onsf
orU.
S.
Mar
i
t
i
meFor
c
es
CLI
MATE&ENERGY Opti
2011
ADAPT
I
NGT
O
CLIMATE
ENERGY
CHAL
L
E
NGE
S
OPTI
ONS FOR
U.
S.MARI
TI
ME
FORCES
AI
ROPERATI
ONS
SHI
POPE
RAT
I
ONS
I
NFRASTRUCTURE
EXPEDI
TI
ONARYCAPABI
LI
TI
ES
Si
mmons
,
L.
D.
SPONSORED BY:
2011
NAVYENERGY
L.DEAN SI
MMONS,EXECUTI
VEEDI
TOR
Adapting to Climate & Energy
Challenges Symposium
2011
Proceedings on
Adapting to Climate &
Energy Challenges:
Options for
U.S. Maritime Forces
29–30 March 2011
Sponsored By:
L. Dean Simmons, Executive Editor
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Executive Editor:
L. Dean Simmons
Managing Editors: Angela Hughes
Kelly Livieratos
Project Editors:
Catherine Peacock
Erin Richardson
Art Director:
George Travez
Print Coordinators: Glenn Cook
Kelly Midkiff
Public Release:
Sandy Misch
William Riggs
Special thanks to our sponsors at: The Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), Global
Assimilation of Information for Action (GAIA), Navy Task Force
Climate Change, Navy Task Force Energy, and CNA (which
operates the Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for
Public Research).
A complete list of symposium contributors can be found at the
symposium’s website: www.jhuapl.edu/ClimateAndEnergy/
Copyright © 2011
By The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic
or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher.
Requests for permission to make copies of any part of the
work should be mailed to:
L. Dean Simmons
National Security Analysis Department
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Laurel, Maryland 20723
Printed in the United States of America.
i
11-02681
Contents
Adapting to Climate and Energy
Challenges
Introduction
Dr. L. Dean Simmons............................................... 1
Chapter 1
Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges:
Options for U.S. Maritime Forces
Admiral Jonathan Greenert.................................... 15
Adapting to Climate Challenges
Chapter 2
Task Force Climate Change Update
Rear Admiral David Titley...................................... 35
Chapter 3
Adapting Maritime Infrastructure to
Climate Challenges
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo............................................... 65
Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Jr.................... 69
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel................... 79
The Honorable John Warner.................................. 83
Chapter 4
Adapting Research Priorities to
Climate Challenges
Captain Timothy Gallaudet.................................... 97
Dr. Frank Herr........................................................ 99
Dr. Chet Koblinsky............................................... 106
Dr. Jeffrey Marqusee............................................ 113
Dr. Graeme Stephens........................................... 120
iii
Chapter 5
Adapting Maritime Strategy and Operations
to Climate Challenges
Dr. Ed McGrady................................................... 129
Ms. Amanda Dory............................................... 131
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin.................................. 143
Rear Admiral David Woods.................................. 152
Adapting to Energy Challenges
Chapter 6
Task Force Energy Update
The Honorable John Warner................................ 171
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom................................. 174
Chapter 7
Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
Captain Randall Lynch......................................... 201
Mr. Rick Kamin.................................................... 205
Mr. William Voorhees.......................................... 213
Commander Daniel Orchard-Hays...................... 217
Commander Scott Fuller...................................... 225
Chapter 8
Adapting Ship Operations to
Energy Challenges
Mr. John Benedict................................................ 239
Rear Admiral Joe Carnevale................................. 249
Mr. Howard Fireman............................................ 255
Dr. John Pazik...................................................... 262
Mr. Glen Sturtevant.............................................. 273
iv
Chapter 9
Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities to
Energy Challenges
Colonel Edward (Ted) Smyth................................ 287
Colonel Robert Charette, Jr.................................. 293
Colonel David Karcher........................................ 312
Mr. Cody Reese.................................................... 319
Chapter 10
Adapting Maritime Facilities and
Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo............................................. 331
Rear Admiral David Boone.................................. 334
Mr. Jeffrey Johnson............................................... 338
Captain Ramé (Hugh) Hemstreet.......................... 343
Dr. William Waugaman....................................... 351
Chapter 11
Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
on Maritime Forces
Mr. Duncan Brown.............................................. 369
Adapting to Climate and Energy
Challenges—Reprised
Chapter 12
Adapting to Climate and Energy
Challenges—A Maritime Force Perspective
Ms. Sherri Goodman............................................ 403
Captain Michael Sparks....................................... 405
Rear Admiral David Titley.................................... 409
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom................................. 411
Dr. Catherine Kelleher......................................... 415
Appendix A
Symposium Agenda............................................. 435
v
Adapting to Climate and
Energy Challenges
Introduction
1
Dr. L. Dean Simmons
On behalf of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (JHU/APL), CNA, Navy Task Force Climate Change,
Navy Task Force Energy, and JHU/APL’s GAIA internal research
and development effort, I would like to welcome all of you to
Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges, Options for U.S.
Maritime Forces. Let me begin by explaining why we have invited
you here for this 2-day event. As some of you may recall, when we
held our first climate and energy symposium at this time last year,
we said that we intended to examine climate and energy implications for future naval forces.
To do that, we looked at global climate change and energy
supply and demand and their impacts around the globe, focusing
specifically on the areas of responsibility of America’s six geographical combatant commands (USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM,
USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, USPACOM, and USCENTCOM). In the
Dr. L. Dean Simmons is a National Security Studies Fellow at JHU/
APL. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Purdue University, and he holds
master’s degrees in physics and operations research, also from Purdue.
Dr. Simmons served as the overall Chair and Proceedings Executive
Editor for the 2010 JHU/APL and CNA Symposium on Climate and
Energy Imperatives for Future Naval Forces and as Co-Chair for JHU/
APL’s series of Unrestricted Warfare Symposia. Since joining JHU/APL
in summer 2005, Dr. Simmons has directed studies related to irregular
warfare, the role of the reserve component, and the DoD’s strategic
command and control systems. Earlier in his career, Dr. Simmons was
employed at the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Center for Naval
Analyses. He has contributed to a number of Defense Science Board,
Naval Studies Board, and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board panels and
has published articles in the Journal of Defense Research, the Marine
Corps Gazette, Vertiflite, and the Proceedings of the Naval Institute.
2
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
months following last year’s symposium, Dr. Ronald Filadelfo from
CNA, along with some other JHU/APL and CNA staff, met with
personnel at Navy Task Force Climate Change and at Navy Task
Force Energy to determine, first, if it seemed advisable to schedule
a follow-on event and, given their positive response to that inquiry,
to select the most appropriate topics to cover.
Based on those discussions, we have been working for the
past 6 months to put together the program that you will see over
the next 2 days. JHU/APL and CNA are once again serving as
co-chairs, but this year we have benefited considerably from the
participation of a number of additional sponsoring organizations:
Navy Task Force Climate Change, Navy Task Force Energy, the
Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Energy Office, the Coast Guard, and
JHU/APL’s GAIA internal research and development effort. At our
co-sponsors’ urging, we have focused the symposium on the operational aspects of accommodating climate and energy challenges.
Just what are those challenges? (See summary in Figure 1.)
On the climate side, our nation’s maritime forces will soon confront an Arctic Ocean environment where changes in the nature
and reductions in the extent of sea ice will open new sea routes
and provide increased access to natural resources. Our maritime forces will also be affected by rising sea levels that could
potentially threaten the homes and livelihoods of some 3 billion
people, 40% of the planet’s total population, as well as the shoreside installation facilities used by our maritime forces.
Projected changes in the frequency and severity of storms
will increase demands for humanitarian assistance. As you are no
doubt aware, the Navy established Task Force Climate Change several years ago specifically to address these types of concerns. Rear
Admiral David Titley, the director of that task force, will provide an
update on their activities tomorrow.
On the energy side, our maritime forces devote significant
resources to securing America’s access to energy resources, especially petroleum, and protecting the land and sea routes that
deliver those products to America’s shores. In the process of carrying out their assigned missions, our maritime forces consume
Introduction
3
large amounts of petroleum, the cost of which is currently on the
rise as you well know from your latest trip to the service station.
To address the problems attendant to these concerns, the Navy
established Task Force Energy and the Marine Corps set up their
Expeditionary Energy Office. The directors of both of those organizations will be here to update us on their activities.
Figure 1. Climate and Energy Challenges
CLIMATE CHALLENGES
Given that background, let us take a quick look at some of the
important climate challenges that are likely to confront our nation’s
maritime forces. Figure 2, showing a very nice summary of the
major climate events evident in 2010, the year just past, was put
together by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). I realize that from where you are sitting, most of the text
is probably illegible, so I will summarize what I took away as the
key points.
Starting at the top, the figure shows that in 2010, Arctic sea
ice reached its third lowest extent ever during the summer melt
season and its fifth lowest overall extent since record keeping
began in 1979. This fact is undoubtedly related to the observations
presented just one level down, namely that in 2010, Canada experienced the warmest year since national record keeping began in
4
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
1948. Russia, China, and India experienced their hottest summers
in 130, 50, and 110 years, respectively.
Figure 2. Major 2010 Climate Events [1]
There are a lot of other interesting facts in the figure, but I will
let you look those up on the web and turn our immediate focus to
the text outlined in the dashed box. From an overall perspective,
average global land and sea temperature for 2010 tied with 2005
as the warmest year in the 131-year historical record of global temperature data. The 2001–2010 decade was the warmest on record
over that period.
Although it is clear that global land and sea temperatures are
rising, it is interesting to look at the data in more detail. Figure 3,
from NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), plots the
2010 temperature anomalies, the difference between what was
observed in 2010 and the average for the 30-year period between
1951 and 1980. The largest increases are indicated by the deepest
shades of blue; those colors are seen to be highly concentrated
in the Arctic and, to a lesser extent, along the Antarctic coastline. When we convert from the Celsius scale in the figure to the
Fahrenheit scale that we commonly use to measure temperature in
the United States, a 5°C increase grows to a 9°F change. It is no
wonder that the Arctic sea ice is melting.
Introduction
5
Figure 3. Global Temperatures Remain High [2]
Figure 4. Climate Change in the Arctic [3]
Figure 4 shows just how much it is melting. The graphic and
the underlying data were assembled by two researchers at the
University of Colorado Center for Astrodynamics Research. As
of February 2009, only 10% of the ice cover in the Arctic was
made up of ice older than 2 years, the area shown in dark blue
6
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
in Figure 4. Over the preceding 30 years, somewhat more than
half of the ice was older than 2 years. Thanks to the significant
increase in land and sea temperature in the Arctic, much of the
ice that forms each winter now melts by the end of the summer
season. As a result, access to the Arctic during summer is much
greater than has been the case previously. By the year 2030, it is
expected that major international maritime passages will become
accessible for use by ocean-going vessels and that exploitation of
natural resources, to include oil, natural gas, and other minerals,
will be increasingly feasible.
Figure 5 focuses on sea-level rise. Somewhat surprisingly, sealevel rise is not uniform across the world’s oceans. As this figure
from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory shows, sea-level rise
is higher in some parts of the ocean than in others. The largest
increases are shown in blue, with the deepest shade of blue indicating a sea-level rise of 0.15–0.18 meters or 15–18 millimeters
per year, about 0.6 inches.
Figure 5. Sea-Level Rise [3]
While this does not seem like a lot on an annual basis, over
50 years, it adds up to 30 inches or 2.5 feet, and over 100 years, it
adds up to 60 inches or 5 feet. Those of you who are familiar with
the recent Naval Studies Board report on the National Security
Introduction
7
Implications of Climate Change on U.S. Naval Forces may recall
that the report included both Figures 4 and 5. [3] Regarding sealevel rise, the Naval Studies Board report noted that it is not the
average increase in sea level that is likely to be stressing, but rather
how rising sea levels affect regional sea levels, which can differ
significantly as Figure 5 shows, how they affect tides, and how
they affect the nature of extraordinary meteorological forces, like
hurricanes, typhoons, or other severe storms and the storm surges
that invariably accompany those events.
ENERGY CHALLENGES
Now let us take a quick look at the energy challenges confronting our nation’s maritime forces. We will begin with the most
obvious one, price. Since June 2010, the price of petroleum has
increased by over $30 a barrel, or about 40% (Figure 6). Because
the Navy uses nearly 300 million barrels of petroleum a year,
each dollar increase entails a $30 million annual expenditure by
the Navy. And because Navy petroleum accounts for one-fourth
of overall DoD use, each dollar increase costs the DoD about
$130 million per year.
Figure 6. Price of Petroleum: On the Rise [4]
8
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
To get the total cost impact, we have to multiply those numbers
by the $30-per-barrel increase in cost that has been experienced
thus far. If sustained for the next year, that $30-per-barrel increase
will necessitate the expenditure of an additional $900 million by
the Navy and roughly $3.9 billion for the DoD as a whole. And
interestingly, the best curve fit to the data for the last 10 months
turns out to be cubic in time rather than linear, so we have had a
rather dramatic increase in cost.
So what does the Navy intend to do about this problem?
Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed
just these concerns when he delivered his annual posture statement
to Congress at the beginning of March. [5] He said that he had set
three energy objectives for the Navy: to improve combat capability, to assure mobility, and to green the Navy’s footprint (Figure 7).
To meet these objectives, he had charged Navy Task Force Energy
with identifying energy efficiency improvements, with undertaking
consumption reduction initiatives, and with pursuing aggressive
adoption of alternative energy and fuels.
Figure 7. Navy Energy Objectives [5]
The CNO went on to list a number of specific energy initiatives
that are currently being pursued by the Navy (Figure 8). These are
summarized here under the headings of surface ships, aircraft, and
Introduction
9
installations and facilities ashore. I will not cover the list in detail,
but you can expect that our subsequent roundtables on just those
topics will do that for us.
Figure 8. Navy Energy Initiatives [5]
As for the Marine Corps, then-Commandant General James
Conway made the following observations when he established the
Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Energy Office a couple of years ago.
He said that expeditionary means being rapidly deployable, that
it means being efficient and effective, and that it means providing
forces that are no larger and no heavier than they need to be to
accomplish this mission.
General Conway went on to say that meeting these goals provides opportunity to reduce the demand for supply convoys. The
photo in the upper right of Figure 9 shows one such convoy headed
across the Khyber Pass on its way to deliver fuel and other supplies
to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Commandant also proposed that
the Marines examine ways to generate power more efficiently and
to make better use of alternative and renewable energy resources.
In that regard, the photo on the lower right of Figure 9 shows solar
panels powering electronics at a remote Marine Corps base. I am
sure we will hear more about these issues from our roundtable on
adapting expeditionary capabilities to energy challenges.
10
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 9. General James Conway on Activating the Marine
Corps’ Expeditionary Energy Office
SYMPOSIUM OBJECTIVES
With that as background, Figure 10 summarizes our objectives
for the symposium.
Figure 10. Symposium Objectives
Over the next 2 days, we intend to explore the options available to our nation’s maritime forces as they seek to adapt to
Introduction
11
climate and energy challenges such as those I have just described.
Specifically, we are looking at how strategy, plans, and operations will be affected by climate challenges; at how aircraft and
ship operations will be affected by energy challenges; at how
installations and facilities ashore will be affected by both climate
and energy challenges; at how expeditionary capabilities will be
affected by energy challenges; and at how our research priorities
will be affected by climate challenges.
REFERENCES
1. NOAA National Climatic Data Center, State of the Climate:
Global Analysis for Annual 2010, Dec 2010, http://www.ncdc.
noaa.gov/sotc/global/2010/13.
2. NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, GISS Surface
Temperature Analysis, 11 Dec 2010, http://data.giss.nasa.gov/
gistemp/2010november/.
3. Naval Studies Board, National Security Implications of Climate
Change on U.S. Naval Forces, National Academies Press, 2011.
4. NYSE.TV, Crude Oil Price History, http://www.nyse.tv/crudeoil-price-history.htm.
5. Department of the Navy, Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead
Chief of Naval Operations Before the House Armed Services
Committee on FY 2012 Department of Navy Posture, 11 Mar
2011, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/
Testimony/CNO%20Roughead_Testimony_030111.pdf.
Chapter 1
A da p t i n g to C l i m at e
a n d E n e rg y C h a l l e n g e s :
O p t i o n s f o r U.S.
M a r i t i m e F o rc e s
15
Admiral Jonathan Greenert
I appreciate the invitation to this event, and I am glad to
be here. I want to thank The Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory for hosting this event. I think you have put
together a terrific agenda. The mix in the audience is very good,
too. You have both military and civilian personnel as well as students and scientists. As I see it, you have the DoD, interagency,
Hatfields, McCoys, cats, and dogs. So it ought to come together
just right.
Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert is a native of Butler, Pennsylvania. He
graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and completed studies in nuclear power for service as a submarine officer. His career as
a submariner includes assignments aboard USS Flying Fish (SSN-673),
USS Tautog (SSN-639), Submarine NR-1, and USS Michigan (SSBN727, Gold Crew), culminating in command of USS Honolulu (SSN-718)
from March 1991 to July 1993. Subsequent fleet command assignments
include Commander, Submarine Squadron 11; Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces Marianas; Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet (August 2004
to September 2006); and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command
(September 2007 to July 2009). Admiral Greenert has served in various fleet support and financial management positions, including
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for integration of capabilities and
resources (N8); Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Chief of Staff,
U.S. Seventh Fleet; Head, Navy Programming Branch; and Director,
Operations Division Navy Comptroller. He is currently Vice Chief of
Naval Operations. He is a recipient of various personal and campaign
awards, including the Distinguished Service Medal (five awards), the
Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit (four awards).
In 1992, he was awarded the Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale
Award for Inspirational Leadership. He considers those awards earned
throughout his career associated with unit performance to be most
satisfying and representative of naval service.
16
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
The Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower—
our maritime strategy, if you will—lays out a key theme that is very
enduring, and that theme is creating partnerships. [1] It is applicable to all aspects of our maritime operations today, and it applies as
well to the focus for this symposium. When we ultimately decide
how our nation is going to adapt to climate and energy challenges,
whatever approach we use is going to have to be an interagency
approach as well as an international approach.
So, in kicking off this symposium today, I want to provide a
couple of points for your consideration, and I will do that by asking
a series of questions. What are we learning now about climate
change and how does the Navy integrate that into our programmatic behavior? How are we going to build programs so that we
prepare ourselves and prepare our people to deal with climate
change? What are we doing now, and what will we be doing about
energy in the future? As I will explain shortly, I think that when we
act on this is probably as important, if not more important, than
how we act or what we do.
Let me start by reporting that the Navy just completed the Navy
Ice Exercise, or ICEX. For those of us who spend time on ships and
submarines, that is quite an event. It has been on my “bucket list”
for a long time. I am running out of air speed and altitude, as they
say, and I have never been on an ICEX. So I was really planning to
go last weekend, but I just could not make it.
An ICEX, if you are not familiar with the term, is a long-standing biannual exercise in which we typically take two submarines
up into the Arctic do some testing. I cannot get into detail regarding the specific nature of those tests, but you can probably imagine
what we do and why we do it. I can tell you that we hook the subs
up with some equipment, go out to an ice camp, and show people
around to see what the Arctic is like. In the process, we learn a lot
about the Arctic and how it is changing and how we might operate
there in the years ahead.
This year we deployed the USS New Hampshire, one of
our new, cutting-edge Virginia-class submarines, and the USS
Connecticut, which is a Sea Wolf-class submarine but still very
Chapter 1 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
17
cutting edge. Given the unique nature of the Arctic and the difficulty of operating there, we had to put special equipment on the
submarines. We could not just send submarines up as they are and
be able to do the things that we wanted to do. We needed upwardlooking sonar, for example, and a video camera to help us find ice
sheets on the surface and ice keels under the surface.
Despite all of our preparation, we were once again reminded
of the remoteness, the starkness, and the ruggedness of the Arctic.
We had a casualty in the oxygen generator on one of the submarines; our submarines use hydrolysis to produce oxygen from water.
During the exercise, an oxygen generator on one of the submarines
failed. Because oxygen is essential, the crew had to resort to using
the backup system—sodium chlorate candles. These candles are
meant to be used only for short periods of time, and if they are
not properly ignited, they can produce dust that is very irritating
to one’s nasal passages. When that happens in an area that is not
covered by ice, the submarine can just come up, raise the snorkel mast, and bring fresh air in and all will be well. It was not an
option in this case. Fortunately, things worked out well, but it was
a reminder that the unexpected can happen.
So, when operating in the Arctic, it is helpful to remember
that things are different—it is rugged, it is remote. The submarine
crews also had to deal with a lot of condensation. To some extent
that is to be expected—you go up in the cold water and you have
metal, cold water, and difference in temperature, so you generate condensation. With the wide array of electrical and electronic
equipment on our submarines, the crews had to be very cognizant
of exactly where condensation was occurring.
During the exercise, a sailor on one of our submarines got
appendicitis and had to be evacuated. However, because the submarine was in the Arctic, it could not just surface and call for a
helicopter rescue. So they had to deal with that, and it worked out
reasonably well. And they had an air conditioner fail during one
of the surface operations. Air conditioner, Arctic—what is the big
deal? Well, some things do get warm on the submarine, even in
those reaches.
18
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
The point here is the Arctic is harsh. It is remote, and it is
an unforgiving environment; we learn that lesson again and again
with each operation. We invariably discover—or rediscover to be
precise—that some of the very basic issues that our crews have to
deal with on a day-to-day basis turn out to be of great importance.
Whenever we do an ICEX, we like to bring VIPs up there—
congressmen, people in the administration. So, this year, the Under
Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of the Army went
up. Before leaving, though, the Under Secretary of the Army told
us that he needed to be back on Monday, because he had to testify on the Hill on Tuesday. But guess what? The weather changed.
I think he got in last night and is testifying this afternoon. I hope
things work out. But again, here is another reminder that our standard approach of thinking that we can just move around like this
and that, and we’ll just schedule things heel to toe, may not work
out quite as slick when we are in the Arctic. The weather, the
ocean conditions, and the ice conditions can change dramatically
and necessitate equally dramatic changes in plans.
We also had to have a different communication plan, given the
uniqueness of the Arctic. The bandwidths do not operate the same,
the weapons do not operate the same, and the sensors do not
operate the same. All of these have to be taken into account. And,
as I mentioned before, there is little infrastructure in the Arctic to
support operations, so supply becomes an issue. Search and rescue
becomes an issue, as does medevac should one be required. In the
case of the ICEX, we had been planning it for months, perhaps
even a year, so we were able to anticipate a lot of things. Will we
be able to respond like that when we are trying to conduct typical
operations up there?
So, it can be kind of difficult when we want to go see Mother
Nature. But I think what we are talking about in climate change is
Mother Nature coming to us. I am not actually talking about the
Arctic coming down to us, but I am talking about the need perhaps
to operate much more in the Arctic. Mother Nature is going to start
changing things. How do we prepare ourselves for that unavoidable change?
Chapter 1 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
19
We can be certain that within this century climate change is
going to cause us to deal with maritime security in a profoundly
different way. We are going to have to anticipate, we are going to
have to plan how we go about doing this, and we have to act in a
deliberate manner. I will mention why in just a minute.
When we went to the Middle East some decades ago, we were
using a lot of equipment that was built originally for use in the Cold
War. It was meant to be used in the European theater, where the
climate is completely different. The Middle East was dusty and hot.
We found that we had to modify many of the systems that we were
using. In laying out the requirements for those modifications, we
employed what are Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements, or
JUONS. And we went from JUONS to JUONS to JUONS—I need
this, and I need it now because I am operating over here. Because
we were not sure how long this was going to go on, we asserted
that we needed joint solutions and that we needed them urgently.
We did not, however, try to fundamentally change the way we
approach our programs.
So, we kind of muddled through how we built our equipment
to deal with operating in a different climate. I submit to you that
we cannot do this when we are dealing with climate change. If we
are going to the Arctic or another area as the climates change, we
cannot just go from JUONS to JUONS. We cannot muddle our way
through. We need to think about this in a deliberate manner.
So what kind of activities does the Navy have underway today
that will help us understand exactly what we need to do? I think
many of you have studied what is likely to happen with climate
change. Arctic routes will be open maybe by the 2030s. We will
have creeping sea-level rise and enhanced storm surges, threats to
our coastal installations. Increased weather extremes could lead to
geopolitical instability. We need to think about these possibilities
and budget accordingly.
Today, our fleets budget for hurricanes and they budget for
typhoons. They do not budget for tsunamis, but they might start
giving that some thought. When I was Atlantic Fleet Commander,
we would budget about $30 million a year for damage that resulted
20
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
from hurricanes. It was not really a very thoughtful thing; we looked
at our wake and saw how things worked in the past, and we put
that amount of money in the budget. We never really thought
about how you prepare for one hurricane or for several hurricanes
in succession. After Katrina and a few more years of having one
hurricane after the other, we finally learned the hard lesson that we
had to try to prepare for such events.
The same goes for extended periods of cold weather, for
California wildfires, and other things of that nature. Just planning
for what climate could bring to you is something that needs to be
thought out. The effects of water shortages from droughts, water
excess from floods, or other events should cause us to think about
how we are going to disperse our forces globally. We have now
come to the point in the Western Pacific where during typhoon
season, it is sensible to send amphibious ships toward Southeast
Asia to do humanitarian assistance operations. We have to plan our
maintenance accordingly and disperse the fleet so that it is able to
respond to such events. Rather than continuing to muddle through,
we have to become more thoughtful as we look ahead.
Water shortages, perhaps, will lead to population movement,
with the inevitable social, political, economic, and cultural impacts.
Such changes seem certain to amplify the stresses that already
exist. It could accelerate what we might call the point of conflict.
In other words, people’s tempers are getting shorter, and we need
to take a look at that and understand that the kind of timing that we
thought we had in the past for some smoldering issues may not be
available in the future. We probably need to consider this and plan
our humanitarian assistance and disaster relief strategy accordingly.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established Task Force
Climate Change in May 2009 because he wanted to take a lead
angle on this. He wanted the Navy to look out ahead toward climate change. So, he asked the Task Force to start thinking about
this and then come back and tell him what they thought he needed
to do. That Task Force held its first Arctic game at the Naval War
College in 2009. In September 2011, we will do it again.
Chapter 1 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
21
The Task Force conducted an Arctic shipping game in December
2010. They have also sponsored international exchanges, conferences, and interagency partnerships. The Navy, the Air Force, and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
have had an interagency partnership going for some time. The Task
Force put together a very nice Arctic Roadmap that was issued in
November 2009 and a Climate Change Roadmap that came out
in May 2010. [2] [3] That same month, they released their Arctic
strategic objectives publication, which describes our partnerships
in joint surveying and research, search and rescue, and maritime
domain awareness. [4]
In addition to those studies, we have done some tangible
things. During Operation Nanook in 2010, we operated with the
Canadians and the Danes off Greenland. We took the USS Porter
with a dive and salvage unit and one of our P-3 aircraft, and we
went up and operated with a ship from the Canadian naval forces.
The environment was certainly challenging. There was a lot of fog.
And this was not the regular fog that we in the Navy are used to.
When we see fog, we try to avoid it, or we go through it. In this
case, we had to operate consistently in the cold, freezing fog.
How do you operate when your crewmen look like the
Michelin Man all the time? How do you become effective doing
that? Do we need to develop better outfits so that our crews can
more easily carry out their assigned tasks? Given that we were in
the ocean, you would think that there is plenty of water to be had.
But we found that our water-producing units were not very effective in the Arctic. Our ships use a lot of water—so we found that
we had to look at how we produce water.
When we go to the Arctic, our communications plans effectively have to be rewritten. In planning for the recent ICEX, we
found that the angles, the best operating frequencies, and how we
employed our antennae had to be redone. We also get some tangible, albeit anecdotal, output when we do these exercises. The
Norwegians, who have come with us several times, have proposed that we link up our command centers so that it is less of
a helter-skelter operation when we want to talk about maritime
22
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
domain awareness. We have a similar initiative with the Danes in
that regard.
The Naval Research Laboratory is currently investing about
$6 million a year to observe and predict high-latitude climate
changes. We are also conducting what we call a capabilities-based
assessment to determine which platforms and systems we might
need to invest in so that we will have the capabilities we need in
the Arctic. We intend to finish that assessment later this summer
so that when we go to our Fiscal Year 2014 Program Objective
Memorandum (POM), we will be able to deal with specific programs and not just have an unstructured discussion.
Our intent is to integrate the lessons learned from the full spectrum of wargames, studies, exercises, and anecdotal evidence
into our current programs and processes so that ultimately climate
change is not being regarded as a crisis but as one of a series of
future challenges. Just as we are dealing with warfare challenges
and major changes in strategy, we propose to deal with climate
change in a similar way.
Our guiding principle should be to invest diligently and to avoid
surprise. We want to invest at the right time so that we do not have
to make fundamental or dramatic changes or turn things upside
down. We do not want to have to go from JUONS to JUONS to
JUONS as we deal with climate change.
Now let us look at how we deal with the impacts of climate
change programmatically. How do we integrate these considerations into something tangible for a program? We do that by trying
to understand the threats that are out there, the severity of those
threats, and the rate at which those threats are changing. We collaborate with our allies and our partners to determine the threat
that we want to overcome or that we want to counter. We assess
the performance that is needed for the threat. We do scenarios, we
do wargames, and we model, and from those we try to identify the
specific capabilities that we need to try to attain and the limitations
associated with those capabilities.
We embed that in the POM process starting with our research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) budget. As part of the
Chapter 1 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
23
process of providing new capabilities to our forces, we like to do
what we call an “evolution.” Basically, it is an exercise where we
deploy the capability with the fleet as soon as possible. We call
it “getting it wet.” One way to do it—and it has been an effective
way—is to embed the desired attributes for important new capabilities in the Key Performance Parameters of all of our programs—
ships, aircraft, submarines, you name it. If there is something that
has to do uniquely with climate that we need to have on our
platforms or system in the future, it becomes a Key Performance
Parameter or a Key System Attribute.
We try to test our proposed solutions as early as possible and
use our combatant commanders and our fleet feedback process
to see how well it did and whether we need to evolve the capability in some way. Then we adjust the doctrine and the way that
the fleet operates with the new capability. We call that our Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System, or JCIDS. JCIDS
is a very deliberate bureaucratic process, but it is the process we
live in. To some extent, you can try to work around it or skirt it by
going from JUONS to JUONS. But to get to the end state that we
want, we need to integrate what we want for climate change into
the JCIDS process.
Now I would submit to you that we can approach the climate
adaptation problem in a couple of ways. One, we can put the attributes that are needed because of climate change into all of our programs, or two, we can define programs that are strictly attributable
to climate change—Arctic programs, programs to respond to water
change, programs to respond to increased sea level, whatever it
is—and have a bundle of programs to deal with climate change.
However we decide to do this, we first need to think this
through. I have not determined if it is one or the other. I think that
we first need to define what we need. Once we know what we
need and why we need it, we will have a clearer picture of what
we need to do. There is precedence for this as I mentioned before.
When we started operating in the Arabian Gulf and in the Middle
East decades ago, we found logistics issues that we had to put into
our programs, and we had unique logistics solutions that provided
capability to operate in a very hot, dry, and dusty environment.
24
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
When we first went to the Middle East, we found that our heat
exchangers were fouling because the warmer water tended to generate more biological matter that gummed up our equipment. We
had heat stress, both in our equipment and in our people. The fine,
talcum-like dust would get sucked into the turbine engines on our
F/A-18 Hornets and on our helicopters and wear them out early.
So, we have been down this road before. We had some successes in adapting. Some programs did it smartly, some did not.
We did not approach it directly and deliberately like this conference and other sessions like this have the opportunity to do. Here
is my list of some of the things we need to consider. How many
of our future platforms will need to be ice strengthened? How do
we establish reliable communications with our partners in these
remote sites? How will sea-level rise affect when we should invest
in a shore installation that needs to be protected from weather? Is
the current afloat medical capacity sufficient for our future needs
in remote areas, be it the Arctic or otherwise? What mix of assets
is best suited to deploy together in the future? The ships that we
normally operate together now may not be the right mix of ships
that we need in the future. What new tactics, techniques, and procedures or doctrine do we need to adopt for working with nongovernment and international organizations? How and when do we
modify our fleet response training plan?
The fleet response training plan is the deliberate approach that
we use to prepare our ships to operate for their 6- or 7-month
deployment. So how do we integrate the climate changes that we
are going to see into where our units are going to operate? How do
we train and prepare them to do that, both from the maintenance
perspective and from the training of the crew itself? Should we
adjust our global posture, our rotational forces, our prepositioned
forces accordingly based on the new zones of instability that could
result from climate change?
THE NAV Y AND ENERGY
Let me now shift to the energy side and talk about what we are
doing now and what we may be doing shortly. I think our energy
strategy is much more mature than our climate change strategy.
Chapter 1 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
25
Basically, our energy approach has been worked by Rear Admiral
Philip Cullom in a very straightforward manner and one that is
understandable, and it has some good synergy going.
Put simplistically, the Navy has decided that we need to be
efficient with the energy that we have and that we need to find
alternative fuels and sources of energy. Our programs have pretty
good momentum under Task Force Energy, which was established
a few years ago. Our approach is part technical and part operational. On the technical side, we are looking at system efficiencies and alternative energy. The Makin Island, which is one of our
newest big-deck amphibious ships, and our future Arleigh Burkeclass destroyers, our DDG-51 class, will have hybrid electric drives
that are much more efficient.
Some of the other technical options that we are examining are
low-drag hulls and propeller coatings, improved engineering plant
controls, and the ability to have a hybrid fuel or an alternative fuel
that we can just drop in using a 50/50 blend of alternative fuels. We
have successfully demonstrated the usability of those fuels in jet
engines, helicopter engines, and small boat engines. We are testing
them now in our marine turbines and diesels. We are also looking
at alternative energy sources like wind, solar, and geothermal as
options for our shore installations. We have a series of pilots, and
in some cases, flat-out programs, that we are using to get ourselves
off the national electric power grid, and we have pretty good goals
for the future.
Operationally, we are ratcheting down our flying and steaming
hours pretty hard to make sure that we are only flying when necessary, only steaming when necessary, and using optimum routes
and best speeds. We are trying to use our fuel judiciously. Our
expeditionary forces are preparing to use hybrid energy storage
modules. The Secretary of the Navy and the Marine Corps are
working together to reduce the huge logistics tail required by our
expeditionary forces when they deploy.
We are metering our piers, our plants, and our buildings to
alter the behavior and change our input lineup so that it is more
standardized and much more energy efficient. What we ultimately
26
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
want to do is use this opportunity to enhance our combat capability. Every $10 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil costs the Navy
about $300 million a year. If we can reduce the amount that we
spend on fuel, the savings can be invested in the combat power
that we will need in the future. Improving fuel efficiency will also
help our range, it will increase our endurance, and it will loosen
the logistics tether that we have been stuck on for so long.
In closing, I think we have a pretty good plan with regard to
energy; the question is: can we sustain it? Can we stay the course,
follow through, and get to where we need to go?
With regard to climate change, I think the question is: how do
we integrate what we are going to need to do as a result of climate
change with our overall program? We have put a series of programs out there. Are we going to need to change the attributes of
any of those programs to accommodate climate change?
We need to determine when and how we start programming
for these changes. There is a lot of activity going on today—a lot of
good activity. We are going to have to bring that into a deliberate
approach so that we can say, ”here is the approach to deal with
the climate change that we expect in the future and this is when we
need to get started.” We need to do that judiciously and efficiently
and not just go from JUONS to JUONS.
REFERENCES
1. Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century  Seapower,  2007,  http://www.navy.mil/maritime/
Maritimestrategy.pdf.
2. Department of the Navy, Navy Arctic Roadmap, 10 Nov 2009,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_
roadmap.pdf.
3. Department of the Navy, Navy Climate Change Roadmap, 21
May 2010, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/CCR.pdf.
4. Department of the Navy, Navy Strategic Objectives for the Arctic,
21 May 2010, http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2010/09/USNavy-Arctic-Strategic-Objectives-21-May-2010.pdf.
Chapter 1 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
27
Q&
A
SESSION WITH ADMIR AL GREENERT
Q: Will you get the money for the things that you need?
Admiral Jonathan Greenert: I would tell you that Secretary
Ray Mabus is totally committed to this. He has said that he wants
to build ships, to increase use of unmanned systems, and to have
alternative energy and an energy policy. He has said very clearly
that we need to move out on energy. And he has stayed the course
on those three. We often have a tendency when we deal with new
things to say that we would like to shave a little bit off. But, he says,
“not on our life.” We are going to hold the line on this. So, our
Secretary is very much behind it.
I can also tell you that we have great support from the Secretary
of Defense and on the Hill. We had some savings from military
construction last year because of the economy. We had budgeted
funds for a new auditorium, but when it was built, the cost turned
out to be less than expected. The Secretary told us that he would
like to keep those savings. The usual answer in such situations is
something akin to “ha, ha, ha.” When we asked what he intended
to do with the money, he said energy initiatives. And so we said
okay. So, it is starting to get some pretty good traction. And I think
what Secretary Mabus has said is that tough economic times are
exactly the exactly the time to stay the course on something that
we believe in. We have great support from our Secretary so far
through the process.
am from Coast Guard Research and Development. In the
Q: ICoast
Guard we are having a discussion right now about
whether or not to have an Arctic variant of a new class of ship. Is there a
similar kind of a discussion going on in the Navy?
Admiral Jonathan Greenert: As of now, there is no discussion
going on within the Navy about building a new icebreaker. Part of
that is because we want to see who is going to blink. I can tell you,
28
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
though, that we understand that we will not be able to operate successfully in marginal ice without making some changes. We have
to evaluate the strength of our hulls today and, as we start building
new ships, determine what strength we are going to need in our
future hulls, including those on submarines. So, we are discussing how much structural integrity will be needed. But as for a ship
constructed specifically for the Arctic, I am unaware of any discussion at this point. We are kind of hoping the Coast Guard will take
the lead on that.
is the state of the Navy’s understanding regarding the
Q: What
topography of the Arctic and the need for charting and mapping of that region?
Rear Admiral David Titley: About 5% of the Arctic has been
charted to modern standards using GPS and sonar. We are working with the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Healy, which I once thought
was an icebreaker but is apparently now an oceanographic survey
ship. There is a lot to be done. This ultimately will come back to
the Combatant Commanders. As the Vice Chief said, these requirements must be examined in a deliberate fashion. When directed to
do so, we will start working those requirements.
Admiral Jonathan Greenert: To that answer I will add that we
will invest in the things that we need. Activities like our ICEX will
continue to help us understand what those needs are. But I am
pretty confident we will invest in the need to make sure that we
produce the revisions and the upgrades to things like our global
positioning systems and our other navigation systems.
am curious how the fact that only 5% of the Arctic is charted
Q: Iplayed
out in the most recent Arctic ICEX. My understanding
from the Naval Studies Board report was that lack of data was a problem for some antisubmarine warfare operations. Was that an issue in
the most recent exercise? [1]
Admiral Jonathan Greenert: Our subs take a fix and then use
inertial navigation to get them through. They do not use the bottom
topography nearly as much today. They can, but it is not necessary.
Now that is great as long as all your inertial navigation systems are
Chapter 1 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
29
working well and you can go up and get a fix every now and again.
But if you are under the ice for long periods of time, and you have
inertial issues, then you have to rely on bottom-type navigation.
That is where charts become a key factor. So, we are going to have
to take a hard look at the range of capabilities that will be needed
to ensure sustained and continued operations.
of our shoreside infrastructure has lifetimes that could
Q: Much
be as long as 40 years, and up to 60 years with upgrades.
Some of the piers that are still being used at Naval Station Norfolk
are 75 years old. How are you addressing sea-level rise, given those
lifetimes?
Admiral Jonathan Greenert: To me it is not just sea-level rise. I
think the degree of tidal changes and changes in currents are likely
to prove just as important. Something that used to be a tidal swing
of a few meters is now all of a sudden 10 meters. But it will not be
universal. In some places you have pretty good tidal swing and in
other places you do not. So, we need to think about how dramatic
the changes will be and how they might be affected by inclement weather. Erosion is likely to be another important piece of the
equation. In some areas it starts to get significant, and if you do
not build for that, you find that you are in there bulldozing out and
changing entire waterfronts to keep the erosion down. And then
you have to start dredging.
Thanks for your time today. I think that the subject you are
dealing with here is both very real and very exciting. Fortunately,
we have some time to do this deliberately, and so I urge you to help
those of us who work at the headquarters not do this in a kneejerk manner but to start ramping up in a manner that makes sense
and that will allow us to adapt our future systems and operations
appropriately.
REFERENCE
1. Naval Studies Board, National Security Implications of Climate
Change on U.S. Naval Forces, National Academies Press, 2011.
Adapting to
Climate Challenges
Chapter 2
Ta s k F o rc e C l i m at e
C h a n g e U p dat e
35
Rear Admiral David Titley
I did not start out wanting to be a climatologist, not that I am
one now. As long as I can remember I wanted to be a weather
guy. Believe it or not, Figure 1 shows a rain gauge cylinder of the
type that existed before things went digital. It is very similar to one
that I built when I was growing up in Jamaica. I was 7 or 8 years
old at the time, and I bugged my parents and bugged my parents
because I wanted a rain gauge. Eventually we found a cylinder,
but I still needed a funnel. So, we went down to the tinsmith at
the market, and I am sure the tinsmith really appreciated some
A native of Schenectady, New York, Rear Admiral David Titley was commissioned through the Naval Reserve Officers Training Commissioning
program in 1980. Rear Admiral Titley served over 10 years at sea,
including a tour as navigator aboard USS Farragut (DDG-37) and tours
as oceanographer aboard USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3), USS Carl Vinson
(CVN-70), Carrier Group Six, and U.S. Seventh Fleet. Shore tours
include serving on the staff of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
and as the senior military assistant to the Director of Net Assessment
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Rear Admiral Titley has
commanded the Fleet Numerical Meteorological and Oceanographic
Center in Monterey, California, and was the first commanding officer of the Naval Oceanography Operations Command. He served
his initial flag tour as the commander of the Naval Meteorology and
Oceanography Command. Rear Admiral Titley has a B.S. in meteorology from the Pennsylvania State University and an M.S. in meteorology
and physical oceanography and a Ph.D. in meteorology, both from the
Naval Postgraduate School. He attended the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Seminar XXI on Foreign Politics, International Relations,
and National Interest and is a fellow of the American Meteorological
Society. In 2009, Rear Admiral Titley assumed duties as oceanographer and navigator of the Navy and the director of Task Force
Climate Change.
36
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
snot-nosed 8-year-old with a tape measure checking his work. The
first time the funnel was 6 inches in diameter, the second time it
was 4 inches in diameter, and by the third time it was right. I got
my 5-inch-diameter funnel. I am not going to show you my paper
records of rainfall in Jamaica, but I still have them. The first thing
I can tell you—and maybe this was more weather modification
than climate—is that beginning the day that I set up the rain gauge
outside our house, we entered the longest dry spell that occurred
while we were in Jamaica.
Figure 1. Rain Gauge Cylinder
But I knew forever that I was going to do weather. I really had
not thought very much about climate at all. If you are going to do
weather, where do you go? Well, 30 years ago there were only
about half a dozen places in the United States where you could
study meteorology; one of those was Penn State. They accepted
me, and Naval ROTC accepted me as well. Because Penn State
is obviously in Pennsylvania, which was not my home state, it
met my criterion of getting away from home. It was close enough,
though, that I could still get home if I needed to. I would love to tell
you that it looked like the scene depicted in Figure 2 below. That is
what the Penn State Weather Center looks like today. When I was
in school, we were using all the papers and charts that appear in
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
37
the lower portion of the Figure. I would come in at 4 a.m. and use
those data to plot up the morning weather maps.
Figure 2. Penn State Weather Center
How many meteorologists do we have in here? Why would
you do a 9Z chart? What is better about a 9Z as opposed to an 8 or
10Z? Oh, come on. You guys disappoint me—isallobaric analysis.
The 9Z chart allows you to determine the change in atmospheric
pressure over the last 3 hours. By plotting those changes, you can
determine where the isallobars (lines of equal pressure change) are,
and thereby see how the atmosphere is changing. For short-range
forecasting, that was pretty good and that was actually worth getting up 1 hour early for. I was into weather, so that is what I did.
So what did I want to do when I got commissioned? I still
wanted to be a weather guy, but what happened instead was I
received what I would still to this day call my best-ever piece of
career advice. I still have the letter that came from a detailer named
Captain Pine. He essentially said: “Hey midshipman, I understand
you want to be a weather guy. That’s really nice. But guess what,
you went to ROTC and the reason the Navy paid you to go to
ROTC is because we need unrestricted line officers, so go get yourself a warfare pin. In 3 or 4 years, if you’re still interested, come
back and see us, we’ll probably still be around.”
38
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
As I said, that was the best piece of career advice I ever received
because I ended up on a Navy destroyer. The ship had one of
those 1200-pound steam plants that The Honorable John Warner
mentioned. I have a letter from the engineering officer of the watch
that says I did not kill myself or anybody else while operating that
plant. As it turned out, I actually liked this stuff, so I went from an
objective of being in the Navy for 4 years and a day (I was going
to give them 1 extra day after my legal obligation ended) to a goal
of staying in the Navy as long as I was having fun, as long as the
work still seemed meaningful, and as long as they did not throw
me out. So far, by and large if you average over time, all of those
have happened. They have not thrown me out due, no doubt, to a
series of increasingly serious personnel errors on the Navy’s part.
At some point, though, we all have to go home.
Eventually though, after thinking long and hard about it, I transferred into the oceanography community and I got to do things
from the tactical to the operational scale. I worked for some terrific
gentlemen: Admiral Walt Doran out at Seventh Fleet and Admiral
Art Cebrowski, who had Carrier Group Six at the time. I learned a
tremendous amount from them, not only about weather, but about
operations and how to think at the level that those gents do.
In the process, I learned that collecting weather data and
making forecasts was really fun, but that it is more or less at level
one in the overall scheme of things. If you are a decision maker,
you do not really care about collecting the data or creating a forecast. What you care about is what kind of decisions you have to
make. So, we figured out that we needed a translation function that
connects all that weather, oceanography, and climate information
with what we needed to do operationally.
Figure 3 provides an example of what I call a “performance
surface.” The left-hand graphic on the second row from the top, for
example, tells you how well your sonar is working. The right-hand
graphic on that same row, the one that depicts the Horn of Africa,
is a very simple version of what we call the Pirate Performance
Surface. It does not mean that we want pirates to perform better. It
means that if you know where the pirates are, what their CONOPS
are, what their tactics, techniques, and procedures are, how the
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
39
weather will impact their little skiffs, how high the waves are, how
strong the currents are, and what the visibility level is, you can
actually figure out where the pirates are going to be. What that
allows you to do is like going to Vegas and being able to count the
cards. Now the bad thing about working in the natural environment, or what we like to call nature’s casino, is that there is a whole
lot more than 52 cards in the deck. The good thing is that if you
figure it out, there is nobody with a big crowbar who is going to go
break your kneecaps for doing so. So it is worth doing, and it gives
us in the United States an advantage. It is a competitive advantage
to be able to do this.
Figure 3. Performance Surface Illustration
So what does all this stuff have to do with climate or climate
change? The short answer is nothing. I was not really thinking
about climate at this point in my career. That debate was sort of
going on through the 1980s, through the 1990s, and through the
early part of the 2000–2010 decade, but I tended to look at it the
way that a lot of meteorologists do. I was happy if my weather
forecast models could tell me what was going to happen 3 days
from now. If they were still more or less correct after 5 days, I was
ecstatic. So, when someone started talking about climate forecasts,
I would invariably ask: What do you mean you can tell me what is
going to happen 40, 50, or 70 years in the future? Can carbon dioxide really be all that important? I do not know that I would have
40
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
been called skeptical, but I am also sure that I did not fit in the true
believer category. I can pretty safely say, though, that sometimes
when people stumble over the truth, usually what they do is they
just pick themselves up, dust themselves off, and keep on going as
though nothing ever happened.
Well, as the climate debate kept going, I decided that maybe it
was worth looking to see what some of the data showed. So, that
is what I propose we do now. Let’s not worry about projections just
yet. Let’s just look at what some of the data show.
Figure 4. Arctic Sea Ice Continues to Melt and Thin [1]
Figure 4 shows what is going on with the ice in the Arctic.
In the late summer, there is a lot less ice than there used to be at
this time of year. That is probably not a Ph.D. dissertation kind of
insight. The thing that is interesting is the graph at the bottom. It
starts in 1981 and goes to about 2010. The really hard, really old
ice that is really hard to break through is colored black. What they
call “first-year ice” is colored blue, and the stuff in the middle is
colored white. What we have seen over the last decade or so is a
pretty big change in the Arctic. Is it going to stay like that, or is the
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
41
new ice going to stay around long enough to become old ice? I
would say the jury is still out on that, but right now things are starting to look more and more as though we have seen this very fundamental change occur in the Arctic. It has gone from being totally
frozen in the winter, to almost totally frozen in the summer, to now
one that freezes up, albeit with first-year ice, in the winter. Now do
not get me wrong, first-year ice in the Arctic can still be 2-, 3-, or
4-feet thick. This is not like first-year ice in Virginia, which if you
step on it, you go right through it. Still, it is first-year ice, and it melts
back very fast. You have this very, very dynamic system as opposed
to what was almost a static system. So, that is going on. What does
it mean? I am not sure yet, but it is certainly a piece of data.
Figure 5. Earth’s Total Heat Content Anomaly
Now, let us look at the Earth’s heat content. The data shown in
Figure 5 go back about 60 years or so to about 1950. If you look
at where the heat is, you find that it is in the ocean. The heat is
not in the atmosphere. The heat is in the ocean. The amount of
energy it takes to warm up a certain volume of water is a whole
lot more than what is required to warm up the same volume of air.
42
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
So, it should not come as a surprise that the heat is in the ocean. If
you look at temperature variations, especially on the land or in the
atmosphere, it is sort of like the atmosphere tail is being wagged by
the ocean dog. That is one of the reasons that you see these yearto-year and even seasonal or longer time period variations. It does
not necessarily mean that the Earth is warming or the Earth is cooling. From a maritime perspective, if you really want to understand
what is going on in the climate, you need to be looking at what is
going on in the oceans.
Figure 6. Sea-Level Rise (See the Appendix for Close-Up
Views of Panels a, b, and c)
Sea-level rise is another thing that we are looking at. As shown
in Figure 6, we started off in the 20th century with a rise of about
2 millimeters per year, which was mostly from thermal expansion and some from glaciers melting and flowing into the ocean.
We are already up to about 3 millimeters per year. As was mentioned before, we have got to be careful. If you really want to get
people’s attention, you say: “Oh my God. Here we are, 2011,
the rate of sea-level rise is 50% higher than it was in the 20th
century.” When I told this to a friend from Sandia, he joked that
Sandia might not be high enough and proposed that he move to
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
43
Los Alamos. Yesterday, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
said that we need to be deliberate. So, the bad news is that sealevel rise is accelerating. The good news is that it is still only about
3 millimeters per year. What that tells me is we have time to try
to understand what the real vulnerabilities are and what the most
cost-effective and operationally effective mitigation strategies are
so that we can keep going.
What is the real unknown here? The real unknown is not thermal expansion. We know that as water gets warmer it takes up more
space. It is not even the glaciers. You may have heard the ruckus
a couple of years ago when it was reported that the Himalayan
glaciers were all going to melt. Actually, from the perspective of
sea-level rise, the glaciers are small stuff. The big deal is what is
going on with the Greenland Ice Sheet and the West Antarctic Ice
Sheet. It is like the famous question: “Why do you rob banks?” The
answer is: “That is where the money is.” If you are studying sealevel rise, why do you study the ice fields? Because that is where
most of the world’s supply of fresh water is currently locked up.
What seems to be happening is pretty fascinating. If I were in my
early twenties and looking for a Ph.D. in one of these fields, this
would be pretty cool stuff. It is the intersection of weather, oceanography, glaciology, and climate. It seems to combine all of these
different sciences.
As best we can tell, on the basis of reports from scientists at
Woods Hole and a number of research centers, what is happening
is that when the ice fields come down into the fjords as glaciers,
they ground on the ocean bottom because they are about a mile
thick. What is happening then is relatively warmer water is melting those glaciers. The Arctic is kind of weird. You actually have
warmer water underneath really cold water. It is not like a normal
ocean. So some process is bringing up this relatively warmer water.
Now, between you and me, my idea of warm water is, say, 85°F.
The Arctic’s idea of warm water is plus 1°C or plus 1.5°C, but
every degree of additional heat can, over time if you let it sit there
for about a year or so, actually melt about 10 meters of ice off the
bottom of a glacier.
44
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
So, all of a sudden what do you have? You had this glacier that
was grounded and now it is not, and the best analogy I can think of
is the Gothic cathedrals in Europe with their big flying buttresses.
Those buttresses keep the walls up, and that is sort of what the glaciers were doing. If the bottom of the glacier is now floating, what
happens? It is like taking the buttresses away from those cathedrals.
If you do that, the walls spread out. What is happening to the ice
fields? They are spreading out. When they spread out and accelerate, more ice flows into the ocean.
Is that going to continue to happen? Well, we have a variety
of observations that show that it is happening now in both the
Greenland Ice Sheet and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. Is it going
to continue to happen? Is it going to slow down? Are there other
interactions that we just do not know about? That is why there is
such a big unknown with regard to sea-level rise. The National
Academies and the National Research Council say that the sea
level will rise 0.8 meters. I have told the CNO that the sea level
will likely rise 1 meter by 2100, but I have added that if I am
wrong, I am probably wrong on the low side. And if I am in fact
wrong and sea level rises by more than 1 meter, then that is going
to be a big deal. As you heard from The Honorable Jackalyne
Pfannenstiel yesterday, that will have a big impact on Navy infrastructure. Today, though, it is about 3 millimeters. The take-home
message on this is two things. Sea-level rise is a big deal, but we
have some time to get it right.
Figure 7 shows what is called the radiative transfer equation.
Why have I done that? Because I hate you? No. That is not why.
The reason is, if you look at global warming, that is what it is all
about. Who is a science policy guy who hated arithmetic in high
school? I know we have got to have some of those in here. We
cannot all be science and engineering guys and gals. Well, as it
turns out, the science policy guys do not have to worry about this
stuff because global warming at the big, big scale is actually pretty
easy. I should not tell you this because the climatologists will get
mad and nobody will fund them to do the rest of the stuff that
needs to be done.
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
45
Figure 7. Radiative Transfer Equation
But at the big-picture scale, it is pretty easy because you have
“gazintas” and you have “gazoutas” (more precisely, “goes-intos”
and “goes-out-ofs”). Okay? I mean that is what you have. The
gazintas are the Sun. I mean it is not like we get a lot of other
warmth from stars or other astronomical objects besides the Sun.
Sure, there is a little bit of heat from the Earth’s interior, but basically most of the input is from the Sun. NASA has measured the
Sun pretty darn well for at least 50 years from space. They have
really good observations. We have other observations and other
records that go back farther, but certainly for 50 years plus we have
excellent data. What does it show? It shows that to within plus or
minus one tenth of one percent, the Sun’s been constant. There
are some little wiggles, but it has basically been constant. Okay,
so the gazintas are the same. Now let us look at the gazoutas. It
turns out that you can also measure those, and NASA has done
a pretty good job of that. At the frequencies that correspond to
greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, which we know from independent observations is going up, we see that less and less heat is
actually leaving the Earth.
So, for all you physics and engineering majors and even the
national security majors in here, if you have the same gazintas, but
you do not have as much gazoutas, what happens to the system?
46
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Something has got to change, right? In some way, shape, or form,
it has to heat up. That is all global warming is. That is it. That is all
it is. Now the details get really, really, really, really hard. You have
to start understanding that equation I showed earlier. You have to
understand positive feedback. You have to understand aerosols,
versus carbon uptake, versus how much CO2 is getting sucked up
by the ocean and so on. As you would expect, the details get
really, really hard, and there are enough details that it is sufficiently
hard to talk about climate change even at the regional and decadal
levels. But at the big-picture level, it is actually pretty simple.
Figure 8. Global Hurricane/Typhoon Energy [7]
One of the claims frequently heard about global warming is
that it will produce more and stronger storms. We have all heard
that we are going to have more hurricanes and those hurricanes
are going to be bigger and more intense. Well, Figure 8 shows
40 years’ worth of data, updated as of just 3.5 weeks ago. The
measure used is a variable called accumulated cyclone energy.
It is calculated by taking all the hurricanes and typhoons in the
world over a given period of time (e.g., a year) and computing
the product of how long the storm lasted and how big or strong it
was. Then, those products are added up, and a running average is
calculated to smooth it out a bit. What you see is that it certainly
goes up and down. There seem to be some cycles there as well,
but right now, the value for 2011 is pretty low. While the big stuff
is easy to understand, we have to be careful even when we say
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
47
things that seem obvious, for example, that if you are heating up
the ocean, you are going to have stronger hurricanes. Maybe you
are, maybe you are not. I think the jury is still out on that. So, what
is the message from this? Is the message that global warming is a
bunch of hooey? No, the real message is that you have to look at
the data and evaluate everything you hear.
At one point in my career I was a navigator on board a ship
(and, of course, now I am the Navigator for the entire Navy, but
that is an entirely different job). One of the things I taught my quartermasters was “red right returning.” When you bring your ship into
port, you keep the red lights and buoys on your right. I told them
if you cannot remember “red right returning,” remember “red left
new job.” I really did not care which version they remembered, just
as long as they knew which what side of the channel you come up.
When I was a navigator, we did not have GPS. So, I learned to use
a sextant, charts, and dividers. I computed my course using dead
reckoning and by looking out the window. Never underestimate
the value of looking out the window for either navigation or for
weather forecasting.
But the way you do navigation, and I think the same is true for
a lot of things that we do in our profession, is you never rely on
one single piece of data. You look at everything. You look at all
the data. I have shown you a couple of things; we could spend the
whole day looking at the tons and tons of data that are available.
I will not ask you to do that, but if you did, the conclusion you
would reach is that yes, the climate is changing, and yes, a primary
component of that, although probably not the only component,
is greenhouse gases. Where are those greenhouse gases coming
from? They are coming from humans burning fossil fuel. I know a
lot of people say: “well I can see that it is changing, but I do not
really care why it is changing.” However, if you do not care why
it is changing then you can probably believe that maybe it is all
natural, and if it is all natural, then perhaps those natural changes
might stop tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. And if you thought
that, why on God’s green earth would you invest billions of dollars
to adapt or to mitigate for something that is going to be part of a
natural cycle that is going to change regardless?
48
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
So, I think it is important for the Navy, and for the military in
general, to have some understanding at some level as to what is
causing these changes. If somebody tells you they know the details
as to what is going to happen to the climate in Washington, D.C.,
in 2037, my recommendation is to run, do not walk, away from
whoever is trying to sell you that. You need to be careful. Still, the
overall part is pretty simple, and it can be explained by the fact that
humans are putting lots of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
Moreover, that explanation fits even when you start digging
into what is happening 15 or 20 miles up into the atmosphere.
As it turns out, it is actually getting colder than it used to be up
there. That is consistent, because if all your greenhouses gases
are down low, which they are because that is where all the gases
are—and remember that the gazintas are constant—then what we
have done is redistribute the heat. We have kept more of it like in
a blanket down low, but because the gazintas are constant, it has
to be colder up top to balance it out.
So, we have all kinds of data, and it all seems to make sense.
We can even replicate it with our computer models. I talked about
those models at the beginning, and I will come back to them
shortly. When I was still forecasting the weather, getting 5 days
of accurate forecasts out of a computer model was really, really,
really good. Now, of course, about the only forecast I am allowed
to make is whether I can have the roof on my car up or down
when I go to and from work. Nobody lets me forecast anything
else. Given that we cannot forecast the weather accurately much
more than a week out, why should we believe these guys who
come in and they say that in the year 2070, the Earth’s going to be
3° warmer, or 2° warmer, or 5° warmer? Why should we believe
that? It took me a long time to figure this out.
So, let me ask: who did engineering or some sort of physical
science at some point in their past? Remember partial differential equations and things like initial conditions and boundary conditions? Well, the weather specifies the initial conditions for our
long-range forecasting problem. Why is it going to rain here this
afternoon? The answer is because it was raining in the Midwest
last night. Those are the initial conditions. What is the climate?
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
49
Climate specifies the boundary conditions. Among other things,
climate specifies what the Sun is doing. Are we stopping sunlight
from coming in day after day, or are we bringing more of it in? Are
we keeping more of the heat, or are we getting rid of it? Those
are the boundary conditions. So climate is boundary conditions,
weather is initial conditions, and somewhere in between the two,
at perhaps the decadal, seasonal, or interseasonal scale, you go
from one system to the other.
Let us take a look a how something that is a trace gas can
possibly affect the climate. To help us understand that, let us look
at another trace molecule that some people, so I have been told,
might have some familiarity with, and that would be blood alcohol
content. It does not take a very high blood alcohol content for
a person to get into a lot of trouble, especially if they are sitting
behind a steering wheel. As it turns out, 0.04 is about where the
Earth’s atmosphere stands today with regard to CO2. More precisely, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 is 390 parts per million or about 0.04%. I think most of us would agree that there is a
whole lot of difference between being at a party with everybody at
0% and being at one where everybody is at 0.04%. The difference
is just a trace. Now I am not trying to torture this thing in saying
that alcohol is the same as CO2 or anything, but traces can matter.
That is all I am trying to say.
As it turns out, my boss, the CNO, is interested in the Arctic.
He wants to know when these changes are going to affect what
happens to the Navy. One of the things that the people who work
for me know is that when your boss is interested in something,
you better be fascinated by it. So I rapidly became fascinated with
climate, and I thought I better try to understand what is going on.
Admiral Gary Roughead always wants to look at the data to separate fact from folklore, and clearly there are both a lot of facts and
a lot of folklore swirling around the climate. So, he told me to go
figure this out. What do we need to do, and when do we need to
do it? As the Vice Chief said, we do not want to get caught unprepared, but we need to remember that we do not have the money
to go and spend and do things either ahead of need or do things
50
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
just because they are nice. If we do not absolutely need them, we
cannot afford them.
One of the things we figured out on day zero was we cannot,
will not, and should not do this by ourselves. So, thanks to my topnotch staff, we have established great relationships with some international partners. We have talked to Norway, Sweden, and Canada.
Through some of our academic associates, we have pretty good
contact with scientists in Russia. We are also working with other
parts of the DoD, like the Air Force Weather Agency. As you might
expect, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) has been a key collaborator, as has the Department of
Energy and its labs at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Oakridge. We
are interacting with the U.S. Geological Survey, NASA, and lots
and lots of academic institutions. We have received great support from the National Academies of Science. (See Figure 9 for
more details.)
Figure 9. The Task Force Climate Change Team
While climate change is a big deal, we have to think about it in
the context of other things. At last night’s dinner, we were reminded
that the world’s population now stands at 6 billion and counting
and that we might level off at 9 billion, give or take a billion. That is
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
51
a whole lot of people. There will be competitions for resources, for
food, for water, and for energy. Climate change is going to impact
and be impacted by those competitions.
Our ability to address these problems will also be affected by
our computational resources. When I got into the Navy, $1000
bought you the computer power of a nematode. Some people
think that was my computing power and maybe it is; I am not sure.
By about 2000, that same $1000 bought you the computer power
of a lizard, and by 2030 or 2035, $1000 is going to buy you what
is essentially the computing power of the human brain. So how
do we use that? How do we use that to tackle these problems? Do
we make them better? Do we make them worse? And exactly how
do we solve these problems when we are out of money? If you do
not already know, we are now working in a very, very constrained
fiscal environment.
Let me mention some of the things we are interested in. First of
all, there is the Arctic. The Bering Strait is about 60 nautical miles
wide. It is deep enough for any of our ships, but it is actually pretty
shallow. We were talking to the skipper of the USS Connecticut
who went up for the Navy Ice Exercise (ICEX) 3 weeks ago. He
said that the transit was pretty interesting; he had ice 25 feet above
him and the bottom was 25 feet below him, and it was like that for
about 4 or 5 days.
Another key concern is sea-level rise. As I indicated previously,
we have projected that the sea level is going to rise by about a meter
by 2040, but there is a lot of uncertainty about that projection. As
it turns out, the local currents have a big influence on how much
or how little the sea level will rise. And if that is not complicated
enough, in some parts of the globe, the land surface is going down,
and in other places it is coming up. One of the things that affect the
height of the land surface relative to the sea surface is glacial recession. When the glacier’s weight is removed, the land bounces up.
If you live in one of those places, sea-level rise probably will not
affect you. But, if you live in one of the places where the land surface is going down, the apparent change is going to be even worse.
To make sure we understand these issues, we are working with
the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
52
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
(SERDP) to make sure that we understand the relative changes in
sea level for the places that the DoD and the Navy care about. So,
you see that sea-level rise, like politics, is local.
Yet another topic of concern is the ocean acidification issue
that Rear Admiral Philip Cullom mentioned in his presentation.
Will it have a direct impact on naval operations? Probably not.
Some people think that it might impact sonar performance by
changing sound absorption. The best we can tell from studies
done by the Office of Naval Research and Woods Hole is that it
is probably a tertiary effect. There will be some effect, but it will
not be huge.
The big effect is the indirect one, and it gets into the whole
global instability thing. Although we do not eat a bunch of the stuff
that is in the lower parts of the marine ecosystem, we do eat the
stuff that eats that stuff, like tuna and tasty fish. So, if we end up
taking out part of the marine ecosystem, and if people cannot get
that protein (about 1 billion people today get their primary protein
from the ocean), where are they going to get that protein? When
you add to that the fact that the Earth is getting more people,
not less, you end up with what I call the silent partner to global
warming. There is not a big controversy about this. The chemical
oceanographers have shown that the pH levels are coming down,
which means the ocean is getting more acidic. You are not going
to be able to put your finger in and pull out just bone—it will not
be that acidic. But it will be acidic enough that if your ecosystem
has had this nice steady state for 200,000 years chemistry-wise,
and then in 200 years you change it, then wham, like that, what
is going to happen? The answer is nobody knows, but we are running this big uncontrolled experiment as we speak.
As the Vice Chief of Naval Operations mentioned, we have
published two roadmaps—an Arctic Roadmap and a Climate
Change Roadmap—and got them signed out. [8, 9] Both are available on the Internet, and they are free. Dr. Ronald Filadelfo mentioned the Naval Studies Board panel that was chaired by Admiral
Skip Bowman, former Director of Naval Reactors. The study’s
recommendations are listed in Figure 10. We have also been
working to encourage Senate ratification of the United Nations
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
53
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States
signed the treaty, but we have never ratified it. Why does it matter?
Well, because if you ratify it, you can then make what they call
“extended continental shelf claims.” The potential claims available to the United States would cover a land area on the order
of half the size of the Louisiana Purchase. The U.S. Geological
Survey estimates that the associated mineral resources could have
a value approaching $1 trillion.
