Chapter 1
Introduction
and Keynote
Address
1
1.1 Introduction
Dr. L. Dean Simmons
In recent years, the U.S. national security community has
expressed increasing concern about the potential adverse effects
that might arise from changes in climate and energy. In 2009, for
example, the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Dennis
Blair, U.S. Navy Retired, declared in testimony before Congress
Dr. L. Dean Simmons is a National Security Studies Fellow in The Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory’s National Security
Analysis Department. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Purdue
University and master’s degrees in physics and operations research,
also from Purdue. He graduated summa cum laude from Kansas State
University with a B.S. in physics. Since joining APL in summer 2005,
Dr. Simmons has served as APL Program Co-Chair and a roundtable
moderator for APL’s series of Unrestricted Warfare Symposia. In 2009,
he served as APL study lead for the DoD Irregular Warfare Study and
is currently leading APL’s efforts in support of DoD’s Comprehensive
Reserve Review. He has also contributed to several important assessments of DoD’s national and strategic command and control capabilities. Prior to joining APL, Dr. Simmons worked at the Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA), where he directed cost-effectiveness assessments of strategic and tactical aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, rotary
wing aircraft, and surface ships and led IDA’s lessons learned assessments for the recent conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia. In recognition of
his contributions to national defense, Dr. Simmons was twice awarded
IDA’s Andrew J. Goodpaster Award for Excellence in Research. Early
in his career, Dr. Simmons spent 7 years with the Center for Naval
Analyses, where he specialized in the amphibious warfare systems
used by the Navy and Marine Corps. Dr. Simmons has contributed to a
number of Defense Science Board, Naval Studies Board, and Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board panels. In addition, has published articles in
the Journal of Defense Research, the Marine Corps Gazette, Vertiflite,
and the Proceedings of the Naval Institute.
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that “climate change, energy, and other factors are often intertwined, and while not traditionally viewed as ‘threats’ to U.S.
national security . . . will affect Americans in major ways.” [1] Last
September the Central Intelligence Agency established a Center
for Climate Change and National Security to assess the impacts of
such climate effects as “desertification, rising sea levels, population
shifts, and heightened competition for national resources.” [2]
And this year, the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) new
Quadrennial Defense Review, the QDR 2010, devotes an entire
section, some six or seven pages, to the task of “crafting a strategic
approach to climate and energy.” [3] Let’s look at what the QDR
2010 had to say in a little more detail. The report notes that “climate change and energy are two key issues that will play a significant role in shaping the future security environment.”
Two types of climate-related effects are noted. “First, climate
change will shape the operating environment, roles, and missions
that we [DoD forces] undertake. . . . Second, DoD will need to
adjust to the impact of climate change on our facilities and military
capabilities.” The QDR 2010 then goes on to identify some of the
specific climate effects of concern to DoD, citing as its source the
integrated perspective pulled together by the U.S. Global Change
Research Program. This program integrates the climate-related
activities of seven federal departments—Commerce, DoD, Energy,
Interior, State, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture—as
well as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the Smithsonian Institution.
The effects of concern include rising atmospheric and ocean
temperatures, rising sea level, retreating glaciers, thawing permafrost, lengthening growing seasons, lengthening ice-free seasons in
the oceans (especially in the Arctic) as well as on lakes and rivers,
increases in heavy downpours, earlier snowmelt, and alterations in
river flows. According to the QDR 2010, such effects can increase
the likelihood of poverty, lead to environmental degradation, and
further weaken already fragile governments. Climate change also Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
3
can contribute to food and water scarcity, increase the spread of
disease, and spur or exacerbate mass migration.
Turning next to changes in energy, the QDR 2010 declares that
energy security for DoD means “having assured access to reliable
supplies of energy” and being able “to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.” To put the first concern in
perspective, let’s look at some data from a recent report by DoD’s
Energy Information Administration (EIA). In Figure 1, the upper pie
chart shows average daily petroleum use measured in thousands of
barrels (Kbbl) for the top 15 oil-consuming nations.
As is clear from the chart, the United States is far and away
the largest consumer. China is second, India is sixth. The lower
pie chart shows the same data adjusted for population. When we
look at the data this way, America still ranks near the top, trailing
only Saudi Arabia and Canada. On a per-capita basis, the average Chinese citizen consumes 1/13th as much oil as the average
American; the average Indian citizen, only 1/30th as much. This
drop is, of course, due to these countries’ billion-plus populations.
