on the politics of Europe and the politics of NATO. There
is no question about that. There are all kinds of ideas on how to
mitigate that—by building pipelines that do not go through Russia,
by bringing in pipelines under the Mediterranean from Africa. So
that is being worked and it is now part of the calculus. I will let
Lieutenant Colonel Beebe talk about Africa and what works there.
Lieutenant Colonel Shannon Beebe : I will flip it around.
Again, the remarks I am making are entirely my own. They are
not reflective of DoD. I know Colonel Welton can speak from the
USAFRICOM perspective. I would like to look at it from an African
perspective. We have a real opportunity to work with Africans on
renewable energy resources, those kinds of things, to bring them
a single light bulb for a single hut. Doing so will certainly provide
significant benefits for education and for health. If you can bring
those things, you are talking about a more educated population.
You are talking about a healthier population. You are talking about
a more stable population. At the end of the day, I would say that we
want to be seen as the Maytag repairman. We do not want to have
to do our primary job of kinetics. We need to identify those things
that we can do proactively not just using DoD, but with the NGOs,
with the European Union, with other international organizations, to
bring things that are not going to create a larger carbon footprint.
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Colonel James Welton : I would say it is not U.S. policy that
we are going to provide for the security of all those tankers leaving from the Gulf of Guinea whether they are going to the United
States or to other countries. We do, however, want to be able to
work with those countries so they have the capacity to provide for
their own security. General Wald described an image of armed
fighters who operate within Nigeria’s coastal waters. So we want to
be able to partner with the Nigerians to ensure that they can have
the security capacity to deal with that threat. It is not a DoD role
to provide that security.
Admiral Harry Ulrich : Soon after I assumed command of
Naval Forces Europe, General Wald sent me down to Nigeria to
work with the Nigerians on energy security. Oil tankers were simply disappearing. The tankers would go to unload and would never
be heard from again. Gen Wald asked me to go down there and
work with the Nigerian Navy and collaborate together to provide
energy security. And so I did. I went down and met with their Chief
of the Navy. We had a very rich and powerful discussion about
what we could do together for energy security and the maritime
domain. Then, the day after I returned to Naples, I read that the
Chief of the Navy in Nigeria had been arrested for stealing oil tankers. Well, I guess I had some influence on that.
I’m interested in is how the government is going to incorQ: What
porate the things that you have spoken about in the career
paths for our military and civilian personnel who have to be a part of
the whole-of-government solution. I am also interested in how it is going
to be incorporated in our educational programs. I mean, this is the first
time I have heard talk like this from military. Maybe I am not going to
the right meetings. But I think you have very exciting stories that need to
be told in a much broader audience.
Lieutenant Colonel Shannon Beebe : I am coming out with my
first book. It is going to be published in April. It is entitled The
Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon. I have a lot to say about human
security, and I devoted an entire chapter specifically to Africa. But
basically what we talked about is that as we have searched for
weapons in the 20th century to do kinetic types of operations, those
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actual weapons are technically for the 21st century, not producing
security, but consuming security. And it is going to be a lightening
rod kind of book. Fortunately, I have only about a year left in the
military, because I am probably going back to Leavenworth on the
other side of the tracks when this thing comes out. That being said,
it is very important that someone does come out and talk about
these kinds of things. My job as a strategic scout is to see and then
report what I see.
I will be the first to admit that I am not that smart. Basically, the
book relates what I have seen, what I have heard, and what I have
experienced. By writing it, I hope to get folks to think about shifting that security narrative away from what we did very successfully
in the 20th century toward what we need to do in the 21st century.
The book provides no answers, but it does attempt to raise the firstorder question of security in the 21st century. Hopefully, it will be
incorporated into the academies, even the Naval Academy. That
being said, I am hopeful that it is going to have an impact.
Admiral Harry Ulrich : Just before we started this panel discussion, I was asked what was on my mind. And I said, “the difference
between defense and security,” which is part of your point. I was
happy to hear you say that we should no longer talk defense or
think defense. That is what we did in the Cold War, World War II,
and World War I. Whether it is a long-term trend or it is just a hiatus, we now talk about security. Security is different from defense.
We need to get the words right. We need to get the mental models
right. We are not there yet, as we are finding out in Afghanistan.
We found that out the hard way in Iraq. We will find it wherever
we go. So what is security, writ large, not only energy security or
climate security? But what is security? What are the factors that
make it up? So, Shannon, I look forward to reading your book.
have noticed one stark contrast between this panel and the
Q: Iother
panel discussions. The best way to characterize it is
that there seems to be a lack of data. What all of you have said is that
the difference between Africa and analyzing the risks of climate change
to security in Africa and the other areas of the world is we just have a
lack of data. You mentioned a couple of areas, specific areas such as
Chapter 6 Future Naval Operations in Europe and Africa
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meteorological data, that would help in assessing those risks. What
other areas of data need to be collected? What are the bodies that need
to be gathered in order to properly assess the risk in Africa?
Colonel James Welton : I would say that, for the large part,
since the end of World War II, Africa has been largely ignored
by most of the developed world, including the United States. Our
focus was elsewhere. So there is a lack of data. Often, we do not
know what we do not know. But with this task force that I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation, this is one of the things
that the task force is going to be charged to look at. What are the
things that we need to know related not just to climate change, but
also to the national security implications for the African continent?
Admiral Harry Ulrich : I would take another look. I’m not sure
there is a shortage of data. There are tons of data out there. We
talked about the average age in Nigeria. We can talk about yields
per hectare, inches of rain per whatever. We can divide it by the
square root of 2, multiply it by Avogadro’s number. We have data.
The question is what do you do with the data? In order for something to get done, you have to do something about it. There must
be interventions if you want to change the tendency of the data.
Africa, as everyone has pointed out, is a very, very big place.
There is a lot of inertia there. It takes a lot of intellectual capital and
commitment to intervene through change. It is not clear to me that
we should take on that mission. That is an open debate. The NGOs
should certainly play a role.
I will tell you another sea story to get to this. Chuck Wald
tasked me to go into Darfur. In preparation, I got all my Intel guys
together and said, “Tell me everything that I need to know about
Darfur and come back and see me in about 3 days.” Then I went
to another bunch of folks who shall remain nameless, so I do not
put them at risk, and I said the same thing. The Intel guys came
back with about 8 pages; they could tell me where Darfur was,
they could show me satellite pictures at any time of the day, and all
kinds of other very useless stuff. When the other folks came back,
they gave me volumes and volumes on Darfur and where all the
camps were and how many people were in the camps and how
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many calories we were delivering per day to the camps, blah, blah,
blah. The Intel group went to the SIPRNet, where they found no
shortage of data. The NGOs fill the Internet with data. I cannot tell
you what is the accuracy. But my sense is it is pretty good. So I do
not think there is a shortage of data.
Colonel Ted Smyth : We are going to have to call a halt at this
point. But I have promised Lieutenant Colonel Beebe 20 seconds
for a closing point.
Lieutenant Colonel Beebe : One quick thing I would like to ask
is how does this play in Peoria? Two of the greatest attacks on the
United States, on American soil, happened at the beginning of the
21st century—al Qaeda’s attack on September 11 and Hurricane
Katrina. Neither was a state-based threat. The question I will leave
you with is: how prepared were we for either of those?