Figure 10. Naval Studies Board Recommendations [10]
Then there is research and development. We have set five
strategic objectives for ourselves (Figure 11). Unfortunately, I seem
to be able to remember only three things at one time, which is
why I have to have them written down. When you leave this symposium, though, there is just one that I would really like you to
remember, and it is “safety, security, and stability for the Arctic.”
That is really what we are about. We are going to protect the
American people, we are going to protect the infrastructure, and
we are going to make sure our forces are ready, which is really
why we have Task Force Climate Change. It is for readiness in the
21st century.
54
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 11. Navy Arctic Strategic Objectives [11]
Figure 12. ICEX-11
I just got back from this year’s ICEX (Figure 12). I was joined
on the trip by Admiral Chris Colvin, commander of the 17th Coast
Guard District, Alaska Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell,
and Rear Admiral Nevin Carr, Chief of Naval Research. The
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
55
USS New Hampshire was there. The Coast Guard helped out by
dropping some vitally needed supplies. While there, I learned how
people in the Arctic get fresh water. They find a piece of old ice
and start chipping away at it. It is called “ice mining,” and it can be
a lot of fun as long as you do not have to chip enough ice to meet
the daily fresh water needs of 40 people.
Thanks to Task Force Climate Change, we have been able to
get the Navy’s Hampton Roads complex onto the top tier of facilities that SERDP will be studying (Figure 13). We have talked about
how we go from weather to climate, but even though we can
get projections out to the year 2100, who budgets for 2100? The
answer is nobody. The DoD stops planning ahead shortly after the
end of its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and the associated Defense Planning Projections (DPP). Although the Navy has a
30-year ship-building program and buys aircraft that it expects to
have around for 30 years, like the rest of the Department, it plans
budgets for the next 5 or 6 years. I am sure that it is the same for
other parts of the government and for the commercial side. So,
how do we as a nation improve our capabilities at the regional
level and at time scales that matter? We are working with NOAA,
with the Department of Energy, with NASA, and with our Air Force
colleagues to see what can be done.
Figure 13. Installation Vulnerability Assessments
56
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
So what are we doing on adaptation? You know, I mentioned
this topic yesterday with a couple of comments on how we educate the next generation. One of the things I have told CNO is
that by the mid to late 2020s or 2030s, we are going to have probably about a month or so of ice-free conditions in the Arctic each
year. By the middle of the century, we will have 2–3 months of
relatively open water. Now, 2040 is just 29 years from now. What
that means is that the Navy has already assessed the officers who
will be the senior captains and admirals at that time. They are in
the Navy today. They will be dealing with this, and it will not be
like some guy standing up with a PowerPoint brief saying what
might happen. It will be: “Hey, we have got all this ocean where
there used to be ice. We have got all these people up there sailing
around. What are we doing? What are our needs?” So the more
we can start talking about this and getting people to think seriously
about it, it will be to our benefit.
Yesterday, Rear Admiral Cullom told us that the Navy is engaged
in Task Force Energy primarily to be better at delivering combat
power. A tremendous co-benefit, though, is that it will help to mitigate climate change. It will not do so directly, because the DoD as
a whole accounts for about 2% of the greenhouse gases emitted
by the United States. The Department of the Navy accounts for just
a quarter of the DoD share. So, even if the Navy’s emissions went
to zero, it would not make much of a difference. As we all know,
though, leadership is a nonlinear term, and a little bit of leadership
in the right place can have tremendously outsized effects, and that
is what the Secretary of the Navy is looking for.
Here are some of the things that are coming up next. You can
probably pick your favorite event on the calendar in Figure 14.
Of course, we are here today at the Symposium. Our capabilities
based assessment was mentioned by the Vice Chief. It is part of
that whole Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
or acquisition process. It is not particularly sexy, not like “woo hoo,
I am going to go work on a capabilities based assessment today,”
but it is absolutely essential that we have the foundational analysis
down so that in 2014, when we start asking the Navy to make
significantly different investments, there is an analytical basis for
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
57
doing so and so that we can defend our proposed changes first
within the Navy, then within the Secretary of Defense’s Office, and
ultimately to the Congress.
Figure 14. What’s Next
Sometimes I am asked what keeps me awake at night. Well the
answer can be found in Figure 15. Between about 60,000 years
ago and about 12,000 years ago there were big, big changes going
on with the climate. Then suddenly sometime between 10,000
and 12,000 years ago, it is as if somebody flipped a switch off
and we entered into this wonderfully benign and incredibly stable
weather and climate system. When did civilization start? About
12,000 years ago. Can I say it is causality? Somebody brought up
the question about causality at last night’s dinner speech, and it
is a very good question. At this point, I guess I should put up a
picture of Clint Eastwood asking: “How lucky do you feel?” Can
you imagine 9 billion people migrating thousands of kilometers,
all chasing the best agricultural land? How are we going to deal
with that? You can deal with that when your world population is
2 or 3 million and everybody’s nomadic. But how are we going
to deal with that when you have 9 billion people? Are we going
to be able to go back into some less advanced state if we have
to? I am not saying we are, but we do sort of have our foot on the
58
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
gas pedal. The real answer is, we do not know, but I would say
that there is considerable risk that we may not have thought this
through. I do not know how you mitigate that one, so that is what
keeps me up at night.
Figure 15. Climate Change in Prehistory
I will close by returning once more to Winston Churchill. He
once said that Americans can always be counted on to do the
right thing after exhausting every other possibility, and I think
that is where we might be with regard to climate change. As you
know, there are climate change deniers, climate change skeptics,
and climate change believers. I do not like those terms. I think the
American Meteorological Society is trying to use the terms convinced and unconvinced. I think those are better terms. I will tell
you ladies and gents one thing I do believe in. I fundamentally
believe that America, our nation, will figure this out with our allies
and partners, and rather than having a Thelma-and-Louise moment
with climate change, we will have an Apollo 13 moment. When
that is going to happen, I do not know exactly, but I can tell you
that without the efforts of everybody here trying every day, we will
not get there. So, keep plugging away. I appreciate the work that
everybody here is doing on this, and we will get to the Apollo 13
moment for climate change.
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
59
REFERENCES
1. Jackie Richter-Menge, and Jim E. Overland, Eds., Arctic Report
Card 2010, 2010, http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard.
2. Robert A. Rohde/Global Warming Art, Recent Sea Level Rise,
http://www.globalwarmingart.com/wiki/File:Recent_Sea_
Level_Rise_png.
3. CU Sea Level Research Group, Global Mean Sea Level Time
Series, 2009, http://sealevel.colorado.edu/, last updated July
29, 2011.
4. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment
Report: Climate Change 2007, IPCC, 2007.
5. E. Rignot, J. E. Box, E. Burgess, and E. Hanna, “Mass balance of
the Greenland ice sheet from 1958 to 2007,” Geophys. Res. Lett.
35:L20502, 2008, doi:10.1029/2008GL035417.
6. Eric Rignot, “Changes in West Antarctic ice stream dynamics
observed with ALOS PALSAR data,” Geophys. Res. Lett. 35:
L12505, 2008, doi:10.1029/2008GL033365.
7. Ryan N. Maue, “Recent historically low global tropical
cyclone activity,” Geophys. Res. Lett. 38: L14803, 2011, doi:
10.1029/2011GL047711.
8. Department of the Navy, Navy Arctic Roadmap, 10 Nov 2009,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_
roadmap.pdf.
9. Department of the Navy, Navy Climate Change Roadmap, 21
May 2010, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/CCR.pdf.
10.Naval Studies Board, National Security Implications of Climate
Change on U.S. Naval Forces, National Academies Press, 2011.
11.Department of the Navy, Navy Strategic Objectives for the Arctic,
21 May 2010, http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2010/09/USNavy-Arctic-Strategic-Objectives-21-May-2010.pdf.
60
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
APPENDIX
Close-Up Views of Figure 6 Graphs (Sea-Level Rise)
Chapter 2 Task Force Climate Change Update
61
Q&
A
SESSION WITH REAR ADMIR AL TITLEY
the fact that Figure 15 showed that climate change is
Q: Given
cyclical—that it has been occurring over eons—how effective
do you think changes in human behavior can be given the vast scale of
natural effects on climate?
Rear Admiral David Titley: I think it is important to try to
understand what has led to climate changes in the past and why
the climate has been comparatively stable for the last 10,000 years.
We do know that from 60,000 years ago to 10,000 years ago, the
Earth’s climate was undergoing some pretty dynamic changes. Ice
ages came and went at fairly rapid intervals. I do not want to be
left in the position of saying that just because the climate changed
before it is going to change again. We need to know why. If we
could have another 5,000, 10,000, or 15,000 years of benign climate, why would we consciously want to stop that? You know, we
have something pretty good. For better or worse, we have built our
civilization on that stable climate. There is probably nothing magic
about it, but it is stable. So now we are going to change it, and
potentially change it quite radically. I do not think we know the full
consequences. My guess is that some of the things we all worry
about will turn out to not be a big deal, and there will be other
things that nobody is thinking about for which we will say: “Man,
where did that come from?” Ultimately, it comes down to how
much risk do we want to take. As Clint Eastwood so aptly phrased
it: “How lucky do you feel?” The fact that there were big changes
in the past, in my view, does not absolve us if we consciously create big and unknown changes in the future.
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo: To answer your question really succinctly, it is not the size of the change, but the rate, and the simple
statement is the rate of change we are seeing now is inconsistent
with any known natural cycle.
62
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Rear Admiral David Titley: Fortunately, people are very, very
adaptable. But, the faster you change a system, the harder it is and
the steeper that adaptation.
Mr. Glen Sturtevant: Can you comment on the Arctic Air
Responsibility, AAR, and how that relates to today’s combatant
commands? Is there a decision that may change that?
Rear Admiral David Titley: From what I understand, that plan
has now gone across the Potomac. It had sat on Secretary Robert
Gates’s desk for quite some time, and I understand that it is now
awaiting the President’s signature. But until the President signs it, I
think it is probably premature for me to say how that is going to get
carved up, because I will guess wrong. I think we will see a simplification of the division of responsibilities. I will just put it that way,
but until the President signs it, I probably should not get in front of
his headlights.
Chapter 3
A da p t i n g M a r i t i m e
I n f r a s t ruc t u r e to
C l i m at e C h a l l e n g e s
65
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo
I am pleased to convene this panel on Adapting Maritime
Infrastructure to Climate Challenges. As you will soon see, we have
three prefect people to address these issues.
By way of background on the importance of these issues, in
2008, the National Intelligence Council, in one of its periodic
National Intelligence Assessments, looked at the implications of
climate change for national security. [1] The resulting National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) identified roughly 30 military installations
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo is the Director of the Environment and Energy
Team at CNA. He has primary responsibility for all research in the area
of national security and climate change, energy policy, and environmental studies. The CNA Environment and Energy research team is currently conducting studies in the areas of natural resources and stability,
DoD and national energy policy, climate change and state stability,
and ocean environmental issues. Dr. Filadelfo’s academic training was
in physical oceanography, where his work focused on wind-induced
sea-level variability at subtidal frequencies. He received his Ph.D. in
oceanography from the State University of New York and his master of
science degree in meteorology and oceanography from the City College
of New York. Dr. Filadelfo received his bachelor of science degree in
meteorology and oceanography from the Polytechnic Institute of New
York. He joined CNA in 1984 and worked in antisubmarine warfare
until 1992. Since that time, his research has focused on environmental
issues facing the Navy. He has led studies of military environmental
compliance, hazardous waste management, and toxic release inventories. He has also directed interagency teams in evaluation of federal regional oil spill response exercises. His current research deals
with ocean noise and the effects of military sonars on marine mammal
populations. Dr. Filadelfo was one of the authors of CNA’s report on
National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.
66
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
that were thought to be at particular risk from rising sea levels.
Obviously, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard facilities were
very well represented on that list.
Based on the combination of that NIE, some work we did at
CNA that looked at the links between climate change and national
security, and some other work we did looking at the implications of
the change in the Arctic for the Navy, Admiral Gary Roughead, the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), asked the Naval Studies Board
at the National Academy of Sciences to examine the national security implications of climate change for U.S. naval forces; I had the
honor of serving on that panel. During our deliberations we spent
quite a bit of time looking at infrastructure issues.
Going in, I thought the overall emphasis would be on operations and security. But to my surprise, infrastructure emerged as
an area of significant concern to our Navy leadership. Our final
report came out about a week ago, and the infrastructure section
naturally led with a discussion of sea-level rise. [2] Sea-level rise, as
you all know, is the real wild card of climate change because of its
inherent unpredictability. That is, we cannot predict it really with
any precision as to level or timing given the difficulties associated
with modeling ice sheet dynamics.
Recently, there has been increasing concern within the science
climate community about sea level given the growing consensus
that the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report’s prediction of sea-level
rise this century is going to have to be modified upward, and perhaps significantly upward. [3] The National Academy of Sciences
report recommended to the CNO and the Navy leadership that the
Navy use a planning factor for sea-level rise of about 0.8 meters
this century. [2] However, the report states that the rise could be as
high as 2 meters. When the Naval Studies Board began its deliberations about 18 months ago, 2 meters was pretty much out of
the question.
Of course, sea-level rise is not the only risk that our installation
plan is going to need to consider. Water supply and water rights
could be bigger issues than they are now. Of course, heat stress
could affect our ability to train at our installations. Extreme weather
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
67
could also impact our infrastructure. So, our military services are
now beginning to consider these things and look at how to meet
these coming climate challenges.
The Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, which
is run out of the White House, is co-chaired by the Council on
Environmental Quality, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
The Task Force is staffed with representatives from about 20 federal
agencies, including the DoD. This group recently recommended
that the federal government strengthen the nation’s capacity to plan
for coming climate changes. [4] Interestingly, the Task Force further
recommended that federal agencies make adaptation a standard
part of agency planning; the DoD is now beginning to do this.
This is going to be challenging for the department. As the Naval
Studies Board observes: “The Navy has billions of dollars in assets
exposed to the threats of climate change, and it must make strategic decisions in the face of considerable uncertainty about the
pace, magnitude and regional manifestations of climate change.”
[2] As we know, that is a point that Rear Admiral David Titley has
been hammering home to our Navy leadership for the past 2 years.
The pace is just very difficult to predict.
So, from the point of view of the DoD, several questions are
going to need to be addressed in order to support informed infrastructure planning:
• What critical infrastructure considerations associated with
climate change are applicable to DoD installations?
• At which steps in the current infrastructure planning process
should climate change considerations be inserted?
• What policy changes might we need at the DoD, Department
of the Navy level to ensure that these considerations are
properly accounted for in our installation planning process
that exists?
The panel we have assembled is well qualified to take on these
and other infrastructure issues. I have asked Brigadier General
Gerald Galloway to lead off, and he will discuss briefly some of the
68
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
infrastructure issues he sees looming from the perspective of climate-change engineering. The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel
will then discuss issues particular to the Department of the Navy
and will comment on what the Department is doing with regard
to infrastructure planning. Finally, The Honorable John Warner will
wrap up things from the national level.
REFERENCES
1. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global
Warming: Statement for the Record by Dr. Thomas Fingar,
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, National
Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications
of Global Climate Change to 2030, 2008, http://www.dni.gov/
testimonies/20080625_testimony.pdf.
2. Naval Studies Board, National Security Implications of Climate
Change on U.S. Naval Forces, National Academies Press, 2011.
3. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment
Report: Climate Change 2007, IPCC, 2007.
4. Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, Progress Report of the
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, 2010.
69
Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Jr.
I want to start off by stipulating that certainly we can all agree
that climate change is an issue. It is all of the things you see in
Figure 1, and worst of all, it is the combination of all of these
things. Importantly, too, the chart does not include such effects
as subsidence that creates relative sea-level rise in many locations. So, we are faced with some very interesting challenges as
we move forward.
Climate change impacts are not only a U.S. problem but
also a world problem, which means that wherever our forces are
deployed and wherever we have bases and infrastructure, we will
have to keep this in mind. The other aspect of this is the way we
think about the future.
Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Jr., is a Glenn L. Martin Institute
Professor of Engineering and Affiliate Professor of Public Policy at the
University of Maryland, where he teaches and conducts research in
national water resources policy and management, flood mitigation, and
disaster management. He has served as a consultant to national and
international government and business organizations. He is currently
an advisor to The Nature Conservancy on its Yangtze River Program,
a member of the Louisiana Governor’s commission on coastal protection, and co-chair of the World Water Assessment Programme’s Experts
Group on Policy and was recently appointed by the Secretary of State as
one of three inaugural Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas
Fellows. He has been Presidential appointee to the Mississippi River
Commission and was assigned to the White House to lead a study of the
1993 Mississippi River Flood. He served in the U.S. Army for 38 years,
retiring as a Brigadier General and Dean of Academics at West Point.
He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a Fellow
of the National Academy of Public Administration.
70
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 1. Stipulation: There Are Climate Challenges
I like Figure 2 a lot, because it tells the way I grew up. In the
old days, you looked at planning from the present to the future,
and you looked down a narrow tube and you saw at the end what
it might be like in 50 years. It looked almost like it did today. You
could assume that, especially in terms of climate, things would be
about the same. As a hydrologist, I had all sorts of formulas that
were based on stationarity—the concept that the future can be
based on the past.
Figure 2. Planning for Uncertainty [1]
Somebody reported 2 years ago that stationarity is dead. What
does that mean? Well, it means that the future is going to be far
different than the past. Instead of looking down a thin pipe, we
are now looking out through a cone. That total area there shown
by the cone is the space of potential variability—the broad set of
potential scenarios that might occur as the result of climate change.
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
71
Sea-level rise might be 0.8 meters, or it might be 2 or 3 meters.
Right now, we really do not know. And you can stack into that all
of the other changes that are occurring around us. So, planning
under uncertainty today has yet to be figured out.
I will give you a clue. If you want to build a levee somewhere
in the United States, you ask, well, what is the 100-year flood going
to be in 50 years? It is not going to be what it is today; it is going to
be considerably different. But we do not know yet what it is going
to be. So how do you plan under those sets of circumstances? As
you go forward the question then becomes, how do you convince
people who are used to having things the same, and who think in
terms of 4- or 5-year increments, to think about what has to be 50
or 60 years from now? It is a problem that we have to overcome in
dealing with infrastructure because truly, tomorrow’s infrastructure
will not be the same as today’s.
What is infrastructure? Well, as many of my students would tell
you, the best place to start is Wikipedia. So I pulled this definition
for what we might want to call maritime infrastructure (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Maritime Infrastructure
I think it is important to recognize that infrastructure is a lot of
things. It is the bases from which we operate. It is the places where
people live, where people work, and the locations around that particular area that provide protection–the breakwaters, the levees,
and the other sorts of facilities we have. So it is a pretty complex
undertaking when you try and pin down what infrastructure is.
72
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
When you get into critical infrastructure, you can narrow it a bit,
but you do not really have critical infrastructure that operates in the
long term without the rest of that infrastructure.
What are the potential climate change threats to our coastal
infrastructure? Well, as you can see from Figure 4, it is not just
the coast because in most of the areas in which we operate, the
coast is the location where rivers enter the sea. So, we will have
problems with riverine flooding. We also have maritime installations on our inland waterways, and those that are very important
to our international commerce. You can take the largest port in the
United States, Southern Louisiana. How much of that is far from
the sea? So, increased riverine flooding begins to take a toll.
Figure 4. Potential Coastal Climate Change Threats
What about increased hurricanes and typhoons? They are
going to cause a problem. They are going to create surges that we
have not yet experienced, increased storm-water flooding. It turns
out that the British have been looking at their problems from water
and flooding and they have discovered that about 30% of the flood
damages do not come from riverine flooding or from coastal flooding, they come from pluvial flooding or storm-water flooding. The
problem with that is, as the intensity of rainfall increases, getting rid
of all that additional water poses an even greater challenge. And if
sea level is in fact higher, you will have that same problem of where
do you put that additional water? And if climate change results in
more frequent storms, you will have even more water to deal with.
What then do you do, what are the potential climate change
challenges that we face as we move forward? As shown in Figure 5,
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
73
certainly the inundation of developed areas will be a concern. That
is something we are already facing in many places, and it is going
to get worse from the three climate change effects that I noted earlier. If you look at downtown Washington, D.C., you will recognize
we have all of those problems there. They are not unique to just
coastal areas. Any area that is near waters that can be influenced
by tidal variations will also be affected by the problems with storm
surges and sea-level rise.
Figure 5. Impacts of Climate Change on Infrastructure
The next challenge that we will have to face is erosion. Erosion
can cause you to lose many of your important facilities. It can
degrade your protection systems; breakwaters can come apart, and
levies can be undermined. Erosion can also degrade transportation
facilities. If you cannot move cargo out of a port, then you have a
problem. If you cannot bring supplies in because of the connectivity to the mainland or other areas around, you have a significant
problem. Yet another consideration that is not often thought of as a
climate change effect is the potential impact on our wetlands and
on our groundwater. For many years, as sea level has been rising,
the West Coast has been experiencing an increasing intrusion of
salinity into groundwater supplies in that very arid region. While
there are steps that one can take, all of those require resources.
As you may have read, we are also rapidly losing wetlands.
The state of Louisiana, for example, is losing about 25–40 square
miles of coastal wetlands each year. These areas are important
because they provide barrier protection to the people who live in
74
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
that region. They also protect the 35% of our nation’s oil and gas
industry that is located along the Gulf Coast. You can go on and
on. The point is that we need to be conscious of all of the components of the overall infrastructure.
Well, what can we do about it? I will not go through a detailed
discussion of this, but I will point out some comments that the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) made
about sea-level rise. What can you do? You can retreat, you can
move away. That is not very feasible for most of the facilities for the
services, whether it be Army, Navy, or Air Force.
You can accommodate by doing things such as elevating
homes, elevating structures, and raising the facilities you already
have and adapt in much the same way. The adaptation is different from the accommodation in the sense that you can adapt over
time—you can build a program that will let you make changes
as sea level rises. This approach, however, is not always the most
efficient from a resource standpoint.
The third way you can deal with it is to try to protect your
installations by building more levees and sea walls. As we learned
in Louisiana, that is only a risk-reduction tool, not a protection tool.
It does not guarantee you anything. All of these things are going
to cost you money, and that is the challenge. Engineers have the
ability to deal with these particular challenges, but they require
resources and large amounts of resources.
So what are we dealing with? We are dealing with the identification of risk and how we are going to deal with that risk. What are
we going to do to make risk go down as we move forward? What
sorts of things can we implement? How much risk is too much for
the Navy or for the Army or for the Air Force? How are we going to
deal with that at Joint Base Langley-Eustis? How much protection
should you provide? I think that is the challenge.
Figure 6 shows the typical description of risk. Unacceptable
risk is shown as dark blue. We all know what that is—we are not
going to fly in an airplane with no engines or one that is about to
fall apart. Acceptable risk appears at the bottom. Those of us who
drove here today determined that the risk associated with doing so
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
75
was acceptable risk or else we would have chosen to stay home.
So, we know what that level of risk means. The open question is:
What do we do with that area in the middle? Who decides where
we are in that? That level of risk applies to everything we are doing
in the risk management for installations. We are going to have to
make some tough decisions. Then, we will need to put the money
where the risk is the greatest.
Figure 6. What Do Risk Values Mean? [2]
There is another challenge that we need to address as we move
forward. We need to know where we currently stand. As a member
of the American Society of Civil Engineers, I can report that we
have a problem with our infrastructure. The report card that we
received in 2009 gave our nation a D grade for its infrastructure.
We are not doing well in maintaining what we have. Those of
us who have been in the service have experienced this over our
lifetime. It always gets to the crunch point where money has to
be diverted to operations. Where does that money come from? It
inevitably comes from maintenance. As a result, we have ended
up with infrastructure that is not as good as we would like it to be.
The second thing we need to do is identify what risks we actually have. It is amazing as you look at the coastal United States
and the related riverine flood environment, we do not really know
what our exposure is. In some cases, we do not want to know
because we are afraid that the cost of reducing that exposure will
76
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
be too high. So what do we do about that? We need to find out
what our exposure is and then assess the risk. Once we have done
that, we can develop an action plan that will deal with the issues
over the long haul.
Why am I showing you that the population is increasing
(Figures 7 and 8)?
Figure 7. Population Growth
Figure 8. The Boom to Come [3]
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
77
We know that we are going to face an increase in population
in this country over the next 15–30 years. The Census Bureau says
that the U.S. population could increase by as much as 150 million.
That is a lot of people. They have to go somewhere. Where they
seem most likely to go are the places that they have been going
recently: our coastal areas.
Given this increase in population, we know that we are going
to have an increase in construction. We also know that roughly
40% of our nation’s existing infrastructure needs to be replaced
because it is simply too old. So, between now and 2050, we are
going to have a massive construction program going on. At the
same time, we are going to have problems from the rising sea level.
How do we deal with this nexus of problems?
Well, I think the challenge comes because what happens on
our military bases actually carries over to what happens in the
communities nearby. Similarly, what happens in those communities affects what happens on our bases. We are not independent
anymore. As much as we would like to stand on our own, there
is a connectivity there that is very important. We share utilities in
many cases. We share the same transportation networks. Although
many of our military installations have their own medical facilities,
in emergencies, they may have to rely on the resources available in
the civilian community.
Transportation includes the relevant infrastructure internal to
the immediate region as well as facilities that support transportation that extends beyond the region such as overseas shipping.
This latter component includes shipyards and related facilities that
provide the base for what we are doing. Thus, the city of Norfolk is
critically important to the overall Hampton Roads military area. If
we are dealing with these places, we have to take them with us as
we move forward. To ignore sea-level rise and the climate change
impacts on these communities is at our own peril because what
happens to them is going to happen to us. We have to figure out a
way—using our joint land use studies and some of the other things
done by the DoD—to address climate change on a win–win basis
with our local communities.
78
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
What is my bottom line as we go forward? Climate change is
going to happen. I do not think we can avoid that. As a professor
at the University of Maryland, I frequently have students who still
do not believe in climate change; they say, “No, I have learned at
home that there is no such thing as climate change.” But gradually,
as they see and learn more about what is happening around them,
and as the number of natural disasters grows every year, they come
to believe that climate change is occurring and that it is going to
have a significant impact on our maritime infrastructure.
It is possible to deal with climate change impacts on infrastructure, so we need to start thinking about what we are going to do
and develop the appropriate plans, whether they are adaptation,
protection, or retreat. Tough decisions are going to have to be made
regarding priorities, acceptable risk, and resource levels/funding.
Installation protection is not as sexy as some of the other things
that we have heard about today, but it is just as critical for the wellbeing of our force, especially the Army and the Air Force, who are
not as used to water as the Navy and the Coast Guard are. Clearly,
something needs to be done, and we have to recognize that in
addition to the things we do for ourselves, somehow we have to
influence the things that are done for others as we move forward.
I think we have to always remember that nature bats last and
nature does not make any promises. It cannot say that we are going
to be here or there in 15, 20, or 40 years. We just know something
is happening, and we had better be ready for it.
REFERENCES
1. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc. and Denver Water (Waage), Decision Support
Planning Methods: Incorporating Climate Change Uncertainties
into Water Planning, 2010, http://www.wucaonline.org/assets/
pdf/pubs_whitepaper_012110.pdf.
2. E. Mark Lee, How Does Climate Change Affect the Assessment of
Landslide Risk?, 2006.
3. Arthur Nelson, “America Circa 2030: The Boom To Come,”
Architect, 2006, http://www.architectmagazine.com/retailprojects/america-circa-2030-the-boom-to-come.aspx.
79
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel
Let me start with a point that may be obvious to a lot of
people, namely that the Pentagon, and the whole DoD for that
matter, recognizes the importance of climate change and the need
to address it. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review provides a
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel was appointed Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment) in
March 2010. In this position, Secretary Pfannenstiel is responsible for
formulating department-wide policies, procedures, and advocacy and
strategic plans as well as overseeing all Department of the Navy functions and programs related to installations, safety, energy, and environment. Secretary Pfannenstiel is a former chairwoman of the State of
California Energy Commission. Secretary Pfannenstiel was appointed
by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to the commission in 2004 and
served until January 2009. Her responsibilities included licensing new
generating facilities and development of California’s integrated energy
policies. She chaired the Governor’s Climate Action Team subgroup
on energy and land use and worked on the creation of California’s
low carbon fuel standards. Prior to her role at the Energy Commission,
Secretary Pfannenstiel served as an independent energy consultant,
providing assistance to wind energy development projects as well as
helping local housing authorities manage energy costs in public housing facilities. Previously, Secretary Pfannenstiel spent 20 years at
Pacific Gas and Electric Company and its parent, PG&E Corporation.
She joined the company in 1980 and, in 1987, she was promoted to
vice president of Corporate Planning. At PG&E, she led the company’s
participation in a multiparty collaborative proceeding that produced
many of California’s innovative regulatory policies promoting energy
efficiency. Secretary Pfannenstiel is a past member of the Board of
Trustees of Clark University. She was also on the Board of Directors
of the Alliance to Save Energy and a Director of Energy Recovery, Inc.
Secretary Pfannenstiel graduated from Clark University with a B.A. in
economics and the University of Hartford with an M.A. in economics.
80
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
good discussion of the worldwide vulnerabilities to climate change,
including the geopolitical consequences, poverty, environmental
degradation, humanitarian consequences, food and water scarcity,
spreading of diseases, mass migrations, and the physical consequences—rainfall, temperature, thawing permafrost, earlier snowmelt, and alterations in river flow. [1] Based on this, the report
concludes that these consequences can lead to increased demand
for humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
So, the whole DoD recognizes this. The Department of the
Navy is thinking along the lines of the vulnerabilities that we face.
Fundamentally, what we are thinking is that climate change may
well affect our mission readiness. The areas within the United States
that are most vulnerable to the effects of sea-level rise and storm
surge are New Orleans and the Hampton Roads area of Virginia
where we have an enormous concentration of naval bases. We
know that sea level is rising; we have documented that. We also
have the potential for flooding, for greater storm damage, and for
shoreline erosion.
Given our facilities on the coast, climate-caused changes could
have an incredible impact on our future readiness. We also know
that a hotter and drier climate in the Southwest, for example, is
going to affect water availability. We know that we can expect
weather extremes in the Southeast. All of these changes have the
potential to affect our training and our testing on our installations.
So the Navy has two ways of looking at it: mitigation strategies and
adaptation strategies.
Our mitigation strategies are fundamentally our aggressive
energy goals. I know that Rear Admiral Philip Cullom talked about
them earlier, but let me just emphasize the fact that we are viewing
energy as mission critical—it is what we need to do our mission.
We also need to protect our bases from supply shortages, from
volatility, and from grid outages, and we are doing that not just
because it is the right environmental action to take, but because it
is in the nation’s interest and is part of our national defense mission.
As you are aware, the Secretary of the Navy has set some very
aggressive energy goals, two of which I will mention because they
will make a big difference. One is that by 2020, half of the energy
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
81
that the Department of the Navy uses will come from non-fossil
fuel sources. Given the fact that 75% of the energy that we use
now is used for operations in ships, planes, and tactical vehicles,
that is a big challenge. Another goal that he has issued is that by
2020, half of our Navy and Marine installations will be zero net
energy. They will produce as much energy as they use. So what
does that mean? Well, from a fossil fuel standpoint, it means we
will use less, and it means that our contribution to greenhouse
gasses will be that much less.
So that is what we are thinking about in mitigation; that is
where we are going. Can the Department of the Navy alone make
a difference in the United States? Our greenhouse gas emissions
will not make the difference, but if we model how energy can be
used and how to build a more energy efficient base and a more
energy efficient community, then yes, we can make a difference.
The adaptation strategy is fundamentally about building sustainable infrastructure. That means continuing to build our energyefficient bases using the technologies and the practices that will
help us meet the Secretary’s goals. It also means that we need to
look at adaptation for both the long and short run.
The DoD together with the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Department of Energy has launched the Strategic Environment Research and Development Program (SERDP), which is doing
a series of studies that look at our military bases. They are looking
both at vulnerabilities and at the set of tools that our bases and
installations can use to meet certain climate events. By postulating
specific climate events such as storm surge and sea-level rise in
specific years, they are examining how base commanders may be
able to deal with those events.
When completed, those studies will give us a series of tools
that we can use for all of our bases. We have already started going
to each individual Navy and Marine Corps base to look at the
specific vulnerabilities to climate change effects and to see what
tools will be needed. One of the conclusions that we have already
drawn is that we need to be holistic. We do not stand alone. Our
bases are not separate from their communities. Our bases rely on
the local power grid; they rely on the local transportation system;
82
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
they worry about the food supply. So, to the extent that our bases
are developing strategies, those strategies need to include the
greater community. That means sharing information back and forth
with the community, and it means preparing our infrastructure on
an expanded basis.
Task Force Climate Change draws on the talents of some 600
U.S. government employees, not just across the military but across
other parts of the government. There are other task forces that have
grown up on both the East and West Coasts with local communities working with the science community, government, business,
and academia to look at local area climate effects and adaptation
strategies. That is true in the Virginia area, and it is true on the West
Coast where this is something that has come up not because it
was required and not because it was structured by government per
se, but rather because it is the communities who are worried. The
Department of the Navy is involved in these activities and is both
providing information and helping to develop appropriate strategies.
The fact that such collaborations are happening, I think, leads
to the conclusion that communities are looking for a national
strategy and are looking for some leadership at the national level
to make sure that all of the various risks are being assessed and
that the infrastructure is being built to be adaptable. The question
then becomes: who will pay for adaptation? Who will pay to build
the levees or to move bases where we decide that they need to
be moved?
From the perspective of the Department of Navy, this investment needs to be part of our overall readiness. We need to do this
because we need to be militarily ready and so that is part of the
investment that we would make in national defense. But in fact, if
the American public does not believe that climate change is happening, should we really expect that Congress is going to fund
whatever adaptation strategies we might develop?
REFERENCE
1. Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review,
2010,  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_
12Feb10_1000.pdf.
83
The Honorable John Warner
I asked to go last not knowing that all the hot balls would be
passed down the table to end up in front of me. But I will try and
address each of those very important points. First, I am privileged
to have as a client the Pew Foundation, and they have sponsored
During his 30 years in the Senate, The Honorable John Warner focused
primarily on national security, foreign affairs, and intelligence. He
served on the Senate Armed Services Committee, at times as Chairman,
the Senate Committee on Intelligence, at times as the Vice Chairman,
and various other committees. Earlier in his career, the Senator volunteered for two periods of active military duty: the first as an enlisted
sailor in the final years of World War II (1945–1946) and the second as
a Lieutenant in the U.S. Marines, where he served as a communications
officer in the First Marine Air Wing during the Korean War (1950–1952).
After completing his law degree at the University of Virginia School of
Law, he clerked for The Honorable E. Barrett Prettyman, U.S. Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. From 1955
to 1960, he was in the Department of Justice serving as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the District of Columbia. He joined Hogan & Hartson as
an associate in 1961 and became a partner in 1964. He left Hogan &
Hartson in 1969 when he was appointed, and confirmed by the Senate,
as Under Secretary, and later as Secretary, of the U.S. Navy. He served
in those positions during the Vietnam War and during the Cold War. In
1974, the Senator was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as administrator for
the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration, where he administered federal programs in all 50 states and international programs with
22 foreign nations that participated in this historic 200-year anniversary
of the founding of our nation. Subsequently, he waged 2 years of political campaigning, winning election to his first of five Senate terms in
November 1978. On January 3, 2009, he completed his fifth consecutive term and retired, establishing a record of being the second longestserving U.S. Senator in the history of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
84
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
me to travel to now 18 states to address the public. A typical visit
takes me into a community to speak with the legislative body, the
governor’s office, the chambers of commerce, and the city councils
and to have a public forum, usually at a nearby university. I want to
come back at the end and close with some of those experiences.
First, though, I want to say that the job being done by this
forum and each of you individually and collectively will eventually, hopefully, get into a book like the one produced by last year’s
symposium. On behalf of Pew, I have been to over 100 different
conferences all across the country, and this book is about as good
as it gets in writing regarding the subjects we are addressing today.
I have never seen any better.
In my judgment, the subject of the nexus between energy
and climate change and national security is gaining momentum,
and people are beginning to pay attention, as was mentioned by
General Gerald Galloway. But here is the problem. A recent Pew
report looked at the 20 major industrial nations, looked at their
GDP, looked at their job structure, and looked at the context of
what they are doing in climate and energy and the like.
Those nations that had a national energy policy were forging
ahead, just as The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel pointed out.
We, the United States, do not have such a policy, and we are falling behind. We were not up in the top four or five on that chart,
we were down at about eighth or ninth, somewhere in that area.
Those of you who like to study the economic relationships of the
subject would be well advised to look at that report.
Now I do not tend to be an expert on much in life, but I did
spend 30 years in the Senate, and I think I understand some of the
fundamentals of the legislative body. Winston Churchill once said
that the first obligation of every parliamentarian (and he was actually referring to the British Parliament) is to get himself or herself
reelected. If you can do some good along the way, that is all well
and good.
I just think that we are on the precipice; we are doing things
to this planet that could produce cataclysmic results. We have to
come to grips with that in this country. Folks, I would be less than
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
85
honest if I did not tell you that right now I do not see, and I do not
say this in a pejorative or negative sense, that coming together in
the Congress to really consider the situation.
So we have two cataclysms crashing on this country at the
same time. We need to address climate change, we need to fund
our adaptations, and we need to engender how to get it done. At
the same time, we have this budget crisis we face. So I go back to
Churchill, he said get reelected. The only way you get reelected is
if you do things that satisfy the instincts, motivations, and desires of
your constituents. We will not be able to make any progress until
we convince hometown America, main street America, that this
subject is going to affect them or that it is going to really affect their
children and grandchildren unless we address it. The same argument has to be made about fiscal policy in this country.
So our job, the job of those of us who are interested in this subject and are willing to take the time—as Secretary Pfannenstiel and
General Galloway have done—is not only to convey our technical
knowledge and perspectives but also to help figure out how we are
going to message this to the general public and message it in a way
that they understand it.
I am going to tell a little story on myself, and I never tell a story
unless it is a story on me and it is sticking me in the ribs. I was a
very aggressive, not so bright, but energetic Secretary of the Navy
and I was visiting the Sixth Fleet. I always did my homework, and I
checked on every ship’s route there. I spotted one that I was interested in, and I said: “You know, I want to go visit that ship.”
When I arrived in the Sixth Fleet, I told the commander that I
wanted to visit this certain ship, so he directed his subordinates to
let the Secretary get aboard that ship. As it turned out, this particular ship was in the process of getting a new helo pad, so you could
not get to it by helicopter which was the way I had been traveling. So, I had to use a breach’s buoy, which is throwing two lines
to the ship from another ship going along at the same speed, and
then getting in a little canvas bucket so that a bosun’s mate could
haul you over. But that did not appeal to the senior officers one
damn bit, because if they dumped the Secretary of the Navy into
86
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
the Mediterranean in a high-sea state, they probably would not get
their next star. But I insisted that I was going to go.
Well, the reason I went out there was because this ship had
a 1200-pound steam plant. The captain of the ship was a young
lieutenant commander. I told him that I never went aboard a ship
without going into the engine room. Because as somebody said
in the Royal Navy in World War II, all battle plans begin in the
engine room.
So I went down there because if the crew knows that the
Secretary went to the engine room, then he is one of you and he
is thinking about how you run the ship. So I went down and was
met by this big strong guy. He was covered with sweat because
the place was full of steam. I asked, “Can you get this thing up to
31 knots?” He turned to the captain and asked, “Who is this guy?”
“He is the Secretary of the Navy,” came the reply. “Should I answer
the question?” “Yes,” was the captain’s answer. So the chief said:
“I expect I could because this is one of Burke’s 31-knot beavers.”
So I went up on the bridge with the captain, and we cranked it
up to 31 knots because Admiral Arleigh “31 knot” Burke was one
of my mentors. We got it up to 31 knots, and I called the Sixth Fleet
commander up and told him what we had done. Well, I am telling
you, he keel hauled me verbally and said you bring that throttle
back down, that might blow up the steam plant and everything
else. So I always think of that story, that if we do not get this thing
right, we will have a problem on our hands in this country.
So I am going to finish up my remarks by just saying Congress
has got to look at their responsibility in terms of leverage. As part of
the good work being done by this forum and by many others elsewhere across America to deal with this message, we have got to
figure out how to convince the voters to put knowledgeable ladies
and gentlemen into the Congress and then convince those elected
to do what has to be done. If Congress passes a national policy,
then American can move ahead; it will create jobs and generate
dramatic changes to help our economy.
So therein rests the leverage. I will continue to speak on behalf
of Pew and others. Ultimately, though, we have to get our message
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
87
into a couple of pages so that local mainstream America can
understand all your good and handy work. Let us hope that someday in the not-too-distant future that the American public and the
Congress will recognize the tremendous leverage they have to help
America get out of this dilemma.
Believe me, Secretary Robert Gates—whom I have known for
many, many years in all his iterations—has really set the course
and speed with his service secretaries. While in some instances
they are competitive, in others, they need to work together. They
have to share their thoughts. We do not always want everybody to
build their own stovepipe. In many cases we need a team effort. A
clear example, as I mentioned before, is how the President of the
United States has tried his best to address this subject.
Now we are in a different sort of a situation—the reelection
cycle is coming up. And frankly, I credit this forum for at least
bringing up climate change. You would be surprised how at many
of the forums to which I am invited to speak, they will say, “Well,
we have taken climate change off the agenda,” and I tell them, “No
way, I am going to talk about it anyway,” which I continue to do,
as General Galloway did. It has to be brought up, even though it is
a term that has now almost dropped from the lexicon of those who
are trying to address the energy and the security problems.
88
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo: Okay, before we open it up to the floor
for questions: Secretary Pfannenstiel and General Galloway, do
you have any quick follow-up remarks?
Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Jr.: I must say that the
only time that the Army, Navy, and Air Force are not on the same
team is when they are competing in sports. Otherwise, they are the
closest friends we have, and we are part of this common approach
to dealing with the nation’s defense.
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel: I would just like to follow-up on a point that Senator Warner raised about which I could
not agree more: we need to find a way of messaging climate change
to the general public. Part of that is what we are doing here, talking
about the nexus among energy and climate and national security,
but all of us who are part of the discussion here need to find a way
to do that.
The Honorable John Warner: Folks, in these trips that I take,
we bring with us whenever it is possible two or three retired general or flag officers—with two, three, or four stars—from CNA’s
Military Advisory Board. I have spoken 10,000 times; and my voice
is gone now because I have flapped it so much over my lifetime,
but I go in and people perceive it as the usual senatorial blather
and they all sort of nod their heads. But when that retired admiral
or general gets up to talk, the audience is riveted because of the
credibility attached to our uniformed people and the retired people today. When they speak, America listens. And that has been
one of CNA’s greatest contributions to this whole setup.
would like to follow up on one of Secretary Pfannenstiel’s
Q: Icomments.
You mentioned the studies being made of base
vulnerabilities to climate change in that there will be expenditures
needed to adapt or mitigate. Are you also looking at energy vulnerabilities and dependencies?
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
89
The Honorable John Warner: Oh, very definitely. It is an awesome subject, and I frequently address that. Our national grid is
so vulnerable, the question of the sources of the energy and the
whole thing. We are going through this despairing situation in
Japan. Folks, we cannot as a nation slip away from advancing on
the nuclear front and further looking at means by which to access
that as a part of our overall power needs. Twenty percent of our
electrical needs in America are met by nuclear power. We cannot
simply decide to let those plants go and not be replaced.
In addition, we have got to look at ways to advance the technology—of course, adopting every safety measure—and move on
into the future. How many times have I used and have you used,
Secretary Pfannenstiel, the fact that the U.S. Navy is operating
today about 60 to 70 nuclear plants on ships throughout the world
with a marvelous record?
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel: The Senator is absolutely correct—we are looking very seriously at every one of our
bases for their energy use. I mentioned that one of the Secretary
of the Navy’s goals is 50% of the bases being zero net energy by
2020. In order to do that, we have to go to every base, because
each one is different. The ones in the Pacific Northwest have different resource availabilities and issues than the ones in the southeast, for example.
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo: I would point out that according to the
2008 Defense Science Board report on DoD energy use, one of
our great vulnerabilities is that our installations are over-reliant on
the commercial power grid. [1]
Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Jr.: As I recall, the last
Military Advisory Board report talked about ways in which the
Department of Energy and the DoD could cooperate in dealing
with energy and getting renewable energy. [2] I would point out
that our military installations are great test beds. You have people
there who know and understand what R&D is and who are used to
using things forward. At the same time, you build your own independence by having the ability to support others. Such things as
small nuclear plants could be put on military installations, as could
90
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
wind farms. Whatever you happen to do, you can bring it together
at a military installation and let the DoD lead the way.
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel: That is right, we are
using the bases as test beds wherever we can, which is in quite
a few places and with quite a few technologies. I think that in
the day of smart meters and of the smart grid, it is a very different technological world than it was even a decade ago. We also
have to recognize, though, that are bases are part of communities, and they are invariably integrated with the local utility grid. In
some cases, we can generate sufficient power on our own, but we
need to make sure that it is the right thing economically and that
it is the right thing from a national security standpoint. There are a
lot of questions there that I think we are just at the early stages of
answering.
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo: At one time, we talked about islanding
our installations, making them self-reliant. We no longer seem to
do that for a couple of reasons. There are business case reasons
why we might not want to do that, but our installations tend to be
part of a community. We cannot island Naval Station Norfolk from
the surrounding community. If the surrounding community goes
down, how are our people going to get to and from work?
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel: I think the point is
that technologically, we probably can physically island any of the
bases. At some point, we may want to have enough generating
capacity of our own that we could rely exclusively on that if it
made sense to do so. But in the greater scheme of the U.S. energy
picture, we have to be very wise in terms of how we relate to the
local community.
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo: Let me ask a question having to do with
the Navy’s ability to conduct long-range planning. Simply stated,
my question is: is there any particular science-related information
that the Navy or the DoD needs in order to develop future plans
regarding our maritime infrastructure?
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel: The answer is yes, but I
do not think I can identify them off of the top of my head. We are
continually struggling with some of the energy technologies, for
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
91
example. As I mentioned before, the Navy and Marine Corps have
over 100 bases, and each one is absolutely unique in terms of its
physical situation, its needs, and its mission. So yes, for each base,
there are information needs for that base for making the right economic decisions and the right national security decisions. A lot of
what we are looking at is not so much a global forecast or a U.S.
projection, but rather a regional or even a local projection.
mentioned that it is very important that we try to educate
Q: You
the public about climate change. Unfortunately, my experi-
ence has been that our leaders and our future leaders do not really have
a good grasp on climate change or energy security. Are there initiatives
underway that will ensure that these issues are addressed in our professional military education from the lowest levels to the highest?
The Honorable John Warner: I am scheduled in about a month
or so to go out to the Navy Postgraduate School. I intend to cover
it out there. After that, I will be speaking at the Army War College
at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. But, you know, again people will say,
“The old senator is blathering on.” The military has taken this challenge on ever so seriously, and I just hope that you young officers
will avail yourselves of opportunities to speak to your peer group
because that is where we are going to make the progress.
The force multiplier of Congress putting in place a law is just
enormous, and it will help the job situation and the like. I am just
concerned about the current fiscal environment because having
spent a goodly number of years in the Pentagon, you always kept
at least two budgets in your drawer, and sometimes three, because
you would find that even though you had put an entry in the service Program Objective Memorandum (POM), you now had to
take it all out. Sometimes, you kept cutting until, unfortunately,
R&D was cut. So many of the things that were described up here
on the cutting edge of technology are going to be the ones that
people can shave off by saying, “Oh, let’s do the best we can with
what we have until we can afford to go from what we have to
where we should go.”
You have to really take that argument on forcefully and keep it
in balance. While we want to modernize our bases to be energy
92
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
efficient, the services’ first priority will invariably be weapons,
ships, and cockpits and modernization of your artillery and your
tanks and so forth. So, it is going to be hard to get energy-efficient
bases into the budget.
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel: I absolutely agree, but
I would take it a step further and go back to where you started in
answering the question, which is make sure that everybody understands, regardless of whether you are talking about climate change
or about energy. I think that we are working in that direction. We
are working with Rear Admiral Philip Cullom to bring energy into
the curriculum everywhere we can, because we are convinced
that when people understand how critical energy is to the national
defense and our national security interests, people will make the
right decisions. They will make the right decisions about immediate use, about facilities, and about future platforms. But, we need
to make sure such considerations are included in the curriculums
at our service schools.
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo: I do not know if it is okay to plug a
book, but I will say I have nothing to do with it. At Rear Admiral
Cullom’s Energy Conference in Washington, D.C., last fall, he spoke
about Daniel Yergin’s classic book, “The Prize.” [3] Based on Rear
Admiral Cullom’s prodding, I picked up that book and just finished
it. It provided eye-opening reading about how our national security in the Middle East is inseparable from energy.
The Honorable John Warner: Let me just pick up on that.
Folks, I am 84 years old, and I have seen a lot of America and what
has transformed. People ask me what the difference is between the
Senate today and what it was when I came in some 33 years ago. It
is communications. When I came to the Senate, we were all reading newspapers and books. Now, you have to figure out how you
are going to get this on Facebook and blogs. I am telling you, that
is the way America is learning things—texting. It is a challenge to
take this and get that, but that is the way America is learning things
now.
Dr. Graeme Stephens: I am a climate scientist and I might be
the only climate scientist in this room. Today has been a real eye
Chapter 3 Adapting Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
93
opener for me. Last week we held a special symposium at the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory on communicating climate to the public.
One of the key messages from that was to keep the message simple
and have it come from a credible messenger.
As I reflect on this, I believe that scientists are not the right
messengers for climate change because the debate about climate
and global warming has kind of partitioned the climate community
into those who believe and those who do not believe, although
the majority of the climate scientists believe that warming is real
and climate change is with us. But what has been real eye opening
for me today is the fact that the military has moved so far ahead
toward adaptation. I think that is a key message point, because the
military is a credible messenger.
I think you have an important role to play in educating the public because you actually are adapting to climate change. I think that
is a powerful message that will get across to the public more than
if we scientists say that it is happening or that it is likely to happen.
Rear Admiral David Titley: Senator Warner, you talk about
Facebook and all those kind of things. Believe it or not, both Task
Force Climate Change and Task Force Energy are on Facebook. So
we are using those types of ways of getting out the message. When
we spoke in Norfolk, the Norfolk Pilot picked it up. National Public
Radio, their current problems notwithstanding, has been very supportive of getting this message out. We have put both climate and
energy into the curriculums at the Naval Academy, at the Naval
Postgraduate School, and at the Navy War College. I know that at
both the Navy War College and the Naval Postgraduate School,
a lot of our Air Force and Army colleagues serve at those institutions. So those are just a few things that we are doing to try to get
the message out.
The Honorable John Warner: Well Admiral, I am not trying to
put anybody on report; I am just telling you what my experiences
have been in trying to deliver this message. But I would say to
you well done sir for what that communication agenda does. But
again, I come back to a basic point. I have said it three times, and
I will say it a fourth time: people are listening to the United States
94
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
military. So when you put it on a blog, they are listening. When
you put it into the media for them to see, they will listen. I get up
there and stand on my head on a blog, and they will not listen to
me. That is where you got—and it is up to you to help carry that
message as you are doing, so well done.
REFERENCES
1. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, “More Fight—Less Fuel,”
2008, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf.
2. The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of
Climate Change, 2007.
3. Daniel Yergin, The Prize, Free Press, 1993.
Chapter 4
A da p t i n g R e s e a rc h
P r i o r i t i e s to
C l i m at e C h a l l e n g e s
97
Captain Timothy Gallaudet
By way of introduction, Isaac Asimov once said that science
gathers knowledge much faster than society gathers wisdom; I
think that is pretty appropriate in view of our discussion about the
climate debate. The Navy’s position is this: There is broad scientific consensus on global warming, on the fact that global warming
exists, and on the changes that are currently happening and projected to happen with our climate. If you look at the history of this
debate, the reality is that the consensus is so strong that it really
should not even be regarded as a debate. Back in the 1600s, there
was a debate as to whether the Earth revolved around the sun or
vice versa. I think the scientific consensus is established today, and
there is really little discussion about that fact. The same should be
the case for the climate discussion. Climate change is occurring,
and the vast majority of scientists agree and view it as such, so the
Navy does not really respond to much of the noise that we hear.
With regard to research, one of Task Force Climate Change’s
goals is reducing the current uncertainties in climate changes and
in the projections regarding those changes, as well as identifying
potential engineering solutions that might be required to adapt to
those changes. Over the past 2 days, we have heard about some
of the significant issues that affect maritime forces with regard to
climate change. For example, Rear Admiral David Titley described
Captain Timothy Gallaudet is currently Rear Admiral David Titley’s
Deputy Director of Task Force Climate Change. Captain Gallaudet was
commissioned in 1989 after graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy.
He holds master’s and Ph.D. degrees in physical oceanography from
Scripps Institution of Oceanography in San Diego. He has had 7 years of
sea duty, including service in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
98
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
how the melting of the ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica is
contributing to sea-level rise. We need to know when and to what
extent that sea level will affect our installations. So, that is certainly
an area of research interest for the Navy. There is also the question
of timing with respect to the reduction in Arctic sea ice.
Yet another area of interest for us is better understanding the
relationship between climate change and storm intensity. Earlier,
Rear Admiral Titley showed data for what is called the average
cyclone index; based on such information, there does not appear
to be a global consensus on what storms are doing. The oftencited connection between climate change and increasing storms
appears a little fuzzy. So, that is clearly an area where additional
research could prove beneficial.
There are many other areas of potential interest as we will
soon discover from four very distinguished, accomplished, and
very capable speakers who are established leaders in the federal
government with regard to climates and environmental science
and applications.
99
Dr. Frank Herr
I am going to describe some of the research that Office of
Naval Research (ONR) is either conducting or planning for the
next 5–10 years. We have made strategic decisions based on
Dr. Frank Herr has been the Head of the Office of Naval Research
(ONR) Ocean Battlespace Sensing Department since 2001. The Ocean
Battlespace Department is responsible for the Navy’s and Marine
Corps’ science and technology in ocean and meteorological science,
undersea warfare, mine warfare, space technology, and marine mammals. It comprises two divisions and 14 programs spanning sensing,
systems, and geophysical processes and prediction. The department
also has built and cares for six oceanographic research vessels. From
1996 to 2001, Dr. Herr was director of the Sensing and Systems
Division within ONR. His division’s work spanned undersea warfare, mine warfare, and space technology. Dr. Herr currently is the
U.S. National Representative for the Maritime Systems Group of The
Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), where he coordinates technology among the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand. Dr. Herr was appointed to the Senior Executive
Service in August 1998. Dr. Herr joined federal service in 1977 as a
research chemist at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and conducted research until 1982 when he joined ONR. Dr. Herr became
the Program Manager for Remote Sensing in 1988. From 1992 to
1994, Dr. Herr served on the staff of Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Chief of
Naval Operations, as Assistant for Science and Technology to the CNO
Executive Panel, N00K. Dr. Herr graduated from Hamilton College in
Clinton, New York, with a B.A. degree. He also holds a Ph.D. from
the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. Dr. Herr was a
National Research Council post-doctoral research associate. Dr. Herr
is the author of 22 scientific and technical publications. Dr. Herr
received the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Award
in 1994 and again in 2008, a Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious
Executives in 2005, and the NRL Research Publication Award in 1981.
100
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
conversations that we have had with Rear Admiral David Titley and
the work that he has initiated from the Oceanographer’s Office
and with Rear Admiral Jonathan White, the Commander Navy
Meteorology and Oceanography. Our job at ONR is science and
technology. We are supposed to have the long-term view, but in
this crowd, we are actually the short-term folks because we are
more interested in weather forecasting than in climate change. As
Rear Admiral Titley said, those of us in the DoD and the Navy have
come programmatically a bit late to the climate change issue. I am
leaving it to my colleagues here to get into the climate issues.
Actually, my view of the time spans involved in forecasting
and climate change is changing. I have started thinking of weather
as the government shutdown and climate as an appropriation
for FY2011.
One of the key things that we are starting to work on is what we
are calling Global Seamless Prediction (Figure 1), which is essentially the set of next-generation, coupled ocean–atmosphere–ice
models. Currently, we have 28 environmental prediction systems
to include prediction system models with assimilation of data that
are running at the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO)
and at the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography
Center (FNMOC). As Rear Admiral Titley has rightfully pointed
out, our large-scale models that are used for atmosphere and
ocean prediction are not coupled well enough and they are getting a little bit long in the tooth in terms of the way the code was
developed and the model architecture that was used. It is time
for a new generation of these systems, and our goal is to build the
research that will allow us to put together a fully coupled system
that incorporates a higher resolution down to 1/25th of a degree
at worst. We also intend to add the Arctic to this model. The coupling will be sufficient over broad scales to include the effects
of storms, specifically tropical storms. We have had some good
results so far on forecasting the initiation of storms. The effects
of internal waves in the upper ocean and the acoustic environment are things that we are particularly interested in getting into
these systems as well. So, Global Seamless Prediction overall is
a major strategic goal for us.
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
101
Figure 1. Seamless Global Prediction
Figure 2. Establishment of an Arctic Research Program
Conducting additional research in the Arctic is also one of our
major goals. Now, some of you may remember that Navy science
and technology was in the Arctic back in the Cold War. At that time,
we did not have a lot of partners up there, but we had a pretty big
102
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
program. Over the past 25 years, we have let that Arctic work drop
down and focused on other areas to the point that we have been
spending a little less than $1 million on a few projects, but we are
going to ramp that back up again. We now have more partners in
the Arctic than we had before (see Figure 2), and so we are looking
forward to a good, robust Arctic program. The issue that we have
for the Arctic is to be able to build an Arctic Prediction System that
will couple with the Global Seamless Prediction that I described
earlier. In particular, we want to be able to establish boundary conditions that are important for the more temporal latitudes.
As you may know, we have no climatology for where the
Arctic is going now; we do not really have a way to say this is
the way the Arctic works. So, we want to build a dynamic model
that can couple with the rest of the world and the ocean atmosphere system in order to fill in that big hole in the way the Global
Seamless Prediction would operate. We have some very interesting
tools that are going to help us that we did not have the last time
we were up in the Arctic. One of those is synthetic aperture radar
(SAR). The number of passes that our global SAR systems are giving
us for the Arctic is actually pretty astounding to me. We want to
be able to assimilate all that data and use that information to determine where the ice is and how it is working. Coupling that with
the mathematics of the dynamics of ice melting and movement will
provide us with a really stupendous model for the Arctic.
Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) are another technology
that can play a key role in the Arctic. ONR has led a number of
these developments; those systems are now sufficiently reliable that
we can begin sending them up into the Arctic to do work under ice
and in the marginal ice zone. We could not do that in the past, so
we are eager to begin. We also have a larger diameter UUV program that will have an endurance of between 30 and 60 days and
that will be particularly useful in the Arctic. Placing remote sensors
on those underwater vehicles will help us to understand how the
halocline is changing, where the marginal ice zone is, and how all
that is moving and thereby help us establish new boundary conditions for our Global Seamless Prediction capability. I realize that
that is a tall order, but we are moving in that direction.
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
103
In my department at ONR, we have established a process called
Department Research Initiatives (DRIs), which are $9–10 million
programs over 5 years that develop teams of researchers and then
move forward on specific topics. The one that we have recently
put in place for FY2012 will kick off part of our overall Arctic program. This specific effort is intended to help us understand the
dynamics of the marginal ice zones and provide the science input
that would go into a new model (Figure 3). We will also be looking at halocline circulation and air–sea coupling and working on
assimilating ice-related information into our models.
Figure 3. DRI: Emerging Dynamics of the Marginal Ice Zone
The importance of this research was made apparent in a recent
conversation I had with researchers from Defense Research and
Development Canada (DRDC)–Atlantic last week. They told me
that they had been making regular trips to areas in the Arctic where
we had worked cooperatively 20 years ago. At that time, these
areas were essentially Arctic deserts; they received little or no precipitation. However, the last several times that they have visited
these places, they have found 5–8 feet of snow. While it is only
anecdotal evidence, it provides a good example of the air–sea
coupling and the development of air–sea interaction that was not
104
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
there in the past but is now occurring in a very strong way. So,
Arctic meteorology is going to be another key element in what we
are doing.
As we move from weather forecasting models, where we can
make reasonably accurate projections out to about 7 days, to
working with the climatologists who have been working on their
own model systems, we find that there is a gap between forecasting 7 days into the future and making predictions that are now
3 months, 6 months, or 1 year ahead. The question invariably
comes up as to whether or not we can pull together the best of
what is going on with climate modeling with the forecasting capability and the physics that we have built into the forecast systems
used by the Navy and the weather services around the world. So,
we have initiated some programs in this area.
Figure 4. DRI: Extended Range Prediction
In particular, one of our Department Research Initiatives is looking into long-term forecasting on the order of 6 months to 1 year
(Figure 4). The task involves a lot of questions that we do not yet
fully understand. For example, how do these very large elements
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
105
of the spherical harmonics of the atmosphere and ocean—such
as El Niño or the Madden–Julian oscillations—how do they operate, how do they wobble, how do they change, and how can we
investigate them in a way that will give us some indication of how
we would want to predict them?
At the same time, we have to begin to understand from a longrange perspective and a climate perspective what sorts of questions we want to be able to answer in a predictive mode. What
the limits of prediction could be is itself an important element, so
we are starting slowly in this area. We are going to look for some
really brilliant proposals and get the community to start thinking
about the idea of extending forecasting by bringing in the best of
what we know on climate and to work new avenues of research in
that area. We know how long it takes to improve the skill level for
our models and prediction systems, about a decade per day of skill
increase. At that rate, it is going to be a long time before we have
even a 1-month prediction capability. So, you can see why this is
an important science and technology issue.
106
Dr. Chet Koblinsky
I am going to talk about something that is of great interest to
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—
namely, the task of translating emerging climate science into a form
that is useful to decision makers. Toward that end, NOAA has proposed a major reorganization of the agency that would result in
the creation of a climate service on the management scale of the
existing weather service. In addition, NOAA has asked Congress
for permission to revise its overall research program to include the
satellite service.
Before delving into that, I want to talk first about the need
for a broader multiagency approach to the overall climate change
problem that has come up over the last few years. It is increasingly apparent that no one agency can tackle this on its own.
It is going to take the capacity of a number of agencies, especially in cases where the challenge is extremely large like in the
Defense Department.
In January 2009, just at the end of the Bush Administration,
the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) invited
As Director of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA) Climate Program Office and leader of NOAA’s climate mission, Dr. Chet Koblinsky leads the execution of NOAA’s climate competitive research programs and the formulation of NOAA’s future
climate activities. He joined NOAA in 2003 after a 25-year career
as a research oceanographer and science manager at the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography and NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center.
He has published numerous scientific papers and led the development
of research satellite missions. He is a recipient of NASA’s Medal for
Exceptional Scientific Achievement and the Presidential Rank Award
for federal senior executives.
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
107
representatives from some 23 federal agencies to discuss the future
of climate research and begin development of next-generation strategy for the U.S. Global Change Research Program. The proposed
FY2011 budget provides a total of $2.6 billion across 13 agencies
to support that effort. As it turns out, each of those 23 agencies
has an interest in climate information. It is not just the four major
research organizations—the National Science Foundation (NSF),
the Department of Energy (DOE), NASA, and NOAA. The full suite
of mission-driven agencies are finding that they need to respond
to mandates imposed specifically by Congress or that they need to
react to impending changes in natural resources or protected habitat areas. At the end of the day we found that there was a general
need to understand the future at local or regional scales and at a
wide variety of time scales ranging from weeks out to decades.
This need imposes a tremendous challenge on the modeling community as well as on the research and observational communities.
That challenge continues today, although I am pleased to report
that we have seen some major breakthroughs. As you may know,
the Department of Energy recently decided to open up their major
computational facilities to earth science researchers, especially at
NASA, NOAA, and the NSF. Earth scientists are now competing for
awards to use the DOE’s petaflop (1015 floating point operations
per second)-scale computational machines to test their coupled
forecast models at different resolutions.
NOAA was lucky enough to gain support, through the FY2009
Economic Stimulus Package, to buy two of that class of computational facilities. We have installed one at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory in Tennessee and are using it to run our long-term climate models. We are building a second one in West Virginia that
will look at shorter time scales and support development of ensemble and probabilistic forecast information that we can use to test
the resolution envelope and see how far our existing tools can be
pushed with current technology. At the present, we are running one
of our atmospheric models at the Oak Ridge machine in test mode.
We are using 1-kilometer resolution globally and have seen some
stunning results. If I had more time I could play a video clip that
NASA has produced. So far, however, none of us really understand
108
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
how well those models actually simulate reality; how they would
play out over time; how they need to be initialized, tested, and verified; or how we should manipulate the huge amounts of data that
our major satellite systems are able to provide. In the meantime,
however, we are busy running models to support the next generation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment,
which is due to come out in the 2013–2014 period.
I know that our laboratory at Princeton, for example, has just
completed runs on a sequence of models using our tremendous
computational capability at Oak Ridge. Other researchers are
looking at long-term scenarios of 100 years or more with complex
system models that include carbon and nitrogen cycles. Yet others
are looking at decadal predictability using a range of initialization
levels based on the last several decades and then running forward
30 to 40 to 50 years. Still others are looking at the impact of initializing their runs at higher spatial resolution—say 25-kilometer
resolution rather than 200-kilometer resolution—to see how that
affects results over a decade or so. While we are not certain yet
what these higher-resolution models will show, we are beginning to
test the resolution envelope to see if we can enhance predictability.
One of the major challenges ahead will be to collect the data
necessary to support or verify our predictions. How do we build
observing systems that will be useful for initializing these higherresolution models? How do we produce information out of these
models that some 23 different agencies will be able to use? If
we are interested, for example, in storm extremes, coastal surge
extremes, or wave extremes, how do we get that information out
of the model? How do we levy requirements to the civilian modeling community so that they can work with us and gain access to
the information that they need? Finally, how do we establish the
uncertainty bounds on our predictions and forecasts?
So what I want to do is talk a little bit about how NOAA
is approaching that problem and how it is working with different communities of decision makers. I will provide a couple of
examples so that you can see how we are developing our service concept and how we propose to tackle the grand challenge
that I have just described. Our proposal includes organizational,
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
109
budget, and mission structures that will enable us to monitor the
climate using appropriate observing systems, build our data sets,
and then use the data collected to produce products and services
that describe the current state of the climate and typical climatologies. We also want to define appropriate climatological norms and
applicable climatologies that decision-making communities can
use. Today’s products, which typically provide variables like temperature and precipitation, are not well suited for climatic issues.
We need to know flood frequencies, hundred-year flood plains,
and wave climatologies along the coast. While we need to continue to conduct research, we need to target that research on the
grand challenge problems of predictability, understanding drought,
and understanding how climate impacts marine ecosystems and
coastal environments.