At the same time, these massive populations mean that a
modest increase in per-capita consumption will turn into a substantial increase in national consumption. A 1% increase in percapita consumption for either China or India will mean a 4% or
5% increase in national consumption relative to the United States.
A 2% increase will mean an 8–10% increase.
Having looked at consumption, let us take a quick look at
production. Figure 2 shows EIA data for the 23 largest petroleum
producers, measured again in thousands of barrels per day. The
roughly 8500 barrels per day produced in the United States provide approximately 40% of the 20,700 barrels we consume each
day. The other 60% must be imported, sometimes from nations
whose interests differ markedly from our own. Although few of us
may be trained as economists, most of us know that the combination of supply and demand determines price. When the demand is
high and the supply is low, the price goes up.
Although there is some disagreement as to whether the world
is nearing peak production for oil, there is no disagreement that
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Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010
Figure 1. Average Daily Petroleum Use for
Top 15 Oil-Consuming Nations
Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
5
Figure 2. Petroleum Production for the
23 Largest Petroleum-Producing Nations
changes of only a few percent in the demand or supply for petroleum can lead to substantial changes in price. Just 2 years ago, the
price per barrel peaked at nearly $150; then when demand dropped
during the recession that began in 2008, the price dropped rapidly
(see the far right-hand side of Figure 3). Now that economies are
improving, price is climbing rapidly. It is already over $80 a barrel,
and, as any of you know who have purchased gas recently, it is
climbing weekly.
So that is what is happening globally in terms of climate and
energy. Our concern today is what those changes mean for our
nation’s naval forces. Let’s look first at climate. We have all heard
about changes in Arctic sea ice and the potential for new shipping
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Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010
Figure 3. Crude Oil Prices in 2008 Dollars
routes and access to natural resources. Several of the presentations
that follow will address this important topic. Our naval forces, of
course, operate at sea, and sea level is rising. That rise will be particularly relevant to the 40% of the globe’s 7 billion people who
live within 60 miles of the coast.
Sea-level rise will also affect the many seaside installations
and bases used by the Navy, the Marines, and the Coast Guard.
Changes in the frequency and severity of storms will affect demand
for humanitarian assistance, such as that provided by our naval
forces. In recognition of just such considerations, the Navy established Task Force Climate Change. A presentation by the director of
that task force is included in Chapter 2 of this volume.
On the energy side, our Naval forces devote significant
resources to the task of securing U.S. access to energy resources,
especially petroleum, and those forces use large amounts of
increasingly expensive petroleum products themselves. In recognition of considerations such as these, the Navy established Task
Force Energy, and the Marines set up the Expeditionary Energy
Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
7
Office. Presentations from the directors of both of those organizations appear in subsequent chapters of this proceedings. So that
brings us to our overall objective, to examine how changes in climate and energy might affect future U.S. naval forces. In particular,
we want to look at what our naval forces need to be able to do,
how they should be organized to accomplish those tasks, and how
they should be equipped.
We look at all three naval services: the Navy, the Marines,
and the Coast Guard (Figure 4). And because the effects will differ
from one geographic region to another, we will look at the problem from that perspective as well. In the chapters that follow, we
will look first at climate and energy and then examine the implications for naval operations in North and South America, Europe
and Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. Our speakers and panelists
include representatives from each of the relevant combatant commands (see Figure 5). The final chapter of this proceedings reports
on the observations of the Integration and Synthesis Panel, whose
objective was to draw out the key findings from the entire collection of presentations and panel discussions.
Figure 4. Naval Service Emblems
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Figure 5. Geographic Regions
ReferenceS
1. Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence
Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
12 Feb 2009, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_
testimony.pdf.
2. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Opens Center on Climate Change
and National Security, Press Release, 25 Sept 2009, https://
www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/
center-on-climate-change-and-national-security.html.
3. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
Feb 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.