We also need to develop the next-generation models and test
predictability measures, improve our understanding of longer-term
climate change, test the resolution envelope, and test our ability to
replicate historical changes over time. Once we have done that, we
can begin to produce authoritative and timely information that is
appropriate for government entities. We also need to work with the
private sector to understand their role and interest and help define
the proposed climate service from a private-sector-provider point
of view as well as a federal-entity point of view. Finally, we need
to continue to work with the decision-making communities as we
have for the past 20 years to collaboratively define and tailor information that government leaders can use as they try to understand
how climatological norms are changing over time.
So let me give you two examples. One is more applicable
to today’s decision makers, while the other is research oriented
and looks to the future. The first has to do with drought-related
information. It is clear from looking at both current and long-term
trends that the water cycle across the country is going to change.
We expect more water to be available at higher latitudes and less
at lower latitudes. This is a huge concern in the Western states
where water is gold. In anticipation of this problem, the Governors’
Association in that area has been working with the scientific community to try and define how you build preparedness information.
110
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Typically, state governments are responsible for allocating and
managing the large water systems within their borders. They were
primarily interested in how you deal with preparedness information
for the people who use water in their states rather than developing
response mechanisms for existing droughts. So, in the early 2000s,
government decision makers met with the scientific community
and designed a program to improve observations and consolidate
data information with other participating agencies. They wanted
to see if they could improve predictability and better understand
the impacts of drought. They also want to educate their communities and to build an early warning system that would provide preparedness information to their state governments so that they could
better manage the situation in the future.
In 2006, President Bush signed a new law that assigned NOAA
the lead for the integrated Drought Information System and directed
the cooperation of a number of other federal agencies in cooperation with state and tribal communities. I am pleased to report that
it is well underway. An implementation plan was quickly developed on the basis of the strategy laid out in the public law. On
the order of 8–10 other agencies have joined us in this; the implementation team is made up of over 50 people. We have begun
to build out the capabilities to improve observations and tackle
the predictability problem. We have also secured resources from
Congress to support the effort. We have set up a project office and
have developed a basic understanding for how to approach the
problem. We realize that we need to work these issues regionally
because drought in the Colorado basin is different from drought
in the Flint-Apalachicola-Chattahoochee system in the Southeast,
the Chesapeake Bay, the Hudson River, the Missouri River, or the
Columbia River. So, we are planning to build a national system
through a set of regional entities.
Two of our first systems are currently underway and almost
wrapping up their prototypes—the Colorado basin and the FlintApalachicola-Chattahoochee. What is fascinating is that it is not
just scientists sitting around the table. At the regional level, these
sessions include not only the scientific community that is developing the information, the drought monitoring, and the outlook
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
111
capability, but also the state, local, and tribal decision makers, as
well as representatives from such private industries as ski resorts,
ranches, and corporate agriculture.
As you may know, there has been some controversy over the
last few years in the Flint-Chattahoochee-Apalachicola system
about water allocation rights. It turns out that Atlanta wants to draw
more water from Lake Lanier than it has in the past. This naturally
led to a lawsuit because legally they were not allowed to have that
water. Fortunately, it has also resulted in a more open dialogue
among the states that use that water as they have tried to resolve
such issues. Although the court issue has yet to be resolved, it has
helped to socialize the scientific information.
We also held a workshop with the Western governors and various members of their policy-making staffs. It was great to see them
employing some of the decision tools that we had made available.
So that is another example of a very active effort. The outcome
provided vision and direction to the scientific community. The
involvement of decision and policy makers in such interactions is, I
think, an interesting model that is likely to prove useful.
A very different approach that we are taking is our work with
NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries. Given that their job is to regulate and try to sustain fisheries, they are very interested in how
marine ecosystems might change over time and how this might
lead to future changes in regulations. This is very much a research
problem; it has not yet reached the decision-making context at
all. So, we have begun to look at how we would build observing
systems, how we would monitor sentinel sites, and how we would
begin to factor in ecosystem effort changes in two of our long-term
climate models. We have sent scientists to the Geophysical Fluid
Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton where we run our big models.
They are trying to put advanced marine chemistry and nutrient
models into some of the lab’s ecosystem models. They are seeing
indications that there will be change due to factors such as ocean
acidification, nutrient loading, and current cycles. As a result, over
the next few years, we may be able to build hypotheses and begin
to evaluate. In particular, we want to look at how we could use the
protected habitat areas that NOAA manages, both the estuarine
112
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
reserves and the marine sanctuaries, as sentinel sites at different
scales and how we would begin to monitor and survey a large
marine ecosystem like the California current system. We want to
see if we can detect these changes and, if so, set up a program to
begin to monitor whether or not change is occurring on a longer
time frame.
So those are two very different examples; I hope they give you
a sense of the complexity of taking on this challenge. We do need
direct engagement between the user community and the civilian science community to ensure that we get the best out of both
worlds. The civilian science community needs to understand the
requirements of the decision-making community. It provides some
directed vision for the scientific community to work with and provides goals that the two communities can work together on. Still,
each has to have its own capacity to develop and work toward
this issue.
113
Dr. Jeffrey Marqusee
I welcome the opportunity to talk to you and explain what
we are trying to do at the Strategic Environmental Research and
Development Program (SERDP). We have a great partnership with
Navy Task Force Climate Change, and I think that you will see that
there is a national synergy between our plans and those of both the
Navy and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). To begin, though, let me reiterate something that you
heard about earlier in this conference, and that is the latest
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). [1] As I am sure all of you are
Dr. Jeffrey Marqusee is currently the Executive Director of the Strategic
Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and
the Director of the Environmental Security Technology Certification
Program (ESTCP). SERDP is a triagency (DoD, Department of Energy,
and Environmental Protection Agency) environmental research
and development program managed by the DoD. SERDP supports
research and development to solve environmental issues of relevance
to the DoD. ESTCP is a DoD-wide program designed to demonstrate
innovative environmental and energy technologies at DoD facilities.
ESTCP provides for rigorous validation of the cost and performance
of new environmental and energy technologies in cooperation with
the regulatory and end-user communities. Prior to his current position, Dr. Marqusee served as a program manager for environmental
technology in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Environmental Security. He was the principal advisor to the Deputy
Under Secretary on environmental technology issues. Before joining the DoD, he worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where
he advised both the DoD and NASA in the areas of remote sensing,
environmental matters, and military surveillance. Dr. Marqusee has
worked at Stanford University, the University of California, and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology. He has a Ph.D. from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in physical chemistry.
114
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
aware, this is the first time that the most senior level in the department has set out a specific policy objective focused on responding to climate change. As part of that response, the QDR directed
that the DoD conduct a comprehensive assessment for all installations of the potential impacts of climate change on its mission and
identify any necessary adaptation. This is a pretty broad statement;
initially, I do not think people recognized just how difficult the task
would be. At present, there is not a timeline to accomplish that. I
think that is both good and bad. I think it is good because it is a
very tough job. On the other hand, not having a timeline means
that you do not have the pressure or the budgetary support to get
things done in a timely way. From our point of view, however, it
is probably more important that we develop the right process and
develop the right underlying science and technologies so we can
do these assessments and enable future adaptation. The challenge
of climate change is not something we are going to overcome this
year, this next decade, or in our lifetimes. So, given the DoD’s
responsibilities for managing its fixed installations, it is important
that we establish a process through which the impacts of climate
change can be included in the planning process. The Department
has begun to develop that process, but it is a long way from being
completed.
The first step in addressing this was to articulate in more detail
what the QDR was talking about. The Strategic Sustainability Plan,
which was signed out last year, describes a proposed multitier process for addressing climate change. [2] As part of that, we need
to first develop the decision tools and the processes by which we
assess impacts and vulnerabilities. After we have used those at the
installation level, we can then develop robust adaptation plans.
According to the QDR, the research programs that I am responsible for were tasked with providing leadership for the overall effort.
While I was quite happy to take on that responsibility, I did not
engineer its placement in the QDR. I first learned of the assignment
when the QDR was published.
In our view, SERDP’s primary role in the DoD’s climate-related
challenge is to understand the impacts to DoD installations and
translate those impacts to vulnerabilities. In the future, we will
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
115
begin to look at adaptation schemes in a much more serious way.
Before we do that, though, we have to really understand what we
are adapting to, what the stressors are, and what things are going
to really impact our mission requirements. In looking at the DoD
infrastructure, we need to look at both the built infrastructure—the
Department is responsible for over 300,000 buildings—as well as
some 30 million acres of landscape. The Department is responsible
for this landscape, both using it to conduct our training and testing
missions and stewarding the natural resources included therein.
In addition, we use our installations as a power protection
point. We have to be able to carry out our mission, whether it
is from a harbor or from a desert location, from our installations.
They are critical to our warfighting capabilities. I am sure all of
you in this audience are familiar with the litany of possible climate
impacts to the DoD. Many of these are, of course, very regionally specific. The impacts you are concerned about on a coastal
installation are qualitatively different than the ones applicable in
Alaska. They are qualitatively different than the ones that apply in
the Southwest. However, they do have some commonality in that
they are going to affect our built infrastructure in each of those
areas. So, we have to know what we need to do to sustain that
infrastructure. We need to know the key aspects of climate change
that will impact our decisions on where we build our infrastructure and how we select the best sites for each of our missions.
And, as we develop our management scheme for natural resources
in a stressed ecosystem, we have to accommodate the additional
stressor of climate change.
From SERDP’s perspective, we try to avoid looking at climate
change in isolation. It is one more significant and long-term stressor
on a system that is already quite stressed. We are trying to identify ways to manage responses to all of those stresses. To do that,
SERDP has initiated a set of what I would call Regional Research
Programs that look at the major locations for DoD installations to
get a sense of what the impacts are and what tools need to be
developed. Down the road, we hope to hand the development
of those tools over to groups like NOAA and the climate service.
116
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Ultimately, we want to be able to use the data that they produce
as we attempt to identify the DoD’s specific climate-related needs.
We are also starting a number of projects on the mitigation and
adaptation side, although I am not going to focus on those today.
For the most part, they are currently concerned with energy use at
our fixed installations. While that is obviously a significant concern,
I would like to focus more on the impact and vulnerability work
that we have been doing. So, let me turn to the impacts of sea-level
rise on our coastal installations. We have started a number of projects covering most of the major areas within the continental United
States that we think are likely to feel such impacts: Norfolk, Camp
Lejeune, the Gulf Coast, Tyndall Air Force Base, and Southern
California to include both Coronado and the Marine Corps base at
Pendleton. We initiated these studies some 2 years ago; they will
be completed in another year. At that time, the information will be
made available to the DoD and the public.
In conducting the assessment, we have tried to avoid predicting
what future sea-level rise will be, but instead have employed a postulated set of scenarios. Thus, we are asking what would happen
if the local sea-level rise was 1 meter, 1.5 meters, or 2 meters. In
each case, we want to know what the impact would be on those
installations. Many people think that sea-level rise is a simple phenomena to understand. We can all go to the Internet and call up
simple maps of inundation. Unfortunately, that tells you very little
about the actual problems that we will be facing. So, we are doing
very detailed modeling using existing tools as well as building new
models to look at the full range of dynamic impacts on these installations to include not only inundation but also such effects as storm
surge, impacts to underground freshwater aquifers, and shifts in
land cover. When we have completed the model runs, we need to
translate the results into a form that means something to an installation garrison commander or one of the mission planners operating
from that base. We need to be able to translate the information that
you can get out of a local storm surge model into vulnerabilities
for carrying out a missions. We also need to recognize that those
vulnerabilities are not all for just one point in time. If you lose
capability for X hours or Y weeks, what does that mean in terms of
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
117
overall mission execution? In the end we need to take the science
of climate change predictions, translate that down to the regional
or local installation level, and then translate that down to what a
manager actually needs so he can plan and make his installation
more robust.
We have started a number of projects looking at other regions
that we think are going to be impacted in the near term. We are
particularly concerned about issues in the Southwest, although our
role at SERDP is not to augment or replace the predictive capabilities of organizations like NOAA, NASA, the National Science
Foundation, or the Office of Naval Research but rather to take the
information they produce and translate it into impacts that our
installation managers can use. In the American Southwest, it is
clear that over the coming decades we are going to face a climate
that is qualitatively different than what we have seen thus far. What
does that mean for issues of fire frequency, the presence of invasive species, and the coupling between those effects? How will
those factors affect our natural resource management for a system
that is heavily dependent on the ephemeral stream flows? If we
suddenly reach a situation where the many water bodies in the
region are effectively disconnected for longer periods of time, how
will that change the viability of endangered species that we are
legally required to sustain? We need to develop the science and
the tools both to develop new ways to manage that future as well
as to inform the regulatory process so that we have requirements
that we can manage toward. It does no one any good to set up
regulatory requirements that cannot possibly be met. So, we really
need to jointly understand what the future will look like and what
our options are likely to be.
Alaska is yet another area where we are conducting research.
The DoD, predominantly the Army, has 1.5 million acres of critical training land in the central part of the state. Alaska is already
undergoing significant climatic changes. The permafrost no longer
seems to be permanent. Areas that we used to drive across in training are no longer frozen solid. Our whole understanding of the
hydrology of that region was based on the belief that permafrost
is permafrost. We do not even have the appropriate models that
118
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
will allow us to couple the changes in permafrost to the region’s
hydrology. We have to understand the future. Are we going to be
managing wetlands that are no longer wetlands? How does this
couple to the health of the boreal forest? And how does that then
translate back to our range managers who need to use this landscape to train troops while ensuring that the landscape remains
healthy landscape? So, we have provided funding to Alaska’s universities, several federal laboratories, the U.S. Geological Survey,
NOAA, and selected service laboratories to try to really push our
understanding of what is going on.
At this point, let me talk briefly about where we are going in
the future. One of the big challenges that is out there is how to provide the information that our managers need. How do we develop
the decision frameworks or tools that allow either a major command or an installation garrison commander to make decisions
about the future? Over the next several years, we plan to initiate
a series of pilot projects to explore this space. If you go to people
who have responsibility for major DoD installations and ask them
if they care about climate change the answer you will usually get
is no. If you ask whether climate change will affect their mission,
they will say no. However, if you translate that question to one that
asks: does the weather impact your mission or does the availability
of this research impact your mission, then they will say, “Yes, it is
currently getting really tough.” So we need to figure out the specific information the group needs, translate that into decision tools,
and then request that information from the science community.
While that community is making impressive gains, there is a big
gap between being able to predict temperature or precipitation
and providing information that tells someone whether or not their
installation is vulnerable.
As I indicated at the beginning of my presentation, the QDR
and the Strategic Sustainability Plan have imposed a requirement
for all installations to look at the impact of climate change. While
that is a straightforward statement, until we define that future scenario in specific terms, it is going to be very difficult for an installation to actually approach the problem. What future climate? As we
have heard, there is enormous uncertainty on exactly what we will
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
119
be looking at 10, 20, or 50 years out. So, one of the things that the
Department has to identify in the relatively near term is the specific
climate scenarios we should plan against. I think the Department
is actually in a relatively good position to do this. We are not a
regulatory organization. We have no authority on the civilian side.
We are only responsible for our military installations. We have a
culture and a history of planning in the face of uncertainty. It is perfectly appropriate to look at the extremes; you just have to quantify
in what way they are extremes. You have to lay out the possible
futures so that you can look at your management options. It does
not mean that you need to be robust in the face of every possible future. We need to advance the science and develop the right
tools to enhance the management of our installations. By doing
that, we will be playing a key role in developing the guidance for
the services as we work together to accommodate climate change,
whatever it looks like.
REFERENCES
1. Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review,
2010,  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_
12Feb10_1000.pdf.
2. Department of Defense, Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan
FY 2010, Public Version, 2010.
120
Dr. Graeme Stephens
I am from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). A person might
reasonably ask: why is JPL involved in climate science? The
answer is that if you look at the civilian research satellites that
are used to measure various Earth-related parameters from space,
you will discover that JPL is responsible for more than 50% of the
civilian research satellite observations of Earth. Thus, the lab is a
major producer of the data that we use to measure and forecast
climate change.
So, what I would like to do is offer three main points framed
around the conversion of science data to actionable information.
In my view, that is fundamentally the mission of our climate services. How do you go from data to science and knowledge to
really actionable information? I am going to frame three points that
touch on that to some extent.
Dr. Graeme Stephens completed his B.S. with honors at the University
of Melbourne in 1973 and received his Ph.D. in 1977 from the same
university. He was appointed to the CSIRO Division of Atmospheric
Research in 1977 as a research scientist and promoted to senior research
scientist in 1982. From 1979 to 1980, Dr. Stephens served as a postdoctoral research student at the Colorado State University Department
of Atmospheric Science. He joined the faculty as an associate professor in 1984 and was promoted to full professor in 1991. Dr. Stephens’s
research activities focus on atmospheric radiation, including the application of remote sensing in climate research to understand the role of
hydrological processes in climate change. He also serves as the primary
investigator (PI) of the NASA CloudSat Mission and associated research
group, which has launched a satellite to study the internals of clouds
using equipment similar to radar.
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
121
First, I think it is pretty important to find what data we need
and what specific requirements we would place on those data. To
do that, we have to ask the question of what the heck is your mission and what do you actually wish to achieve.
Second, we currently have a variety of data collection resources
that already exist and could be used to help address this problem.
We need to ensure that we optimally exploit those resources. I am
going to throw out two examples of many that could be identified. Then I am going to make the point that climate observations
are not the same as weather observations. It is just not a matter of
making them over a long period of time. There are different sets of
observations that are needed really to understand and to predict
the climate change. There are all sorts of measurements that are
not high on the operational radar screen but are absolutely critical
for climate.
The third point I want to make is that the DoD needs to be an
important stakeholder in defining climate data needs, particularly
from the point of view of Earth observations. As I said, the Earthobserving community relies almost exclusively on downwardlooking satellites to measure the Earth’s system; they are absolutely
critical for the Arctic.
So let us begin by talking about defining the data requirements.
Clearly, we have to define what our highest-priority challenges are.
Based on my attendance here the last 2 days, I have figured out
that we have begun to articulate this, but it is not yet sharply articulated. We have talked about sea-level rise, storm surges, Arctic
navigability, and so on, but we have not identified either the specific data that we need or the specific reason that we need it. We
really need to sharpen this. For example, what time horizon do
we want data for? Clearly we want to predict into the future that
is being talked about. Is it a week? Is it a season? Is it a year? Is it
decadal? Is it multidecadal?
As I indicated previously, many of the essential climate observations are derived from current civilian research satellites that are
not part of the operational weather forecasting system. Many of
those satellites may not even be ready to be part of an operational
122
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
system. They may be too expensive to be part of an operational
system. So, to recap, point number one is define the requirements,
the time horizon, the spatial scale, and the latency. These factors
will influence how we produce the data and whether the data
that we have streaming down now are actually relevant to our
mission objectives.
Now let us look at two examples of many that exploit existing resources. Our climate projections rely on the observational
data records that we have, and that is an activity that is going on
now, but that is an example of something we could do with existing resources. I will start with sea-ice change, because it appears
that sea-ice change is a big deal for this audience. We learned a
number of important lessons from the precipitous loss of sea ice
that occurred in 2007. That year’s dramatic loss was off the record
book. As a result, we learned that sea ice is vulnerable to climate
effects but is relatively invulnerable to other forces. However, it
is the other forces that fundamentally will shape whether the sea
ice opens up or closes in the summer. It is those other forces that
have to do with meteorology weather pattern changes. One of the
big factors in 2007 that does not get discussed much is that the
atmosphere dried out; the cloud disappeared. There was perpetual
sunshine for 3 months. The warmer sea surface temperatures (SSTs)
further exacerbated the loss of sea ice and so on. Obtaining information on that kind of energy coming into the Arctic Ocean is
pretty important for a prediction of sea ice and seasonal swings in
sea ice. We currently do not have the observing systems necessary
to address that today, so that is the sort of information that we need
in order to understand sea-ice loss. In terms of research satellites,
we have unprecedented information from research satellites that I
think are ready to be exploited to look at some of these issues with
sea ice. It is data coming in that is untapped from the point of view
of studying the Arctic.
The Arctic’s really interesting, including from the polar satellite
point of view. Because all longitudes converge at the pole, all of
the polar orbiting satellites will also converge to the pole. That is
why you can get 16 synthetic aperture radar (SAR) samples from
one satellite in a day. So, you get a lot of data covering the poles.
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
123
The question is: is it the right kind of data for what you have in
mind? With the new research observations that we have today,
we have unprecedented views of the Arctic that we have never
had before. It is a gold mine waiting to be tapped. We are just not
tapping it as a research community because we are not challenged
to do so. We are doing all sorts of other things. One of our lowhanging fruits is to make use of the capabilities we have today to
explore issues related to the loss of sea ice.
Another aspect of sea-level rise is that it hits a bit close to
home for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Sea-level rise is a pretty
complex problem. It involves the changing of the thermal structure
of the oceans. It involves ice sheet dynamics and its changes, and
it involves solid earth responses. As a result, predicting future sealevel rise is complicated but, given our ability to make observations, it turns out that the sea-level rise problem is in better shape
than most other areas of the climate problem. We have systematic
observations of sea-level rise. We have incredibly new ways of
observing ice-mass loss that we see. We have seen the acceleration of the Greenland Ice Sheet over the last decade from space.
However, we currently have no modeling and assimilation tools
that describe sea-level rise, so we have a building block program
to develop a system that would provide actionable information.
We have the wherewithal and we have the interest to do this, so
we have a consortium community involved—a number of universities, the JPL, and other communities that are heavily engaged in
the sea-level problem, observing sea level, and modeling sea level
have put their hands up. They are interested in taking the next step
to identify and work with users and determine what the product
ought to be and on what scale the products ought to be.
My third and last point concerns establishing the DoD as an
important stakeholder within the community of civilian observing
systems. The DoD has already established stakeholder positions
in other aspects of the modeling, but I think the civilian program
needs help with their civilian satellite observing systems and
would certainly benefit from the DoD’s stakeholder involvement.
To further illustrate this point, consider the European Centre for
Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), which is one of the
124
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
major weather forecasting centers on our planet. The ECMWF produces weather analysis that gets integrated into the climate record
through a process called reanalysis. That process combines over
30,000 surface observations every 3 hours to create a climate
record. However, if you disregard the data from the Scandinavian
countries, you could count almost on one hand the number of
actual surface observations from above the Arctic Circle that go
into this reanalysis product. For such data-sparse regions, reanalysis relies on model-based inputs rather than observation-based
inputs. Is that good or bad? Well, we do not know, but we know
that in key areas the models are particularly bad. Those key areas
include ones that relate to energy flow into the Arctic, which is
very important for sea-ice loss. We also know that the models are
fairly poor at predicting clouds and precipitation, both of which
are pretty important for the Arctic climate. As we have heard, we
do not really have a climate record for the Arctic. One of the reasons is that the Arctic is very sparsely observed. This is why satellites are so critically important. They can provide the density of
observations that you just cannot produce with surface stations,
especially given the harsh environment. Satellites have to play an
important role.
In the case of climate, as I emphasized, many of our key
measurements come from civilian research satellites. These measurement systems are fragile. They are fragile because they are
primarily tied to discretionary funding lines and are not linked to
observations. As a result, they basically come and go depending
on budgets, and we have just had two major flagship climate satellites cancelled in the last couple of months. So the situation is
fragile. What is of even greater concern is that we do not have a
strategy to observe key parts of the climate system from space. We
do not have a coherent plan for measuring precipitation globally.
Currently, it is all done using research satellites rather than operational ones. We are not measuring snowfall in the Arctic, which is
a key part of the water cycle of that region. So, given the fragility of
the civilian part of our observing systems, having key stakeholders
articulate their needs will strengthen the argument for moving from
research systems to operational systems.
Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges
125
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
the number of bases and ships that are available worldQ: Given
wide, is the Navy doing anything to outfit these platforms or
these locations so as to increase the number of surface observations?
Captain Timothy Gallaudet: We have an active observing
capability on our ships and stations, so the answer is yes. We are
doing it. It is not driven necessarily by climate. It is driven really by
a combination of weather for safety and operational effectiveness,
but it will have the long-term benefit of supporting and contributing to climate observation systems.
you plan to store those data so that they will be availQ: Do
able for other uses beyond weather forecasting in support of
flight observations?
Captain Timothy Gallaudet: Yes, we do. It could potentially
provide more justification to keep those programs healthy in a time
when decision makers are often looking to trim the budget.
Dr. Graeme Stephens: If we start cruising through the Arctic,
you are obviously going to be able to provide surface observations
that we currently do not have. A lot of those 30,000 surface observations I mentioned come from ships. Our global forecast models
currently assimilate the ship observations already.
Captain Timothy Gallaudet: I might point out, too, that our
submarine force currently collects ice keel measurements that are
used in some studies, especially by the Applied Physics Laboratory
at University of Washington.
Chapter 5
A da p t i n g M a r i t i m e
S t r at e g y a n d O p e r at i o n s
to C l i m at e C h a l l e n g e s
129
Dr. Ed McGrady
This first panel focuses on a very interesting, and in my view
an extremely important, topic as we think about how to prepare
the maritime services for climate change. In particular, the panel
will discuss the strategy, policy, and operational implications of climate change for the maritime services. I think each of those words
Dr. Ed McGrady is a senior research analyst at CNA. He develops games
and conducts studies on a wide range of topics from force structure and
planning to operational deployment of medical forces. He is currently
working on projects related to the effect of climate change on U.S.
military involvement in humanitarian operations and disaster response.
His research work includes studies of humanitarian emergencies, disaster response operations, the role of Naval and other military forces in
medical humanitarian missions, cooperation between military forces
and nongovernmental organizations, and the role of military forces in
domestic disaster response. He has led studies examining recent hospital ship deployments including the tsunami relief efforts and followon humanitarian medical assistance operations in the Pacific. During
the Katrina response, he led a group of 10 analysts in examining the
full spectrum of disaster response operations, from military support to
civil authorities to internal Navy disaster response. He has also examined the role of military forces in complex emergencies, such as during the U.S. intervention in Haiti. As part of that effort, he deployed
with U.S. forces onboard the USS Enterprise. Dr. McGrady has written
extensively on the role of military forces in humanitarian and disaster
response operations. He has authored papers on such diverse topics
as the role of Naval forces in providing emergency communications
support, the impact of these operations on national security objectives,
and type of emergencies that military forces typically get called on to
support. Dr. McGrady holds a B.A. in chemical engineering from the
University of Florida and a Ph.D. in chemical engineering from the
University of Michigan.
130
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
is very important. We are going to be looking at strategy, policy,
and operations. Those are not topics that we typically focus on
when we think about how climate change is going to impact how
our forces operate, what we are going to have to do, and what we
are going to have to buy, so we want to try to dig into some of
those issues.
We also want to emphasize the maritime services. Many of
the missions that are typically assigned to these services are going
to be affected by climate change, and the services are going to
have to adapt accordingly. Rising sea levels will displace bases,
and the opening of the Arctic will require new deployments of
Coast Guard and Navy forces. Climate-induced instabilities around
the world will increase the number of humanitarian assistance and
disaster response missions as well as peacekeeping and perhaps
even counter-insurgency missions. How are such changes going to
affect the maritime services, and how should we adapt our strategy, our policy, and our operations to deal with them?
From the above discussion, it seems clear that the Navy will be
impacted by climate change. In my view, however, it is the Coast
Guard that is currently charged with much of the mission set that
our other maritime forces will need to do more of in a world adapting to climate change. The Coast Guard is an interagency organization in that it has to work with a wide variety of the other agencies
in an interagency environment. In addition, the Coast Guard has
law enforcement responsibilities, both on the domestic side as
well as overseas in working with naval partners to provide on-ship
capabilities. The kind of challenges that the Coast Guard currently
confronts may end up being issues that all of our maritime forces
have to deal with in the future as increased stresses from climate
change impose new requirements and new missions.
To discuss these issues, we have assembled a very representative panel in terms of both strategy and operations. Their charge is
to try to help us understand how our maritime forces should adapt
their strategy and operations to climate change.
131
Ms. Amanda Dory
I am the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy,
and part of what my office does that you are very familiar with is
developing the big-picture strategic articulation and then explaining it over time, updating it, and testing our assumptions regularly.
Our office also focuses on the long-term future in that we project
out at least 20 years, depending on Congressional requirements,
Ms. Amanda J. Dory currently serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Strategy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
She is a career member of the Senior Executive Service. From 2007 to
2008, Ms. Dory served as the Principal Director, Policy Planning responsible for strategy development, oversight of contingency and campaign
plans, and long-term trends analysis and futures. In 2006–2007, she
served as the chief of staff for the Irregular Warfare and Building
Partnership Capacity Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Execution
Roadmaps. From 2003 to 2006, Ms. Dory served as the Director for
Planning and Integration in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense, and in 2002–2003, Ms. Dory was a
Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow based at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). From 1999 to
2002, Ms. Dory worked in the OSD Strategy office on a broad range of
strategy and guidance documents. From 1996 to 1999, Ms. Dory served
as the Country Director for Southern Africa and the Country Director
for West Africa. Ms. Dory joined OSD as a Presidential Management
Intern in 1994 and conducted rotational assignments related to
European and African security affairs as well as international arms
control negotiations. Ms. Dory’s nongovernment experience includes
positions with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and
the World Bank. She received an M.A. in international affairs from The
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.S. in
foreign service from Georgetown University. She is a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations.
132
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
and farther when we can. We use these forecasts to support longterm trends as well as to guide our development of force planning
scenarios for the midterm and long term. Those tasks form the core
of what our office does.
On the basis of that brief description, you should be able to
see how climate change and climate change trends would begin
to intersect with our work. What I would like to do first today is to
touch briefly on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Figure 1).
[1] I will not spend a lot of time going through the QDR in detail
because I have a feeling that almost everyone in the audience has
either read the QDR or heard me or others from my staff—I am
joined here today by Ms. Esther McClure and Lieutenant Colonel
Paul Schimpf—who have been out and about talking about the
findings of the QDR. So I do not want to duplicate what you may
have already heard; instead, I want to push ahead to the next step,
to talk about what we are, or should, be doing about some of the
important issues identified in the QDR and how we are progressing on that agenda.
Figure 1. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
The overall theme of 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review was
rebalancing and reforming the DoD. In the months since its release,
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
133
you have seen more of that, particularly with the efficiencies initiative that the Secretary of Defense led over the past year to find
lower-risk areas in order to create resource availability for higher
priorities. I think that is a rebalancing and reforming effort that we
will continue, particularly as the nation grapples with how we get
our defense and government budgets back in alignment as far as
inputs and outputs.
The first of the four strategic imperatives that we focused on in
QDR 2010 is prevailing in today’s operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and the global effort to defeat Al Qaeda and its associates. We
placed that at the very top of the priority list, as you know. We also
talked about preventing and deterring conflict—a strategic imperative that ties in directly with climate change projections in the midterm and in the long term; I will say more about the implications
for conflict later on.
The third strategic imperative was to prepare to defeat adversaries across a broad range of future contingencies. This was really
a deliberate effort to try to take ourselves out of focusing on what
had become, through the years, an almost canonical war fight. We
have become very comfortable with these as analytical manifestations of potential future conflict. As a result, we continued to refine
and update them without broadening our scope to think about a
broader range of future contingencies to which the Department
may be asked by the President to respond. Preparing for a broader
scope and preparing for complexity are thus a key strategic imperative in the QDR.
For the first time, this QDR raised the importance of preserving
and enhancing the all-volunteer force to the level of the strategic
imperative. We have certainly always addressed the roles and the
responsibilities associated with caring for the all-volunteer force,
but this QDR raised this issue to the level of a strategic imperative
by recognizing that the all-volunteer force is at the heart of what
the Department does.
Based on Congressional guidance, the QDR also included a
focus on climate change for the first time. Since you have probably read that section, I will not repeat it here; we can talk about it
134
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
further in the question and answer period, if there is particular interest. What we did was go through the potential impacts of climate
change on our operating environment and on the Department’s
roles and missions. We also looked at energy because we consider
energy and climate change as highly inter-related or, if you like,
two sides of the same coin. You cannot really think about climate
change without also thinking about what is happening with energy
production and consumption.
I also want to touch briefly on what I will call upstream and
downstream guidance that has come out since the QDR was published. There are two very important documents in this regard
(Figure 2). The first is the National Security Strategy (NSS), which
was released in May 2010. [2] The NSS is the overarching strategy
for all of the national security departments and agencies. If you
have been through the NSS, you have noted that it includes very
forward-leaning guidance on climate change and that it talks about
climate change as a danger that is real, urgent, and severe. The
NSS calls on our nation’s security and development communities
to work together to successfully integrate our approaches and the
different elements of American power to address climate change
now and in the future.
Figure 2. Other Strategic Guidance
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
135
Last month, Admiral Michael Mullen released the National
Military Strategy (NMS). [3] In the hierarchy of strategies, the
National Security Strategy is the most overarching. The Defense
Strategy included within the QDR is subordinate to that and
expresses the way that the defense toolkit—the assemblage of
ways and means at our disposal—nests within the broader national
security goals. The NMS takes it a step down by focusing on the
military instrument, on military personnel and forces and the application of power, in particular.
In the recently released NMS, you see again the importance of
climate change in describing the future security environment. You
also see a robust discussion of conflict prevention in which the
Chairman emphasizes the savings that we believe are associated
with preventive action as opposed to responsive action. I am sure
that you are very familiar with the idea that the least costly wars are
the ones that we do not fight; but it is that type of approach that is
embedded in the NMS.
Figure 3. Related Strategic Guidance
Two other documents (Figure 3) have been released recently
that round out the strategic discussion. The first is the Presidential
Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD), which was
136
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
released in September 2010. [4] That PPD is a critical implementing step in what was laid out in the National Security Strategy.
(In the Obama administration, PPDs serve the same function that
National Security Presidential Directives or National Security
Decision Directives have in prior administrations—they provide
definitive guidance to all elements of the executive branch of the
U.S. government.)
Within the PPD, the President calls for the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and articulates what
is termed the 3-D approach, meaning the integration of development, diplomacy, and defense to reinforce and complement one
another in a comprehensive approach to national security. This
PPD in particular has three initiatives within it. One is a global
health initiative, a second is a global food security initiative, and
a third is a global climate change initiative. The National Security
Council is actively managing the process of implementing all three.
The final document I would like to raise to your attention is
the QDDR. [5] If you have not had a chance to look through that
document, it is the State Department’s first ever effort to do what
the QDR does for the DoD. Completion of the QDDR took about
a year. During the process, the State Department and the U.S.
Agency for International Development looked both internally and
externally at how they should organize and orient to address today’s
challenges. The final report was released in December 2010. The
DoD was highly supportive of the State Department in this effort,
not only sharing the lessons learned from our experience in completing multiple QDRs through the years, but also providing personnel support when requested and actively participating where it
was relevant toward their effort.
I think the most important thing coming out of QDDR is the
concept of civilian power as a complement to military power. As we
try to balance what happens within national security approaches
to problems, we have to find ways to accommodate the fact that
the proverbial 800-pound gorilla, otherwise known as the military instrument, is the most resourced, the strongest, and therefore
the most frequently used. Part of what Secretary of State Hillary
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
137
Rodham Clinton has done in the QDDR is to craft her own version
of “rebalance and reform” that really focuses on civilian power.
I have one quote from that report that I want to share with you;
I commend the entire report to your attention if you have not had a
chance to look at it. Secretary Clinton speaks about civilian power
as the combined force of women and men across the U.S. government, so it is not just focused within the State Department—it is
women and men across the U.S. government who are practicing
diplomacy, implementing development projects, strengthening alliances and partnership, preventing and responding to crises in conflict, and advancing America’s core interests. To me the framing of
the idea of civilian power is, in addition to all the particular pieces
of guidance and implementation that will follow, very powerful as
we head forward.
To summarize then, the key theme through all of the different
strategic articulations is the concept of prevention and deterrence
of conflict—that is the way it is described in the QDR, but conflict
prevention is a common theme throughout all strategic guidance
documents (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Common Strategic Theme: Conflict Prevention
138
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Within the department, we look at conflict prevention as a way
to help shape the future security environment. At the same time,
however, there are physical trends within the future security environment, like climate change and demographics, that also shape
the future. Conflict prevention efforts are one way we can actively
seek to shape outcomes instead of just responding to what is evolving and unfolding.
As we have seen all too clearly over the past decade, state
weakness can create as many challenges as state strength. We
spend a lot of time in the DoD focusing on state strength, but part
of the broadening of our suite of challenges is recognizing the challenges associated with state weakness. Among other things, weak
states heighten the risk of conflict, like humanitarian crisis, and the
potential for becoming terrorist sanctuaries.
Figure 5. Notional Interagency Partnership on Climate
Security Issues
I am trying out Figure 5 for the first time. It is something we
have been working on within the Strategy Office; it does not have
official standing of any sort—it is a concept, if you will. But it is a
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
139
concept for a holistic approach for how we could begin to, as a
U.S. government, convert climate science and data into actionable,
whole-of-government preventive efforts, as well as response efforts.
I will try to explain what it is we are trying to convey in
Figure 5 and then look forward to a discussion in the question
and answer period. What we are starting to show, if you move
from the top of Figure 5 down, are the various departments, agencies, and other federal entities that are involved on a particular line
of effort. The output of each line of effort appears in the blue boxes
along the right-hand side. The amount of effort being expended on
these topics is very impressive. When you go to some of the interagency meetings, whether they are called by the State Department
or the National Security staff, you see stakeholders from all the
different agencies and departments that have equities, expertise, or
activities underway.
At the very top of Figure 5, you can see where entities such as
NASA, the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) national laboratories,
the National Science Foundation (NSF), the DoD to include Navy,
and the intelligence community (IC) are all collecting various types
of climate data or working in the climate science arena.
One of the challenges in this process is to create the translation function where the science and data eventually are converted
into something that is tractable and actionable. Thus, the vertical
arrow is intended to show how you move from science and data
into model inputs, then into the creation of climate projections,
then into the creation of more granular projections, for example,
developing concepts for food, water, energy supplies, and security.
The final piece, and the one critical for the DoD, is the national
security assessment piece where the intelligence community comes
in. You are all, I imagine, very familiar with the pioneering work
of the National Intelligence Council and their National Intelligence
assessments on climate change. Importantly, they are now working
on a full-blown climate impact estimate.
The translation function is particularly critical for the national
security piece because that is where you start to bring to bear the
human dimension and state behavior in a way that causes the
140
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
national security agencies to focus on what potential pathways lay
ahead. In the bubble in the middle you see the role of the Executive
Office of the President, the National Security staff focusing internationally, and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), along
with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) focusing
on domestic concerns. These organizations play key roles in terms
of integration and guidance development and promulgation, such
as the Presidential Policy Directive that I described earlier.
The spectrum of actions appears at the very bottom of the
chart. You can see that we have opportunities that are response
related vis-à-vis climate change and security, and we have opportunities that are prevention related. Within each response, there is
an array of responses. There are responses that happen—adaptiontype responses, for example—at a local level, at a regional level,
or at a state level. There are also responses like migration that are
based on a local manifestation of climate change. The other places
where the DoD and other U.S. agencies tend to get engaged are
humanitarian assistance and disaster response activities, particularly in the event of natural or man-made disasters.
On the prevention side, as I have mentioned previously, climate
change at a global level is not a particularly tractable challenge, and
there are different ways of starting to make it more tractable. One
of those is to develop a regional or a subregional focus and assessment process to support the planning and response development.
Another way is to focus on some critical basic human needs
such as water, food, and energy. The scarcity of any of those items,
whether it is absolute scarcity or relative scarcity, is where one
begins to see a range of adaptation responses. Those can include
things like destabilizing migration or conflict over resources.
In closing, I would like to make a few points about the way
ahead. I have summarized these points in the list below and then
describe them in greater detail:
• It is no longer enough to simply recognize climate change
as a national security issue. Now is the time to begin moving into the “planning and solutions phase.”
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
141
• Debate about whether or not climate change constitutes a
stand-alone “threat” or whether climate change, by itself,
causes conflict are less helpful than identifying prudent
actions to begin taking, given our improving understanding
of vulnerabilities and risks.
–– The DoD should apply a risk management framework to
climate change considerations.
–– Reducing the impacts of climate change will reduce the
likelihood of conflict in vulnerable regions.
The first point is that we need to move beyond simply congratulating ourselves for recognizing climate change as an important
dimension of the future security environment. Instead, it is an area
that we need to pay attention to on a day-to-day basis. The DoD
crossed that bridge with the 2010 QDR. Many other departments
and agencies preceded us and a few others have followed behind.
In my view, we now need to be moving into the planning and solutions phase of the discussion. The DoD needs to figure out how it
can most effectively plug into and enhance interagency efforts on
mitigation and adaptation, working not only with the United States
Agency for International Development and the State Department,
but also with the full array of other actors who are engaged in prevention activities.
We also need to think about adaptation solutions that we
develop for our own installations, particularly domestic installations, and how we will transfer knowledge and work with civilian
communities around those installations. In cases where the civilian
communities are on the cutting edge as opposed to the DoD, we
need to find ways to take advantage of their expertise as we think
through adaptation planning.
We also need to move beyond just asking questions such as:
Is climate change a threat, is climate change a threat accelerant,
or is climate change a threat multiplier? We need to focus beyond
just the semantic tangles that we get ourselves into at times. They
are not particularly helpful. Instead, we need to focus more on
where are we with data, where we are with the science, and
142
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
where are we with assessments and projections and what can we
do about them.
As part of that, I think it is particularly important that we refocus our discussion on risks and vulnerabilities, particularly moving
from global scales down to regional scales.
REFERENCES
1. Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review,
2010,  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_
12Feb10_1000.pdf.
2. The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_
security_strategy.pdf.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the
United States of America, 2011, http://www.jcs.mil//content/
files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf.
4. The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy,
2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/
09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy.
5. U.S. Department of State, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153142.pdf.
143
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin
It is a great opportunity to be here, and it is certainly great to
sit on the panel with Ms. Amanda Dory and Rear Admiral David
Woods. I have had the opportunity to work for and with Ms. Dory
a couple of times now, and it is intimidating to say the least. She
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin recently assumed the position of Assistant
Commandant in support of the Deputy Commandant for Operations.
Prior to this assignment, Rear Admiral Atkin served as the Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Transborder Security;
first Commander of the U.S. Coast Guard Deployable Operations Group
(DOG); and the Deputy Principal Federal Official to the Gulf Coast in
2006 and Chief of Staff in New Orleans, Louisiana, for the Principal
Federal Official for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Before working the Hurricane Katrina disaster, Rear Admiral Atkin served as Chief,
Maritime Homeland Security and Defense Policy in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. In 2003, he served
as the Chief of the Counterterrorism Division in the Chief of Naval
Operations Office, Deep Blue. Rear Admiral Atkin’s operational assignments included Commanding Officer, Tactical Law Enforcement Team
(TACLET) North in Chesapeake, Virginia; Commanding Officer, TACLET
Gulf in New Orleans, Louisiana; Operations Officer, TACLET Seven in
Miami, Florida; Navigator, Coast Guard Cutter ALERT in Cape May,
New Jersey; Deputy Group Commander in New Orleans, Louisiana;
and Coast Guard Liaison to Joint Task Force One Six Zero at the U.S.
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. His staff assignments included
Chief, Office of Law Enforcement and Intelligence for the Eighth Coast
Guard District, New Orleans, Louisiana; Fisheries Enforcement Officer
for the Eighth Coast Guard District, New Orleans, Louisiana; and
Mathematics Instructor, Assistant Football Coach, and Head Lacrosse
Coach at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut.
Rear Admiral Atkin graduated from the United States Coast Guard
Academy with a B.S. degree in mathematical sciences. He also holds
an M.S. degree in management science from the University of Miami.
144
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
is obviously brilliant. I am also intimidated because when I first
found out I was coming here to speak I thought that I would be the
only Coastie here, and that if I did poorly, I could always go back
to work and say that I was awesome. I now see that I am not alone
and there are people who will be inclined to tell the truth when
I go back to work. So it is a little bit scary from that perspective.
I have just a few slides, and I am not trying to repeat too much
of what Ms. Dory talked about already. I am going to try to cover
my material quickly so that we have a lot of time for questions
and answers.
To start, I am going to talk a little about climate change in
general and how we look at it from the Coast Guard perspective.
Then, I will turn briefly to strategic engagement. Finally, I am going
to talk about the Arctic, which is really where, from a Coast Guard
perspective, climate change will require that we focus first.
Climate change, as I think everyone here already knows, is not
so much about the Earth just getting warmer. Climate change is
really about severe weather extremes; it is about how the weather
is changing, becoming more severe—events such as the snowstorm we had here in Washington, D.C., not too long ago in which
people were stuck on the roads for 13 or 14 hours. It is those types
of things that are really starting to affect us. Several days ago, on
one of our piers up in Alaska, we were getting steady-state winds
of 80 knots, with gusts up to 120 knots—very unusual, indeed, but
another sign that the times are changing.
So, many types of severe weather—to include hurricanes and
floods—are going to become more severe. On top of those direct
effects, you have all the indirect effects that are associated with
severe weather—the degradation of the environment, for example
(Figure 1). When we look at the coastline of Louisiana, we can see
how it is eroding and the speed at which it is eroding. Such effects
are certain to affect our pipelines, our offshore oil rigs, and the
Louisiana Offshore Oil Port that brings oil into the refineries along
the Gulf Coast. The implications will eventually extend all the way
to the global supply chain and our overall economy.
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
145
Figure 1. Climate Change Effects
As more and more countries are impacted by significant environmental change, population migration is likely to increase. There
will invariably be more migration from countries that are impacted
to countries that have greater opportunities; migration to the United
States may well increase. Another concern is critical infrastructure;
we have a lot of critical infrastructure around our coastline that will
be impacted. Obviously, a lot of our Coast Guard infrastructure is
located at the water’s edge. Any significant rise in sea level will
have an adverse effect on that infrastructure. These are all things
that we have to take a look at, and all are starting to impact what
the Coast Guard and the nation will have to do.
So how do we look at it? How do we do that strategic engagement part (Figure 2) and who do we need to work with?
Obviously, the Arctic Council is a huge player from the perspectives of both the Arctic and climate change. As climate change
advances and the Arctic opens up, we will have no choice but to
interact with the eight other Arctic nations. This coming May 11,
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is going to sign a searchand-rescue agreement with eight other Arctic nations on how we
respond from a search-and-rescue perspective in the Arctic.
146
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 2. Strategic Engagement
On the national security side, we have the strategies and
policies laid out in the National Security Presidential Directive/
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD/HSPD) on
Arctic region policy. [1] This document includes specific implementation tasks. While originally signed by President George W.
Bush, it has recently been reaffirmed by President Barack Obama.
Unfortunately, only two interagency policy committee meetings on
the Arctic have been held since it was signed. Having hosted one
of those, I understand that we need to have greater involvement
from the National Security staff on the Arctic and the associated
implementation of a national policy. We need to ensure that it is
being implemented uniformly across the whole of government.
The National Ocean Council is an Obama Administration
initiative to develop a National Ocean Policy and a governance
structure for how we move forward. While the National Ocean
Policy does not really have a security component, is does include
a coastal marine spatial planning effort. That effort describes how
planning should be divided up regionally around the United States
and how it is going to be a joint effort between federal, state, and
local governments and private industry.
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
147
I do not think you can go into any climate change discussion
without talking about the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how critical it is that we have UNCLOS
ratified by Congress. We have to move forward on that. UNCLOS
is going to be our lifeline into the international community and how
we protect our own national security interests. We have talked a
lot about what the impacts are from an environmental perspective,
from an energy perspective, and from a natural resource perspective, but I think we really need to re-look at this issue. We must
bring UNCLOS into our national security discussion because it is
imperative to make that part of our way ahead.
The International Maritime Organization, which establishes the
standards and regulations for the shipping industry, is also going
to be critical. Consider, for example, something as simple as the
Bering Strait. There are two islands in the middle—one is Russian,
one is American. As the Arctic sea ice melts and we get more
and more open water, the shipping industry will want to use the
Northwest Passage. We will need some type of vessel traffic separation scheme up there. We have to work that through the international community and the IMO. Simply stated, we are going to
have to utilize and partner with our international organizations.
Figure 3. Importance of the Arctic Region
148
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
We in the Coast Guard like to remind people that the United
States is an Arctic nation, even though we usually do not think
about our country that way (Figure 3). While everyone in this room
probably understands that, if you asked someone in Ottumwa,
Iowa, about the Arctic, they probably would not have a whole lot
to say about it. So you have got to think about how do we communicate to the American public the importance of climate change
in general, then the importance of the Arctic in particular, and then
how that is going to impact not only our national security but also
things like the global supply chain and global economics.
It is a fact that climate change is going to have some impacts.
Although the most significant effects in the Arctic will occur well
after my time in the Coast Guard comes to an end, and perhaps
even after I am alive, given the rate I am going right now, we have to
make dealing with these effects a priority. The question becomes:
how do you get people interested in something that is not going
to even happen in their lifetime? For me, I always think about my
children. I make them recycle.
But those are the little things that we can do as we teach and
talk about the impacts of climate change and the impacts of where
we are going as a country. There is already more open water in
the Arctic, there is more human activity, and there is more maritime traffic. While I do not understand the science part or how we
got to where we are, it does not really matter to me. I do not care
what people’s cultural, political, or scientific beliefs are or why we
are where we are with climate change, but there is more water
and there is more traffic, so we have to start accounting for it, and
we have to develop the right strategies, plans, and policies as we
move forward.
From a Coast Guard perspective, we have the same responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean as we do in the Gulf of Mexico. We
have the same law enforcement responsibilities, we have the same
search and rescue responsibilities, and we have the same fisheries enforcement responsibilities. While it used to be ice covered,
that no longer matters since now all of a sudden, there is plenty of
open water. So now we have to start looking at how we are going
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
149
to fulfill our responsibilities by law in the Arctic and how that will
impact us.
Operating in the Arctic will entail immense challenges. I am
sure all of you have seen a map with the Arctic placed over top
the United States and how big it is. I was actually going to bring
that slide, but my staff told me that I could not have another slide,
so I left it behind. But the distances that we will have to cover are
dramatic. Other challenges include the lack of infrastructure and
the lack of the knowledge of just what is going on up in the Arctic.
Then, of course, there is severe weather, which will have impacts
on infrastructure, vessels, and people.
Another challenge that we face is dealing with the indigenous
peoples who live in the Arctic region, including Alaska. We have
to make sure we are talking to them and make sure that we understand their concerns. As you probably know, the Coast Guard likes
people to wear life jackets when they are out on the water. When
we tried to push the idea of life jackets to the Native Alaskans, they
were adamantly against them. They said that if you put on one of
those big orange life jackets, you are just making yourself an easy
target for polar bears to zero in on.
Their fear was genuine, so we had to go with white life jackets which are very hard for rescuers to see. But at the same time
we had to understand their concerns and we had to adapt ourselves accordingly. The indigenous people are also going to provide us with a lot of knowledge of the area. They can help identify
the impacts because they can remember what it was like 50 or
60 years ago. That knowledge will help us identify impacts as we
go forward. A big concern is melting permafrost and its impact on
our infrastructure, for example.
So how does the Coast Guard look at that from a strategic
or an operational perspective? The answer for now is that we go
right back to the strategy that was signed out by Admiral Thad
Allen in 2007 and is still in effect today. It is our strategy for maritime security, safety, and stewardship. It is a legal regime along the
lines of the other legal regimes, like UNCLOS, IMO, and the Arctic
150
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Council. It is about the domain awareness—understanding what
the domain is about, to include talking to the Native Alaskans.
For the last 3 or 4 years we have had forward operating locations at Barrow and Nome up on Alaska’s North Slope. We have
flown up there in our aircraft, which gets kind of scary. We did not
realize when we first started flying our C-130s up there that aviation fuel freezes at about –43°. So when it is hitting –40°, we are
trying to get those things turned on and come home pretty quickly,
especially when an admiral is on board. Speaking from experience, they can get a little nervous.
What we have done is we have forward deployed people and
assets during the right weather and right time of year to see if we
can operate, if we have the right capabilities, and if we have the
right understanding of the area. What we have found is that most
of our small boats and our short-range helicopters are ineffective.
We found that we currently do not really have good charts for the
Arctic; we do not understand where all the shallow water is. We
need ships that can operate with the right endurance. There is not
always an opportunity to refuel so we have to be able to get where
we want to go, and then we have to be able to stay there for a
long time. We have to have ships that have platforms for embarked
helicopters in order to provide the extended reach that we need.
We have also learned that there is not a lot of infrastructure
that can provide logistics support. So if something breaks, we have
to worry about how we get the part that we need. It is pretty easy
if we are operating in the Caribbean or in the Gulf of Mexico; we
have an established network, and we can get parts within a couple
of days. It is not so simple in the Arctic. The existing communications network is not very effective. So that is something else we
have to work on as we go forward.
We know for certain, however, that there is going to be a
requirement for the Coast Guard and for the nation up there. We
understand that. We understand that we will have responsibilities
for law enforcement, fisheries regulation, search and rescue, and
environmental response. But there are things we do not understand yet. For example, how do you clean up oil spilled on the ice?
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
151
I do not know anyone who knows how to do that at this time, but
we have to start accounting for that, we have to start figuring it out,
we have to carry out essential research and development, and we
have to partner with industry.
One of the neat things about the Arctic, if you think about it,
is that there is not a lot of infrastructure. However, as we get more
and more open water, and as private industry wants to operate
more up there—whether it be cruise ships, fisheries, or oil and
energy companies—we have an opportunity to establish rules
and regulations to fit the environment. We have an opportunity to
build the infrastructure that fits the regimes instead of building the
regimes to fit the infrastructure, like we do now.
It is an opportunity for us to look way ahead and say okay,
if somebody wants to operate in the Arctic, let us establish the
regulations by which they can operate. If you want to be there,
you have to establish the appropriate logistic and communications systems that will enable the federal agencies to carry out their
assigned responsibilities. There has to be a partnership between
the federal government and private industry.
REFERENCE
1. The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 66/
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD-66/HSPD25), Arctic Region Policy, 9 Jan 2009, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/
nspd/nspd-66.htm.
152
Rear Admiral David Woods
You probably wonder why, with my operational background, I am the head of strategy for the Navy. Before this job,
I served for 18 months as the head of our strategy team for the
Rear Admiral David Woods earned a B.S. degree from the U.S. Naval
Academy in 1981 and a master’s degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College in 1997. In 1983, he was designated a naval flight officer. His shore assignments include: research
officer, Naval Surface Weapons Center; aviation enlisted rating
assignment officer, Bureau of Naval Personnel; EA-6B fleet replacement training officer and flight instructor, Electronic Attack Squadron
(VAQ) 129, Vikings; EA-6B wing readiness and requirements officer,
Electronic Combat Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet; and EA-6B and airborne
electronic attack requirements officer, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) Air Warfare Division. His sea duty assignments
include: VAQ-131 for deployments with Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 6 and
CVW 2 and VAQ-138 for two deployments with CVW 9. Woods’s commander command was with VAQ-132. His bonus commander command was with VAQ-129, the Navy’s EA-6B Prowler Fleet Replacement
Squadron. Woods’s major command was as commander of CVW 11
for two deployments with Carrier Strike Group 11 in combat support of both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He
served as deputy director, Combined Air Operations Center, Joint
Task Force Southwest Asia, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. He returned in
September 2008 from a combat tour in Iraq as the commander of Joint
Crew Composite Squadron 1. Woods’s decorations include the Legion
of Merit, a Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medals (four awards),
Strike/Flight Air Medals (five awards), a USAF Aerial Achievement
Medal, Navy Commendation Medals (four awards), Navy Achievement
Medals (two awards), the 1995 National Navy League Vice Admiral
John Perry Award for excellence in electronic warfare, and various
other awards.
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
153
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) with Ms. Michèle Flournoy
and Ms. Amanda Dory.
The Navy’s new strategy, and that of our sister services, the
Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, came out in October 2007. It
laid out exactly where we wanted to go. It defined the ends, the
strategic imperatives, and the core competencies that we think that
the maritime forces should deliver to the nation. During my first
year and a half on the job, I was kind of doing missionary work. I
am from Utah so I understand missionary work. It was my job to
explain the new strategy to the citizens of our country as well as to
citizens of other nations, and to conduct kind of the litmus test of
that strategy to see if we got it right.
As Ms. Dory discussed earlier, over the last 18 months, we
have gone through several higher-level strategy efforts, including
the QDR, as I noted in my introduction. Specifically, the QDR
updated our national defense strategy. In addition, the National
Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR), and the Space Strategy have all been
accomplished in the last 18 months.
The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century went through a
similar process in 2007. Based on our more recent efforts, we found
that we got it about right. As the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
says, the recent strategic reviews validated the Navy strategy, even
though it preceded all of those efforts. As you go through the collection of strategy documents, you will see some similar words and
similar themes and ideas, not only regarding the security environment that we expect to face in the future, but also regarding what
the nation expects the maritime forces to deliver.
For the last 10 years, we have been focused on the current fight
in the Middle East. But as the NATO operations against Libya and
the international response to the recent tsunami off Japan show,
once the current fight is wrapped up, maritime forces are not going
to be done. Moreover, the demand signal probably is not going
down; it is going to be reoriented and focused elsewhere in order
to deliver some of the strategic imperatives and core competencies
that we articulated in our strategy.
154
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
If you looked across the globe a couple of weeks ago, you
would have seen that the Navy had some 16,000 sailors on the
ground, another 10,000 at sea, and two carrier strike groups supporting U.S. and allied operations in Operations Enduring Freedom
and Iraqi Freedom along with related activities in Bahrain, in
Yemen, and on the African continent. You would also see the
counter-piracy effort that is going on off the coast of Somalia and
the dedicated assets and capabilities that go into that. Beginning
just several weeks ago, the Navy has committed additional forces
to support the no-fly zone that is part of Operation New Dawn. A
great example of the Navy’s inherent flexibility is that we were able
to shift some of the Navy’s electronic attack aircraft from flying
combat missions over Iraq to flying combat missions enforcing the
no-fly zone over Libya. For the affected units flying out of Aviano,
Italy, just 47 hours elapsed between their last combat mission over
Iraq and their first mission over Libya.
At the same time that all of these things were going on, the
Navy was also responding to the tsunami-caused disaster in Japan.
Sailors and Marines from the George Washington Strike Group and
its escorts, and from the Essex Amphibious Ready Group, have
been involved in a variety of humanitarian relief and disaster relief
operations in Japan. The Ronald Reagan Strike Group and nine
other ships also responded to that crisis and as of today are on station delivering humanitarian relief and assistance. The command
ship Blue Ridge and naval forces from the Seventh Fleet and the
Pacific Fleet are leading the joint task force that is providing overall command and control for the operations off of Japan. At the
same time, our SSBNs are at sea providing a deterrent capability
as the most survivable leg of our nuclear triad. The impressive U.S.
response effectively demonstrates the operationalization of the maritime strategy. The capabilities available in those forces range from
deterrence to sea control and include power projection, maritime
security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Moreover, the
Navy is conducting all of those missions simultaneously.
Now let us spend a few minutes examining the question: how
does the Navy respond to climate change, how do we move forward into the future, and how do we operationalize that? Climate
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
155
change will directly impact several of the strategic imperatives
that we articulated in our 2007 strategy, in particular, our desire to
limit regional conflict. As we have already heard, climate change
will invariably heighten the competition for resources in the maritime environment, especially in the Arctic as it opens up. Those
resources will not only include strategic materials like petroleum
and important minerals, but also trade. As a result, the Bering Strait
could well become a main trade route and another strategic choke
point. And any time that there is competition, there is the potential
for conflict.
Obviously, prevention of such conflict is a key component
of the strategy guiding the employment of our Navy and other
maritime forces. Our goal is to prevent local disruptions, whether
in Japan or on our own shores as in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. Such issues were brought home to me last month when I
was taking a course attended by a number of allied officers, one
of whom was from New Zealand. During one class he was talking
about climate change and sea-level rise. He pointed out that the
ocean would not have to rise very much before several of New
Zealand’s Pacific Island neighbors would be under water. The
potential need to evacuate the entire population of an island state
brings home the importance of climate change, especially in the
maritime environment. So, it will be important that the Navy foster
and sustain the essential cooperative relationships with our sister
services and those of our allies.
We are doing that with Japan today. It is humbling to see the
world’s third largest economy brought to its knees in one fell
swoop; it reminds one of the collapses of ancient civilizations, how
they could perish so quickly. That level of disaster obviously is devastating. And, it shows the importance of the Navy being able to
contribute to homeland and defense in depth—being able to take
our mission-tailored forces and globally distribute them as required
are important mission capabilities.
As we think about adapting the Navy’s strategy and operations
to climate challenges, it is clear that there is a need to apply the
deliberate-planning process that the DoD and the Navy employ on
a regular basis to the issues associated with climate change. You
156
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
will hear more tomorrow from Rear Admiral David Titley about the
CNO’s commitment to use Task Force Climate Change to kick start
that planning process for Climate Change. And later today, you will
see how we are doing the same thing on the energy side when
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom talks about Task Force Energy.
We are taking deliberate planning steps to address not only
climate change, but how we are going to operate in the Arctic. We
have a capability based assessment underway to define what the
infrastructure requirements are, not only for our shore-based facilities but for our operating forces. We have a 30-year ship-building
plan that is looking at the next generation of surface ships and
submarines. With the 50-year-old Enterprise out on deployment
now, we are reminded that the follow-on to our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, the SSBNX, will be on deployment in the
year 2080. Thus, given the lifetimes of our capital assets, it is clear
that the Navy has to think about what the operating environment is
going to be like far into the future.
So what is required to operate in the Arctic? What kind of hardening, what kind of propulsion, and what kind of systems will we
need there? Moreover, we need to be concerned not only with our
ships and our people, but also with the infrastructure that supports
them by providing navigation, search and rescue, communications,
and all of the other pieces that come into play.
So, that is where the Navy is headed. We realize that as we
come out of the current fight, the demand signal is going to change
for us. As we have seen from some of our recent activities, the
demand for offshore options is likely to be an increasing one.
The climate is changing, and those changes will both increase
the demands on our naval forces and impose challenges on
employing them. As the Arctic opens and that region takes on
increasing strategic importance for us, the demand signals will
change. If we do not get out ahead of those changes with efforts
like those being led by Rear Admiral Titley and by Rear Admiral
Cullom, then the assets that we are buying today in anticipation
of future operations will not be equipped to handle the extremes
that we may be facing.
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
157
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
have been tracking the initiatives and efforts of Task Force
Q: IClimate
Change and Task Force Energy for some months now,
and I am very impressed. I was privileged to attend the Navy Energy
Forum in Washington, D.C., in October. My question to the panel is how
do you convince, at worst, a doubting, but at best, an ambivalent set
of policymakers to take climate change and the energy issues seriously?
From my perspective north of the border, we seem to be addressing the
problem from a bottom-up approach, while you have the benefit of topdown direction.
While we are thinking about that, I would like to respond to the
observation made by several of the speakers regarding the poor or incomplete mapping and charting in the Arctic. I would like to make people
aware that in Ottawa last year, there was an inaugural meeting of the
Arctic Regional Hydrographic Committee where all five nations of the
Arctic got together to formulate plans and strategies to actually improve
charting. So, better charts will be coming your way.
Ms. A manda Dory: Let me address your question about how
to get policymakers and decision makers to take these issues seriously. You described a little bit of a top-down effect here in the
States and maybe more of a bottom-up approach in Canada.
I think to really optimize, you need to apply both approaches
together. In fact, in the United States, the approach has kind of
shifted over time. There is a strong grassroots effort in favor of
action and change, whether it has a climate focus or whether it has
an energy efficiency focus. But then there are opposing views that
tend to work against those signals and, in effect, cancel them out
at various points. So there is not a clear, unified demand signal, in
my view, that is from the bottom up.
What you have seen from the top-down perspective over the
course of at least two administrations now is a Commander in
Chief demonstrating leadership and saying this is an issue, it is
real, and we need to take it into consideration in our planning
158
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
and move deliberately in directions that are based on data and
projections. As a result, we are planning and making investments
relative to our understanding. In the view of some people, we are
moving way too slowly, and in the view of others, we are moving way too quickly. I like to think that we have chosen a middle course consistent with the uncertainty that surrounds future
projections.
I would like to comment briefly on Rear Admiral David Woods’s
earlier observation about the concurrency of efforts that the United
States is engaged in right now. We have the ongoing efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan against Al Qaeda, the “prevail” component of our
national defense strategy. On top of that, we are providing an ally
with a massive humanitarian disaster response that will extend for
a lengthy period of time, and now, with another group of allies,
we are enforcing a new no-fly-zone over Libya that will remain in
place for an unclear duration.
When you start to stack all of those efforts together, it takes me
back to some of our internal discussions during the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) process in which we talked about exactly
what the DoD should be using as its force planning and sizing construct. We wanted to be able to describe what the force is able
to do in aggregate, so we created some hypothetical cases along
those lines. We thought the DoD should be able to handle a longterm stabilization campaign plus something similar to what we are
doing in Afghanistan right now, plus a domestic disaster of some
sort, as well as our steady-state activities. We came up with several different force sizing constructs along those lines. The overall
result was something that looks like what we are actually doing
today. Although this approach is somewhat more complex than the
scenarios we were using, I think we will benefit by acknowledging
that the DoD needs to be able to do a variety of things and have
a variety of measures of effectiveness. Doing that analytically will
make it tractable for the department.
I think “tractability” also relates directly to the question that
you posed, which is: how do you get decision makers to a point
of seriousness? This is accomplished by making problems tractable
and actionable. I think that is a challenge for us collectively, and
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
159
there are different ways to do it. I mentioned two of them here, but
I think analytical tractability is a third path that we need to follow.
possible that one could potentially see some sort of a trigQ: Isgeritevent
that would change that bottom-up equation, say a
large-scale disaster or a series of disasters that might encourage people
to think differently about climate change?
Rear Admiral David Woods: I think we are seeing just such
events. We sent an Amphibious Ready Group with a Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to Pakistan during the floods a few
months ago (July 2010), and that event was publicized via social
media and the interconnected world. As a result, we see a burgeoning partner in the conflict that we are engaged in today. We
reacted not to a military threat, but to a threat associated with a
natural disaster.
That event and our reaction to it are part of the bottom-up
piece that ties things together for the support that you are talking about. You typically see a lot of discussion in the media about
Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan and its effect on our military
efforts there. Adding to that the story of the relief efforts going
on inside Pakistan to stabilize that country following record floods
starts to bring it home for many Americans.
I think the science underlying climate change is undeniable,
as Rear Admiral David Titley will tell you. But as Rear Admiral
Thomas Atkin noted, many of the effects will not occur during our
lifetimes, and that is the point that is ultimately going to matter to
the people living in Dubuque, Iowa, or Ogden, Utah. However,
seeing people suffering as the result of a natural disaster and the
subsequent response from the United States makes it clear to people that we have to start thinking about such eventualities.