9
1.2 Opening Remarks
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo
I think it is very appropriate that we continue our discussion
regarding the relationships between climate and energy and our
defense and security. These are truly front burner-issues for the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the nation as a whole. In
summer 2006, when the fundamental existence of anthropogenic
climate change was still being debated in this country, more so
than it is today, and before the recent energy shocks really made
the cost of energy a front-burner issue for the department, CNA
was the first major DoD research center to really take a serious
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo is the Director of CNA’s Environment and Energy
Team, where he has primary responsibility for all research in the area
of national security and climate change, energy policy, and environmental studies. The CNA Environment and Energy research team is currently conducting studies in the areas of natural resources and stability,
DoD and national energy policy, climate change and state stability,
and ocean environmental issues. Dr. Filadelfo’s academic training was
in physical oceanography, where his work focused on wind-induced
sea-level variability at subtidal frequencies. Dr. Filadelfo received his
B.S. in meteorology and oceanography from the Polytechnic Institute
of New York, his M.S. in meteorology and oceanography from the City
College of New York, and his Ph.D. in oceanography from the State
University of New York. He joined CNA in 1984, working in antisubmarine warfare until 1992. Since that time, his research has focused on
environmental issues facing the Navy. He has led studies of military environmental compliance, hazardous waste management, and toxic release inventories. He has also directed interagency teams in evaluating
federal regional oil spill response exercises. His current research deals
with ocean noise and the effects of military sonars on marine mammal
populations. Dr. Filadelfo was one of the authors of CNA’s report on
National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. [1]
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look at climate change and its implications from a national security
perspective.
And we did that, as many of you know, by assembling a panel
of highly regarded recently retired senior (three- and four-star rank)
military officers who would (1) be above partisan politics and could
look at things objectively, (2) have expertise on security issues in
various parts of the country, and (3) have great credibility in speaking on these issues to Congress and to the American public.
Another critical aspect of that study, which gave it so much
credibility and really moved the ball forward in this country, was
that this panel of military leaders made very clear that they were
not climate scientists and they were not going to stick their necks
out and speak on the causes, the timing, or the expected severity
of climate change. Rather, as national security leaders, they took
the following attitude: If such-and-such change occurs in this part
of the world, this is how we could see it potentially playing out in
terms of stability, world geopolitics, and its implications for U.S.
security posture.
And because that was the take, we treated climate change very
qualitatively. We did not tie our findings to any particular level of
sea-level rise or any particular temperature change or even any
particular timing. And, of course, that decision seems very fortunate given events of the last few months in what seems to be sort
of a general regression in our level of national climate discourse.
But this group of military leaders offered five broad recommendations to the DoD and to the nation as a whole:
• First and foremost, they said that climate change should
be included in our national security planning and national
defense planning and, of course, that started with the fiscal
year 2008 Defense Authorization Act. [2] The nation immediately acted upon that recommendation.
• Second, they said the U.S. government, and indeed the
nation as a whole, should make more of a commitment to
greenhouse gas reduction and climate stability.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
11
• Third, they said the United States should engage on the
international level to help ensure that the less developed
nations are going to be ready and prepared to cope with the
coming changes in climate.
• Fourth, DoD could help lead the way forward for national
energy efficiency and development of alternative sources.
• And fifth, they said DoD needs to remember to look out for
itself and assess the potential implications of climate change
on military installations worldwide.
For the most part, all five of five recommendations have been
acted upon by the defense community and the broader national
security community. Of course, the first recommendation is evidenced by the inclusion of both climate change and energy in the
latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). [3] So I think there
is now a broad acceptance of the importance of these issues to
our national security and the need to include energy and climate
change in national defense and national security conversations.
But I think now the bigger and probably tougher questions are
those that get down to specifics. That is, they get into things like
force structure, what platforms, what training, perhaps what new
missions our naval forces should be considering. What specific
energy investments do we have to make to meet the challenges
that we have heard about yesterday and that we will continue hearing about today? So it is that direction that I hope our general discussion will take today.
We all agree on the importance of these issues and what we
do as a Navy; thus, let’s start with that and scale it up to the DoD
and the nation as a whole, so we can all move forward. The set of speakers and panels that we have assembled are very much up to
that challenge.
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ReferenceS
1. Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Threat of
Climate Change, Alexandria, Virginia: CNA, 2007, http://
securityandclimate.cna.org/report/.
2. U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 1585: National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 110th Congress, 2007–2008, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1585.
3. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
Feb 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.