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin: In recent years, we have had
numerous natural disasters that have had dramatic effects—
Hurricane Katrina, the Haiti earthquake, the Christchurch earthquake, the earthquake in Japan, floods in Pakistan, and floods in
the United States. The reality is that these events are probably not
linked all that well just to climate change.
160
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Despite multiple occurrences of huge disasters, for the most
part, the American people see each as a singular event that has
either an adequate or an inadequate response. They see the U.S.
government coming in and supporting it if it is an international
event or the federal government working with state and local governments if it occurs here in the United States. But I would argue
that we have to convince the media—both the traditional media
and the new social media—to do a better job of tying these things
together. We need to examine whether they are linked to climate
change without getting into why the climate is changing. We have
to make clear that climate change is occurring and that it is impacting us by making disasters occur more often and be more severe.
While I think that both the current and the previous administration
looked at climate change as happening in the Arctic, how well are
we doing at convincing policymakers and Congress that it is important to them right now?
Let us look, for example, at the issue of Coast Guard icebreakers. You probably noticed that I did not mention icebreakers during
my talk. Do we really need icebreakers in 2040 and beyond, or do
we need ships that are able to operate in different ice conditions,
whether it be broken ice, chopped ice, or 3-foot ice? Do we really
need something that could get through 16–20 feet of ice? I do not
know the answer to that, but we need to establish what those true
requirements are based on the future, and that is hard to do.
So I think if we are going to start convincing policymakers and
those in Congress to look forward, it is not necessarily the members themselves we have to convince, but rather their staffs. Those
are the folks that we have to show that there is a linkage and that
we need to start focusing on this problem today because it will
impact us 10, 15, 20, or 30 years from now.
Vice Chief of Naval Operations made it clear that the
Q: The
Navy does not really want to build new icebreakers. The
Coast Guard has long believed that some will be needed. Strategy is the
job of portioning your resources in the right way. So, I ask you, should we
be buying new icebreakers? Do we really need them? When do we make
the decision? How long can we afford to wait?
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
161
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin: I will go ahead and jump on
that hand grenade. I hate using the term icebreaker—it is just a
pet peeve of mine because it has certain connotations, especially
when I talk with my colleagues at the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Whenever we talk to them about icebreakers, they
invariably ask: what are the true requirements in the future? Do we
really need to build a Polar Sea- or Polar Star-type ice breaker that
can break through 15–20 feet of ice if we are not going to have
15–20 feet of ice in the future?
So I think we have to take a hard look. One of the planning activities that the Coast Guard engages in is called Project
Evergreen. As part of that project, we take a look at a broad set of
scenarios that could happen 20–30 years out and, based on those
scenarios, we develop our strategy. Then, based on the strategy,
we work with our colleagues in the DoD and establish the overall
requirements for ice-capable ships.
We know that we will need to be able to conduct search and
rescue, we will need to be able to conduct fisheries enforcement,
we will need to be able to conduct law enforcement, and we will
need to be able to conduct environmental response in the Arctic
Ocean. Sometimes that ocean is going to have ice on it; sometimes
it is just going to have broken ice. But we need develop the right
ships or platforms to conduct operations regardless, and I would
say the time is now.
As of today, we are down to one icebreaker, the Healy, and it
can only operate in the Arctic; it cannot operate in the Antarctic.
Even then, it is somewhat limited. It is more of a scientific platform
than a response platform, so we need to start looking at the right
types of ships that can operate in that environment, and they need
to be ice capable versus icebreakers.
Rear Admiral David Woods: I think the Navy sees ice-capable
ships as something it needs as well. As we project ourselves operating in the Arctic in the future, at least a portion of the fleet needs
to be able to operate in a marginal ice environment. So it is probably not icebreakers as we know them today, but ice-capable ships,
as Rear Admiral Atkin indicated. Then, as the Vice Chief of Naval
operations said, the issue is when we buy them.
162
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Ms. A manda Dory: Just from the strategic perspective, I think
that my colleagues have already addressed the perspectives as
far as the right sizing and the right timing of the U.S. government
response and the need to continue to refine and define what the
missions are. We understand those missions in a broad sense, but
we need to understand them in a more particular sense. Are they
maritime security missions? Are they freedom of navigation missions? Are there sovereign defense issues? There are already activities underway to identify the appropriate subsurface, surface, and
above-the-surface assets.
The issue is, consistent with the projections, what is it that the
U.S. government will need? Where can we work with allies and
others in a complementary fashion? Where can we work with the
private sector? Where does the private sector have the preponderance of interests and therefore need to take the lead?
We need to find the right balance. Strategy is aligning your
ends with your ways and your means. I think what you have heard
from my colleagues is the means piece. We understand what the
ends are and we have plenty of guidance that lets us know the
extent of U.S. interests in the Arctic.
Getting the right sizing and the right timing of the capabilities
to support the missions is really the crux of the matter now. No
one wants to overinvest, and no one wants to underinvest. We are
not in a resource climate where we can do the “field-of-dreams”
strategy, build it, and wait for people to come. We need to build
what we need in tandem with the arrival and the manifestation of
our interests.
I ask my question, I would like to offer some comments
Q: Before
that get to this issue of how do you get people to act on cli-
mate change based on a study that we recently conducted. On behalf
of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
(SERDP), we looked at the potential effects of climate change on military installations. In the process, we talked to a lot of people all across
the DoD, everybody from the combat guys to the environmental folks.
Almost to a person, we heard two things. One was agreement that climate change is out there but that we do not have to do anything right
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
163
now. Their perception was that the effects would occur in the future, and
we do not need to act now. Second, we heard that even if we had to act,
we do not have any data that we can use. We do not know what to do.
All the data we have are so general that they are useless to us; we cannot
act upon them.
After we heard those responses over and over, we made up some scenarios to try to identify the type of data needed. For example, we said
what if the number of days per year when the temperature at Ft. Benning,
Georgia, was over 90°F increased from 10 days to 40? With that sort of
data, we heard different responses: “Holy cow, we would have 15 blackflag days and 37 red-flag days, and it would shut us down—we could
not do training.” But essentially the minute we gave them data, everybody began processing the data and began to figure out what they meant
to them. So the need is for data, and we heard Rear Admiral Atkin say
that. They look at scenarios, and once you give people information that
is relevant to what they are doing, they will act upon it immediately.
The question then is what are the DoD, the Navy, and everyone else doing about getting data that are specific to the needs of all
these folks? The Special Forces trainers need to know about lightening
because if there is lightening within 10 miles, they have to stop training.
So is there going to be a lot more lightening? Will there be more blackflag days to shut down everybody? That is what they want to know.
How are you all dealing with getting the data that we will need to do
detailed planning?
Ms. A manda Dory: I think you have described perfectly the
DoD culture of being analytically informed and data driven in the
way we conduct our planning processes. When we do not have
scenarios to work with, for example, or when we do not have the
data, we run into a brick wall until we have created those kinds of
approaches for whatever the particular planning is, whether it is
installations, operational, or long-range force planning.
So, we have a lot of different data needs and a lot of different
scenario needs. I think you are beginning to see that in the course
of the tremendously valuable work that SERDP does, for example,
and in how the QDR included a preliminary data call to all of the
164
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
DoD’s domestic installations to get a preliminary sense of the data
they were working with and what responses they projected given
some basic scenario parameters. With that, you can begin to start
the dialogue and start the thinking.
I think what you are highlighting is that this is a process that will
mature, and there will be a lot of different hands on the different
pieces and parts of it. I think there are some in the audience who
work closely with the installations and the environmental component of the DoD’s Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, who has overall responsibility for that piece. In the
force planning arena, what we have done is to create a number of
scenarios to help us think through what the requirements will be
in the Arctic, for example, to enable us to better understand what
kinds of missions and capabilities come into play. At the same time,
you can also see the workarounds that are preventing actionable
responses in some cases.
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin: I am always intrigued when we
start talking about data with climate change only because the data
look back, and we are trying to project forward into an environment that we do not really know. We know it is all changing, we
just do not know what the rate of change is or the overall scope
of the change. Certainly from a search and rescue area, which we
have looked at in the Arctic, the question I usually ask is: what
kind of water will our search and rescue forces have to face? What
will the ice be like? Will it be 2 feet of ice, broken ice, or just
clear water?
The more we understand, the more likely we will be able to
project the requirements going forward. But I would argue that we
have a variety of projections already of what the climate will be like
30, 40, and 50 years from now, and it is a pretty wide picture. So I
think what we have to do is not try to narrow it down to say there
is going to be more lightning strikes in this area or there is going to
be 16 more days over 90°F. We have to take a look at all of the different projections out there and see what capabilities work across
all of them. That is what we need to then build from within both
the strategy perspective and the asset perspective.
Chapter 5 Adapting Strategy and Operations to Climate
165
I will sing Project Evergreen’s praises a bit more because that is
what this scenario-based planning process does so well. It enables
us to look across all the different projections, build the different
scenarios, and then identify the capabilities that apply across all
of them. I do not think we are going to be able to get that specific
on projecting exactly what we are going to face. Although I would
like someone to tell me that I am only going to have 16 ice days
in 2050, I know I am not going to get that. So I have to look at it
from a different perspective, and it is not always going to be the
data that are going to get me there. Data are good, but we need to
try to identify what things work best across all the different projections going forward.
Rear Admiral David Woods: We are very good at the data
piece at the tactical level and even at the operational level. We collect and process a wide variety of data to support environmental
characterization and forecasting. As an aviator, winds and freezing
levels and those types of things are critical to operations. Where
we are not as good, but we are getting better, is strategic planning. We are trying to capture such considerations in some of the
wargame scenarios that we are conducting. We did one in 2009;
we are planning one in 2011 that focuses on the Arctic. In these
events, we give the game players data to act upon. The outcomes
will inform our thinking—not only our roadmap, but also our strategy for the Arctic.
More of that is required to get us out of the comfort zone that
says that climate change is only of concern in the future that we
do not need to deal with it in the near term. We need to devise
wargame scenarios where you need to deal with climate change
and provide the necessary data so that the players can act on it.
In large part, that is our approach, especially for the Arctic. We
are trying to focus our wargaming efforts appropriately and then
feed the results back into higher-level games that are going on in
the department.
Adapting to
Energy Challenges
Chapter 6
Ta s k F o rc e E n e rg y
U p dat e
171
The Honorable John Warner
Let me begin by thanking all of those who have spent so many
hours preparing for this extremely important conference and for
the invitation to participate. I offered to do several things and
they took me up on two offers—to introduce Rear Admiral Philip
Cullom for a few minutes and to serve on one of the symposium
roundtables. But in introducing Rear Admiral Cullom, I want to go
into a little bit of background regarding how I became involved in
this general subject.
Over the course of my Senate career, I became keenly aware
of how the climate was having an impact on our operations and
on the budgets that came before me when I was Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee. I talked it over with some of my colleagues, one of whom was a new member of the committee. I
remember very well when this member joined the committee,
because as chairman I had implemented a pretty firm rule. I said
this committee is for one purpose and one purpose only, and that
is to serve the nation and the men and women of the armed forces
and their families. We do not do much politics on this committee.
That is the way we ran it. In the 30 years that I was on that committee, virtually all of my predecessors ran it the same way.
So this particular member, who was a really politically oriented
individual, agreed to follow that rule. So, that is when then-Senator
Hillary Rodham Clinton and I became fast friends. She was a marvelous member of the committee. She said she wanted to learn a
little bit more about national security; I said “I will be your professor.” And the rest is history. We even sponsored a piece of legislation together, which I will describe shortly.
In the annals of the Congress of the United States, there is a
tremendous paucity of specific legislation related to the generic
172
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
subject of climate change, its connection to our nation’s energy
needs, and how both climate and energy are then connected
to national security. A goodly number of members have sought
answers to our national security concerns, and I thank them for
their efforts. It is terribly important to understand these subjects
and their relationship to each other and to our nation’s security.
So, in 2008, Senator Clinton and I wrote a bill directing the
Congress—I am just going to read one sentence of it —“to assess
the risk of projected climate change to current and future missions
of the armed forces.” When the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) came along in 2010, they had that as their guidance. They
came out with some very definitive findings on the nexus between
climate, energy, and national security. So how does this relate to
the distinguished speaker about whom I am privileged to say a
few comments?
Well, I will date back. I have had the privilege of being associated with the men and women of the armed forces for a half centuryplus, beginning in 1945. It was January 10, 1945, when I enlisted in
the U.S. Navy. Over the intervening years, I have learned far more
from serving with the men and women in uniform, whether I was a
sailor or a young Marine lieutenant on active duty or in the Marine
reserves, than they ever learned from me. As a consequence, when
I had the good fortune to come to the Senate I said to myself: “You
know, you owe a tremendous payback to the U.S. military.”
So, I joined the Armed Services Committee and believe me,
I tried as best I could in my 30 years on that Committee, 17 of
which I spent as either Chairman (three times) or a ranking minority member (three times), depending on political shifts. I really had
an opportunity to do things for the men and women of the armed
forces. In the process I got to know the military. And my service in
the Senate was preceded by 5 years, 3 months, and 2 days in the
Navy Secretariat. So I know a little bit about Navy politics and how
things operate.
And I would say that our next speaker is what they call a fasttrack individual. He, in his earlier life, did the right thing and went
to sea after having an extraordinary career at the Naval Academy,
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
173
where he majored in physics. He then went on to get another
graduate degree in technology. Once on active duty, he became
what we call a saltwater sailor. He commanded small ships, he was
on large ships and aircraft carriers, and he commanded fleets. He
has done it all. He is a real fast-track, what we call a black-shoe
saltwater sailor.
Now, along comes this subject, and President Barack Obama,
to his credit, began to put emphasis on the issues of climate and
energy from the start. He was determined to lead the Executive
Branch in the direction to do what we can to begin solving some
of the challenges facing this country. Sure, I am an old rock-ribbed
Republican, but I have always, on the issues of security and politics, focused solely on the national interest. So, I credit President
Obama for his leadership.
His predecessor was a dear friend of mine, and I am deeply
indebted to both George W. Bush and his father George Herbert
Walker Bush. I served with both and worked with them many
times, but climate and energy was not one of their top priorities. As
a matter of fact, Senator Clinton and I put into the same legislation
provisions for a position in the DoD for a person who was going
to focus totally on energy. The law provided for that position, and
it was confirmable by the Senate. But they never put up a nominee. But President Obama did, and that gave rise to a very good
friend of mine, Ms. Sharon Burke, who is now in that position in
the department, coordinating all of the functions of which I speak.
So, back to Rear Admiral Cullom. He is a top saltwater sailor,
and suddenly he has chosen to take on this job. And he was chosen
because the President and the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus,
whom I have had the privilege of knowing quite well through the
years, decided they wanted one of the Navy’s finest and best to
take on this responsibility. And what does that do? That sends a
signal all over the E-Ring. The President says we are going to do
business and the Secretary of the Navy says we are going to do
business, so we are going to pick one of the fast-track, top-flag
officers to run it. Now need I say more? No. Rear Admiral Cullom,
Petty Officer Third Class John Warner requests permission to leave
the bridge and for you to take over.
174
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom
Senator, I am very humbled by that introduction. I would really
like to start out by thanking The Honorable John Warner for his
visionary leadership in this area. At a time when other people were
Rear Admiral Philip H. Cullom graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy
with a bachelor’s degree in physics and from Harvard Business School
with a master’s degree in business administration. At sea, he has served
in various operational and engineering billets. From 1998 to 1999, he
commanded USS Mitscher (DDG 57). As commander of Amphibious
Squadron Three, he served as sea combat commander for the first
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG 1) (2003–2004). From 2007 to 2008,
he served as commander of Carrier Strike Group Eight. Ashore, he has
served in various positions including shift engineer and staff training
officer of the A1W nuclear prototype at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations’ Executive
Panel (OP-00K), and branch head for Strategy and Policy (N513). Joint
assignments have included defense resource manager within the J-8
Directorate of the Joint Staff, White House fellow to the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, and director for Defense Policy
and Arms Control at the National Security Council. He also served as
the head of Officer Programs and Placement (PERS 424/41N) from
2001 until 2003. After completing major command, he served as the
chief of staff for Commander, Second Fleet/Commander, Striking Fleet
Atlantic until 2005. Flag assignments ashore included Navy staff positions as director of Deep Blue, the Strategy and Policy (N5SP) Division,
and Fleet Readiness Division (N43). In 2010, he assumed his present
duties as director of the Energy and Environmental Readiness Division
on the Navy staff. Rear Admiral Cullom’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal (two awards), the Legion of Merit (five awards),
the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Meritorious Service
Medal (two awards), the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation
Medal (three awards), the Joint Service Achievement Medal, and the
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal.
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
175
not thinking about this issue, he was doing so. He was able to
garner support across the aisles—to identify and work with the
people who could move this thing forward. I think we as a nation,
and we as a Navy, owe an awful lot to Senator Warner for where
we are on these issues today. So I would actually like to give a
great round of applause for him because without his active involvement, our children, our grandchildren, and our great-grandchildren
would live in a very different world.
I have the unenviable position of being the after-lunch speaker
which, as you all know, is a hard slot to fill because the audience
is oftentimes tempted to let their minds wander. So I am going to
try to keep us on track, adding a bit of variance to my standard
PowerPoint brief. I am going start out with a video that will capture
our imagination about how important this issue really is.
Figure 1. Easter Island
In the past, when I have talked about this, I have done so using
a couple of slides. I think they were powerful, but I think I am
going to let the experts speak to this. These particular experts were
picked by the History Channel for a program that first aired about
176
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
2.5 months ago. It has been shown several times since then. This
very powerful program features five futurists, brought together
by the History Channel, to talk about potential global events that
would present the greatest challenges to mankind.
Now this is not the first time that something like this has happened in the world. Oftentimes people say that history does not
necessarily repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Well, one of those
rhymes is Easter Island. A thousand years ago, Easter Island was the
site of a pretty advanced society for its day. It was founded on the
island’s major resource, which was wood, timber. As you can see
from Figure 1, there is not much wood on Easter Island today. It is
all gone because they used it and never replaced it. Eventually, by
at least some reports, they chose to resort to cannibalism in their
attempt to stay alive.
So when we think about where societies have been through
time—and Easter Island was not the last one that got into trouble, there have been others that have followed a similar rhyme or
theme—we need to think about where we are today and where
we are going. I am going to start by saying that we are faced today
with a number of different paradoxes, laws, and maybe corollaries
to those laws.
Figure 2. The Jevons Paradox, Moore’s Law, and Energy
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
177
The first one I want to bring up is called the Jevons paradox
(Figure 2). Jevons was an economist in the United Kingdom back
in the mid-19th century. You can see some of the things that he
observed as the British economy at the time was dealing with the
depletion of coal in England and Wales. What he saw was that as
machines became more and more efficient, the operators tended
to consume more and more fuel. That, in turn, meant that the
mines were being depleted that much faster, despite the fact that
things were much more efficient.
Fast forward a century or so to the mid-1960s when another
individual, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, came up with his
law, which was that the number of transistors on an integrated
circuit board seemed to double every 2 years. Almost everyone
remembers that part. He also said that with that doubling, your
power requirements also doubled.
There is some debate today regarding whether Moore’s law is
still in effect or whether it may eventually reach a peaking point,
which would have its own interesting dynamic. But certainly what
we see today and what we saw in our own military as we went
from sail to coal to oil is an example of both the Jevons paradox
and Moore’s law. Back when we had sail as our only energy source,
we were a pretty self-sufficient Navy. We had manpower and we
had wind, and the only other energy source was the whale blubber
that we used to light the smoking lamp, which then either got used
for smoking or for lighting the cannons so that we could destroy
the enemy. We foraged for water and food, and that was about it.
By the time we moved into the 20th century, we found that we
had this seemingly inexhaustible source of cheap power, and that
inexhaustible source of cheap power meant that we could live in
a profligate manner and not have to be austere or Spartan in any
way. We just shoved everything off on the logisticians. We told
them to just figure out how to get the oil there, and we will do the
warfighting.
With that has come a vulnerability. We understood that in
World War II. We understood that the U-Boat attacks, in part, were
about destroying those logistic links across the oceans. Sadly, we
178
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
have had to relearn that lesson on today’s battlefields in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Lest we not have to relearn that lesson at sea, I think it
is important for us to make sure that we address both these trends
and find a way to keep the march of technology and our improved
efficiencies from simply requiring more and more energy.
What we really need to become is a smart Navy—a smart Navy
that really is an austere, energy-efficient Navy (Figure 3). Because
if we are energy efficient and energy smart and have that Spartan
mindset to be able to sustain our mission, we will be able to operate, if we pick the right energy sources, in perpetuity. That is an
important piece of this that I want us to understand as we reflect
on what happened on Easter Island. We have to be able to do this
in perpetuity, both as a military and as a nation and as a globe.
Without that, at some point the gig is up, and at some point it comes
to an end. We have to decide whether we want our society and our
world to continue in perpetuity. I have to worry about making sure
that our Navy is able to continue its operations in perpetuity.
Figure 3. An Energy-Smart Navy
To do that, we need to focus on energy efficiency when we
acquire new systems and platforms. The things that we build for
the future need to be as efficient as possible, so that our new
ships and our new planes really are austere in the way they are
designed and built. At the same time, we have to improve our
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
179
existing fleet efficiency. We have to make sure that the Navy that
is out there today is as efficient as it can be as well, even though
it was designed when the cost of a gallon of gas was probably less
than a dollar.
We have to find diverse energy resources, and then ultimately
we have to change our behavior. Otherwise, as Jevons showed, we
will continue to use more and more energy, even as we make our
systems more efficient. So, changing our behavior is ultimately how
we get to an energy-smart Navy. And if we have an energy-smart,
sustainable Navy, you can use the same lessons and extrapolate
those to an energy-smart nation.
Let us turn now to the topic of energy efficient acquisition
(Figure 4). Earlier this morning, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
talked about acquisition related to climate change writ large. The
lessons that we have learned on the energy side of the house are
very similar. While we have been embarked on the journey of
trying to get to energy efficient acquisition for a couple of years,
we have more work yet to do. It is pretty clear where the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stands on this issue.
Figure 4. Energy Efficient Acquisition
As some of you may already know, acquisition is a difficult
process, and unless you are in the acquisition world and trained as
180
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
an engineering duty officer, it is a hard thing to understand because
it has a lot of moving parts. You have milestones A, B, and C. You
have a process with different steps along the way. You have gate
reviews that have to happen at certain points and times. And you
have this Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) process that is used to define the requirements for the thing
that you are going to build, whether it is a plane or a ship, and the
capability that it will need to have when it is finally delivered to
the warfighter.
Now we oftentimes think that we can solve this problem simply
by defining the right Key Performance Parameter (KPP) or the right
Key Success Attribute (KSA). But the reality is that if we are going to
do this right, we have to tackle it in two ways—the process and the
paradigm. You have to start as early in the process as you can. You
cannot wait for a gate 6 review to say, ”You know, we should have
made the system more energy efficient because you have already
expended hundreds and hundreds of thousands of man hours to
create the energy-inefficient platform now in front of you.” We have
to identify and define the right attributes very early in the game.
The Marine Corps and the Navy are in synch on this. I have
spoken with their Expeditionary Energy Office, and we are
approaching this in exactly the same way. We both want to start
very early in this process and make sure that, in the gate reviews
along the way, we can ensure that what we are doing, and what
we actually are building, is in fact energy efficient. Now how do
you do that? It is always a matter of trade-offs. Just like in the space
program when you build a satellite, you have to worry about payload. You have to worry about the energy that it uses once it is up
there and the capabilities that it needs to have. You need a lot of
scientists and engineers sitting around a table to figure out what
trade-offs must be made to ultimately produce the satellite that can
do the mission.
The problem is that we do not normally do that when it comes
to building ships or planes. The paradigm we tend to use for our
military systems starts with some desired capability or capabilities
and then translates that into specific requirements. For example,
you might want to be able to hit a pea that is going Mach 5 at
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
181
500 nautical miles, which will require X amount of energy. That
requirement is then handed over to a team of engineers who are
responsible for one particular aspect of the design, say the propulsion system. When they have done their job, they kick the task
across the transom, across the fence to the next guys in line.
The next engineer says, “Okay, well, then you need a 10-megawatt generator,” and that in turn goes on and on and on. Ultimately
we end up with a ship or a plane that is significantly different than
what it would be if we had forced everybody to sit at the table and
balance the capability requirements with the operational energy
requirements as part of an analysis of alternatives. All of the necessary trade-offs would be made as a part of this process.
We need to figure out what to put into the process—how to
change the paradigm so that the analysis of alternatives is not on
the outside, but on the inside. If we can do that, then we can
fundamentally change what we build for the future. That is part
of our challenge. It is not an easy thing, and the joint world has to
be involved.
Retooling the existing fleet—or said differently, fixing a fleet
that was designed very inefficiently from an energy perspective—so that it becomes a fleet that is much more efficient for the
future is a task that we have been embarked on since we kicked
off Task Force Energy several years ago. Many of the ships we have
today will still be in the fleet in 20 or even 30 years. The life span
of a destroyer is 40 years. The operational life span of an F/A-18
is 10,000 flight hours (and we typically fly 400 hours per year).
Because we will own these things for a long time, we better make
them as efficient as we can along the way.
So what are we doing in that regard? Over the last 2 years,
we have been focusing on making what is out there today as efficient as we humanly can (Figure 5). We are installing efficient lighting systems that will also last a lot longer without having to be
replaced. We are improving hydrodynamics by adding stern flaps
and using hull coatings and propeller coatings that improve laminar
flow across the hull and save a percent here and a percent there.
It may not seem like a lot, but those percentage points add up to
182
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
millions and millions of dollars in savings. Installing a hybrid electric drive system on a DDG-51-class destroyer will save 8500 barrels of fuel per ship per year.
We are also changing the way we operate our fleet. Part of
this is actually cultural in nature, but save that thought, we will get
to that later. We are making use of the predictive capabilities that
our oceanographers provide by making sure that we sail our ships
along the most fuel-efficient routes and thereby reduce our fuel
consumption by a few percent.
Figure 5. Maritime and Aviation Technology
On the aviation side, we are conducting research and development on engine modifications that we can make to the F/A-18’s
gas turbine, which in turn can ultimately be rolled back into the
engine on the F-35. We are looking at new science and technology for the variable cycle engine. This one is a little bit farther
out there, but we have got to be thinking continually ahead of the
problem. If we are ultimately going to make some of these things
a requirement, then we have to make sure they are included when
we write the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) or the Capability
Development Document (CDD). That in turn will enable the Office
of Naval Research to develop the appropriate technologies so that
our industry partners can deliver a product 10 years from today
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
183
that is significantly different in terms of its energy efficiency. That
improved efficiency will also enhance our combat capability by
expanding our tactical reach or extending our endurance.
On the expeditionary and shore sides of the house (Figure 6),
we are involved in a similar game. We are focusing on creating
a Spartan warrior ethos that will drive us to make austere use of
our energy in the future. India Company of the 3rd Battalion, 5th
Marine Regiment was provided with several energy-efficient systems during their recent deployment to Afghanistan. In the process
they have learned that they can use the new technology in ways
that they probably would not have predicted before they took it
out there.
Figure 6. Expeditionary and Shore Technology
We are also experimenting with a number of different kinds of
power sources. In some cases you just roll them out—they are actually on a fabric. You can put them on the top of tents, making those
tents more energy efficient as well. We are working with the Army
on that one. Onboard vehicle power is another very important way
to make the engines that we are using more efficient. The Marines
are going to be experimenting with such concepts during this summer’s Expeditionary Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) event.
184
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
On the shore side, we are working hard to make our buildings
and installations more energy efficient. At the same time, we are
looking at ways to incorporate renewables so as to make ourselves
more sustainable. This will enable our critical infrastructure ashore
to continue to support the mission in perpetuity. We are also working to change Navy culture and behavior by providing more transparency in how our individual commands and functional levels
use energy. Ultimately, we want to enable those organizations to
adopt appropriate energy efficiency technologies.
Let me shift to diversifying our energy resources. The Secretary
has spoken very passionately about this and about why we need to
it, not only as a Navy, but as a nation.
Figure 7. Alternatives—Diversifying the Fuel Mix
But let us take a look at this from the technical perspective
of what we have to do. Figure 7 shows the fuel mix that we are
using today. Unfortunately, we have created this chart based on
percentages, so all the bars have the same height (i.e., they add up
to 100%). But if you look at it in terms of the amount of energy provided, the afloat pillar would be three times higher than the ashore
pillar. Do not let this fool you into believing that all we have to do
is solve the afloat side. That is not true. We have to tackle both the
afloat and the ashore portions, particularly given our shore side’s
heavy reliance on the commercial power grid.
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
185
The right-hand side of Figure 7 shows where we are going and
the diversity that we expect to have. That diversity will buy down
our risk. It will buy us confidence that, if at some point we were to
lose one of those pieces of the mix, we would not be held hostage
to that loss and that we would be able to continue our mission.
And, as you can see, we also intend to diversify the fuel mix used
on the afloat side.
Figure 8. Alternatives—Test and Certification Milestones
Relative to where we were a year ago, we have accomplished
a lot in the last 12 months (Figure 8). We have flown an F-18—the
Green Hornet—on alternative fuel. We have also demonstrated
use of alternative fuel on the Experimental Riverine Command Boat
(RCB-X). We have flown a helicopter on alternative fuel. Keep in
mind that these are drop-in replacement fuels, and this gets to one
of the questions that was asked at the beginning of the morning.
We are not out here trying to invent a whole new logistics system
to handle a different fuel. We want these fuels to mix in seamlessly
with the petroleum that is already there so that you do not have to
have a whole separate logistics system to handle that.
That way, no matter where you are, you will always have
access to fuel of whatever kind, whether it happens to be a biofuel
or it happens to be distilled petroleum. Obviously, the quicker and
faster we can move toward those alternative sources, the better off
186
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
we will be from a sustainability standpoint and from a greenhouse
gas standpoint.
Earlier, someone asked whether we would be able to achieve
the alternative fuel goals we have set for 2012 and 2016. I firmly
believe we will be able to make it, and we now have some pretty
good work that is being done by industry, independently from the
Navy. Indicators are that industry will be able to support our goals
for 2020, which call for use of 50% alternative fuels by that date.
I call this Cullom’s Corollary: For the foreseeable future, we will
not be able to get away from use of an energy-dense liquid fuel for
airplanes or for ships at sea. You need an energy-dense liquid to
move those large things.
Now is there going to be something different in the distant
future? Probably, and we have to look for those things; we have
to look for those generational leaps. In the meantime, we better
have something that can meet our needs for the next 20, 30, or
40 years. Fortunately, we are not the only ones thinking about that.
The commercial airlines and commercial shippers are all looking at
exactly the same series of things and realizing that we have to have
a solution set for the long haul.
Right now, we are testing the use of our biofuel blend on one
of our older engines, the Allison 501, which is the precursor to
the LM 2500. The LM 2500 is the big gas turbine that we use on
our frigates, destroyers, and cruisers. So once we finish the test on
the 501, we will have certified that all of our engines are able to
run on 50/50 blend mixes of drop-in replacement fuels that look,
smell, and act like any other petroleum fuel. Their origin, however,
is decidedly bio.
Last, but not least, and probably the hardest one of these things,
is culture and behavior. The Chief of Naval Operations has said it
very well. We realize that we have been wedded to gas, and you
cannot get away from that. He had his air controllers think about
that every minute, because you need to know how many pounds
of fuel that F/A-18 on a combat air patrol station has. Frankly, it
is no different for our ships at sea. The captain gets briefed every
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
187
8 hours on the fuel percentage remaining and where and when the
next refueling will be. Those things are never far from your mind.
Figure 9. Culture Change—Sample Fleet Initiatives
In addition to culture and behavior, we are working hard to
change the technologies that are available to us (Figure 9). We
are working on a diverse set of technology initiatives that you
will see play out over the next 5 years. Adding those changes
to the culture piece really makes the return on investment much
larger than what was originally expected. Use of hybrid electric
drive on destroyers is expected to save 8500 barrels of fuel per
ship per year. What if we coupled that with a box placed on the
ship’s bridge—like the one you might have seen on the Prius—that
shows your fuel efficiency continuously? That sort of thing can
change your behavior.
So, our plan is to have that device on the bridge of a destroyer
in the not-too-distant future. It will help us run our ships more efficiently. However, if your combat requirement imposes a need for
speed, you will still have that to use. But there are times you do not
need speed—and there are many times that you have your ship out
there and it only needs to do 6 knots—such as when you are waiting to shoot Tomahawk missiles, when you are patrolling a sector
looking for pirates, or when you are offering help and assistance
188
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
in response to a disaster. It is during the times when logistics lines
may not be there for 3 or 4 days that these efficiency initiatives will
really pay off. We recognize, though, that speed is still important,
so we are proposing to put speed and efficiency together, to provide a force multiplier.
The Navy’s Pacific Fleet is working on a number of energy efficiency improvements. In fact, they have set up what they call the
Expeditionary Naval Operating Base. In analogy with the Marine
Corps’ ExFOB, we might call it the “ExNOB.” It includes the ships
as well as the base and infrastructure at Pearl Harbor.
Some of that is a matter of the tyranny of distance. The Pacific
Fleet has to worry about that because the distances are much
longer out there than is typically the case in the Atlantic or the
Mediterranean. So, the Pacific Fleet is looking at fleet initiatives
that they can test and prototype and that will ultimately find their
way into the rest of the fleet.
The rest of culture change really is across the board. We need
to provide energy-related training so that everyone understands the
issues, from the seaman recruit to the Chief of Naval operations
and all the people in between. We need to provide incentives to
our personnel and establish subspecialty codes that will identify
personnel who have expertise in climate or energy issues.
We need to make energy efficiency one of the factors we consider when awarding unit incentives. Many Navy personnel here
wear a battle efficiency award. Most of us do so proudly, because
it takes an awful lot to get a Battle “E.” Right now energy is not a
part of that, but why shouldn’t it be? If that truly is part of our warrior ethos, truly part of being a Spartan warrior, why shouldn’t we
take it into account when we make awards for being the best ship,
the best aircraft squadron, the best shore command, or providing
the best infrastructure support?
We have also talked about redefining the process, bringing all
the right people to the table. While that will be very difficult, it
is part of the cultural change that we have to continue to work
toward. But austere energy frugality really is just a return to our
roots. If you have a chance to tour the USS Constitution and walk
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
189
the decks, you will certainly see that frugality was very much the
mindset of that day.
Our challenges are many (Figure 10). Earlier this morning, we
heard about the volatility in the cost of energy, particularly oil.
Right now it seems that the price of crude is going up and up and
up, and we are getting whip-sawed more and more.
Figure 10. Our Challenges
There are a lot of energy alternatives out there, but a lot of the
technology is immature. So, we need to make the right bets. What
things do we choose? What do we send through operational test?
What do we experiment with so that we are sure that we chose
the right things? We are, in fact, experimenting with a number of
things that have been part of our plan over the last couple of years.
We will have to see how things like ocean thermal energy conversion, wind, and geothermal play out. The choices we make on the
infrastructure side can also help make us a much more resilient
Navy in the future.
I cannot finish my presentation without talking about total
ownership costs. If we do not keep an awareness of this, we are
190
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
certain to have problems. The cost of energy is currently rising
five times faster than the overall consumer price index. Manpower
costs are rising at twice the rate of growth of the consumer price
index. While we often think of manpower as being expensive, the
cost of energy is going up much faster. Sooner or later it will eat
us out of house and home. If you are spending more for energy,
it means that you are just going to spend less for something else,
whether those things are beans, or bullets, or ships, or planes.
And at the end of the day, how do you do pay that energy bill
and still be able to keep the capability and readiness of our force
where it needs to be? Those are the challenges. As I have said, we
are in the process of changing paradigms. We are moving toward
diverse energy resources, toward making the existing fleet more
efficient. We are trying to get energy efficient acquisition established, and we are trying to change culture and behavior. Our goal
is to reduce our energy consumption to sustainable levels, and by
doing so, gain tactical advantage.
Changing the efficiency of the existing fleet is not very sexy.
It is only a percent here, a little percent there, but this is where
combat capability comes from, and this is why we are working on
it so hard. If we do not solve these things, we will never get to a
sustainable force.
I want to leave you with two thoughts: the first is that this journey that we are on is not an easy one. It is hard; it is one that will
take far longer than any one individual’s tenure. It will take longer
than the careers of the lieutenants who are working on this, or the
youngest engineers and scientists. We will still be working these
issues when you are my age or Senator Warner’s age because that
is what it is going to take. It is going to take the dedication of all of
us to reach this.
My second thought is that energy, and sustainable energy in
particular, is linked to climate. Both Rear Admiral Titley and I talk
about these two issues being two sides of the same coin. The word
is “anthropocene”—a term that was coined by Dr. Paul Crutzen, a
Dutch chemist who won the Nobel Prize. About a decade ago, he
said that we are in a new time epoch that is defined by our own
massive impact on the planet.
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
191
Scientists believe that the Anthropocene epoch (Figure 11) is
characterized by changing seas, urban super sprawl, and planet
resource limits (in terms of both energy and water) and by what I
would call the perfect trifecta. The first element of that trifecta is
a population which, at about 7 billion people, is well beyond the
burden-bearing limit of the planet. When we were relying on coal,
the population was about 2 billion people. What is that burden
loading of the planet going to be if oil goes away and we have not
found some kind of a substitute for it?
Figure 11. Do We Live in the Anthropocene Epoch?
The second and third elements of that trifecta are affluence
and technology. Everyone wants to be more affluent, and everyone
wants to use more technology. The impact of those two factors in
the face of continued global population growth is what makes this
the Anthropocene epoch. Bill Gates talks about this, and he says
it much more simply. He says, “Look, we have a planet ‘A.’ We
do not know where planet ‘B’ is or even if it exists, so we better
make planet ‘A’ work. And making planet ‘A’ work had better take
climate change and energy into consideration.” You pretty much
cannot talk about where our future is going without realizing that
it is going to be ever more constrained in many, many dimensions.
And it will be constrained for the Navy, it will be constrained for
the nation, and it will be constrained for the globe.
192
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
I am going to end my remarks with the photograph below
and by doing so bring my talk back to the sea. As I am sure Rear
Admiral David Titley will point out tomorrow, ocean acidification
is the silent partner to greenhouse gases. And guess where that
acidification comes from? CO2. The same CO2 that is causing the
rise in global temperatures. So if we do not want the planet to
look like this by 2100, then we better start doing something different, and we better understand what the Anthropocene Age really
brings us to and what changes it will wreak on the globe. That is
why we need to come up with a coordinated plan, a holistic plan
that looks at these issues together.
Why is that so important? Because the carbonate that is available for the growth of coral is not just available for the coral, it also
supports algae and all the living things in the sea. The bottom line
is that if you kill the coral and you kill the algae, you kill the entire
ocean ecosystem. If you kill the ocean ecosystem, not too many
people are going to be able to live on this planet given that the
oceans cover nearly 70% of the Earth’s surface.
Hopefully that brings us full circle. Doing what is right for the
Navy, making a sustainable Navy, can help lead the way to a sustainable planet at the same time.
REFERENCE
1. Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or
Succeed, Viking, 2005.
Q&
A
SESSION WITH REAR ADMIR AL
PHILIP CULLOM
the late 1800s, the United States did not have any of the
Q: Inarmor
plate needed to rebuild its iron-clad fleet. Therefore,
the Navy put out a specification for armor plate. Andrew Carnegie
picked that up and produced the armor plate needed to build the Great
White Fleet. Do you see industry responding in a similar way to the
Navy’s need for biofuel?
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
193
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: Yes, they are. Actually, that is part
of what the 2012 and the 2016 timeframes are all about. Those
events will create specific demand signals that are not related to
some uncertain future increase in the price of oil. If that were the
case, we would have to wait for some venture capitalist, some
angel investor to say, “Yes, there is a market out there.” Right now,
however, everyone is looking to the DoD to provide that first entry
point. We need 8000 barrels of biofuel by 2012. So, the demand
signal is going to be out there very soon for people to bid on.
By 2016, we will need 80,000 barrels, and by 2020, if not earlier—and my bet is that it will be earlier because I think the cost
parity point will occur before then—we will need 8 million barrels.
We believe that is the only way you can get the diverse mix that
you need to buy down our risk as operators, as warriors, in going
out there and doing our mission and not being held hostage to
whether or not the price of a barrel of oil is $150 or $300.
So we are sending some very strong signals. We are also making some rules change, and Congress has taken leadership in this
arena by stretching out the contracting ability for the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA) so they can have 10-year contracts for
certain things, rather than just the standard 5-year contracts. Such
incentives provide strong signals to the angel investors, the venture
capitalists, and others, so that they will have the confidence to say
that it is time to pour money into XX company because they have
a good process. As we all know, there are going to be winners and
there are going to be losers in that process. I would like to see a lot
of winners, and I would like to see a lot of winners in the United
States of America.
explained how the Navy’s need for 80,000 barrels of bioQ: You
fuel will serve as a demand signal that might draw investors.
What sort of metrics have you been using to see how that is progressing?
As a follow-up, I would like to know if the Navy is partnering with others,
perhaps commercial or other services, to create these demand signals?
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: I will respond to your questions
in reverse order and cite some of the other folks who we are working with. Key among these are the shipping industry—UPS, FedEx,
194
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
and the Postal Service, as well as a host of others—along with the
commercial airlines. These firms are large enough that they can
send their own demand signals. I think we will probably see that
very soon. There is actually a consortium of companies and organizations, some of whom actually work with DLA, that is looking
hard at where the market is going.
We also have partnerships with academia. At our request,
MIT’s Sloan School of Management sent a team out to look at the
biofuels industry and where it is going. They went and talked with
angel investors, with venture capitalists, and with manufacturing
companies, both large and small, that are either developing or
already delivering real product for customers, to include the Navy.
What we learned from that task forms the basis for my feeling infinitely more certain today than I did a year ago as to whether or not
we are going to get to that parity point.
We have also worked with DARPA, with the Office of Naval
Research, and with others who are also looking at this. The
Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency–
Energy is also looking at some of these issues, and we are plugged
into every one of those efforts and understand exactly where they
are going.
The Honorable John Warner: Could you address the concern
that biofuels take valuable farmland out of food production and
use it to grow crops that provide fuel?
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: That question comes up an awful
lot, and it is a logical question to ask because there are a lot of
people out there who say that if you want to supply all of the
nation’s gasoline demands with biofuel, you are going to have to
cover 15 states with camelina, switch grass, or something else.
And you know what? That is correct. But we would never do
that. That is why I was pretty careful about my corollary that on
the aviation side and on the ship side, you cannot get away from
an energy-dense liquid fuel. In the case of cars and trucks, however, we ought to have our heads examined if 10, 20, or 50 years
from now, we are still fueling them with gasoline. They should be
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
195
running on electricity, fuel cells, or something else because they
can and they can do that as cheaply, probably, as anything else.
I do not want to get into the national policy on that; that is not
my gig. But I think that we are seeing that play out in front of our
eyes today. I do not think you need to worry about the massive
amounts of energy that goes into the transportation industry except
that used by planes and ships because I think they will stay on liquid fuels for some time to come. Our problem now is significantly
different and significantly reduced. There are ways to be able to
pursue our fuel goals so that you are not actually going after farmland in Kansas. Or if you do, you go at that farmland in a way that
actually increases or improves the yields.
I come from a pretty small town in Illinois. The field next to our
house was filled with soybeans and corn. I will neither confirm nor
deny that we ever took an ear of corn out of there. The bottom line
is, farmers had to rotate the crops and they had to fertilize them to
make the crops grow.
One of the good features of some of the energy crops like
camelina is that you can actually plant it in between crops of corn.
Maybe you do not get quite as many ears when you do that, but
you are replenishing the soil with nutrients without having to fertilize it. There is huge benefit in that, because most fertilizer comes
from petroleum or from other fossil fuels. There are ways to make
the whole process much more holistically energy efficient and not
disrupt the food chain.
I might add that one of the other partnerships that we have
embarked on is a NASA project called Omega. The project deals
with being able to take treated sewage that normally just spills out
into a bay, putting that sewage into polyurethane bags, and towing
it into an area where it can sit offshore and flop around for a while.
Prior to doing that, you inoculate it with algae, and 7 days later,
plus or minus, you get oil out of it. It is a pretty good way to turn
waste into energy using something nobody else wants.
Moreover, this approach does not use any land whatsoever,
although it will use some littoral areas. We have looked at the
environmental issues associated with it. It uses freshwater algae,
196
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
so it dies if the bags break open while it is in saltwater. It does
not disrupt the ecosystems in other ways either. So, we now have
a Navy–NASA joint partnership—just one of many that we have
set up.
I think there are ways that we can smartly do this so that it does
not impact the food chain or food prices or result in any of the negative things that we saw happen with corn.
could you highlight some of the opportunities for collabQ: Sir,
orating with international partners or foreign governments?
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: The Navy frequently works with
many partner nations and partner navies around the world; we are
seeing that play out right now off the coast of Libya. It is important that we be able to truly help each other when we are out at
sea because the sea is a pretty unforgiving environment. It is also
pretty important from an energy perspective. That is one of the
reasons that we have been in touch repeatedly with not only the
folks here in town, but also with each of the combatant commanders. We have asked them to bring people together to talk about
both climate and energy.
I was lucky enough to get invited to Lima, Peru, to talk with
our South American partners about energy issues as part of one of
these climate and energy forums. I think that it is critically important to have such dialogues so that we can understand that we
need to work on these things together. This is particularly true on
the fuel side with these 50/50 drop-in replacement blends. The
results from these tests should be shared with our partners so they
can take advantage of them as well.
As many of you may know, the Allison 501 generator is actually a Rolls Royce engine, which is used by a number of our allied
partners. A number of nations use the same fighter aircraft that we
do. Several will eventually end up having the F-35. The things that
we are doing in preparation for the F-35 will have huge applicability for the navies and air forces of our partners.
Chapter 6 Task Force Energy Update
197
have heard a fair amount about the benefits that the
Q: We
Navy can expect from improving energy efficiency. Can you
address the consequences that might be attendant to energy efficiency
that the Navy might want to consider?
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: In my view, it is a combination
of both consequences and risks. When we shift over to alternative fuel sources, we want to know, to the extent possible, whether
there are things that we did not predict that may now rear their
heads. Fortunately, we can learn from history because the Navy
has transitioned from wind to coal to oil. And, although history
does not repeat itself, it does rhyme.
We certainly saw that as we transitioned from coal to oil. We
had coaling stations in various places around the world. When we
shifted to oil, it suddenly meant that we needed some different
things. For one thing, oil is more energy dense, which gave us longer legs. It also meant that we had to store our petroleum fuels in
different areas than we had previously thought about. That, in turn,
caused us to rethink a number of things that had strategic, operational, and tactical consequences.
Fortunately, transitioning to biofuels will be a bit simpler,
because we are not transforming to a radically different kind of
fuel. It is still a liquid fuel; in fact, that is precisely why we went
to drop-in replacement. We could have chosen other possible
biofuels or other alternative fuels that would have forced more
radical changes.
Had we done that, we would now be forcing ourselves to
totally reinvent our logistics train. We would have had to build
new oilers, new transfer rigs, and separate fuel storage tanks. We
thought about all of these things as we went through this. If we are
going to diversify our mix, how do we do that at the least overall
cost? We also want to have flexibility so that if at some point there
is a blight of whatever and the crop of a certain type of algae does
not produce, or the price of camelina goes up, we would be able
to weather through such events by reverting to regular petroleum.
Our mix could go from 50/50 to 80/20 for a year or so. Our overall
198
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
intent, though, is to push toward a more sustainable alternative mix
that, over the long term, does not need to be mixed at 50/50.
We do not want to have too much risk in the near term, so
we have tried to constrain the rate at which we are changing technology. We are managing the risk by going 50/50. We think this
imposes minimum risk and will enable us to transition to alternative fuels. We will continue to work on the science so that we can
get to the perfect blend of a true alternative fuel that is a 100%
biofuel. If we had gone to that first, 2020 would have been a pretty
far stretch.
We are trying to mitigate some of those risks. Are there going
to be other risks that are associated with some of this? Yes, and
that is one of the reasons why we need to partner with industry,
because they are looking at all these risks as well. Understanding
what their risks are helps us understand what our risks will be in
moving toward some of these same goals, whether it be at the
Office of Naval Research, DARPA, or elsewhere.
And let me also make note of—and this goes back to Senator
Warner’s question—some of the places where these alternatives
can be grown. I will speak to algae. I had the good fortune to go
out and kick the dirt at one of the places where they are building
a production site. The farmer who sold the land to the company
said: “You know, you cannot grow anything in this stuff. I feel kind
of embarrassed selling it to you, but if you want to buy it, I will. I
grew corn up until 3 years ago and now there is too much salt. You
cannot grow anything in it now.”
In other words, this particular project was not taking land away
from anyone. But guess what? They needed saltwater because that
is what they were going to grow their algae in. And they needed
a renewable source so they would not end up taking too much of
the water out. Companies are thinking about these issues. That is a
way of mitigating risk as well. But that is also a way of not having
to impact good crop land that needs to be used to grow food, for
us and for the world.
Chapter 7
A da p t i n g A i r O p e r at i o n s
to E n e rg y C h a l l e n g e s
201
Captain Randall Lynch
Let me begin by reminding you of the principal energy challenges that confront naval aviation (Figure 1). I think everyone is
familiar with my first two sub-bullets, which were cited earlier by
Dr. L. Dean Simmons. So, I will call your attention to the third
bullet. Between the year 2000 and the year 2010, the DoD’s petroleum costs more than tripled from $3.6 billion to $13.7 billion.
A native of Huntington Beach, California, Captain Randall J. Lynch
attended the University of California at San Diego under the Naval
Reserve Officers Training Corps and graduated in 1988 with a B.A.
in U.S. history. After flight training in Pensacola, he was designated a
Naval Flight Officer in March 1990 and completed three tours in the
S-3A and S-3B, one as a Junior Officer, one as a Fleet Replacement
Squadron flight instructor, and the third as a department head. After
transition training in the EA-6B, Captain Lynch joined the Garudas
of VAQ-134 as the Executive Officer, where he completed a combat
deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. He then led
the Garudas as the Commanding Officer through the transition to the
ICAP II Block III Prowler and a subsequent deployment once again
in support of Enduring Freedom. While attached to the Garudas, the
squadron received the Admiral Arthur B. Radford Award for Tactical
Electronic Warfare Excellence. Captain Lynch’s shore and non-flightrelated assignments include Flag Lieutenant/Aide to the Abraham
Lincoln Battle Group Commander and assignment to the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he graduated with academic
distinction and was selected as the President’s Honor Graduate. He also
served as the Naval and Amphibious Liaison Officer at the Combined
Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar and as a Joint Staff Officer at
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. Currently,
Captain Lynch is serving as a Federal Executive Fellow at JHU/APL and
is the Prospective Commanding Officer for Naval Station Great Lakes
in Illinois.
202
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Over that same period, however, the volume of fuel purchased
increased by only 13%. The difference can be attributed solely to
the increasing cost of fuel. My final sub-bullet points out that 75%
of the energy consumed by the DoD is petroleum based.
Figure 1. Department of the Navy Energy Goals
So, what is the Navy doing in response to these challenges?
The Secretary of the Navy has set two goals. First, he has directed
the Navy to increase use of alternative energy, so that by the year
2020, 50% of total Department of the Navy energy will come
from alternative sources. Second, the Secretary has directed the
Navy to demonstrate an all-green Carrier Strike Group by 2012
and then to deploy that Strike Group by 2016. The aircraft flying
from that Group are to rely on biofuels for at least half of their total
fuel usage.
Overall, the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations have
set three energy-related goals for the Navy, namely to:
• Reduce consumption
• Increase efficiency
• Increase use of alternative energy sources
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
203
To provide some perspective on what these goals might mean
for naval aviation, I am going to recall my most recent experience
in Afghanistan (Figure 2). As commanding officer for an expeditionary squadron of EA-6Bs, my job was to provide electronic attack
coverage for U.S. and coalition forces on the ground.
Figure 2. Operational Experience
We typically flew four to six missions per day, and each mission was anywhere from 2.5 to about 6 hours in duration. While
airborne, we were being refueled from tanker aircraft that were
flying out of former Soviet states. We were also receiving fuel from
over-land sources coming in by truck. As you might suspect, that
was the weak link in that chain. If you have read the press in the
last 6 months, you are aware that there have been some real issues
getting fuel into different countries in the Middle East. In some
cases, the host nation has not allowed us to bring the fuel into
country. In other cases, there have been problems at the border
or with terrorists blowing up trucks. As a commanding officer, one
of the things that really got my attention was when I was informed
that the wing had only 8 days’ worth of fuel left at one point in our
deployment. If we ran out of fuel, we were going to have to cease
operations. Luckily, we never got to that point, but there were several occasions when it got very close. The overall national security
implications of such concerns appear obvious.
204
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Realizing that logistics is still the key to getting any type of fuel
into an expeditionary environment such as Afghanistan, alternative
fuel sources would have given us increased flexibility. We would
have had another source for fuel, which in my view would have
made things a little bit easier for us in our daily planning and operational efforts.
205
Mr. Rick Kamin
My goal today is to provide a brief overview of where the Navy
currently stands in its alternative fuels efforts, what we have learned
from our testing, what we have accomplished, and the direction
for the future. To begin, I will summarize the Navy’s energy goals
(Figure 1).
Let us put those goals into perspective. To get to 50% alternative energy use by 2020, the Navy will need to provide 8 million barrels of alternate-source fuel for use by its aircraft and ships.
From an industry that is starting from scratch, that is a big challenge for the next decade, but the Navy is willing to step up as an
early adopter to work with industry to make that challenge happen.
To meet our near-term goals of demonstrating a Green Strike
Group by 2012 and sailing the Great Green Fleet by 2016, we
need to approve a fuel for those aircraft in that timeframe. So, just
Mr. Rick Kamin received a B.S. in chemical engineering from Lehigh
University. He has 28 years of experience in the area of fuels technology. He currently holds the title of Naval Air Systems Command
Research and Engineering Fellow. His current responsibilities include
the following: Navy Fuels Team Lead responsible for the direction of
all Navy fuel (aircraft, ship, and missile) in-service engineering and
research, development, test, and evaluation programs; Navy Task Force
Energy Fuel Working Group lead responsible for alternative fuel test
and certification; and Navy Task Force Energy Aviation Working Group
co-lead responsible for Navy Aviation Energy Strategy. Mr. Kamin has
authored more than 50 technical reports and articles and holds one
U.S. patent. He is a member of the ASTM Aviation Fuel Subcommittee,
the Coordinating Research Council Aviation Steering Committee, the
International Association for the Stability, Handling and Use of Liquid
Fuels Steering Committee, and the Tri-Service Petroleum, Oil, and
Lubricants Users Group Steering Committee.
206
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
15 months from now we are going to have an operational demonstration of aircraft powered by biofuel. The challenge is to approve
a fuel to make that happen.
Figure 1. Navy Energy Goals
Figure 2. Near-Term Alternatives to Petroleum
What are the near-term alternatives available today? There
are basically two choices (Figure 2). The first converts some raw
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
207
material—whether coal, natural gas, or biomass—to gas, which
is then liquefied into a synthetic crude using what is called the
Fischer–Tropsch (FT) process. That liquid is then refined into finished product. The second choice is to use a hydro-treated renewable source, such as oil-rich plants or algae. This process basically
takes the oils, the lipids, from the plants or algae, converts that oil
into biocrude, takes that biocrude through a refining process, and
turns it into jet fuel or ship fuel.
How does that differ from petroleum? In both cases you end
up with a “crude” that goes through a refinery process so there are
a lot of similarities between the end products that you get from
petroleum, which we have used forever in aviation, and some of
these alternatives. Because the hydro-treated renewables provide
environmental benefits, there is a big push in industry to make this
happen and there is a lot of potential for it to go into use within
naval aviation.
Figure 3. Alternative Fuels Strategy
The challenge comes because naval aviation has been using
liquid hydrocarbon fuels for a very long time. If you look at the
aircraft systems that the Navy plans to employ in the future, it is
clear that we are going to be wedded to liquid hydrocarbons for
the remainder of my lifetime and for the lifetimes of our current
208
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
aircrews. The liquid hydrocarbon fuels that we use today have
always come from petroleum. We have geared all our development and all our designs around petroleum-based liquid hydrocarbon. We cannot change our fuel type drastically now. The systems
that are in place, as well as those that will be coming on in the near
future, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, are going to be with us
for decades. So the key to developing appropriate alternative fuels
is to show that we can have a drop-in replacement, and that is the
challenge (Figure 3).
Figure 4. From Field to Fleet: Certifying Drop-In
Replacements
Drop-in replacement means that we are not going to change
our aircraft weapon systems, we are not going to change our
engines, and we are not going to change our fuel systems. Our
capability for storing and distributing fuel at sea is rather limited,
so we cannot send multiple aviation products through different
lines and different tanks and expect them to be segregated in our
shipboard environment. Thus, the critical path of our strategy is
to demonstrate that these fuels from alternative sources are fully
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
209
drop-in replacements. Drop-in replacement means that the guys
who fly do not know or care where the fuel comes from. They just
want to be sure that we have guaranteed that it will work the same,
whether it comes from petroleum, from algae, or from a plant.
The key to this is a process for demonstrating the required
similarity that extends from the laboratory to the weapon system
(Figure 4). The goal of that process is to show that any fuel produced from sources other than petroleum meet requirements for
100% operations. It starts in the laboratory with specifications and
testable properties that we call fit-for-purpose.
To understand fit-for-purpose, you have to remember that all
of our aviation capability today was designed around petroleumbased liquid hydrocarbon fuel. Many of these aspects are so subtle
that they do not measure them on a day-to-day basis and we have
not included them in our specifications, but they are still important
to our aircraft. That is what fit-for-purpose means. Once we get out
of the laboratory—today’s laboratory tests probably measure some
50–60 different properties related to fuel performance—we go
into performance similarity. Do the materials react the same way,
do the propulsion systems react the same way, and do the auxiliary
power units and the fuel distribution systems react the same way?
That is the next level of testing.
Once we have satisfied that point, we look at the operational
weapon system. Do the aircraft, whether fixed-wing or helicopters, fly exactly the same with these fuels? Again, we have to
meet the requirements of the operational community. We have
to prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that when we change
our specification to add a new source of fuel, that that fuel will
operate 100% guaranteed, as petroleum has for decades in the
past. At the last point in the game, after we have proven that the
operational weapon systems work, we get into long-term operability and durability issues. When we start running for hundreds
of hours, do we find any differences that our earlier tests may
have missed?
In the Navy, we call this process a standard work package.
Basically it is our recipe for how to test and approve a fuel. Granted,
210
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
they are works in progress, they are constantly changing, and they
are constantly being modified as we learn more and more about
these fuels, but they are doing the job in providing a systematic,
dedicated approach to proving 100% compatibility.
Where do we stand today? Hydro-treated renewable fuels
have been through the laboratory and they have been through
component and propulsion system tests for naval aircraft. And we
have made the proof of concept by flying successfully two different aircraft—the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, also known as the
Green Hornet, and the MH-60 helicopter. In the case of the Super
Hornet, we flew 16 flights lasting a total of 17 flight hours across
the entire flight envelope of that aircraft. At the conclusion of the
flight test program, Lieutenant Commander Tom Weaver, our lead
pilot, basically said that he could not tell the difference in the fuel
(Figure 5).
Figure 5. Flight Tests: Demonstrating Operational Equivalence
About 6 months later, we tried the 50/50 fuel in our helicopter
community. Although we did not accomplish as many flights, the
impact was the same. We know we have success when the operator community tells us things are looking good and that they do
not see any difference. That is the challenge; that is the goal of the
alternate fuels program for aviation.
Where are we going from here? We have a number of demos
lined up over the next year looking at different parts of the fuel
system and different propulsion systems—old and new (Figure 6).
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
211
We intend to get buy-in in different communities, including those
associated with the MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned system. Again,
we are trying to build confidence by demonstrating that the fuels
that pass our laboratory tests actually work in operational conditions. All of this is leading up to changing our specifications and
moving to the Carrier Strike Group demonstration in 2012.
Figure 6. 50/50 Hydrotreated Renewable JP-5 (HRJ5) Flight
Demonstration Plan
Still, 8 million barrels of fuel is a lot of fuel and 10 years is a
short period of time. In our view, hydro-treated renewable sources
are part of the answer. However, people have come up with a
lot of great ideas for making fuel from things that we have never
thought of. Some of the pathways we are just looking at are synthetic biology, alcohol oligomerization, and pyrolysis technologies
that are being developed today (Figure 7). We may well want to
look at some of these technologies in the future, with the idea of
increasing the supply pool of fuels and reducing our dependence
on petroleum. The fact that many of these fuels will be more environmentally friendly than using petroleum will help ensure that at
the end of the day, we meet the Secretary’s goals for energy, security, and environmental stewardship.
212
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 7. Potential Future Fuels
213
Mr. William Voorhees
I am here to talk about the role of technology in enhancing
energy security both over the near term and into the future. Thanks
to the emphasis provided by Navy leadership, it has been much
easier to get some traction on energy-related efforts in the science
and technology arena.
As several speakers have noted, the Secretary of the Navy has
set three energy-related goals for the Department. My presentation
will describe the potential role of technology in supporting each of
those three goals.
Mr. William Voorhees graduated from Lehigh University with a B.S. in
mechanical engineering in 1985. He is currently the head of the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Propulsion and Power Technology
Office and is responsible for the planning, execution, development,
demonstration, and transition of propulsion- and power-related technologies for all Navy and Marine Corps air vehicles, both present
and future. He is also the Deputy Program Manager for the Variable
Cycle Advanced Technology propulsion system demonstration effort.
Mr. Voorhees’s other duties include an active role on the NAVAIR
Science and Technology Leadership Team, which guides the Naval
Aviation Enterprise Science and Technology Strategic Planning efforts.
Prior to his current position, he was the Air Vehicles Technology Team
Lead and the Execution Co-Lead/Propulsion Team Lead for the RATTLRS
flight demonstration program. With more than 25 years of experience
in propulsion and power science and technology, he has also held
the positions of Deputy Program Manager for the international X-31
VECTOR Flight Demonstration Program, Navy Lead for Fighter/Attack
Demonstrator Engines, and Navy Lead for Propulsion Environmental
Team and has participated in numerous other propulsion-related technical management and execution projects. He is a graduate of the Navy
Senior Executive Management Development Program and has received
the Meritorious Civilian Service Award.
214
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
We saw the F/A-18 Green Hornet; Rick just finished talking
about that. While we want the alternate fuels to be drop-in, we also
have to ensure that they provide the same performance and have
the same safety and reliability that we get with our current fuels.
As we go to even more exotic fuel formulations, we want to make
sure that we have the technology in place to burn those fuels safely
and reliably, as well as the ability to stretch the spec envelope to
start making sure we can use fuels that are on the edge of what we
would currently consider within spec today.
We are also using advanced materials in our latest aircraft
designs, and we will continue to look at their use for future systems
(Figure 1). Included in these are lightweight composites, which are
key to getting weight out of the aircraft and achieving desired mission fuel burn reductions. In addition to the advanced materials,
we are exploring things like low-drag coatings, which are paints
you can put on an aircraft that reduce the drag, allowing you to be
more efficient in cruise regimes of flight.
Figure 1. Use of Advanced Materials
Our emerging aircraft systems are also benefiting from
advances in propulsion that were started prior to the establishment
of Task Force Energy (Figure 2). In the past, however, most of these
efficiency benefits were really secondary to the primary goal of the
Advanced Development Program, which was usually the development of some new type of operational capability. In some cases,
by developing that advanced capability, we have also been able to
increase efficiency, and we are seeing the benefits of that today.
As the Vice Chief of Naval Operations indicated this morning, as
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
215
efficiency becomes more important, we may see Key Performance
Parameters (KPPs) or Key System Attributes (KSAs) emerge for
future weapons procurements, which will put additional emphasis
on things like specific fuel-reduction efforts.
Figure 2. The GE-38 Engine Will Provide Fuel Economy
We will hear more from our next speaker about how optimized
simulator usage can reduce flying hours required to train our pilots.
Technology can also contribute there by providing advanced modeling techniques, which make the simulation more realistic and
more useful to the pilots.
Enhanced mission planning capabilities offer yet another way
to improve both capability and efficiency. We want to help our
future mission planners by asking: how do you fly the aircraft
throughout the whole mission? How do you optimize the way you
fly or operate the aircraft? Fairly simple changes can yield major
reductions in fuel burn. We are also looking at how to model the
aircraft as a system—not just the engine, but the whole electrical,
thermal, and propulsion systems. How do you optimize aircraft
operation over the entire flight regime and then take advantage of
that in your missions?
We are also trying to identify the leap-ahead technologies that
will be coming down the pipe for next-generation naval aircraft.
216
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
One of these is called variable-cycle engine technology. Basically,
it allows you to adjust the bypass ratio of your jet engine appropriately to consume very little fuel while you are in cruise or to enable
high specific thrust when you need it for combat maneuverability
or takeoff. We are looking at the potential for reducing mission
fuel burn by as much as 20% by utilizing variable-cycle technology (Figure 3). If you start looking at the fully integrated system—
engine, propulsion, and thermal management—you can probably
get another 10% efficiency on top of that. So we see this as a key
enabler for the next generation of aircraft systems.
Figure 3. Variable-Cycle Engine Technology Could Reduce
Specific Fuel Consumption up to 20%
Finally, we are building a roadmap that lays out the set of
technologies that will both enable future capability for the Navy
and reduce fuel burn. Some of these are described in the Naval
Aviation Enterprise’s Science and Technology Objectives. [1] With
the increased interest from high-level leadership, we are getting
traction on many of these ideas, so if we stick with it, I think there
is a lot of opportunity for improvement.
REFERENCE
1. Naval Aviation Enterprise, Science and Technology Objectives,
2010,  http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/nae/Documents/
2010%20STO.pdf.
217
Commander Daniel Orchard-Hays
I am going to spend a few minutes talking about things that we
are doing in the fleet today. Obviously, in the current fiscal environment, one of the things we have been asked to do at the fleet
Commander Daniel Orchard-Hays grew up in Silver Spring, Maryland.
He is a 1995 graduate of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) in Troy,
New York, where he was commissioned through the Naval Reserve
Officers Training Corps. He earned his Naval Flight Officer wings in
1996 in Pensacola, Florida. After completion of F-14D training with the
VF-101 Grim Reapers in Oceana, Virginia, he was assigned as a Radar
Intercept Officer (RIO) to the VF-31 Tomcatters onboard USS Abraham
Lincoln. He then transitioned to the F/A-18F Super Hornet in Lemoore,
California, where he was assigned as a Weapon System Officer (WSO)
instructor with the VFA-122 Flying Eagles. During this tour, he was
selected to attend TOPGUN and served briefly as the Assistant Forward
Air Controller (Airborne) instructor at Strike Fighter Weapons School
Pacific. Commander Orchard-Hays’s next sea tour was as the WSO
Training Officer with the VFA-2 Bounty Hunters onboard USS Abraham
Lincoln during their first deployment in the F/A-18F. He then spent a
year at the Army Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth,
Kansas, before completing his Department Head tour with the VFA-32
Swordsmen onboard USS Harry S. Truman. He is currently assigned
as the VFA and Non-Combat Expenditure Allocation (NCEA) Readiness
Officer to the Commander of Naval Air Force Atlantic in Norfolk,
Virginia. During his operational tours, Commander Orchard-Hays has
deployed four times in support of Operation Southern Watch, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Unified Assistance. His awards include
the Air Medal (Strike Flight), the Navy Commendation Medal, the Joint
Service Achievement Medal, the Navy Achievement Medal, and various
other service awards. Commander Orchard-Hays has a B.S. in aeronautical engineering (space concentration) from RPI and a master of business administration degree from Webster University.
218
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
level is to look at how we are operating to see if there are some
places where we can become very efficient.
Based on that, there are three things in particular that I want
to talk about today: SMART tanking, cold (truck) refueling, and
simulation. Since you are going to hear a lot more about simulation
from Commander Scott Fuller, I will limit myself to providing the
fleet perspective. Then, I will identify some additional things that
we may be able to look at.
Many of you are no doubt aware that naval aviation is currently
undergoing a major recapitalization effort; as one of the results of
that, we have gotten rid of some of our older legacy aircraft. The
S-3 that Captain Randall Lynch flew is gone. That was our primary
refueling aircraft for the last 10 or 15 years; now we rely on the F/A18E/F Super Hornet for that mission. The photo in the upper right
of Figure 1 shows a Super Hornet refueling another Super Hornet.
The advantage of the Super Hornet is that it can carry more fuel
than the S-3. Unfortunately, it burns a lot more as well. So when
we first transitioned about 6 or 7 years ago, we basically stuck with
the same operational model we had used with the S-3s, which is
you launch a tanker aircraft any time you have airplanes flying.
You leave that guy out there burning; he burns a lot of his gas in
the process, and then you hope he has enough fuel left to refill inbound aircraft and then get back on deck.
There are some disadvantages to that. Obviously you are burning fuel, but you also have to put on a lot of fuel tanks to do that.
Although you cannot see it in the top picture, the refueling aircraft
is carrying five fuel tanks—four externals and an Aerial Refueling
Store (ARS) pod. Even when empty, those tanks add weight to the
aircraft. Thus, when an aircraft is carrying them, it is likely that the
pilot will have to get rid of any excess fuel in his plane when he
recovers to ensure that the overall aircraft weight remains below
the carrier’s recovery limit.
As part of the effort, Carrier Air Wing 5, operating out of Japan,
started looking at ways to be more efficient. In particular, their
effort was focused on making Hornet pilots more efficient. Then,
about 2 years ago, Carrier Air Wing 7 proposed an approach that
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
219
we call SMART—that stands for Short-Cycle Mission and Recovery
Tanking. We had to come up with an acronym; otherwise, we
would not be able to remember it!
Essentially what we do is reduce airborne gas. One of the risks
you accept is you do not have to have a tanker airborne all the
time. I will not go into all the operational details, nor will I say
that we are doing this wholesale, because we are not. There are
still times when you need to have a five wet, as we call it, tanker
airborne. But in the bottom picture in Figure 1 you can see a Super
Hornet refueling off of another F/A-18 equipped solely with an
ARS; it is carrying no other external tanks. That approach offers a
number of operational advantages, of which the most significant is
that by dropping all those fuel tanks the pilot can bring more internal weight back to the ship and thereby reduce the amount of fuel
that must be dumped before he recovers.
Figure 1. SMART Tanking
As it turns out, about 10% of our cost of doing business on
the carrier is refueling. So if we can reduce that, which we can,
we can save some money. We have found that we can get a 65%
reduction in the tanker fuel burned by going to SMART. While we
cannot use the SMART approach all of the time, there are significant portions of deployment where you can. And by doing so, we
220
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
can reduce the fuel burned by our tankers by 65%. That translates
roughly to a low single-digit percent increase in our operational
efficiency. We also benefit by not having to bring as much fuel to
re-supply the carrier, and we can use the fuel that we have saved
for other missions.
Air Wing 3 has always utilized this practice, and we have had
portions of other air wings that have tried this and are moving
toward utilizing this approach over the long-term. There are some
cultural challenges to overcome, primarily from senior leadership
because you have to make risk decisions on how often you are
going to have the aircraft airborne with or without fuel available.
The second initiative for improving efficiency looks at how
we do truck refueling at major training installations like Naval Air
Station Lemoore. For those of you who are not familiar with that
base, the airfield was actually laid out very well. Offset runways
enable pilots to minimize their taxi time both for takeoff and recovery, so they burn a lot less fuel.
On the other hand, they have laid hot pit refueling sites at the
throat of every taxiway coming back to the ramp. What that means
is that when an aircraft lands, it goes into the hot pit, and a fuel
hose is hooked up while the jet is turning. After fuel is pumped, the
plane is taxied back to the line. The idea behind this approach was
that it reduced the need to use fuel trucks. With fewer trucks, the
argument went, you need fewer drivers and you could save some
money. Unfortunately, the cost of fuel has increased substantially
since this approach was first devised.
In 2006, staff at Lemoore decided to look at the cost of doing
this in the face of higher fuel costs. They discovered that the aircraft
burns about 70 gallons of fuel during a “hot” refueling cycle. To put
that in perspective, the jet burns about 2000 gallons on a typical
sortie, so about 3% of that (70/2000 × 100%) is lost while sitting in
the hot pit for 18–20 minutes while refueling.
There are a number of ways to deal with this. Pilots could
obviously just shut down their aircraft when they pull into the pits
(Figure 2). But the pilots would not have anything to do at that point,
so they would hop out and you would have to get the maintenance
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
221
folks to tow the aircraft back to the line. After trying that for a while,
we realized that it would probably be smarter just to buy more fuel
trucks. In FY2006—a time when aviation fuel cost a mere 93 cents
per gallon—the Navy saved $1.3 million at Lemoore by adding
more trucks. To gain that savings, they added 1000 additional cold
truck refueling evolutions and eliminated 1000 hot pit refuelings.
Today, JP-5 costs $3.06 per gallon.
Figure 2. Cold (Truck) Refueling
The Navy has the same challenges at Naval Air Station Oceana,
where we are looking at ways to possibly buy more fuel trucks so
that our squadrons do not have to spend as much time running
our engines. While it is probably not a substantial amount of time,
our naval aviators could use the 20 minutes of time that they now
spend sitting in the jet while it is being refueled to do something
more important, like debriefing a student pilot. Obviously, this
should not be the primary driver of why we are doing this, but it is
an added benefit. When aircrew get in the airplane, they want to
fly. They do not want to just sit on the deck.
As I said, I am not going to spend a whole time on simulation because Commander Fuller is going to cover it in detail, but
I do want to describe how the fleet looks at simulation. Recently,
we have been under a lot of pressure to move a larger portion of
222
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
our overall training curriculum into simulators. In Figure 3 I have
listed some of the topics where we currently rely heavily on simulator training. The simulator is excellent for emergency procedures
and flight preparation and great for tactical repetition and mission
rehearsal, and that is primarily what we use it for.
Figure 3. Simulation
One of the things that we have been trying to accomplish for
at least 10 years is to figure out a way to move more of our training
and readiness program into our simulators. We have had limited
success doing that. We need to find the right balance between
training in the aircraft and training in simulators. It is clear that our
aircrews need to fly the airplane to learn some tasks. It is also clear
that you can do some training in a simulator to help prepare you
to actually fly your mission. The question we have not answered—
and it has been asked of us—is: what is the right mix of time in the
airplane and time in the simulator?
We are currently working with CNA to see whether we can
identify appropriate metrics for determining the right way to determine whether reducing flight hours by X and replacing them with
Y simulator hours will allow us to maintain the same capability.
From the fleet’s perspective, before we cut flight hours, we have
to have some sort of methodology to determine whether our
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
223
aviators, who will be receiving more simulator time and less flight
time, will be as competent in the airplane as those who receive
more flight time.
Some of the other energy efficiency initiatives that we are looking at are identified in Figure 4. Let me begin with fueling and defueling practices at our fields. We have found that on some of our
missions, we do not need all the gas that the jet can carry. Taking
advantage of that, however, requires some planning. We do not
necessarily know exactly which airplane we are going to be using;
sometimes an aircraft that we had planned on using is down for
maintenance, and sometimes something fails before we take off.
So, it is not going to be as simple as just putting in the gas that you
need for the mission.
Figure 4. Additional Potential Initiatives
One of the training evolutions where we know we need less
fuel is when we are just practicing landings, or what we call Field
Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP). In other instances, we may have
five fuel tanks on a jet, but we do not need fuel in all of them. We
need to find the balance between totally filling up the jet and only
partially filling it.
The last topic that I will discuss under fueling practices is maintenance. Occasionally we need the airplane to have as little gas as
possible on board so that our maintenance crews can work on it,
particularly when they are working on the fuel tanks.
224
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
As for mission planning, the Super Hornet recently received
certification for Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM),
which allows us to fly that aircraft at altitudes above 29,000 feet
over the United States. As a result, we are able to better optimize
fuel use during cross-country flights, particularly when we are
moving airplanes from one side of the country to the other. We are
also looking at ways to plan our flights better so that we optimize
fuel use.
In the case of external stores, we have a lot of training flights
where we put fuel tanks on our jets. The problem is when you put
tanks on the jet, you create a lot of drag. If you have to go back and
forth across country, you end up burning a lot of additional fuel.
So, we are trying to make sure that we spread out our resources
and truck them back and forth as opposed to putting them on the
airplane and burning extra gas to haul a training missile or fuel tank
from one place to another.
Finally, we have discovered that some of our other aircraft
platforms were not designed with all of the features of the F/A18. The Hornet has minimum startup and shutdown time on the
ground, and there is no need to run the auxiliary power unit (APU)
to do maintenance. Some of our other platforms were not designed
that way, and they have to run the APU to do maintenance. They
are both burning fuel and wearing out important parts. So we are
trying to make sure we have sufficient ground support equipment
to be able to do maintenance on our aircraft without requiring that
they use an APU.
225
Commander Scott Fuller
Simulators have been an integral part of naval aviation since
such flight operations began and seem certain to play an important
role for the foreseeable future. As you can see from Figure 1, naval
Commander Scott Fuller, a native of Lockport, New York, graduated
from the University of Rochester and was commissioned an Ensign
in 1991. Following Flight Training, he was designated a Naval Flight
Officer in 1993. Upon completion of Fleet Replacement Training at VP
30, Commander Fuller reported for his first operational tour with the
War Eagles of VP 16 at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida. In 1997,
Commander Fuller returned to VP-30 to serve as a Fleet Replacement
Squadron Instructor. In 1999, Commander Fuller was accepted into the
Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) Program and reported to
the Reserve Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Training Center (RATCEN)
at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Willow Grove, Pennsylvania,
where he served as the Training Officer and Director of Training. After
a tour at RATCEN, Commander Fuller reported back to Jacksonville,
Florida, where he served as the Training Officer and Maintenance
Officer for the VP-62 Broadarrows. He served as the Officer-in-Charge
of VP-92 in Brunswick, Maine, from 2005 to 2006. After completion of his Officer-in-Charge tour he reported to CPRW-11, where he
served as the Operational Support Officer and Wing-11 Operations
Officer. Screening for Commander Aviation Command in the spring
of 2007, Commander Fuller reported back to the Broadarrows of
VP-62 and served as their Executive Officer and Commanding Officer.
Following his command tour he reported to Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations Staff in Washington, D.C., where he currently serves as the
Aviation Training Resources Section Head, overseeing Chief of Naval
Air Training Training and Simulation Programs for Naval Aviation.
Commander Fuller’s decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal
(three awards), the Navy Commendation Medal (three awards), and the
Navy Achievement Medal (three awards), as well as other awards.
226
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
aviation’s use of training simulators—or just “trainers” in the Navy
vernacular—continues to evolve. Trainers were initially developed
for use by aviators going through our undergraduate training programs. Because of technological limitations, those systems were
used primarily to review basic aviation fundamentals and to reinforce basic procedures to maximize actual flight training events.
Figure 1. Evolution of Naval Aviation Simulation
As Commander Daniel Orchard-Hays indicated, the Navy
has been looking into incorporating additional simulation into its
overall fleet training plan to ensure that naval aviators receive the
right mix of training while preserving fuel, reducing the flight hours
accumulated on our aircraft, and reducing non-combat expenditures for air-delivered ordnance. We have just completed a thorough analysis of aviation simulators, which we have been briefing
up the command chain within the Pentagon. The overall objective
of the study was to understand the current fidelity of our simulators
today and then look into the future and see what simulators we
need to invest in to gain additional training benefits.
As part of that study, we reviewed the entire training system
selection process that the Navy uses to analyze the skill set
required by our aviators. The bottom line is that we want to make
sure our simulators are developed from the basics—from when a
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
227
prospective aviator enters flight school to start his training, all the
way to when he gets to his fleet aircraft. We use the phrase “street
to fleet” to characterize this entire training continuum. We begin
by literally taking the person off the street and, through the appropriate training regimen, get him or her into a fleet aircraft. It is a
very long process that is supported by a rigorous analysis program
to ensure that we are meeting training objectives.
Figure 2 depicts the flight training program for the young pilot.
As you can see, it is a mix of aircraft hours and simulator hours.
During the early phases of naval aviator training, you see more
flight hours than you see simulator hours because the trainee has
to get that basic air worthiness, that basic air sense that you just
cannot fully replicate in the trainer. The right mix is something that
we look at frequently. What is that right balance between aircraft,
simulator, and the classroom? Of course, when I say classroom, I
am talking not just stand-up lectures, but computer-based training
as well.
Figure 2. Undergraduate Pilot Training
In the early phase of pilot training, the curriculum focuses on
air worthiness and air sense. During this phase, the prospective
pilot spends more training time in the aircraft than in simulators.
However, simulators are used to teach basic procedures so that
228
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
when the aviator gets into the plane for the first time, they know
where the buttons are, which allows them to focus on flying the
plane.
Because the undergraduate military flight officer, i.e., the
back-seat guy, or officially, the radar intercept officer (RIO), is far
more concerned with learning how to employ the various electronic systems that he will be using, his training can include more
simulation (Figure 3). So you will see we have more simulation
in the pipeline for these aviators, but again, balanced with classroom training and flying the actual aircraft to produce the overall
aviator.
Figure 3. Undergraduate Military Flight Officer Training
Once the aviator gets his wings, we take him to the fleet
replacement squadron, where, for the first time, the prospective
aviator gets to fly the type/model/series aircraft that he or she is
going to be operating in the fleet, whether it is the F/A-18, the
H-60R or H-60S helicopters, or the P-3, which we are changing to
the P-8. While in the fleet replacement squadron (Figure 4), future
pilots get substantial platform-specific training. And, because they
already have the basic flight skills, more of that training can be
conducted using simulators.
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
229
Figure 4. Fleet Replacement Squadron Training
Now we are trying to perfect the aviator’s ability to employ
the aircraft tactically. As a result, you see more weapon system
trainers and more crew coordination elements because you are
not just focusing on flying the plane, but you want to employ it as
a weapon system and take all the people that are on that platform
with you and combine them into a total crew. Thus, we see more
simulators as we move through our pipeline.
Once an aviator graduates and gets through the fleet replacement squadron, he or she goes to the fleet. The fleet uses simulation as part of what is called the training and readiness (T&R)
matrix. The T&R matrix is the set of tasks that an aircrew must
learn in order to be combat ready for deployment anywhere in
the world. On the left-hand side of Figure 5, I have identified the
current percentages of training time that must be done in the aircraft compared to what we can do with simulators. In looking at
these numbers, it is helpful to remember that most of our existing
simulators were built as procedural trainers to train undergraduate
aviators going through the basic pipeline. Since the focus was procedures, really high fidelity was not needed. Moreover, the underlying technology was not nearly as sophisticated as it is now. As
a result, only a relatively small fraction of training is accomplished
230
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
using simulators. As you can see from the data on the right-hand
side of Figure 5, we hope to increase the simulation percentages
substantially in the future.
Figure 5. Fleet Training Accomplished in Simulators
But what we are doing now is we have completed a thorough
analysis and have challenged ourselves to do more simulation and
enhance the simulation experience with upgraded visual displays
and communications capabilities. Now we can ask questions such
as: What is an improved simulation capability going to do for us? Is
it going to save fuel? Is it going to save wear and tear on the aircraft
and help us become more efficient overall?
As the Navy’s Air Boss—the commander of Naval Air Forces—
has pointed out, the skills required of naval aviators differ markedly from those needed by commercial airline pilots. The fact that
airline pilots spend a lot of time flying simulators to maintain their
skills does not mean that naval aviators should be trained in the
same way. The skill set required to fly a modern, high-speed fighter
aircraft is quite complex. Landing on a pitching and rolling aircraft carrier deck at night is a lot more difficult than landing on
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
231
10,000 feet of hard runway at Dulles International Airport. Naval
aviators require substantial flight time to become proficient. It is
important to remember, too, that the pilot flying for United or
American Airlines probably received his basic aviation training in
the military and thus can now concentrate on becoming proficient
with the systems he will use when airborne.
So we have a different mix there that we are constantly evaluating to ensure that we have the right balance. A naval aviator must
be proficient at flying his or her aircraft and getting it back on the
ship even in the most austere conditions. At the same time, an
aircrew can use a simulator to improve their ability to conduct mission planning, so that when they go and fly, the crew only has to
practice the mission once in the air because they rehearsed it 10
times in the simulator. Thus, they are much more efficient. So that
is what we are trying to do. We are trying to see what we can do
with our trainers to get more bang for the buck.
Figure 6. Anticipated Return on Investment by Investing
in Simulation
So far, we have focused on the F/A-18E, F, and G models and
the MH-60 R and S model helicopters. For the near future, these
platforms are going to take up about 78% of our flight hours. And,
because they are going to be around for a considerable amount of
232
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
time, we have taken a look at the trainers—the procedural trainers—that we use for these aircraft. We have asked the fleet—the
people who use them daily—what they wanted us to invest in so
that we can accomplish additional training in our simulators. Some
of the things that they came up with are listed on the right-hand
side of Figure 6.
In summary, the Director of Air Warfare is working with Task
Force Energy to see whether additional investments in simulators
can enhance aircrew training while reducing flight hours and wear
and tear on our aircraft. That is pretty much the bottom line of
what we are trying to do with simulation. We want to be more
efficient; at the same time, we recognize that doing so will involve
some cultural changes. So, we are working on that as well.
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
week I was attending a conference at the University of
Q: Last
Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs entitled “Empty
Stomachs, Loaded Rifles, Food Scarcity and Global Security.” The conference identified a whole raft of issues contributing to hunger in different parts of the world. There was near-universal perception that using
foodstuffs for biofuels was complete and utter madness. In an era when
population growth is outstripping the world’s capacity for growing food
to feed that population, it is important that we recognize that this perception is bubbling up amongst people. One could argue, therefore, that
reliance on biofuels contributes to instability and thus works against the
strategy of conflict prevention. I would appreciate your perspective on
this important issue.
Mr. Rick K amin: I agree completely that using food crops for
fuel is not an appropriate way of addressing future energy needs.
I think we have learned some of these lessons from our nation’s
experience with using corn to produce ethanol. While I am not
in an official position, I can say that the Navy has been focusing
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
233
a lot of our efforts on things that are sustainable, renewable, and
non-competitive with food crops. In particular, we are looking at
things like algae and camelina that can be grown on fallow land
or that can be used as a rotation crop in between crops of wheat
or corn.
We are also looking at using cellulosic wastes, garbage, or
other types of waste that can be converted into biofuels. At the
same time, we have to recognize that we have got to start somewhere, with what is available, in order to develop the technologies to create biofuels and the necessary processes for evaluating
them, certifying them, and qualifying them for use. So I do not
think anyone is in disagreement that we do not want to be food
competitive; we do not want to look at food crops as our source
for biofuels.
when someone is working up a program, they have
Q: Often
three pillars to worry about—performance, risk, and cost.
In describing the development of alternative fuels, we have heard a lot
about performance and risk, but cost was not discussed. Could you give
us some information on that?
Mr. Rick K amin: Cost is always an issue. When one looks at
fuel alternatives in the military world or in the commercial world
for that matter, cost is important. So, we are doing things to reduce
cost. At this point in the game, costs for alternative fuels are higher
than those for petroleum-based fuels because we are basically
talking about pilot-scale facilities, whether for growing crops, producing algae, or demonstrating the necessary refining capability.
At the same time, it is important to note that what we are doing
is not being done in a vacuum. There are a lot of people beyond
the Navy looking at these issues, and a lot of people are putting in
a lot of effort across the government—especially the Department
of Energy and the Department of Agriculture—and commercial
industry, especially the commercial airlines.
So, a lot of people are addressing the issue of cost. Our
approach is to let the people who are focused on cost and commercialization deal with those issues since they can do so more
efficiently and more productively than we can. What the Navy is
234
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
doing is focusing on being an early adopter, setting a demand signal so as to aggressively incentivize those people who are looking
at the cost issues.
said that the Navy’s goal was to demonstrate a strike
Q: You
group fueled from alternative sources by 2012 and to deploy
that strike group by 2016. Is industry up to the challenge of producing
the necessary amount of fuel in those timelines?
Mr. Rick K amin: Yes, all the signals from the industry are that
that demand can be met, both in 2012 and 2016. We are already
seeing procurements on the street because 2012 is not that far
away. As we start moving toward 2016, we will not be the only
people looking for this fuel, and we will not be the only people
setting the demand signal.
you think that the algae source for fuel is going to be a
Q: Do
wave of the future or is it just in the experimental stage right
now? How would you evaluate that?
Mr. Rick K amin: As far as making fuel oils from renewable
sources, algae is likely to be a primary source mainly because the
amount of product per acre used is significantly better than for
any plant crop you can grow. This makes sense, because the algae
basically yield oil without growing the rest of the plant, as is the
case with traditional agricultural crops. So, virtually everyone is
betting on algae as being very successful in the future. There are
people talking about scaling up what used to be 5-acre farms to
50-acre farms to 500-acre farms in the next couple of years. There
are folks growing algae heterotrophically in batch fermenters who
are looking at facilities where they can extend their quantities and
reduce their costs. It is becoming a “chicken-or-the-egg” game of
demand signal versus supply, and that is where the challenge is
going to be. Will the supply and the investment get the technology
commercialized to the point that we will get the demand that we
are looking for? As of today, everything looks very positive.
Chapter 7 Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
235
Coast Guard runs alternative fuels programs out of
Q: The
New London, Connecticut, for both small boats and aviation. Have you looked at or does the panel have knowledge of some of the
promising returns from buterol? It was the fuel that actually fueled the
Spitfires in the Battle of Britain in 1940. Although it was expensive to
make at that time, it now looks promising to us.
Mr. Rick K amin: Buterol, as it is, probably would not work in
our systems because of the type of engines that we use. But there
are people who are looking at alcohol derivatives and who are
developing processes to turn alcohols from various sources into a
kerosene fuel that our gas turbines can operate on.
to the panel that talked about strategic planQ: Iningwantandto link
where we are going to be operating in the future.
Is any concurrent analysis being done with the development of these
alternative fuels with where they would be deployed? Are we going to
be relying on industry in the areas of operation or will we be transporting the fuels? What is the plan for that?
Mr. Rick K amin: There are studies looking at what fuel sources
work best in various areas of the world and what the potentials are
for those sources’ quantities. I know that the Department of Energy
and commercial aviation have been studying that, although their
reports have not been released. Because the Navy is a global force,
we are not going to carry these fuels around with us to the point
they are needed. As I indicated previously, we are specifying that
any biofuels we use be drop-in replacements, which means they
can be intermingled with petroleum-based products as well. So I
do not think there is any intention to haul these fuels around the
world. We need to keep in mind that Americans are not the only
people on the planet who are looking at these types of technologies. There are also people in Europe and other places who are
looking at how to make kerosene-based fuels from the renewable
sources prevalent in their part of the world. So, we hope to be able
to make use of these types of products that are produced in other
parts of the world that meet our specifications.
Chapter 8
A da p t i n g S h i p O p e r at i o n s
to E n e rg y C h a l l e n g e s
239
Mr. John Benedict
I am going to provide a brief overview by focusing on each of
the six framing topics identified here (see also Figure 1):
• What are we trying to accomplish?
• How do we measure success?
Mr. John Benedict is currently a Fellow in the National Security
Studies Office within the National Security Analysis Department
(NSAD) at JHU/APL. Mr. Benedict has been focusing most recently
on total ownership cost issues for surface combatants, U.S. Navy
missions, and roles related to irregular warfare (IW), an Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-sponsored IW study to inform the
Quadrennial Defense Review, and an OSD-sponsored study to evaluate missions and roles for the reserve component of the military.
He has also recently investigated the national security implications
of various future trends including climate change and global energy
shortages. Previous to becoming a Fellow, Mr. Benedict served as the
Head of the Joint Warfare Analysis Branch in NSAD. Mr. Benedict has
extensive experience in Naval operations analysis, primarily in the area
of undersea warfare (USW) with special emphases on antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) and mine countermeasures. He has led numerous USW
analyses including a 2006 Way Ahead in ASW study done for the Chief
of Naval Operations (N8). He was a principal investigator in the mine
warfare (MIW) assessment that was conducted by the Naval Studies
Board in 2001. Throughout his career he has served as Study Director/
Lead Analyst for various analysis of alternatives efforts related to USW.
Mr. Benedict gives regular tutorials at the Naval Postgraduate School
on ASW, MIW, and other topics. He has had articles published in the
Naval War College Review, the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, The
Submarine Review, the U.S. Navy Journal of Underwater Acoustics,
the ASW Log, the Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, and other
journals. He has an M.S. in numerical science from The Johns Hopkins
University and a B.S. in mathematics from the University of Maryland.
240
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
• What technology enablers are we relying on?
• Can we transition these technology enablers into key acquisition programs?
• What operational and strategic impacts are we ultimately
going to have?
• What can go wrong with our plans?
Figure 1. Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges—
Overview (See Appendix for Details)
In the paragraphs that follow, I’ll briefly address the key elements of each of these important topics. Additional supporting
details are provided in the Appendix to this presentation.
WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH?
Stated strategic objectives include strengthening energy
security at Navy, joint, and national levels and achieving secure,
sufficient, reliable, sustainable energy that reflects future mission requirements, force structure, and operating tempos. Other
broad objectives are to conserve energy and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Stated operational objectives include enhancing
combat capability and achieving a reduced logistics tail through
the required operational and technological innovations that result
in hopefully saving time, money, and lives.
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
241
Another broad objective is to diversify energy sources for
enhanced resilience. Stated technical objectives include energy
efficient acquisition, rapid adoption of technology as an early
adopter, and improved tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) and associated testing and adaptation of viable alternative
energy sources.
HOW DO WE MEASURE SUCCESS?
Now let us turn to potential metrics for judging progress and
success in this area. At a recent Military Operations Research
Society special meeting on power and energy (P&E), it was agreed
that a consistent methodology and framework was lacking but
was definitely needed if the analysis community is to address
P&E to the same extent that we address other important system
performance measures. Modeling and simulation tools need to
be updated accordingly. The fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF)
or energy (FBCE) needs to be understood better; it needs to be
decomposed, defined, and standardized so that we can talk on
a common playing field across the services and other DoD and
government entities. Our analytic methods will need to include
energy efficient Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) as well as the
FBCF. Bottom line: we need to provide a more balanced view of
total ownership cost, risk, and capabilities for P&E to help support
decision makers in this area.
WHAT TECHNOLOGY ENABLERS ARE WE
RELYING ON?
Now let us look at the enabling technologies that the Navy
is currently focusing on. This is just a short list of some of the
things that are being addressed: improved prime mover efficiencies, hybrid electric drive (HED), alternative fuels, high-capacity
energy storage, improved hull forms, advanced propellers, efficient energy and power conversion, improved power generation,
high-energy and pulsed-power load development, all-electric
ship power control and distribution, and, in some cases, possibly
nuclear power and propulsion. You are going to hear a lot more
about these topics from our panelists.
242
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
CAN WE TR ANSITION THESE TECHNOLOGY
ENABLERS INTO KEY ACQUISITION
PROGR AMS?
So what are some of the corresponding acquisition initiatives?
I think you may have heard about some of these. LHD-8 Makin
Island has been fitted with an electric auxiliary propulsion system.
HED will be going on the USS Truxtun (DDG-103) as a proof of
concept very soon. You have heard about increased use of biofuels, and time-phased goals have been stated. A variety of other fleet
energy efficiency and conservation initiatives have been started.
These include the energy dashboard, Smart Voyage Planning, synthetic training, incentivized energy conservation, and a variety of
other measures to reduce power propulsion demands.
One of the areas of keen interest is the integrated power system
(IPS). We have seen commercial IPSs being put on logistic ships,
and a military IPS is being incorporated onto the DDG-1000. A
number of research and development initiatives are underway, and
a roadmap has been developed for the next-generation IPS. The
goal is to provide substantial benefit to warfighting, including providing power to enable future missions with high power demand.
We will hear more about some of these from the panelists.
WHAT OPER ATIONAL AND STR ATEGIC
IMPACTS ARE WE ULTIMATELY GOING
TO HAVE?
The expected operational and strategic impacts of these various energy, power, and propulsion initiatives will be important, so
I will examine them briefly here. We are taking the 80,000-foothigh strategic impact view, realizing that the Navy is just a part of
an overall national and hopefully international effort. Obviously,
the number one desired impact is to have more reliable supplies of
energy. But when you think about recent foreign policy areas that
have caused us grief, becoming more energy diverse will reduce
the demand for petroleum and thereby engender fewer questionable alliances, fewer oil supply entanglements, less energy supply
blackmail, and fewer perturbations to our national economy
caused by oil price volatility.
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
243
As for the operational impacts on the Navy, we would like to see
increased ship range, endurance, and tactical reach; a less vulnerable and burdensome logistics tail for ships; a reduction in the FBCF,
which is part of our total ownership cost reduction program; and
increased power and growth flexibility for next-generation weapons
systems. Like Rear Admiral Philip Cullom, I will also cite the observation from the 2009 Global War Game summary that sea logistics
lanes and bases are potentially an “Achilles’ heel” for the Navy.
WHAT CAN GO WRONG WITH OUR PLANS?
What are the principal concerns or risks associated with successfully implementing the various energy-related initiatives that I
have described? First of all, it occurs to me that without credible
tools for computing metrics like the FBCF or total ownership costs,
which admittedly have to be calculated out many years, decision makers will be very reluctant to make acquisition decisions
in favor of ship energy, power, and propulsion initiatives whose
payoff, whose return on investment (ROI), is many years away. So
we need to improve our tools so that we can properly support
decision makers in this area.
Second, there is obviously a very significant need to monitor
the technology readiness levels of many of the energy efficiency
technologies and to carefully manage risk in this whole area. Third,
I believe that the Navy, and the DoD as a whole for that matter,
would benefit significantly from diversity in its fuel and energy
sources. If one thing does not pan out as planned, something else
will be available to take its place. It is obviously hard to predict the
future, but you can bet that some of the alternative fuel sources will
have their own set of vulnerabilities and dependencies.
APPENDIX
I.
Energy, power, and propulsion objectives
• Strategic objectives
–– Partner with other services, government, industry, and
academia to strengthen energy security at Navy, joint, and
national levels
–– Protect access to energy sources for our nation and our
allies (i.e., secure, sufficient, reliable, sustainable energy)
244
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
–– Maintain a long-term perspective regarding energy security, accounting for future mission requirements, force
structure, and operational tempo
–– Conserve energy, develop alternative energy options, secure
energy distribution, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions
• Operational objectives
–– Employ energy efficiency as a force multiplier for both
enhanced combat capability and a reduced logistics tail
–– Reduce full logistics tether through operational and technological modifications
–– Reduce operational risks for logistics while saving time,
money, and lives, enhancing both operational flexibility
and sustainability
–– Rely on diversified energy sources for enhanced military
operation efficiency/resilience
• Tactical (and technical) objectives
–– Incorporate energy requirements into all phases of system development and acquisition, i.e., energy efficient
acquisition
–– Rapid adoption of technology and improved TTPs for
energy efficiency
–– Spearhead early testing and adaptation of viable alternative energy sources, e.g., alternative fuels seamlessly interchanged with petroleum-based fuel
II. Potential metrics—ROI
From a Recent Military Operations Research Society (MORS) special meeting on P&E:
• A consistent methodology/framework (e.g., data, metrics, terminology, logic) is needed to address P&E with regard to operational effectiveness across the spectrum of required models
• Modeling and simulation tools should be updated accordingly
to keep pace with developing P&E technologies
• The elements of FBCF* or FBCE should be decomposed,
defined, and standardized to provide a common understanding (e.g., for the force protection/attrition part of FBCF)
* Definition according to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Acquisition and Technology is: “FBCF is the commodity price plus the total
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
245
• Analytic methods are required to derive energy efficiency
KPPs** and FBCF and should be employed to set capability and
cost metrics (objectives/thresholds) for acquisition programs
• Bottom line: Analytic tools and metrics are needed to provide
a balanced view of total ownership costs, risks, and capabilities for P&E in support of decision makers
III. Illustrative enabling technologies for energy/power/
propulsion
• Improved prime mover efficiencies, e.g., combined diesel and
gas turbine plants and podded propulsion for new ship designs
• HED for greater efficiency at low speeds and low electric loads
• New/alternative fuels, e.g., sustainable non-petroleum-based
fuel
• Rechargeable high-capacity energy storage, e.g., advanced
battery and capacitors to enable ultrahigh P&E densities
• New/improved hull forms and designs for greater efficiencies
at various speeds and increased range/endurance
• Advanced propeller designs/improved propulsive efficiency
• Efficient P&E conversion, e.g., high-power-density electrical
power conversion and thermal management
• Improved power generation, e.g., advanced gas turbine
engines/generators, high-efficiency/reliable/high-power-density
fuel cell systems
• High-energy and pulsed-power load development for
advanced combat systems
• All-electric ship power control and distribution, i.e., integration of ship service electrical power and propulsive power for
greater overall efficiency by using same distribution system
(e.g., for pulsed-power switching and control system in support of advanced weapon systems)
• Nuclear power/propulsion
life cycle cost of all people and assets required to move and protect fuel from
the point of sale to the end user.” Note: FBCF use in life cycle operations and
support has been codified in DoD 5000.02.
** Energy efficiency KPPs are called out in CJCS 3170.01F to be “selectively
implemented”—in other words, slowly applied to programs.
246
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
IV. Illustrative acquisition initiatives for energy/power/
propulsion
• USS Makin Island (LHD 8) with an electric auxiliary propulsion
system that enables efficient low-speed operations (up to 75%
of time deployed)
• Goal for HED on DDG-51 (USS Truxtun) by 2012 (as part of
a proof of concept) with potential cost savings at low speeds
• Increased use of biofuels in fleet with ambitious time-phased
goals:
–– 2012: Green Strike Group with all ships certified to run on
50/50 biofuel blend
–– 2016: Green Strike Fleet with all ships containing full load
of biofuel plus HED DDG
–– 2020: 50% of Department of the Navy energy consumption will come from alternative energy sources
• Other fleet energy efficiency and conservation initiatives, e.g.,
–– The energy dashboard to monitor power and fuel
consumption
–– Smart Voyage Planning software for all ships
–– Expanded use of synthetic training for ships to reduce fuel
consumption
–– Combustion trim loop on L-ships
–– Stern flaps, bulbous bows, hull and propeller coatings, propeller redesign, and other measures to reduce propulsion
power demands
–– Incentivized Energy Conservation (I-ENCON) program
• IPS
–– Commercial IPS on T-AKE 1
–– Military IPS incorporated into DDG-1000
–– Next-Generation IPS (NGIPS) Research, Development,
Test & Evaluation, Navy funding to enable, for example,
more efficient prime mover operations, opportunities for
propulsion efficiency, integration of fuel cell technology
for ship applications, and very-high-powered mission systems in the future
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
V.
247
Potential operational (and strategic) impact from
energy/power/propulsion initiatives
• Potential strategic impact (as part of an overall national effort)
of lessening dependence on foreign oil/energy with very large
implications for military/U.S. Navy deployments and utilizations in the future
–– More reliable supplies of energy, i.e., more assured energy
access in the future
–– Less contesting for petroleum energy sources between
nations
–– Fewer questionable alliances with autocratic regimes to
ensure access to their oil supplies
–– Fewer oil supply entanglements influencing our foreign
policy (e.g., today’s Middle East)
–– Less energy supply blackmail by bad actors empowered by
energy (e.g., oil, gas) wealth
–– Less adverse perturbations to our national debt and economy caused by oil price volatility
• Potential operational impact on Navy of successful energy
efficiency efforts
–– Increased ship range and endurance, i.e., expanding tactical reach through efficiency
–– Less vulnerable/burdensome logistics tail for ships—frees
up combat forces for key missions (less logistics protection
needs), i.e., increased combat flexibility/effectiveness
–– Reduction in FBCF by not over-relying on volatile oil market
–– $10 increase in barrel of oil increases the Navy fuel bill by
about $300 million
–– Reduced fuel/energy costs could mean more funds available for procurement, training, and maintenance
–– Increased power/growth flexibility for next-generation
weapon systems (e.g., very-high-powered radars, electromagnetic rail guns, free-electron laser systems)
• From a participant at a Naval War College wargame exercise:
“Sea control of logistics lanes, as well as defense of related
logistics bases, were as important or more important than
sea control of the main objective area . . . [i.e., a potential
Achilles’ Heel]”
248
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
VI. Concerns/issues/risks to manage related to energy/
power/propulsion initiatives
• Analysis/acquisition decision support
–– Need reliable tools to compute FBCF(E)—the current state
of the art in this area appears suspect (i.e., insufficient rigor
and discipline)
–– Without credible tools for computing FBCF(E) and total
ownership cost, decision makers will be reluctant to make
acquisition decisions in favor of ship energy, power, and
propulsion initiatives whose payoff (ROI) may be many
years away
–– It is also not clear whether energy efficiency-related KPPs
will be as strongly enforced as other KPPs (related to ship
and combat system capabilities), e.g., potentially resulting
in the cancellation of a program
• Many enabling technologies
–– Technology readiness levels (TRLs) for key enabling ship
energy, power, and propulsion technologies must be carefully monitored/managed
–– For example, the NGIPS roadmap appears to be a good
initial step in prioritizing and tracking related technology
developments
• Alternative (non-petroleum-based) fuels
–– Putting the requisite infrastructure in place in the near- to
midterm could be a significant challenge
–– Technical hurdles and economic constraints could greatly
limit how rapidly alternative fuel sources can replace (vice
augment) fossil fuel-based energy on Navy ships
–– Uncertain whether these alternative fuel sources will pose
their own set of vulnerabilities/dependencies (albeit with a
smaller carbon footprint)
249
Rear Admiral Joe Carnevale
To begin, let me make a couple of observations, one at the
microscopic level and one at the macroscopic level. I bought a
new computer on Friday, and I have spent the whole weekend
trying to get all the software up on it and transferring data from
the old computer. I had it custom built at a local shop; I told them
I wanted a fast central processing unit (CPU), Windows 7, a 64-bit
Rear Admiral Joe Carnevale represents Shipbuilders Council of
America before Congress, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, and
other federal agencies, applying over 30 years of experience to defense
acquisition issues. He actively participates in a variety of ship maintenance and construction issues including the surface ship maintenance
budget, the shipbuilding budget, multi-ship/multi-option contracting, the Naval Technical Committee, Naval Vessel Rules, ship-building issues specific to ship classes, and many other important issues
affecting the ship building and repair industrial base. Prior to joining
Shipbuilders Council of America in June 2005, Rear Admiral Carnevale
led the professional services division of one of the fastest-growing
Fortune 500 companies. He served as Director of Fleet Maintenance
for the Commander, Fleet Forces Command where he addressed the
complete range of fleet maintenance issues as well as the recovery
operation for USS Cole (DDG 67). As Program Executive Officer (DD
21) for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development,
and Acquisition), he led the development of the next-generation U.S.
Navy surface combatant. He has directly participated in the construction of six different ship classes. After graduating from the University
of Massachusetts with a B.S. in chemical engineering in 1971, Rear
Admiral Carnevale joined the Navy, participating in combat operations
in Vietnam. He attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
where he earned two postgraduate degrees (an M.S. in naval architecture and marine engineering and an ocean engineer’s degree in 1980).
He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral (lower half) in 1998.
250
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
operating system with 16 megabits of random-access memory, a
1-terabyte drive, a high-end video card with multiple CPUs, and
a cabinet with a lot of fans. I ended up with seven fans: five in
the cabinet, one on my video card, and a big fan on my CPU. Of
course, you know what fans mean? Fans mean heat. You have
to get rid of all the heat that your computer is generating, and of
course, heat is proportional to the power that you are using. So, I
had to have a high-end power supply. Five years ago, my computer
had a 500-watt power supply; the one I bought on Friday has a
700-watt power supply, a 40% increase. So, at the microscopic
level, it is all about energy. It adds up—every little bit of it.
Now, let us take a more macroscopic view. Several years ago,
I read an article in Technology Review that observed that when
India’s standard of living reaches the current level of Belgium, world
demand for energy will have doubled. So add up all those little
CPUs and fans all over the United States and all over the world—
because people are constantly upgrading and getting more and
more and more power—and it is all about energy.
I am the one and only industry speaker you are going to hear
on this panel. The bad news is I am not a fuels guy; I am a shipyard guy, so bear with me. The good news is that my briefing
slides are not going to test your reading skills. The Shipbuilder’s
Council of America represents about 43 companies with over
100 shipyards around the United States—East Coast, West Coast,
Gulf Coast, Hawaii, Alaska, and inland waterways. Those yards
deal in commercial work as well as in government work for the
Navy, the Coast Guard, the Army, and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and in some other activities. We also
deal in new construction and in repair, maintenance, and modernization. We have companies that deal in all of these areas. We
have other companies that deal in only one.
So what does industry want out of all of this? To be blunt,
industry wants profitable contracts, and I must be the industry
guy because I just mentioned the P word. Industry also wants the
opportunity to perform. That is critical because that establishes
industry’s relationship and credibility with its customer; industry
lives on having a good customer base. In order to perform, industry
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
251
would like stability; they would like to get on a learning curve. In
acquisition, the best way to get cost down is pretty simple. The
best way to control costs is to fix your requirements before you
start the design, complete your design before you start production,
and then start construction and get into series production so you
can get on the learning curve and get down the learning curve.
I am going to talk about two parts of the industry—the shipyards, which is the part I deal with most, and then the whole host
of vendors and research and development (R&D) organizations—
the brainy people who have all kinds of good ideas. While I am
going to put everything in the context of shipyards and shipbuilding, what I present should be applicable to aviation, ground vehicles, and even major software procurements.
The absolute first thing we need to do is to set the requirement.
If you do not do that, your program is in big trouble if not dead
on arrival. The encouraging thing with regard to the requirements
associated with the Navy’s use of energy is that we have Rear
Admiral Philip Cullom, the Director of Energy and Environmental
Readiness Division, and an organization that is focused and dedicated to addressing the appropriate issues. So that is good news.
Fortunately, too, industry is making a lot of contributions.
Industry is coming up with ideas on how to improve hull forms and
appendages on the hull, how to improve both main and auxiliary
propulsion, and the use of green fuels. Industry is also looking at
ship operating procedures.
While industry has a lot of ideas, some big and some small,
the problem is there are lots of barriers (Figure 1). I am sure most
of you know about at least some of these barriers. In the case of
timing, for example, you think you have got a great idea and a great
platform, but the timing is just off. You cannot get your idea into
the program, you are too late, you missed the window, there is not
enough money, or there is no allocation for that. There are all kinds
of organizational wickets you have to go through.
When I used to teach acquisition to young engineering duty
officers, I would tell them that it has taken 40 years to make acquisition this hard and it could not have been done in a day less.
252
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 1. Lots of Barriers
Joe Carnevale’s third law of bureaucracies is that every time
you move the boxes around, you get more boxes. That is what we
have been doing for 40 years, so you have all these activities that
are there trying to do a good job and trying to make sure that they
weigh into the process. As a result, you get a lot of people weighing
in, and you need facilitators to move through this obstacle course
to take those great ideas and actually get them aboard steel hulls.
Fortunately, what you are going to hear about today are people
who are facilitating the process and are being successful at moving
their ideas through the process. From my perspective, if you want
to lock this process in concrete, you really have to take a systematic approach. You need Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) that
pertain to fuel cost, to manning, and to maintainability. While fuel
cost is an enormously important part of this, you cannot focus on
it exclusively. Manning and maintainability are also key focus areas
for the Navy right now.
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
253
My thought is that from the very beginning of a program, you
need to allocate dollars, both for development and for acquisition, and you have to allocate displacement, center of gravity, and
volume. If you want to get improved energy efficiencies, you are
going to need to make adjustments within the allowable margins
for all of these factors. If you want to improve maintainability, you
are also going to need all these things. If you to want to address
manning issues or improve the quality of life for our sailors, you are
going to need all these things.
If your requirements say that you have to have a 5-inch gun,
then you have to fit it in within allowable margins. During the development process, someone will have to make the necessary allocations: I have to have this much development, this much acquisition,
this much volume, displacement, lay down—it will all have to be
spelled out, and it will all have to be allocated. But if you want to
improve the energy efficiency of your ship, no one will allocate
any of those things right now. And if you do not allocate any of
these things, then how is the program manager going to approach
taking those great ideas and implementing them onboard his ships?
So you start by establishing clear performance parameters, and
you have to measure those performance parameters throughout
the life of the program. Then, most importantly, you have to grade
the Navy and industry program managers in terms of their success
in attaining desired performance levels. You have to determine
how well they are applying the allocations that they have been
given to improving the fuel efficiencies of their platforms, whether
that platform is a ship, an aircraft, or an armored vehicle.
You have to ask: How much displacement, how much volume,
how much acquisition cost did they invest in improving fuel efficiencies, and how much fuel efficiency did they get? They needed
the allocations to take those ideas and get them through the program, and then they needed to be graded against that to see how
well they did. And all of those things have to relate back to the KPPs.
In my mind, that is the way to build lanes through the barriers
so that everyone understands from the beginning that there are
requirements to improve fuel efficiencies, to reduce total ownership
254
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
cost by improving fuel efficiency, to make manning more efficient,
and to improve maintainability (Figure 2). You have the requirements, you have allocated the resources, and you will be measuring the programs against those improvements and reporting back.
Doing those things should provide lanes through this very, very
difficult process that we deal with in getting things into the fleet.
Figure 2. Build a Path Through the Barriers
255
Mr. Howard Fireman
As the Executive Secretary of the Resources and Requirements
Review Board (R3B), I am part of the process police that Rear
Admiral Joe Carnevale mentioned in this presentation. The good
news, from my perspective, is that I get to see everything—ships,
Mr. Howard Fireman assumed his current position as the Deputy
Director of the Navy Programming Division on the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) staff in 2009. He also serves as the Executive
Secretary for the Resources and Requirements Review Board. Previously,
Mr. Fireman was the senior civilian responsible for Surface Ship Design
and Systems Engineering at the Naval Sea Systems Command, where
he was also appointed as Chief Systems Engineer for Ships and as the
Deputy Warranting Officer. During this time he served as the NATO
Chairman for Ship Design and Mobility and was Technical Project
Officer. In 2001, Mr. Fireman served as the Special Assistant for Science
and Technology to the CNO Executive Panel until he became a member
of Senior Executive Service for the Naval Sea System Command and
worked as the Director for the In-Service Submarine Programs. He was
selected as the Science and Technology Advisor for the Commander
of Seventh Fleet and worked aboard USS Blue Ridge in Yokosuka,
Japan, from 1999 until 2001. He was Seventh Fleet’s Chief Technology
Officer. In 1994, Mr. Fireman was selected as the Acquisition Program
Manager for the San Antonio (LPD17) Program. Mr. Fireman has B.S.E.
and M.S.E. degrees in naval architecture and marine engineering from
the University of Michigan. In 1993, he earned his M.S. degree in technical management from The Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Fireman’s
awards include the University of Michigan Department of Naval
Architecture and Marine Engineering Rosenblatt-Michigan Alumni
Award (2010) and Bill Zimmie Award (2008), the American Society
of Naval Engineers Gold Medal (2006), the Meritorious Presidential
Rank Award, two Navy Superior Civilian Service Awards, the Navy
Meritorious Civilian Service Award, and the Department of the Navy
Competition and Procurement Excellence Award.
256
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
airplanes, unmanned systems, information technology. It is a good
place to be.
One of the things that the R3B does is serve as the gatekeeper.
The R3B reviews Key Performance Parameters. We also review Key
System Attributes, the guidance for analyses of alternatives (AoAs),
and the Initial Capabilities Documents (ICDs). We just did exactly
that in a series of 10 R3Bs looking across the whole set of Navy
programs in support of the Navy Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) being developed for FY2013.
Figure 1. Alternative Design Objectives
As Rear Admiral Carnevale mentioned, it is about getting the
requirement right. So, we have to ask first, what is our objective
(Figure 1)? Do we want to go fast? Do we want to survive? What
is it that we want? What is important to the Navy? Based on what
we want, we see different things that are potential options. Each of
these will result in different shipboard architectures and subsystem
designs and components. Then if you want to have effectiveness,
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
257
you have to address onboard training, use of simulations, time on
station, and ultimately the size of your fuel tank. If life cycle is
the objective, then there is another set of parameters we need to
look at.
As one of my old bosses used to say, a problem well defined is
a problem half answered. A lot of things that used to fall out the tail
end are what we do up front. So, we insist on putting the analytical
piece up front and making sure that we have the appropriate tools
to do that. I am okay with putting money in the development of the
analytical tools we need.
To reiterate, we need to start by identifying our objective.
Once we have that, we get into the process of specifications and
having the design done before we start building it. We have to
figure things out early so that we can determine precisely what
the requirements mean. We have to have good analysis done up
front using the right tools so that the decision makers can make the
right call. If we have done all that correctly, the process should get
easier, and then 20 years from now, no one will be disappointed
with what comes out the other end.
Figure 2. SECNAVINST 5000.2D [1]
258
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
The formal process we use in the Navy is laid out in Secretary
of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5000.2D (Figure 2), which
was signed out by Dr. Donald Winter in 2008. [1] The process
lays out six different gates that we go through, and they are very,
very important. Where Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV) gets to play pretty heavily in the process is in gates 1,
2, and 3. Those gates focus primarily on capabilities and requirements; thus, they address the Capability Development Document
(CDD) and the system concept of operations (CONOPS). The R3B
sessions for gates 1, 2, and 3 are typically chaired by my boss, Vice
Admiral John Terence Blake, the N8.
Following gate 3, we get into engineering and architecture
development and what we call the System Design Specification
(SDS), which you see next to gate 4. That is where the analysis
falls out, and that is how architectures are developed. We have to
make certain that the SDS has the right systems and components
in it, because we are essentially locking in significant parts of the
design for a very long time. It is important to get it right early in the
preliminary design stage. The Honorable Sean Stackley, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition,
chairs gates 4, 5, and 6.
One of the key elements prior to gate 1 is the capability based
assessment (CBA); I will talk a little bit more about that shortly
when I address some of the likely climate impacts on ship design.
During the CBA, we try to open the aperture and see where we are
headed. A CBA, for example, could tell us that we need to invest
in science and technology (S&T) before we start thinking about
building some key subsystem or component. We have to know that
early before we even get to what gap we have or whatever system
we want to fuel because the Office of Naval Research may need a
5-year head start.
The linkage between what we want to do and the capabilities
based assessment should be a stimulator of the S&T process as well
as to the acquisition process. If a key system or component is not at
the technology readiness level (TRL)—if it is not mature enough—
forget everything after gate 3 because it is never going to get on the
program. It is too late for whatever it is to ride that bus. So getting
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
259
things in line among S&T, acquisition, engineering, requirements,
and capabilities is very, very important.
Now let us get into energy (Figure 3). It is all about questions
like what is the ship supposed to do, what is its mission, what is the
CONOPS, what is the operating tempo, how much time is spent
steaming, how much time is spent in the threat environment, and
what radar resources do you need? So you have to worry about
mission profile and operating tempo. While the design process is
obviously complex, if you get it figured up front, what comes out
the other end should not be a surprise and will probably meet
expectations.
Figure 3. Energy Requirements
As I indicated, the overall ship architecture will be driven by
the specific problem we are trying to solve. That will lead to the
requirements and then to the specifications and components. We
will also need the appropriate linkages to S&T investment to ensure
that we can meet all those requirements. We will invariably want
to have the most efficient system, use the least volume, and have
the least displacement. And, we will need to remember that as the
ship gets heavier, we have to push it through the water, and the
260
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
faster we want to go, the more energy we need. As you can see,
we have a very complex system of systems problem.
Now let me turn briefly to the impact of climate on ship operations. As you may know, we have developed an Arctic Roadmap
to help us get our pieces up front (Figure 4). [2] One of the key elements of that roadmap is a capabilities based assessment, which I
think you will hear more about in Rear Admiral David Titley’s presentation. The CBA will describe what we are trying to do, which
will then lead into our gap analysis—our assessment of whether
our current systems meet requirements or whether we need new
widgets. Eventually the roadmap will get us down to the solutions
that we require. But, everyone has to be on board, and I guess
there are a lot of boxes, and yes, there is a lot of complexity. But
again, if we are going to invest billions of dollars, we really do need
to get the right type of analysis up front and early.
Figure 4. Arctic Roadmap
We also need to focus on identifying the knee in the curve of
cost versus capability. And to do that, we have to have the right
tools. I bet if I were to ask each of you to give me a definition of
total ownership cost, I would get 15 or 20 different definitions,
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
261
maybe even more. So, we have to make sure we have defined
things properly and that we are accounting for all of the appropriate costs.
REFERENCES
1. The Secretary of the Navy, SECNAV Instruction 5000.2D,
2008,  http://doni.daps.dla.mil/directives/05000 general
management security and safety services/05-00 general admin
and management support/5000.2d.pdf.
2. Department of the Navy, Navy Arctic Roadmap, 10 Nov 2009,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_
roadmap.pdf.
262
Dr. John Pazik
I am really encouraged to be on this panel today because as
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom said, if we want to make changes in
Navy culture, acquisition, and operations, all the participants have
Dr. John Pazik is the Director of the Ship Systems and Engineering
Science and Technology Division at the Office of Naval Research (ONR)
and leads a group of scientists and engineers involved in the development of technologies for advanced naval power systems, platform survivability, advanced platform concepts, and sea base enablers. Dr. Pazik
is responsible for a portfolio of basic, applied, and advanced technology
development programs that range from topics in nanotechnology to aircraft carrier technologies. Dr. Pazik is currently engaged in development
of science and technology strategy for incorporation into the Navy’s
Next Generation Integrated Power Systems (NGIPS) master plan. As the
Navy’s Science and Technology Advanced Naval Power and Energy lead,
he has worked extensively with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the services to coordinate and plan power and energy programs.
Dr. Pazik was promoted to Senior Executive Service in December 2002.
Previously, Dr. Pazik was Director of the Physical Sciences Division at
ONR. As Director of Physical Sciences, Dr. Pazik focused resources on
power and energy transfer and environmental quality to address future
Naval needs in these areas. Prior to his selection to the Senior Executive
Service, Dr. Pazik was a program officer at ONR where he developed
and managed programs in nanotechnology, solid state chemistry, electronic materials, and thermoelectric materials and devices. As a program officer at ONR, he developed and managed joint programs with
DARPA. From 1989 to 1992, Dr. Pazik was a member of the technical staff at the Naval Research Laboratory. Dr. Pazik received a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from the State University College of New
York (SUNY) at Fredonia in May 1982. He received his doctorate degree
from the SUNY Buffalo in the area of inorganic chemistry in May 1987.
He was an American Society for Engineering Education postdoctoral
fellow at the Naval Research Laboratory in June 1987.
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
263
to come to the table. I think this panel brings the right participants
together. We have the warfighting customer, we have the acquisition procurement officer, and we have industry—the ultimate
source for the products we need to buy. And I represent the science and technology (S&T) enabler who puts forward the underlying concepts that we are going to want to rely on in the future.
Let me begin by briefly reviewing the history of electric power
aboard U.S. Navy ships and the approach for managing how we
use that power. Electric power is clearly one of our critical enablers.
Starting at the bottom then, the USS New Mexico was actually the
first capital ship that really had an integrated power system associated with it (Figure 1). We started our processes prior to that with
the USS Jupiter, a bulk cargo carrier. We tend to get our feet wet
by using our logistics platforms as experimentation laboratories for
many of the new technologies that we look at. The USS Trenton
was the first ship that had electric lights installed on board—238
light sockets. It was also one of the first hybrid ships. It obviously
had sails, and in the middle of the deck, you can see the exhaust
for the steam engine. That exhaust stack actually could be raised or
lowered depending on whether or not the steam engine was being
used for power.
Figure 1. History of U.S. Navy Electric Ships
264
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
I wanted to stop at the Trenton because it also brings together
climate change and energy in a different way, but probably not one
of the more positive ways: the USS Trenton was lost in a hurricane
off Samoa. I say that in a way that is a little bit tongue in cheek, but
part of what we are doing outside of the energy areas in terms of
climate change is looking at what the conditions are in the areas
where we are going to be operating. As we have heard, within a
few decades we will no longer have year-round ice in the Arctic.
How is that going to affect weather conditions and sea states? How
is that going to affect ice coverage and other issues associated with
our platforms?
The operational conditions that we expect to encounter affect
how we design a platform, not just from the electrical perspective, but also from the perspective of structures and mechanical
systems. Moving on to today (Figure 2), LHD-8 is a great example
of a hybrid electric drive that is achieving $2 million in fuel savings
relative to a modern steam plant. We first got our feet wet in these
areas with T-AKE 1 and now are moving on to the DDG-1000,
which is going to be an integrated power system with 78 megawatts of power.
Figure 2. Today’s U.S. Navy Electric Ships
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
265
Let me just quickly remind you what the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) does. When it comes to energy, the Navy, and the
DoD’s use for energy, we have an app for that. So for anything that
you want to put energy on, we have a way to do that. What we
are trying to do at ONR, and within the S&T community across the
department, is to look at programs that solve those applications,
either by providing a variety of energy sources for us to use or by
increasing the efficiency of our platforms and thereby reducing our
demand for the fuels that we have (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Naval S&T Strategic Plan [1]
So we go from supporting development of quick enabling technologies, like solid-state lighting, through fundamental work that
looks, for example, at new materials for exhaust heat recovery. We
look at fuels and other energy sources and at how we take that fuel
and generate electricity in some form or another (Figure 4). We
also look at the types of energy storage media that are available.
And, we look at the different types of radars and weapons that we
are going to have aboard ship. We know that we are going to have
some baseline load and that we are going to have to handle peak
loads as well. So the storage piece is going to be a critical component. Then we have to have the distribution and control network
because, as I will show you in a few moments, it is not just about
266
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
installing a generator and hooking it up to our propulsor. It is about
integrating it into the platform and getting the right power at the
right time at the right place, and electrical distribution is key to that.
Figure 4. Power and Energy Technologies
Ultimately, the S&T community has to address the loads piece.
What can we do to enable our designers to create more energy
efficient ships? Whether it is a new hull form, whether it is stern
flaps, or whether it is a new coating that reduces bio-fouling, which
causes a significant amount of drag, all these things add up.
Said another way, we look at both the near term and the far
term (Figure 5). We are planning ahead for a Navy that is going
to have more electric weapons and that is going to have highpower radars. But, we cannot just continue to add energy sources
to our ships. The rules that we have in front of us now are different.
We need to have an increasing amount of capability; we will have
greater loads due to our use of advanced radars and advanced
electric weapon systems, but we have to reduce the amount of
fuel we use. That is the challenge that has been put in front of the
S&T community, the research and development community, and
the United States as a whole: how do we use less and still increase
our capability?
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
267
Figure 5. S&T Energy Investments
One of the things that we are talking about is the Next
Generation Integrated Power System (Figure 6). We are looking at
this because we do not want the radar system to bring its own generator set with it, and we do not want the rail gun to bring its own
generator set with it. We do not have room. So we have to be able
to figure out the layout of the platform that meets those needs while
satisfying design constraints on ship volume and center of gravity.
Figure 6. Advanced Electric Warship Next Generation
Integrated Power System (NGIPS)
268
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
The Next Generation Integrated Power System is a way of
ensuring that we use a given amount of installed energy most efficiently. Regardless of whatever level of installed power we have—
say it is 78 megawatts like on a DDG-1000—that power is not
going to be directed in only one direction. We need to be able to
direct it in multiple directions. We need to be able to add different
timescales, and that means we are going to have to have energy
storage capabilities on the platform. That storage will not just be in
the fuel; it might be batteries, capacitors, and flywheels. We are
going to have to direct the energy from our generators into our
propulsion system at one point, a millisecond later we are going to
have to be able to fire an electric weapon, and at the same time
we are going to have to have broadband radar coverage with our
advanced radar systems. We are going to have to be able to move
that energy around, and the power electronics and distribution and
control systems necessary to do that are some of the S&T thrusts
that we are now working on.
What can we do to make sure we achieve our goals in
these areas? Our approach is to apply the design paradigm that
Mr. Howard Fireman described earlier. Let us take a quick look at
designing the electrical architecture for a ship, admittedly a very
difficult task. We know we are going to need power for weapons
and for radar systems. We know we would like to avoid bringing separate power sources for those capabilities, and we want
to have an integrated activity. How do we do that within the
design constraints and spaces that we have for a platform given
its requirements for speed, range, and payload? Right now we
effectively create a rough specification for the ship and then we
think in detail about the machinery, the intakes, the uptakes, and
the mission spaces and how we set those out to actually have an
effective platform.
Currently, we do not have a great tool that allows us to determine whether, if we use this architecture with these components
aboard, it is going to fit in this platform, it is going to be able to
make this speed, and it is going to be able to have this mission set
aboard (Figure 7). We need to have an iterative process so that
we can iterate the design as many times as needed and thereby
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
269
optimize the solution space that we have between what the warfighter needs and what our acquisition community can afford. That
design tool is going to be a crucial piece, and it is one of the things
that we are looking at from the S&T perspective. So, our job is not
just about developing the hardware and the components, it is also
about bringing the right design tools to the table so that we can
take those components and put them into a platform and then take
those platforms and put them into an overall scenario that includes
energy and power and how we operate as a Navy and as a DoD.
Figure 7. Today, We Have No Reliable Method or Tool
The Ship Smart-System Design (S3D) is one of our tools that
we are working on, primarily with the university community and
with an industrial partnership associated with that community.
We ultimately want to bring that design capability to the electrical
architecture and its interfaces with combat systems. We also want
to address manning requirements and the platform’s operational
capabilities as well as construction, testing, training, and finally
ship delivery and service life to include maintenance and future
upgrades (Figure 8).
One of the things that we have embarked upon is an electric
ship research and development consortium that includes a number
of universities partnered with an advisory board from industry
270
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
(Figure 9). That latter element is critical for ensuring that the academic community understands what industry wants to be able to
do but also for providing the connections so that industry knows
what is coming out of the design community.
Figure 8. Future Vision of Shipboard Electrical Design
Development Process
Figure 9. Electric Ship Research and Development Consortium
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
271
One of the things the consortium is doing is creating a center
for incorporating hardware-in-the-loop capabilities into our design
models and simulations. This is particularly important given the
cost associated with the actual testing all of the individual components that we have to do before we can assure that they are safe
for use aboard ship. If we can create models and verify that those
models truly represent what those systems do, then we can reduce
the cost of our testing activities.
In addition to the things that I have already discussed, ONR is
also looking at some far-out things (Figure 10), including the variable acquisition motor system for unmanned aircraft mentioned
by Rear Admiral Cullom. We are also looking at the whole spectrum of unmanned vehicles. We want to have unmanned capability undersea. We want to extend the range and the lifetime of our
unmanned vehicles. The power system and the control system are
key to making that happen.
Figure 10. Other Power and Energy Considerations
There are also a number of secondary things that we need to
look at that impact efficiency and affordability. These range from
272
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
hull husbandry to the type of cabling that we install aboard the
ship. All these things factor into the energy needs, the cost, and
the efficiency of the platform. It is getting down that user demand.
So in summary, I think from an S&T perspective, we are at a good
place with this power and energy portfolio right now, and I think
it is a good paradigm for where we need to go in the future. We
need to partner across our various constituencies, understand what
the needs are, and also inform them about the capabilities that we
are developing.
As Rear Admiral Cullom stated, we need strong partnerships.
At the ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit a couple of weeks ago,
the Secretary of the Navy announced that the Navy was establishing a partnership activity with ARPA-E in hybrid energy storage.
It is important that we continue to establish these types of collaborations, because none of us can do it alone. It has to be a U.S.
government effort, and we have to look at what all our partner
agencies are doing. We have to take a holistic approach to efficiency 1% at a time. At the same time, we have to understand that
the key aspects are at that front end. Sixty percent is the greatest
efficiency you are going to get from a gas turbine generator on a
good day. Then, when you look at where that energy goes, you
discover that 99% is lost in drag and other activities at the end of
the cycle. So we have to attack the back end of the process as well.
The Navy’s S&T community is working well with the acquisition community to develop hybrid electric drive, to deploy the
Green Fleet, and to conduct the Green Strike Group demo. In short,
we have those essential close partnerships with our colleagues at
Naval Sea Systems Command and the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
REFERENCE
1. Office of Naval Research, Naval Science & Technology Strategic
Plan,  http://www.onr.navy.mil/en/About-ONR/sciencetechnology-strategic-plan.aspx.
273
Mr. Glen Sturtevant
I am going to try to convince Rear Admiral Joe Carnevale that
this program executive office is not a barrier to getting new ideas to
the fleet. I will begin by spending a few minutes describing some of
Mr. Glen Sturtevant is the Director for Science and Technology assigned
to the United States Navy Department’s Program Executive Office for
Ships. He graduated from College du Leman in Geneva, Switzerland,
earned a B.S. degree in civil engineering from the University of Delaware,
and earned an M.S. degree in public management from Indiana
University. He has completed Program Management and Engineering
programs of study at National Defense University, Webb Institute of
Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Mr. Sturtevant began his career with the
Department of the Navy in 1978 as a Project Engineer at Philadelphia
Naval Shipyard. In 1983 he was assigned to the Surface Ships Directorate
at Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia,
where he was a Project Manager. In 1987 he was assigned to the Aegis
Shipbuilding Program (PMS 400) where he held several managerial
positions, and from 1998 to 2004, he was Program Manager for the
Navy’s Smartship Program. His current duties include Senior Advisor for
Energy to the Program Executive Office (PEO) and Naval Sea Systems
Command Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare, Project Manager
for the DDG 51 Hybrid Electric Drive Proof of Concept Project, and
the PEO’s Small Business Innovative Research Program. He is a member of the American Society of Naval Engineers, the World Scientific
Engineering Academy and Society, the Surface Navy Association, the
American Management Association, and the Navy League of the United
States and has served on the Association of Scientists and Engineers
Professional Development Committee and as Chairman of the Science
and Education Committee. Mr. Sturtevant has received the Association
of Scientists and Engineers Professional Achievement Award, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense’s Aegis Cruiser Reduced Total Ownership
Cost Award, and the individual Aegis Excellence Award.