13
1.3 Keynote Address
Honorable Ray Mabus
I am glad to be back at Hopkins after a 40-year gap since my
master’s. My topic today will be a discussion of quark-gluon plasma
Ray Mabus is the 75th Secretary of the U.S. Navy, where he is responsible for conducting all Navy affairs, including recruiting, organizing,
supplying, equipping, training, and mobilizing. He also oversees the
construction, outfitting, and repair of naval ships, equipment, and facilities and is responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies and programs consistent with the national security policies and
objectives established by the President and the Secretary of Defense.
Previously, Mabus served in a variety of top posts in government and
the private sector. In 1988, Mabus was elected governor of Mississippi,
and he stressed education and job creation, passing B.E.S.T. (Better
Education for Success Tomorrow), one of the most comprehensive education reform programs in America and was named one of Fortune
Magazine’s top 10 education governors. He was appointed Ambassador
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1994 for the Clinton Administration.
While he was Ambassador, a crisis with Iraq was successfully averted,
and Saudi Arabia officially abandoned the boycott of U.S. businesses
that trade with Israel. He also was Chairman and CEO of Foamex, a
large manufacturing company, which he led out of bankruptcy in less
than 9 months, paying all creditors in full and saving equity. Before
becoming governor, he was elected state auditor of Mississippi and
served as a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy aboard the cruiser
USS Little Rock. Secretary Mabus has a bachelor’s degree from the
University of Mississippi, a master’s degree from The Johns Hopkins
University, and a law degree from Harvard Law School. He has been
awarded the DoD Distinguished Public Service Award, the U.S. Army’s
Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Martin Luther King Social
Responsibility Award from the King Center in Atlanta, the National
Wildlife Federation Conservation Achievement Award, the King Abdul
Aziz Award from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Mississippi
Association of Educators’ Friend of Education Award.
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and its importance as a testing ground for finite-temperature field
theory within the broader field of quantum chromodynamics.
Wait, wrong speech. I thought I had to do that since I am here
at the Applied Physics Laboratory. I wanted to say that I lectured
on physics to my friend and colleague Dr. Steven Chu, Secretary of
Energy. But once I tell him that and give him the topic, I’ll have to
change the course of the conversation pretty fast because it took
me about 30 minutes of reading just to come up with that one
sentence. Steven Chu was flying with Secretary of Agriculture Tom
Vilsack who tells the story that Steven Chu had a large textbook on
gravity. Vilsack asked Chu what he was doing, and he said, I think I
can prove Einstein’s theory of relativity using gravity—certain constructs around gravity. Vilsack said, yeah, I think I can do that too.
So, I am happy to be here, not to talk about chromodynamics
but to talk about energy. First I want to thank those of you at the
Applied Physics Laboratory: Thank you for what you do for our
country every day. Your work with the Navy in putting together
the Radar Hull study helped us determine the best shape for our
future fleet, and your work with the Naval Integrated Fire Control–
Counter Air System will drive integration of all of our Fleet Air
Defense capabilities over the near future.
Those of you who are here for the conference, it is great to
see this crowd turn out to discuss the incredible importance that
energy and the harmful effects of climate change will have on our
Navy, our Marine Corps, and our nation in the coming years. It
is an area that I have talked a lot about and focused on in the
10 months that I have been in this job.
How we as a military and we as a country deal with the ramifications of these issues will have dramatic impacts on our military
strategy, our military capabilities, and our force structure throughout this 21st century. Changing the way we use and produce energy,
and the fallout from climate change, are fundamentally issues of
national security.
This is not a new fact. Last week I was privileged to go to a
premier of the HBO series The Pacific, which brings the campaign,
particularly for the Marines, across the southern and central Pacific
Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
15
to the screen in a very vivid and graphic way. But when you watch
the show, you are reminded that one of the chief underlying causes
of the war in the Pacific was the competition to control the natural resources of Southeast Asia and ensure access to the sources
of petroleum necessary to sustain the economic expansion and
military might of Japan. That competition, in the 1930s and 1940s,
manifested itself in military operations and, ultimately, open conflict between the United States and Japan.
Today, competition for natural resources, specifically oil, still
exists. We know that the global supply of oil is finite; we know it is
getting harder to find and to exploit and that much of it comes from
volatile areas of the world susceptible to price and supply shocks
largely outside the scope of our control. Demand for energy continues to rise, and, although competition for additional energy has
largely manifested itself as economic competition as opposed to
military action over the past few decades, the potential exists that
some triggering event could set off a chain reaction and bring parts
of the world once again into open conflict based not on ideology but on a desire for resources and the corresponding desire to
ensure access to those resources. Add in the additional pressures
that are likely imposed by a summer arctic free of ice in the next
quarter century and loss of access to clean water—you add those
in, and you have the potential powder keg of security challenges
that have to be realistically confronted and deliberately addressed.
These geopolitical and strategic concerns are amplified by
the tactical complications associated with energy use and the
dependence of our ships, our aircraft, and our tactical vehicles
on fossil fuels. Take, just for example, a Marine platoon operating
from a forward operating base in Helmand or Nimroz Province in
Afghanistan. In order to get fuel to them, in order to get a gallon
of gasoline, first you have to take it by ship to Pakistan, get it into
trucks, and truck it through the Hindu Kush, move it to the forward
operating base, and only then does that fuel go into the tank of a
fighting vehicle, an airplane or generator, or a water purifier. At
every stage of that process, you add incremental cost, and more
importantly you take a Marine away from doing the things a Marine
ought to do—patrolling a city or conducting development—and
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you expose them to one of the most dangerous tasks in the theater:
guarding a fuel convoy.
For the Navy, the argument is broadly similar—the less fuel
that a ship or aircraft uses to do the same tasks, the more operational capability you provide to the tactical and fleet commander.
To put it simply: fuel efficiency improves warfighting capability.
These arguments are absolutely compelling, and it is for these
strategic and tactical reasons that I have committed the Navy and
Marine Corps to meeting five comprehensive energy goals over
the next several years. The most important of these targets requires
that, by 2020, half the Department of the Navy’s total energy consumption comes from alternative sources. The other major goal
changes the way we award contracts. It requires industry to be
contractually accountable for meeting energy goals—and, beyond
that, we are also looking at the individual energy performance and
energy footprint of competing companies when we make procurement decisions.
I have said before, these goals are ambitious, but it has been my
experience that people tend to meet expectations. If you set high
expectations, people will surprise you to reach beyond them. You
set low expectations and that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy,
and it becomes the standard. “Small dreams have not the power to
move the hearts of men.”1
Nothing big was ever accomplished without taking some bold
first steps. And we are taking those first steps across the Navy and
Marine Corps now.
Next month, April 22—very appropriately, Earth Day—we will
conduct an airborne test of the Green Hornet, one of our F/A-18s,
using a biofuel blend made with camelina. For those of you who
do not know what camelina is, and I was certainly in your number
until a few months ago, it is a grain related to mustard that can be
grown in crop rotation with wheat all across the United States. This
test will build on successful ground tests that we conducted last
year and is critical as a proof of this concept. It will demonstrate
Johann von Goethe, 1749–1832.
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
17
that our systems can work on biofuel. After it is successful, and we
are absolutely confident that it will be, we will move to expand
biofuel testing to our marine gas turbine engines and to the engines
of our tactical vehicles.
It is important to note that we are not doing this alone. We are
working with a lot of partners in industry and in academia across
America to improve biofuel production and continue research
into both grain-based and algae-based biofuels. The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been looking at
algae-based biofuels over the past couple of years, and they have
pioneered some very promising work in Hawaii. If their work meets
its objectives, their algae ponds will be able to produce, at scale,
an algal biofuel at affordable prices, prices perhaps approaching
what we buy gas for today. That is amazing, and the commercial
and security possibilities of this technology are fascinating.
Our partners in government see these possibilities. I have had
meetings and conversations, we have signed agreements with both
Secretary Vilsack at Agriculture and Secretary Chu at Energy, and
we have resolved to work together for more alternative energy,
more biofuel research, and move these sources of energy forward.
All three of us, and all across government, we recognize that there
are tremendous economic and agricultural opportunities in alternative energy that our country has only begun to tap. We recognize
that there is a new economy that can be based on these alternative
fuels and that America cannot be left as a nonparticipant in this
new economy.