274
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
the operational testing we are doing to reduce the risk associated
with the follow-on acquisition of some important technologies.
In my view, there are three key things to think about. I believe
that the energy imperative is now driving innovation, but I submit
to you that the real innovation is in the application of that technology. Secondly, I think we all need to adapt faster. We should not
be forcing the adaptation on the back of the operators in the fleet;
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations staff resources requirements, the Office of Naval Research, scientific research, technology development, the shipbuilders, the program executive offices,
and the systems commands need to adapt faster if we are going to
get ahead of the power curve with respect to energy. And lastly,
if you think you understand all of the consequences of your decisions today, then I submit you are wrong.
We adapted this idea from commercial shipping. We start easy.
Basically, we are going to go out and survey our ships. It is all
about collecting the data, making improvements, and then validating those improvements. It is basic stuff. We design ships—the
best ships in the world. But I will tell you, we really do not know
where the energy goes today. We know how we design our ships
and where the electricity and fuel goes for those designs, but many
of our existing ships are 10, 15, 20, or 25 years old, and we really
do not know where the energy goes. So we are going to find out.
We are going to measure it. We originally called it an audit, but the
crews did not like the word “audit,” so we are calling it an energy
survey. We are starting simple to make sure we are chasing the
sweet spot and not some red herrings and to make sure we are not
investing in the wrong areas for improvement.
I am going to talk about four technologies. As you will see, we
have adapted a lot of things from commercial shipping, from the
airline industry, and from government and industry labs. I am going
to talk about a handful of these and what we are doing today, how
we trying to get operational feedback, and how we plan to reduce
risks for the follow-on acquisition programs. So here is the list.
As you can see (Figure 1), we have categorized these technologies according to their expected availability—be it 2012, 2016, or
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
275
farther in the future. By 2012 we will have the Green Strike Group,
and by 2016, we will have the Great Green Fleet. I have highlighted four of these technologies; in what follows, I will describe
how we are taking these to sea and how we think we are going to
make a difference.
Figure 1. Energy Efficiency Enabling Technologies
Let us start with hybrid electric drive, which you have already
heard something about. In Figure 2, we show the drive system for
a DDG-51-class destroyer. We have three gas turbine generators
over to the left. They generate electricity and make up half the
system. The propulsion plant is on the right. We actually have four
LM-2500 gas turbine engines on USS Truxton, the proof-of-concept ship. Next January, we will be taking a subscale system out to
the ship. As shown in the center of Figure 2, it includes the basic
electric motor on the main reduction gear, along with a converter
and switchboard. Ultimately, we will be powering the electric
motor through the gas turbine generators that have been moved to
a more efficient location aboard ship, the way they were originally
designed. When you do not need all the power that the gas turbines provide, you can turn them off and run the ship through the
water at low rates of speed using electricity.
276
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 2. DDG-52 Hybrid Electric Drive
That is the idea. Initially, it is all about fuel efficiency. But once
you field the hybrid electric drive, you are likely to find that the
operators will say “well, geez that kind of changes everything.”
Now they will have a new quiet speed that can be used by DDG51s conducting antisubmarine warfare operations. Or, it could
prove beneficial for destroyers conducting ballistic missile defense
missions in the Mediterranean. Maybe it changes the transit speed
when the ship crosses the Atlantic. Perhaps 16 knots is not the best
speed for that evolution. So, once we make that innovative design
change, we are likely to find that it is followed by innovative application changes.
We stole the idea for the Smart Voyage Planning Decision Aid
(Figure 3) from the commercial airline industry. When you fly from
here to Los Angeles, it is all about altitude and heading. It turns out
that Maersk, the largest American commercial shipping line, has
adapted the idea to ship routing. They have come up with a pretty
sophisticated tool that directs the ship where to go in order to save
gas. By adapting that approach for the Navy, we are projecting
that perhaps as much as 8% fuel savings could result from using
the most fuel-economic route. Airplanes take advantage of the jet
stream, why can’t we take advantage of the Gulf Stream?
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
277
Figure 3. Smart Voyage Planning Decision Aid
For years we have done optimum track ship routing to avoid
bad weather that bangs up the ship and injures the crew. If we
can lay the toolset for the ship router, or something that has local
weather conditions, into the Voyage Planning Decision Aid, then
perhaps we can route our ships based on weather and get better
gas mileage, recognizing of course that mission comes first. So, we
are going to start doing that. We intend to roll out this system in
time to support Pacific Fleet’s participation in Exercise Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012 next year.
Figure 4 illustrates our test plan for surface ship alternate fuels.
Starting with the upper-left-hand corner, you see the rigid hull
inflatable boat (RHIB). We tested a 50/50 blend in a RHIB down
in Little Creek back in July 2010. In October, we tested a Riverine
Control Boat experimental craft (RCB-X). We are going to test alternate fuel on a yard patrol (YP) craft at the Naval Academy this
spring and on an LCAC down in Panama City this summer. Next
year, we are going to test use of alternate fuel on an FFG coming
out of commission or on the Navy’s self-defense test ship (SDTS)
in Port Hueneme, California. In June 2012, we will test alternate
fuels with the Green Strike Group (GSG) during RIMPAC 2012. Our
basic approach is to “build a little, test a little.” We are also doing
component testing ashore.
278
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 4. Alternate Fuel Test Plan
The important point is that using the alternate fuel will have
no impact whatsoever on the operator. We are designing drop-in
fuels. The operators will not know the difference. That is the model
we are following now for a lot of our technologies. We are not putting the burden on the back of the warfighters. They already have
enough to worry about.
My final example is what Rear Admiral Philip Cullom called
“the box on the bridge.” We have labeled it the “energy dashboard.” Commercial shipping uses this extensively. It is a way to
try to influence the actions of the operators. If you know exactly
where your fuel is going, where your electricity is going, then perhaps you can take actions to use that fuel or energy more efficiently. The large arrow in Figure 5 is my way of showing that you
may want to send that data off the ship, which is what commercial
shipping does. They have found that by pitting one ship against
another, they can significantly change the energy consumption
behavior of their ship masters.
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
279
Figure 5. Energy Dashboard
One of the real powers of this energy tool is that you can overlay the material condition of the ship onto the display. You will
know that the sea grass on the hull is increasing your drag. You will
know that you have a bad generator that you did not know about
before. You can also lay the maintenance of the material piece
into the energy dashboard. We are going to field this in one of our
destroyers—the USS Chafee—later this year. We will get it out to
other ships as we move forward.
280
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
have heard a lot about powering, propulsion, and energy
Q: Iproduction
but not so much about efficiency, especially concerning the hotel loads on ships and submarines. Given the example of
the computer with the multiple fans, it strikes me that combat systems,
radar systems, and other electronic equipment are prime candidates
for energy efficiency. So I am asking the panel what your thoughts are
about energy efficiency so that we do not need the fuel in the first place?
Rear Admiral Joe Carnevale: Before getting to your question,
let me relate a recent report I received from a colleague. He told
me that when his auxiliary ship pulled up into port, they discovered that there were electrical meters right on the pier. Based on
the meter reading, they found out that their electrical usage went
through the roof each night after the crew had gone home. As
it turned out, the ship’s integrated HVAC system was creating a
nightly battle between heating and air conditioning. The air conditioning would cool compartments down and then the heating system would heat them back up again.
So, you are absolutely right. Paying attention to design details
can be critically important. But who addresses that? Typically that
is left up to the ship builder to design the HVAC and the other
habitability systems. How is the ship builder incentivized? Well,
right now it is to reduce costs. Make sure you meet the requirements, but keep the costs down. So wherever you can you buy
commercial off the shelf or robust commercial off the shelf, or if
it is on a complex surface combatant, you buy militarized products. But basically there is no incentive to make the HVAC system
fuel efficient.
My idea for addressing this problem would be to provide the
two program managers, Navy and industry, with margins for electrical power, cost, volume, and those sorts of things. This would
encourage them to invest in better HVAC controls; they may be
larger and more expensive, but they would be much more fuel
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
281
efficient. Those are trade-offs you can make in the actual process
of going through the detailed ship design. When you are out buying equipment, you often see that they all meet the requirements.
But how do you encourage the more efficient choice? How do you
get at that? Whose job is that?
Dr. John Pazik: Another example at the other end of the
spectrum is switching from fluorescent to solid-state lighting. This
change yields only a small percentage increase in energy efficiency
but imposes a capability cost. I have to take all those fluorescent
bulbs, I have to have the sailors go out and replace those fluorescent bulbs, and then I have to store them as hazardous waste
somewhere on the platform.
So, are there unintended opportunities that can occur when
you develop efficient systems? I think that is a real possibility.
We could put a meter at the pier and understand the peak
usage of when something bad happens. But trying to understand
what the specific components are that are driving that peak usage
requires a better understanding of how we use energy on the subcomponent level.
Mr. Howard Fireman: In my view, a lot of energy efficiency
improvements start with the concept of operations. What are the
specific orders for the watch? How do we take advantage of the
design and the architecture built into the ship? To further address
the question of efficiency, it is about how you want to use the
product; it all starts with the specific problem you are trying
to solve.
Mr. Glen Sturtevant: I think that air conditioning is a major
load on the ship, although we do not really know. It might be toasters or hairdryers for all we know. If you monitor energy usage, you
see it peak in the morning just like it does on the national grid. It
peaks in the morning and then goes up again at night; it is pretty
predictable. But is it the sonar, or is it the electronic warfare system, or is it the galley? We do not know. That is why we are doing
surveys. We are going to put energy meters on our ships and at
the shore power receptacles on the pier. We have never done this
282
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
before; it was never an issue. So we are going to collect data and
actually determine where our energy investment is going.
is a historical question. Could you compare the energy
Q: This
consumption, at, say, flank speed, of a DD of World War II
vintage, a 2200 series, to a modern gas turbine, which gets better knots
per gallon?
Rear Admiral Joe Carnevale: The resounding answer is “no, I
cannot do that.” But, let us look at the standard marine gas turbine
as used by the Navy. We design our ships to operate at best speed.
As a result, our gas turbine engines are not very efficient when the
ship is tooling around at 5 or 12 knots. They burn a lot of gas. Is
that the right way to design ships? I do not know. That is the way
we have always done it. I cannot speak to World War II vintage
ships. But I do think that there has to be a better way than the way
we have done it for max or best speed. I think there might be a different approach, a different paradigm perhaps.
a steam plant inherently less efficient or more efficient than
Q: Isother
propulsion options?
Mr. Howard Fireman: I would say for the speed ranges that
surface traditional steam could handle, and that includes the 1200pound steam plants, steam engines were probably more fuel efficient than gas turbine plants, but they could not get into the speed
ranges that are required. For every 10-knot increase in speed on
a surface ship, you typically have to double the installed power;
steam plants could not achieve those power densities. But for the
power densities that they operated in, I think they probably were
more efficient.
Steam is also very efficient for nuclear power plants, where
increasing the size is fairly straightforward. Unfortunately, steam
plants are also a lot deadlier and much more difficult to maintain
in terms of the surface ships plants that we replaced. But power
density wise, they are a lot more efficient.
Chapter 8 Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
283
to me that most of the energy efficiency initiatives
Q: Itthatseems
I have heard about fall into the later research and devel-
opment phases [those designated advanced development (6.3) or engineering development (6.4)]. Many of those things yield relatively small
percentage improvements. Although they all add up, and that is important, I would like to know if you see any promise for getting dramatically
improved fuel efficiency through use, perhaps, of different thermodynamic cycles?
Dr. John Pazik: From the exploratory research (6.2) perspective, I think one of the things that I am very excited about is a
hybridization of energy storage capability, because ultimately it is
about using the installed energy most efficiently. We are going to
have a given amount of energy available, but the way we use it
and how we direct it aboard the ship are the critical elements.
Having an energy storage component that can handle different
pulse loads and different discharge rates could require a variety
of different technologies such as batteries or capacitors. Bringing
them together with the right control will be critical; it is all about
the controls and the control network.
Ultimately, we need to have a safe storage module that we can
put in a platform along with controls that can release a set amount
of stored energy at the right rate for the given application. Those
things are now bubbling up. That is where I think the real opportunities are in early applied research. We need to be doing systems
engineering and resilient engineering on those systems.
We are pretty good at the individual components. We can
optimize a lot of components to do the best things in the world.
But when you bring those components together and ask them to
operate as a system, that is where I see real opportunities arising.
We are starting as a community to look at that systems approach.
284
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
“energy dashboard” has been mentioned several times.
Q: The
I am curious how comprehensive that dashboard is and
whether it is trying to just induce behavioral changes or whether there is
going to be some sort of control or optimization built into it?
Mr. Howard Fireman: Referring to the energy dashboard, we
have looked at those various systems out there, mostly in commercial shipping. We are taking the functionality, making it applicable
to a warship, and then actually engaging some operators to build
the appropriate graphical user interface (GUI). I was not aware that
this is as mature as you have led me to believe it is. So there might
be something else out there we have missed. But this is something
we are developing for warships from commercial shipping lines. I
do know that the GUIs are still a work in progress.
are a number of new-generation technologies associQ: There
ated with nuclear power that are being considered for commercial applications. Is there any consideration being given to using
nuclear power to provide the energy for surface ships smaller than aircraft carriers?
Mr. Howard Fireman: I would refer you to a 2006 report
(Alternative Propulsion Study) to Congress by the Secretary of the
Navy which assesses the potential use of nuclear power for surface
combatants and amphibious warfare ships. The report shows that
manning and training costs tend to drive overall costs. But, when
fuel cost is high enough, it becomes a factor. Thus, the study shows
what the cost of fuel would have to be (on a cost-per-barrel basis)
in order for nuclear power to be preferred for various ship classes.
Given the current cost of fuel, this is something that the government will have to consider in future acquisitions.
Chapter 9
A da p t i n g E x p e d i t i o n a ry
C a pa b i l i t i e s to
E n e rg y C h a l l e n g e s
287
Colonel Edward (Ted) Smyth
Thus far, we have had three previous roundtable discussions
on the subject of energy and energy challenges, so at this stage of
the game, you might wonder what sets this particular roundtable
Colonel Edward (Ted) Smyth is the Supervisor of the Analysis,
Modeling, and Simulation Branch and a Fellow within the National
Security Analysis Department (NSAD) at JHU/APL. He is also a Fellow
and former President of the Military Operations Research Society
(MORS) and a former Marine Corps Colonel with 30 years of active service, during which he commanded Marine Corps units at the company/
battery, battalion, and regimental levels. His primary military occupational specialty was artillery/fire support with subspecialties as a military operations analyst and historian. Since joining JHU/APL, he has
served as the Director, Land Attack Warfare Studies and as Supervisor
of the Ground Operations Section of NSAD. He has also coordinated
efforts in support of Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Sea Strike
analyses, served as the Supervisor of the Joint Effects Based Operations
Group, developed and organized a 3-day symposium sponsored by
MORS on the subject of “Analysis of Urban Warfare,” and served
as the Senior JHU/APL Analyst in support of the National Security
Agency’s Signals Intelligence Requirements Office. His most recent
activities include active contributions to the Johns Hopkins University
Symposia on Unrestricted Warfare and the 2010 Climate and Energy
Symposium. He also provided leadership and/or major contributions
to the following projects and analyses: a MORS Special Meeting on the
subject of “Wargaming and Analysis”; an Analysis of Alternatives on
the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS); a study of the implications of
economic and financial issues and actions on U.S. national security; an
analysis of DoD and interagency coordination in support of homeland
defense; and the Quadrennial Defense Review-directed study on a
comprehensive review of the Reserve Component. Colonel Smyth also
serves on the faculty of The Johns Hopkins University’s Whiting School
of Engineering.
288
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
discussion apart. In my view there are really two factors. First, we
are going to dwell almost exclusively on expeditionary capabilities
and the energy challenges created by being expeditionary. Second,
this roundtable consists of folks who day to day are either serving
in the Marine Corps on active duty or in a civilian capacity. So this
is, in effect, our Marine Corps panel for this symposium.
I am not an energy expert per se. I will leave it to the panel
members to provide those details, but what I thought I might do
in the way of introducing this particular panel is attempt to put the
term “expeditionary” in context. To do that, I will offer a definition
or at least provide you with a set of characteristics that are normally used by the Marine Corps and others in describing expeditionary. I will also briefly touch upon the types of missions Marine
expeditionary forces conduct and capabilities that they possess,
and then I will touch briefly on how we link some of those expeditionary capabilities to some of the emerging energy challenges that
we face. At that point, I will pass it off to the experts to describe
some of the solutions that they are working on.
My initial effort to find an accepted definition of the term
“expeditionary” took me to Joint Publication 1-02, the Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms. [1] Unfortunately, I did not find a
great deal of help there. The term “expeditionary” does not appear
in that document. What you will find is a definition of the term
“expeditionary force,” which, in my view, does not fill the need of
defining what a true expeditionary force is all about.
Accordingly, I chose to expand my research and consulted
a number of Navy and Marine Corps sources. Please note that
the Marine Corps sources frequently describe “expeditionary” in
terms of being a state of mind, one that drives the way in which
the Marine Corps organizes, trains, and equips its forces. These
sources also serve to describe “expeditionary” in a number of different ways and provide characteristics that include rapidly deployable, self-sustainable, adaptive to mission requirements, scalable,
and agile. These same sources also frequently provide a comprehensive overview of the types of missions that naval expeditionary forces have recently supported as well as information on the
numbers of Marine Corps forces that have been involved. As we
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
289
well know, these types of operations are continuing today. Below
is a summary of some of the important points from my research:
• Expeditionary Force: “An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.” [1]
• The Navy and Marine Corps describe “expeditionary” as a
state of mind that drives the way their forces are organized,
trained, and equipped. Forces are described as possessive
of a high state of readiness, scalable and agile, self-sustainable, capable of rapid deployment, and able to begin operating immediately upon arrival, even in the most austere
environments. [2]
• During 2010, naval expeditionary forces participated in combat operations in Afghanistan, successfully completed their
mission in Iraq, conducted humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief operations in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines, and
conducted antipiracy missions off the Horn of Africa.
• At the end of 2010 there were approximately 20,700 Marines
in Afghanistan, 6,200 at sea in Marine Expeditionary Units,
and 1,600 engaged in various other missions, operations, and
exercises. An additional 18,000 Marines were also assigned
to garrison locations outside the continental United States.
Figure 1. Marine Corps Operations
290
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Turning now to Marine Corps operations (Figure 1), I am sure
that most of you are aware that the Marines are routinely organized
into Air-Ground Task Forces to meet designated mission requirements and are capable of rapid deployment and employment from
the sea, land, and air. In recent years, Marine expeditionary forces
have been deployed frequently alongside their Navy shipmates.
The list below highlights a number of other key points regarding the Marine Corps:
• Contributions:
–– A versatile “middle-weight” capability to respond across
the range of military operations
–– Inherent crisis response speed and agility buys time for
national leaders
–– An enabling and partnering capability in joint and combined operations
• America’s return on investment:
–– 8.5% of the proposed FY2012 DoD budget
–– 31% of DoD ground operating forces (combat, combat
support, and combat service support)
–– 12% of the DoD’s fixed wing tactical aircraft
–– 19% of the DoD attack helicopters
The Marines are now characterizing themselves as a middleweight force: a force that is much lighter than the U.S. Army yet
possesses considerable combat power. The projected Marine Corps
mission focus as identified by Secretary Robert M. Gates in his
February 2011 speech at West Point clearly requires the continuance of Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities. At the same time,
I think everyone recognizes that the Marine Corps of the future
will be somewhat smaller than today’s Marine Corps. As forces
are withdrawn from Afghanistan, Marine Corps force structure is
almost certain to be reduced. In addition, I have noted the Marine
Corps’ own description of the current and future contributions it
will make to the nation in terms of national security. As indicated,
these capabilities come at what I think is a very reasonable cost.
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
291
In short, the Marine Corps provides the American taxpayer with an
excellent return on investment.
It is this expeditionary combat power that we are going to
focus on this morning because as Marine Corps combat power has
become more lethal, it has also become increasingly dependent
on fossil fuel. Along with the substantial increase in Marine Corps
combat power, the number of tactical vehicles, radios, computers,
and other equipment organic to Marine Corps units has increased
threefold over the past decade. This increase has obviously contributed to increased fuel requirements. Daily Marine Corps fuel
consumption in Afghanistan, for example, is estimated to be in
excess of 200,000 gallons. According to General Jim Amos, the
current Marine Corps Commandant, this dependency on fuel puts
both Marines and expeditionary capabilities at risk.
The photograph in Figure 2 shows a typical fuel convoy in
Afghanistan. This convoy reflects today’s efforts to sustain forces
in the field. In addition to the challenges posed by the terrain and
a fairly limited road network, relying on such convoys in a hostile
threat environment necessitates extensive use of security forces,
forces which become another target for the adversary along with
the fuel and supplies that are being protected.
Figure 2. Energy Challenges
292
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
So what is the Marine Corps doing about it? As you will soon
learn, the Marines are currently working hard to reduce both the
size and the amount of equipment that they use as well as the
energy demands associated with that equipment. When implemented, these changes will reduce the demand for fuel and thus
there will be fewer fuel convoys and fewer personnel in harm’s
way. I will leave it to my roundtable colleagues to describe the
important initiatives that are underway.
REFERENCES
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2010,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
2. General James F. Amos, The 2011 Posture of the United States
Marine Corps, 2011, http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/MCBQ
PAO Press Releases/CMC 2011 Posture Statement-bm.pdf.
293
Colonel Robert Charette, Jr.
Colonel Ted Smyth’s introduction proves that I am not an
expert in energy but only an expert in burning energy. It is an
honor to be here. This was one of the first forums I addressed
Colonel Robert Charette, Jr., enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves in
1985. He then attended Officer Candidate School and was commissioned in 1986. He has a B.S. degree in chemistry from Delaware Valley
College, a master of business administration degree from the University
of Phoenix, and a master of national security strategy degree from the
National War College. He has attended numerous major professional
schools. He has served as the VMFA-235 Embarkation and Pilot Training
Officer, Third Battalion/Third Marines Air Officer and Operations
Officer, VMFA-312 Admin Officer and Pilot Training Officer, VMFA451 Aircraft Maintenance Officer and Operations Officer, Marine
Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 FA-18 Instructor, Director
of Safety and Standardization, Tactical Aircraft Department Head, I
Marine Expeditionary Force G-5 CENTCOM Planner, Task Force-58
Air Officer, VMFA-314 Executive Officer, VMFA-323 Commanding
Officer, Marine Aircraft Group-11 Operations Officer, Joint Staff J8,
Chief Joint Requirements Oversight Council Secretariat, and the USMC
Representative to the Joint Chief of Staff Working Group. He is currently
Director, Expeditionary Energy Office. Colonel Charette participated
directly in the following combat operations: Operation Desert Storm,
Operation Southern Watch, Operation Deliberate Force, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. His personal decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two gold
stars, Air Medal with combat distinguishing device, Air Medal Strike/
Flight Award numeral six, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation
Medal with combat distinguishing device and two gold stars, Navy and
Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and seven Sea Service Deployment
ribbons. He has earned “Top Ten” honors with Carrier Air Wing 8 and
Carrier Air Wing 9. He was awarded the 1996 Alfred A. Cunningham
Award for being selected as the Marine Corps’ Aviator of the Year.
294
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
last year after getting my orders pulled to go to Miramar and fly
again. So this reminds me of last year’s horrible experience. But I
will tell you, it has been a fascinating journey; it has really been
about watching and helping develop cultural change in the Marine
Corps. Commandant James Conway started the process a year
ago, and Commandant James Amos has put the pedal to the metal
and has continued it. It has been fascinating to watch what the
Commandant’s leadership can do.
So what did the Commandant do? How did we get here? Several
years ago, Commandant Conway, working with General Amos, at
the time the Director of Combat Development and Integration down
in Quantico, conducted the Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025
Study. They looked at the war after the next war, how we need
to be positioned for it, and how it will be affected by resource
constraints around the world. They considered the fact that a lot
of people live near the world’s oceans and the fact that a lot of
people live in urban areas. The next war could well be over oil or
it could be over water. The world is changing rapidly. Populations
in Europe and Japan are decreasing, while those in Asia and Africa
are increasing dramatically. The price of oil has once more begun
to rise as you can see on the left-hand side of Figure 1.
Figure 1. Rising Energy Demand: Increasing Fiscal
and Combat Risks
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
295
If we have learned just one thing from the last 10 years of
combat, it is that if one man can build it, another man can destroy
it. You do not need a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
if you are not on the road. The impact of that, however, is that
you cannot require fuel or water. So, that is the issue that the
Commandant was looking at. There is an obvious danger in putting a fiscal concern next to a mortal combat concern; they are not
the same. Obviously, the reason we are attacking this problem is
to reduce the risks incurred by our Marines. However, the fiscal
issue is also important. You can see that fuel prices spiked between
2000 and 2001. Congress passed an emergency supplemental
during that timeframe that authorized $1.56 billion to account for
the cost of fuel. The operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts
in the Marine Corps and the other services had been totally disrupted. If we did not do something about that rise, the Marines
would not have been able to train. When we lose money in our
O&M accounts, we can have Marines at risk because they cannot
complete the required training. So we have to address the fiscal
issue head on.
The bottom line is we cannot afford to do business as usual. It
is not in our best interest fiscally, and it is definitely not in our best
interest combat wise; that is what got us going. As a follow-up to
Strategic Vision 2025, the Commandant set up my office and put
this great team together over the last year.
When you take a look at it in real terms, the Marine Corps is
burning over 200,000 gallons of fuel per day (Figure 2). The price
per gallon that we pay in the Helmand Province is $7 even. We do
not pay the Defense Logistics Agency price of $2.80 in Afghanistan;
we pay the NATO price of $7.05. What does that come down to?
Well, it adds up to $1.4 million per day, or a little over $500 million
per year. Right now it costs about a billion dollars to operate the
Marine Corps for a year in Afghanistan. That is half of the Marine
Corps’ entire annual procurement budget; so that is significant.
Then you take a look on the right side of Figure 2. We have been
running about 5 million barrels a year. Most of that is consumed by
aviation, and as you have already heard, the Navy is working on
296
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
that challenge. There are things we can do in training and simulation that we are looking into.
Figure 2. Marine Corps (USMC) Energy Use
What we are really getting after though are the things that we
can affect today on the battlefield. One of the principal components of Marine Corps battlefield energy consumption is batteries.
The Marine Corps spends $22 million a year just on batteries, and
a large share of those batteries power our radios. We do not need
to get into the jammers that Marines carry, or the sights or night
vision goggles.
Let us just take a look at the number of radios in a Marine infantry company, like the one depicted in Figure 3. Prior to September
11, 2001, each of our infantry companies had a couple of radios,
which required a total of about 160 watts of power. At that time,
the total weight of the batteries required for a 3-day company-level
patrol amounted to 122 pounds, and it only cost us about $4000.
Today in Afghanistan, some 10 years later, that same company
requires about 1255 watts of power because now every Marine
has a radio. The batteries to provide that power weigh 586 pounds
and cost $117,000. We just cannot afford to do business like this.
We are going to price ourselves out of the warfighting business.
General Joseph Dunford, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
297
Corps, has told us that we are out of money. We have got to start
thinking.
Figure 3. The Company Pre-2001 versus The Company Today
So General Amos has raised the bar in his latest planning guidance. He told us to do something about our energy consumption.
Fortunately, we have had an 8-month head start. The Expeditionary
Energy Strategy provides a baseline for our current energy use on
the battlefield. [2] While the Marines are frequently deployed in
different places around the world, we also spend a lot of our time
at home, which means that Marines have to train and think at home
so they are prepared to do the things they need to do when they
get to the battlefield.
Prior to the 1990s—and I joined the Marine Corps in the mid1980s—the Marines were very much a resource-limited force.
When we landed an F/A-18, we called the radio room to find out
how many flight hours we should log because we were concerned
about fuel use. When we went to the fueling pits, we had shut
down our left motor—the right motor was connected to all the
important hydraulics—because we were worried about burning
gas on the ground. When a Marine woke up in the morning on
a patrol, he had two canteens and a couple of iodine tablets. You
made do with what you had, but over the last 20 years, we have
become resource spoiled. We now drink only bottled water on the
298
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
battlefield; Marines do not carry canteens anymore. They expect
to have bottled water.
I was a battalion operations officer (OPSO) some years ago. As
penance for flying too much, they gave me an OPSO tour. I started
as a forward air controller and then they made me the battalion
OPSO. We went to Lowe’s and bought a little Honda generator
because we did not have a generator at the battalion headquarters. We ran it all night to power our stuff so we were not wasting
money on batteries. If you go to Helmand Province today, you will
find that there are generators everywhere. We have Marines starting up 60-kilowatt generators to charge their iPods. By the way,
those kids have guns, so I am not going to say anything to them,
but they need maybe a couple microwatts. We have gotten completely spoiled over the last 10 or 20 years because post-Desert
Storm, we stopped thinking about our fuel bill. We stopped thinking on the battlefield about water because water was always going
to be there. Our logisticians have done heroic work supplying a
battlefield where consumption is out of control.
Figure 4. 35th CMC’s Planning Guidance [2, 3]
We have to turn the corner. Fast, lethal, austere—those are the
attributes of expeditionary operations. The infantry company that
goes out today is magnitudes more lethal than an infantry company was in 2001. We have learned a lot. While we are definitely
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
299
more lethal, we still have to be able to fit back on ship. We have to
be able to get back to our austerity and our speed. We have probably lost some of that, and so what we are figuring out right now in
working with the Marine Corps Systems Command and the Office
of Naval Research (ONR) is how we lighten our load and how we
power that load in a smart way that is less costly. We have to think
ourselves out of this. We are not going to be able to pay our way
out of it.
The triangle on the right-hand side of Figure 4 shows how we
are going to compress ourselves back to the center. One of our
goals is to end up getting some of our energy from renewable
sources. As you will see shortly, we are well along the way to
doing that. We are also going to increase the efficiency of our current gear as we reset and recapitalize. Then we have to make sure
that our requirements documents capture that and move forward
so when our requirements community sends a document to the
Marine Corps Systems Command, it includes energy efficiency Key
Performance Parameters (KPPs). I would actually like those KPPs to
be designated energy performance KPPs, but we have not made
that change yet; but I am floating that idea. More importantly, the
anchors for our whole approach are leadership and training. We
have to have Marines thinking about resource constraints. We need
our Marine Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels and some of the old
guys to think hard about this.
Colonel Eric Smith, a friend of mine, just took over RTC-8
in Northern Helmand Province. He is working very hard to get
his Marines off bottled water by the end of the year. They get it,
and thanks to our leadership it is starting to echo throughout the
Corps. Earlier this week, we sent a Marine out to Twentynine Palms
to show an infantry battalion how to use one of the small solar
blankets we have given them. Forty Marines and their Lieutenant
Colonel sat through that training session. It is starting to spark; that
ethos is going to be our biggest driver, and it does not cost us a lot
of money.
Today in Helmand Province we are burning about 8 gallons of
fuel per Marine per day. In Vietnam I think we were using about
a gallon or so per Marine per day. Moreover, we are projected to
300
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
continue this climb. The equipment we are buying is heavier, and
it is more power dependent. Still, we have to turn the corner. Our
plan calls for us to reduce the fuel required by that same force that
is in Helmand Province by half by the year 2025. The only fuel
that will be on that battlefield is that needed by mobility systems.
Generators are going to disappear. We are going to have more
power-efficient equipment. We are going to have Marines that
think differently about their resources. We are going to harvest as
much solar energy as we can. We are going to store it using some
technologies we do not know about today, and we are going to use
our vehicles in ways that we are not even thinking about. We are
going to harvest energy from our vehicles, whether it is heat energy
or kinetic energy. Our vehicles will micro grid and will become
backup power sources.
Figure 5. Strategy and Timeline
Our strategy has been signed out (Figure 5). What is different
about it is that we have backed it up with an official requirements
document, which identifies 112 specific energy-efficiency-related
shortfalls. We believe that that requirements document is the intellectual foundation for getting us where we want to go. It will inform
both the acquisitions community and the training community. We
have also stood up a new power-and-energy (P&E) future naval
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
301
capability (FNC); so we now have our own tier in the FNC process.
That FNC will guide the work that is going on at ONR, with the
other services, with the agencies, and with the labs. By having a
strategy that flows through a requirements document, everyone
will be able to understand what the end state is for the warfighter
and see the linkages. We also hope that this approach will improve
our ability to successfully transition programs from the research
and development and science and technology worlds. We recognize, of course, that such programs involve risk, but we want to see
if we can improve the transition rate. We believe that our requirements document will help us do that.
We have also asked our operational analysis division at
Quantico to build a methodology so we can figure out if making
these investments makes sense. We believe they do, but we want
to back it up with rigor.
Figure 6. Expeditionary Energy Goals Breakdown
Figure 6 shows the breakdown of that 50%. Figure 6 does not
appear in our strategy, because we do not want anybody in the
system gaming it. I do not want anyone to say that we can just get
our 25% from the ethos change and that we do not need to build
new solar panels. So, I am sharing it with you in confidence.
The point is that when we wrote the strategy we invited individuals from academia and the venture capital community to come
in and provide a red team review. Based on their feedback, we
302
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
ended up with the numbers I have shown above. We believe they
are reasonable. We believe they are executable. When we briefed
the Commandant on our strategy, he said that he wanted it faster. I
said, “Sir, right now we have over 112 things we have to get closed
before we can get there, and that is going to cost a significant
amount of money. We are going to get there, and we are dedicated
to doing it, but it is going to take time.”
So let me switch gears from the strategic level where we have
been focused down to the tactical level. Obviously our most
important thing is to protect the Marines who are in harm’s way.
A year ago, Colonel David Karcher, Mr. Cody Reese, and I were
in the field down at Quantico trying to figure out what we were
doing with our Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB). At
the time, our charter was to develop and deploy an 80% solution
vice spending several years working on the 100% solution. So, in
January 2010, we went out to industry with a request for information (RFI) and asked for their best technologies in solar, water, and
efficient shelter design. We ended up looking at products from
over 200 different companies.
Figure 7. The Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy
Network (GREEN) System and the SPACES System
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
303
We invited 16 of those companies to bring their products to
Quantico, and we ended up buying about six of them. Figure 7
shows two of them. The solar panels that appear in front of
these Marines make up what is called the Ground Renewable
Expeditionary Energy Network (GREEN) System. On the wall is the
SPACES system that we have been working on since 1996.
Following our first two ExFOBs, we approached India Company
of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (3/5). In September
2010, they went into the Sangin Valley in Afghanistan’s Helmand
Province—one of the hardest combat areas in modern history. We
sent these solutions in with them. When we first approached them
in June 2010, they wanted nothing to do with this gear. I begged
them to take it. I told them that if they did not, I would be fired
and that I really need this job because the economy’s not good. So,
they somehow found it in their hearts to train with these systems
and carry them into combat. When they came back, they provided
feedback on how they had used these items. In the process they
told us things that we had not even thought about. As a result,
we are now accelerating our effort to bring them to the rest of the
Marine Corps.
They are getting prepared to come home. We hope to have a
couple of their folks come to Washington and talk about what they
did in their own words. We are particularly interested in learning about their combat operations because they went into a tough
area, and we hope to talk a little bit about how they used the
energy efficiency systems we gave them.
So what is the ExFOB team? It is organized under Lieutenant
General George Flynn, the Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration. The team includes the Marine
Corps War Fighting Laboratory (MCWL), the ONR, the Marine
Corps Systems Command, our Training and Education Command
(TECOM), the Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD) from
the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and finally my
Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O). We meet weekly; our Executive
Board meets every quarter, and we run ExFOB annually. Our next
one will be held August 11–19 at Twentynine Palms.
304
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
The neat thing about this is we never intended for it to turn
out this way. It was one of those things where you just rush to
the field to get things to the front because we were told to do so.
When the Commandant gets interested in something, we get rather
fascinated, and so we ran to the field and did this. Along the way,
we found that it became a process. The things we learned helped
inform our requirements. We also started investing differently, and
when we did our Program Objective Memorandum (POM) drill,
we started changing investments around based on what we could
get from industry and what we thought was possible. At the end of
the day, we gained confidence that some of the stuff can actually
work, and we built confidence in our young Marines by getting
this new technology out to them. When I was in college if you
talked about environmental stuff, you got beat up by guys like me,
but today when you talk about environmental stuff with young
Marines, they are all over it. Their school systems are apparently
different than mine; they embrace this technology. So while it was
confidence building with us old guys, the youngsters got it right
away and ran with it.
Figure 8. ExFOB Process
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
305
Figure 8 will just give you an idea of the scope of our efforts
to date. We did Phases 1 and 2 at Quantico and in the process
evaluated the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) options. Phase 3
was accomplished during the deployment of India 3/5. We conducted Phase 4 last August at Twentynine Palms; we are in the
process of purchasing the solution concepts identified there right
now. Colonel Karcher and his folks are doing tremendous work
coordinating that. If those systems pass the evaluation that we have
planned for this coming May at Twentynine Palms, we will take
them to Afghanistan this summer.
Now we are really amping up the ante. We are looking at getting a battalion-level Combat Operations Center (COC) off the net
entirely if possible or, at the very least, saving a significant amount
of fuel. When we conduct ExFOB 2011 this summer, we are going
to look at concentrated solar power, and we are going to look at
stationary vehicle exportable power. We are really trying to wrap
our minds around how we can make our vehicles better. The RFI
for bringing solution options to ExFOB 2011 closes at the end of
April. The neat thing about ExFOB 2011 is that we have partnered
very closely with the Army to do the evaluation. We really want to
make sure that we share everything we are doing.
Let us get into specific solutions from ExFOB, and the reason
I want to bring this up is because I think it is fascinating. Figure 9
shows the SPACES system; it is a small solar blanket that you can
roll up in your pack. It comes with an inverter that you can use
to charge up a couple of batteries while you keep marching on
patrol. The system was first tested by the Marine Corps in 1996.
The requirements document was not written for it until 2004. It
did not deploy to the field until 2010. At that point, it went viral.
We have no more on the shelf. India 3/5 got it in their hands last
October; they were the only battalion we asked to use this. We
never mentioned it to the other nine infantry battalions or the
Marine Expeditionary Units. The word went out virally. It went
from Marine to Marine; we never advertised this. We were a little
hesitant because we did not know how it was going with 3/5. Now,
thanks to word-of-mouth advertising, we have no more left. We
306
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
are trying to get an additional $9 million to buy some more; hopefully we will get them soon.
Figure 9. Fleet Demand for Renewable Energy Increasing
The success of this system was demonstrated effectively
during one of the unit’s 3-week patrols. The platoon commander
was very skeptical when we first gave him this gear. By accident,
the Marines filmed a video following the patrol that has provided
excellent advertis­ing for the system; we had nothing to do with it.
The platoon commander told Combat Camera that his patrol used
no batteries whatsoever during the entire 3-week duration of their
patrol. Instead, they used the SPACES blan­ket. Normally, batteries
for an infantry patrol have to be resupplied every 2 to 3 days. So,
doing without that resupply is significant. It increased the patrol’s
operational reach. They were less at risk, and they were able to
operate all their systems on the move. There is a link on our website at Marines.mil. A couple of videos are posted there, including
the one with the platoon commander’s comments.
There are some limits to this system. Amorphous silicon does
not do well in clouds and rain. We sent it to the Philippines recently
to test it. It did okay when the sun was shining, but it did not do
well in clouds and rain. We have provided three systems to the
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
307
Naval Research Lab so they can tell us how to make it better. We
know this has applicability, but we need to make it better.
Shown in Figure 10 is the complete set of capabilities that we
provided to 3/5. I have talked about the GREEN System. The zerobased system was a commercial-off-the-shelf product we bought
from Raytheon; it has done really well. The LED lights have done
well; the Marines love them because it is really easy to go to blackout mode when necessary.
Figure 10. ExFOB Capabilities Deployed with India Company
3/5 in September 2010
We also tested the solar shade and the solar light poles. We
found that one of the issues with the solar shade on a forward operating base (FOB) is that the silicon is woven into the top. To keep it
clean you have to send Marines up there once in a while. They had
to get in full battle rattle and were sniper targets, so we withdrew
it back to Camp Leatherneck, our major base in Afghanistan. We
are not really sure what we are going to do with the solar shade
idea; we are working our way through that. The solar light poles
worked out okay, but the Marines on the forward edge did not like
them because they obviously helped the enemy target the Marine
position. So, we moved them back to Camp Leatherneck too. They
may ultimately have some applicability.
308
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
The Marines set up two patrol bases that operated exclusively
on renewable energy. I was a little concerned when I heard that
because by then the gear had been out there for a while. Some
of it was commercial off the shelf, and some of it was homemade
stuff. When we tried to get it back a couple weeks ago, I asked
my liaison officer in Helmand to bring it back, and he said: “Sir,
3/5 will not give it back. All they have is renewable energy.” I
was really concerned that they were using gear full time that we
had not fully developed. So, we have some generators moving out
there to back it up. But, they have really become dependent on
renewable energy.
The Phase 4 options that are going to be deployed to Afghanistan
this summer are shown in Figure 11. We have direct current (DC)powered air conditioners and DC-powered refrigeration. We think
we are going to make large cuts in the load at the company level,
and we are adding the liners and the lights.
Figure 11. ExFOB Phase 4 Follow-On Deployment for
Summer 2011
So it is clear that our multifunctional team can move out quickly
when we work together. The key is our written requirements documents. We did not just talk about it as a science experiment.
We put our money where our mouth was. We have increased our
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
309
funding for these systems by over 67% from the President’s Budget
for FY2011 to the President’s Budget for FY2012 and have the flexibility to get the right stuff in Marines’ hands.
Figure 12. Key Technology Focus Areas
This is what we are doing on the science and technology side
(Figure 12).
Figure 13. Changing Ethos
310
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Beyond just buying better toys, we are working hard to get
energy efficiency into the Marine Corps ethos (Figure 13). Toward
that end, we have just added a liaison officer in our shop who works
with the Marines Training and Education Command; I believe that
organization is one of the keys to our success. If we train our young
leaders, and if we train our young Marines, the rest of it will take
care of itself.
Figure 14. Nawa Renewable Energy Project:
Providing Opportunities
As my final point, I think it is important to note that we have
not just been thinking about ourselves in this. We are also thinking about the local Afghanis; we have looked at a lot of different approaches for helping them. To be sure, not everything has
worked. We could not get the Afghanis interested in biofuels, for
example. While they do not have a lot of clean water or good food,
they do have a lot of cell phones. When we went to their markets
to see how we might help, we found out that they are very familiar with solar power; they use it to charge their cell phones. So,
after a 6-month negotiation, we started a renewable solar-energy
project that is under construction right now. Interestingly, there is
a Nawa renewable energy company in Kabul, Afghanistan. We
asked them to come out to Helmand and meet with the local shura
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
311
in Nawa. So now, we have an Afghan energy company helping
local Afghans (Figure 14).
When it is completed, we will be providing renewable energy
in a distributed environment; we will be helping the local Afghanis
in the same manner that we are helping our Marines. The costs for
transporting fuel and building infrastructure are simply too high for
the local Afghanis. This approach will allow them to avoid those
expenses. We really believe this has a lot of opportunity throughout Helmand Province.
REFERENCES
1. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025,
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/
Vision%20Strat%20lo%20res.pdf.
2. The Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, United States
Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation
Plan—Bases-to-Battlefield, http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/
cmc/Documents/USMC Expeditionary Energy Strategy.pdf.
3. Department of the Navy, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 2010, http://www.marines.
mil/unit/hqmc/cmc/Documents/CMC 35 Planning Guidance
FINAL.pdf.
312
Colonel David Karcher
As Colonel Robert Charette, Jr., noted, the Commandant has
said go faster and gain and maintain momentum. You have seen
some of the things that we have done. But, it is with your help that
we are going to gain and maintain the momentum that we need
Colonel David Karcher recently retired after more than 31 years as a
United States Marine. A U.S. Naval Academy graduate, he served in
various command, staff, and instructor positions across the Marine
Corps. Primarily a field artilleryman, with secondary specialties in
acquisition and joint operations, he deployed to operations including
Urgent Fury in Grenada, security operations and humanitarian evacuations in Lebanon, Sharp Edge evacuation operations in Liberia, Desert
Shield/Desert Storm in Kuwait, United Nations Operation in Somalia II
(UNOSOM II) with Joint Task Force Somalia, Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) in Iraq, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.
His acquisition tours included acquisition of command and control systems (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, Tactical Combat
Operations system, Intelligence Operations Workstation, and Global
Command and Control System) and tactical software (Command
and Control Personal Computer) and serving as Director of the DoD
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program and Chief of Staff of the Marine
Corps’ Acquisition Command. Colonel Karcher retired in December
2009. He returned to government service in 2010 and is currently the
Director, Energy and C-IED Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command
in Quantico, Virginia. Colonel Karcher graduated from the U.S. Naval
Academy with a B.S. in engineering, holds a master’s degree in business
from Oklahoma City University, and earned a master of science degree
from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is a graduate of the
Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and General Staff College,
the Armed Forces Staff College, the Defense Systems Management
College, the Defense Acquisition University, and the National Defense
University. He is a Lean Six Sigma Black Belt and is Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act Level III certified in program management.
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
313
to reach the goals we have set for the future. Colonel Charette did
a nice job of laying out our strategy. How are we going to put this
into action? How are we going to have long-term enduring solutions that the Marines and the other services can use? I will show
you some of the challenges that we have; those faced by the Army
are very similar.
The Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC), where I work,
provides support to both the acquisition community and the
requirements community. One of the things we have done to gain
and maintain momentum is to put a multifunction team together. It
has worked very well. That team is addressing the capabilities that
we want to have in the Marine Corps given our limited resources.
While some of our challenges are the same as those for the other
services, some are different. Thus, we have to get the requirements
right. The bullet points below provide some background:
• MCSC provides long-term material solutions
• We meet the requirements
• We provide life cycle support
• The warfighter must be, and is, an integral part of process
• Materiel solutions must be integrated into the larger
Expeditionary Energy Strategy
Earlier, Colonel Ted Smyth took a shot at defining the term
“expeditionary” from the Marine Corps perspective. I want to
expand that a bit by looking at “expeditionary” from the energy
perspective. In my view, it is a mindset, but it is also more than
that. We have to be able to go at any time to any place, and we
have to win the battles that the country calls on us to fight. So, the
first thing that comes to mind when I hear the word “expeditionary” is that whatever piece of gear that Marine takes with him has
to work exactly as he expects it to the first time he uses it and every
time thereafter.
Obviously, we have to make trades when we consider energy
efficiencies. We have to be very careful when we make those
trades because our material solutions still have to provide desired
314
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
capabilities. Thus, we have a bit of a challenge, particularly on the
engineering side. Our systems have to be rugged, and they have to
work. We have to be able to train on them and be able to do so in
a way that does not add to the existing training burden. Then, we
have to be able to use them. They have to work. They have to fit
into our mission profiles. When necessary, we have to be able to
repair them or get parts for them.
In some ways, the energy efficiency community is fairly new.
While many things have been going on for years, a lot of the
interesting work is still being done by small companies with great
ideas. Managing the supply chain and providing long-term support are not necessarily their strong suit; so, we have to work our
way through that. When we build something, we want it to be as
lightweight as possible. We want it to be agile. And we have to
be able to test and prove that it works, and we have to do all this
preferably by this afternoon, and if not, by tomorrow morning. In
short, it has to be worth taking to “every clime and place.” It has
to be useful to our individual Marines and to their units. It has to
make them better in combat and also in secondary missions such
as those providing humanitarian assistance. It also has to operate
in a Marine Air-Ground Task Force organization (transportability,
training, mission profile, supply chain, weight/space, testing, etc.).
So, we have to be prepared to do all those things, but when it gets
aboard that ship or aboard that aircraft, we have to make very
tough choices. We already have too much of what we sometimes
refer to as GLOP—gear left on pier—because it does not fit aboard
our ships. So whatever equipment or renewable sources we use to
improve energy efficiency have to be worth that prioritization.
So what are we trying to do? To meet these requirements, we
want to do a couple of different things. We want to reduce our
energy consumption for the equipment we already have across
the board (vehicles, aircraft, radios, generators, computers, mobile
command posts, night vision devices, etc.). It is always a challenge
to re-buy or reset, and it is not particularly unusual to have a pilot
or a truck or tank driver who is younger than the equipment he is
using. In some cases, his father may have used the same equipment before him. We want our gear to last for a long time. Given
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
315
our resources, we have to be able to make it last for a long time.
Unfortunately in many cases, when the original program manager
made his design trades, gas was less than $1 a gallon. Fuel efficiency was not that important. Now it is. We seek to supply energy
more efficiently and to supply it in part from renewable sources.
One of the first things we need is the expertise found in this
room and in other rooms like it to make improvements in the gear
we have. In some cases, the production lines are long closed. So,
how do we insert new technology? How do we do it gracefully,
smartly, inexpensively, and without taking everything we have
down? We will still need to be able to use the equipment, or at
least some portion of it, while we refit. We are looking at all our
equipment from top to bottom and from left to right as you can see
in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Recently Deployed Power and Energy Systems
We have seen dramatic proof of the increase in the number of
batteries used by a rifle company. We need to make a difference
not only at company level but at squad level and for the individual
Marine. If we can make that company 10% more efficient, they
can go that much longer without resupply, that much farther, or
operate that much more efficiently. At the same time, we have to
316
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
get a good return on our investment, so we have to take both capability and cost into account.
We also have to change behavior. It is not just training; it is
mindset. Something that makes us more efficient is not any good
if we do not actually use it. We seek to combine efficient behavior
and equipment. How are we going to do this? Well, Marines get it.
Our young Marines clearly understand power consumption if only
from the necessity of recharging their personal electronics. They
do not always know what it costs, so we have to continue to meter
up and show them the energy costs for the equipment that they are
using. The Commandant has clearly said that we need to go faster.
So we are getting very good acceptance. But that acceptance is
based on the belief that what they get will work every time and it
will make them better in combat. So far, what we have delivered
in admittedly small amounts has met those requirements. Now,
how do we transition that across the Marine Corps? We certainly
look for your help in making reliable deliverables of the appropriate material solutions.
So far, some things seem to be doing particularly well. I will not
necessarily say that solar is better than any other renewable, but
for the environments in which we expect to operate, and certainly
in Afghanistan and Iraq, solar is pretty reliable. We can make it
reasonably rugged, and it has a fairly good return. Geothermal and
hydro are not quite as dependable in all the geographical locations
that Marines can expect to visit. Moreover, solar is a technology
that is fairly well understood at least in some installations.
So, the question is how do we take that and have the high
efficiencies and low weight that a small Marine unit can use? As
a simple example, almost every Marine has a flashlight. If we
just made a difference in flashlights between weight and power
it would be a significant difference. Getting to the right kind of
rechargeable batteries and getting to a more unified approach just
on flashlights will make a big difference. There are lots of opportunities for improving technology across all our equipment, and solar
has been a big help.
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
317
While industry is doing a good job making our IT equipment
more energy efficient, there are some things that do not work as
well. Tactical units—infantry, armor, and artillery—have to be able
to pick up and move their gear on short notice, and they have to
be able to operate as part of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force and
more likely than not in some remote location. They may be able
to connect their equipment, say a radar, to the power grid, or they
may have to connect it to its own power supply. When you have to
move often, and on short notice, renewable energy sources do not
always enable rapid movement or provide the high energy densities that they need. Thus, in the short term, although we want to
get out of the generator business, it is a technology we understand.
We want to have energy sources, preferably as dense as
possible, that can come and go with our units and plug into the
commercial power grid when it is available. We need to be both
efficient and effective. In the case of some of our tactical units, it is
a real challenge to fit energy efficiency into their environment. We
want our tanks to be as lethal as possible and to be able to move
their 70-ton weight as rapidly as possible. Energy efficiency was
not important when we first partnered with the Army on the M-1
tank. We have since put an auxiliary power unit (APU) on it so we
do not have to run the tank main engine quite as much. The weight
penalty was small, and we do save some fuel, so this modification
has had a good outcome. That has not been true for everything.
So, we are still looking for technologies that will provide energy
efficiencies for the equipment used by our tactical units.
Now let us look at what we are focused on for this coming year
and what are we looking for in the long term. As Colonel Charette
indicated, this is the year of the vehicle. A lot of our battlefield fuel
is used by our vehicle fleet. As we have added vehicles and as they
have gotten heavier in response to the improvised explosive device
threat, our fuel use has increased further. My sons are 23 and 25.
They are starting to learn exactly what it costs them to fill their car
at the pump and that driving efficiently with a lighter foot on the
pedal is a good thing. We want to put more effort into training our
young Marine drivers to do the same thing. We want to provide
318
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
feedback within our tactical vehicles that shows the driver how the
way they are driving is affecting the vehicle’s efficiency.
To some extent, industry has led the way in efficiency
improvements. However, we are not always able to use some
of the advances they have made. Consider, for example, something as simple as low-rolling-resistance tires. Michelin sells them
for commercial vehicles, but they are not made for the types of
tires that we use on our large trucks. So, we are partnering with
Michelin to see what can be done. In other cases, industry is not
yet looking at the technology that we want to use. What is called
on-board power generation is an example. Today’s military truck
has enhanced vision devices for the driver, radios, and a host of
other electronics to include, in some cases, cameras and jammers.
We are looking at providing a more efficient bus inside that vehicle
so it can use its electricity better and can in fact produce more of
it. We have actually just about reached the physical size limit of
alternators to generate power on board a vehicle. So, we are asking
what can we do to make our vehicles more energy efficient?
We are very interested in what is called concentrated solar.
How can we obtain greater energy density? We also want to establish relationships and partnerships with the other organizations that
are working on energy efficiency. We want to know what they are
doing and, where possible, whether there is some sort of leveraging or trade-off that can occur. We think such collaborative efforts
will help us move from the short term where we have seen success
to the long term. We are interested in meeting with anyone who
may have a path to success. By all means, please let us know.
319
Mr. Cody Reese
First off, you might notice that unlike my panel colleagues, I am
not a Marine colonel nor do I expect to be one anytime soon. But I
definitely appreciate the work they are doing. The first commanding
Mr. Cody Reese graduated from the University of California, Berkeley
with a B.S. in mechanical engineering in 2002. Upon graduation, he
served at the Naval Facilities Expeditionary Logistics Center under the
Professional Development Center intern program. Following the receipt
of his California Professional Engineer license in 2005, Mr. Reese took
a position in the Amphibious and Expeditionary Systems Department
at the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NAVFAC ESC). At
the Engineering Service Center, he has worked on projects ranging
from autonomous crane systems for cargo transfer in high sea states
to expedient airfield damage repair equipment. In 2009, Mr. Reese
accepted his current position at NAVFAC ESC as Technical Direction
Agent (TDA) for the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Code 30 Logistics
Thrust. As TDA, Mr. Reese assists the ONR Logistics Thrust Program
Manager with the development and execution of the logistics science
and technology (S&T) program. Mr. Reese leads a team of subjectmatter experts who have a broad range of knowledge and experience
in diverse expeditionary logistics disciplines including the following:
expeditionary energy and power, autonomic logistics, water purification and distribution, logistics sustainment support for small-unit
distributed operations, and sea-based logistics. The end users of the
technologies include the Marine Corps and the Naval Expeditionary
Forces. Mr. Reese is highly involved in concomitant duties in support
of the command and the engineering profession. For the past 6 years
he has served as senior staff for the Society of American Military
Engineers, Seabee Engineering and Construction Camp. He has served
for the past 4 years as the command’s Combined Federal Campaign
chair and as a member of the command’s lauded recreation committee. He was recently inducted as a cadre member into the NAVFAC
2011 Leadership Development Program.
320
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
officer I served under at the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC) Engineering Service Center was Navy Captain Mark
Samuels. He was an excellent public speaker; at the beginning of a
presentation he would always tell a poor joke that would enhance
his presentation. So, I am going to try that technique today and see
how it works. I will tell one related to energy and climate change.
What do you call a fish with no eyes? A fsh. See? Lame.
As Colonel Ted Smyth said, I work for the NAVFAC Engineering
Service Center. While the Center is doing fantastic things for Naval
facilities engineering across the board, I have been assigned full
time to support the Office of Naval Research (ONR). Basically, I
get to go all kinds of good places. I have the coolest job in the
room, and I think you will agree with me at the end of this. I
am basically a science and technology scout for ONR Code 30
Logistics Thrust. ONR 30 is the Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
and Combating Terrorism Science and Technology Department,
and as such it is focused on the expeditionary Navy and Marine
Corps, the guys with boots on the ground. Within that, there are
different technology thrusts: maneuver, fires, C4ISR (Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance). I support logistics, which is everything else
to include energy, water purification, asset transport, and infrastructure. This year, in the logistics thrust area we are managing
over 25 efforts focused on improving expeditionary logistics. In
the remainder of my talk, I am going to delve into some of the cool
technologies that we are looking at.
As my panel colleagues have said, there are several different
ways to reduce energy demand. To start with, there are behavioral
initiatives, which I am not going to go into. The Marine Corps ethos
is driving that pretty hard, and I think that is going to have a huge
impact. Then there are technological options. There are specific
device improvements that have a direct energy benefit, and there
are those where the effect is indirect. A lot has been said about
vehicles and convoys. I am not going to talk about specific vehicle improvements, although rest assured, ONR’s maneuver thrust
has that covered. They are working heavily on Medium Tactical
Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) fuel efficiency and hybrid vehicles.
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
321
The bottom line is that nearly every research and development
effort in the logistics thrust reduces Marine Corps energy demand
in one way or another.
That being said, I get to basically present whatever I want out
of the logistics portfolio, so naturally I will choose my favorites. I
am going to start with power and then move on to water and cargo
delivery. I am going to focus mainly on technologies at the applied
level. We definitely support the basic research that supports these
applied-level things, but it is not quite as easy to see the actual
benefit that a carbon nanofoam is going to have on MTVR energy
reduction. So, I will focus on those that have obvious applications.
Let us start with a hybrid power source with a high energy
density (Figure 1). This is basically the union of an alter-capacitor
and a lithium-ion battery in one box. It has the same form factor as
a BA-5590. It has the potential to double the specific energy of that
battery. So basically you have a battery that has twice the power
of the one that you now have. The indirect energy benefit is that
you now have to bring fewer batteries to the fight. Batteries are
heavy, and hauling them around the theater takes a lot of fuel. In
addition, with fewer batteries we can reduce battery manufacturing and disposal. Although the manufacturing is not quite a Marine
direct cost, disposal certainly is.
Figure 1. Hybrid Power Source with High Energy Density
322
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Now let us look at power management for military radios. We
are basically adapting a power management integrated circuit that
is found in a lot of commercial laptops, cell phones, and those types
of things. It functions through selective power control to individual
circuits in the radio with no adverse performance effects. Basically
it just shuts down subsystems that are idle and consuming power
within a specific device. It has the potential to reduce the power
consumption of that device by 30%. With that, a radio squad can
reduce its battery requirements for a 4-day mission by 12 pounds,
which again leads to fewer batteries transported around theater
and reduced manufacturing and disposal.
Figure 2. Harvesting Electric Power from Walking
My next concept is a device that harvests electric power from
walking (Figure 2). This has been tried a couple of different ways
before; our approach uses a backpack that effectively oscillates up
and down as you walk. Depending on the load you are carrying
and the speed at which you are moving, you can generate anywhere between 8 and 45 watts—a significant electrical output. As
a secondary benefit, the backpack reduces load-related forces that
cause musculoskeletal injury. I have run around with one of these
on my back; it is actually pretty amazing. So obviously the direct
energy benefit is that the Marine self-supplies his electrical needs.
The indirect energy benefits are the same as reported previously.
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
323
Fewer batteries need to be transported to and around the theater,
and manufacturing and disposal costs are reduced. Since you need
fewer batteries, your pack is lighter than it would be otherwise.
Although the pack weighs a little more, it pays off since you need
fewer batteries. If you couple that with batteries that are twice as
powerful and with radios that need 30% less power, this can definitely provide the guys on the ground with their own source of
self-sustaining power even for the cases where other renewable
energies might not be appropriate.
Now let us turn from power to water purification, which is
something I really like working on. This next one is a platformenabling technology that has applications across the different
scales and levels of water purification systems used by the Navy
and Marine Corps. It is effectively a pretreatment and uses a
continuous-flow clarification process that operates on the sheer
forces within a fluid with a very low-pressure drop (around 3 psi). It
is not a centrifuge; it is basically just a curved rectangular channel
with one input and two outputs.
Figure 3. Small-Scale Fluid Particle Separator
As you can see in Figure 3, it is pretty small. Figure 3 shows
a tank of water that has been spiked with carbon particles measuring from 5 to 30 microns. The water initially goes in dirty, but
by three quarters of the way around, the sheer forces cause the
324
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
carbon particles to band together in one particular region of flow.
The water containing the particles can be diverted out one of the
output ports, while the “clean” water goes out the other port.
This is the closest thing to magic I have ever seen; it is amazing
to watch. Its orientation does not matter; you can shake it while it
is running. We are looking at using this on everything from small
water purifiers all the way up to replacing the prefiltration systems
on shipboard-level systems. The Navy has discovered that when
they operate in remote regions, prefilter fouling for their reverse
osmosis systems can go through the roof. They need six times as
much prefiltration than they currently have. If we could use this
instead, we could save a lot of room on the ship. In the expeditionary environment, we could save a lot of resupply of small filters for
these water purification systems.
Advanced energy recovery is another of our water-related concepts. It takes a lot of power to actually pump water through a plastic membrane to get freshwater out the other side. Typically, energy
recovery systems are optimized for large-scale plants such as
industrial water purification systems that process millions of gallons
per day. Currently, none are really adapted to small expeditionary
systems where you may be operating on fresh- or saltwater in any
climate or place. So the reverse osmosis systems with energy recovery that we are looking at are scalable for the small range (40 gallons per hour). They allow for variable recovery ratio depending
on the specific operating conditions. They have been shown to
improve the efficiency of an actual system by as much as 60%. If
we couple that with some of the less-resource-intense prefiltration,
we can have a huge impact. An indirect energy benefit is that it
reduces fuel transport requirements.
This next concept is sort of a baby step in the direction of autonomous resupply. This is an upgrade to the existing CQ-10 Alpha
SnowGoose unmanned aerial vehicle, which is a parafoil-based
system (Figure 4). The parafoil is launched by towing it behind a
Humvee on a trailer. We are upgrading it by adding a three- or
four-blade autogyro that will prespin the rotors at zero pitch and
then go full collective and launch up in the air. The system autogyros from that point on. It is a very simple autonomous system, and
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
325
it is extremely easy to operate. It can deliver up to 2400 pounds
and can cover a 93-mile radius in 24 hours. How does this save
fuel? Instead of using the parafoil, the alternative would be to send
an MTVR with an armed escort that might have to drive 200 or
300 miles round-trip though the mountains to cover the same
93-mile radius. Thus, it offers an energy-efficient way to provide
direct resupply for small expeditionary units. As a secondary benefit, it reduces maintenance needs for your vehicle fleet.
Figure 4. CQ-10 “Bravo” Cargo Unmanned Air Vehicle System
My next concept is a local favorite. It was originally developed
right here at JHU/APL: it is a self-healing galvanic protection additive called polyfibroblast (Figure 5). It is basically uncured paint in
a zinc microcapsule, and it is compatible with existing MIL-SPEC
paints. It can be mixed in with current paints and applied without
retraining or refitting the equipment. Essentially, when a scratch is
made through the paint surface, it ruptures the zinc microspheres
and the paint resin flows out and fills the cracks. In addition, the
zinc provides a galvanic protection for the actual surface. You can
also add fluorescent dyes to indicate damage so you can tell where
the stuff has been used and where your vehicle has been damaged. While it has no primary energy benefit, it definitely reduces
vehicle maintenance. The cost of corrosion for the Marine Corps
326
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
in 2007 was something like $600 million; a lot of that is due to the
cost of rotating vehicles through maintenance cycles. Anything you
can do to reduce that is going to save energy and dollars.
Figure 5. Polyfibroblast: A Self-Healing, Galvanic
Protection Additive
The last technology effort I am going to cover is the modular composite bridge (Figure 6). The Marines and Army currently
deploy 10 to 15 different types of bridging for theater aspects for
different scenarios. Each bridge has its own deployment issues,
maintenance, and training. The whole process is very energy intensive. What we are looking at is a system of basically giant carbonfiber Legos. This is the bridge that every 5-year-old dreams about.
The kit has five or six basic components: a pier section, a ramp
section, a beam, a bank seat, and a deck. You can combine these
in multiple different ways to make short bridges, long bridges,
pier bridges, or line-of-communication bridges. You can put railings on the bridges. The actual energy benefit of this is somewhat
sneaky. Instead of shipping 15 different bridges to the theater, you
can ship two full bridge kits and save a tremendous amount of
logistics transport. Space is at a premium on our amphibious ships
and on our ground transport vehicles. Shipping the equivalent of
a medium girder bridge will take seven ISO containers instead of
the 20 ISO containers that would be required to ship the existing medium girder bridge. Even though these modular bridges will
Chapter 9 Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities
327
be slightly more expensive to procure, the energy savings and the
overall life cycle cost savings are significant.
Figure 6. Modular Composite Bridging
Rest assured that we are also investing in the fundamental
materials science that lies behind all this stuff. We are conducting
research on nanocarbons. We are looking at composites for large
structures and nanocomposite electrodes for solid oxide fuel cells.
We are investigating self-lubricating coatings and alloys to enable
maintenance reduction. We are looking at solar energy, including
stretchable photovoltaic materials. These materials can stretch and
crumple. They can get shot through, get damaged, and still function pretty well.
In addition, we are looking at ways to optimize the logistics
supply chain. How do we do packaging? Are containers the right
thing? Austere cargo handling is a big issue. Is there a more efficient way to move a 55-gallon drum full of water than to find
enough Marines to lift it? There are opportunities for automation
in the packaging process. We are also working on the micro-grid
concepts that you heard about earlier to include energy storage
buffers and load-source management technologies. The things
we really look for are platform-enabling technologies that can be
scaled across many different systems and become game changers
through their secondary or tertiary logistics effects.
328
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
Robert Charette, Jr., mentioned that the Marines
Q: Colonel
would be working closely with the Army during the upcoming
ExFOB 2011. Could you highlight some of the collaborative efforts with
the other services and with the joint community?