There are two objections that get raised in opposition to biofuel development. One is that they cost too much, and the other is
that the infrastructure is not available to support them. But as folks
like DARPA are proving, these challenges can be, and are being,
answered. In supporting biofuels, we are providing one of the most
important economic incentives to production: we are creating
demand. Just for a moment imagine you are an energy company,
and there is a customer that wants a specific kind of product. And
that customer owns 4.4 million acres of land; that customer has
72,500 buildings, 50,000 commercial vehicles, 3800 aircraft, 286
ships, and more than 900,000 employees. That customer is the
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Department of the Navy. You as that energy company and you as
the people who finance energy development might want to investigate what the customer wants to buy. The market power of the
Navy and Marine Corps is pretty big.
Together, these two services consume about a third of the
petroleum power used in the federal government. And the federal government consumes 2% of all petroleum that the United
States uses. So it is like the reverse of Field of Dreams, if we come,
they will build it. As we build demand, the supply will come. And
with this additional supply we will be able to reap the benefits of
some basic economics—greater supply will create some economies of scale and drive the price down. It becomes economically
and fiscally responsible to do once the supply reaches a critical
point. What we are doing is providing that demand for the supplier
to meet.
There are two parts to this. The first is looking at alternative
ways of producing and using energy. The second is making the
energy that we use more efficient. Doing the same jobs, just using
less energy to do it. We have made some significant strides there.
Last year we commissioned the USS Makin Island. On its first
voyage from my home state of Mississippi, around South America
to its home port in San Diego, the Makin Island, which has a hybrid
drive system that switches to electric power at speeds of 10 knots
or less, saved almost $2 million in fuel costs. If you take the price
of fuel today, the Makin Island, over the lifetime of that ship, will
save about $250 million in fuel. If fuel prices increase, that savings
will only go up. We are now investigating and prototyping similar
systems on some of our DDG-51s, our Arleigh Burke destroyers.
Ashore, we have invested a good bit in a lot of different alternative energy sources, including solar power. Through the stimulus
act, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, we have been
able to contract more than 20 MW of additional solar power. We
could add another 40 MW at Navy and Marine Corps installations
in the Southwest through contracts we have signed this year. We
started small, we had a baseline of 5 MW, and we are increasing
our solar capacity by another 60 MW over the next few years,
which is the equivalent of powering 41,000 homes or about half
Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
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the homes in Arlington, Virginia. Our other initiatives—wind, solar,
ocean, and geothermal—across our bases are also looking promising, and I think you’ll begin to see the results of these over the next
few years.
Tactically, the Marine Corps is moving forward. That is really
the only way the Marine Corps ever moves, is forward. Once they
get a project, they are focused, and they are aggressive in meeting that project. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and all
Marines take energy seriously, because every Marine that guards
a convoy is a Marine lost to the fight—and every dollar spent on
gasoline is a dollar that could be better spent on armor, or weapons, or ammunition, or equipment. To fix this, the Marines have
established an experimental expeditionary forward operating base
at Quantico, and they are testing the power, durability, and savings of new energy-saving systems. As these systems prove reliable, they will be pushed forward to our Marines on the ground
in Afghanistan. One has already made it. The Corps has deployed
several solar-power water-purification units across the country, and
they are providing cleaner, cheaper water.
While these measures are certainly a start in the right direction, it is important for of us to realize that they are only a start.
To reach these goals, a lot more has to be done between now
and 2020. It is up to the people in this room, the people who
work in the Department of the Navy, to the individual Sailors and
Marines in the fleet, to make this future happen. I have spent a
lot of time talking about this on the road to any audience that I
can find, but words do not get stuff done. We have to get down
to a lot more serious work now. One of the things I want to make
sure the Department of the Navy does is to be absolutely open to
any idea, absolutely open to anything that will help us meet these
goals. To not have some predetermined idea that this is exactly
the way we are going to get there. We are going to look at solar
and biofuel; we are going to look at wind, nuclear, ocean, and
geothermal energy. We are going to look at technological-based
efficiency measures, and, by doing so, we are going to improve the
range and endurance of our aircraft and our ships. We are going to
reduce their vulnerability to a fragile supply chain, we are going to
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create a resistance to external shocks that come from overreliance
on the global oil infrastructure, and we are going to bring down the
carbon footprint of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
The stakes could not be higher. It will make us better fighters.