Colonel Robert Charette, Jr.: To answer that, let me say that
we would not have come so far so quickly if it were not for OSD’s
Power Surety Task Force and the work they are doing with the Army
as part of the Net Zero Joint Capability Technology Demonstration
at Fort Irwin. One of the first things we did when we stood up the
E2O was go out to Fort Irwin and see what they were doing. As it
turns out, the Army’s got a lot of things going on. We are partnered
with them on our next ExFOB. We are also working with the Air
Force, especially on the aviation side.
Mr. Cody Reese: I want to mention that the DoD water purification community is one of the most integrated areas of any in
which I have worked. Personnel from the Army, the Navy, and
DARPA attend the meetings. Anytime I get a new idea from a white
paper and abstract, I send it out to the joint team for their input
and review. We have all learned a lot from the Army testing at
Aberdeen and from the really basic research that DARPA is doing.
Ch a p te r 10
A da p t i n g M a r i t i m e
F ac i l i t i e s a n d
I n f r a s t ruc t u r e to
E n e rg y C h a l l e n g e s
331
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo
In my opening remarks at last year’s symposium, I pointed out
that climate and energy and their relationship to national security
and our nation’s naval forces were becoming front-burner issues
for the Department of the Navy. I think it is pretty clear that over
the past year that is exactly what has happened. We in the naval
community—Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard—can take pride in
what we have accomplished. Since we met last year, Navy Task
Force Climate Change has published its Arctic Roadmap and its
Climate Change Roadmap. [1, 2] At the request of Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Gary Roughead, the National Academy of
Sciences Naval Studies Board examined the national security implications of climate change for naval forces; I was on that panel, as
was Dr. Ronald Luman from JHU/APL and Dr. Catherine Kelleher
from the University of Maryland, who will be on our wrap-up panel.
The Naval Studies Board report, which was released on March
10, states that it is absolutely imperative that the Navy deal with
climate change; it is something that could have profound implications for the types of platforms we use, missions we conduct,
and locations in which we operate. [3] In fact, climate change is
going to present challenges for all of our naval services—our Navy,
our Marines, and our Coast Guard. The study’s recommendations
are very broad based; they touch on all aspects of naval planning including command structure, research priorities, training and
platform needs, and the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. Another of the important findings that came out of
that panel was a ringing endorsement of the work being done by
Rear Admiral David Titley and Navy Task Force Climate Change to
make the Navy a national leader among federal agencies in identifying ways to adapt to climate change.
332
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
A number of equally positive things have happened on the
energy side. As if to reinforce the importance of these advances,
we are once again seeing a big spike in gas prices. I, undoubtedly
like many other Americans, am wondering if this time our nation is
going to get it right and come up with a sustainable energy policy.
I am not optimistic, but we will see. At the DoD level, I am sure
you are aware that Ms. Sharon Burke has been confirmed as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
Programs and that Mr. Thomas Morehouse, a long-time expert
on defense energy issues and a key author of the influential 2008
Defense Science Board report on energy, has been named as her
principal deputy. [4] At this symposium we have received a timely
update on the work being done by Navy Task Force Energy’s director, Rear Admiral Philip Cullom, who has emerged as a national
leader in energy transformation. In case you have not seen it, a
couple of months ago, Thomas Friedman wrote a nice op-ed piece
commenting on the leadership that Secretary Ray Mabus and Rear
Admiral Cullom have shown toward making the Navy a leader in
transforming our nation into one with a smart energy future.
The Marine Corps has also accomplished some impressive
work. In particular, the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office
has done amazing things at the Corps’ typical lightning-fast pace
that reduce the energy burden on our forward forces by pioneering
the applications of small-scale solar systems. Thanks to the Marines,
these technologies have been shown to make our forces lighter and
more maneuverable. And, they are garnering great national recognition for the Department of the Navy. Colonel Robert Charette,
Jr., the head of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, will
describe his efforts at this symposium.
Shoreside facilities also face great energy challenges, both from
the energy perspective and, as was noted by our panel, from the
climate perspective. In some ways these are tougher than the challenges faced by the operational community; our shoreside facilities
must be able to provide reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy
as well as comply with Congressional and Executive Order mandates regarding water, energy use, and greenhouse gases.
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
333
So, with that as introduction, I am pleased to turn the discussion over to Rear Admiral David Boone, who will lead our
roundtable on Adapting Maritime Facilities and Infrastructure to
Energy Challenges.
REFERENCES
1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment
Report: Climate Change 2007, IPCC, 2007.
2. Department of the Navy, Navy Arctic Roadmap, 10 Nov 2009,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_
roadmap.pdf.
3. Naval Studies Board, National Security Implications of Climate
Change on U.S. Naval Forces, National Academies Press, 2011.
4. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, “More Fight—Less Fuel,”
2008, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf.
334
Rear Admiral David Boone
I appreciate the invitation to be here today to talk about energy
ashore; for those of you who are not tied to the Navy or the maritime forces, ashore basically refers to our bases. The Navy has 73
bases worldwide, and so the topic for this panel is to talk about
Rear Admiral David Boone reported as Director, Shore Readiness
Division (N46) on the Chief of Naval Operations staff and vice commander of Navy Installations Command in 2010. He had previously
commanded the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) MidAtlantic since 2008. Rear Admiral Boone graduated from California
Polytechnic State University with a B.S. degree in civil engineering in
1982. Commissioned an ensign in 1983, he attended the Civil Engineer
Corps Officer Basic Course and then reported for duty with the Seabees
(NMCB-40). In 1987, he attended the University of California at
Berkeley and graduated with a master of engineering degree in coastal
engineering and an M.S. degree in construction management. He then
attended the Navy Diving and Salvage Training Center in Panama
City, Florida, and was designated a Navy diving officer in 1989. Rear
Admiral Boone has served in a variety of sea and shore assignments.
In 1996, he reported as commanding officer of a Seabee Underwater
Construction Unit One. He was then stationed at U.S. Joint Forces
Command as the deputy engineer from 1998 to April 2001. He then
transferred to the White House Military Office as the director of the
Special Programs Office in May 2001. Rear Admiral Boone became the
first commanding officer of NAVFAC Marianas in Guam in 2003. He
transferred to Naples, Italy, as executive officer of NAVFAC Europe –
Southwest Asia in July 2005. In June 2006, he became the chief of staff
to commander, Navy Installations Command. His awards include the
Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (three awards), the
Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (two
awards), the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine
Corps Commendation Medal (four awards), the Navy and Marine Corps
Achievement Medal (two awards), and other service awards.
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
335
what we are doing in regard to energy and climate change. Before
launching into that, I would note that your symposium agenda is
quite impressive, especially when you look at all the aspects of the
maritime forces that are touched by energy, everything from expeditionary to acquisition. There is virtually nothing that we do that
is not touched by this topic. As I indicated, while this panel will
focus on our bases, it has a lot of relevance beyond the DoD and
the Department of the Navy because those bases invariably touch
the greater civil infrastructure. So, it is more than a Navy issue. It
becomes a national issue in terms of how we manage energy and
climate change. The boundary at the base does not stop and end
at the base from an energy standpoint. We are inextricably linked.
I have three great panel members who are going to talk to you
about important aspects of using energy ashore. But to start things
off, I want to share with you the Navy Shore Vision to provide
overall context before we hear from the panelists.
Figure 1. Navy Shore Energy Program
Figure 1 shows the Navy Shore Energy strategy. The centerpiece of that strategy is energy, security, and compliance. Unlike
the tactical side, our bases have an obligation to satisfy a number
of compliance measures levied by federal, state, and local governments as well as by the DoD and the Department of the Navy.
336
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Thus, the strategy is centered on meeting that myriad of compliance requirements, many of which deal with reductions in energy
consumption. Of course, energy security is part and parcel to that.
How do we ensure uninterrupted capability, particularly where
it centers on operational requirements of our bases? Those two
pieces are really what the Navy strategy revolves around.
Aligned around that centerpiece are three focus areas. Of
these, I think that Navy energy culture is a particular challenge.
We have been working energy culture for many years in terms
of education, but how do we take it to the next level? How do
we really impart a change in culture, in how people think about
their consumption? Toward that end, our next step is to link energy
accountability to energy behavior through transparency. There are
a number of examples of where we are pursuing this. We have a
pilot program going on right now in Hawaii in our housing area.
Up until now, many residents of government housing or public/
private venture housing were not accountable for their energy consumption. Instead, the government typically pays for their utility
consumption. Under the pilot program, if the residents exceed a
specified energy consumption threshold, they are responsible for
making up the difference, and if they go below that threshold, they
get some financial reward back. This approach provides a way to
link energy consumption to behavior; and so we are pursuing that
in order to change energy culture.
Energy efficiency first is another of our key focus areas. We
have a lot of infrastructure across our 73 bases worldwide, and so
rather than chase technology from the beginning, we are trying to
make our existing infrastructure more efficient. We consider that
key to getting to a sustainable infrastructure that is financially viable.
Our third focus area is renewable energy and sustainability. It
is the right technology at the right time. We do not want to chase
things that are not mature yet, so we are patterning this according
to the phrase “watch–partner–lead.” There are some technologies
we are interested in, but we just want to watch the development as
industry works through those; when they get to the right maturity,
then we will be ready to jump in. There are likely to be some industries that we will want to partner with in order to further develop
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
337
a specific technology. And, in some cases, we will want to take
the lead in coming up with the right technologies. This approach
allows us to prioritize, focus resources, and make the right investments, because there are not enough resources to do everything.
Our first speaker is Mr. Jeffrey Johnson, who is going to describe
how we integrate information systems as part of our shore energy
program. Some of those systems exist today. More will exist in the
near term. The Navy is very aggressively installing what we call
the Advanced Metering Initiative (AMI), which will place meters
in virtually every building on our bases. We are in the process of
doing that, so the question is, when you meter everything, then
what? What do you do with the information? What behavior does
it change? Frankly, I think this touches on an even bigger national
issue, namely: how do we integrate those legacy systems that provide a vast amount of information and what do you do with it?
How do you integrate it?
Following Mr. Johnson’s presentation, Captain Hugh Hemstreet
is going to talk about the concept of operations; in particular, once
you get all that data, how do you use the data to make good decisions? That concept is really in two pieces. The first deals with
infrastructure issues: prioritizing what you do in recapitalization
and maintenance. Then, the second deals with how those adjustments lead to culture change. And when we talk about culture,
we view it in three separate pieces: (1) change affecting every individual on a base whether military, civilian, or contractor, (2) change
affecting the leadership of our organizational commands, and (3)
changes affecting our functions. As you all know, everyone now
has a computer at his or her desk. If we look functionally at the IT
business, are there things we can do that impart a culture change?
Finally, Dr. William Waugaman is going to talk about the
Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability
and Security (SPIDERS). It is a mouthful, but it is really looking
from the base outwardly to see how it ties into grid cyber security, microgridding, and smart gridding on a national level. As you
will see, what we have tried to do is set up a structure that looks
inward at how we operate at the base level and then looks outward beyond the base.
338
Mr. Jeffrey Johnson
The objective of my pilot project is to integrate the existing
industrial control systems that are in nearly every commercial or
military facility that has been built in the last 25 years. These systems include a wide variety of disparate systems and an equally
wide variety of cyber protection measures. Our challenge is how
A native of Orange County, Virginia, Mr. Jeffrey M. Johnson graduated
from the Virginia Military Institute with a B.S. degree in civil engineering in 1980. Commissioned in 1980, Mr. Johnson served 8 years as
an Engineer Officer in the U.S. Army Reserve. Mr. Johnson served as
head of the Operations and Maintenance Division of several Public
Works Departments. During his tenure with Naval Surface Warfare
Center Dahlgren Public Works, he also led the Facilities Maintenance
Engineering Division and served as Deputy Public Works Officer. He
led the effort to deploy and modernize the use of direct digital control systems and enterprise asset management systems to improve the
efficiency of facilities management operations at Dahlgren and to
reduce energy consumption at the base. Mr. Johnson is currently the
Regional Command Information Officer (N6) for the Naval District of
Washington. He supports the Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP)
program as an ad hoc member of the Systems Engineering Integrated
Product Team and is the Commander Naval Installations Command
(CNIC) government representative for Shore Wireless Networking.
He has piloted several projects for the ATFP program, including the
Virtual Perimeter Monitoring System (VPMS), which is composed of
secure wireless networks, video management, and video analytics
systems. He also leads for the CNIC SmartGrid Pilot project at Naval
Support Activity South Potomac, which leverages the VPMS network
components and includes secure middleware panels and software to
bring disparate direct digital controls and supervisory control and data
acquisition systems into a common, secure, and accredited architecture. He is considered a shore sensor systems expert.
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
339
can we leverage the existing infrastructure, integrate it onto our
cyber secure network that we use for public safety systems, and
deploy those systems to enable our facilities commanders to operate and run them from a command and control perspective.
Figure 1. Discover, Certify, Accredit, Connect
As illustrated in Figure 1, our first challenge is basically a challenge of discovery. The Navy Facilities Command (NAVFAC) has
been working to discover the existing systems that are in use in our
facilities and infrastructure at the same time that we are deploying
the advanced meters that are now legally mandated. By providing
precise monitoring, these meters will greatly improve our ability to
see how our facilities are using energy. We also want to identify the
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are
used to operate such plant systems as water, wastewater, electrical
distribution, and natural gas. Once we have integrated those systems into our network, our next challenge will be to integrate them
with our facility management systems so we can take advantage of
the sensor data for other purposes. Lastly, we intend to then integrate in a graphical environment so that we can display the data
geospatially, because a lot of us work better with pictures than we
do with words.
The Advanced Meter Initiative (AMI) is a Navy-wide initiative
to deploy advanced electrical meters on Navy facilities around
340
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
the world. The dashed boxes in Figure 2 indicate the regions that
have already been awarded and have meter installations currently
underway. The solid boxes identify locations where we hope to
deploy meters this fiscal year subject to funding, while the dotted
boxes show locations where we hope to deploy next year. All of
these meter systems are being deployed on our foundational cyber
secure network that we call the PSNet. The meters connect to
a server infrastructure that we call the Meter Data Management
System. That system allows us to collect the meter data and then
interface with our billing systems in NAVFAC and with the systems
that our customers use to monitor their own energy use.
Figure 2. Advanced Metering Initiative Programs
The pilot project that we have is related to integration of these
various control systems (Figure 3). The issue of cyber security for
industrial control systems has been in the news a lot recently; a
great many people are concerned about it. So we have a big challenge in how to take all these different systems, integrate them on
a network, and make them secure enough that we can take advantage of the systems without having to replace them. Our approach
is to use a middleware architecture that involves installing a new
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
341
industrial control system middleware panel. That panel then is
firewalled to add an extra layer of network security. We are also
deploying new servers to then read that panel. The architecture
that we are using will communicate with the legacy protocols for
the multitude of different control systems that exist across the Navy
and pull them into a common framework. In addition, it will be
able to communicate in modern protocols. As NAVFAC deploys
new facilities, they are using new construction specifications
that require the system to communicate with modern protocols.
Accordingly, the system we are deploying is a foundational system
that integrates older technology that is noncompliant and cannot
communicate in a modern language with that newer technology.
Figure 3. Enterprise Industrial Controls Systems (EICS)
Given the meter locations and the state of our networks, particularly on the industrial controls and utility systems side, we are
leveraging wireless networking to reduce the cost of our deployment and to provide connectivity for our mobile workforce. We
are also focusing on meeting cyber-security requirements and satisfying DoD and Navy mandates for wireless networking (Figure 4).
From a command and control perspective, we fully intend
to respect the chain of command. Accordingly, at the installation
342
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
level, we are establishing command centers, and we are establishing the ability for the installations to operate their facilities and their
infrastructure. At the same time, we are taking advantage of the
Navy’s strong regional approach. Thus, we have command and
control at the installation level and we have visibility at the regional
level (Figure 4). This tiered approach relies on a web-based architecture to accomplish that mission.
Figure 4. Secure ICS Architecture
Given the wide variety of control systems that we are interfacing with, we have developed a regional screen template so that the
command centers at all the bases will have the same look and feel.
They will use the same monitoring screens to display the data in a
graphical format. We will have standardization and centralization
of data so that we can interface with our business systems while
retaining decentralized command and control.
As part of the industrial control systems that we are deploying,
we will also be able to collect alarm and event data that can be
used to trigger our work management activities. This alarm data
basically is deployed at the installation level; however, a regional
alarm server rolls all that data up into one regional framework.
343
Captain Ramé (Hugh) Hemstreet
I am here to tell you how we are going to use the IT abracadabra that Mr. Jeffrey Johnson just described to improve the energy
efficiency at installations throughout Naval District Washington.
Captain Ramé (Hugh) Hemstreet graduated from Tulane University in
1982 with a B.S. in civil engineering. He was commissioned an ensign
upon graduation, and his first assignment was as an assistant Resident
Officer in Charge of Construction (ROICC) in Newport, Rhode Island.
His following tour was as the ROICC, Palau and Yap, reporting to OICC
Marianas. In 1986, Captain Hemstreet reported to Commander, Fleet
Air Mediterranean, as the NATO Infrastructure Officer. He is a veteran
of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Forty; he deployed to Operation
Desert Shield/Storm, Naval Air Station Sigonella, and Operation
Restore Hope. In 1993, Captain Hemstreet reported to the Public Works
Center Yokosuka, Japan, where he served as the Japanese Facilities
Improvement Program/Planning Officer and as the Production Officer.
From 1996 to 1998, Captain Hemstreet was on the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations staff in the Shore Installation Management Division.
From 1999 to 2001, he was the Public Works Officer/ROICC/OICC at
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. In 2001, he returned to Japan;
first as the Executive Officer, Public Works Center Yokosuka, Japan, and
then as the Deputy Regional Engineer for Commander, Naval Forces
Japan. From 2004 to 2006, he commanded Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC) Midwest at Great Lakes, Illinois. He then served
as Deputy Commander for Operations, NAVFAC, from 2006 to 2009.
Currently, he is the Commanding Officer of NAVFAC Washington and
the Regional Engineer for Naval District Washington. Captain Hemstreet
has an M.S. degree in construction management from the University of
California, Berkeley, and an M.S. degree in national security studies
from the National War College. His personal decorations include the
Legion of Merit (Gold Star in Lieu of Third Award), the Meritorious
Service Medal (Gold Star in Lieu of Fifth Award), and the National War
College Commandant’s Award for Writing Excellence.
344
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
First, however, I would like to describe how we are organized
because I think that is another foundational element in our effort
to reduce energy consumption. A 2010 energy efficiency assessment done by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change pointed
out that one of the stumbling blocks to achieving energy efficiency
is what is known to economists as the “principal–agent problem.”
[1] That problem arises when the organizational entities that are
responsible for purchasing things like equipment and buildings are
not the same as those who are responsible for paying the electrical
bills associated with using that equipment or those buildings. The
problem is often further complicated by assigning responsibility for
equipment or facilities maintenance and improvement to yet other
organizational entities.
That is how things worked in the Navy for a long time, although
we have made some progress in that regard during the past decade.
In fact, working to resolve that dilemma is part of my job at Naval
District Washington. We have brought our facilities-related entities
together and created an organization that is responsible for facilities life cycle management. We start with construction at the front
end and then manage the utility program for the region. We are
also responsible for the operation, maintenance, and restoration
and eventually demolition of those facilities. So, in concert with
the IT efforts that Mr. Johnson described, we think we have the
right platform for success.
Within the Facility Engineering Command, we have created
what we call the Smart Energy Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
at Naval District Washington to try to pull together all those disparate elements. The objectives for that CONOPS are shown below:
• Objectives
–– Reduce energy costs without impacting mission (also
reduces energy consumption)
–– Reduce operations and maintenance costs without
impacting mission
–– Change operational behavior regarding energy to
allow transparent decisions regarding energy-saving
opportunities
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
345
• Action Areas
1. Manage facilities to as-designed condition
2. Identify energy efficiency upgrades
3. Generate stakeholder metrics that change behavior
4. Enhanced demand response
5. Networked SCADA (supervisory control and data
acquisition)
You will notice that the word “cost” appears a couple of times
both with regard to energy itself and with regard to operations and
maintenance. That is the key driver for us at the deck-plate level.
Our utility bill for the region and all the tenant commands on the
installations within Naval District Washington is about $200 million a year; our primary goal is to reduce that cost and return that
money for other purposes.
You will also notice the word “mission” appears frequently. In
order to gain buy-in from the stakeholders—the folks who execute
missions on our installations—we need to assure them that we are
not going to have the energy tail wagging the mission dog, that we
are going to safeguard their mission operations. At Indian Head, we
produce chemical propellants that are not manufactured anywhere
else in the free world. At Patuxent River, we are doing research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) on unmanned vehicles.
We need to assure the personnel at those locations that the energy
CONOPS is going to remember that the mission is primary. To
help change operational behavior and get at that second aspect
of the triad Rear Admiral David Boone talked about, we need to
ensure that we provide the information to all the energy users in
the region so that they can make smart energy decisions. Then, the
industrial control system that Mr. Johnson is creating will allow us
to take action in the five primary areas listed in bottom half of the
list above.
The first of these is to manage our facilities to as-designed
condition, or in facilities speak, to employ “continuous commissioning” so as to maintain our facilities in their peak performance
346
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
mode. That will also help us identify energy-efficient upgrades,
the second of our five action areas. We know that a lot of our
facilities are underperforming, and the data that we are going to
gather from the Industrial Controls System (ICS) will help us identify where we can make investments that will reduce energy usage
and energy cost.
Our third action area is to generate stakeholder metrics. While
about half of the tenants on our installations actually pay their own
energy bills, the employees at those sites typically do not see the
bill and thus are not necessarily impacted. Thus, there are really
two aspects to this. One is providing everyone that pays a utility
bill with real-time meter data that shows how they are performing. The second is to provide that data to the folks at the deck
plates who are utilizing the energy. As that data percolates its way
down, we can take advantage of the fact that people are naturally
competitive to further reduce energy consumption. That same Pew
study I talked about earlier described a number of success stories
where people had been given just the information they needed in
order to change their behavior. [1]
Our fourth action area is enhanced demand response. We
already have a pretty aggressive demand response program in the
region, but it is now focused on our generating capability. We have
many backup generators that we can use in response to peak loading from the utility companies. The ICS system will allow us to
use the consumption side of the equation to further enhance the
demand response program that we have. Our final action area is to
network our SCADA systems together to improve the overall reliability of our systems.
The industrial control approach that Mr. Johnson described
essentially happens within the dotted lines shown in Figure 1. Our
next goal is to export a lot of that data into our current Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC) CIRCUITS (Centralized and
Integrated Reporting for the Comprehensive Utilities Information
Tracking System) billing information system. Then, as the meters
are installed and come online, we can provide actual metered billing data by facility on the installations, which will help the tenant
commands who pay those bills identify where they can conserve.
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
347
Figure 1. Integration with SmartEnergy System with
NAVFAC Databases
A huge component of this is to tie together energy and facility operations with energy and facilities management and facilities
maintenance. In the short term, we will have to rely on a human
interface to use ICS data service tickets to identify the projects
that we need to create in our Maximo maintenance management
system. Over the next several years, our goal is to make that an
automated process whereby the ICS pushes a service ticket directly
into Maximo whenever ICS identifies a system that is operating
outside of parameters. We also want to be able to use our Regional
Shore Installation Management System geospatial information
system as a graphic platform to show trends over time.
Figure 2 provides a notional example of some of the metrics
that we want to provide. Some of these are internal metrics that
will help our public works folks identify the real energy hogs. Once
they have done that and discovered the underlying reasons, they
can identify appropriate energy conservation measures that we
might want to undertake to drive down those energy hogs. Once
we have dealt with the low-hanging fruit, we can turn to the temporal aspect of facility operations to see if there might be opportunities during nighttime or weekends to further reduce energy
348
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
loads. We can provide this type of output to our energy users and
in the process help them identify where their high expenses are
and what projects they might want to fund in order to reduce their
energy bills over the long term.
Figure 2. SmartEnergy Metrics Scorecard
We now have capability at three of our installations, and this
spring we will bring online a facilities operations center at the
Washington Navy Yard that will enable us to actually implement
the CONOPS and operate our facilities within identified parameters. That will enable us to identify the facilities shortcomings that
we need to fix. Then, over the course of the next couple of years,
we will be setting up facilities operations centers at our other installations. We have decentralized the approach for the facility operations centers to ensure that each of them remains focused on the
specific mission at that installation. At the same time, we want to
ensure that we do not adversely impact that mission by turning off
a piece of equipment that is essential to the folks who work on
our installations.
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
349
Figure 3. Five Elements of Naval District Washington
Energy Vision 2035
As indicated in Figure 3, we hope to achieve results in five
areas:
1. Efficient end-use technology
2. Cost-efficient energy sources and distribution
infrastructure
3. Networked SmartEnergy management capabilities
4. Aggressive demand response
5. Cost-effective renewables
Achieving results in these areas will help ensure that NAVFAC
is operating the utility systems on our installations in an efficient manner. By networking our energy management capabilities together, we will be able to produce the metrics that provide
real-time feedback to those who use our utilities. The aggressive
demand response program is intended to go beyond generating
capability to the actual buildings themselves while minimizing any
impact to the tenant commands. Finally, where it makes sense, we
are looking at cost-effective renewables. Toward that end, we have
350
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
a demonstration project for a NetZero building on the Washington
Navy Yard. That building, which we should finish this summer,
will demonstrate technologies that can get us to NetZero. While
these technologies may not be applicable in every circumstance, I
think the demonstration project will provide lessons that will get us
closer to NetZero. We also have other renewable projects, many of
them as a result of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act.
REFERENCE
1. William R. Prindle, From Shop Floor to Top Floor: Best Business
Practices in Energy Efficiency, 2010, http://www.pewclimate.
org/docUploads/PEW_EnergyEfficiency_FullReport.pdf.
351
Dr. William Waugaman
I appreciate the opportunity to provide the joint perspective
from one of the DoD’s combatant commands as it relates to homeland defense and our infrastructure. Fully 76% of all DoD installations lie within the U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM)
area of responsibility. Thus, when the USNORTHCOM combatant commander thinks about how he is going to execute homeland defense in a joint world, he wants to ensure that all these
of different energy projects support both mission accomplishment
and energy assurance. So, I was very happy to hear Captain Hugh
Hemstreet talk about the importance of the mission. That is certainly where the combatant command is. How do we tie our operational mission together with our infrastructure and keep the two
working hand in hand to accomplish the mission rather than simply
working on compliance on the energy? Developing a CONOPS to
Dr. William Waugaman is currently the National Laboratories liaison
to North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern
Command (N-NC), Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. In this position,
he represents the research and development information exchange
between the Department of Energy’s 17 laboratories and the combatant command. His responsibilities include his role as the science and
technology advisor, homeland security issues, laboratory reachback
during exercises and real-world events, and interagency coordination.
His current areas of interest include electric smart grid security, cyber
security, information sharing, tunnel detection, bioengineering, and
unmanned aerial vehicles. Prior to this position, he was the Deputy
Head of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and
Dean of the Faculty, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.
He is a member of the Board of Directors for the Rocky Mountain
Bioengineering Symposium and an IEEE member. He earned his Ph.D.
in electrical engineering from the University of Colorado in 1999.
352
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
bring mission and infrastructure together is very important from the
combatant command point of view.
Several of our speakers have mentioned the 2008 Defense
Science Board study of the DoD’s energy needs and the 2009 CNA
study that examined the cyber security aspects of our electric infrastructure upgrades. [1, 2] This past year, the Quadrennial Defense
Review included a discussion of what improving energy efficiency
will mean from a mission perspective. [3] At USNORTHCOM, we
are focusing not only on improving the efficiency of day-to-day
efficiency operations, but what happens when we have any type
of catastrophic event, whether natural or man-made. How are we
going to be able to continue to accomplish our mission of defending our citizens within the homeland?
When you think about energy from a DoD perspective, liquid
fuels are absolutely huge; but when you think about homeland
defense from a continental United States (CONUS) perspective,
electricity runs the home game and wet fuels run the away game.
And, as we rely more and more on reachback to support our operational forces, that CONUS perspective becomes important for our
deployed forces as well. We have to rely on our national infrastructure and our installation infrastructure to ensure that those missions
are successful. Thus, the electricity running the home game is very
important. As made evident by the ongoing tragedy in Japan, without that electricity infrastructure, it will be very difficult to accomplish the mission.
As it turns out, Mr. Jeffrey Johnson’s efforts to bring in the
legacy infrastructure and add the layers of security is the focus of
the ongoing Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy
Reliability and Security (SPIDERS) Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD) that USNORTHCOM is working on with
the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). As shown in Figure 1, that
JCTD is intended to address four critical deficiencies.
What is SPIDERS trying to do specifically? First of all, we want
to ensure that we can address the very large cyber vulnerabilities
that arise when we add intelligent operations and a cyber layer over
the top of what has traditionally been an analog and mechanical
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
353
industrial control process. As we try to bring these processes into
the smart grid infrastructure and improve our ability to automate,
remotely control, and monitor all of these processes with less human
intervention, how do we protect against potential cyber threats? We
have to be able to use the modern encryption and cyber protection
that Mr. Johnson described earlier while still having the ability to
reach back to the infrastructure that we have already in the ground
because we are obviously not going to replace it all. We have to be
able to interface and work through that upgrade process.
Figure 1. SPIDERS Summary
Thus, cyber security is probably the biggest aspect of SPIDERS.
We are looking at the cyber security of the smart grid infrastructure
both at the installation level and at the interface with the public
utilities. That is where we tie our installation into the civilian infrastructure, because obviously, we do not generate our own electricity. We rely on the public utilities sector to do that. So, we are
concerned with how we interface our future microgrids with those
public utilities and the potential impacts on our NetZero goals.
We are also concerned about the use of renewable energy
sources. Currently, the electrical power needs for our bases are
being met primarily by a combination of conventional coal,
nuclear, and natural gas. The intermittent nature of many of our
existing renewable sources—like wind and solar—limits them to
providing less than 10% of our energy. Given that, how are we
354
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
going to meet Secretary Ray Mabus’s goal of getting 50% of our
energy from renewable sources by 2025? How are we going to
meet the Green Navy goals? How are we going to meet the goals
being set by the DoD and by Executive Orders if we cannot get
past 10% right now?
We are also concerned with how we are going to be able
to integrate all the way up to 100% renewable energy and run
NetZero facilities or installations during or after a catastrophic
event. Can we maintain our mission after a catastrophic event and
keep those renewable energy assets connected? Right now if we
have an event, our concepts of operation (CONOPS) call for us to
disconnect all our green energy sources because of the instabilities they have. Thus, that energy cannot be used for sustainment
and mission. As an alternative, we are looking at whether we can
use microgrids to keep the mission moving forward and in the process leverage those renewable sources, not necessarily to maintain
100% mission capability, but to accomplish at least the core mission and keep that going. We need to know how to integrate those
microgrids with our current backup diesel generation.
In a macro sense, the goal of SPIDERS is to bring together in a
cyber-secure environment a microgrid that provides multiple paths
of energy distribution that can be commanded and controlled by
the installation commander according to mission priorities. We
want to be able to allocate those energy assets in a cyber-secure
way so that the renewable energy, energy storage, and backup
diesel generation all work together in a system-integrated demand
response methodology that allows us to do our core missions even
in the event of a prolonged outage.
So, that is what we are looking at when we are talking about
SPIDERS—a cyber-secure microgrid that allows backup diesel generation, renewable energy for sustainment and the enhancement
of the logistics tail in a long-term outage, and energy storage to all
work together in concert.
As shown in Figure 2, we are starting with three locations—
Hickam Air Force Base (AFB), Hawaii; Fort Carson, Colorado; and
Camp Smith, Hawaii—and using a stair-step approach. Because
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
355
the JCTD has to have a 1-year deliverable, we have to leverage the
things that we already have. Thus, we are using a crawl–walk–run
methodology in stair stepping our way—sort of like taking the itsy
bitsy spider up the water spout. Along the way, we will be developing the CONOPS and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
that we need while working in partnership with the Department of
Energy (DOE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Ultimately, of course, we want to transition the effort to the commercial sector.
Figure 2. Expected SPIDERS Outcome
Hopefully, our demonstration will benefit industry as it works
to improve its own capabilities. The end result will be to enhance
energy assurance as it comes across the fence line to us, so that we
do not need to have our own stand-alone generation capability.
The expected benefits of realizing the capability we are demonstrating in SPIDERS include day-to-day efficiencies, the demand
response aspects of the microgrid, the ability to maintain enhanced
renewable generations well past the 10% threshold, and the
backup generation capability for the catastrophic case. Achieving
these benefits in the face of cyber threats requires that we focus
on cyber security. Accordingly, we have asked DHS, the National
Security Agency (NSA), and the new Cyber Command to serve as
a red team during our operational utility assessments.
356
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 3 identifies the other organizations that are currently
participating in SPIDERS. In addition to USNORTHCOM and
USPACOM, they include DOE, DHS, five of the DOE national
laboratories, the military services, and the states of Colorado and
Hawaii. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) is
our transition manager and is developing the CONOPS and TTPs
that we will need. We have also involved several local utility companies from the very beginning, because ultimately, we want them
to solve our problem of maintaining a protected energy supply to
our DoD installations.
Figure 3. SPIDERS Participants
REFERENCES
1. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, “More Fight—Less Fuel,”
2008, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf.
2. CNA, Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to
National Security, 2009, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/
Powering%20Americas%20Defense.pdf.
3. Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review,
2010,  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_
12Feb10_1000.pdf.
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
357
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
Commander Daniel Orchard-Hays: You mentioned the initiative you have underway for metering on-base housing and you also
discussed the importance of culture change and the fact that we
need to drive culture change in order to get energy efficiency in
the future. I am curious why we have not aggressively moved out
and already put meters on all of our on-base housing. There seems
to be a definite disparity between the utility bills of folks who live
off base and those of personnel who live on base and do not have
a utility bill. Without that bill as an incentive, there is no way to
prevent those who live on base from running their air conditioning at relatively low temperatures in the summer and their heat at
relatively high temperatures in the winter. Why are we just now
starting a pilot project in Hawaii as opposed to moving out more
aggressively across all of our on-base housing?
Rear Admiral David Boone: The way that you have described
the behavior in government housing is pretty much correct, in part
because a lot of our infrastructure is very outdated and old. I can
remember times when you would have the window open as you
were heating your building because you could not get the balance
right in the facility. However, over the last 10 years, we have outsourced the vast majority of our housing to public–private ventures.
As a result, the vast majority of Navy housing does not belong to
the government anymore. The government still owns some housing overseas or in specific situations where we could not go to
public–private ventures. The pilot we have launched in Hawaii is
the beginning of our effort to work with those public–private partners. Part of the pilot is a business deal, and part of it is developing the concept of operations of how we operate—do we provide
money back or get money from the residents who either exceed or
go below the threshold? We are setting up those conditions in our
current plan. The pilot will enable us to get through the business
rules before we expand this on an enterprise-wide scale. As you
can imagine, each partnership has its own business deal, so it has
358
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
to be negotiated and worked through individually. But we are getting there, and getting there very quickly.
Dr. William Waugaman: I will be Dr. Doom and bring the
cyber security part into this. Imagine that I hack all the smart meters
on your installations and I turn everybody’s lights out on base, and
then I do that in the middle of a bias update, which is the vulnerability that was publicly talked about with most of the metering
systems that are out there. Now, instead of being able to just reboot
like you can with your computer, all of those meters have to be
replaced. So, you have to wait until the facilities person comes and
does that. Now let us say I do it across the whole base: how does
that commander get his mission done when all of his people are
worrying about how they are going to take care of their families?
As part of the American Recovery and Investment Act, the
government purchased 500 million smart meters, although many
of them have not been deployed. The Maryland Public Utility
Commission, for example, nixed their installation after all these vulnerabilities came out. Imagine if terrorists had the ability to turn out
the lights of 500 million Americans, and we all had to wait until
the utility company could come and replace them. That might take
anywhere from a week to 10 days to 2 weeks to who knows how
long, given the need to get 500 million new meters. So, from a
cyber-threat point of view, these things are great. We never think
of the homeland as being under a threat, but when an adversary
can reach out and touch someone without having to be here physically, that really changes the equation with some of the threat scenarios that we are talking about. And, while I have used residential
housing as my example, such attacks could have major impacts on
our ability to conduct our missions.
Mr. Jeffrey Johnson: From a Navy perspective, the advanced
meters that are being deployed Navy wide are for monitoring only,
and we are not taking advantage of any of the control features that
exist within the meter framework. It is actually being disabled as
part of the deployment. We are focusing our control on direct digital control systems and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems where we have added additional cyber protection and layered defense mechanisms. So, while the commercial
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
359
sector is deploying advanced meters perhaps in the way you
described, the Navy at least has not taken advantage of those features in their deployment.
do not have a question, but would like to offer a comQ: Iment
about the use of incentives to change behavior. The
public–private venture housing in Monterey is run by the Army, and
by keeping the thermostat in the house at 67° and tossing on a sweatshirt in the evening, I receive a $40 check each month from the contractor. I suspect that the other services have similar initiatives in their
public–private ventures.
have a question for the entire panel. In doing the assessQ: Iments
of critical energy assets on installations, has any effort
been made to prioritize those assets? I know that is difficult because
missions change, but if you are looking at a situation where an installation may be forced to island or to protect itself because of outages
outside the gate, have we already prioritized the assets inside the gate?
Rear Admiral David Boone: I will ask Dr. Doom to answer
that question, but on a very high-level scale, we have criteria that
link specific missions to different capabilities. Does it support a
national-level asset? Does it support a component asset within the
DoD? Dr. Waugaman, could you expand on that please?
Dr. William Waugaman: Rear Admiral Boone is correct in
that there is a process. What we have typically found, though, as
we have done some of these assessments, is that the installation
commanders have done that prioritization. However, as we move
toward joint basing and as we have more and more tenant units
on installations so that the mission spread across an installation
is much more diversified, the ability to understand how all those
pieces come together to support those critical assets is not quite
as simple as it used to be when you had basically a homogenous
mission that was being supported by a single base. So, it is getting
harder, but there are ways in which they can do that.
With the SPIDERS concept that we are testing, we will be able
to know which missions are important and work from that. To
accommodate the things that pop up, the microgrids will provide
360
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
the installation commander with the ability to do real-time demand
response and control of his energy assets as the situation dictates.
He will be able to turn on and turn off different functions according to mission. You need to have that capability at the tactical level
so that you can deal with all the different scenarios, whether it be
a mother nature-type thing or a man-made event. The needs will
vary depending on the specific installation and whether the lights
are off outside the fence or there is a regional brownout and the
infrastructure is all still basically okay. The ability of the installation
commander to control his energy assets is critical.
Rear Admiral David Boone: While we can prioritize based
on capability, energy security is not like flipping a switch. There
are many, many layers that you can put in. From my position as
a resource sponsor, I am concerned with how to make the next
investment decision. What level of security capability do we want,
and if we put it in to a microgrid, are we truly islanding an enclave
or are we pushing the vulnerability to another place in the grid? So,
this is a very complex problem that leads us to complex solutions
in terms of where we spend our next investment dollar in order to
get the next layer of capability within a constrained resource environment. This is a lot more challenging than merely a return-oninvestment model.
up on that, I have had the privilege of going to sevQ: Toeralfollow
energy-related conferences, and during the industry
demonstrations, quite often there will be somebody there showing their
smart-grid equipment or their smart-grid capabilities. I will ask where
their components were made, and they will say, very proudly, “ here in
the United States.” But, when I ask where were the chipsets were made
that go into the components, the answer comes back, “overseas, offshore,
in China.” It seems to me that that builds in an insecurity or at least an
uncertainty. Can I get your thoughts on that?
Rear Admiral David Boone: We are looking at supply chain
management issues. That is definitely an issue when you talk
about the intelligent control. One of the things that the Defense
Science Board talked about was just bringing back manufacturing
capability for electrical transformers and some of the other large,
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
361
long-lead-time items so that we have a friendly supply source to
support our electric infrastructure. However, the ultimate thing
that we have been looking at is how to work in a cyber-compromised environment and still maintain authentication and security
and all those things assuming that you can have trusted pieces of
that cloud rather than ensuring that everything is perfect 100% of
the time. We know that we are going to have to use off-the-shelf
equipment. There is no way to go back to DoD-unique systems.
Mr. Jeffrey Johnson: From a testing perspective, the Navy
has some fairly rigorous standards for the equipment that is being
deployed to include common criteria for network equipment
and Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) validation for
encryption equipment. For those components that we have to
deploy but are commercial and do not meet those requirements,
we do additional penetration testing to validate that the components are cyber secure. In the case of our pilot efforts and the
architecture that we are deploying, we are conducting an independent assessment of the combined components to make sure
that there is nothing that we missed on the Navy side from an
accreditation and cyber security perspective. While we cannot
control the chips that are used in the equipment, we can control
how we use that equipment, and we can do the additional testing
necessary to make sure the equipment meets the standards that
we need.
Captain Hugh Hemstreet: There are also a lot of low-tech, mundane vulnerabilities out there and, in the case of the Washington
Navy Yard where I work, it becomes a question of affordability and
priorities. Our power is provided through an off-base substation in
the surrounding community. The threat there is not high tech; you
could disable the Washington Navy Yard with a small incendiary
device thrown over a 10-foot brick wall. The question is, though,
how much can we afford to spend to island the Navy Yard to protect ourselves from that vulnerability? The best approach is to partner with the utility providers to ensure that we minimize those
vulnerabilities.
362
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Captain R andall Lynch: As we saw a couple of years ago, our
grid, especially in the Northeast, is tied into the Canadian grid.
Are we partnering with the Canadians or with our neighbors to
the south to figure out how to harden the grids for all of North
America? If so, how does that effect what is going on with our
military bases?
Rear Admiral David Boone: From the overall perspective of
the DoD and the Navy, both of which have bases throughout the
United States, what you see is a very fractured industry by state
and by region in terms of their approach to networks and their
strategy for the future. I think that without a national strategy, we
as a country have a lot of vulnerabilities. Moreover, we are not
currently enabling new technologies, be it renewables or storage
capability, and while there is a lot of great talk about future technology, our existing grid is not enabled to tie into that because we
do not have a national strategy that aligns and unifies disparate
organizations. So, there is a real problem in my view. It makes it
problematic when we want to enable new technologies on our
bases, and it does not enable us to work together with the utilities because there is no unified strategy. Dr. Waugaman, can you
expand on that?
Dr. William Waugaman: Rear Admiral Boone is absolutely
correct in that the electric power industry is very much a stateregulated industry. As far as the U.S. partnership with Canada, I
can report that there is a Two-Plus-Two Exercise coming up in
which Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn along with the
Deputy Secretary from Department of Homeland Security will
be hosting Canada’s Natural Resources Deputy Secretary and the
Public Safety Canada Deputy Secretary. They will be looking at
what the potential effects would be of a solar storm or an electromagnetic pulse that causes ground-induced currents that affect
the electric power grid in the northern tier states and Canada and
what critical infrastructure partnering would be needed for such
a scenario. So, the answer to your question is “yes.” It is becoming more and more of a priority that is being addressed at very
senior levels.
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
363
talked about resiliency to natural disasters and trying to
Q: You
be robust in that capability. Can you describe how your strat-
egy would implement that? As it turns out, we just had a good example
of what could happen at the Washington Navy Yard, which is subject to
storm surge and flooding from the Potomac River. Such a flood would
not only knock out off-site power but would also destroy a lot of the
capabilities at the Navy Yard because many of the Yard’s servers are
currently located in the basements of buildings, which would be underwater. How do you assure that if you island your capabilities so that
you are safe against being knocked out by problems in the surrounding
community, that you also have not physically destroyed your own infrastructure at the same time by not raising it or putting it in buildings that
will not be blown down in a hurricane?
Rear Admiral David Boone: From my perspective, you are
really asking two different questions. The first relates to base-wide
resiliency. As you know, at both the national level and at the base
level, our infrastructure is old and in many cases obsolete. We
need to harden our infrastructures by making the right kinds of
investments at the right component level that address those kinds
of vulnerabilities. At the same time, we have to understand that we
are in a different environment than we were 10, 20, or 30 years ago
when those initial investments were made.
The second question deals with determining which of the
things that we do on the base are the most critical and making
sure that we can protect those. Do we need to create some sort
of islanding microgrid to ensure that we have power for those systems? Ultimately, you want to give the base commanding officer
the ability to prioritize where the power goes. Doing that takes a
smart grid-like system to enable the commanding officer’s decision
to be affected throughout the base. Captain Hemstreet, could you
take it from there please?
Captain Hugh Hemstreet: In the Navy Yard scenario that you
have painted, we are not going to be able to afford to maintain all
the operations at the Yard. If we lose commercial power, we do
not have the capability to replicate that even in the short term. We
do need to identify what the critical assets are that need to have
364
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
both back-up power and islanding capability. The capability that
we are putting in place with our new facility operations centers will
facilitate that transition in an emergency and enhance our ability
to monitor the effectiveness of that transition. Our plan also envisions that we will be utilizing those capabilities in nonemergency
situations, so that we will in essence be constantly exercising the
capabilities we do have. To go back to the earlier point about vulnerabilities, we have to recognize that we cannot afford to guard
against every vulnerability. In certain circumstances, lower-priority
missions will be impacted by a natural or man-made disaster.
Dr. William Waugaman: I would like to provide a strategic
perspective by looking at where we want to be in the future versus
where we are right now. Before I do that, though, I want to make
an observation about “islanding” from the combatant command
point of view. I liken “islanding” to the body’s reaction to hypothermia. If you get in a hypothermic situation, your body is going
to naturally protect the brain, and all your warmth and blood flow
and everything else are going to be doing that. If you have to lose
a limb in the process, so be it; that is your body’s choice. Then, as
you start to get warm, then the blood can start flowing out to the
other parts of your body. When we talk about where we want to
be with energy in the future, I think we can use that same analogy.
In a catastrophic event, we are going to suck all the way down to
that core and ensure that we can execute our core mission. Then,
as restoration takes place within the public utility sector, we will be
able to extend that capability. In the smart-grid world in the future,
we will have a way to manage this process dynamically.
Mr. Jeffrey Johnson: I would like to say a bit about the cyber
security aspect and the accreditation processes used by the DoD
and the Navy. With regard to the server farm example, disaster
recovery and response is part of our accreditation documentation.
However, because we cannot plan for every event, we have backup and recovery capabilities in place on the technology side. We
recognize that we have to be able to respond and recover from
such events and have back-up media, back-up locations, and a
response plan in order to restore capability. That is an aspect of
accrediting systems and bringing them onto the network, but I
Chapter 10 Adapting Infrastructure to Energy Challenges
365
agree that we cannot afford to have all the layers of defense that
are necessary from that perspective.
Captain Hugh Hemstreet: It is worth noting that there is a potential synergy here between renewables, greenhouse gas reduction,
and security. Putting in place more dispersed generating capability
enhances our ability to respond to these disasters.
Rear Admiral David Boone: To footnote that, one of the challenges of renewables is the quality of the power; you get inconsistent surges. Because a lot of the operations on the bases require a
higher power quality in terms of voltage regulation, use of renewables imposes a different management challenge than does use of
fossil fuels.
have a question about the influences on the commercial side
Q: Ioutside
the fence. I am curious how you account for power
efficiencies that can be gained in the commercial sector. Specifically, we
are working on a radio frequency technology that could have beneficial
side effects including tremendous energy savings in the wireless industry. How would such savings translate back into our systems?
Rear Admiral David Boone: As we move to new technologies
for facilities systems or information technology systems, we recognize that some of those technologies will save us energy while others will require more energy. The key to assessing that is being able
to baseline where we are at. The Advanced Metering Initiative that
we are working on now will allow us to baseline our energy consumption down to the building level, so as we make improvements
and go to new technologies, we will be able to see that difference
in real time. Over a period of year, we will be able to get that transparency and that will be key.
C h a p t e r 11
E co n om i c a n d E n e rg y
S e cu r i t y a n d I t s I m pac t
o n M a r i t i m e F o rc e s
369
Mr. Duncan Brown
Tonight I am going to talk about economic and energy security
and its impact on maritime forces. Before I get into the details, I
would like to provide a quick overview of the U.S. maritime missions.
U.S. MARITIME MISSIONS
Although our nation’s maritime missions are described well in
the Navy’s Maritime Strategy, I think a brief review will be helpful:
Mr. Duncan Brown is a National Security Studies Fellow at JHU/APL
and an Adjunct Professor in The Johns Hopkins University’s Global
Security Studies Graduate Program. Most recently, he was the Director
of the Strategic Assessments Office at JHU/APL, where he was responsible for the conduct of assessments of national security strategy,
policy, and technology trends. Mr. Brown has been a participant on
National Academy of Sciences, Naval Research Advisory Committee,
and Naval Studies Board panels. Mr. Brown served on the Navy staff
in the Pentagon as the Science Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, in the Pacific as the Science Advisor to the Commander in
Chief Pacific Fleet, and in the Pentagon as the Director for Submarine
Technology. He also headed the Hydrodynamics Branch at the
Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) in Newport, Rhode Island.
Mr. Brown received an M.S. degree from The Johns Hopkins University
in technical management, an M.S. degree in ocean engineering from
the University of Rhode Island, and a B.S. degree in engineering science from Hofstra University. His professional education includes the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Seminar XXI Foreign Politics and
International Relations in the National Interest Program and Harvard’s
Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security.
Mr. Brown is currently a Board Member of the Baltimore Chapter of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers and a member of the Board
of Trustees for the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs.
370
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
• Sea control and power projection (maritime supremacy)
–– But, change is required to go from a fleet that delivers power from a safe sanctuary to a fleet that will be
attacked in Pacific or Indian Ocean waters
• Area defense
–– Think Aegis ballistic missile defense both ashore and at
sea
• Nuclear deterrence
–– Think SSBNs on patrol
• Transport of personnel and materials in war time
• Maritime defense of the homeland
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
• Forward presence and support to free market economies
and democracies
• Maintaining open “sea lanes of commerce”
–– Protecting safe transit of raw materials and manufactured goods
• Anti-terrorism, disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation,
peace enforcement, counter-drug and counter-human
smuggling, and search and rescue
–– Humanitarian missions: 2011, Japan; 2010, Haiti; 2004,
Indonesia
–– 1970–2000, U.S. forces involved in 366 humanitarian
and 22 combat missions
Among the key missions of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard are sea control and power projection—two tasks that are
often referred to as maritime supremacy. But as we all know,
changes will be required to go from a power projection fleet that
can operate from a safe sanctuary to one that has to deal with
cruise and ballistic missile threats, over-the-horizon radars, and
command and control assets, whether it is in East Asia or in the
Persian Gulf. Those challenges are coming.
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
371
Navy also conducts area defense, for example, protection of
our Japanese allies in East Asia from air and missile attacks. Aegis
ships are deployed in Northeast Asia, and ground-based Aegis systems will soon be deployed ashore in Europe. The Navy also has
SSBNs on patrol, providing nuclear deterrence. Our maritime forces
also transport personnel and material in times of war. Maritime
defense of the homeland is mostly a Coast Guard effort, sometimes combined with other forces. ISR is a major mission focus, as
are forward presence and support of free market economies and
democracies. At any one time, the U.S. Navy is deployed around
the world in lots of different ports and in lots of different places.
The Navy also works to maintain open sea lanes—or what I
call “sea lanes of commerce.” While “sea lanes of communication”
is the standard definition for SLOC, in today’s world, these lanes
are devoted primarily to commerce. The Navy protects the safe
transit of raw materials and manufactured goods around the world.
At the bottom of the list are some other important tasks: antipiracy
efforts such as those off the Horn of Africa and disaster relief activities such as the recent response to the Japanese tsunami, along
with a host of others.
Interestingly, if you look at the data, you see that while the
Navy has focused on training and equipping its forces for combat
missions, they have typically been asked to do lots of other tasks.
Between 1970 and 2000, for example, the Navy was involved in
366 humanitarian missions but only 22 combat missions. So what
the Navy gears up for—what it spends money on—and what it
actually does are very often two different things.
Another way to look at the breadth of maritime missions is to
take a quick look at what our maritime forces were doing during one
single month. I have chosen March 2011 as an example (Figure 1).
Early in the month, the Navy helped provide humanitarian
assistance to the victims of the tsunami off Japan. Several weeks
later, Navy aircraft flew strikes and conducted electronic warfare
(EW) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions over Libya.
The Navy and Marine Corps were also supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Navy was conducting antipiracy
372
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
operations off of Africa. SSBNs were on patrol conducting the
nuclear deterrence mission. And, the Navy was providing presence
in many areas around the world. While all of this was going on, the
Coast Guard was helping to secure our harbors and waterways. So
if you look in detail over a relatively short time period, you see U.S.
maritime forces providing support in a lot of different areas.
Figure 1. U.S. Naval Forces Employment—March 2011
ECONOMIC CONSIDER ATIONS
What I want to delve into now is the relationship between economics and energy and security and the role of maritime forces
relative to that relationship. I will start with economics. I like to
look at the information shown in Figure 2 as a depiction of “the
United States, Inc.” While a lot of people are somewhat down
on America, if you look at the data, you see we are not doing
too badly in the overall scheme of things. In 2010, the U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP)—the market value of all final goods produced in the country—totaled $14.6 trillion. By contrast, China’s
GDP was about $5.7 trillion. While we can argue, of course, about
purchasing power parity and about whether the renminbi is properly pegged to the dollar, just looking at the raw numbers tells us
that the U.S. economy is about three times the size of China’s.
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
373
Figure 2. United States, Inc.
Interestingly, the United States still accounts for 19.5% of world
manufacturing, despite the frequent complaints that U.S. manufacturing is going down. While it is true that U.S. manufacturing jobs
are declining, U.S. manufacturing output continues to rise. China’s
share of global manufacturing is roughly the same as ours, 19.7%.
But they are doing it with 100 million people while we are doing
it with about 11 million. In short, Americans are very productive.
The United States is also home to the vast majority of the
world’s 500 largest companies. The dollar still represents 60% of
the world’s reserves, the next largest being the Euro. And, we are
still the largest trading nation in the world, as you can see by the
numbers for exports and imports. So we are still doing pretty well.
Let us take a more detailed look at our GDP, which is defined
as the sum of private consumption, investment, and government
spending, plus the difference between exports and imports. From
Figure 3, you can see that private consumption is about two-thirds
of the U.S. GDP and that investments run about $1.8 trillion per
year, while government spending was about $3 trillion last year.
Unfortunately, U.S. exports have tended to lag behind imports in
recent years, but having said that, we still had about $4 trillion in
exports and imports last year.
374
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 3. GDP of United States, Inc.
So the bottom line is that the American way of life does depend
upon the global economy. When we talk about globalization and
trade, what we are talking about is a set of interdependent production systems and tremendous growth in trade of intermediate
goods. An intermediate good is a part, for example, that goes into
a larger system or a larger thing that we produce, for example,
chips going into computers or parts coming out of Japan going to
factories to produce Nissans in this country. Because intermediate
goods yield reduced costs because of efficiencies and economies
of scale, you are able to trade more goods and you can leverage
comparative advantages. All of this is fueled by intermodal transportation—a fancy name for containers. The list below, provided
by Steve Carmel (Maersk), summarizes these main points regarding
globalization and trade:
• Interdependent production systems
• Growth in trade in intermediate goods
• Reduced cost, more goods traded
• Leveraging comparative advantage and exploiting economies of scale
• Enabled by intermodal transportation (containers) [1]
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
375
In reality, globalization consists of three important pieces—
information, finance, and the actual physical movement of material
goods. So when I wanted to buy a new Apple laptop last year, the
first thing I did was order what I wanted via the Internet. The next
thing I did was to give them my credit card number. After that, a
message went around the world to China that basically said to take
the chips that you got from Taiwan, take the mother boards, take
the hard drive, stick it all together, build exactly what I want, put
it in a container, and ship it to me. Then, within 4 or 5 days of my
placing that order, the laptop showed up at my door having traveled via containers on ships and via UPS delivery trucks. All three
pieces to globalization and trade are essential. Without all three,
you cannot have globalization.
Figure 4. Worldwide Trade at a Glance
Now let us look at containers—the ubiquitous means for
moving materials around the globe (Figure 4). The worldwide traffic in containers essentially tripled over the period from 1995 to
2008. Container experts like to talk in terms of 20-foot equivalent
units or TEUs. Thus, using this measure, the 40 × 8 × 8 foot container that shows up at the front of your house when you have
376
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
to move overseas is two TEUs. As you can see, the number of
containers shipped worldwide is immense—90% by value of all
imports into the United States arrive in containers. Oil is not our
dominant import; it is goods coming in containers. In 2008, tremendous amounts of goods were coming into and going out of
U.S. ports.
Figure 5. Supply Chains
So what does this all mean? It is important to supply chains
(Figure 5). If you are a good company and you are operating efficiently and have your logistics under control, you worry about the
supply chain, you worry about just-in-time logistics. Several years
ago, AMR looked at the top 25 supply chain companies in the
United States and determined that the average rate of return for
those companies in 2007 was almost 18% per year compared to
the Dow Jones industrial average of about 6.5%. [2]
Now the flip side to that is if you have problems with the
supply chain, and we are seeing that right now with Japan, you can
have problems with your shareholders. The producers of Nissan
parts, which are located in northeastern Japan, are having problems because they cannot run their plants because they do not
have electricity. As a result, we are seeing glitches in the supply
chain and in the production of Nissan automobiles in this country.
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
377
Such problems can lead to a big hit to the value of shareholder
equity in the affected company. In fact, studies have shown that
companies that have supply chain problems can lose as much as
25% of shareholder value. It is a big deal. The reason Dell does so
well is that they built a very, very efficient supply chain; according
to their management, it is the biggest leverage point they have.
Figure 6 provides an overall look at global trade routes, based
on the automated information system data collected from all merchant ships. To put it simply, when a ship is traversing someplace,
this system says: “I am this ship, I am going to this particular port,
here are my coordinates, and here are the speed and direction that
I am going.” If you take all that data and you sum it up for a month,
you get a chart that looks like this. The black lines are the high traffic routes and the blue lines are the lesser traffic routes.
Figure 6. Trade Routes
Some areas appear as white even though they still carry a lot
of traffic. The Mississippi River, for example, appears white on the
chart, even though there is a lot of shipping traffic going up and
down the Mississippi. Thus, although not all important traffic is
shown on the chart, you can still see a tremendous amount of
traffic out of the East and West coasts of the United States going
378
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
to Europe and to East Asia and a lot of traffic coming out of the
Middle East, principally oil.
Now the question is: what happens if there is a port disruption?
The problem is, and this is true of most industries, the shipping
industry does not have a lot of excess space and capacity that can
take up the load when one portion of the overall network fails,
for whatever reason. We see something similar when we conduct
infrastructure assessments and look, for example, at whether the
medical infrastructure in any given city could cope with a major
disaster. In such cases, we invariably find that the answer is no,
they do not have a lot of extra hospital beds. As it turns out, the
same outcome holds for rail capacity and port capacity. In each
instance, the reason for the lack of excess capacity is that providing it is expensive and there is not a good return on investment. So
when people talk about providing extra infrastructure capacity, the
question is always going to be how much in which sector and who
pays for it. There are no easy answers to that question.
But having said that, the problem is we do not have a lot of
excess capacity in our ports. Thus, if an attack or disruption occurs,
we are going to have a problem; things are going to pile up, and
that disruption can persist and propagate (Figure 7). The lack of
excess capacity is likely to cause cascading effects that can lead to
all kinds of problems.
Figure 7. Port Disruptions [1]
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
379
A 2006 Congressional Budget Office study basically said that
if the Long Beach facilities near Los Angeles were shut down, the
U.S. economy would suffer damage on the scale of $125–150 million per day. [3] A Booz Allen study concluded that a 12-day shutdown of all ports in this country would entail an economic loss of
about $60 billion. [4]
As this point, I would like to briefly recap the economic portion of my presentation. I have tried to show you that the United
States is part of the globalized world; we rely heavily on trade, we
rely heavily on our ports, and we rely heavily on shipping. Now,
I am going to turn to considerations of energy, and then I will talk
about what happens if energy supplies get disrupted. I will conclude by looking at what economics and energy imply about the
potential roles for the DoD’s maritime forces.
ENERGY CONSIDER ATIONS
Figure 8 shows the world’s oil producers in million barrels per
day (MBD) in 2008; the Energy Information Agency’s 2010 report,
which will show data for 2009, has not yet been released. [5] What
you see on the left-hand side of the curve is that Russia, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States are actually the three biggest producers of petroleum.
Figure 8. World Oil Producers (MBD in 2008) [5]
380
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
On the consumption side, the United States appears as the
largest consumer; China and Japan are the two next largest consumers (Figure 9).
Figure 9. World Oil Consumers (MBD in 2008) [5]
Figure 10. World Oil Importers (MBD in 2008) [5]
In terms of oil imports, the United States uses about 18–20 million barrels per day (Figure 10). Because we are producing about
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
381
10 million barrels per day, we have to import roughly 8–10 million
barrels per day. Japan and China are the other two big importers.
On the export side, the two major exporters are Saudi Arabia
and Russia (Figure 11).
Figure 11. World Oil Exporters (MBD in 2008) [5]
Figure 12. World Oil Flows
Figure 12 shows that a lot of oil comes out of the Middle East
and goes to Western Europe and that a lot of oil comes out of the
Middle East to go to East Asia, principally through the Indonesian
382
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
straits to Southeast Asia, India, China, and Japan. A lot of oil also
comes to the United States, but from very, very disparate sources.
We import oil from Canada, Mexico, South America, and Africa,
as well as from the Middle East.
Now let us look at the choke points that this oil has to flow
through (Figure 13). The thing with choke points, with the exception of the Strait of Hormuz, is that you can usually go around. A
CNA study done a few years ago looked at what would happen
in you closed the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait—all the
Indonesian straits, in fact. [6] That study showed that you can still
sail around Australia. It is going to take a little bit longer, it is going
to add to the cost, and it will probably result in an approximately
1% hit to the world economy, but you can get away with it; it is
not the end of the world. Having said that, if you close the Strait of
Hormuz, it is the equivalent of closing a port because there is no
way around. There are no pipelines that cross Saudi Arabia to take
an equivalent amount of oil down to the Red Sea. There is just no
way around it, and that is why we care so much about it.
Figure 13. Major Oil Shipment Routes
Now let us look at how the United States uses energy (Figure 14).
From an overall perspective, petroleum accounts for about onethird of total U.S. energy consumption. We primarily use it for
transportation purposes and for industrial purposes—chemicals,
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
383
fertilizers, and other things. We do not, however, use oil to make
electricity. We are not, by the way, going to solve our Mideast oil
problem by producing more electricity from nuclear energy or by
using clean coal.
Figure 14. Sources of U.S. Energy Consumption
Two-thirds of all oil in the U.S. is used for transportation, with
heavy trucks and aircraft accounting for roughly one-third of the
two-thirds and cars, light trucks, and SUVs making up the other
two-thirds of the two-thirds (Figure 15).
Figure 15. U.S. Oil Usage
In March 2008, then-President George W. Bush spoke about
our addiction to petroleum and the fact that it presents a target for
terrorists like Osama bin Laden (Figure 16). Similar concerns were
raised in the National Defense Strategy for 2008, which declares
that the well-being of the global economy is contingent upon
384
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
access to energy resources—read that as oil. [7] As we are well
aware, current trends indicate an increasing reliance on petroleum.
Figure 16. Oil As a Strategic Issue
If you look at the Energy Information Agency (EIA) numbers
heading out to 2035, for example, you will see that those numbers
really do not change much. The amount of oil that is going to be
used worldwide is not expected to change markedly. Renewables
are projected to grow a little, and other things will also grow, but
the total amount of oil used in the world, at least according to the
EIA, is not expected to change by much. So the bottom line, at
least according to the National Defense Strategy, is that the United
States is going to have to continue to foster access to and the flow
of energy resources viable to the world economy.
A couple of years ago, JHU/APL did an internal study that
asked the following questions (Figure 17): (1) What if a few major
Mideast oil processing facilities were successfully attacked and had
to be taken offline? (2) What if 5–10% of the world’s oil were taken
off the market for 6 months at a time when supplies were tight
and demand was high? It is unlikely that either of these events
would have the same level of impact today, since global supplies
are actually in pretty good shape and global demand is actually
down compared to 2007. However, if events such as these had
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
385
happened shortly before the onset of the recent recession, it would
have been a big problem.
Figure 17. An Attack on Oil and the Economy?
The next question we asked was: What if such an event were
followed by the threat of additional attacks, including strikes against
ports and choke points? What is the role of maritime forces at that
point? A lot of people will say that this will never happen. However,
Osama bin Laden had said that this is something he was interested
in doing. In his view, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was simply an effort
to dominate Iraq’s energy resources. He clearly understood that
a steady and affordable oil supply was crucial to the well-being
of the United States and the global economy. He believed that
prices should be between $100 and $150 a barrel and that anything less than that was stealing from Muslims in the Mideast. He
also believed that the Mideast resources, the oil resources, were
the treasure for current and future generations of Muslims and thus
should be protected and preserved for their benefit. Given that, he
was faced with the following dilemma: how do you attack oil and
the flow of oil to the United States or Western Europe yet preserve
that wealth? Osama’s solution to that was to rule out attack on
wells and reserves and instead to focus on tankers, oil processing
facilities, ports, and pipelines, because those things can be rebuilt.
386
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
You do not want to permanently contaminate a reserve, but it is
okay to take out something that is part of the transportation or
refining infrastructure.
Such attacks have been carried out in the past. The French
oil tanker Limburg was attacked in 2002; it is shown smoking in
Figure 18. A lethal attack was made on an oil company executive in Bahrain in 2004. The world’s largest oil production facility
at Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia was attacked, albeit unsuccessfully, in
2006. The Abqaiq facility processes two-thirds of the 9.5–10 million barrels of oil that the Saudis produce each day. It is no wonder
that terrorists struck this facility. Fortunately, in this instance, Saudi
security forces were able to thwart the attack.
Figure 18. Past Attacks
One might ask whether or not the intentional diversification in
U.S. petroleum imports would help us weather such an event. If a
particular facility in Saudi Arabia gets taken down, does that really
matter to us since the United States does not import that much oil
from Saudi Arabia? Unfortunately, the answer is the oil market does
not work like that. It is like cows at the trough; everyone is drinking
from the same water source. Oil is a worldwide commodity, and
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
387
its price is determined in a global market. If one suffers, everyone
else suffers as well.
A number of recent oil import and choke point disruptions are
listed in Figure 19.
Figure 19. Past Oil Disruptions
In 1956, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nassar seized control
of the Suez Canal and temporarily closed it. The Suez was closed
again in 1967 as a result of the Six-Day War; the impact appears
in Figure 19. In 1970, the Saudi tapline to the Mediterranean was
closed. What I remember most, because I was not old enough to
really remember the earlier disruptions, is sitting in the gas lines in
1973 and 1974 for hours on end and being told I could have only
10 gallons of gas. As I recall, oil prices went up by a factor of three
or four at that time.