But in the end, it is a matter of energy independence, and it is a
matter of national security. Our dependence on foreign sources
of petroleum makes us vulnerable in too many ways. The stakes
are clear, and the stakes are high. Our response has to be equal to
that challenge.
Q&
A
Session with Secretary Mabus
Mabus, in your talk, you mentioned all sources of
Q: Secretary
energy that the Navy is reevaluating and considering. Is there
a larger, more prominent role for nuclear energy, maybe to fill the gaps
until we see ourselves through to other alternatives?
Honorable R ay M abus : I think the Navy has demonstrated
its reliance and faith in nuclear power, given that all our aircraft
carriers and all our submarines are nuclear-powered today and
given the fact that 17% of all our energy is produced from nuclear
sources. And one of the reasons I mentioned nuclear specifically
when I was speaking was that is certainly a technology that we are
willing to use in other capacities—ashore, perhaps—if it proves to
be economical and that we can do it in the way that we need to
do it. But it is certainly an alternative form of energy, and we have
a lot of experience dealing with it.
say that you are going to be funding more work in wind
Q: You
power and geothermal and other renewable sources. Is one
aspect of that research going to focus on regionalism and where certain
renewable sources would work best, as opposed to others?
Honorable R ay M abus : Obviously, things like solar we are
looking at first in the Southwest, where they make more sense. On
some of our bases that are on the water, which is most of them,
you know, we can look at hydrothermal. We can look at wave
Chapter 1 Introduction and Keynote Address
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action. Some of our other bases, China Lake, for example, we are
using geothermal, and it is already producing more energy than
China Lake uses. So we are better than net zero in terms of energy
usage there. But whatever the location gives us, but also for things
like biofuels, there is going have to be an infrastructure built, and
that is why we think putting the demand signal out there will help
get that infrastructure built pretty fast.
For those of you who have heard me talk before, you know that
I have stressed that the Navy is usually at the forefront of changing
energy sources: from wind to coal in the 1850s, from coal to oil in
the early part of the 20th century, and then to nuclear in the early
part of the 1950s. Every single time there were people who said
you are trading one source of very proven energy for another that
is not proven, and every time those naysayers have been wrong.
And every time the Navy’s changing has led to bigger changes in
our society.
could you address something that I do not think
Q: Mr. Secretary,
I heard a lot about in your talk today, and that is challenges
to changing culture. To see the Commandant of the Marine Corps sitting at the front of a room multiple times for 12 hours at an energy meeting sends quite a message to the Marine Corps. I was recently at a Navy
base for a meeting, and, at the end of a late day, I decided just to play a
game, and I walked around, and I turned off roughly 8 kW of lights in
empty rooms with no indication that they were going to be turned off
otherwise. Let’s switch now to your partners in industry. Industry reacts
to the dollar figure. It is what they are legally required to do. When are
energy considerations going to start showing up in the Navy’s requests for
proposals? In other words, how are you going to try to drive the cultures
both within the service and with your partners?
Honorable R ay M abus : It is an excellent question, and that
Navy base must be populated by folks like my children, since I
do that every night at the house. Several ways. One is to allow
bases or ships as they save power to keep part of those savings in
terms of dollars. To give them incentive to do some of those things.
Second is we are conducting an energy audit to see what the baseline is of energy that we are using, and we are installing stuff like
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smart meters. We are also installing things that if there is no movement in the room for a while, the lights go out automatically.
We are installing solar panels for swimming pools and on tops
of garages for homes. And I think that the cultural change comes as
there are incentives and also as there are some rewards for doing
some of these things exceptionally well. We have got Secretarylevel awards for bases, for ships, for individual activities, and we
are trying to make those very much in demand and trying to set up
a competition, which is beginning to happen there. You are right
when you say that when the Commandant of the Marine Corps
starts talking about energy, as he does on a very routine basis,
starts hosting energy conferences, builds an experimental forward
operating base at Quantico that you can see right as you go in
down there, that sends a pretty powerful message.
I think it is fair to say that Marines have not been seen as environmentally sensitive over the years. And I think that having the
Commandant, and this Commandant—if you were in Hollywood
and you said send me the Commandant of the Marines, they
would send you Jim Conway. To have his presence there talking
about energy, but also having the Chief of Naval Operations doing
exactly the same thing. And not only having the people at that
level, but having the captains of ships, the commanders of bases,
having your senior enlisted personnel talk about it. To be able to
show to a Marine, a lance corporal, that instead of being out there
on convoy duty he is doing what he was trained to do in Helmut
or Nimruz or Marja, wherever he is, that when he looks up and
sees that water purifier being powered by solar power so that he
does not have to put gasoline in there, to see his tent being insulated by spray-on insulation instead of having to power a generator to do that, then I think you are beginning to see that culture
change. Finally, I said that we have got 50,000 noncombat commercial vehicles in the Department of the Navy. We are changing
what we buy. We are going to buy more hybrids. We are going to
buy more electric vehicles.
I think as you begin to see more and more of these on our bases
along with the infrastructure to support them, you are going to see
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23
more of these begin to spill out into the surrounding communities,
which I think will drive the culture change as well.
I want to ask you about the mechanisms for
Q: Mr. Secretary,
providing feedback to the individuals. One of the things that
we really understand is that if you have a miles-per-gallon gauge on your
car, you can see how well your car is doing. When you build in meters,
are you going to have them so they can locally reflect what individuals
are doing or what is happening in specific rooms? If you just have one
meter on the base, that does not tell you where to go fix it.
Honorable R ay M abus : That is absolutely true. We are putting
smart meters in much the same way you put meters in in any community, at individual buildings, individual houses, so you can tell
what the usage is. We are doing that so that the smart meters can
drive usage at non-peak times, so that we can make better use of
the energy that we do have. But you are absolutely right. You have
to first establish a baseline and then key off of that baseline, and I
think we are. We are in the early stages, but we are moving pretty
aggressively to do that.
the example you gave earlier of China Lake, as the Navy
Q: Using
moves forward in looking for alternative sources, there is the
likelihood that more and more installations will become not only selfsufficient but actually become sources of power. How is the Navy working with local and regional power distribution organizations to become
part of that initiative to plug into the power grid?
Honorable R ay M abus : Well, we are at the early stage of this,
but that is one of the things that is going to have to happen. In a
state like California, where we are doing a good bit of our work,
there is already a state structure to feed excess energy into the
local grid, or into the state grid there. In states that do not have that
yet, or other places that do not have that yet, we are working to
do that. This is related but not exactly on point. The first place, for
example, where we are looking at doing our combined research
with the Department of Agriculture and it will be announced officially 2 weeks from now, is in Hawaii.
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We are doing that for two reasons. First, Hawaii’s the most
petroleum-dependent state in America. And, second, Hawaiian
farmers are not doing well, and if they can grow biofuels—whether
it is algae or camelina or whatever—there, we are going to solve a
couple of problems at the same time.
some in the international community are concerned that
Q: Sir,
if we do develop a large market for biofuels, that is going to
divert a lot of croplands from feeding the world’s hungry. How would you
assess the risk that we might actually exacerbate regional instability by
building a large national market for biofuels?
Honorable R ay M abus : I think they are correct only if you
look at first-generation biofuels. Corn-based ethanol, for example,
clearly uses a lot of land. It has diverted acreage into crops specifically for fuel. The other downside, and it is significant for cornbased ethanol, the first generation of these ethanol products, is it
takes almost a gallon of gasoline to make a gallon of corn-based
ethanol. You cannot make that up in volume. But if you look at second- and third-generation biofuels, what you are looking primarily
at are things like camelina, if you are looking at crops.
Camelina’s a rotational crop. You plant it on the same land you
plant wheat, for example. It is land that otherwise would be lying
fallow, so you are not taking any food out of the food chain. But
you are also looking at waste products: you know, wheat stalks,
any sort of biological waste, timber tops, grass, McDonald’s grease.
Any sort of organic waste is being looked at to be turned into that.
Finally, algae would not; it is a completely different structure and
would not take up the croplands that you are worried about. So I
think that those two things can coexist very, very well if we move
as we are to the second- and third-generation biofuels.
Again, I want to thank you all for coming today. Thank you for
listening to me, but thank you primarily for helping us get to where
we need to be, not only as a department in the Department of the
Navy, but particularly as a country. America simply cannot afford
to not be a part of this from a strategic sense and from a sense of
energy independence and national security. Thank you for your
work. Thank you for what you do for America.