Other events included the 1979 Iranian revolution where oil
prices surged (Figure 20). In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the
1991 Gulf War followed. U.S. Naval forces were assigned to escort
oil tankers. More recently, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 resulted
in most Iraqi oil production being taken offline.
388
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Figure 20. Additional Past Oil Disruptions
Figure 21. Historical Price of Crude Oil: 1947–2009
The question then becomes what does this mean for price?
Figure 21 plots price per barrel, measured in constant 2008 dollars,
over time. Based on the data, you can see that the Suez crisis did
not have much of an impact. However, the 1973 Yom Kippur War
involving Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and the subsequent Arab
oil embargo produced a substantial spike. The result of that was the
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
389
1973–1974 recession, during which prices started to drop. Shortly
afterward, the Iranian Revolution occurred, followed by the Iran—
Iraq War, both of which led to supply disruptions and subsequent
price spikes.
As a result of those price increases, many Americans essentially said that gasoline had become too expensive, and so they
traded their 12-mile-per-gallon gas guzzlers for 24-mile-per-gallon
compact cars. So many people did that, in fact, that over a period
of just 7 years, the average miles per gallon for the entire automobile fleet in this country went from 12 miles per gallon to 24 miles
per gallon. Because the Europeans did the same thing, demand
dropped worldwide and the price of petroleum declined over the
20-year period from 1980 until about 2000.
Over this period, the OPEC countries had trouble staying on
quota. They kept cheating on their quotas, and so the supply of oil
remained high. Finally, in about 2000, they agreed to cut supplies
by 4.2 million barrels per day. As a result, the price of oil began
to rise. This was followed by a large strike in Venezuela, substantial economic growth in Asia following their 1998 meltdown, and
a weakened U.S. dollar. A big spike in the price of oil followed.
Then, prices dropped substantially after the 2008–2009 recession,
but they have begun to rise again as demand has started to come
back up.
One of the things the United States has been very smart about
was that after the 1973–1974 oil embargo, we established the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Figure 22). Basically the idea was
to have a billion barrels of oil stored in underground reservoirs
in southern Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi. That specific area
was chosen for several reasons: (1) the underground salt domes
located there provide ideal storage areas for petroleum, and (2) that
is where the majority of oil inflows come into the United States, so
that is where the pipelines are and that is where the refining capacity is. It makes sense to have it there.
The basic idea of the strategic reserve was to have 90 days of
U.S. imports set aside, based on an average importation rate of
about 11 million barrels a day. As it turns out, we did not build the
390
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
billion-barrel reservoir, we built a 727-million-barrel storage facility. That facility is currently full, because the United States has been
spending money over the last few years to fill the reserve, which in
my view is a good thing.
Figure 22. U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)
The drawdown capacity for the reserve is about 4.5 million
barrels a day, about one-third of U.S. imports. There are always
calls to release oil when prices go up; however, the government
always pushes back and says no. Why? Because you really only
want to release petroleum from the reserve when you have a true
shortage, such as the shortages after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in
2005 and after Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) provides a worldwide
strategic petroleum reserve that is the global analog of the U.S.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. This Paris-based intergovernmental
organization was founded in 1974, shortly after the 1973 Arab
oil embargo. It was created to prevent disruptions in the supply
of oil. As of June 2007, the IEA’s combined stockpile was about
4.1 billion barrels, of which 1.5 billion was under direct government control. As you can see from the map in Figure 23, the IEA
includes Canada, the United States, several nations in Western
Europe, Scandinavia, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
391
South Korea. The participating nations meet periodically to vote or
resolve issues.
Figure 23. International Energy Agency
The IEA’s agreement is called a Coordinated Emergency
Response (Figure 24). In the event of a worldwide disruption, they
have agreed in advance as to who gets what. The IEA agreement
was implemented during the 1999 Gulf War and in 2005 following
Hurricane Katrina.
Figure 24. IEA Coordinated Emergency Response
Measures (CERM)
392
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MARITIME FORCES
Now let us return to our discussion of potential attacks on oil
infrastructure. One of our options is to draw on our national or
international strategic reserve. Clearly, the United States and other
nations will have to work together to see the shortage created by
a terrorist attack through. There will be lots of efficiency measures
that can be implemented. For example, the country could go to a
4-day work week or make cutbacks in other areas.
We next examined the general question: What should the maritime role be in protecting infrastructure and choke points from
potential follow-on attacks?
To start, we asked ourselves: Do critical ports and terminals
need to be guarded, and, if so, who does it? As it turns out, the
answer to the first question is yes. But obviously, if we are engaged
in other places—for example in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya—we
have to come up with the assets to do that. We have to determine
what assets to put where and what we can trade off.
The Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and SOF personnel,
in collaboration with the military forces of allies, would, quite
frankly, have to do this. The next question is whether the DoD
would actually guard ports, terminals, and production facilities.
The answer that we arrived at was yes, they absolutely would and
that a regional cooperative approach would be required. We are
going to have to work with our allies.
As for the United States itself, legal constraints such as those
imposed by Posse Comitatus, Title X, and the Jones Act (which says
that only U.S. flagships can move certain commodities within U.S.
waters) will impose limits on what the DoD can do. Despite these
restrictions, the DoD is probably going to get involved in protecting
U.S. infrastructure. The DoD could use a “layered” approach with
local port authorities, metropolitan police, the National Guard,
the Coast Guard, and the DoD. The Navy obviously can help,
for example, by providing ISR support. In certain areas, the Navy
might be required to provide missile defense. Obviously, effective
prioritization is going to be key.
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
393
What about follow-on attacks? We considered two categories:
attacks on the U.S. homeland and attacks somewhere in the rest of
the world. In either case, terrorists could seek to damage oil industry facilities, related industrial facilities, or major ports. Regional
interstate wars or internal threats also could pop up as a result
of the disruption. Disputes over ownership of oil-producing areas
could flare up. Vulnerable economies would undoubtedly suffer,
and strife could occur as a result. Internal strife could, in turn, lead
to repression.
My guess is that our alliance system and our economic dependencies could be threatened by such attacks. Serious statesmanship would be required to resolve the international issues. Still,
opportunities for mischief are likely to abound.
As for the question of what the worst case is for follow-on
attacks, the answer we arrived at was that a series of attacks against
refineries or ports would impose the most stress. If you take out
a port or a refinery, it is not like a choke point that you can sail
around. If you take out a port, you have a major problem. It is like
the Strait of Hormuz; there is simply no easy workaround.
In such a case, festering disputes over access to oil could
worsen. China’s claim of ownership of potential oil-producing
areas near the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
or other Southeast Asian oil facilities could once again come to
the fore. China might also use the situation to gain leverage over
Taiwan, Japan, or other states in the region. Or, suspicion that
one nation state had funded terrorists or acted directly to take out
another nation state’s oil facilities could cause war to break out in
the Middle East.
As to whether the DoD should be involved in helping to stabilize the global system, I think the answer is that the Department
should support homeland security by providing assistance to the
security of ports, infrastructure, and lines of communication. As
for broader Mideast security, we probably do not want to put additional forces on the ground there, but we could provide advisors
and support wherever possible. We can train and equip others to
take on antipiracy operations and keep the sea lanes open. We
394
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
should work hard to convey the message that it is not okay to seize
oil production facilities, and that it is not going to work. We can
use deterrent measures to do that, to discourage such opportunism.
Over the last two decades, we have clearly moved from
the Cold War environment into a post-Cold War environment.
However, given that some of our adversaries obviously intend to
disrupt Western economic and energy flows, as Osama bin Laden
made clear, should the DoD now be considering moving to an
economic-and-energy security environment? The question I would
leave you with tonight is: “Is it time to pay more attention to this
particular problem?”
Figure 25. Two Schools of Thought on Future Maritime Forces
There are two schools of thought regarding the future role of
our maritime forces (Figure 25). We saw a similar argument play
out when the Navy was working on the previous version of the
maritime strategy. On one side of the argument are those who
believe that we should be getting ready to fight the next big war
and thus that the primary roles for our maritime forces should be
power projection and sea control. On the other side are those
who argue that we should focus on tasks such as economic and
energy (E2) security, antipiracy, and humanitarian relief. I do not
think the question is whether we should be doing all of one or all
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
395
of the other, but rather where should we place our emphasis. That
is something I would ask you to think about.
Along these lines, I find it particularly interesting that in January
2011, NATO released their new maritime strategy. It basically
says that global trade relies on secure and low-cost international
maritime transportation and distribution networks and that both
of these are vulnerable to disruption. Because those disruptions
would have serious impacts, the maintenance of freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes, and related critical infrastructure is
of considerable importance to the NATO nations.
REFERENCES
1. Global Commerce Networks: Presentation to JHU/APL’s
Rethinking the Future International Security Environment,
Mr. Steve Carmel, Maersk Line, August 22, 2007.
2. Accenture, A Global Study of Supply Chain Leadership and its
Impact on Business Performance, 2008.
3. Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Costs of Disruptions
in Container Shipments, 2006.
4. Booz Allen Hamilton, Port Security War Game: Implications for
U.S. Supply Chains, 2003, http://www.boozallen.com/media/
file/128648.pdf.
5. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook
2009, 2008.
6. Center for Naval Analyses, Value of Maritime Trade in Southeast
Asia, 1994.
7. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2008, http://
www.defense.gov/news/2008 national defense strategy.pdf.
8. Michael Scheuer, Stephen Ulph, and John C.K. Daly, Saudi
Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy,
Jamestown Foundation, May 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/
uploads/media/Jamestown-SaudiOil.pdf.
396
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Q&
A
SESSION WITH MR. DUNCAN BROWN
the oil pipelines from Canada to the United States be
Q: Might
vulnerable to attack?
Mr. Duncan Brown: Yes, people could go after pipelines.
Fortunately, however, pipelines can be repaired. You can put in
new pipes and valves fairly quickly. You can take them offline for a
short period of time. The more serious attacks are those directed at
ports or large oil-processing facilities. As I stated earlier, I think that
is where the major issue would be. And again, it is not so much
about disruptions in the United States; it is about disruptions anywhere in the world. Petroleum is traded on the world market—we
all drink from the same trough, and we are all in this together.
question has to do with the ongoing (and very tragic) crisis
Q: My
in Japan. Given your three constructs of economics and the oil
supply and consumption piece, the fact that their economy went down
has apparently reduced demand for oil but significantly increased the
price at the same time.
It seems to be kind of a double-edged sword. What lessons can we
learn from that kind of interdependency as we apply it toward your
stated questions?
Mr. Duncan Brown: Well, I think the answer is supply and
demand fluctuates. We have obviously just been through a major
recession. Japan just got a huge hit. Demand is down on a relative basis, for example, from where it was in 2008. But my guess
is demand will come back up at some point; supply usually tries
to meet demand, and producers will produce less. And so that will
dictate the price. Having said that, if you have a major disruption,
whether it is a port disruption, the closure of a major choke point
that cannot be overcome, or an attack on a major facility, that is
just going to drive prices through the roof, and that is definitely
going to hurt the economy. And we saw that in the past.
For example, in 1973 and 1974, we intervened on Israel’s side.
Arab nations were not happy with that, so we had the subsequent
Chapter 11 Economic and Energy Security and Its Impact
397
Arab oil embargo, and the price of oil went through the roof. The
consequence of that was a major recession in 1973–1974, which,
until this last recession, was the biggest U.S. recession since the
Great Depression. So the answer is it does not matter necessarily
where we are today in terms of supply and demand. Supply and
demand will pretty much balance out most of the time. But the
issue of concern is what happens if you take a major hit.
cannot defend every choke point everywhere in the world
Q: You
with limited resources. Do you have some specific choke
points or egress points in mind?
Mr. Duncan Brown: I think you focus on the Strait of Hormuz
because there is no way around it. I think you give up on the other
straits; you just say, “If I have to, I can sail around,” so you do not
worry about those as much. I think you worry about major import
and export ports, and we know where those are. You worry about
major facilities, such as the refining capacity in Houston, Texas.
You pick and choose the major pieces—the ones whose disruption would cause major harm. Because you are absolutely right,
we cannot defend everything, so we have to pick and choose, and
we have to prioritize.
Q: What other critical infrastructure might you have to protect?
Mr. Duncan Brown: That is a good question. I think you
break it into two pieces. One is the intercontinental communication cables; the other is their connection points. When I was a kid,
I loved charts, and one of the charts I had hanging on my wall was
one that showed where all the AT&T lines came into the East Coast
of the United States. They do not produce that chart anymore, for
obvious reasons.
So I think you have to defend those. I do not know how you
defend thousands and thousands of miles of undersea cable. I think
what you do instead is create the capability to repair those things
or you create workarounds. And those workarounds might be routing traffic a different way, which we should be able to do to some
degree, or reducing the amount of traffic and prioritizing when that
traffic can move on those cables in terms of the time of day.
398
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
look at balancing responsibility, how do you reconQ: Ascileyou
what the federal government should do and what private
industry should do in terms of protecting critical infrastructure?
Mr. Duncan Brown: In my mind, such questions are very similar to the excess capacity question: how much excess capacity do
you build, how much security do you pay for, and what do you
plan for? Obviously industry, to the extent that it can, is going to
wring out as much excess capacity as possible. Firms are going to
wring out as much security as possible; when possible, they will
base their decisions on risk calculations. Still, I do not have an
exact answer, and I do not think anybody knows. I think there will
be a lot of assumptions made and there will be a lot of calculations
made, but at the end of the day, I do not know.
that piece, but what I am really trying to get
Q: Iyourunderstand
feel for is the balance between what the federal government takes on and what industry takes on.
Mr. Duncan Brown: I do not know the precise answer for
that. I do not know how to rationalize who pays for what and what
portion of the bill is allocated to the federal government and what
portion is allocated to private industry. I am sure there are lots
of people with lots of answers, but I am not sure I would believe
them, quite frankly.
anyone done a study on the cascading and potential
Q: Has
failures that come with different amounts of oil shortage?
For instance, power plants typically run on coal, but the trains that get
the coal there run on diesel. Has someone studied the other parts of the
infrastructure that could fail sequentially in the event of a shortage?
Mr. Duncan Brown: There is a critical infrastructure panel in
this country that I think has examined such issues, but I do not
know if they have addressed your precise question: Does the loss
of a tremendous amount of oil screw up the trains that are delivering coal to our nation’s electrical power plants? There are so many
inter-relationships between all of the variables that affect our ability
to respond, and sometimes when we do calculations we find that
we have missed one.
Adapting to Climate and
Energy Challenges—
Reprised
C h a p t e r 12
A da p t i n g to
C l i m at e a n d E n e rg y
C h a l l e n g e s —A M a r i t i m e
F o rc e P e r s p e c t i v e
403
Ms. Sherri Goodman
Let me begin by noting that the auditorium here is not nearly as
full as the one at Georgetown University was this morning when I
heard the President deliver his energy security address. However,
this conference is really the untold story for Americans about where
innovation is happening in energy and climate change today. All
of you are a part of that, so I am glad that you are here. And I am
very pleased to be here.
I am very privileged and honored to be on this panel with
three of my Navy uniformed colleagues. We have the best coming
out here at the very end; I know that you have heard from Rear
Admiral Philip Cullom and Rear Admiral David Titley already in this
Ms. Sherri Goodman is senior vice president, General Counsel and
Corporate Secretary of CNA and serves as Executive Director of the
Military Advisory Board. From 1993 to 2001, Ms. Goodman was
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security), serving
as the chief environmental, safety, and occupational health officer for
the DoD. In this position, she was responsible for over $5 billion in
annual defense spending including programs on energy efficiency and
climate change, cleanup at active and closing bases, compliance with
environmental laws, environmental cooperation with foreign militaries, and conservation of natural and cultural resources. As an attorney,
Ms. Goodman has practiced law at Goodwin Procter, has served on the
staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and has also worked at
RAND and SAIC. Ms. Goodman serves on the boards of the Atlantic
Council of the United States, the National Academy of Sciences’ Energy
and Environmental Systems Board, the Marshall Legacy Institute, and
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. She is also a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations. Ms. Goodman received a J.D. cum laude
from the Harvard Law School and a master’s degree in public policy
from Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. She received
her bachelor of arts degree summa cum laude from Amherst College.
404
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
conference, so we are going to start with the man with the money
because, as we all know, that is what really talks. Captain Michael
Sparks is in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
N862, Combat Modernization. He is looking to the future and
putting together the Navy’s long-term program. President Barack
Obama, in his remarks this morning (which I urge all of you to read
because they provide a blueprint for securing America’s energy
future), described the work that the Navy and the other services
are doing in this area and the new mandates and opportunities for
the federal family to continue to show leadership as we move to
a world where we are less reliant on oil, whether from developing our own sources of clean and renewable energy or by taking
advantage of energy efficiency opportunities.
After we hear from Captain Sparks, we will turn our attention
to Rear Admiral Titley. Some of you may have heard, as I did a few
weeks ago, Rear Admiral Titley being interviewed by Ira Flatow
on the NPR Science Friday program. While I have conversed with
Rear Admiral Titley many, many times in the past, based on that
interview, I discovered that he is one of the greatest science communicators that we have in our nation today. It is really important to be able to communicate the science of climate change to
a broad reach of Americans in a way that they can understand it.
That is so critically important now. I think that one of the things
that really stands out to me, having served for 8 years in the DoD
in the 1990s and having spent all my professional life working with
the military, is that the Navy is truly blessed and that the nation and
the DoD are truly blessed by having Rear Admiral Titley and Rear
Admiral Cullom leading the Navy’s efforts on climate change and
energy, respectively.
After Rear Admiral Titley speaks, we will hear once again from
our other great Naval leader, Rear Admiral Cullom, who has also
been bringing innovation, creativity, and ingenuity to what the
Navy is doing on the energy side.
405
Captain Michael Sparks
From my point of view in the resource sponsor seat, the Navy
has made, and will continue to make, significant investment in
energy change and energy initiatives. Since I have been in N86, my
objective has been to look hard at those investments and ensure
that they are looked at holistically rather than merely as an initial
response to an urgent need. The energy need is real. It is in our
face right now. We live it every day. I lived it this morning when I
Captain Michael C. Sparks was commissioned in 1988 through the
Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps program at The Citadel in
Charleston, South Carolina, where he received a bachelor’s degree in
political science. At sea, Captain Sparks has served as Ordnance Officer,
Operations Officer, and Navigator on the USS Charleston (LKA 113),
Fire Control Officer on the USS Deyo (DD 989), Weapons Officer and
Combat Systems Officer on the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), Commanding
Officer of the USS Dextrous (MCM 13) forward deployed in Manama,
Bahrain, and Commanding Officer on the USS Momsen (DDG 92).
Tours ashore include Navigation and Naval Operations Instructor at
the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit, The Citadel, Surface
Department Head Assignment Officer and Sea Coordinator at Navy
Personnel Command (PERS 41), Assistant Sea Shield Pillar Head and
Warfare Requirements Action Officer for Surface, Anti-Submarine,
and Mine Warfare programs in the Fleet Forces Command’s Warfare
Requirements Branch (N80), and Chief, Strategic Operations Division,
Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff. Captain Sparks holds a master’s degree in joint campaign planning and strategy from National
Defense University via the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS)
and a master’s degree in management from Webster University. His
awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Bronze Star,
the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), the Navy Commendation
Medal (six awards), the Navy Achievement Medal (two awards), the
Combat Action Ribbon, and a variety of unit and campaign awards.
406
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
filled my gas tank up before driving up here for the meeting. Given
the billions of dollars that we spend on fuel, any savings that we
can make at sea is an immediate return on investment.
Still, that return on investment needs to be something that is
sustainable for the long term. What does that mean? That means
ensuring that systems—be they backfits, new procurement, or new
construction—include the entire tooth-to-tail thought process. We
do not want to put systems on ships to save money if we cannot
sustain those systems. The logistics train needs to be there. The
training for our operators has to be there. The technical support
and backup has to be there so that when those systems break, we
can repair or replace them. We have to be able to reach the tech
community so that they can conduct the repairs. In short, we have
to ensure that these systems continue to provide that return on the
initial investment.
In making those investments, we have to live within the existing requirements and acquisition process. While we are trying
to change that process so that it does a better job of recognizing
energy consumption and energy efficiency from the get go, we
have to work within that process to achieve the desired end state.
The desired changes are not things that you can just push a button
and make happen. Such factors are, however, important enough
that we should try to ensure that they are somehow considered in
the system that we have today and fundamental to the process that
evolves over the long term.
I want to touch on the culture change topic that Rear Admiral
Philip Cullom mentioned in his presentation. I think it is clear that
investments in material solutions to help save energy are coming.
Within the next year or two, proofs of concept will be coming into
the fleet. After that, these solutions will appear in larger numbers
as we go into the Green Fleet demo in 2016. Beyond that, we will
have backfits to install hybrid electric drive on destroyers and the
injection of the various technologies for renewable energy solutions, particularly fuels. The only drawback to this schedule is that
it includes a gap, and that gap starts now. To be factually correct,
I should say that the gap started about 10 years ago, but we will
just take it from right now. Thus, until such time as when we have
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
407
a fleet of sailors who know nothing but the energy conservation
capabilities that exist within the fleet, we will have to rely heavily on that culture change piece that Rear Admiral Cullom talked
about. That is huge. It is easy to say that we will just change the
way we think, but the change is not just a change at the shipboard
level. It is not just that the commanding officers of our ships have
to drive differently. For the past 60 years, we have focused exclusively on combat capability; we all aspire to be 32-knot Burke. We
want capability to go fast. We want speed to station. That thought
process still needs to be there, and that capability still needs to be
there when necessary, but now we need to consider the energyrelated aspects associated with properly planning and executing
our operations not only at the shipboard level, but also at the numbered fleet level.
That thought process has to be infused. When appropriate, we
need to adjust our transit speeds to enable our ships to be more
energy efficient. Our tactics, techniques, and procedures need to
reflect those kinds of thought processes. In addition, we have to
look at how we can infuse energy conservation into our risk management thought processes when we operate our ships. This is not
to say that our ships should not have all their engines online when
they are going alongside the oiler, but if a ship is getting under way
from San Diego and it is a crystal clear day, there is no wind, and
several tugs are on hand to pull the ship off the pier, is it really
necessary to have four main engines, two generators online, and a
third generator on standby? Operating that way burns a lot of fuel
over the 3- to 4-hour period that it takes to get under way. Do we
really need to do that? Our risk-averse side says: “Hey, I need to
have the others available just in case that generator drops offline
or that engine drops offline.” But remember, the ship still has two
shafts. It still has two engines that can start quickly. So, what I am
saying is that we need to provide opportunities for our commanding officers to consider energy conservation when they conduct
their risk assessment along with everything else that goes into ship
operations. It needs to become part of our culture at all levels of
command.
408
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Lastly, I will touch briefly on climate change. This past year,
N86 sponsored a Naval Sea Systems Command study that takes a
hard look at the changes we need to make in our systems in order
to be able to operate effectively in the Arctic. The lessons learned
from port are all very good and sound and are going to be included
in the study. However, we need to go deeper; we need to go a lot
deeper. We need to look hard at what the Canadians and some
of our European allies do because they operate more frequently
in the Arctic than we do. We need to see if they have already
identified concepts that we could adapt to enhance our capability
to operate in the Arctic as that mission set expands in the years
to come. We do not want operations in the Arctic to be a crisis.
Hopefully, we have time available now to investigate those issues
and then implement any necessary changes so that when we need
to operate in the Arctic, we will be ready to do so.
409
Rear Admiral David Titley
Whether you are military or civilian, whenever you sit down
for that midterm counseling and they start talking about other
things that you could be doing, you should feel pretty certain that
things are going to change. So perhaps Ms. Sherri Goodman has
been talking with the Chief of Naval Operations and what comes
next is pack your bag. Your badge does not work here anymore.
You guys listened to me for probably too long before lunchtime, so
I am going to make this fairly brief.
First, I was remiss in my earlier remarks by not publicly thanking
my colleagues at the Office of Naval Research (ONR) because ONR
is putting real money both into Arctic research and into improving
our understanding of that very, very hard part of climate change, the
part where we go from today’s weather to something significantly
different in just 70 years. We are doing as much as we can to enable
our resource sponsors to get the answers that they need when they
ask us to tell them what the risks are when they delay their programs by 1 year or by 2 years. The work that ONR is doing is going
to help inform that risk analysis. Over the next 5 years, ONR will
be spending about $40 million to support this very important work.
You cannot do much better than the Vice Chief’s guidance that
we need to look at this in a deliberate way and make investments
at the right time based on the right analysis. I thought that was a
tremendous message, and we will keep going on that. I wish climate
change were not happening, but it is happening, and unfortunately,
as long as we keep accelerating the rate at which we are putting
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, we in the Navy at least will
need to continue to develop adaptation strategies and probably
more aggressive adaptation strategies as the decades go on. I hope
that is not true. I hope that either there will be some tremendous fix
or we are missing a huge piece of the science, but until we see that,
410
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
we are going to have to continue to plan based on what we now
know. So, it is great to hear about the studies that N86 is sponsoring
with Naval Sea Systems Command. Those efforts will provide the
next level of detail so that we can start influencing programs.
Let me mention three things about the Arctic. First, it is an
ocean. I think everyone here understands that. That is why the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is important. That
is why the Bering Strait is important because, although the Arctic
is an ocean, it is also essentially the world’s biggest estuary. If you
look down on the Arctic region, you see that there is a lot of water
around Greenland through the Fram Strait down to Europe. On
the opposite side, everything goes through the Bering Strait. By the
middle of this century, it is likely that a large part of the Arctic will
be relatively ice-free for 8–12 weeks each year. The big shippers tell
me that is when they will get really interested in trans-Arctic routes.
At that time, the Bering Strait could start taking on the characteristics
of both the Strait of Malacca with its two-way trade and the Strait
of Hormuz, with significant hydrocarbon resources coming out of
the Arctic. I am not saying that this is going to happen, but I think it
is plausible within the next 35 or 40 years. It is not that far off, and
there are a lot of issues that we will need to deal with. What kinds of
ships do we want? How does the Navy work with the Coast Guard?
What role does the Arctic play in maritime domain awareness?
My third point about the Arctic is that we will not be able to
operate there as if it were a vacuum. We will need partnerships and
cooperative arrangements similar to those that we have at the middle
latitudes. Admiral James Stavridis, the current Commander of the
U.S. European Command, told me that he would like to see at least
the European component of the Arctic as a zone of cooperation.
To close, I would like to again remind you that we humans are
one of the most adaptable species on Earth. We can certainly deal
with changes, but the faster those changes occur and the more
unpredictable they are, the harder and harder it will be for mankind to adapt. So, as you pay attention to the science over the next
several years, think about the rate of change and how that change
is going to occur. Do not focus exclusively on whether the change
is 1° or 3°. By themselves, those numbers do not mean a whole lot,
but how we get there means an awful lot.
411
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom
At the beginning, you mentioned that there were not nearly
as many people here as there were at the President’s remarks just
a couple hours ago. I would like to point out that there were also
more people here yesterday. What this really means is that those
remaining, those dedicated few, are the real Spartan energy and
climate warriors. Either that or you are all Mayo from “An Officer
and a Gentleman.” (He was the one who said, “I got no place
to go.”) I prefer to believe it is the former rather than the latter
because I think the issues that we have been discussing over the
last 2 days require dedicated thought.
Like Rear Admiral David Titley, I was remiss yesterday in not
making a big enough deal about some of the partnerships that we
have. I certainly did talk about how we are working with industry,
but I did not mention all of the emerging partnerships we have with
academia. Earlier today, President Barack Obama spoke about the
partnerships that we need to have if we are going to solve our
energy problems. But, I would like to go further than just industry
and academia. We also need partnerships with the nongovernmental organizations that we are working with and building new
relationships with and finding that we have a lot that we can share
with each other to move these issues forward. And then I would
go even further than that and talk about the other military services
and how much we have learned from them.
As I think about the differences between where we were last
year and where we are today, it is clear that the Navy has made
a lot of progress in the last 2 years. But, we did not get here by
accident. The Air Force and the Army have been doing a lot of
great work with their energy programs. We are talking with them
on a day-to-day basis to make sure that we benefit from that work
412
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
without having to duplicate it. We all benefit by sharing information, whether it is on the energy side or on the climate side. And,
it is not just information about the technical issues like composite
materials or fuels that we share, it is also information about strategy.
In fact, much of our process for coming up with our energy strategy
was copied from the Coast Guard’s efforts. To a large extent, we
mirrored the Evergreen process that Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin
talked about yesterday. We did energy wargaming, not to fight
wars over energy, but to help us understand what is happening
with energy. From those trends and uncertainties, we developed a
series of potential futures. From those futures, we took the strategy
that we were developing and then tested it against those futures to
see how it would survive. The process was remarkably similar to
the approach used by the Coast Guard.
But let me go further than that. Establishing partnerships is also
about our allies. Five years ago, I had the job that Rear Admiral
Woods has today. When I was in that job, I did a lot of liaison
work with the allied navies, and interestingly enough, many of
them were talking about the issues of climate change and energy.
I remember getting several briefs and having several discussions
about these issues with my counterparts in the Royal Navy and in
the Australian and Canadian navies. At the time, I kept wondering,
why are they so interested in climate? What is the big deal? That
was 5 years ago; look at where we are today. We need to have
those partnerships developed so that we can move these issues
forward quickly when necessary.
Hopefully Rear Admiral Titley and I have made the argument
that climate and energy issues are linked. We truly see them as
linked; you cannot deal with one without dealing with the other,
whether you start on the energy side and end up on the climate
side or you start on the climate side and end up on the energy side.
That is one of the reasons why the Task Force Energy website, for
instance, actually includes climate, energy, and environment, and
you can go to any one of those three as you navigate around to see
what we are doing.
The second thing I would like to say is that if you are a returnee
from last year, I hope it is apparent that the difference between
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
413
where we were then and where we are today is profound, not
just in terms of what we are talking about, but in terms of what
we are doing. As The Honorable John Warner emphasized, it has
to be about what you are doing. Well, we have done a lot. How
we are balancing these things is exactly what I saw play out as we
were developing the FY2012 budget. We had to strike a balance
between the N8 side, which is developing the Navy’s programs,
and the things that provide specific capabilities—be it a weapon
system, a radar, or a communications system—and the Navy’s systems commands on the other side—Naval Air Systems Command
and Naval Sea Systems Command. Several of our panels yesterday
talked about these issues. Well, what we saw happen in the budget
process was the grinding, grinding, grinding that is needed to figure
out how important energy is. At the end of the day, we achieved
success by focusing on the art of the long view. We have to accept
that this is something that may require more than 2 years to pay
back. We have to look at this in terms of where we are going to end
up in 2020 or 2030, so any of the energy initiatives we brought up
as a part of that discussion and debate in the N8 and the systems
command world brought forward exactly that view. What is the
return on investment? What is the payback period? Let us project
it out to 2020 or 2030 and see where we end up. Is that the Navy
we want? I think that was a profoundly important point because
it made us make decisions that were not just about the here and
now, not just about the quarterly profit and loss statement, and not
just about the annual return, but about where the Navy is going
to be in a decade or two decades. When you do that, you make
profoundly different decisions, and that is what I am most proud of
with regard to the 2012 budget.
As a final point, I would like to remind you that our approach
has to be holistic. At the end of the day, we have to consider both
climate and energy. We really need to look at ourselves as going
back to our roots. The future should, in fact, truly benefit from the
past. The ability to be austere in the way we handle energy does
the right things on the climate side as well as the right things on the
mission side for the people who are at the pointy end.
414
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
So, I am going to leave you with a final thought. I was up on
Ward 5 in Bethesda a couple of weeks ago. Ward 5 is the surgery
floor, and I had a chance to walk around and talk at length with
some of the soldiers, sailors, Marines, and, from time to time, even
airmen who were there. I have to tell you that many of them are
being asked to make some pretty incredible sacrifices because we
did not value energy the way we should have 20 or 30 years ago.
Were we to have valued it differently, there might be fewer injured
servicemen and women because many of them are there because
they were protecting convoys. They were, in fact, moving water,
moving fuel, or moving things logistically up into some pretty Godforsaken country. When you consider the environment in which
they have been working—the tremendous elevation changes, the
lack of roads, and the fact that there are so many places to be
attacked from in the various countries where we are currently
engaged—I have to tell you that we owe it to them to make sure
that we come up with the right plan for the long haul so that there
will be fewer families visiting their loved ones at Bethesda or Walter
Reed in the future.
As Senator Warner said yesterday, all battle plans really do
begin in the engine room. They begin with that soldier or that sailor
who is down there on the deck plate or in the trenches, and they
have good ideas about this stuff. The culture change that I mentioned earlier is about capturing some of the things that come up
from them as much as it is about the leadership that we show along
the way. At the end of the day, it is about their buddy; it is about
their fellow sailor or soldier who they want to see make it through
this conflict. Every one of the individuals who was there, some of
whom had missing limbs, said they wanted to get back to their unit.
And some of them will return to their units, but we need to make
sure that they are afforded all the things that they need to have
so that we can, in fact, have a Navy that is sustainable and that
we can sustain in perpetuity. That is the kind of sustainability that
does the right thing for every sailor, Marine, soldier, and airman out
there as well as for the Navy, for the nation, and planet A.
415
Dr. Catherine Kelleher
First my apologies; I will never rely on GPS again. Over
the last hour or so, I have explored parts of Maryland I did not
know existed.
Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher is a professor at the University of
Maryland at College Park and also holds both a research appointment as Senior Fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University in
Providence, Rhode Island, and the honorary title of Research Professor
Emeritus at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
She is a member of the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy
of Sciences. She was also named an Honorary Professor at the Free
University of Berlin and is a Senior Faculty Associate for 2004–2009
at the Geneva Center for Security Policy in Geneva, Switzerland. She
serves as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analysis in Washington.
In the Clinton Administration, she was the Personal Representative of
the Secretary of Defense in Europe and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. She served on the National
Security Council staff during the Carter Administration and has consulted for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of the Army. She was
Professor of Military Strategy at the National War College and has had
numerous other teaching assignments. She has been a research fellow at
the Institute of Strategic Studies in London and a Kistiakowsky fellow of
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and she has received individual research grants from NATO, the Council on Foreign Relations,
the German Marshall Fund, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Ford
Foundation. Dr. Kelleher holds degrees from Mount Holyoke College
(bachelor of arts and doctor of letters) and from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (Ph.D.). She is the recipient of the Medal for
Distinguished Public Service from the DoD, the Director’s Medal from
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Cross of Honor in Gold from
the Federal Armed Forces of Germany.
416
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Based on my look at the program and few remarks I have
heard here, I am sure that all of you share the feeling I have that
this conference, in a way, could not have happened at a more
opportune time. Although the Japanese tsunami was not caused
by climate change, I think the damage that has been suffered in
Japan gives you a sense of how the best laid preparations can seem
so inadequate when we have to deal with the force of water and
the problem of where we all like to live, what we all like to do,
and how much that is going to have to change in the future simply
because of climate change.
Imagine, if you can, what kind of picture we would have in
North Africa if there were not just a wave of revolution with uncertain effects facing us, but if, in fact, that wave were backed up by a
massive push of population from places in Africa where both water
and ways to support the population are in short supply. Imagine
all of those people crowding onto a littoral that is plenty crowded
already. I think all of us are under an enormous mandate to think
differently about the future. It is not a future that we want. It is not
one we are going to be comfortable with, but it is coming, and to
the best of our abilities, we have to think through what the implications are not just for the Navy but really for the kind of world
in which the United States is going to be operating. There will be
many, many demands for resources, and we are going to have to
come up with a new list of priorities and be able to defend them
not just to our own population but to other people as well.
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
417
Q&
A
SESSION WITH THE PANELISTS
Ms. Sherri Goodman: Now we are going to have an opportunity to have some Q&A; I will start with the first question while
you all are getting your own questions together. Let me begin with
some context. One of our goals for the future is to make our military more sustainable in the way we use energy and reduce our
reliance on fossil fuels. That reliance currently forces us to put our
men and women at risk every day, to include those who are protecting us as well as those who are protecting the convoys that
are bringing the fuel to the front. As President Barack Obama said
today, we are looking to alternatives, to moving beyond fossil fuels
to renewable energy sources. We know that we in the DoD have
to think about what that means for our whole tooth to tail. It is all
good to say that we believe in this, but we also need to really operationalize these concepts within our acquisition process.
I spent 8 years in Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, sometimes beating the drum,
sometimes beating down doors, and sometimes beating my head
against the brick walls set up by my colleagues as I tried to integrate environmental considerations into the weapon system acquisition process. While we have clearly made some progress in the
years since, there is still a lot more room for improvement.
As we try to operationalize how we use energy within the
acquisition process, we have focused on having energy be a Key
Performance Parameter for major acquisition systems and using the
fully burdened cost of fuel as a way to price energy so that we are
measuring the true cost to the Department. I am sure most of you
are already aware of these concepts, but I understand that maybe
that is not enough. Maybe we actually have to go even beyond
these two or put them into practice in other ways. So, I would like
to ask our panelists to speak to this particular issue. How, in fact,
do we make sure that energy considerations are properly included
in the acquisition process?
418
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Captain Michael Sparks: We need recognize that energy considerations are here to stay. It is just the reality of the situation. And
that realization has to drive the necessary changes in the acquisition process. Accomplishing that change is not something that can
be realized simply by saying the words “acquisition reform.” Every
time someone discusses changing the acquisition process, people
wave flags and say, “Yes, yes, yes.” But making that monster move
is not a quick process. Simply saying that it is going to cost us millions of dollars more each year if we do not make these changes—
if we do not infuse these energy parameters—oftentimes falls on
deaf ears because of where we are trying to inject energy considerations into the process. As Rear Admiral Philip Cullom mentioned,
it has to be at the very beginning. As you know, a lot of our requirements come from operational commanders. If those operational
commanders are not out there saying, “Not only do I need this
capability, but I also need this capability with a reduced demand
for energy,” then that requirement is not going to appropriately
stimulate the entire process from tooth to tail. We need operational
commanders to say, “I want a ship that I do not have to refuel every
3 days but that still provides all the essential warfighting capability.”
We have to get beyond just saying that we need this desired effect
from the sea, from the air, or from the land. And that goes right
back into the whole process of the culture change. That energy
savings needs to be translated to the end user, who is the original
requester for the capability. It sounds simple, but it is not.
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: I tried to talk to some of this during my presentation with the slide that showed the acquisition process and showed that it is both a process issue and a paradigm
issue. The paradigm issue is the culture change piece because you
have to get all the people involved in the analysis of alternatives to
sit around the table at the same time. In the past, we generally have
not done that; the process did not seem to work that way except in
the space program and a few other places.
Your point about the metrics that we need to be tracking, whether
they be Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) or the fully burdened
cost of fuel, are precisely the kinds of things that we are looking at.
Over the last year and a half, we have started to dig in pretty hard
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
419
on this. One of the slides I showed addressed total ownership cost.
That slide showed how the various costs associated with the average surface ship are changing. For example, maintenance costs for
that average surface ship are actually going down compared with
the consumer price index. Those costs are still going up in reality, but less than the consumer price index. Manpower costs are
growing at twice the rate of the consumer price index, and energy
costs are growing at somewhere between 5 and 15 times the rate
of the consumer price index. So, that is what is happening with
total ownership cost or what we call TOC. Having that become a
centerpiece for our decision making would certainly improve the
process. The earlier that we can look at things like KPPs or the fully
burdened cost of fuel, whether at the Initial Capabilities Document
point or the Capability Development Document point in the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process, the better off we will be. Ideally, we should be looking at energy before
we get to the first milestone, before we get to the first gate review.
That will force people to work together and make the necessary
trade-offs along the way. When we do that, we are going to end
up with something that is radically different in terms of its energy
efficiency yet still able to achieve the capabilities that we want.
Toward that end, I would recommend that you take a look
at Factor Ten Engineering Design Principles, a paper written by
Mr. Amory Lovins from the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI). [1]
RMI is one of the nongovernmental organizations that we talk with,
and this paper addresses the type of thinking that we are going to
need to use to help solve the problems we are facing.
Rear Admiral David Titley: I am going to take us about 15° off
course here. In addition to the acquisition side, we need to think
about how we get the right demand signal. If the combatant commands really want to increase naval proficiency in the Arctic, there
needs to be a demand signal. On its own, the Navy is not going to
send ships north. Virtually all of our ships respond to a demand signal from one of the combatant commands. Once submitted, that
demand is adjudicated through a pretty well-defined process. So,
if we see ourselves needing to gain proficiency in some area, it is
great that we see that, but the combatant commands will need to
420
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
believe that as well. So, that is how we can really start generating
change. It comes back to the ultimate users, to the customers. We
can talk all we want inside the beltway, but a lot of this gets driven
by the ultimate customers.
Ms. Sherri Goodman: As I am sure many of you know,
Mr. Lovins has done a lot of innovative work on energy and the
environment over many decades. Back in the 1990s, as we were
starting the first wave of renovation to the Pentagon, he led a session to brainstorm new concepts for how to green the renovation
of the Pentagon. That might seem like an oxymoron, but I think
ultimately some, although not all, of his concepts were integrated
into the design. That leads me to think that there might be some
opportunity if his Factor Ten Engineering is a new distillation of
how you get a little more forward leaning and look a little earlier
in the acquisition process to find ways to introduce those concepts
on a trial basis early on. Doing that would provide some seeding of
the ideas and help to get them socialized within the culture in the
right way in order to get taken up and adopted more consistently
throughout a variety of programs.
am walking away from the symposium with a bit of a mixed
Q: Imessage.
There is the energy side, the climate side, and what I
would call the national security energy side. The elephant in the room is
that there is a sizable chunk of the U.S. population that does not believe
in climate change, so mentioning climate change or anything with green
in front of it automatically incurs the wrath of about 630 radio stations
and a major television network. It has become a political football; opinion is hardened, and it is impervious to logic or data. Given that, would
we not do a better job if we emphasized national energy security? No one
can be against that. All of us here are living proof that the United States
will spend a good deal of money on security.
Rear Admiral David Titley: I agree that energy security is certainly an important part of what we are trying to do. I have certainly been in a lot of meetings where people have asked that we
think along the lines of how we prosecuted Al Capone. We could
not get him for murder, but we could get him for tax evasion. To
a point, I think that is okay, but I think that although maybe it is
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
421
of tactical benefit for us to just pretend that there is nothing going
on with the climate, we are, in fact, doing the country a long-term
disservice if we do not confront the facts. We all took an oath to
uphold and defend the Constitution; most of us were taught in our
officer candidate classes as midshipmen or cadets that sometimes
that means telling people things that they do not want to hear. It
is part of leadership. It does not mean you have to be nasty or
unpleasant, and it does not mean that you have to get in the middle of a political debate. When speaking to the public, I like to say
that ice does not vote Republican or Democrat. It does not caucus. It does not provide money to any political group. It does not
watch MSNBC. It does not watch Fox. It just melts. So, we have
the facts on the ground that are telling us what is going on, and we
need to adjust for that. We can certainly work the energy issues,
and there are tremendous reasons to do so even if there was no
such thing as climate change. Even if there were no greenhouse
gases, there would be hugely compelling reasons to do everything
Rear Admiral Cullom is working on because it makes our troops,
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines safer and more combat
effective. But if you believe that then you would not care about
the Arctic because you would say, “Well, there is not going to be
any change in the Arctic, so why would you care about sea-level
rise when that is not going to happen?” And you would say, “Why
would you care about water resources when that is not going to
happen?” But, we can see that all of those things are happening.
We can either stick our heads in the sand and make it a crisis or
we can, as the Vice Chief observed, look at this in a deliberate and
thoughtful way. When we do that, we usually come up with better
ideas, and we usually spend a whole lot less money than when we
attack something as an “oh-my-God” crisis.
Over the years, I have found that the military is a relatively
trusted institution. I have testified on this issue a couple of times
on the Hill, and not always in front of people who have hit the “I
believe” button. It gives people pause. I am not representing big
industry. I am not representing academia. I do not have a grant.
My agenda is ensuring that our Navy is ready in the 21st century.
I do not get anything extra in my paycheck for talking about this
stuff. In some ways my life would be easier if I did not; I would
422
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
get fewer of the strange things I get on Facebook and some other
blogs. But, you have to be able to see the facts on the ground and
address them. It is certainly possible that all the science is wrong,
but that is not the way to bet right now. Until we have pretty good
evidence that this is all wrong, we need to start thinking about how
to address it. So, absolutely we can do the energy. We should do
the energy regardless. But I think long term, we do ourselves and
our country a disservice if we do not really talk about the facts.
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: The only place I disagree with
Rear Admiral Titley is that I think that we need to be ready for the
22nd century and the 23rd century, not just the 21st century. I realize that that is long past your lifetime, my lifetime, and no doubt
the lifetimes of our children and our grandchildren, but if we are
going to look to the future—we hope that the future is going to be
a good future—then we owe it to our citizens to be thinking with
the art of the long view.
When I came to this job of energy and environment, I went
from strike group command to being the head of readiness for the
Navy, and this was an outgrowth of that position. To me, it is absolutely a direct descendant from that position because you cannot
be ready if you do not have the tools to be able to go out there
and do your mission. One of the greatest tools we have is the 200
energy people that we have behind us that make our job possible.
That is the profound transformation that is occurred over the last
4000 years from the time when we had no other source of energy
beyond human power.
If we are, in fact, going to be ready for a 22nd or a 23rd century, then the first mission set we have is to make sure our service is
prepared for that. What I have focused on in my job is making sure
that the service is prepared for it, and I regret if I did not meet The
Honorable John Warner’s messaging challenge by leaving you with
a mixed signal, because I think it should be profoundly clear at the
end of this symposium that from the energy side, we are doing
these things. There is not a single initiative that Captain Sparks and
the folks involved in Task Force Energy’s Maritime, Aviation, or
Expeditionary Working Groups that made it through the process
that did not somehow improve the combat capability of a unit at
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
423
sea, in the air, or on land for our forces afloat or for the people
that make that happen on the shore side of the house. That is the
eye of the needle that every project had to pass through, so the
national security side of this has truly dominated our view from
start to finish.
We would be foolish to stick our heads in the sand and be an
ostrich about it. Given what we know—and you can debate some
aspects of that—we have an obligation to be mission ready across
the range of conditions that might exist. If the Arctic is going to be
ice-free for part of the year in the not-too-distant future, then we
have to deal with that. I go back to the word I left you with yesterday, “anthropocene.” At some point, the things that we as humans
do has an impact. So, why would we contribute to something that
makes our planet unsustainable for the long haul? It just does not
make sense to me if your art of the long view is looking ahead to
the 22nd or the 23rd century. So, hopefully we are not leaving you
with a mixed message. It is about national security. That is what
you pay us to go do. That is our job. We are keeping our focus
on that job to make sure that our Navy will be ready when it is
needed.
Captain Michael Sparks: While the political aspects of this
problem are currently difficult, I think that you have to be true
to your own intellectual understanding of the challenges we face.
That is the right way to go, and we are just lucky to have some
institutions that are willing to do that. We need to remember, too,
that the big debate about science was whether or not the world
was flat was not that long ago. That argument was settled when a
bunch of sailors showed everyone how the world really is.
have a “what if ”-type question. Suppose some years in the
Q: Ifuture
that a 5000-passenger cruise ship decides to go north
into the Arctic in August. Then, all of a sudden the ship goes dead in the
water. What would be the DoD response to that situation? More specifically, how long would it take for us to get there and help out, and how
long would it take to get that ship out of there?
Rear Admiral David Titley: It is really not that much different
than if a 5000-passenger cruise ship got itself in trouble in the
424
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Southern Indian Ocean, which they do occasionally. In the case of
U.S. waters, the Coast Guard basically runs the search and rescue.
The DoD assists whenever requested and whenever it is possible.
We can easily get into speculation really, really quickly, but let us
take a quick look at Japan. No one knew on 11 March what was
going to happen, but because our U.S. Navy is forward deployed,
we had the Ronald Reagan strike group very close by. We had not
planned for that force to conduct humanitarian assistance/disaster
response (HADR) operations in Japan. I really doubt if the strike
group commander had thought much about doing that mission in
Japan, but that is what they got to do. So, if you had this kind of
major issue, you are going to look at where your forces are. Does
the Coast Guard need help? Is it in the U.S. sector? If it is not,
does the local national coast guard need assistance? That is how
it is going to work. I think your larger point regarding the fact that
more and more people are going into the Arctic is a very good
one. The Economist has a wonderful picture that talked about this
about a year ago. Actually, it was a picture from the Antarctic, but
it showed a tourist dressed up in a full red protection suit, kind of
staring at a penguin, and the penguin is staring back. And, as only
The Economist can do, the caption read, “One of these two species is stupid.”
There have, in fact, been three sinkings of passenger vessels in
polar waters, two in the Antarctic and one in the Arctic. Each of
these cases has been a “there but for the grace of God” moment.
In each instance, there happened to be other cruise ships or civilian ships nearby who could effect a rescue. They were lucky; the
seas were good so the lifeboats all worked, and they only made
the news for one or two cycles. At some point, though, and I hate
to say this, there almost certainly will be a Titanic-sized disaster
because where do the tourist ships want to go? They want to go
and see critters, and they want to see ice, so you are going to go
drive these ships where no normal, sane mariner would go and
hazard the vessel because that is their business model. They are
going to go and do that. While they try to do it as safely as possible, things happen; we have seen that. So, it is a scenario certainly
the Coast Guard plays out. The good thing about the search and
rescue agreement that is going to be signed by Secretary of State
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
425
Hillary Rodham Clinton in May is that it will formalize the processes in the Arctic so that it looks like the rest of the world. Still,
there is no magic elixir that means all of a sudden there are tons of
assets for that. So everybody, when you go on your Arctic cruise,
just sort of think about that scenario and think of how much those
pictures are worth to you.
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: I am glad you talked about the
fact that being present is how you matter in the world. Still, with
the forces that we have, it is hard to be everywhere at once. That
is one of the reasons why the Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower talks an awful lot about partnerships with our
fellow navies. [2] We need those partnerships, and we need to be
interoperable so that we can cover exactly those kinds of things.
When a crisis occurs, the question that is invariably asked is: who
can get there first? Very often what ends up happening, whether it
be for disaster relief in response to a tsunami or a typhoon or the
sinking of a vessel, is that you do not know who is going to show
up for that particular event.
One of the great things about the Navy is that we are multimission. When we get there, we can generally handle the situation
with what we have. We typically do not have to draw out a mission
set and develop a specific task organization to accomplish a given
mission. We oftentimes are faced with those kinds of things, but
that is one of the reasons why we operate routinely with the navies
of other nations. When a crisis happens and the ad hoc forces from
different countries show up, we typically find that we have worked
together before or we have talked about these things, and we are
able to do the right thing and render as much assistance as we can.
While there are probably plenty of Coast Guard folks who
have taken a vessel through an ice field, I am one of the few Navy
officers who have done that. It is pretty uncomfortable listening to
those small icebergs—they are called growlers for a reason—as
they scrape their way down the side of the ship. If you are below
the waterline at the time, you realize that you are only a few inches
away from the ice. So, I find it interesting to think about all these
vessels going up into the Arctic without necessarily having thought
through all those issues as well as they should have ahead of time.
426
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
I would think twice before you take that Arctic venture during the
next couple of years.
would like to start off with a comment from a Navy that has
Q: Igone
long distances into the southern ocean to pick up yachts-
men who go on round-the-world races. Did you add that to your list of
things to think twice about? Luck is not a strategy in that case. We have
been lucky so far. I have a question, though. Over the last couple of days,
I have seen very clearly the nexus between energy, climate, and national
security. That makes a whole lot of sense to me, and that resonates as
something that makes sense with regard to why this is important to all
of us. It also takes away the environmental side, which is very easy to get
excited about or not depending on your side of the fence. I see what the
Navy is doing and the set targets, and that is great. I just wonder, though,
what about the industrial base that supports the Navy? I have heard
nothing about either encouraging energy use in the national industries
that support the DoD, for example, either by using it as an evaluation
criteria in contracts or by using a big-stick approach and mandating
targets in energy and climate change for those industries. Has there been
consideration of that? I know that will be a very political issue, but perhaps the next step in generating change is looking at the industrial base
and at how they might support the effort. They face the same challenges
that the military does in maintaining their ability to construct and support your ships and your systems.
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: Let me address a couple of points
beginning on the industrial base side. In response to a similar question, Mr. Rick Kamin pointed out that the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) buys the fuel for all the services. DLA has been looking at
their contractual timeframes because currently they are restricted
by law to contracts no more than 5 years out. They cannot hedge.
They cannot buy futures. There is no ability to do a lot of things
that American Airlines, United Airlines, or one of the shippers like
UPS or FedEx can do. Some of those companies have been blessed
by some of the decisions that they made in that regard, while others have been burned. This was one of the issues that the Secretary
of the Navy talked about during the Q&A after his testimony last
year. When someone asked what could be done on the Hill that
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
427
would be helpful, he proposed that the Congress look at the length
of contracts for different types of fuels, in particular alternative
fuels. The current 5-year limit does not provide enough incentive
for either the venture capital community or others who will put
money into companies if they see that there is going to be a bona
fide contract out there. Five years is not a long enough period
given the vagaries that they have seen in other parts of the alternative energy world. The Secretary pointed out that stretching some
of those contracts out would help a great deal. I believe that there
are now some bills out there that will stretch the contract period to
10 years. Those are the kind of things that will make a difference.
Of course, that is only one aspect of the problem. There are
many, many others, and then there are more broadly asked questions. I am not the right person to respond to whether we should
have federal policies that mandate targets. That is out of my lane.
But could it help? Yes, absolutely some of those could help. One
of the things we look at with fuels is when the price of biofuels
could reach parity with petroleum-based fuels. On the basis of an
academic study that was done just this last year, we know that we
could use incentives to move that point forward by several years.
Ms. Sherri Goodman: Many parts of the industrial base, the
supply chain to include both defense contractors and other contractors to the federal government, are already responding, particularly those operating in states like California that already have
a price on carbon or have other incentives or other requirements.
While they are not necessarily required to meet those requirements in the way they sell to the federal government, many of
those firms do not want to work to several sets of standards. That is
why you see a lot of the innovation coming out of California right
now because they are already incentivized to innovate toward
newer and different standards.
Many of the defense contractors that have a substantial business in selling energy or environmental climate-related services to
the government do so either because they know the market is here
today or because they anticipate the market will be there in the
future. Today, for example, President Obama announced that he
is taking administrative action to direct the federal government to
428
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
ensure that by 2015, all new vehicles purchased will be alternativefuel vehicles, including hybrids and electrical vehicles.
I used to have to implement and track the earlier version of that
standard back in the 1990s when we had certain targets to meet
for flex fuel and hybrid vehicles in the federal fleet. Each year, the
services would come up and give me their briefing, and every year
they would be a little bit short on the target. They would say: “I
am supposed to have 25% but really I only got 20% because I just
did not have the funds. I had other more urgent requirements. I
had to fund my Clean Water Act violations and my Clean Air Act
violations.” They got away with that because there was no penalty for noncompliance. It is not always as easy to live to up the
standards we set. That is one of the issues we have to face here. A
federal statute has more power than an executive order target, but
an executive order target can make some difference. It can lead
the way.
Both the House and Senate are now considering important
energy-related bills. Senator Dick Lugar’s bill focuses on our nation’s
overall energy security. I know that he is aware of the issue regarding the length of contracting in the federal government for energy
services, as are Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and others on
the House side. Another important issue is how you score various
things. There is a parallel here with the DoD’s efforts in the 1990s
to improve family housing at military bases. That effort produced
much-higher-quality housing by privatizing the way in which housing was built at military bases. Making that change required that
there be a fundamental shift in the way housing gets contracted, to
a way that had not been permitted previously. There are parallels
on the energy side that will ripple through the industrial base and
the supply chain in very important ways.
Dr. Catherine Kelleher: The other thing from the public policy
side, though, is that it has been convenient to use the Defense budget as a kind of wide-open laboratory to fund pet projects. I think
in many cases one can find programs or enthusiasms, particularly
on the energy side, that have not proven themselves. I am thinking,
for example, about ethanol. You had an enormous rush to show
that ethanol could be used, should be used, and must be used,
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
429
depending on specific uses; we need to bear in mind that we are
going to have fewer resources and less latitude, so this enthusiasm
for using the Defense budget as a laboratory to try things for the
nation has to proceed more cautiously than it has in the past.
Ms. Sherri Goodman: The move against earmarks will help
tamp down some of the special interest items but allow the military’s needs for operational requirements and readiness and preparing for the future to be the driving forces.
really like the focus on science to answer these questions, and
Q: Ithere
is one thing I am a little confused about. You often hear
that because the planet is warming, there will be bigger and more frequent storms. Yesterday, however, Rear Admiral Titley put up a chart
that showed that over time, the data does not really prove that. But then,
the Vice Chief brought it up, and Dr. Kelleher brought up Japan, so I am
confused as to how global warming might be related to earthquakes. So
if you could just clear that up from a scientific standpoint, this nonscientist would be happier.
Rear Admiral David Titley: I think it is pretty easy to say that
there is no proven link between earthquakes and global warming. I thought I might regret pulling up that slide on what is called
“accumulated cyclone energy.” It applies only to hurricanes and
typhoons. It does not account for midlatitude snowstorms and rainstorms. If you look at the distribution of rainfall events in the United
States, where we have good and consistent records over a century
or more, you can pretty clearly see that the tails are getting fatter.
The distribution of storm intensities is changing, especially in the
Northeast and the Midwest. When it rains there, it is tending to
rain harder, and when it does not rain, the droughts are tending to
be worse.
A lot of people talk about this as, “Oh, well that must mean hurricanes,” because everybody says, “Ah, Katrina, climate change.”
My point is that you have to be careful. Everybody thinks I am
some green wacko, but I tell the environmentalists that there is an
onus on them to be as careful with the data as we would expect
everyone else to be. I see people on all sides of this play very
fast and loose with facts that support their beliefs. Unfortunately, it
430
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
seems to come down to beliefs, and there are those on both sides
who choose not to be guided by the facts.
My personal thought on this is that some of the things that we
think are going to be a big deal in climate change like hurricanes
may turn out not to be. On the other hand, I will bet my bottom dollar that there will be things that we are not really thinking
of, maybe subtle variations in temperature during rainfall, that will
have a big effect on ecosystems. How do we monitor what is going
on so that we can start seeing relatively early warning signs (here
is something that was not on our scope, but it is a fast mover and
it will be here soon)? Alternately, we may discover that something
we thought was really important is a dog that is just not going to
bark. We do not need to worry about this anymore. That is important, too, because as several people have mentioned, we do not
have unlimited resources. We are going to have to be very careful
on what we adapt to and mitigate against because otherwise we
will run out of money.
have two facts and a question. In looking around the auditoQ: Irium,
I have noticed that I am in the minority—I am a young
person. That is my first fact. My second is that a much smaller percentage of my generation has served in the armed forces than was the case
in my parents’ generation. I, for example, have not. So, I do not think I
would be the first person who would comment that within my generation, there is less of an understanding of the true price that we pay for the
consumption of fossil fuels. With that in mind, I want to ask: what more
can and perhaps should the Navy and the DoD do to shape the way that
the American public thinks and acts with respect to our consumption of
fossil fuels?
Ms. Sherri Goodman: I think we have the ideal panel to
answer that question. In addition to their military qualifications
and their science or engineering backgrounds, each has proven to
be a great communicator. We need more people who can speak,
as I say, so that my mother can understand it. That is partly what
CNA’s Military Advisory Board on energy, national security, and
climate change has been doing for almost 5 years now. Have we
penetrated every corner of the country? Absolutely not, and it is
Chapter 12 Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges
431
going to take a whole generation of young veterans coming back
from Iraq and Afghanistan who can bear witness, from their own
experiences, to putting their lives on the line to convoy fuel to the
front and to the other hazards and risks that our American soldiers,
sailor, airmen, and Marines face. Their testimony tells this important story in ways that nearly all Americans can appreciate.
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom: I would add that you are likely to
see some of that happen naturally as many of those veterans come
back. I think a number of them are probably going to run for political office; and a number of those will probably end up on Capitol
Hill.
They will bring a very strong voice to this—a very strong testament similar undoubtedly to what I heard from two Marines
in India 3/5. As Colonel Robert Charette, Jr., reported yesterday,
India 3/5 was experimenting with some of the new alternative
energy things that the Marines identified using their Expeditionary
Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) concept. Although these two
Marines were at Walter Reed recovering from injuries, they are living, breathing examples of how important energy considerations
are to our deployed forces.
Sometimes I feel like we are out on the stump all the time talking about these issues. Every day, I search for new ways and new
venues to get the word out on how important it really is and to
bring it back to what really matters—those young soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and Marines who have to bear the price. The Navy leadership has a responsibility to make sure that we hazard as few of
those sailors as humanly possible and that we give them the tools
and the capability that values energy just like any other weapon
system out there.
It is something that we understood 60 years ago during World
War II. One of the posters that was pretty prominently displayed
featured Admiral Ernie King, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) at
the time, standing under the motto “oil is ammunition.” Another
showed General Dwight D. Eisenhower with the same motto. So,
this is not a foreign topic. The CNO has spoken to it a number of
times. We have got to be able to make sure that we really live and
432
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
breathe it every single day in every place that we can. Some of the
culture change that Captain Sparks talked about is internal, but it
also has to be external if it is going to affect the national consciousness for this. It needs to because without it, you just keep doing the
same old thing and the balance of payments keeps going out. All of
the things that those prophet-of-doom experts were talking about
in that video eventually come together at one point or another.
So, the more we can do to save energy, and the more energy we
are able to make ourselves, the better off we will be. As President
Obama mentioned earlier today, this country consumes 25% of
the world’s energy, yet our reserves amount to only 2% of the
worldwide total. That is not a good equation. We have got to figure out how we can change the dynamics of that. There are a lot of
different ways to do that, and we need to explore them all. I think
the country is waking up to that task, and it is not just because oil
is above $100 a barrel.
REFERENCES
1. Amory Lovins, Michael Bendewald, Michael Kinsley, Lionel
Bony, Hutch Hutchinson, Alok Pradhan, Imran Sheikh, and Zoe
Acher, Factor Ten Engineering Design Principles, 2010, http://
www.rmi.org/rmi/Library/2010-10_10xEPrinciples.
2. Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century  Seapower,  2007,  http://www.navy.mil/maritime/
Maritimestrategy.pdf.
Appendix A
S ym p o s i um
A g e n da
435
Symposium Agenda
Day 1
(29 March 2011)
8:00–8:15 Opening Remarks
Dr. L. Dean Simmons, JHU/APL
8:15–9:15 Keynote Address
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Vice Chief of Naval Operations
9:15–10:30 Roundtable: Adapting Strategy, Plans, and Operations to Climate Challenges
Dr. Ed McGrady, CNA (Moderator)
Rear Admiral Thomas Atkin, U.S. Coast Guard
Ms. Amanda Dory, DASD for Strategy
Rear Admiral David Woods, Director, Strategy and Policy Division (N51)
10:45–12:00 Roundtable: Adapting Air Operations to Energy Challenges
Captain Randall Lynch, Navy Federal Executive Fellow, JHU/APL
(Moderator)
Commander Scott Fuller, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N882)
Mr. Rick Kamin, Naval Air Systems Command
Commander Daniel Orchard-Hays, Commander, Naval Air Forces
Atlantic (N403)
Mr. William Voorhees, Naval Air Systems Command
1:00–2:00 Navy Task Force Energy—An Update
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom, Director, Energy and Environmental
Readiness Division
2:00–3:15 Roundtable: Adapting Ship Operations to Energy Challenges
Mr. John Benedict, JHU/APL (Moderator)
Rear Admiral Joe Carnevale, U.S. Navy (Retired), Shipbuilders Council of
America
Mr. Howard Fireman, Deputy Director, Programming Division (N80)
Dr. John Pazik, Office of Naval Research
Mr. Glen Sturtevant, Director for Science and Technology, Program
Executive Office Ships
3:30–4:45 Roundtable: Adapting Maritime Infrastructure to Climate Challenges
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo, CNA (Moderator)
Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired), University of
Maryland
The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
The Honorable John Warner, Former Senator from Virginia
4:45–6:00 Symposium Social
7:00–8:00 After Dinner Presentation
Mr. Duncan Brown, National Security Studies Fellow, JHU/APL
436
Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011
Day 2
(30 March 2011)
8:00–8:15 Opening Remarks
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo, CNA
8:15–9:30 Roundtable: Adapting Basing and Facilities Ashore to Energy Challenges
Rear Admiral David Boone, Director, Shore Readiness Division (N46)
(Moderator)
Captain Ramé (Hugh) Hemstreet, Commander, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Washington
Mr. Jeffrey Johnson, Chief Information Officer for Naval District
Washington
Dr. William Waugaman, National Laboratories Liaison, NORAD and
USNORTHCOM
9:45–11:00 Roundtable: Adapting Expeditionary Capabilities to Energy Challenges
Colonel Edward (Ted) Smyth, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), JHU/APL
(Moderator)
Colonel Robert Charette, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Director Expeditionary
Energy
Colonel David Karcher, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), Marine Corps
Systems Command
Mr. Cody Reese, NAVFAC Engineering Service Center
11:00–12:00 Navy Task Force Climate Change—An Update
Rear Admiral David Titley, Director, Task Force Climate Change
1:00–2:15 Roundtable: Adapting Research Priorities to Climate Challenges
Captain Timothy Gallaudet, Deputy Director, Task Force Climate Change
(Moderator)
Dr. Frank Herr, Director, Ocean Battlespace Sensing Department, Office
of Naval Research
Dr. Chet Koblinsky, Director, Climate Office, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
Dr. Jeffrey Marqusee, Executive Director, Strategic Environmental
Research and Development Program
Dr. Graeme Stephens, Director, Center for Climate Sciences, NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory
2:30–4:00 Culminating Panel: Adapting to Climate and Energy Challenges—A Maritime
Force Perspective
Ms. Sherri Goodman, CNA (Moderator)
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom, Director, Task Force Energy
Dr. Catherine Kelleher, University of Maryland
Captain Michael Sparks, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Surface
Warfare Directorate
Rear Admiral David Titley, Director, Task Force Climate Change
4:00–4:15 Closing Remarks
Dr. Ronald Filadelfo, CNA
Dr. L. Dean Simmons, JHU/APL
onsf
orU.
S.
Mar
i
t
i
meFor
c
es
CLI
MATE&ENERGY Opti
2011
ADAPT
I
NGT
O
CLIMATE
ENERGY
CHAL
L
E
NGE
S
OPTI
ONS FOR
U.
S.MARI
TI
ME
FORCES
AI
ROPERATI
ONS
SHI
POPE
RAT
I
ONS
I
NFRASTRUCTURE
EXPEDI
TI
ONARYCAPABI
LI
TI
ES
Si
mmons
,
L.
D.
SPONSORED BY:
2011
NAVYENERGY
L.DEAN SI
MMONS,EXECUTI
VEEDI
TOR